G.R. No.

72005 May 29, 1987

PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; SYCWIN COATING & WIRES, INC., and
DOMINADOR CACPAL, CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J .:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Resolution dated September 12, 1985 of the
Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CR-05409 1 granting private respondent's motion for execution pending
appeal and ordering the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution on the counterbond to lift attachment filed by petitioner. The focal
issue that emerges is whether an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the said bond. In the Resolution of
September 25, 1985
2
this Court as prayed for, without necessarily giving due course to the petition, issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint of.
The records disclose that private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for
collection of a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of
the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond.
3
The latter in
turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400, 000.00
4
thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co.,
Inc., so the attached properties were released.
On December 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, and
judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Varian
Industrial Corporation, and the latter is hereby ordered:
1. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation with 12%
interest per annum from the date of default until fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff 5% of the principal obligation as liquidated damages;
3. To pay plaintiff P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay plaintiff 15% of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation, as and for
attorney's fees; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
Accordingly, the counterclaim of the defendant is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
5

Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a
petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian in respondent Court. Varian
was required to file its comment but none was filed. In the Resolution of July 5, 1985, respondent
Court ordered the execution pending appeal as prayed for.
6
However, the writ of execution was
returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand.
In a Petition dated August 13, 1985 filed with respondent Court Sycwin prayed that the surety (herein
petitioner) be ordered to pay the value of its bond.
7
In compliance with the Resolution of August 23, 1985
of the respondent Court herein petitioner filed its comment.
8
In the Resolution of September 12,
1985,
9
the respondent Court granted the petition. Hence this action.
It is the submission of private respondent Sycwin that without a previous motion for reconsideration
of the questioned resolution, certiorari would not lie. While as a general rule a motion for
reconsideration has been considered a condition sine qua non for the granting of a writ of certiorari,
this rule does not apply when special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. 10 It has
been held further that a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like this where execution had been ordered and the need
for relief was extremely urgent. 11
The counterbond provides:
WHEREAS, in the above-entitled case pending in the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch LXXXV, Quezon City, an order of Attachment was
issued against abovenamed Defendant;
WHEREAS, the Defendant, for the purpose of lifting and/or dissolving the order of
attachment issued against them in the above-en-titled case, have offered to file a
counterbond in the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
ONLY (P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, as provided for in Section 5, Rule 57 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, we, VARIAN INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, as Principal and
the PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a corporation duly
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, as Surety,
in consideration of the above and of the lifting or dissolution of the order of
attachment, hereby jointly and severally, bind ourselves in favor of the above Plaintiff
in the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY
(P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, under the condition that in case the Plaintiff
recovers judgment in the action, and Defendant will, on demand, re-deliver the
attached property so released to the Officer of the Court and the same shall be
applied to the payment of the judgment, or in default thereof, the defendant and
Surety will, on demand, pay to the Plaintiff the full value of the property released.
EXECUTED at Manila, Philippines, this 28th day of June, 1984. 12
Sections 5, 12, and 17 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court also provide:
SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property. The officer executing the order shall without
delay attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, all the properties of the
party against whom the order is issued in the province, not exempt from execution, or
so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless the
former makes a deposit with the clerk or judge of the court from which the order
issued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount sufficient to
satisfy such demand besides costs, or in an amount equal to the value of the
property which is about to be attached, to secure payment to the applicant of any
judgement ment which he may recover in the action. The officer shall also forthwith
serve a copy of the applicant's affidavit and bond, and of the order of attachment, on
the adverse party, if he be found within the province.
SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. At any time after an
order of attachment has been granted, the party whose property has been attached,
or the person appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant,
apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the
action is pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on the
security given. The judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if
a cash deposit is made, or a counter-bond executed to the attaching creditor is filed,
on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where the
application is made, in an amount equal to the value of the property attached as
determined by the judge, to secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching
creditor may recover in the action. Upon the filing of such counter-bond, copy thereof
shall forthwith be served on the attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon the discharge
of an attachment in accordance with the provisions of this section the property
attached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party making
the deposit or giving the counterbond aforesaid standing in place of the property so
released. Should such counterbond for any reason be found to be, or become,
insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an additional counterbond,
the attaching creditor may apply for a new order of attachment.
SEC. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. If the
execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on any
counter-bond given pursuant to the provisions of this rule to secure the payment of
the judgment shall become charged on such counter- bond, and bound to pay to the
judgement creditor upon demand, the amount due under the judgment, which
amount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and summary
hearing in the same action. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is provided that the counterbond is intended
to secure the payment of "any judgment" that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. Under
Section 17 of same rule it provides that when "the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in
part" it is only then that "payment of thejudgment shall become charged on such counterbond."
The counterbond was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court as provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is deemed reproduced as part of the
counterbond. In the third paragraph it is also stipulated that the counterbond is to be "applied for the
payment of the judgment." Neither the rules nor the provisions of the counterbond limited its
application to a final and executory judgment. Indeed, it is specified that it applies to the payment
of any judgment that maybe recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only logical conclusion is that an
execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied maybe charged
against such a counterbond.
It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi
lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. 13 "The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that
general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. 14 The rule requires that a
general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the
operation of the law. 15 In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated.16 For courts are
not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but
as they find it and without regard to consequences. 17
A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception, courts may
not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify
it.18 Thus where a statute grants a person against whom possession of "any land" is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for
unlawful detainer, this Court held that the phrase "any land" includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural, residential, or mineral.19 Since
the law in this case does not make any distinction nor intended to make any exception, when it speaks of "any judgment" which maybe
charged against the counterbond, it should be interpreted to refer not only to a final and executory judgment in the case but also a judgment
pending appeal.
All that is required is that the conditions provided for by law are complied with, as outlined in the
case of Towers Assurance Corporation v. Ororama Supermart,
20

