Civ Reviewer Civil Personality Onwars

CIVIL 1 REVIEWER CASES
1

CONTINENTAL STEEL VS MONTANO
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation
(Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro
Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and
Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave
and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
x x x x
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave
with pay to any employee in case of death of the employees legitimate dependent (parents,
spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
x x x x
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
x x x x
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe Company shall grant death and
accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:
x x x x
4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of
death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the
employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with
proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).
4

The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife, Marife V.
Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy.
5
According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female
fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.
6

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his
claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident
insurance.
7


2

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos claims for
bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery
provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle
their dispute,
8
prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).
9
In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October
2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of
whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to
Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.
10
The parties mutually chose Atty. Montao, an
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.
11

When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the
parties proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers,
12
Replies,
13
and
Rejoinders
14
to Atty. Montao.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death
benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article
XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first
been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death
could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of
MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister
companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death
benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of
Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to
the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary
contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel.
15
Dugans child was only 24
weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillanos child who was already
37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the
same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer
Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees unions were the same as the
representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in
labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent
living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not
contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that
there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status
as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel,
relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42
16
of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil
personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical

3

personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a
fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term
dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus
that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any
support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous.
Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted
definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the
Union to have unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA the
death of whom would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other
death benefits bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister
companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and
incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies.
Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other
death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted "company
practice."
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator,
issued a Resolution
17
ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and
death benefits.
Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by
the covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3)
indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be of
employees "dependent"; and (3) such dependent must be "legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as
provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties CBA, four (4)
indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of
employees "dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal
document to be presented.
18

Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an employees legitimate
dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very
moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could
not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else,
specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she
died during the labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife
were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:

4

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein
petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand
Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and
the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death
benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari,
19
under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillanos claims for
bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an employees
dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was
excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the
death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical
personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that
the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status
of a child could only be determined upon said childs birth, otherwise, no such appellation
can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to bereavement
leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaos
Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as
follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on the legal sense in which the term
"death" is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for
ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits
thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the
acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon
delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be
contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event
causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a
legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to
the term "death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and
death benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental Steels] theory, there can be no
experience of "death" to speak of. The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead
fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than "loss of human life", especially for
the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to
assuage the employee and the latters immediate family, extend to them solace and
support, rather than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child.

5

[Continental Steels] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes
only sadly misses this crucial point.
20

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator
Atty. Allan S. Montao is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].
21

In a Resolution
22
dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration
23
of Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one
with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2
of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child,
brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the
employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3)
of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent,
spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee;
and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death
certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the
provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying
Hortillanos claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly
proper interpretation of the terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the
provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to
the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted
that neither management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for
bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil
Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the
very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:

6

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent
in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to
do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical
capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us
whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her
death that were passed on to or assumed by the childs parents. The rights to bereavement
leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the
unborn child upon the latters death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death.
Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished
by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality
could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.
24
Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child
inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception,
25
that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If
the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental
Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to
exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general
definition,
26
even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not
have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother,
Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question
that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for
the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil
personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers
womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in relation to his/her
parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,
27
we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage.
Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between
parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter:
"Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis
ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,
28
we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:

7

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated
in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those
who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself
gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it
was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was
conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.1avvphi1
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element
entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death
certificate of his unborn child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits
under the CBA, Hortillanos claims for the same should have been granted by Continental
Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an
employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his
family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief and
sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents
whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other
death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and
again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of
any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.
29
In the
same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor.
InMarcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission,
30
we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision
that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both
sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all
doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists
that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between
private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State,
enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we
are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we
categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social
justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and
compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.

8

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)],
we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the
social justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and
Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming
the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
Montao, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death
benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and
Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the
death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation.

DUENAS VS SANTOS
Petitioner Gloria Santos Dueas is the daughter of the late Cecilio J. Santos who,
during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land with a total area of 2.2 hectares located at
General T. De Leon, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. In 1966, Cecilio had the realty
subdivided into smaller lots, the whole forming the Cecilio J. Santos Subdivision (for
brevity, Santos Subdivision). The then Land Registration Commission (LRC)
approved the project and the National Housing Authority (NHA) issued the required
Certificate of Registration and License to Sell. At the time of Cecilios death in 1988,
there were already several residents and homeowners in Santos Subdivision.
Sometime in 1997, the members of the SSHA submitted to the petitioner a resolution asking
her to provide within the subdivision an open space for recreational and other community
activities, in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957,
6
as amended by P.D. No.
1216.
7
Petitioner, however, rejected the request, thus, prompting the members of SSHA to
seek redress from the NHA.
On April 25, 1997, the NHA General Manager forwarded the SSHA resolution to Romulo Q.
Fabul, Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer of the HLURB in Quezon City.
8

In a letter dated May 29, 1997, the Regional Director of the Expanded NCR Field Office,
HLURB, opined that the open space requirement of P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No.
1216, was not applicable to Santos Subdivision.
9

SSHA then filed a petition/motion for reconsideration,
10
docketed as HLURB Case No.
REM-070297-9821, which averred among others that: (1) P.D. No. 957 should apply
retroactively to Santos Subdivision, notwithstanding that the subdivision plans were
approved in 1966 and (2) Gloria Santos Dueas should be bound by the verbal promise
made by her late father during his lifetime that an open space would be provided for in
Phase III of Santos Subdivision, the lots of which were at that time already for sale.

9

Petitioner denied any knowledge of the allegations of SSHA. She stressed that she was not
a party to the alleged transactions, and had neither participation nor involvement in the
development of Santos Subdivision and the sale of the subdivisions lots. As affirmative
defenses, she raised the following: (a) It was her late father, Cecilio J. Santos, who owned
and developed the subdivision, and she was neither its owner nor developer; (b) that this
suit was filed by an unauthorized entity against a non-existent person, as SSHA and Santos
Subdivision are not juridical entities, authorized by law to institute or defend against actions;
(c) that P.D. No. 957 cannot be given retroactive effect to make it applicable to Santos
Subdivision as the law does not expressly provide for its retroactive applicability; and (d)
that the present petition is barred by laches.
On January 14, 1998, HLURB-NCR disposed of HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821 in
this wise:
In view of the foregoing, the complaint is hereby dismissed.
It is So Ordered.
11

In dismissing the case, the HLURB-NCR office ruled that while SSHA failed to present
evidence showing that it is an association duly organized under Philippine law with capacity
to sue, nonetheless, the suit could still prosper if viewed as a suit filed by all its members
who signed and verified the petition. However, the petition failed to show any cause of
action against herein petitioner as (1) there is no evidence showing Santos-Dueas as the
owner/developer or successor-in-interest of Cecilio Santos, who was the owner/developer
and sole proprietor of Santos Subdivision; (2) the LRC-approved subdivision plan was
bereft of any proviso indicating or identifying an open space, as required by P.D. No. 957,
as amended, hence there was no legal basis to compel either Cecilio or his daughter
Santos-Dueas, as his purported successor, to provide said space; and (3) the alleged
verbal promise of the late Cecilio Santos was inadmissible as evidence under the dead
mans statute.
12

SSHA then appealed the NCR offices ruling to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The
latter body, however, affirmed the action taken by the HLURB-NCR office, concluding thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby DISMISSED
and the decision of the Office below is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.
13

The HLURB Board decreed that there was no basis to compel the petitioner to provide an
open space within Santos Subdivision, inasmuch as the subdivision plans approved on July
8, 1966, did not provide for said space and there was no law requiring the same at that
time. It further ruled that P.D. No. 957 could not be given retroactive effect in the absence of
an express provision in the law. Finally, it found the action time-barred since it was filed nine
(9) years after the death of Cecilio. The Board noted that SSHA sought to enforce an
alleged oral promise of Cecilio, which should have been done within the six-year
prescriptive period provided for under Article 1145
14
of the Civil Code.

10

Dissatisfied, respondent sought relief from the Court of Appeals via a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 51601, was decided by the appellate court in this manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED--and the decision, dated January 20, 1999,
of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in HLURB Case No. REM-
A-980227-0032 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, this case is
ordered REMANDED to the HLURB for the determination of the definitive land area
that shall be used for open space in accordance with law and the rules and
standards prescribed by the HLURB. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
15

In finding for SSHA, the appellate court relied upon Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon,
16
which
held that while P.D. No. 957 did not expressly provide for its retroactive application,
nonetheless, it can be plainly inferred from its intent that it was to be given retroactive effect
so as to extend its coverage even to those contracts executed prior to its effectivity in 1976.
The Court of Appeals also held that the action was neither barred by prescription nor laches
as the obligation of a subdivision developer to provide an open space is not predicated
upon an oral contract, but mandated by law, hence, an action may be brought within ten
(10) years from the time the right of action accrues under Article 1144
17
of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the equitable principle of laches will not apply when the claim was filed within the
reglementary period.
Petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied on July 31,
2001.
Hence, this petition grounded on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW BY
TAKING COGNIZANCE OF RESPONDENTS PETITION (WHICH ASSAILS THE
DECISION OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE HLURB) WHEN
JURISDICTION THEREON IS WITH THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AS
CLEARLY MANDATED BY SEC. 2, RULE XVIII OF THE 1996 RULES OF
PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD.
II. IT WAS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO HAVE ASSUMED
JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION BELOW WHEN RESPONDENTS CLEARLY
FAILED TO EXHAUST THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THEM
UNDER THE LAW.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, A NON-
REGISTERED ORGANIZATION, LACKED THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SUE.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION HAS NO
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER; NEITHER WAS SANTOS

11

SUBDIVISION, A NON-ENTITY, POSSESSED WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED
NOR IS PETITIONER GLORIA SANTOS-DUEAS A PROPER PARTY TO THE
CASE, THE LATTER NOT BEING THE OWNER OR DEVELOPER OF SANTOS
SUBDIVISION.
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING ITS
FINDINGS WITH THAT OF THE ADJUDICATION BOARD AND BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS OF THE HLURB WHEN THEIR DECISION IS BASED ON
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION CAN BE
ATTRIBUTED TO THEM.
VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS DEVIATED FROM THE EXISTING LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT P.D. 957 HAS RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION -- WHEN THE LAW ITSELF DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ITS
RETROACTIVITY AND THE EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE THEREON CLEARLY
PRONOUNCED THAT IT HAS NO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. TO PROVIDE
RETROACTIVITY TO P.D. 957 WOULD CAUSE IMPAIRMENT OF VESTED
RIGHTS.
VII. WHILE AS A GENERAL RULE, THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IS BINDING ON THE SUPREME COURT, THE SAME IS NOT TRUE
WHEN THE FORMERS CONCLUSION IS BASED ON SPECULATION, SURMISES
AND CONJECTURES, THE INFERENCE MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN OR
ABSURD, THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, JUDGMENT IS BASED
ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CONCERNED, AND IT WENT BEYOND THE ISSUES
OF THE CASE AND THE SAME IS CONTRARY TO THE ADMISSIONS OF BOTH
PARTIES.
18

To our mind, the foregoing may be reduced into the following issues: (1) the applicability of
the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) the legal capacity of
respondent to sue the petitioner herein; and (3) the retroactivity of P.D. No. 957, as
amended by P.D. No. 1216.
On the first issue, the petitioner contends that the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 51601 was
premature as SSHA failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. Petitioner submits that
since Section 1,
19
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure does not mention the
HLURB, the respondent should have appealed the decision of the HLURB Board in HLURB
Case No. REM-A-980227-0032 to the Office of the President prior to seeking judicial relief.
In other words, it is the decision of the Office of the President,
20
and not that of the HLURB
Board, which the Court of Appeals may review.
We find petitioners contentions bereft of merit. The principle of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is, under the factual circumstances of this case, inapplicable. While
this Court has held that before a party is allowed to seek intervention of the courts, it is a
pre condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded
him,
21
nonetheless, said rule is not without exceptions.
22
The doctrine is a relative one and is

12

flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial
settings of each case.
23

In the instant case, the questions posed are purely legal, namely: (1) whether the
respondent had any right to demand an open space and the petitioner had any legal
obligation to provide said open space within Santos Subdivision under P.D. No. 957, as
amended by P.D. No. 1216, and (2) whether the action had already prescribed under Article
1145 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that SSHA had sought relief
from the Office of the President, but the latter forwarded the case to the HLURB. In view of
the foregoing, we find that in this particular case, there was no need for SSHA to exhaust all
administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.
On the second issue, the petitioner claims that respondent SSHA failed to present any
evidence showing that it is a legally organized juridical entity, authorized by law to sue or be
sued in its own name. Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3
24
of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, it has no legal capacity to file this suit before the HLURB and the Court of
Appeals.
SSHA counters that it has the capacity to sue as an association, since it is a member of the
Federation of Valenzuela Homeowners Association, Inc., which is registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. In the alternative, the individual members of SSHA
who signed both the resolution and the complaint in this case may, as natural persons,
pursue the action.
There is merit in petitioners contention. Under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court, only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action. Article 44
25
of the Civil Code enumerates the various classes of juridical persons.
Under said Article, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a
personality separate and distinct from that of its members.
26
The records of the present
case are bare of any showing by SSHA that it is an association duly organized under
Philippine law. It was thus an error for the HLURB-NCR Office to give due course to the
complaint in HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821, given the SSHAs lack of capacity to sue
in its own name. Nor was it proper for said agency to treat the complaint as a suit by all the
parties who signed and verified the complaint. The members cannot represent their
association in any suit without valid and legal authority. Neither can their signatures confer
on the association any legal capacity to sue. Nor will the fact that SSHA belongs to the
Federation of Valenzuela Homeowners Association, Inc., suffice to endow SSHA with the
personality and capacity to sue. Mere allegations of membership in a federation are
insufficient and inconsequential. The federation itself has a separate juridical personality
and was not impleaded as a party in HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821 nor in this case.
Neither was it shown that the federation was authorized to represent SSHA. Facts showing
the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is
made a party, must be averred.
27
Hence, for failing to show that it is a juridical entity,
endowed by law with capacity to bring suits in its own name, SSHA is devoid of any legal
capacity, whatsoever, to institute any action.

13

Anent the third issue, the petitioner ascribes error to the appellate court for holding that P.D.
No. 957 has retroactive application. She points out that there is no retroactivity provision in
the said decree. Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively pursuant to Article 4
28
of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The same holds true for P.D. No. 1216, which amended Section 31
of P.D. No. 957 and imposed the open space requirement in subdivisions. Petitioner
stresses that P.D. No. 1216 only took effect on October 14, 1977 or more than ten (10)
years after the approval of the subdivision plans of Cecilio Santos.
Although it may seem that this particular issue, given our ruling on the first issue regarding
the lack of capacity of SSHA to bring any action in its name, is now moot and academic, we
are constrained to still address it.
This petition was brought to us not by respondent SSHA but by Gloria Santos Dueas who
assails the appellate courts finding that our ruling in Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon
29
allows
P.D. No. 957, as amended, to apply retroactively.
We find merit in petitioners contention.
Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon is inapplicable. It is not on all fours with the instant case. The
issue in Eugenio was the applicability of P.D. No. 957 to purchase agreements on lots
entered into prior to its enactment where there was non-payment of amortizations, and
failure to develop the subdivision. We held therein that although P.D. No. 957 does not
provide for any retroactive application, nonetheless, the intent of the law of protecting the
helpless citizens from the manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers justify its retroactive application to contracts entered into prior to its
enactment. Hence, we ruled that the non-payment of amortizations was justified under
Section 23 of the said decree in view of the failure of the subdivision owner to develop the
subdivision project.
Unlike Eugenio, non-development of the subdivision is not present in this case, nor any
allegation of non-payment of amortizations. Further, we have held in a subsequent
case
30
that P.D. No. 957, as amended, cannot be applied retroactively in view of the
absence of any express provision on its retroactive application. Thus:
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. Thus, it is necessary that an express provision for its
retroactive application must be made in the law. There being no such provision in
both P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, these decrees cannot be applied to a situation that
occurred years before their promulgation.
At any rate, our principal concern in this case is Section 31 of P.D. No. 957, an
amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1216. Properly, the question should focus on the
retroactivity of P.D. No. 1216 and not P.D. No. 957 per se.
We have examined the text of P.D. No. 1216 and nowhere do we find any clause or
provision expressly providing for its retroactive application. Basic is the rule that no statute,
decree, ordinance, rule or regulation shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly
stated.
31
Hence, there is no legal basis to hold that P.D. No. 1216 should apply retroactively.

14

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51601 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
of the HLURB dated January 20, 1999 sustaining that of its Regional Office
is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs

BAYOT VS CA
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San
Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage
Certificate
6
identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American
citizen
7
born in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay,
American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to
Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's
marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996,
initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of
the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca
personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel. On
February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No.
362/96,
8
ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to
remarry after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody
and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would
issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,
9
settling the couple's property relations
pursuant to an Agreement
10
they executed on December 14, 1996. Said
agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they acquired
during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia
Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."
11

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of
Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a
petition
12
dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity
of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later
moved
13
and secured approval
14
of the motion to withdraw the petition.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment
15
stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that,
since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is
carrying a child not of Vicente.

