DRURY'S DRAMATIC DIATRIBE AGAINST

CHRISTIANITY IN POLITICS
By Michael Wagner
Since conservative Christians in North America
have become more serious about political activism
beginning in the mid-1970s or so, a plethora of books
has been written about the supposed threat posed by
the Christian Right. And with many Christians still
politically active, it's no surprise that books continue to
appear warning of the peril that such Christians pose
to government and society. They tend to be books
"exposing" the allegedly sinister political activities
of groups such as Moral Majority or the Christian
Coalition. Recently, however, a more sophisticated
attack on conservative Christian politics has appeared,
Terror and Civilization: Christianity, Politics, and the
Western Psyche (N ew York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)
by Shadia Drury. This book is more philosophical than
the mn-of-the-mill variety. It attempts to deal with more
foundational issues than whether certain Republican
politicians have ties to "fundamentalist" organizations.
Shadia Drmy is a professor of political science at the
University of Regina in Canada. Now, the University
of Regina is not commonly recognized as a particularly
prestigious university, even in Canada. So it may appear
at first that Drmy's work is obscure and easily dismissed.
But this is not so. Drmy, in fact, has a substantial
international reputation, largely due to her books
attacldng the influential conservative political theorist
Leo Strauss, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss (St.
Martin's Press, 1988), and Leo Strauss and the American
Right (St. Martin's Press, 1999). In conservative
academic circles in the United States, Dmry is
recognized as a noteworthy opponent. Her stature alone
makes her recent book more worthy of critical attention.
A thorough and detailed critique of the entire book
would be a massive undertaldng. Thus it makes more
sense to focus on the specific points she makes against
Christianity in politics.
First of all, and this is typical ofleft-wing critiques of
Christian politics, Dnlly is not opposed to all Christian
political activity, just conservative Christian political
activity. Those who were involved in the Social Gospel
movement, such as Walter Rauschenbusch, and the
33 the COUNSEL of CHALCEDON
Civil Rights Movement, notably Martin Luther King,
are okay in her view. These left-wing activists are
"Christian democrats" and "Christians with a social
conscience." However, according to Drmy, 'The
most vocal Christians of our time are members of the
Religious Right. Far from underplaying the harshest
features of Christianity, the "Religious Right" highlights
them. It is not equality before God that inspires their
political principles; it is not the message oflove and
forgiveness that guides their policies. On the contrary,
it is the harsh, vengeful, mthless, and merciless features
of the faith that attract them" (p. 73). So in Drmy's
world there's the good-guy Christians and the bad-guy
Christians. The former are all on the Left, and the latter
are all on the Right. And, of course, it is only the latter
she opposes. It is not Christianity per se that is bad, just
the conservative variety. Although she doesn't make this
qualification so explicit throughout the book, it is safe for
the reader to keep it in mind.
Drury is most particular about her reasons for
opposing Christian politics in a section appropriately
titled "Against Christianity in Politics" on pages 69-
74. Among these reasons are that "Christianity has
a profoundly singular conception of the good that
encourages a militant and cmsading spirit, while
discouraging tolerance, plurality, and diversity" (pp.
69-70). As an example of this she points to a Vatican
directive admonishing Roman Catholic politicians to
oppose abortion, same-sex marriage and euthanasia.
She then states that "If Catholic politicians have a loyalty
to the Vatican which supersedes their loyalty to the
constitutions and values of their own countries, then
they cannot be tmsted with public office in democratic
societies" (p. 70)' Now, I'm not one to defend the
Vatican, but look at the principle at work here: in
order to protect "tolerance, plurality, and diversity,"
conscientious Catholic politicians "cannot be tmsted
with public office." So Drmy's "tolerance" does not
extend to conservative Catholic politicians, and by
extension, conservative Catholic political activists. Nor
is her "plurality and diversity" wide enough to include
conservative Catholic political views. And make no
mistake; this would not just apply to Catholics, but to all
conselvative Christians.