Under Section 17, in order that the judgment creditor might recover from the surety
on the counterbond, it is necessary (1) that the execution be first issued against the
principal debtor and that such execution was returned unsatisfied in whole or in part;
(2) that the creditor make a demand upon the surety for the satisfaction of the
judgment, and (3) that the surety be given notice and a summary hearing on the
same action as to his liability for the judgment under his counterbond.
The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any
judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgement but also the
execution of a judgment pending appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining order issued
on September 25, 1985 is hereby dissolved with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995
JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

QUIASON, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Resolution
dated April 28, 1994 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in UND No. 94-040.
I
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.
On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively,
the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to
file his statement of contributions and expenditures.
In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration
of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 (Rollo, p. 14).
Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a
Resolution dated April 28, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 10-13).
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
We dismiss the petition.
II
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local
Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes"
provides as follows:
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement.
Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after
the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full,
true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with
the election.
No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he
has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning
candidate fails to file the statement required herein within the period prescribed by
this Act.
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or
reports in connection with electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein
shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to
pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure;
otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission
against the properties of the offender.
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in writing, by
personal delivery or registered mail, within five (5) days from the date of election all
candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their obligation to file their
statements of contributions and expenditures.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section, the
administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty
Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the
offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office (Emphasis
supplied).
To implement the provisions of law relative to election contributions and expenditures, the
COMELEC promulgated on January 13, 1992 Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations
Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local
Elections on
May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution are:
Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to candidates to
file statements. Within five (5) days from the day of the election, the Law Department
of the Commission, the regional election director of the National Capital Region, the
provincial election supervisors and the election registrars shall advise in writing by
personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed their certificates of
candidacy with them to comply with their obligation to file their statements of
contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections. Every election
registrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with
said obligation (Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any public office
shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of
contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning
candidates fails to file the statement required within the period prescribed by law.
(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file statements or reports
in connection with the electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein
shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to
pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure;
otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission
against the properties of the offender.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the
administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty Thousand
Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall
be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy
three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have
entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost" (Rollo, p. 39).
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures.
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]; cf Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741
[1981]). No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated (Lo Cham v.
Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]).
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate
pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer
not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall (The Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation
or interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and
expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their
certificates of candidacy."
Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word
"shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced ,
particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply
the general rule (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 [1988]; Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, 91 Phil. 608 [1952]).
The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of
the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating
contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same.
Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the
elections (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 94; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus, laws and regulations prescribe
what contributions are prohibited (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 95, Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 4), or unlawful
(B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 96), and what expenditures are authorized (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No.
7166, Sec. 13; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 8).
Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt and illegal practices acts" of several
states in the United States, as well as in federal statutes, expenditures of candidates are regulated
by requiring the filing of statements of expenses and by limiting the amount of money that may be
spent by a candidate. Some statutes also regulate the solicitation of campaign contributions (26 Am
Jur 2d, Elections 287). These laws are designed to compel publicity with respect to matters
contained in the statements and to prevent, by such publicity, the improper use of moneys devoted
by candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections 289). These statutes
also enable voters to evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of candidates by the contributors,
and to furnish evidence of corrupt practices for annulment of elections (Sparkman v. Saylor [Court of
Appeals of Kentucky], 180 Ky. 263, 202 S.W. 649 [1918]).
State courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing (State
ex rel. Butchofsky v. Crawford [Court of Civil Appeals of Texas], 269 S.W. 2d 536 [1954]; Best v.
Sidebottom, 270 Ky. 423,109 S.W. 2d 826 [1937]; Sparkman v. Saylor, supra.)
It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and
incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by
the law is not all too remote.
It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may
not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from
filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of
Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no
contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such
fact."
Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of
candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may
have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the
administrative fine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza and
Francisco, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., is on leave.



Separate Opinions

MELO, J ., dissenting:
The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate, including one who has withdrawn his
certificate of candidacy, is obliged to file his statement of contributions and expenditures in line with
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 vis-a-vis the pertinent portions of Comelec Resolution No.
2348. I must concede that the use of the word "shall" in the main statute as well as the implementing
rules generally suggest mandatoriness as to cover all candidates.
But is an anspirant for public office who had a sudden change of heart, so to speak, still considered
a candidate to begin with? I am of the impression that he is not and is thus not bound to render an
accounting subsequent to election for the simple reason that the term 'candidate' is used to
designate a person who actually submits himself and is voted for at our election (Santos vs.
Miranda, 35 Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs. Hirsch, 125 Ind., 207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno,
Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 2nd ed., p. 84) Certainly, one who withdraws his certificate of
candidacy 3 days after the filing thereof, can not be voted for at an election. And considering the
shortness of the period of 3 days from the filing to the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy,
petitioner cannot be accused, as indeed there is no such charge, of utilizing his aborted candidacy
for purposes to raise funds or to extort money from other candidates in exchange for the withdrawal.
I, therefore, vote to grant the petition.
Padilla, J., concurs.