15

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the
Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
16
on the
ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case
No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente
Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court.
In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also
prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their
daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss
17
on, inter alia, the
grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior
judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for
the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her
Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that,
therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and
Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each other.
Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca.
Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order
18
denying Vicente's motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for
support pendente lite, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the
respondent is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion
for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby
ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support
for the duration of the proceedings relative to the instant Petition.
SO ORDERED.
19

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by
Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a

16

matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of
support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery
against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal
support.
Following the denial
20
of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8,
2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.
21
His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.
22
On April 30, 2002, the
appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the
petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this
case, enjoining the respondent court from implementing the assailed
Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November
20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-
094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of
P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
23

Rebecca moved
24
but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April
30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary
injunctive writ
25
was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this
issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her
motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are
presently being assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed
under G.R. No. 155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March
25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental
orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently
assailed CA Decision reads:

17

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November
20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause
of action. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
26

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the
basis of the following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or
petition states a cause of action.
27
Applying said rule in the light of the
essential elements of a cause of action,
28
Rebecca had no cause of action
against Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her
marriage with Vicente declared void, the union having previously been
dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree she personally
secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract
another marriage.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino
citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her
allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not
shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The
Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did
not indicate the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having
professed to have that nationality status and having made representations to
that effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her
marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and
eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over
a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her
marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly
Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's
representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she

18

secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and
impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision,
but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004
Resolution.
29
Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as
grounds for the allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the
proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTC's
orders which would have entitled her to support pending final resolution of
Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision
submitting as follows:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING
AND NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION
OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO
CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER
PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON
ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS
BROUGHT BEFORE IT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING
THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN
DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT
ACTS.
IV

19

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL
COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.
30

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being
determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce
obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner.
31
Second, the reckoning point is
not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad. And third,
an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be
recognized in this jurisdiction.
32

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No.
155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the
appellate court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner
Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered
in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the
judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and
obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be
one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following
are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she
was born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this
American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there;
and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport.
33

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted,
and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her
marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix;
and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention

20

may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment
34
in which she stated being
an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau)
of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its
face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been
recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that
such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the
Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of
Recognition issued by Bureau Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.
For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose
photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by
the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars are as follows:
Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953
Sex: female Civil Status: married Color
of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face:
none
was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant
to Article IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order
of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B.
Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice
Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1
st
Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11
th
day of October, 1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official Receipt No. 5939988
issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

21

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and
dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez
issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1
st
Indorsement
of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as
a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the
date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was
purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000
fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have
been issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of
Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation
was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date
of the issuance of the 1
st
Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this
Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary of Justice from February
16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to
conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino
citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition
issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as
the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6),
it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization
regulatory services and implement the laws governing citizenship and the
admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order
of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002
35
on Recognition as a
Filipino Citizen clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall
automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its
Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the way
of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice
pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate
shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau pursuant
to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport
only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero

22

issued the 1
st
Indorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too
much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which,
to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca
was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also
imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as
Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification
certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's
recognition as a Filipino citizen through the 1
st
Indorsement issued only on
June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual
issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be
exact.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen.
But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have
that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when
she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican
Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca
voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case
No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show
proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition
shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the
RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on
February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently,
there was no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only
documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-
Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex
"B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau was truly issued on
October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document be
appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being
crucial to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have
the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached
consisted of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A")
and Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's

23

Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)
36
did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID
Certificate No. RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to
dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said
petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's
opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a
case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97
valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be
recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a
Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American
citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her
divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second,
she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in
the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit
to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility
of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of
United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and
residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x
x x, who personally appeared before this court, accompanied by DR.
JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa,
Filipino, appeared before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO
TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney
given the 19
th
of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public
Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing
him to subscribe all the acts concerning this case.
37
(Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of
the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the
property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through
their Agreement
38
executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No.
362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree

24

No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a
foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven
as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.
39
Be this as it
may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured
the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of
the Union,
40
the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been
denied, but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the
jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on
the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both
appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect
to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court explained
in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment [of divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to
the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds
allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39,
Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of
a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the
foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly
determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly
provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from

25

actions in rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima
facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary.
41

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the
foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain
Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign
divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are
valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino
citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice
Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing
alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as
an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset,
in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the
pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the
citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.
42

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall
be given a res judicataeffect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the
divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculumbetween Rebecca and Vicente
is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In
plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each
other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between
MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is
hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after completing the
legal requirements."
43

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be
subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for
instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to Rebecca.
44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of
Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x

26

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As
amended by E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the
applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
45

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact
of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and
their professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the
Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente
as regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-
couple's conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they
acquired during their marriage consists only of the real
property and all the improvements and personal properties therein
contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered
by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds
of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente M. Bayot,
married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.
46
(Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the
divorce court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97

27

dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into
between the parties dated 14
th
day of December 1996 in Makati City,
Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not
merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply with
each and every provision of said agreement."
47

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the
Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce
court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property was not limited
to their family home in Ayala Alabang.
48

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that
Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and elements of a cause of
action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the
legal right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of
action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint.
The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the
followingelements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2)
an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.
49

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the
RTC, Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the
documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action
for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence
of a marriage.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must
show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.
50
With the valid

28

foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her
to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and
Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not
clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the
support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having
been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27,
2000, or four months before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of
nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back support,
which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a
separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the
support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente
and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any,
considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall
have finished her education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the
issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to
support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges
on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably
removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the claim for
support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is
hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the petition for review
in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

MORIGO VS PEOPLE
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from
1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each
other.

29

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to
join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August
30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant
Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition
for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992
and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago
4
at
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage
with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information
5
filed by
the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
6

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy
case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by
the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No.
8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio
Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months
of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
7

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,
8
the

30

trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,
9
which
held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which
one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no
jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by
said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith
in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v.
Bitdu,
10
everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his
act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the
marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initiosince no marriage ceremony actually took
place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
11

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could
not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349
12
of the
Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage
had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the
beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15
13
of
the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under
Article 17
14
of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by
a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the
doctrine in Mendiola v. People,
15
allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the
effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.
16
However,
the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-

31

G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice
Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared
void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the
law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
C.
THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and
if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The
petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal
in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised
Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a
complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the
crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his
intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,
18
which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted
provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40
19
of the Family Code, a
judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the
petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know

32

the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith because he
relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No.
6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must
first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-
Bobis v. Bobis,
20
we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence
of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in
Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the
annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete
on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of
Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.
21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio
and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court
thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3
22
and 4
23
of the
Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes,
reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of
the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never
married."
24
The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning."
The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted
the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being

33

an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner,
must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.
25
In the
latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."
26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not
just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and
then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first
marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of
nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute
in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of
innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we
held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry
on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is
now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the
appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven
with moral certainty.

SAN LUIS VS SAN LUIS
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo),
who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo
contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out

34

of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel.
On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce
5
before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United
States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding
Child Custody on December 14, 1973.
6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
7
He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration
8
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children
by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties,
both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent
does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets
be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his
first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss
9
on the grounds of improper venue and failure to
state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence
prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the
petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in
seeking the dismissal
10
of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order
11
denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition
12
thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo
exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further,
she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of
paragraph 2,
13
Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.
14


35

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss.
15
They asserted that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256
16
of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion
to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order
17
denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for
disqualification was deemed moot and academic
18
because then Acting Presiding Judge
Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said
motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition
19
against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even
date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration
20
from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order
21
granting the motion for
inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995,
22
the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position
papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On
May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested
23
that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth
in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo
filed their position papers on June 14,
24
and June 20,
25
1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It
held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident
of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna
and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous,
thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos
marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was
a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate
children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration
26
and for the disqualification
27
of Judge Arcangel
but said motions were denied.
28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of
the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of
which states:

36

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place
of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that
although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in
Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in
Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by
virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr.
30
and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.
31
It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry
Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26,
Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code
of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind
the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual
view sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family
Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever."
Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force
and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by
the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,
32
the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to
remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and
petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can
institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x
33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration
34
which were denied
by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari.
35
Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which
was granted.
36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in
Nuval v. Guray
37
and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,
38
"residence" is
synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any

37

given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous
because it was performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They
argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be
considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent
has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1,
39
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which
he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,
40
we
laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from
domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary.
41
(Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval
and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws
and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence"
and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to
which when absent, one has the intention of returning.
42
However, for purposes of fixing
venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his

38

legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.
43
Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and
domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa
from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale
44
dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid
property. She also presented billing statements
45
from the Philippine Heart Center and
Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of
Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented
proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association
46
and Ayala
Country Club, Inc.,
47
letter-envelopes
48
from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds children
to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards
49
stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court
50
which has
territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December
17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over
Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No.
3.
51
Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his
alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the
provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
52
involved a marriage between a foreigner and his
Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained
abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien
spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be
protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien
spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and

39

to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to
the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does
not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.
53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer
be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform
her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support
to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country
if the ends of justice are to be served.
54
(Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
55
where the Court recognized
the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse
is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that
"the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from
each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other."
56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,
57
the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced
by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.
58
Although decided on
December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code
provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce
in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing
marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to
remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad
by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the
foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law."
59
In Garcia v. Recio,
60
the Court likewise cited the aforementioned
case in relation to Article 26.
61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,
62
the historical background and legislative
intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

40

Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26
thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No.
227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A
second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn
v. Romillo, J r. TheVan Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
63
(Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent.1awphi 1. net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable
to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some
way should be obtainable.
64
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between
two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is

41

considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the
state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino
spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15
65
and 17
66
of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void
under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts
rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
67
In Alonzo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,
68
the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add,
by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern
of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some
laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only
of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
x x x x
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a
way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin
with, that the law be dispensed with justice.
69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by
Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with
the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However,
the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws
of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,
70
the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading
and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be

42

presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as
a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
71

With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text
72
of
the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence
on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for
letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards
the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6,
74
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be
granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also
provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must
be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was
not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity
to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the
laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144
76
of the
Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a
co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor,
efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-
owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
77


43

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.
78
In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals,
79
we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
80
The Court described the property
regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not
legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and
wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of
money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
x x x x
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be
proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x x x
81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition
for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or
as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating
and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners
motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings.

UGDORACION VS COMELEC
Ugdoracion and private respondent, Ephraim Tungol, were rival mayoralty candidates in the
Municipality of Albuquerque, Province of Bohol in the May 14, 2007 elections. Both filed
their respective Certificates of Candidacy (COC).
On April 11, 2007, Tungol filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of Jose Ugdoracion, Jr., contending that Ugdoracion's declaration of eligibility for
Mayor constituted material misrepresentation because Ugdoracion is actually a "green card"

44

holder or a permanent resident of the United States of America (USA). Specifically,
Ugdoracion stated in his COC that he had resided in Albuquerque, Bohol, Philippines for
forty-one years before May 14, 2007 and he is not a permanent resident or an immigrant to
a foreign country.
It appears that Ugdoracion became a permanent resident of the USA on September 26,
2001. Accordingly, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Services
2
(USINS)
issued him Alien Number 047-894-254.
3

For his part, Ugdoracion argued that, in our jurisdiction, domicile is equivalent to residence,
and he retained his domicile of origin (Albuquerque, Bohol) notwithstanding his ostensible
acquisition of permanent residency in the USA. Ugdoracion then pointed to the following
documents as proof of his substantial compliance with the residency requirement: (1) a
residence certificate dated May 5, 2006; (2) an application for a new voter's registration
dated October 12, 2006; and (3) a photocopy of Abandonment of Lawful Permanent
Resident Status dated October 18, 2006.
On May 8, 2007, the COMELEC First Division promulgated one of the herein questioned
resolutions canceling Ugdoracion's COC and removing his name from the certified list of
candidates for the position of Mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. Posthaste, on May 11, 2007,
Ugdoracion filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution arguing in the main
that his status as a "green card" holder was not of his own making but a mere offshoot of a
petition filed by his sister. He admitted his intermittent travels to the USA, but only to visit his
siblings, and short working stint thereat to cover his subsistence for the duration of his stay.
In yet another setback, the COMELEC En Banc issued the other questioned resolution
denying Ugdoracion's motion for reconsideration and affirming the First Division's finding of
material misrepresentation in Ugdoracion's COC.
Hence, this petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC. Subsequently,
Tungol and the COMELEC filed their respective Comments
4
on the petition. On March 7,
2008, Ugdoracion filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to Reiterate Issuance of an Injunctive
Writ.
5
On March 11, 2008, we issued a Status Quo Order. The next day, March 12, 2008,
Ugdoracion filed a Consolidated Reply to respondents' Comments.
Ugdoracion's argument focuses on his supposed involuntary acquisition of a permanent
resident status in the USA which, as he insists, did not result in the loss of his domicile of
origin. He bolsters this contention with the following facts:
1. He was born in Albuquerque, Bohol, on October 15, 1940 and as such, is a
natural-born Filipino citizen;
2. He was baptized in the Catholic Church of Sta. Monica Paris in Albuquerque,
Bohol on February 2, 1941;
3. He was raised in said municipality;
4. He grew up in said municipality;

45

5. He raised his own family and established a family home thereat;
6. He served his community for twelve (12) years and had been the former Mayor for
three (3) terms;
7. From 1986 to 1988, he was appointed as Officer-in-Charge;
8. He ran for the same position in 1988 and won;
9. He continued his public service as Mayor until his last term in the year 1998;
10. After his term as Mayor, he served his people again as Councilor;
11. He built his house at the very place where his ancestral home was situated;
12. He still acquired several real properties at the same place;
13. He never lost contact with the people of his town; and
14. He secured a residence certificate on May 5, 2006 at Western Poblacion,
Albuquerque, Bohol and faithfully paid real property taxes.
6

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in canceling Ugdoracion's COC for material misrepresentation. Essentially, the
issue hinges on whether the representations contained in Ugdoracion's COC, specifically,
that he complied with the residency requirement and that he does not have "green card"
holder status, are false.
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's cancellation of Ugdoracion's COC
for material misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petition must fail.
Section 74, in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in unmistakable terms,
requires that the facts stated in the COC must be true, and any false representation therein
of a material fact shall be a ground for cancellation thereof, thus:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall
state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein
and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the
province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector
which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his
date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the
laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
assumed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to
the best of his knowledge.

46

x x x x
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing not later than fifteen days before the election.
The false representation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code pertains to material fact,
and is not simply an innocuous mistake. A material fact refers to a candidate's qualification
for elective office such as one's citizenship and residence.
7
Our holding in Salcedo II v.
COMELEC
8
reiterated in Lluz v. COMELEC
9
is instructive, thus:
In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the
Comelec is authorized to deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the
filing of a petition by any person pursuant to Section 78. x x x
x x x x
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy
under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein
pertain[s] to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect
the substantive rights of a candidate- the right to run for the elective post for which
he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be
considered as a "material representation," the court has interpreted this phrase in a
line of decisions applying Section 78 of [B.P. 881].
x x x x
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by
Section 78 of the Code refer[s] to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is
strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of
having made a false representation in [the] certificate of candidacy are grave-to
prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him
for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to
deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a
public office upon just any innocuous mistake.
x x x x
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78
must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made with
an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office.
Viewed in this light, the question posed by Ugdoracion is hardly a novel one.

47

Ugdoracion urges us, however, that he did not lose his domicile of origin because his
acquisition of a "green card" was brought about merely by his sister's petition. He maintains
that, except for this unfortunate detail, all other facts demonstrate his retention of residence
in Albuquerque, Bohol. Believing in the truth of these circumstances, he simply echoed in
his COC a truthful statement that he is a resident of Albuquerque, Bohol, and, therefore,
eligible and qualified to run for Mayor thereof.
We are not convinced. Ugdoracion's assertions miss the mark completely. The dust had
long settled over the implications of a "green card" holder status on an elective official's
qualification for public office. We ruled in Caasi v. Court of Appeals
10
that a Filipino citizen's
acquisition of a permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his
domicile and residence in the Philippines. In short, the "green card" status in the USA is a
renunciation of one's status as a resident of the Philippines.
11

We agree with Ugdoracion that residence, in contemplation of election laws, is synonymous
to domicile. Domicile is the place where one actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return (animus revertendi) and remain (animus manendi).
12
It consists not only in the
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.
13

Domicile is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every person at birth;
(2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and
(3) domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person independently of his
residence or intention.
In a controversy such as the one at bench, given the parties' naturally conflicting
perspectives on domicile, we are guided by three basic rules, namely: (1) a man must have
a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) domicile, once established, remains until a new one
is validly acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at any given
time.
14

The general rule is that the domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is lost only when there is an
actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with such purpose.
15
In
the instant case, however, Ugdoracion's acquisition of a lawful permanent resident status in
the United States amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of his status as a resident
of the Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of origin, which was
Albuquerque, Bohol, to a new domicile of choice, which is the USA.
The contention that Ugdoracion's USA resident status was acquired involuntarily, as it was
simply the result of his sister's beneficence, does not persuade. Although immigration to the
USA through a petition filed by a family member (sponsor) is allowed by USA immigration
laws,
16
the petitioned party is very much free to accept or reject the grant of resident status.
Permanent residency in the USA is not conferred upon the unwilling; unlike citizenship, it is
not bestowed by operation of law.
17
And to reiterate, a person can have only one residence
or domicile at any given time.

48

Moreover, Ugdoracion's contention is decimated by Section 68
18
of the Omnibus Election
Code and Section 40(f)
19
of the Local Government Code, which disqualifies a permanent
resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country, unless said person waives his status.
Corollary thereto, we are in complete accord with the COMELEC's ruling on the validity and
effect of the waiver of permanent resident status supposedly executed by Ugdoracion, to
wit:
Following the Caasi case, in order to reacquire residency in the Philippines, there
must be a waiver of status as a greencard holder as manifested by some acts or
acts independent of and prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. In the case
at bar, [Ugdoracion] presented a photocopy of a document entitledAbandonment of
Lawful Permanent Resident Status dated October 18, 2006. A close scrutiny of this
document however discloses that it is a mere application for abandonment of his
status as lawful permanent resident of the USA. It does not bear any note of
approval by the concerned US official. Thus, [w]e cannot consider the same as
sufficient waiver of [Ugdoracion's] status of permanent residency in the USA.
Besides, it is a mere photocopy, unauthenticated and uncertified by the legal
custodian of such document.
Assuming arguendo that said application was duly approved, [Ugdoracion] is still
disqualified for he failed to meet the one-year residency requirement. [Ugdoracion]
has applied for abandonment of residence only on 18 October 2006 or for just about
seven (7) months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections, which clearly fall short of the
required period.
The Permanent Resident Card or the so-called "greencard" issued by the US
government to respondent does not merely signify transitory stay in the USA for
purpose of work, pleasure, business or study but to live there permanently. This is
the reason why the law considers immigrants to have lost their residency in the
Philippines.
20

Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily
constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to,
and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's
misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and
qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform
or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an
intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office.
21

Ugdoracion claims that he did not misrepresent his eligibility for the public office of Mayor.
He categorically declares that he merely stated in his COC that he is a resident of the
Philippines and in possession of all the qualifications and suffers from none of the
disqualifications prescribed by law. Unfortunately for Ugdoracion, Section 74 specifically
requires a statement in the COC that the candidate is "not a permanent resident or an
immigrant to a foreign country." Ugdoracion's cause is further lost because of the explicit
pronouncement in his COC that he had resided in Albuquerque, Bohol, Philippines before
the May 14, 2007 elections for forty-one (41) years.
22
Ineluctably, even if Ugdoracion might

49

have been of the mistaken belief that he remained a resident of the Philippines, he hid the
fact of his immigration to the USA and his status as a "green card" holder.
Finally, we are not unmindful of the fact that Ugdoracion appears to have won the election
as Mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. Sadly, winning the election does not substitute for the
specific requirements of law on a person's eligibility for public office which he lacked, and
does not cure his material misrepresentation which is a valid ground for the cancellation of
his COC.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The COMELEC
Resolutions dated May 8, 2007 and September 28, 2007 are AFFIRMED. The STATUS
QUO Order issued on March 11, 2008 is herebyLIFTED.