It is quite clear that there are severe limitations
to Drmy's "tolerance, plurality, and diversity." In
this respect her secular liberal perspective is just as
"intolerant" as Christianity. The difference between the
two perspectives lies primarily in what is tolerated and
not tolerated. Christianity is certainly intolerant towards
abortion and same-sex marriage, and secular liberalism
is intolerant of conselvative Christian views. But DrUlY
is not conscious of this contradiction and she continues
to sing the praise of what she calls "tolerance." In her
view, it is one of the two most important political virtues.
"The supreme political virtues are moderation and a
certain degree of tolerance," not "tolerance of tyranny
and gross injustice" but tolerance of the plurality of the
good, tolerance of a plurality of beliefs about ultimate
reality, tolerance of the many roads to righteousness, and
tolerance of private vice (p. 70). Wait a minute. DnllY
has now told us we should not tolerate "tyranny" and
"gross injustice." What do "tyranny" and "gross injustice"
consistof? How do we know when we see them? Well,
the answer to those questions depends upon your
worldview. In Dmry's view, Geneva in the time of
Calvin and England under the mle of the Puritans were
"theocratic tyrannies" (p. 191). Reformed Christians
would disagree. Christians certainly see abortion as a
gross injustice, whereas it seems Dmry does not. This
problem of definition points to the inherently religious
nature of these political issues. While DrUlY thinks she
is advocating a neutral position against Christianity, she
is actually defending a particular religious perspective or
worldview.
This becomes even more apparent a little further
on. After noting .Jesus' "intransigence" and His
"intolerance of competing views," DrUlY says that certain
characteristics are necessary for tolerance: "tolerance
and diversity presuppose a certain skepticism regarding
the human ability to grasp the nanlre of ultimate reality,
coupled with recognition that there is a plurality of
competing goods" (p. 70). Biblical Christianity is unable
to indulge in this sort of skepticism and thus it once
again fails Dnny"s standards for tolerance. But this
"skepticism" is itself part of a particular religious view.
For Dmly to call for "a certain skepticism regarding the
human ability to grasp the nature of ultimate reality"
is to advocate a religious perspective. She herself is
promoting a view about the degree to which humans
can understand "ultimate reality." I submit that this
represents a particular religious view or worldview.
More clearly yet, she offers an explicit alternative
to Christianity as the basis oflaw and politics that she
calls "natural justice." As she puts it, "natural justice, not
Christian love, must be the guide to law and politics" (p.
71). However, she does not state what natural justice is
or how we can determine what is "nann'al justice" and
how do we determine which political positions accord
with it? Does natural justice favor same-sex marriage,
for example? Drmy seems to support same-sex marriage.
Presumably, then, natural justice would also be open
to, if not outright favorable to, same-sex marriage. If so,
then through millennia of human histOlY no one noticed
this aspect of "natural justice" until the homose:A.'Ual rights
movement became powerful in Western countries. That
being the case, "natural justice" is a velY elusive concept
indeed. It easily becomes a convenient term under which
to advance the entire agenda of the social Left. In other
words, it does not provide an objective basis for politics.
It can be filled with whatever meaning is fashionable at
the moment.
In her discussion of natural justice, Dnny states that
"Politics is primarily about resisting evil" (p. 71). But
how do we know what "evil" is so that we can resist it?
At the risk of sounding like a broken record, this again
demonstrates the religious nature of DmlY"s entire case.
The question of the definition of evil is a fundamentally
religious question. Christians believe that abortion
is one of the worst evils in the world today, and that
accounts for the great lengths to which many courageous
Christians have gone to resist it. But Drmy would not
share this view of abortion as a great evil. She just does
not seem to be conscious of the inescapably religious
basis of politics. Yet she makes such statements as
this: "The distinction between good and evil, justice
and injustice is fundamental to politics" (p. 148). How
can those distinctions be made without reference to a
religion or worldview? They cannot.