LIMBONA VS COMELEC
Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (Norlainie), her husband, Mohammad G. Limbona
(Mohammad), and respondent Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan (Malik) were mayoralty candidates
in Pantar, Lanao del Norte during the 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.
Mohammad and Norlainie filed their certificates of candidacy with Acting Election Officer,
Alauya S. Tago, on January 22, 2007 and March 29, 2007, respectively; while Malik filed his
certificate of candidacy with the Office of the Election Officer on March 26, 2007.
On April 2, 2007, Malik filed a petition to disqualify Mohammad for failure to comply with the
residency requirement. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 07-188. Subsequently, or on
April 12, 2007, Malik filed another petition to disqualify Norlainie also on the ground of lack
of the one-year residency requirement. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 07-611.
3

On April 21, 2007, Norlainie filed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of
Candidacy.
4
Thereafter, or on May 2, 2007, she filed before the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor a Motion to Dismiss
5
the petition for disqualification in SPA No. 07-611
on the ground that the petition had become moot in view of the withdrawal of her certificate
of candidacy.
The Comelec en banc granted the withdrawal of Norlainies certificate of candidacy in
Resolution No. 7949
6
dated May 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of which provides:
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the foregoing
recommendations of the Law Department, as concurred in by Commissioner
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., as follows:
1. To GIVE due course to the Affidavits of Withdrawal of Certificates of Candidacy of
the following candidates:
x x x x
Norlaine M. Limbona Mayor Pantar, Lanao del Norte

50

x x x x
2. To direct the Election Officers concerned to DELETE the aforementioned names
of candidates from the Certified List of Candidates.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Meanwhile, the First Division of Comelec issued on May 24, 2007 a Resolution
7
in SPA No.
07-188 granting the petition filed by Malik and disqualifying Mohammad from running as
municipal mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte for failing to satisfy the one year residency
requirement and for not being a registered voter of the said place, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent
Mohammad "Exchan" G. Limbona is hereby disqualified. Accordingly, his name is
ordered deleted from the official list of candidates for the position of mayor of the
municipality of Pantar, Lanao del Norte.
SO ORDERED.
The May 24, 2007 Resolution became final and executory on June 2, 2007.
8

Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate for
Mohammad which was given due course by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution No.
8255
9
dated July 23, 2007, the dispositive portion of which states:
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve the foregoing
recommendations of the Law Department, as follows:
1. To GIVE due course to the Certificate of Candidacy and Certificate of Nomination
and Acceptance ofNorlainie "Lai-Exchan" Mitmug Limbona as substitute
candidate for Mohammad "Exchan" G. Limbona for Mayor, Pantar, Lanao del
Norte; and
2. To direct the Election Officer of Pantar, Lanao del Norte to DELETE the name
of Mohammad "Exchan" G. Limbona from the Certified List of Candidates for
Mayor, Pantar, Lanao del Norte and to INCLUDEtherein the name of Norlainie "Lai-
Exchan" Mitmug Limbona.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, Malik filed a second petition for disqualification against Norlainie docketed as SPA
No. 07-621.

51

After the elections, Norlainie emerged as the winning candidate and accordingly took her
oath and assumed office.
However, on September 4, 2007, the Second Division of Comelec in SPA No. 07-611
disqualified Norlainie on three grounds: lack of the one-year residency requirement; not
being a registered voter of the municipality; and, nullity of her certificate of candidacy for
having been filed at a place other than the Office of the Election Officer.
Norlainie filed an Omnibus Motion to declare the petition in SPA No. 07-611 moot and/or for
reconsideration, arguing that the Comelec en banc had approved the withdrawal of her first
certificate of candidacy and had given due course to her new certificate of candidacy as a
substitute candidate for Mohammad. Malik opposed the omnibus motion.
Meanwhile, the Second Division of Comelec in SPA No. 07-621, promulgated on November
23, 2007 a Resolution
10
disqualifying Norlainie from running as mayor of Pantar, Lanao del
Norte. It held thus:
As regards the residency requirement, We rule for petitioner.
As borne out from the record, respondents domicile of origin was in Maguing, Lanao
del Norte, which is her place of birth. When she got married, she became a resident
of Marawi City, specifically, in Barangay Rapasun where her husband served as
Barangay Chairman until November 2006. This is her domicile by operation of law
pursuant to the Family Code as applied in the case of Larrazabal v. Comelec (G.R.
No. 100739, September 3, 1991).
What respondent now is trying to impress upon Us is that she has changed her
aforesaid domicile and resided in Pantar, Lanao del Norte. x x x
In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which consists merely of
self-serving affidavits cannot persuade Us that she has abandoned her domicile of
origin or her domicile in Marawi City. It is alleged that respondent "has been staying,
sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20 months" in Lower
Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent and competent evidence that would
corroborate such statement.
Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondents intention to stay in
Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in
Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as her
new residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07-611, this
Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter in the said municipality
warranting her disqualification as a candidate.
11

On January 9, 2008, the Comelec en banc in SPA No. 07-611 denied Norlainies motion for
reconsideration.

52

Hence, the instant petition alleging that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in
proceeding to resolve the petition in SPA No. 07-611 despite the approval of petitioners
withdrawal of certificate of candidacy.
12

On January 29, 2008, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order effective
immediately enjoining respondents from enforcing and implementing the Comelec
Resolutions disqualifying petitioner as a candidate for mayor in Pantar, Lanao del Norte.
13

The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not necessarily render the certificate
void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even if the
certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn.
14
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code of
the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881, as amended) provides:
Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy. No person shall be eligible for any elective
public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed
herein. A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the
election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written
declaration under oath. No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be
filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than
one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of
the period for the filing of certificate of candidacy, the person who has filed more
than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he
desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or
offices. The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect
whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may
have incurred. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on March 29, 2007, such act
produced legal effects, and the withdrawal of the same, despite the approval of the
Comelec, did not bar or render nugatory the legal proceedings it had set in motion. As such,
the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled on the merits of the
petition despite the withdrawal of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The Comelec correctly
held that a case only becomes moot when "there is no more actual controversy between the
parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits."
15
In the instant
case, although petitioner withdrew her first certificate of candidacy, the subsequent
disqualification of her husband required that she file a new certificate of candidacy as a
substitute candidate. The second filing of a certificate of candidacy thus once again put her
qualifications in issue. Hence, a ruling upon the same is necessary.
The fact that petitioners certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate was given due
course by the Comelec did not bar the Comelec from deciding on her qualifications to run
as municipal mayor. As correctly found by the Comelec:
Said resolution (Comelec Resolution No. 8255) discloses only the following: a)
movant is given the green lights to be the substitute candidate for her husband who
was disqualified; b) her certificate of candidacy was duly accomplished in form and

53

substance and c) the certificate of candidacy will not cause confusion among the
voters. Clearly, no issue of disqualification was passed upon by the Commission in
the said resolution.
Movant may have been given the impression that the Commissions act of giving due
course to her substitute certificate of candidacy constitutes a pronouncement that
she is not disqualified. It must be pointed out, however, that the bases for giving due
course to a certificate of candidacy are totally different from those for enunciating
that the candidate is not disqualified. x x x
16

Moreover, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646) "authorizes the Commission
(Comelec) to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections,"
17
thus:
SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong. (Emphasis ours)
As such, the Comelec did not err when it continued with the trial and hearing of the petition
for disqualification.
The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency
requirement. The term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with
"domicile," which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
18
The manifest
intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the
latter, from an elective office to serve that community.
19

For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of intention. There is
no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a person actually resides.
20
Three rules
are, however, well established: first, that a man must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a new one is acquired;
and third, a man can have but one domicile at a time.
21

In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence
in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile.
22
A persons "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be
deemed lost until a new one is established.
23

To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other

54

words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.
24

Petitioners claim that she has been physically present and actually residing in Pantar for
almost 20 months prior to the elections,
25
is self-serving and unsubstantiated. As correctly
observed by the Comelec:
In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which consists merely of
self-serving affidavits cannot persuade Us that she has abandoned her domicile of
origin or her domicile in Marawi City. It is alleged that respondent "has been staying,
sleeping and doing business in her house for more than 20 months" in Lower
Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent and competent evidence that would
corroborate such statement.
Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondents intention to stay in
Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in
Pantar, standing alone, is not sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as her
new residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07-611, this
Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter in the said municipality
warranting her disqualification as a candidate.
26

We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioners domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao
del Norte,
27
which is also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law (by
virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec found that Mohammad,
petitioners husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte
only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live together in
one legal residence,
28
then it follows that petitioner effected the change of her domicile also
on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from
living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply
if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis ours)
Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her
husband, and as there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of
the Family Code is proper and is in consonance with human experience.
29

Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is disqualified to run for
the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. However, petitioners disqualification would
not result in Maliks proclamation who came in second during the special election.

55

The rules on succession under the Local Government Code shall apply, to wit:
SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor,
Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the xxx
mayor, the xxx vice-mayor concerned shall become the xxx mayor.
x x x x
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify or is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated
to discharge the functions of his office.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
Considering the disqualification of petitioner to run as mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, the
proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as mayor.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The September 4, 2007 Resolution
of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 07-611 disqualifying petitioner Norlainie
Mitmug Limbona from running for office of the Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, and the
January 9, 2008 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, areAFFIRMED. In view
of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor
shallSUCCEED as Mayor. The temporary restraining order issued on January 29, 2008 is
ordered LIFTED.

JALOSJOS VS COMELEC
Private respondents come before this Court on the sole issue of who between the vice-
mayor and the second placer shall assume office pursuant to the final determination of
petitioner's ineligibility to run for office and the lifting of the 07 September 20 1 0 Status Quo
Order.
Petitioner, on the other hand, questions the Decision, by raising the following arguments:
1. This Court erred in concluding that there are inconsistencies in the Joint Affidavit
of the witnesses presented by petitioner.
2. Petitioners stay in Brgy. Punta Miray should be considered in determining the
one-year residency requirement in the same municipality.
3. Petitioners registration as a voter presupposes she has stayed in the municipality
at least six months prior to the registration.
4. Petitioners certificate of candidacy (COC) should not be cancelled, absent any
finding of a deliberate attempt to deceive the electorate.

56

5. COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction to decide on the question of the
qualification of petitioner after she was proclaimed as winner.
We deny the motion of petitioner and grant the partial motion for reconsideration of private
respondents.
The claim of actual and physical residence in Brgy. Tugas since 2008 is contradicted by the
statements that petitioner was staying in Mrs. Lourdes Yaps house while her residential unit
was being constructed; and that by December 2009, the construction was still ongoing.
Petitioner questions the inconsistencies noted by the court in the affidavit of her witnesses
who, while claiming that they personally know her to have been an actual and physical
resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008, declared in the same affidavit that while her house was
being constructed, she used to stay at the residence of Mrs. Lourdes Yap (Mrs. Yap) in
Brgy. Punta Miray.
The declaration of petitioners witnesses that they know petitioner to be "an actual and
physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008" contradicts their statements that (1) they have
"started the construction of the residential house of the owner and other infrastructures of
the resort since January 2009"; (2) "until the present (meaning until December 2009 when
they executed their affidavit), the construction and development projects are still on-going";
and (3) "at times when Ms. Jalosjos is in Baliangao, she used to stay in the house of Mrs.
Lourdes Yap at Sitio Balas Diut, Brgy. Punta Miray, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, while
her residential house was still being constructed."
Petitioner asserts that there are no inconsistencies in the statements of her witnesses, and
that the statements are in fact consistent with her claim that she had been residing in
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for at least one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections. She
argues as follows:
x x x the fact that some of these witnesses knew that petitioner lived in the house of Mrs.
Lourdes Yap in a different barangay, particularly Brgy. Punta Miray, is not at all inconsistent
or contradictory with petitioners assertion and the witnesses statements that petitioner
resides in Brgy. Tugas, because petitioner obviously needed a place to stay while her
residence in Brgy. Tugas was being constructed. This does not negate the fact that
petitioner was establishing her residence in Brgy. Tugas since the latter part of 2008, or at
the very latest during the first few months (sic) of January 2009.
1

Her assertion that she "was establishing her residence in Brgy. Tugas since the latter part
of 2008, or at the very latest during the first few months [sic] of January 2009" shows that
she herself cannot pinpoint the particular date when she established her legal residence in
Brgy. Tugas. This fact is contradictory to the declaration of the witnesses that "we have
personal knowledge that Ms. Svetlana P. Jalosjos has been an actual and physical resident
of Sunrise Tugas, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, after she bought the properties thereat
from the Heirs of Agapita Yap, Jr. on 9 December 2008."
To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where
one resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a

57

parcel of land does not make it ones residence. The fact that the residential structure where
petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she purchased means that
she has not yet established actual and physical residence in the barangay, contrary to the
declaration of her witnesses that she has been an actual and physical resident of Brgy.
Tugas since 2008.
Petitioner wants this Court to believe that the ongoing construction referred to by her
witnesses in their joint affidavit does not refer to the residential structure, but to the other
structures in the resort that petitioner was then establishing. She does not assert, however,
that her residential unit had already been completed by that time. In fact, she has failed to
present any proof as to when her claimed residential unit was completed, or when she
transferred to the unit.
It must be pointed out that the second statement in paragraph 1 of the Joint Affidavit states:
"We have started the construction of the residential house of the owner and the other
infrastructures of the resort since January, 2009." This was immediately followed by
paragraph 2 which reads:
2. Until the present, the construction and development projects are still ongoing. To
establish the fact of the on-going construction work, we are attaching herewith as part
hereof, pictures we have taken on December 20 and 29, 2009 marked Annexes "1", "2", "3",
"4", "5", and "6" hereof, respectively.
2

Without any qualification as to what is being referred to by the construction and
development projects in paragraph 2, it follows that it refers to the "construction of the
residential house of the owner and the other infrastructures of the resort" found in the prior
statement.
In the affidavit, there is no mention whatsoever of completion of the residential house as of
30 December 2009. Neither has any occupancy permit been presented by petitioner to
definitely establish the date she started occupying what she claims to be her residential unit
in the resort.
Petitioner takes pains to present photographs of other structures in the resort, but fails to
present any photograph of a completed residential structure, which is more relevant in
proving her claimed residence in Brgy. Tugas. If the residential unit was already completed
by December 2009, her witnesses could have easily testified to that fact and presented
photographs of the structure.
This absence of any photograph proving the alleged residence of petitioner in the resort
bolsters the courts conclusion that at the time the witnesses signed their affidavits in
December 2009, or six months prior to the May 2010 elections, her residential unit had not
yet been built.
A temporary stay in a strangers house cannot amount to residence.

58

Petitioner wants this Court to credit her stay in Mrs. Yaps house as proof that she had been
a resident of the Municipality of Baliangao for more than one year prior to the 10 May 2010
elections. In her words:
7. More importantly, if this Honorable Court would consider the circumstance that petitioner
was staying in Brgy. Punta Miray as true so as to render the statements of her witnesses
inconsistent, then such a consideration should not have led this Honorable Court to the
conclusion that petitioner was not a resident of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental since Brgy.
Punta Miray is located in the municipality of Baliangao like Brgy. Tugas. In other words, the
fact that petitioner was staying in a house in Brgy. Punta Miray while her residence in Brgy.
Tugas was being constructed during the early part of 2009 would STILL LEAD to the
conclusion that petitioner has been residing in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for at least
one (1) year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections since Brgy. Punta Miray is a part of
Baliangao.
3
(Emphasis in the original and underscoring omitted)
Petitioner relies on Mitra v. COMELEC
4
and Sabili v. COMELEC
5
in claiming that "the series
of events whereby petitioner first had her residence constructed ... after she purchased in
2008 the property where her residence was eventually established, and while she lived in
another barangay of the same municipality, and then eventually moved in to her residence
in Brgy. Tugas amounted to an incremental process of transferring residence."
Petitioners case must be differentiated from Mitra in that petitioner therein presented not
only the notarized lease contract over the property where he claimed to be residing, but also
"a residence certificate ... and an identification card of the House of Representatives
showing Aborlan as his residence."
6

In Sabili, the Court declared that "the existence of a house and lot apparently owned by
petitioners common-law wife, with whom he has been living for over two decades, makes
plausible petitioners allegation of bodily presence and intent to reside in the area."
7

Petitioners stay in the house of Mrs. Yap in Brgy. Punta Miray, on the other hand, was only
a temporary and intermittent stay that does not amount to residence. It was never the
intention of petitioner to reside in that barangay, as she only stayed there at times when she
was in Baliangao while her house was being constructed.
8
Her temporary stay in Brgy.
Punta Miray cannot be counted as residence in Baliangao.
Petitioner failed to show by what right she stayed in Mrs. Yaps house. Except for the
declarations of her witnesses that she stayed there while her residential unit in the resort
was being built, she presented no other evidence to show any basis of her right to stay in
that particular house as a resident.
Approval of voter registration does not presuppose six-month residency in the place prior to
registration.
It appears on record that petitioner, in filing her application for registration as a voter on 7
May 2009, claimed "that she has been a resident of Brgy. Tugas, Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental for six (6) months prior to the filing of the said registration."
9
For her claim to be
true, she must have resided in Brgy. Tugas on or before 8 November 2008. The records,

59

however, show that she purchased property in Brgy. Tugas only on December 2008. Thus,
her claim that she had been a resident of Brgy. Tugas for at least six (6) months prior to her
application for registration as a voter on 7 May 2009 is an utter falsity.
The approval of the registration of petitioner as a voter does not and cannot carry with it an
affirmation of the falsehood and misrepresentation as to the period of her residence in Brgy.
Tugas. At best, the approval of her registration as a voter carries a presumption that the
registrant will be able to meet the six-month residency requirement for the elections in which
the registrant intends to vote.
10
It does not prove that the registrant has resided in the
locality for more than one year prior to the elections.
Representation that one is qualified to run for public office when proven false constitutes a
deliberate attempt to deceive the electorate.
Petitioner contends that the Court erred in upholding the cancellation of her COC despite
the glaring absence of any finding made by the respondent COMELEC in its assailed
Resolution that petitioner committed a false material representation in said COC.
The finding of the COMELEC that petitioner lacks the one year residency requirement to run
for local elective position in the municipality of Baliangao directly contradicts her sworn
declaration that she is eligible to run for public office. The fact that petitioner failed to prove
that she has been a resident of the locality for at least one year prior to the elections reveals
the falsity of her assertion in her COC that she is qualified to run for a local elective position.
This false material representation justifies the cancellation of her COC.
When the candidates claim of eligibility is proven false, as when the candidate failed to
substantiate meeting the required residency in the locality, the representation of eligibility in
the COC constitutes a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide the fact"
11
of
ineligibility.
COMELEC is not ousted of jurisdiction to decide a petition for cancellation of the certificate
of candidacy after the winner is proclaimed.
The COMELEC, in its Resolution dated 19 August 2010, citing Aquino v. COMELEC,
12
has
amply discussed this matter, thus:
Petitioners contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been
established the winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC
is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of qualification" finds no
basis in law, because even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in
relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to
qualifications of candidates. Section 6 states:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the

60

action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate
allowed to continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction),
but his obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination
of the proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when
the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be
applicable only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases
involving disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P. 881. Section 7
states:
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.1wphi 1 The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.
13

The cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of an ineligible candidate who has assumed
office renders the officer a de facto officer.
This Court has ruled in Aratea v. COMELEC
14
and Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC
15
that the
cancellation of the COC based on an ineligibility that existed at the time of its filing means
that the candidate was never a valid candidate from the very beginning.
16

On the question of who should assume the post vacated by the ineligible candidate, this
Court amply explained in Jalosjos, Jr. that:
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the
first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the
certificate of candidacy of the first placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had
to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took
effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab
initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a
candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and
should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the
elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the
day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray
votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the
elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of
candidacy is void from the very beginning.
17
x x x. (Citations omitted)
There is another more compelling reason why the eligible candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes must assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was
proclaimed and who already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of the ineligibility.
The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code
18
cannot apply in
instances when a de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer takes over.

61

The ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in the
Local Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful
winner in the elections, has the legal right to assume the position.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 08
March 2013 is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 March
2013 is hereby DENIED with FINALITY. AGNE V. YAP, SR. is hereby declared the duly
elected Mayor of the Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental in the 10 May 2010
elections. This resolution is immediately executory.

JALOSJOS VS COMELEC MR
Svetlana P. Jalosjos (petitioner) comes before this Court on a Petition for Review under
Rule 64 with an extremely urgent application for the issuance of a status quo order and for
the conduct of a special raffle,
1
assailing the 04 June 2010
2
and 19 August
2010
3
Resolutions in SPA No. 09-161 (DC) of the Commission on Elections (respondent
COMELEC). These Resolutions granted the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy filed by Edwin Elim Tumpag and Rodolfo Y. Estrellada (private
respondents) against petitioner. At the heart of this controversy is whether petitioner
complied with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the 10 May 2010 elections. She indicated therein her
place of birth and residence as BarangayTugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental (Brgy. Tugas).
Asserting otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner a Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in which they argued that she had falsely
represented her place of birth and residence, because she was in fact born in San Juan,
Metro Manila, and had not totally abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City.
4
To
support this claim, they presented the following as evidence:
1. Certification from the Assessors Office of Baliangao that there was no tax
declaration covering any real property in the name of petitioner located at any place
in the municipality;
5

2. Certification from the Civil Registrar of Baliangao that petitioner had no record of
birth in the civil registry of the municipality;
6

3. Joint Affidavit of three residents of Baliangao incumbent Barangay Chairperson
Gregorio P. Gayola (Gayola) and incumbent 3rd Kagawad Felicisimo T. Pastrano
(Pastrano), both officials of Barangay Tugas, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, and
former police officer Adolfo L. Alcoran (Alcoran);
7

4. Affidavit of Patricio D. Andilab (Andilab), official of Purok 5, Brgy. Tugas,
Baliangao.
8


62

On the other hand, petitioner averred that she had established her residence in the
said barangay since December 2008 when she purchased two parcels of land there, and
that she had been staying in the house of a certain Mrs. Lourdes Yap (Yap) while the former
was overseeing the construction of her house. Furthermore, petitioner asserted that the
error in her place of birth was committed by her secretary. Nevertheless, in a CoC, an error
in the declaration of the place of birth is not a material misrepresentation that would lead to
disqualification, because it is not one of the qualifications provided by law.
9
Petitioner
presented the following evidence to sustain her claims:
1. Certificate of Live Birth;
10

2. Extrajudicial Partition with Simultaneous Sale executed by the heirs of Agapito
Yap, Jr. (Yap, Jr.) pertaining to two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) Nos. 12410 and P-33289 in favor of petitioner;
11

3. TCT Nos. 12410 and P-33289 in the name of Yap, Jr.;
12

4. Two Declarations of Real Property in the name of Yap, Jr.;
13

5. Two sketch plans of lots covered by TCT Nos. 12410 and P-33289 prepared by
the Office of the Provincial Assessor for Yap, Jr.;
14

6. Photographs of the alleged residence of petitioner in Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental;
7. Sketches of structures petitioner constructed in the resort she developed in
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental;
15

8. Petitioners Application for Voters Registration and Voters Certification issued by
the Office of the Election Officer of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental;
16

9. Petitioners CoC;
17

10. Joint Affidavit of Rodolio R. Yap III (Yap III), Roger V. Villanueva (Villanueva),
Romeo A. Duhaylungsod, Jr. (Duhaylungsod) and Dennis M. Estrellada (Estrellada),
who undertook the construction and development of petitioners residential house
and resort;
18

11. Affidavit of incumbent Barangay Chairperson Marichu Michel Acas-Yap (Acas-
Yap) of Barangay Punta Miray, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental (Brgy. Punta Miray);
19

12. Affidavit of Nellie E. Jumawan (Jumawan), the president of the Center for
Agriculture and Rural Development, Inc.;
20

13. Affidavit of Dolores B. Medija (Medija), the president of Women for Children
Association;
21


63

14. Joint Affidavit of Emily J. Bagundol (Bagundol) and Nelia D. Colaljo (Colaljo),
presidents of the Paglaum Multi-purpose Cooperative;
22

15. Joint Affidavit of Charles C. Tenorio (Tenorio) and Reynold C. Analasan
(Analasan), presidents of Tamban Multi-Purpose Cooperative and Balas Diut
Brotherhood Association, respectively;
23

16. Affidavit of Pedro Rio G. Bation (Bation), president of the Del Pilar Lawn Tennis
Club of Baliangao;
24

17. Affidavit of Jessie P. Maghilum (Maghilum), a member of the Phi Omega Sigma
Fraternity/Sorority of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental Chapter;
25
and
18. Affidavit of Ophelia P. Javier (Javier), petitioners personal secretary.
26

The Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy remained
pending as of the day of the elections, in which petitioner garnered the highest number of
votes. On 10 May 2010, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental, proclaimed her as the duly elected municipal mayor.
27

On 04 June 2010, the COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is DISQUALIFIED from running for the
position of mayor in the Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for this coming May
10, 2010 elections.
28

The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution on 19 August 2010 denying the Motion
for Reconsideration of petitioner for lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the Second
Division denying due course to or cancelling her CoC.
COMELEC Ruling
Respondent COMELEC ruled in its 04 June 2010 Resolution that misrepresentation as to
ones place of birth is not a ground for the cancellation of a CoC. Petitioner merely
committed an oversight when she declared that she was born in Baliangao when she was
actually born in San Juan. However, the COMELEC ruled that based on the evidence
presented, petitioner never acquired a new domicile in Baliangao, because she failed to
prove her bodily presence at that place, her intention to remain there, and her intention
never to return to her domicile of origin. Hence, respondent COMELEC disqualified her from
running for the position of mayor of Baliangao
29
pursuant to Section 78 in relation to Section
74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
30

In response to this adverse ruling, petitioner elevated her case through a Motion for
Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, arguing that the evidence she presented
proved that she had established her domicile in the said municipality.
31


64

Nonetheless, in its 19 August 2010 Resolution, respondent COMELEC affirmed the earlier
ruling of the Second Division. In upholding the latters ruling, COMELEC En Banc said that
(1) the Extrajudicial Partition with Simultaneous Sale was not sufficient proof that petitioner
had purchased two parcels of land, because she was never a party to the agreement, and it
was quite unusual that she never acquired a deed of sale or title to protect her interests; (2)
the sketch plans were not signed by the corporate engineer who purportedly prepared them,
nor was there an affidavit from the engineer to authenticate the plans; (3) the application of
petitioner for voter registration only proved that she had met the minimum six-month
residency requirement and nothing more; and (4) the affiants of the Sworn Statements were
all partial, because they either worked for her or were members of organizations that
received financial assistance from her.
32

Hence, the instant Petition arguing that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that petitioner was not a
resident of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental and in thus justifying the cancellation of her CoC.
She also asserts that the 04 June 2010 and 19 August 2010 COMELEC Resolutions are
null and void, being violative of her right to due process, because there was no
promulgation or prior notice as required by Sec. 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 or by
the Rules on Disqualification of Cases Filed in Connection with the 10 May 2010 Automated
National and Local Elections.
In a Resolution dated 07 September 2010, we issued a Status Quo Ante Order, which
required the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions.
33
Thereafter, the parties filed their respective pleadings.
Issues
The issues before us can be summarized as follows:
I. Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed to
promulgate its 04 June 2010 and 19 August 2010 Resolutions in accordance with its
own Rules of Procedure; and
II. Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner
had failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local
elective officials.
Our Ruling
COMELECs failure to serve
advance notice of the promulgation
of the 04 J une 2010 and 19 August
2010 Resolutions does not invalidate
them.
Petitioner assails the validity of the 04 June 2010 and 19 August 2010 Resolutions,
because she was not served an advance notice that these Resolutions were going to be
promulgated. This failure was allegedly a violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696.

65

Hence, she argues that her right to due process was violated. In response, respondent
COMELEC asserts that it suspended COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 through an En
Banc Order dated 04 May 2010.
34
Furthermore, the suspension was in accordance with its
power to promulgate its own rules as provided by the Constitution. Nevertheless, petitioner
was afforded the opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of her defense.
We agree with respondent COMELEC.
As stated by respondent COMELEC, Resolution No. 8696 was suspended through an
Order dated 04 May 2010. However, assuming that this Resolution was still in effect, the
failure to serve notice of the promulgation under Section 6 thereof did not make the 04 June
2010 and 19 August 2010 COMELEC Resolutions invalid. The Court held thus in Sabili v.
COMELEC:
35

In Lindo v. Commission on Elections,[49] petitioner claimed that there was no valid
promulgation of a Decision in an election protest case when a copy thereof was merely
furnished the parties, instead of first notifying the parties of a set date for the promulgation
thereof, in accordance with Section 20 of Rule 35 of the COMELECs own Rules of
Procedure, as follows:
Sec. 20. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. The decision of the court shall be
promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given the parties. It shall
become final five (5) days after promulgation. No motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.
Rejecting petitioners argument, we held therein that the additional rule requiring
notice to the parties prior to promulgation of a decision is not part of the process of
promulgation. Since lack of such notice does not prejudice the rights of the parties,
noncompliance with this rule is a procedural lapse that does not vitiate the validity of
the decision. Thus:
This contention is untenable. Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published,
officially announced, made known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing,
coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel (Neria v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-
24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 812). It is the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of
court for filing and publication (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 433). It is the filing of the
signed decision with the clerk of court (Sumbing v. Davide, G.R. Nos. 86850-51, July 20,
1989, En Banc Minute Resolution). The additional requirement imposed by the COMELEC
rules of notice in advance of promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation. Hence,
We do not agree with petitioners contention that there was no promulgation of the trial
court's decision. The trial court did not deny that it had officially made the decision public.
From the recital of facts of both parties, copies of the decision were sent to petitioner's
counsel of record and petitioners [sic] himself. Another copy was sent to private
respondent.
What was wanting and what the petitioner apparently objected to was not the
promulgation of the decision but the failure of the trial court to serve notice in
advance of the promulgation of its decision as required by the COMELEC rules. The

66

failure to serve such notice in advance of the promulgation may be considered a
procedural lapse on the part of the trial court which did not prejudice the rights of the
parties and did not vitiate the validity of the decision of the trial court nor [sic] of the
promulgation of said decision.
Moreover, quoting Pimping v. COMELEC,[50] citing Macabingkil v. Yatco,[51] we further
held in the same case that failure to receive advance notice of the promulgation of a
decision is not sufficient to set aside the COMELECs judgment, as long as the parties have
been afforded an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, viz:
The fact that petitioners were not served notice in advance of the promulgation of the
decision in the election protest cases, in Our view, does not constitute reversible
error or a reason sufficient enough to compel and warrant the setting aside of the
judgment rendered by the Comelec. Petitioners anchor their argument on an alleged
denial to them [sic] due process to the deviation by the Comelec from its own made
rules. However, the essence of due process is that, the parties in the case were
afforded an opportunity to be heard.
In the present case, we read from the COMELEC Order that the exigencies attendant to the
holding of the countrys first automated national elections had necessitated that the
COMELEC suspend the rule on notice prior to promulgation, and that it instead direct the
delivery of all resolutions to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation.
Notably, we see no prejudice to the parties caused thereby. The COMELECs Order did not
affect the right of the parties to due process. They were still furnished a copy of the
COMELEC Decision and were able to reckon the period for perfecting an appeal. In fact,
petitioner was able to timely lodge a Petition with this Court.
Clearly, the COMELEC validly exercised its constitutionally granted power to make its own
rules of procedure when it issued the 4 May 2010 Order suspending Section 6 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. Consequently, the second assailed Resolution of the
COMELEC cannot be set aside on the ground of COMELECs failure to issue to petitioner a
notice setting the date of the promulgation thereto. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, even if COMELEC failed to give advance notice of the promulgation of the 04 June
2010 and 19 August 2010 Resolutions, its failure to do so did not invalidate them.
Petitioner failed to comply with the
one-year residency requirement for
local elective officials.
Petitioners uncontroverted domicile of origin is Dapitan City. The question is whether she
was able to establish, through clear and positive proof, that she had acquired a domicile of
choice in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, prior to the May 2010 elections.
When it comes to the qualifications for running for public office, residence is synonymous
with domicile. Accordingly, Nuval v. Guray
36
held as follows:

67

The term residence as so used, is synonymous with domicile which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.
37

There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice. First, residence
or bodily presence in the new locality. Second, an intention to remain there. Third, an
intention to abandon the old domicile.
38

These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof, as held
in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC
39
and subsequently in Dumpit- Michelena v. Boado:
40

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three
requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time.
41

Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive proof, the date of
acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical date, must also be established to be
within at least one year prior to the elections using the same standard of evidence.
In the instant case, we find that petitioner failed to establish by clear and positive proof that
she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, one year prior to the 10 May 2010
elections.
There were inconsistencies in the Affidavits of Acas-Yap, Yap III, Villanueva,
Duhaylungsod, Estrellada, Jumawan, Medija, Bagundol, Colaljo, Tenorio, Analasan, Bation,
Maghilum and Javier.
First, they stated that they personally knew petitioner to be an actual and physical resident
of Brgy. Tugas since 2008. However, they declared in the same Affidavits that she stayed
in Brgy. Punta Miray while her house was being constructed in Brgy. Tugas.
Second, construction workers Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod and Estrellada asserted
that in December 2009, construction was still ongoing. By their assertion, they were
implying that six months before the 10 May 2010 elections, petitioner had not yet moved
into her house at Brgy. Tugas.
Third, the same construction workers admitted that petitioner only visited Baliangao
occasionally when they stated that "at times when she (petitioner) was in Baliangao, she
used to stay at the house of Lourdes Yap while her residential house was being
constructed."
42

These discrepancies bolster the statement of the Brgy. Tugas officials that petitioner
was not and never had been a resident of their barangay. At most, the Affidavits of all the
witnesses only show that petitioner was building and developing a beach resort and a
house in Brgy. Tugas, and that she only stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray whenever she wanted
to oversee the construction of the resort and the house.1wphi1

68

Assuming that the claim of property ownership of petitioner is true, Fernandez v.
COMELEC
43
has established that the ownership of a house or some other property does
not establish domicile. This principle is especially true in this case as petitioner has failed to
establish her bodily presence in the locality and her intent to stay there at least a year
before the elections, to wit:
To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of
domicile or residence implies that the landed can establish compliance with the residency
requirement. This Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to
hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional.
Finally, the approval of the application for registration of petitioner as a voter only shows, at
most, that she had met the minimum residency requirement as a voter.
44
This minimum
requirement is different from that for acquiring a new domicile of choice for the purpose of
running for public office.
Accordingly, in the CoC of petitioner, her statement of her eligibility to run for office
constitutes a material misrepresentation that warrants its cancellation.
45
She contends that
respondent COMELEC never made a finding that she had committed material
misrepresentation. Her contention, however, is belied by its factual determination in its 04
June 2010 and 19 August 2010 Resolutions that she had failed to meet the one-year
residency requirement.
During the pendency of the case, we deemed it proper to issue an Order dated 07
September 2010 directing the parties to observe the status quo before the issuance of
these COMELEC Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from the mayoralty race in Baliangao.
We issued the Order, considering that petitioner, having garnered the highest number of
votes in the 10 May 2010 elections, had assumed office as municipal mayor. However, with
this final determination of her ineligibility to run for office, there is now a permanent vacancy
in the office of the mayor of Baliangao. Hence, the vice-mayor of Baliangao shall become its
mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Status Quo Ante Order
issued by this Court on 07 September 2010 is hereby LIFTED.