In the concluding chapter of her book Drmy
advocates what she calls the "liberal state." It is this
kind of government that most closely resembles the
ideal she supports. 'The liberal state is intended to be
a minimalist state. It insists on its neutrality vis-a-vis
the good. It makes a valiant effort to be neutral with
regard to the plurality of "goods" vying for its attention
and protection" (p. 145). She also refers to the "cool
neutrality of the liberal state" as "the tme legacy of the
Enlightenment" (p. 144). But while she seems to argue
that the liberal state is neutral, she also says that "the
liberal aspiration to a totally neutral public space is
both impossible and disingenuous. It is impossible
the COUNSEL of CHALCEDON 34
Diatribe Agairut Chrutiallity ill PoLiticJ
because no society can resist the allure of ideals, and
disingenuous because liberal society espouses particular
ideals" (p. 143). Nevertheless, she still seems to advocate
the "neutral" liberal state as the ideal.
Such neutrality, however, is impossible. Every state
enforces a certain law code. That law code defines
which activities are prohibited and which are permitted.
The distinction betvveen what is prohibited and what
is permitted is a reflection of the state's worldview, or
if you will, religion. To say that a certain behavior is
bad and must be forbidden requires a "value judgment."
That is, the behavior must be judged according to some
standard, a standard of right and wrong, a conception
of morality. That morality itself reflects a view about
the naUlre of ultimate reality. And that view about the
naUlre of ultimate reality can best be termed a worldview
or religion.
Among the Reformed segment of Christianity,
R.J. Rushdoony has been a key figure articulating the
impossibility of neutrality in politics and government.
He states this vety clearly in his book The Foundations
of Social Order (Thoburn Press, 1978). As Rushdoony
puts it, "evety law order rests on and is the legal
codification of a system of morality, and evety morality
presupposes a religion, some form of'ultimate concern'"
(p. 220). N aUlrally, the state is a central feature of
this system. 'The state is the social organization of
the creed, the legal strucUlring of the moral system
of a society. The state cannot be amoral, because its
evety law is the codification of its basic morality. The
state cannot be religiously neutral, because it is the
religious organization of society in terms oflaw" (p. 220).
Neutrality in the political sphere is impossible. The
state is never neutral. It always enforces a particular
conception of right and wrong.
With this in mind it is clear that DnllY, in arguing
for a "neutral" liberal state, is aCUlally arguing for what
amounts to the establishment of her own preferred
religion as the basis of society. Granted, she does not
see it this way and is likely unconscious of the religious
nature of her position. In arguing against Christianity
in politics she is arguing for a different religion to be
the basis of politics. This explains why her conception
of "tolerance" does not include tolerating conservative
Christianity. Her religion (secular liberalism) and
Christianity are competing religions, and secular
liberalism must exclude its rival.
3 5 the COUNSEL of CHALCEDON
Christianity is not the sinister force that Drury alleges
itto be. Invas because of Christianity that the West
attained the greatest degree ofliberty and prosperity that
the world has known. Without any historical evidence
whatsoever, Dnuy denies this, stating that "the triumph
offreedom and egalitarianism in the West was won in
spite of Christianity and not because of it" (p. 69). And
she misconstrues the goal of the Christian Right as
being an "effort to re-empower the Churches," that is, to
bestow the churches with political power (p. 69). The
goal, in fact, has never been to grant churches political
power, but to have the state enact policies following
the guidelines of biblical morality. All states enforce a
conception of morality, so it should not be considered
strange that conservative Christians advocate biblical
morality. Again, the choice is not between biblical
morality and "neutrality," it is between biblical morality
and some other religion's conception of morality.
In attacking the role of Christianity in politics
Shadia Dnuy bit off more than she could chew. Not
being self-conscious of the inescapably religious nature
of government and politics, she advocates a "neutral"
liberal state. But the remaining positive aspects of the
Western world are the fruits of its Christian history
and original Christian foundation. As the Western
countries continue to turn away from their Christian
foundation and replace it with liberal secularism, they
also lose the philosophical justification for a limited state
that Christianity historically provided. Far from being
a sinister threat to society as Dnlly believes, biblical
Christianity is the only hope for genuine liberty. As
Rushdoony puts it, ''VVestern liberty began when the
claim of the state to be man"s savior was denied" (p. 82).
Only Christianity can convincingly maintain this denial,
and thus only Christianity can provide the foundation for
genuine liberty
Michael "Vagner is Executive Director for Northwestern
Research Consultants, Edmonton, AB, Canada, and is
a regular contributor to Reformed Perspective, ViTWW.
reformedperspective.ca.