GARCIA QUIAZON VS BELEN
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The
petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo
was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

69

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother,
Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.
3
In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-
3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at
the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to
Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence
of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the
decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth
4
signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged
that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties
worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation
of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her
children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by
filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.
5
The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate,
6
Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of
his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,
7
the petition for
settlement of decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las
Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are
no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
In a Decision
8
dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the
venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby discrediting the position
taken by the petitioners that Eliseos last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The
dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or
incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the
decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon,
after the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by
her.
9

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision
10
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the
findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and
Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of
Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate,
the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a
resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution
11
dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues

70

The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO
QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC
OF LAS PIAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA
GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE
TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON
HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.
12

The Courts Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent
resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
significant factor.
13
Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
14
Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."
15
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode.
16
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
17
Venue for

71

ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.
18
As
thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.
19

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was
properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason,
the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in
Eliseos Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate
should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a
decedents residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding
on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with
Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death
in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial
partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the
ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.
20
That Eliseo went to the extent of
taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners
position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It
disproves rather than supports petitioners submission that the lower courts findings arose
from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this
Court.
21

Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage
has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime
of the parties to the marriage.
22
It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of
the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family
Code, making the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog
23
applicable four-square to the case at hand. In
Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death
of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it
but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
24

It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it
cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage

72

directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage.
25

Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage
even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an
action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.
Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,
26
has a cause of action for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to
the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now
proceed to determine whether or not the decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being
bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage
between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of
Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of
San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent
evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information
relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries
therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than
50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the
National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the
absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and
Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
27

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not
shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are
entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond,
or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it

73

may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of
the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in
estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming
evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners
pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a
desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to
her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.
29
Having a vested right in the
distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be
considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution,
arc AFFIRMED in toto.
------------------------------------PERSONS AND FAMILY-------------------------------------------------------------------------
LUCAS VS LUCAS

74

Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order? In this
petition for review on certiorari, we address this question to guide the Bench and the Bar in
dealing with a relatively new evidentiary tool. Assailed in this petition are the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision
1
dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17,
2009.
The antecedents of the case are, as follows:
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation
(with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing)
2
before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his mother,
Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain "Ate Belen
(Belen)" who worked in a prominent nightspot in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany
Belen to work. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at
Belens workplace, and an intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie
eventually got pregnant and, on March 11, 1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U.
Lucas. The name of petitioners father was not stated in petitioners certificate of live birth.
However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent. On August 1, 1969,
petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City. Respondent allegedly
extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about two years. When the
relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie refused to accept respondents offer of
support and decided to raise petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie
made several attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
Attached to the petition were the following: (a) petitioners certificate of live birth; (b)
petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college diploma, showing that he graduated
from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of
Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers
about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of
the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court on August 29,
2007 and obtained a copy of the petition.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on
September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
issued the Order
3
setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to
the petition to file his opposition. The court also directed that the Order be published once a
week for three consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, and that the Solicitor General be furnished with copies of the Order and the
petition in order that he may appear and represent the State in the case.
On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order,
respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested inter alia that: (1) he
did not receive the summons and a copy of the petition; (2) the petition was adversarial in
nature and therefore summons should be served on him as respondent; (3) should the court
agree that summons was required, he was waiving service of summons and making a

75

voluntary appearance; and (4) notice by publication of the petition and the hearing was
improper because of the confidentiality of the subject matter.
4

On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners
Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Respondent reiterated that the petition for
recognition is adversarial in nature; hence, he should be served with summons.
After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration.
5
Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and substance
because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein.
He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to
respondent as petitioners father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the
acceptability of DNA evidence.
On July 30, 2008, the RTC, acting on respondents motion for reconsideration, issued an
Order
6
dismissing the case. The court remarked that, based on the case of Herrera v.
Alba,
7
there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy,
and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. The court opined that
petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence
of paternity and filiation, which may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like
blood group test and DNA test results. The court observed that the petition did not show
that these procedural aspects were present. Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case
considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare that she had sexual relations with
respondent, and petitioners statement as to what his mother told him about his father was
clearly hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent; and (c)
although petitioner used the surname of respondent, there was no allegation that he was
treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The court opined that, having
failed to establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present any
affirmative defenses. The dispositive portion of the said Order therefore reads:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the petitioner to establish compliance with the four procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action in his petition, his motion for the submission of
parties to DNA testing to establish paternity and filiation is hereby denied. This case is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
8

Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration to the Order dated July 30, 2008,
which the RTC resolved in his favor. Thus, on October 20, 2008, it issued the Order
9
setting
aside the courts previous order, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated July 30, 2008 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside.
Let the Petition (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) be set for
hearing on January 22, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning.

76

x x x x
SO ORDERED.
10

This time, the RTC held that the ruling on the grounds relied upon by petitioner for filing the
petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. The court
stressed that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. It was verified, it included a
certification against forum shopping, and it contained a plain, concise, and direct statement
of the ultimate facts on which petitioner relies on for his claim, in accordance with Section 1,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. The court remarked that the allegation that the statements in
the petition were not of petitioners personal knowledge is a matter of evidence. The court
also dismissed respondents arguments that there is no basis for the taking of DNA test,
and that jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. It noted that
the new Rule on DNA Evidence
11
allows the conduct of DNA testing, whether at the courts
instance or upon application of any person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated October 20, 2008 and for
Dismissal of Petition,
12
reiterating that (a) the petition was not in due form and substance as
no defendant was named in the title, and all the basic allegations were hearsay; and (b)
there was no prima facie case, which made the petition susceptible to dismissal.
The RTC denied the motion in the Order dated January 19, 2009, and rescheduled the
hearing.
13

Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, questioning the Orders
dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009.
On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari in favor of respondent,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious.
The assailed Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 both issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 172 of Valenzuela City in SP. Proceeding Case No. 30-V-07
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case docketed as SP. Proceeding Case
No. 30-V-07 is DISMISSED.
14

The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent, as no
summons had been served on him. Respondents special appearance could not be
considered as voluntary appearance because it was filed only for the purpose of
questioning the jurisdiction of the court over respondent. Although respondent likewise
questioned the courts jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the same is not
equivalent to a waiver of his right to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, specifically
seeking a DNA testing order to abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to
show that the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action had been
met. The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has
failed to establish a prima facie case, thus:

77

While the tenor [of Section 4, Rule on DNA Evidence] appears to be absolute, the rule could
not really have been intended to trample on the substantive rights of the parties. It could
have not meant to be an instrument to promote disorder, harassment, or extortion. It could
have not been intended to legalize unwarranted expedition to fish for evidence. Such will be
the situation in this particular case if a court may at any time order the taking of a DNA test.
If the DNA test in compulsory recognition cases is immediately available to the
petitioner/complainant without requiring first the presentation of corroborative proof, then a
dire and absurd rule would result. Such will encourage and promote harassment and
extortion.
x x x x
At the risk of being repetitious, the Court would like to stress that it sees the danger of
allowing an absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition test even if the
plaintiff/petitioner failed to establish prima facie proof. x x x If at anytime, motu proprio and
without pre-conditions, the court can indeed order the taking of DNA test in compulsory
recognition cases, then the prominent and well-to-do members of our society will be easy
prey for opportunists and extortionists. For no cause at all, or even for [sic] casual sexual
indiscretions in their younger years could be used as a means to harass them.
Unscrupulous women, unsure of the paternity of their children may just be taking the
chances-just in case-by pointing to a sexual partner in a long past one-time encounter.
Indeed an absolute and unconditional taking of DNA test for compulsory recognition case
opens wide the opportunities for extortionist to prey on victims who have no stomach for
scandal.
15

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009, the CA denied the motion for
lack of merit.
16

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RESOLVED
THE ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF HEREIN
RESPONDENT ALBEIT THE SAME WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI.
I.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED
THAT JURISDICTION WAS NOT ACQUIRED OVER THE PERSON OF THE
RESPONDENT.
I.B
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED
TO REALIZE THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED
VOLUNTARILY TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO.

78

I.C
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
ESSENTIALLY RULED THAT THE TITLE OF A PLEADING, RATHER THAN
ITS BODY, IS CONTROLLING.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED
THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY REASON OF THE MOTION (FILED BY
THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE COURT A QUO) FOR THE CONDUCT OF DNA
TESTING.
II.A
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ESSENTIALLY
RULED THAT DNA TESTING CAN ONLY BE ORDERED AFTER THE
PETITIONER ESTABLISHES PRIMA FACIE PROOF OF FILIATION.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WITH ITS MISPLACED
RELIANCE ON THE CASE OF HERRERA VS. ALBA,
ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
OF A TRADITIONAL PATERNITY ACTION.
17

Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as issue in his petition for certiorari the
courts lack of jurisdiction over his person. Hence, the CA had no legal basis to discuss the
same, because issues not raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At any rate,
respondent had already voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by his filing
of several motions asking for affirmative relief, such as the (a) Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order dated September 3, 2007; (b) Ex Parte Motion to Resolve Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated November 6, 2007; and (c) Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order dated October 20, 2008 and for Dismissal of Petition. Petitioner points out that
respondent even expressly admitted that he has waived his right to summons in his
Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case.
Hence, the issue is already moot and academic.
Petitioner argues that the case was adversarial in nature. Although the caption of the
petition does not state respondents name, the body of the petition clearly indicates his
name and his known address. He maintains that the body of the petition is controlling and
not the caption.
Finally, petitioner asserts that the motion for DNA testing should not be a reason for the
dismissal of the petition since it is not a legal ground for the dismissal of cases. If the CA
entertained any doubt as to the propriety of DNA testing, it should have simply denied the
motion.
18
Petitioner points out that Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence does not require

79

that there must be a prior proof of filiation before DNA testing can be ordered. He adds that
the CA erroneously relied on the four significant procedural aspects of a paternity case, as
enunciated in Herrera v. Alba.
19
Petitioner avers that these procedural aspects are not
applicable at this point of the proceedings because they are matters of evidence that should
be taken up during the trial.
20

In his Comment, respondent supports the CAs ruling on most issues raised in the petition
for certiorari and merely reiterates his previous arguments. However, on the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, respondent counters that, contrary to petitioners assertion, he raised the issue
before the CA in relation to his claim that the petition was not in due form and substance.
Respondent denies that he waived his right to the service of summons. He insists that the
alleged waiver and voluntary appearance was conditional upon a finding by the court that
summons is indeed required. He avers that the assertion of affirmative defenses, aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, cannot be considered as waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person.
The petition is meritorious.
Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were orders denying
respondents motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denying a
motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a
case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on
the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss
be the subject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In a
number of cases, the court has granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial
of the motion to dismiss but only when it has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
21
In the present case, we discern no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss.
The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent were (a) the courts lack of jurisdiction
over his person due to the absence of summons, and (b) defect in the form and substance
of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation, which is equivalent to failure to state a cause
of action.
We need not belabor the issues on whether lack of jurisdiction was raised before the CA,
whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent, or whether
respondent waived his right to the service of summons. We find that the primordial issue
here is actually whether it was necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on
respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case. In other words, was the
service of summons jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on the nature of
petitioners action, that is, whether it is an action in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in
rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in
rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a
property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed against the "thing" itself or

80

the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of
marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.
22

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the
court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court,
provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired
either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into
actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which
the power of the court is recognized and made effective.
23

The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of
the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction
over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication
is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort to the right sought to be
established.
24
Through publication, all interested parties are deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of
vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.
25
This is but proper in order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to
protect his interest if he so chooses.
26
Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the
court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may
be excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file
his opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process requirement with respect to
respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in the proceedings in
this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation.
To address respondents contention that the petition should have been adversarial in form,
we further hold that the herein petition to establish filiation was sufficient in form. It was
indeed adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the name of a defendant, the
failure to implead respondent as defendant, and the non-service of summons upon
respondent. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
27
In this
petitionclassified as an action in remthe notice requirement for an adversarial
proceeding was likewise satisfied by the publication of the petition and the giving of notice
to the Solicitor General, as directed by the trial court.
The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct
statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact is essential if
it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.
28
A
complaint states a cause of action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal
right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of
the defendant in violation of said legal right.
29


81

The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to establish his
filiation to respondent. Respondent, however, contends that the allegations in the petition
were hearsay as they were not of petitioners personal knowledge. Such matter is clearly a
matter of evidence that cannot be determined at this point but only during the trial when
petitioner presents his evidence.
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted
to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to
constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations of fact are true, for said
motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.
30

The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.
31
The test of the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer of the complaint.
32

If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and
correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny the motion to dismiss and
require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity of the
assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits.
33

The statement in Herrera v. Alba
34
that there are four significant procedural aspects in a
traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and
misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during
trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of
evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the
petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to
establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity caseis therefore
misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in
the initiatory pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-
-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by
petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a
DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the
trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.
At any rate, the CAs view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without
corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Courts attention. In light of this
observation, we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to aid
the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other
filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of whether a prima facie showing is
necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the
introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the "prescribed
parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures,
protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available

82

objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value
of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of
DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused
and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and
protects, rather than prejudice the public."
35

Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that
are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the
parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing
now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is
relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest
of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if,
during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show
cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good cause" for the holding of
the test.
36
In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search," which,
under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in
order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility,
was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana eloquently explained
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient
justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a
court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed

83

regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that,
as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing,
the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.
37
1avvphi 1
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative
father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing,
the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order
remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is
absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to
establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its
discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 of
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED.

TY VS CA
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church
wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a
valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null
and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private
respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by
the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in
Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig,
Branch 160, praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged
that they had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the time
he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he
married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued.

84

The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980,
while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that
their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage
License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A.
He did not question this document when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner also
submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated
August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on
August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as evidence during trial and, according
to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that the civil
marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the
judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also appears
indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April
4, 1982.
1

The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage to herein
petitioner null andvoid ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties
appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the
trial courts decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna
Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said
the appellate court:
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendants counsel that no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. It does not say, however,
that a second marriage may proceed even without a judicial decree. While it is true that if a
marriage is null and void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling
to rule that the matter of whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to
determine for himself for this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed
to a second marriage even before a competent court issues a judicial decree of nullity of his
first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the least, and could not have been
the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code on marriage.
x x x
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this
wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo
M. Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null
and void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the
amount of P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes
from November 4, 1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.

85

SO ORDERED.
2

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting that
the Court of Appeals erred:
I.
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE
VALIDITY OF PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL
DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
II
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF
APPEALS.
III
IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL
EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME
MARRIAGE LICENSE.
IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is
required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this
question, we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the assigned
errors, particularly the first and the second which we shall discuss jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to
private respondent null andvoid for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage
between private respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court rejected petitioners claim
that People v. Mendoza
3
and People v. Aragon
4
are applicable in this case. For these cases
held that where a marriage is void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity. But the appellate court said these cases, decided before the
enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no longer
control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into the provisions of law
previously obtaining.
5

In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this
case. Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of
the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in the instant case.

86

x x x
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage,
a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .
6

At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and second marriages contracted
in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The
present case differs significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v. Bobis
7
and Mercado v.
Tan,
8
both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage was
contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code,
9
under which a judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage is clearly required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being
alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code
contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears
to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,
10
and People v. Aragon,
11
this Court held that no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the
same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his
first marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during
the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy.
The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void, having been
contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a judicial
declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the
first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages.
Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it
is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or not.
In Gomez v. Lipana,
12
and Consuegra v. Consuegra,
13
however, we recognized the right of
the second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired
estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed that

87

although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of
such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the husband supervened
before such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to share in the estate they
acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.
14

But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),
15
the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as
precedents. We exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that
his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she was already
previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year. The Court held that
no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was
affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.
16

Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),
17
the Court held that there is a need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978,
she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic
Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid
marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:
18

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her
first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for
all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time
she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage
of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,
19
however, the Court found the second marriage void without
need of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our
rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the
Family Code.
20
Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992)
21
the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically
stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we
disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his first
marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already
married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is
that "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential."
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of
Appeals (1993),
22
the Court held:

88

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See
also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).
23

However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the
case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997)
24
the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of
immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage
was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On
the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held
that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before
the promulgation of Wiegeland the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that
time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into
in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license
and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract
a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondents second
marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to
the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her
children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals,
25
the Family Code has retroactive
effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of
vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite prepared
to give assent to the appellate courts finding that despite private respondents "deceit and
perfidy" in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her silence on the
issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner
married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil
ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner
claimed as untruthful private respondents allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked
a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license, though it was the same
license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously,
the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the
appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said
canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as
affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate
court from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of
the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution,
outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied
with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of
a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the
celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the

89

church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served
not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its reasons for
brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could have
tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But
we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the
wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls "his own deceit and perfidy."
On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees.1wphi1 Although the
appellate court admitted that they found private respondent acted "duplicitously and craftily"
in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral damages because the latter did not adduce
evidence to support her claim.
26

Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the
present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent
held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same
breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for
annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer,
we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or
common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not
common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend
an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital
obligation.
27
There are other remedies.
28

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so
that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is
hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of P15,000.00
is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes
and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled
thereto. Costs against private respondent.

ALCANTARA VS ALCANTARA
A petition for annulment of marriage
3
was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the
required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a
person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged
their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC
BR Chapel.
4
They got married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and
respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church
in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the
parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona,
Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar
of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann

90

Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after
due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil
Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract
5
and its entry on file.
6

Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of
their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners
representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14
October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October
1992.
7
Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children.
8
Petitioner only filed the
annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.
9
Respondent, in fact,
has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.
10
Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of
marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing
as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days
of each month; and
3. To pay the costs.
11

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioners
appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 6 April 2005.
12

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be
regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the
presumption. Moreover, the parties marriage contract being a public document is a prima
facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
13

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that
the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on
record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the
solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight
to the Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not
identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage license
number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.

91

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to
apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of
Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to
relax the observance of procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial
rights of the party litigants.
14

We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was
celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the
Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them.
15
The wedding
took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino
Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.
16
He and respondent did not go to
Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from
Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the
place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given
weight because the certification states that "Marriage License number 7054133 was issued
in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario"
17
but their marriage contract
bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)
18
in relation to
Article 58 of the same Code.
19

Article 53 of the Civil Code
20
which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the
parties states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested.
21


92

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his
marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a
ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
22
the Local Civil Registrar issued a
certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage
License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of "due
search and inability to find" a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by
the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the
law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said
certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the
marriage void ab initio.
In Cario v. Cario,
23
the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified
by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the
deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,
24
the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost
one year after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the
ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage
license.
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the
marriage void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license
must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this
case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage
license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of
Carmona, Cavite.
25
The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the
parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita
Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage
License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita
Almario on December 8, 1982.

93

This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever
legal purpose or intents it may serve.
26

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and
the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official
business.
27
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until
it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless
the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be
made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful
or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.
28
Significantly, apart from
these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in
Carmona, Cavite.
29

Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims
that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that
there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a
marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting
parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the
completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not
affect the validity of the marriage.
30
An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage
does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
31

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to
the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license
number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is
not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny
of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the
marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from
our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,
32
petitioner
cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he
now insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the
civil marriage took place because he "initiated it."
33
Petitioner is an educated person. He is a
mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City
Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot
benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his
mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle.
We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of
marriage betrays his bad faith.
34

Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than
one year utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the
second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything
was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.lavvphi1

94

In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San
Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding
ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioners testimony as
follows
WITNESS
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the
wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San
Jose de Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I dont remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I
dont know if it is good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you
already a Marriage Contract?
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the
Marriage Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
35


95

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that
took place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil
marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.
36

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged
everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture.
The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will
be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.
37
Moreover, the solemnizing
officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and
regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that
the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the
contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
38

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of
the marriage.
39
Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage
bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

SY VS CA
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on
November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.
4
Both were then
22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who
were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978, respectively.
5

The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit,
Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and
hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.
6

On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses
lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their
son Frederick transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,
1988, and from then on, lived with his father.
7

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case
No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion
of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the
grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living
separately for more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of

96

Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership.
8
Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal
partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the
Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses.
9
The trial court also granted custody
of the children to Filipina.
10

In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina
testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay,
Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and
bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored
her and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer
away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina
away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also
claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her
only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on
different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a
Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time
Fernando maltreated her.
11

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision
12
dated April 26, 1990,
convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to
20 days imprisonment.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed
as Civil Case No. 8273, on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual
infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her
husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision
13
dated December 4, 1991, granted the petition on the
grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal
separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son
Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition
14
for the declaration of absolute nullity of her
marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the
final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for
separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence
on her which led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms
of psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological
incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on
her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her,
performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such
psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their
marriage and became manifest thereafter.
15

The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision
16
dated December 9,
1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage
to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not

97

constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In
the decision
17
of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of
petitioner concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the
quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and
essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to
show that the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the
celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the
couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the
celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together
harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it
found to be in accordance with law and the evidence on record.
18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
19
which the Court of Appeals denied in its
resolution dated November 21, 1996.
20

Hence, this appeal by certiorari
21
wherein petitioner now raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY
OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED
UPON BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER
MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO
SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD
EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS
CELEBRATED IN 1973;
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF
THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO
THE COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN
AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT
A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS (240
SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO.
22

In sum, two issues are to be resolved:

98

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid
marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of
the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate
and marriage license are different and incongruous.
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on
appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice,
23
in a number of
instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not
ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said
that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very
reason for their existence would be defeated.
24
Hence, when substantial justice plainly
requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be
subject to cavil.
25
In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the
validity of the marriage between Filipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply
seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent facts
are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their effects according to
existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of
marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and
the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to
Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were
contained in the documents she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the
marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their
marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the
course of the trial.
26
The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta.
Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private
respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting
it.
27
This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her
direct examination,
28
as follows:
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November 15,
1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's
and daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter

99

marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial.
29
These pieces of evidence on
record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no
marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license,
numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private
respondent ever resided in Carmona.
30

Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed
petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was
incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the
issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage
license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place
on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying
these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code
31
is clearly applicable in this case. There
being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and
private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79
32
of
the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage
between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are
the birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these
documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that
these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been
made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to
petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration
of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having
been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these
documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.
33

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer
detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9, 1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on
May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CA-
G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between
petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to
costs.

CARINO VS CARINO

100

The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the
subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married. 1wphi 1. nt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision
1
of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision
2
of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the
first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as
Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and
the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter
referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated
by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of
Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent
filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,
3
while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and
burial (SSS).
4

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum
of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to
return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00)
collectively denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons,
petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of
the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased,
where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her
action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the
deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number;
5
and 2) a certification
dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads

This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses
SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on
June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of
Marriage License number from the records of this archives.

101

This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal
purpose it may serve.
6

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00,
half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death
of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of
suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
7

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING
EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL
MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED,
AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
8

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
9
However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case
for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the
parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
10
In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds

102

rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to
an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
11

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity
of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is
rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage,
12
and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,
13
renders the marriage
void ab initio.
14

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
15
the
Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification
issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their
marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was
declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and
explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals
and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from
pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of
their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being
one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny
would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the
Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the
deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized
without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao

103

and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased
is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of
the spouses according to the applicable property regime.
16
Considering that the two
marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute
community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships
where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same
married man,
17
-
... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home,
children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
18

Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then
presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148
is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent
Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not
owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and
respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said
death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being
the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the
Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family
Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the

104

property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family and of the household.
x x x
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either
party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be
divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did
not contribute thereto.
19
Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by
the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in
respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of
bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good
faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner
as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass
by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,
20
where the Court awarded one-half
of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second
wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the
conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost
or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled
to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as
conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in
the husbands share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the
second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership
formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he
only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second
wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider
the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
21


105

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which
requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason
why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their
existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,
22
however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family
Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all
important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is
previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a
judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second
marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the
first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves
the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like
for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid,
no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is
to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from
which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the
determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and
proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and
jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,
23
the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment
of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause
on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the
Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the
amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-
93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi 1. nt

NAVARRO VS DOMOGTOY
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which,
he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the
law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar
A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated
from his first wife.

106

Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent
judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional
area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers
away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that
the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else,
who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as
a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC,
which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter
No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still
pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of
having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from
his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first
wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.
1
With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in
question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted
were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.
2

Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not
been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and
respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by
themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga
states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding
ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit
by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge
Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.
3
The affidavit was not
issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their
affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D.
Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children,
Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been
heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof
of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the
marriage ceremony. We do not agree.

107

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is
clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which
has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages
where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is
factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains
married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part
of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such
neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the
beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge
or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-
general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both
parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage

108

may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his
court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of
the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death,
(2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del
Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request
presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del
Rosario.
4

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority
of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others,
"any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or
qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-
compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines
to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.
5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the
exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The
legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and
uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a
lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in
the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant
with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case.
6
It is not too much to expect
them to know and apply the law intelligently.
7
Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent

109

judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the
status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void,
there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-
month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a
bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of
respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be
more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

ARANES VS OCCIANO
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge
of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17
February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B.
Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside
his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast
properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.1wphi 1. nt
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and
unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting
Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office
of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a
certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17
February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete,
he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a
difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located

110

almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent
judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined
the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not
possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and
suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties,
the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to
solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the
wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke.
After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and
admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner
and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the
afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up
with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license
would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage
is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and
embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001
with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially
refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and
that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the
same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after
reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is
now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their
Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that
the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor
Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has
no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification
dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties
since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the
issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of
Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T.
Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due
to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.

111

The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15
November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly
issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of
P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.1wphi 1. nt
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,
1
respondent judge
held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality
of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the
faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his
Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability."
2
(Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act
of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We
further held that:
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved
in the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment,
for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of
elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons."
3

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality
of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in
Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative
liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized
the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for
violating the law on marriage.

112

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. InPeople vs. Lara,
4
we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance
of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot
render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law,
it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the
law.1wphi1.nt
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by
petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the
complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.
5
Disciplinary actions of this nature do
not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the
will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act.
We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the
Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to
naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity
of this Court as a disciplining authority.
6

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

OCA VS NECESSARIO
On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City
and headed the audit team created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the
MTCC in Cebu City.
5
A female and male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as a
couple looking to get married. They went to the Palace of Justice and were directed by the
guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that
he would be recognized by other court personnel, specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch 4
who was a former law school classmate. The two lawyers then agreed that only the female
lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage application process. Inside Branch 4,
a woman named Helen approached and assisted the female lawyer. When the female
lawyer asked if the marriage process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the
marriage could be solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated
the day the marriage license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the
process for a fee of three thousand pesos (P3,000) only.
6

In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6 July 2007 of the
judicial audit team as a formal administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S.
Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C.

113

Rosales to submit their respective comments.
7
The Court also suspended the judges
pending resolution of the cases against them.
8

On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N.
Elepao submitted its Memorandum dated 29 August 2007
9
and Supplemental Report.
10
Six
hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit
team.
11
The team reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280
marriages were solemnized under Article 34
12
of the Family Code.
13
The logbooks of the
MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of
marriage certificates in the courts custody.
14
There is also an unusual number of marriage
licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan,
Cebu.
15
There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained
on the same day.
16
The town of Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers away from
Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours.
17
Liloan, Cebu, on the other
hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City.
18

The judicial audit team, after tape-recording interviews with other court and government
personnel, also reported the following:
1) Celeste P. Retuya admitted that she assisted couples who wanted to get married by
checking whether their documents were complete and referred them to Judges Tormis,
Necessario, and Rosales afterwards;
19

2) Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to Judge Necessario.
There were also "assistants" who would go over the couples documents before these
couples would be referred to Judge Necessario. Retuya also narrated several anomalies
involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of marriage licenses from the local civil
registrar of Barili, Cebu despite the fact that parties were not residents of Barili. Those
anomalous marriages were solemnized by Judge Tormis;
20

3) Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the available judges.
She admitted that after the payment of the solemnization fee of three hundred pesos
(P300), a different amount, as agreed upon by the parties and the judge, was paid to the
latter.
21
She admitted that she accepted four thousand pesos (P4,000) for facilitating the
irregular marriage of Moreil Baranggan Sebial and Maricel Albater although she gave the
payment to a certain "Mang Boy";
22

4) Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get married and that
most of the marriage licenses were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan,
Cebu because the registrars in those towns were not strict about couples attendance in the
family planning seminar. She also admitted that couples gave her food while the judge
received five hundred pesos (P500) if the marriage was solemnized inside the chambers.
Foreigners were said to have given twice the said amount. The judge accepted one
thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) for gasoline expenses if the marriage was celebrated
outside the chambers;
23

5) Marilou Cabaez admitted that she assisted couples and referred them to Judges
Tormis, Necessario, or Rosales. However, she denied receiving any amount from these

114

couples. She told the audit team that during the 8th, 18th, and 28th of the month, seven (7)
to eight (8) couples would go directly to Judge Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute
marriage solemnization;
24

6) Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in 2003. He told the
investigating team that Judge Gil Acosta would talk to couples wishing to get married
without a license. He would produce a joint affidavit of cohabitation form on which he or the
clerk of court would type the entries. The judge would then receive an envelope containing
money from the couple. Aranas also confirmed the existence of "open-dated" marriage
certificates;
25

7) Antonio Flores, Branch 9 Process Server of RTC Cebu City, told the investigating team
that couples looked for Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 9, Cebu City, "para menos ang bayad."
26
The excess of three hundred pesos
(P300) that couples paid to Judge Econg as solemnization fee went to a certain "sinking
fund" of Branch 9;
27

8) Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or
Tormis. Couples who wanted to get married under Article 34 of the Family Code were
advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint cohabitation for ten pesos (P10);
28

9) Arvin Oca, Branch 1 Process Server of the MTCC of Cebu City, admitted that he referred
couples to Branch 2, Clerk of Court, Harrish Co. Oca declared that on 28 June 2007, he
accompanied a couple to the chambers of Judge Necessario.
29
He informed the judge that
the couple only had birth certificates.
30
The respondent judge then inquired about their ages
and asked them if they had been previously married then proceeded to solemnize the
marriage;
31
and
10) Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared that she does not
scrutinize marriage applications.
32
Couples who are non-Barili residents are able to obtain
marriage licenses from her Barili office because these couples have relatives residing in
Barili, Cebu.
33
She also added that while couples still need to submit a certificate of
attendance in the family planning seminar, they may attend it before or after the filing of the
application for marriage license.
34

Affidavits of private persons were also attached to the records. Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera
was a resident of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu and on 21 May 2007, she and her then fianc
wanted to set a marriage date.
35
Her younger sister who was married in a civil wedding last
year gave her the number of a certain "Meloy". After talking to Meloy on the phone, the
wedding was scheduled at 2 p.m. on 23 May 2007 and the couple were asked to bring their
birth certificates. No marriage license was required from them. Meloy asked for a fee of one
thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500). According to Baguio-Manera, their marriage
certificate was marked as "No marriage license was necessary, the marriage being
solemnized under Art. 34 of Executive Order No. 209". Their marriage was solemnized that
day by Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera claimed that they did not understand
what that statement meant at that time. However, in her affidavit, she declared that the
situation premised under Article 34 did not apply to her and her fianc.

115

Mary Anne Flores-Patoc was a resident of Barrio Luz, Cebu City. In her 5 July 2007
affidavit, she recounted how she and her boyfriend went to the Provincial Capitol to get
married in February 2006. While logging in at the entrance, they were offered assistance by
the guards for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500). The guard also offered to
become "Ninong" or a witness to the wedding. The couple became suspicious and did not
push through with the civil wedding at that time.
On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution: a) requiring Judges Anatalio
S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales of the
MTCC, Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8, respectively, of Cebu City, to comment on the findings of
the 14 August 2007 Supplemental Report of the OCA, within fifteen (15) days from notice;
b) directing the Process Servicing Unit to furnish the judges with a copy of the Supplemental
Report; c) requiring the court personnel listed below to show cause within fifteen (15) days
from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for their alleged grave
misconduct and dishonesty and impleading them in this administrative matter:
1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Cebu
City;
4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City;
5) Marilou Cabaez, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City;
6) Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;
7) Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City;
8) Helen Mongaya,Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City.
The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the referral to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas for appropriate action on the administrative matter involving
the violation of the law on marriage by Ms. Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of
Barili, Cebu, and one Ms. Veronica S. Longakit, former Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu;
b) directed the Process Serving Unit to furnish the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas with a copy of the Supplemental Report of the OCA; and c) required Judge
Geraldine Faith A. Econg, RTC, Branch 9, Cebu City, to comment within fifteen (15) days
from notice on the statement of staff member Antonio Flores saying that Branch 9s court
personnel received an amount in excess of the P300 solemnization fee paid by couples
whose marriages were solemnized by her. This amount goes to the courts "sinking fund".
36

In their Comments and/or Answers to the Memorandum dated 5 July 2007 of the OCA and
its Supplemental Report,
37
the respondent judges argued the following:

116

Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the
documents presented to him by contracting parties.
38
He claims that marriages he
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code had the required affidavit of cohabitation.
He claims that pro forma affidavits of cohabitation have been used by other judges even
before he became a judge.
39
He avers that he ascertains the ages of the parties, their
relationship, and the existence of an impediment to marry.
40
He also asks the parties
searching questions and clarifies whether they understood the contents of the affidavit and
the legal consequences of its execution.
41
The judge also denies knowledge of the payment
of solemnization fees in batches.
42
In addition, he argues that it was a process server who
was in-charge of recording marriages on the logbook, keeping the marriage certificates, and
reporting the total number of marriages monthly.
43

Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and that he is not
required to inquire whether the license was obtained from a location where one of the
parties is an actual resident.
44
The judge believes that it is not his duty to verify the
signature on the marriage license to determine its authenticity because he relies on the
presumption of regularity of public documents.
45
The judge also outlines his own procedure
in solemnizing marriages which involves: first, the determination whether the solemnization
fee was paid; second, the presentation of the affidavit of cohabitation and birth certificates
to ascertain identity and age of the parties; third, if one of the parties is a foreigner, the
judge asks for a certificate of legal capacity to marry, passport picture, date of arrival, and
divorce papers when the party is divorced; fourth, he then asks the parties and their
witnesses questions regarding cohabitation and interviews the children of the parties, if
any.
46

Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA. She calls the actions
of the judicial audit team during the investigation an "entrapment".
47
She also claims that
there is nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date of the issuance of the
marriage license and with the fact that the issued marriage license was obtained from a
place where neither of the parties resided.
48
As to the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation,
she argues that she cannot be faulted for accepting it as genuine as she and the other
judges are not handwriting experts.
49
The affidavits also enjoy the presumption of
regularity.
50
Judge Tormis also discredits the affidavit of Baguio-Manera as hearsay.
51
The
respondent said that when Baguio-Manera and her husband were confronted with the
affidavit they executed, they affirmed the veracity of the statements, particularly the fact that
they have been living together for five years.
52
The judge also attributes the irregularity in
the number of marriages solemnized in her sala to the filing clerks.
53

Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on marriage.
54
He maintains that it is
the local civil registrar who evaluates the documents submitted by the parties, and he
presumes the regularity of the license issued.
55
It is only when there is no marriage license
given that he ascertains the qualifications of the parties and the lack of legal impediment to
marry.
56
As to the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge believes there is nothing wrong with
the fact that these are pro forma. He states that marriage certificates are required with the
marriage license attached or the affidavit of cohabitation only and the other documents fall
under the responsibility of the local civil registrar. He surmises that if the marriage certificate
did not come with the marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation, the missing document
might have been inadvertently detached, and it can be checked with the proper local civil

117

registrar. As to the payment of the docket fee, he contends that it should be paid after the
solemnization of the marriage and not before because judges will be pre-empted from
ascertaining the qualifications of the couple. Besides, the task of collecting the fee belongs
to the Clerk of Court.
57
The judge also argues that solemnization of marriage is not a judicial
duty.
58

On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea
for Early Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of Case.
59
This Court in a
Resolution dated 11 December 2007 lifted the suspension of the respondent judges but
prohibited them from solemnizing marriages until further ordered.
60

On 7 December 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Motion for Early Resolution with
Waiver of Formal and/or Further Investigation and Motion to Dismiss.
61
In a Resolution
dated 15 January 2008, the Court noted the motion and granted the prayer of Judges
Tormis and Rosales for the payment of their unpaid salaries, allowances and all other
economic benefits from 9 July 2007.
62

THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OCA
In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010,
63
the OCA recommended the dismissal of the
respondent judges and some court employees, and the suspension or admonition of others.
The OCA summarized the liabilities of the respondents, to wit:
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for
solemnizing marriages with questionable documents and wherein one of the contracting
parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the
required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the
contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
x x x
JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for failure to make
sure that the solemnization fee has been paid. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of
the contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for
solemnizing marriages with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the
solemnization fee has been paid and for solemnizing marriages wherein one of the
contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in
lieu of the required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.
JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for
solemnizing marriages with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the
solemnization fee has been paid, for solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting
parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the

118

required certificate from the embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired
license.
x x x
HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel that prohibits court personnel from soliciting or
accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit or implicit understanding that
such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions and for giving false information
for the purpose of perpetrating an irregular marriage.
RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the
application for marriage license by instructing her to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.
DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service for providing couples who are to be married under Article 34 of the
Family Code with the required affidavit of cohabitation.
CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of violating
Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court
personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for assisting or attending to parties
engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary.
64

The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the complaints against Judge
Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Corazon P. Retuya, and Marilou Cabaez, for lack of merit.
THE ISSUE
The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC
in Cebu City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross
inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal
from service.
THE COURTS RULING
The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator are
supported by the evidence on record and applicable law and jurisprudence.
This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy burden
and responsibility of keeping the faith of the public.
65
In Obaana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said
that:
Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official
functions must be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission
on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm
of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
66


119

The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift
marriages. The respondent judges and court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to
the prejudice of the parties and the proper administration of justice.
The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis,
and Edgemelo C. Rosales are all guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they
solemnized marriages without following the proper procedure laid down by law, particularly
the Family Code of the Philippines and existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down
aspects of the solemnization process which were disregarded by the judges. The Court will
now discuss the individual liabilities of the respondent judges and court personnel vis--vis
the evidence presented by the OCA against them.
Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario
The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a total of one thousand one hundred
twenty-three (1,123) marriages from 2005 to 2007.
67
However, only one hundred eighty-four
(184) marriage certificates were actually examined by the judicial audit team.
68
Out of the
184 marriages, only seventy-nine (79) were solemnized with a marriage license while one
hundred five (105) were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. Out of the 79
marriages with license, forty-seven (47) of these licenses were issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of Liloan, Cebu. This translates to 42.93% of the marriages he solemnized with
marriage license coming from Liloan for over a period of years.
69
There were also twenty-
two (22) marriages solemnized by the judge with incomplete documents such missing as
marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of
cohabitation.
70

Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had questionable supporting
documents such as marriage licenses.
71
The OCA found that the place of residence of the
contracting parties appearing in the supporting documents differ from the place where they
obtained their marriage license.
72
The documents invited suspicion because of erasures and
superimpositions in the entries of residence.
73
Likewise, in lieu of the required certificate of
legal capacity to marry, a mere affidavit was submitted by the parties.
74
Variations in the
signatures of the contracting parties were also apparent in the documents.
75

The respondent judge solemnized forty-three (43) marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code. These marriages appeared dubious since the joint affidavit of cohabitation of the
parties show minority of one or both of them during cohabitation.
76
For example, he
solemnized on 14 May 2004 the marriage of 22-year-old Harol D. Amorin and 19-year-old
Dinalyn S. Paraiso who are residents of Lapu-Lapu City.
77

There are also sixteen (16) marriage licenses with attached official receipts of the
solemnization fee but the corresponding marriage certificates cannot be found.
78
The
presence of the receipts implies that these marriages were solemnized.
Liability of Judge Gil R. Acosta
Judge Acosta solemnized a total of eighty-seven (87) marriages from 2003 to
2007.
79
However, the logbook showed that he solemnized two hundred seventy-two (272)

120

marriages while the monthly reports of cases showed that he solemnized five hundred
twelve (512) marriages over the same period. Out of the 87 marriages, he solemnized
seventy-five (75) under
Article 34 of the Family Code.
80
This is equivalent to 86.21% of the marriages solemnized
under Article 34 in a four-year period.
81

There were forty-one (41) marriage certificates signed by Judge Tormis or Judge
Necessario as solemnizing officers found in his custody.
82
There were also ten (10)
marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code where one or both of the contracting parties
were minors during cohabitation.
83
To illustrate, respondent judge solemnized on 4 May
2004 the marriage of Julieto W. Baga, 22 years old, and Esterlita P. Anlangit, 18 years old.
84

There were seventeen (17) marriages under Article 34 where neither of the contracting
parties were residents of Cebu City.
85
The judge solemnized three (3) marriages without the
foreign partys required certificate of legal capacity to marry.
86
Lastly, there was no proof of
payment of the solemnization fee in almost all of the marriages the judge officiated.
87

Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to
2007 based on the marriage certificates actually examined.
88
However, the monthly report
of cases showed that she solemnized three hundred five (305) marriages instead for the
years 2004 to 2007.
89
The OCA report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her court
started to use a logbook to keep track of marriages.
90

Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or missing
documents such as the marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint
affidavit of cohabitation.
91
In several instances, only affidavits were submitted by the foreign
parties in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to marry.
92

Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable character of the
validity of the required documents particularly the marriage license.
93
The judicial audit team
found numerous erasures and superimpositions on entries with regard to the parties place
of residence.
94

In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo and Anselma
B. Laranio on 28 December 2006 despite the marriage license containing a rubberstamp
mark saying, "THIS LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and a handwritten note saying "12/28/06"
under it.
95

The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code wherein the marriage requirements authenticity was doubtful due to the
circumstances of the cohabitation of the parties and the given address of the
parties.
96
These irregularities were evident in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan
and Ana Liza Secuya who were married on 25 May 2007. The residential address of the
couple in the marriage certificate is "Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu City." However, there

121

was an application for marriage license attached to the marriage certificate showing that
Secuyas address is "F. Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu City."
97

Liability of Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales
Judge Rosales solemnized a total of one hundred twenty-one (121) marriages from 2006 to
2007 based on the marriage certificates examined by the judicial audit team.
98
However,
only three (3) marriages were reported for the same period.
99
Out of the 121 marriages the
judge solemnized, fifty-two (52) or 42.98% fall under Article 34 of the Family Code.
100
Thirty-
eight
(38) marriage licenses out of the sixty-six (66) obtained or 57.57% were from the local civil
registrar of Barili, Cebu.
101
Nineteen (19) or 28.79% were from the local civil registrar of
Liloan, Cebu.
102
Nine (9) or 13.64% were from other local civil registrars.
103

There were marriage documents found in his court such as marriage licenses, applications
for marriage license, certificates of legal capacity to contract marriage, affidavits in lieu of
certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, joint affidavits of cohabitation, and other
documents referring to the solemnization of one hundred thirty-two (132) marriages, with no
corresponding marriage certificates.
104
He solemnized two marriages of Buddy Gayland
Weaver, an American citizen, to two different persons within nine (9) months.
105
No copy of
the required certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage or the divorce decree was
presented.
106

The judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages without or with incomplete supporting
documents such as the certificate of legal capacity to marry and the joint affidavit of
cohabitation.
107
He solemnized nine (9) marriages under questionable circumstances such
as the submission of an affidavit or affirmation of freedom to marry in lieu of the certificate of
legal capacity to marry, the discrepancies in the residence of the contracting parties as
appearing in the marriage documents, and the solemnization of the marriage on the same
day the marriage license was issued.
108

Judge Rosales also solemnized forty-three (43) marriages with no proof that the
solemnization fee of P300 was paid.
109
On the other hand, there were twenty-six (26)
marriages whose solemnization fees were paid late.
110

To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:
First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the
requirements submitted by the couples were incomplete and of questionable character.
Most of these documents showed visible signs of tampering, erasures, corrections or
superimpositions of entries related to the parties place of residence.
111
These included
indistinguishable features such as the font, font size, and ink of the computer-printed entries
in the marriage certificate and marriage license.
112
These actions of the respondent judges
constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala,
113
the Court held that inefficiency implies
negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.

122

Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of
solemnization fees. The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo,
114
defined neglect of duty as the
failure to give ones attention to a task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity
of the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to
endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit team
show that corresponding official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing
115
or
payment by batches was made for marriages performed on different dates.
116
The OCA
emphasizes that the payment of the solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage
application process and even puts a "stamp of regularity" on the process.
Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a
contracting party is a foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry
from his or her embassy. What the foreigners submitted were mere affidavits stating their
capacity to marry. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are required under
Article 21 of the Family Code
117
displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They
should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents required for the marriage license
issuance. Any irregularities would have been prevented in the qualifications of parties to
contract marriage.
118

Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the
law under Article 34 of the Family Code
119
with respect to the marriages they solemnized
where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such as the minority status of one
party.
120
The audit team cites in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose
ages ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were married by mere
submission of a pro forma joint affidavit of cohabitation.
121
These affidavits were notarized
by the solemnizing judge himself or herself.
122

Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of
some couples where no marriage license was previously issued. The contracting parties
were made to fill up the application for a license on the same day the marriage was
solemnized.
123

The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment
of the validity of the marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing
officer especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point to the contrary. As
correctly observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage
license disappears the moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.
In People v. Jansen,
124
this Court held that:
the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license
has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer
needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be
presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain
whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas,
125
that "the presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a

123

duty." The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have alerted the
solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance.
It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code requires the submission of the
certificate from the embassy of the foreign party to the local registrar for acquiring a
marriage license, the judges should have been more diligent in reviewing the parties
documents and qualifications. As noted by the OCA, the absence of the required certificates
coupled with the presence of mere affidavits should have aroused suspicion as to the
regularity of the marriage license issuance.
The judges gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages
under Article 34 of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the
existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional
character such as those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on
the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license.
126
Under the rules of
statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but reasonably
construed.
127
The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and accepted pro forma
particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The five-year period of
cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered imperfect
only by the absence of the marriage contract.
128
The parties should have been capacitated
to marry each other during the entire period and not only at the time of the marriage.
129

To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and omissions of the respondents, the Family
Code provides the requisites for a valid marriage:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites
shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab initio.
130
The
actions of the judges have raised a very alarming issue regarding the validity of the
marriages they solemnized since they did not follow the proper procedure or check the
required documents and qualifications. In Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano,
131
the Court
said that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void and the subsequent
issuance of the license cannot render valid or add even an iota of validity to the marriage. It
is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a

124

marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.
As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in
the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary layman. They should be skilled and
with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. It is not too much to
expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.
132

It is important to note that the audit team found out that Judge Rosabella M. Tormis ordered
Celerina Plaza, a personal employee of the judge, to wait for couples outside the Hall of
Justice and offer services.
133
Crisanto Dela Cerna also stated in his affidavit that Judge
Tormis instructed him to get all marriage certificates and bring them to her house when she
found out about the judicial audit.
134
In the language of the OCA, Judge Tormis considered
the solemnization of marriages not as a duty but as a business.
135
The respondent judge
was suspended for six (6) months in A.M. No. MTJ-071-962 for repeatedly disregarding the
directives of this Court to furnish the complainant a copy of her comment. She was also
fined the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000) in A.M. Nos. 04-7-373-RTC and 04-7-374
RTC.
136
She was reprimanded twice in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 and in A.M. No. MTJ-
001337.
137
Finally, in the very recent case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon.
Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, promulgated last
12 March 2013, Judge Tormis was found guilty of gross inefficiency, violation of Supreme
Court rules, directives and circulars and gross ignorance of the law by this Court. She was
dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave
credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The respondent judges violated Canons 2
138
and 6
139
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which
exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of their duties. This Court
previously said that "Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law
involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of
integrity."
140
In connection with this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task
and upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes
the visible representation of the law and more importantly of justice.
141

The actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright shameful.
Liability of Other Court Personnel
The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA on the liability of the following
employees:
Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu
City, is guilty of grave misconduct when she informed the female lawyer of the judicial audit
team that she can facilitate the marriage and the requirements on the same day of the
lawyers visit.
142


125

What Monggaya was proposing was an open-dated marriage in exchange for a fee
of P3,000. Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court
personnel from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit
understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.
Mongayas claim that she was merely relating to the lady lawyer what she knew from other
offices as the usual practice
143
is inexcusable. As found by the OCA in its Memorandum,
"Monggaya deliberately gave false information for the purpose of perpetrating an illegal
scheme. This, in itself, constitutes grave misconduct."
144
Sec. 52, Rule IV of the Uniform
Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as "a grave offense that
carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense.
In Villaceran v. Rosete, this Court held that:
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice;
parties seeking redress from the courts for grievances look upon court personnel,
irrespective of rank or position, as part of the Judiciary. In performing their duties and
responsibilities, these court personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the
peoples trust and confidence in this institution. Therefore, they are expected to act and
behave in a manner that should uphold the honor and dignity of the Judiciary, if only to
maintain the people's confidence in the Judiciary.
145

Mongaya acted improperly and in a manner opposite of what is expected of court
personnel. Her actions placed doubts on the integrity of the courts.
Rhona Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MTCC,
Cebu City, is guilty of gross misconduct. She assisted the couple, Moreil Sebial and Maricel
Albater, and demanded and acceptedP4,000 from them.
146
The act was a violation of
Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. As found by the OCA and
adopted by this Court, Rodriguez induced Albater to falsify the application for marriage
license by instructing her to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.
147
The claim that she
gave the amount to a certain Borces who was allegedly the real facilitator belies her
participation in facilitating the marriage. According to the OCA, when the couple went back
for their marriage certificate, they approached Rodriguez and not Borces.
148
When Borces
told Rodriguez that the marriage certificate had been misplaced, it was Rodriguez who
instructed Sebial to fill up another marriage certificate.
149

This Court has held that improper solicitations prohibited by Section 2, Canon I of the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel, merits a grave penalty.
150
Such penalty can be dismissal
from service.
Desiderio Aranas, Branch 3 Process Server, MTCC, Cebu City and Rebecca Alesna are
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best of interest of the service. Aranas provided couples
who were to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the required affidavit of
cohabitation.
151
On the other hand, Alesna refers such couples to Aranas to acquire the said

126

affidavit which according to Alesna costs P10. As aptly put by the OCA, even if the amount
involved in the transaction is minimal, the act of soliciting money still gives the public the
wrong impression that court personnel are making money out of judicial transactions.
152

The Court said in Roque v. Grimaldo
153
that acts of court personnel outside their official
functions constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service because these
acts violate what is prescribed for court personnel. The purpose of this is to maintain the
integrity of the Court and free court personnel from suspicion of any misconduct.
Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the MTCC, Cebu City, Emma Valencia,
Stenographer III of Branch 18, RTC, Cebu City, and Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter of
Branch 1, MTCC, Cebu City, admitted to the audit team that they received food from
couples they assisted.
154
This is in violation of Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other
remuneration for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in
actions or proceedings with the Judiciary. As recommended by the OCA, they are
admonished considering that this is their first offense and the tips were of minimal value. In
Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, this Court held that commission of an administrative offense for
the first time is an extenuating circumstance.
155

The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence against Corazon P. Retuya. The OCA
reports that Corazon Retuya admitted initially that she received P5,000 from spouses Ichiro
Kamiaya and Mary Grace Gabiana to secure necessary documents.
156
The information was
volunteered by Corazon Retuya with no supporting sworn statement from the couple.
However, she denies this fact later on in her Comment.
157
Finding the earlier statement of
Corazon Retuya as unclear and lacking support from evidence, the Court adopts the
findings of the OCA and decides to give her the benefit of the doubt.
The Court also finds insufficient evidence to support the claims against Marilou Cabaez.
Cabaez was only implicated in this case through the sworn statement of Jacqui Lou
Baguio-Manera who attested that they paid a certain "Meloy" P1,200 for the wedding under
Article 34 of the Family through the assistance of Cabaez.
158
Cabaez denies that she was
the one who assisted the couple and explained that it may have been Celerina Plaza, the
personal assistant of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera got the nickname "Meloy"
not from Cabaez herself but from Baguio-Maneras younger sister.
159
When Baguio-
Manera met the said "Meloy" at the Hall of Justice, she did not obtain confirmation that the
said "Meloy" is Cabaez. The Court adopts the findings of the OCA that there is lack of
positive identification of Cabaez and finds merit in her denial.
160

The Court accepts the recommendation of the OCA as to the dismissal of the case against
Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg. The judge was only implicated through the statement of
Process Server Antonio Flores about an "alleged sinking fund". No evidence was presented
as to the collection of an excess of the solemnization fee. Neither was it proven that Judge
Econg or her staff had knowledge of such fund.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents:

127

1. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,
Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law
and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits,
except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
2. Judge Gil R. Acosta, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu
City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and
that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits,
3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4,
and that she would have been DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her
retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation,
had she not been previously dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly
A.M. No. 09-2-30-MTCC);
4. Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 8,
and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits,
5. Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City,
GUILTY of violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that
she be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except
leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
6. Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross misconduct for Section 2, Canon I of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for
marriage and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her
retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -
controlled corporation;
7. Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu
City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and that he be
SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely;
8. Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Cebu City,
GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of violating Section
2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be SUSPENDED

128

without pay for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely;
9. Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City, and Emma
Valencia, Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that they be ADMONISHED with a warning that a
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 9, Cebu City; Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City; and Marilou Cabaez, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina
Plaza and Crisanto dela Cerna, should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
the purpose of initiating disbarment proceedings against the judge.
The Honorable Mayors of Barili, Cebu and Liloan, Cebu, are to be furnished copies of the
Supplemental Report dated 14 August 2007 and are ADVISED to conduct an investigation
with respect to the statements of Filomena C. Lopez, Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and
Bonita I. Pilones, Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu, regarding the processing of marriage
licenses and to take the necessary action as the findings of the investigation may warrant.
Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents files that are with the Office of
the Bar Confidant and distributed to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

ABBAS VS ABBAS
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed
alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of
Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a
ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract
3
of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No.
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing
officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in
Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in
Taiwan.
4
He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around
5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F.
Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that
he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his

129

stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the
ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to
Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area.
In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on
their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the
marriage license number could be found.
5
The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C.
Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license
number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967,
was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.
6
Said certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA
MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and
MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or
intents it may serve.
7

On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001
and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get
certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.
8

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage
License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on
January 20, 1993.
9

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the
numbers are issued chronologically.
10
He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003,
was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona,
Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other
license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.
11

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty.
Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a
barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the

130

Philippines.
12
He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria
Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.
13
He stated that the witnesses were
Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.
14
He testified that he had
been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the
requirements.
15
Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license
the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his
secretary.
16
After the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the
marriage license with that office.
17

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas
and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.
18
He testified that he requested a
certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured
the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.
19
He further testified that he did
not know where the marriage license was obtained.
20
He attended the wedding ceremony
on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of
the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary
Ann Ceriola.
21

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-
law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her
house.
22
She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in
securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a
male person went to their house with the application for marriage license.
23
Three days
later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license before
returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.
24
She
further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she
was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.
25
She also testified that a
bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
26

As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is
one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b)
she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said
photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage
contract bearing their signatures as proof.
27
She and her mother sought the help of Atty.
Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain
Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after
several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she
and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty.
Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and
Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.
28

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.
29


131

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain
Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.
30

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but
that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the
one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were
Chinese.
31

The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as
Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan,
and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license
had been issued for Gloria and Syed.
32
It also took into account the fact that neither party
was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.
33
As the marriage was not one of those
exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an
absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void
ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the
respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the
respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of
the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National
Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the
marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-
Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.
34

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the
same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:

132

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE
OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT
THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A
VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A
MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE
CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND
AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF
LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY
LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN
THE COURT BELOW.
35

The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search
for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
certification could not be accorded probative value.
36
The CA ruled that there was sufficient
testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and
that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
37

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract.
The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife,
and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
bigamy.
38

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05
October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed
[sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and
subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
39

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008
40
but the same was denied
by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.
41


133

Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF
LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS
DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND
SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
42

The Ruling of this Court
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order
No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent
provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as
follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.

134

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
x x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the
formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage
ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage
license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges
on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held
that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage
license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and
relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the
existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the
office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said
license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the
case of Republic v. Court of Appeals
43
such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec.
29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of
a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate
as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove
the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names
of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.
44

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed
probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and
Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license
for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license
pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine

135

copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona,
Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did
not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the
certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to
have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could
not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.
45
It is worth
noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that
a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of
Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the
same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated
that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration
absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an
official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."
46
No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does
exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was
indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not
correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar
conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court.
She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location
where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she
is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could
the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of
them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even
testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents.
Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for
assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The
task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified
as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this
Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of
the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of
the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the

136

court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there
was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,
47
following the case of Republic,
48
it was held that the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license
was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cario further held
that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it
became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was
valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.
49
Gloria has failed to
discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage
license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage
license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed,
based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias
failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and
Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant
and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity
was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave
their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage
contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before
the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of appellants family, taken during
the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the
marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the
Marriage Contract.
x x x x
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring,
Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten
(10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition
appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1")
dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent
marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward
(appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the
process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.
50

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized
without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license

137

requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.
51
Again, this
marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1wphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his
motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the
same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid
marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid
marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the
same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly
absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is
hereby REINSTATED.

GO BANGAYAN VS BANGAYAN
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a
non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre
(Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and
Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who
was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family. In
December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin
and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sallys father was against the relationship. On
7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in
Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing
Benjamins marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the
period of their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of
Benjamin, married to Sally;

138

(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783
registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally
as a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing
Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of
public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to
Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin
also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley
as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the
partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in
his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial
court denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally
then refused to present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her
petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to
present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11
September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite
repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting
the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision
4
dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court
gave weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar,
which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to
6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License
No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.
5
The trial court ruled that the marriage
was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it
could not be registered due to Benjamins subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The
trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence,
bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the
legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial
court denied Sallys claim for spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin.
The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age
and did not ask for support.

139

On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she
named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled
that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was
claiming were owned by Benjamins parents who gave the properties to their children,
including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin
and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamins
civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial
court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to
prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court
found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-
193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783.
However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium
units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the
properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamins
right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin
was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited
Sallys share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of
Bernice and Bentley while Benjamins share reverted to his conjugal ownership with
Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March
7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It
is further declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under
TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT
Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624,
194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634,
194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and
206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B.
Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are
the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon
City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-
seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are
properties acquired from petitioners money without contribution from respondent, hence,
these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is
appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an
accounting of her collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days
from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed
within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession
of these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner.

140

On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-
ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is
declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The
share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed
pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10.
Respondents claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor
General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.
6

Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In
its Order dated 27 August 2009,
7
the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial
courts decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of
Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally,
for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on
the next hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the
warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who
was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamins action was
based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no evidence that the marriage was
annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamins
marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed
by Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties
acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin
and his siblings.

141

As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that
only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin
belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him
solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT
Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of
Benjamins actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be
owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall
accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while Sallys
share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence
that would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his
inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby
AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively
owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondent-
appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common and to
be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal
partnership under his first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to
her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
8

Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial
courts ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial
courts decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
initio and non-existent; and

142

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with
modification the trial courts decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin
and Sally.
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts ruling that she
waived her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present
evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect
marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of
right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.
9
In this case, Sallys presentation of
evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the
case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28
November 2008. They were all made at Sallys instance. Before the scheduled hearing of
28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her
evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing,
despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin
who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel insisted that the trial court could
not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial courts prior
warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had
been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements were at
her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision
should she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was
deemed to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
Sallys continued failure to present her evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial
court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally
was delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on
her petition questioning the trial courts denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact
that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for.
Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution
because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate
delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.
10

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to
Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void
ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present her evidence, she would
have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this
Court to consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by

143

declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in their childrens birth
certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his
family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property
registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was
not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before
the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time
Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage
between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration
Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage
license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos.
6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-
07568 did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local
civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and
Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of
a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys
probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
11
Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally
entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license.
12

It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office.
The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;
13
Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the
Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission
for Culture and the Arts;
14
and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department
of the National Statistics Office.
15
The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that
there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest"
16
and "a simulated marriage,
at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming
from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese
conservatives."
17
In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was
not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin
was the informant in Bernices birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were
married on 8 March 1982
18
while Sally was the informant in Bentleys birth certificate which
also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.
19
Benjamin and Sally
were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the
birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void
ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a
marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license

144

is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no
marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match
the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month
of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35
20
which made their
marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.
Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil
Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the
beginning."
21
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
all aspects the trial courts decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."
22
While
the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the
dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the
Court of Appeals adopted the trial courts discussion that the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally is not bigamous.1wphi 1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former
marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be
assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no
trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the
second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other
causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De
Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage
against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal
Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was
no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally
married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to
petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as
it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.
23

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.
24
In this case, there was
really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage
contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local
civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or

145

industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If
the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by
Sally which were given by Benjamins father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys
Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamins late father
himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which
included Sally x x x."
25

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals
is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722
was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.
26
The properties under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin
27
with the descriptive title "married to
Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of
Sally
28
with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos.
N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have
ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of
the civil status of the registered owner.
29
Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without
proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership
under Article 148 of the Family Code.
30

Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself
from hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in
presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as
an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and
sound discretion on the part of the judge.
31
To justify the call for inhibition, there must be
extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to
palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.
32
In this case, we have
sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision
because of Sallys continued refusal to present her evidence.

146

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice
against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that would justify the
call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

REPUBLIC VS ALBIOS
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge
Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as
evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.
3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She
described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007,
Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC
ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the
existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the
scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend
the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the
merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,
5
the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage
of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of
respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that
she remains the wife of respondent.
x x x x
SO ORDERED.
6


147

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated
with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed
her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5,
2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void
because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which
found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties
clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their
case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to
enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to
obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN
CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
OFCONSENT.
8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and
for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as
they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished
from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in
jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it
were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered
futile.

148

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment
9
to the petition, reiterating her stand that
her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the
beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply
10
reiterating its arguments in its petition for
review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for
the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab
initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage
fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the
United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or
acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.
11
A common
limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.
12
Another,
which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is
usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage,
13
and it
attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.
14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
15
established
the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It
ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life
together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to
instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the
intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration
laws.
16
It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes
and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for
the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on
limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the
notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein
17
was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in
the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce
within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert

149

temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being
no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is
necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go
through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may
always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a
marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will
be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such
to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it
has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They
must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily
understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.
18

(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,
19
which
declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United
States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage
was entered into for a limited purpose."
20
The 1980 immigration case of Matter of
McKee,
21
further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different
from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been
recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit,
a legal marriage is first necessary.
22
At present, United States courts have generally denied
annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a
particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.
23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such
was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the
OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they
had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the
marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the
marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never
intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or
build a family.

150

The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of
consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage.
Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render
a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense
that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45
and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence.
24
Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act.
25
Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was
real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.
Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability
to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose
of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a
real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for
citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as
akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form
but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status,
and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not
followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.
27
It is a pretended
marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever,
hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for
vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is
no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any
way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1wphi 1 Albios and Fringer
had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow
the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married
would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can
properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to
enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to
establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have

151

no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage
freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law
are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be
declared valid.
28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their
lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions.
29
The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure
their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children
or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.
30
Thus, marriages entered into for
other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status,
and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,
31
are equally valid. Love,
though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents
marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not
void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45
(3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code
may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral
turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a
sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or
homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for
an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading
immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under
Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In
the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to
enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her
marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable
institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to
qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no
further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as
instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter
into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself
out of an inconvenient situation.

152

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
32
It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot
leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the
parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is
DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

ANONUEVO VS JALANDONI
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December 1966.
7
He died without
issue.
8

On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo, filed a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration
9
with the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the latters estate. The petition
was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338 and is currently pending before the intestate court.
10

On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation
11
before the
intestate court. In the Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia
Blee Desantis (Sylvia)who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee
(Isabel) with one John Desantis.
12

The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmotherIsabelwas, at the time
of Rodolfos death, the legal spouse of the latter.
13
For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a
share in the estate of Rodolfo.
Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that they be
allowed to intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G.
Jalandoni.
14
As it was, by the time the Manifestation was filed, both Sylvia and Isabel have
already passed away with the former predeceasing the latter.
15

To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their Manifestation,
the following documents:
a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo;
16

b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia;
17
and
c.) Their respective proof of births.
18

It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings that the foregoing pieces of evidence
sufficiently establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo, and that they are her lawful
representatives.

153

The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by Bernardino as
its Special Administrator, however, begged to differ. It opposed the intervention on the
ground that the petitioners and their siblings have failed to establish the status of Isabel as
an heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings
showed that Isabel had a previous and subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time
she was purportedly married to Rodolfo.
In its Comment to the Manifestation,
19
the respondent called attention to the entries in the
birth certificate of Sylvia, who was born on 14 February 1946.
20
As it turned out, the record
of birth of Sylvia states that she was a "legitimate" child of Isabel and John Desantis.
21
The
document also certifies the status of both Isabel and John Desantis as "married."
22
The
respondent posits that the foregoing entries, having been made in an official registry,
constitute prima facie proof of a prior marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
23

According to the respondent, Isabels previous marriage, in the absence of any proof that it
was dissolved, made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo bigamous and void ab initio.
24

On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and their siblings
to take part in the settlement proceedings.
25
The intestate court was convinced that the
evidence at hand adequately establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo and,
by that token, permitted the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the proceedings on
her behalf.
26

The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of Sylvia was insufficient to prove that
there was a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
27
It ventured on the
possibility that the entries in the birth record of Sylvia regarding her legitimacy and the
status of her parents, may have been made only in order to save Isabel and her family from
the social condemnation of having a child out of wedlock.
28

The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was denied by the intestate court in its order
dated 26 January 2006.
29
Undeterred, the respondent hoisted a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the orders of the
intestate court.
30

In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that it was an error on the part of the
intestate court to have disregarded the probative value of Sylvias birth certificate.
31
The
appellate court, siding with the respondent, held that Sylvias birth certificate serves as
prima facie evidence of the facts therein statedwhich includes the civil status of her
parents.
32
Hence, the previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis should have been
taken as established.
The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer any
other evidence proving that the marriage of Isabel with John Desantis had been dissolved
by the time she was married to Rodolfo, it then follows that the latter marriagethe Isabel-
Rodolfo unionis a nullity for being bigamous.
33
From that premise, Isabel cannot be

154

considered as the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners and their siblings, therefore,
failed to show that Isabel has any interest in the estate of Rodolfo.
Hence, the instant appeal.
34

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it nullified the
orders of the intestate court allowing the petitioners and their siblings to intervene in the
settlement proceedings.
The petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer the following arguments:
One. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review under a writ of certiorari.
35
In
nullifying the intestate courts order, the appellate court did not confine itself to the issue of
whether the same was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
36
Rather, it chose to re-assess
the evidence and touch upon the issue pertaining to Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo.
37

Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of whether grave abuse of discretion
exists, it would have found that the intestate court did not act whimsically or capriciously in
issuing its assailed orders.
38
Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate court is
belied by the fact that the said orders may be supported by the two (2) marriage certificates
between Isabel and Rodolfo.
39

Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of Appeals was correct in addressing
the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that Isabel has a right to inherit
from Rodolfo, it nevertheless erred in finding that there was none.
40
A proper evaluation of
the evidence at hand does not support the conclusion that Isabel had a previous marriage
with John Desantis.
41

To begin with, the respondent was not able to produce any marriage certificate executed
between Isabel and John Desantis.
42
The conspicuous absence of such certificate can, in
turn, only lend credibility to the position that no such marriage ever took place.
Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia do not carry the necessary weight to
be able to prove a marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
43
In assessing the probative
value of such entries, the Court of Appeals should have taken note of a "typical" practice
among unwed Filipino couples who, in order to "save face" and "not to embarrass their
families," concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is
legitimate.
44

Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis was not satisfactorily
proven, the Court of Appeals clearly erred in finding that her marriage with Rodolfo is
bigamous.
We are not impressed.
First Argument

155

The first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at best. The question of whether the
intestate court gravely abused its discretion is intricately linked with the issue of whether
there was sufficient evidence to establish Isabels status as the legal spouse of Rodolfo.
A courts power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed
by the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with interest in an action
or proceeding may be allowed to intervene.
45
Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to
allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein.
46

Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested person to
intervene in a casethe mistake is not simply an error of judgment, but one of jurisdiction.
In such event, the allowance is made in excess of the courts jurisdiction and can only be
the product of an exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of error may be reviewed
in a special civil action for certiorari.
Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review under a writ of
certiorari, when it examined the evidence proving Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo. The
sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence determines whether the petitioners and their
siblings have successfully established Isabels interest in Rodolfos estatewhich, as
already mentioned, is an indispensable requisite to justify any intervention. Ultimately, the
re-assessment of the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if the
assailed orders of the intestate court were issued in excess of the latters jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion.
We now proceed to the second argument of the petitioners.
Second Argument
The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We agree with the finding of
the Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed to offer sufficient evidence
to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo. The very evidence of the
petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that Isabel has interest in Rodolfos estate.
between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately established. This holds true
notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel and John Desantis
exists on record.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.
47
Jurisprudence teaches that the
fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate.
48
Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent
evidence of the marriage between his parents.
49

In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent
evidence of marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains
the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b) that

156

Sylvia is their "legitimate" child.
50
In clear and categorical language, Sylvias birth certificate
speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws,
51
the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They are
presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can,
and will, stand as proof of the facts attested.
52
In the case at bench, the petitioners and their
siblings offered no such rebuttal.
The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvias birth certificate as
untruthful statements made only in order to "save face."
53
They urge this Court to take note
of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and
make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot countenance.
The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence,
do not diminish the probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners
would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude
therefrom that the usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners would
themselves argue that the document on which they based their interest in intervention
contains untruthful statements in its vital entries.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves
which, properly appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously
married to John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such marriage
had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion
is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabels
prior marriage was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the
estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the
settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.

VILLATUYA VS TABALINGCOS
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar
Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S.
'L1halingcos (resrondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or
Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross immorality for
marrying two other women while respondents first marriage was subsisting.
1

In a Resolution
2
dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required
respondent to file a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005.
3
The Complaint was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the record.
4


157

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a
Notice
5
setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005.
During the conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and
respondent. They submitted for resolution three issues to be resolved by the Commission
as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
nonpayment of fees to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.
6

The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers.
Respondent filed his verified Position Paper,
7
on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted
his on 01 August 2005.
8

Complainants Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial
consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latters numerous
petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that they
had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to P 50,000 for every Stay Order
issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the
fees paid by their clients. He alleged that, from February to December 2002, respondent
was able to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were
working on together. Complainant also claimed that he was entitled to the amount
of P 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with
respondent, and a total of P 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients.
9
Complainant
appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of the fees he
believes are due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of
Section 27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two
financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link,
Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant
supported his allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of
Jesi and Jane,
10
letter-proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates
11
and
proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients.
12

On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two
counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was
subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos,
herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano,
which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma.
Rowena Garcia Pion in the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary
Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila.
13


158

Respondents Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant
was not an employee of his law firm Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office
14
but of
Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a major stockholder.
15
Respondent
alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a
financial consultant, resulting in the latters dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they
presented in their court cases.
16
Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal
agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional
fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had
been paid.
17

As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended
that his law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm
would handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would
attend to the financial aspect of the case such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans
to be presented in court. To support this contention, respondent attached to his Position
Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos
and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.;
18
and an Affidavit
executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of the said company.
19

On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William
Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no
probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself.
20
Respondent did not
specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two
other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage
Contracts.
21
To the said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage
Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO.
22
The appended Marriage
Contracts matched the dates, places and names of the contracting parties indicated in the
earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three marriages entered into by respondent. The
first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that took place between respondent and
Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980.
23
The second marriage contract
was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Pion, and it took place at the Metropolitan
Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987.
24
The third Marriage Contract
referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on
7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage Contracts,
respondent was described as single under the entry for civil status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by
complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory conference
or submitted during the hearing of the case.
25
Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of
the opportunity to controvert those documents.
26
He disclosed that criminal cases for
bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila. Respondent further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare
Null and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Pion at the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bian, Laguna, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.
27
He also filed another

159

Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-
Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271.
28
In both petitions, he claimed
that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the
NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar Lozano on
different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they were purportedly null and
void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a
clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007.
29
While complainant manifested to the
Commission that he would not attend the hearing,
30
respondent manifested his willingness to
attend and moved for the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against the
latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the
nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be bearing his name.
31

On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies
of two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."
32
The first criminal case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent
with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid.
33
The
other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with having
committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his
marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting.
34
Each of the Informations recommended
bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as accused in the criminal cases.
35

On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same
proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the
outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the RTCLaguna. Thus, the
Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.
36

IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent.
37
The first charge,
for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of
merit. The Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper courts
since it was only empowered to determine respondents administrative liability. On this
matter, complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.
38
On the second
charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of
client for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It
recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to point out exactly
the specific provision he violated.
39

As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality
for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through
documentary evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying two other
women while the latters first marriage was subsisting.
40
Due to the gravity of the acts of

160

respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be
stricken off the roll of attorneys.
41

On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154,
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
42
On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends that the
Commission should have suspended the disbarment proceedings pending the resolution of
the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his
name as having entered into those contracts with other women. He further contends that
the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that the latter committed bigamy was not
substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the
administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately filed with the
RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage Contracts.
43

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and
affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondents disbarment.
44

The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur
with the rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the formers
share in the fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule
9.02
45
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to
divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to
practice law. Based on the allegations, respondent had agreed to share with complainant
the legal fees paid by clients that complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant,
however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David
46
that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson
to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that
the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that
complainants allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the
charge against respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients

161

Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal
services through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence
to prove that Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned
and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the latters legal services and to solicit
clients. In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that
respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the
specific provision that was breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities
mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be
specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated
Rule 2.03
47
of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of
profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety
arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as
to be inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises
when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional
employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the
lawyers behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the
practice of law.
48

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a
vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for
corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C"
49
of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The
letter clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees,
respondent would render legal services related to the formers loan obligation with a bank.
This circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is
signed by respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or
associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.08
50
of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether
the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those
occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations
governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and not in the other.
51
In
this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering
consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this
practice by respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating
Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy

162

The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To
substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage
Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to
the introduction of these documents, claiming that they were submitted after the
administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to
controvert them.
52
We are not persuaded by his argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the
qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the
procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:
53

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings
and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we
see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a
component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it
involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the
continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the
violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public
concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.1wphi1 For the court
to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
convincing and satisfactory proof.
54
In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true
copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latters first marriage
was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third
marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not
dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he contracted those two
other marriages. He submitted copies of the two Petitions he had filed separately with the
RTC of Laguna one in Bian and the other in Calamba to declare the second and the
third Marriage Contracts null and void.
55

We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the
authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage
Contracts presented by complainant to prove the formers marriages to two other women
aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts
bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he
committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The
documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records
pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a person. Having been issued by a
government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much evidentiary weight and carries
with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any
competent evidence to rebut those documents.

163

According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he
filed civil actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for
Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated the second and the third marriage
contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the
then Civil Code provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code
provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code. Respondents regard
for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the
sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to
annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage
twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,
56
we
held thus:
We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not
only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued
membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was
committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a
lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen
at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he
who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do
so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor
are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations.
The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of
the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that
the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.
57
His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and
are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
58

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his
name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos
as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly
immoral conduct.

164

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos
in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of
Attorneys.

ABLAZA VS REPUBLIC
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the
legal issue to be determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that
purpose has been dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that he, not being a party in
the assailed marriage, had no right to bring the action.
Antecedents
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan,
Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
1
The
case was docketed as Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of
Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza,
petitioner.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9,
1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a
marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had
died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any
person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano
and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being
void ab initio.
2

Ruling of the RTC
On October 18, 2000,
3
the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:
Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to
DISMISS the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had
long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev.
Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).
SO ORDERED.

165

The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion
for reconsideration on November 14, 2000.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:
The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the
petitioner is not a party to the marriage.
In its decision dated January 30, 2003,
4
however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the
RTC, thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does
not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper
party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. In the instant
case, the petition was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a
party to the marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The
contention of petitioner-appellant that he is considered a real party in interest under Section
2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as he stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage will not
prosper if persons other than those specified in the law file the case.
Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the
subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even
impleaded as a party to said case.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
5

Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49 AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN
SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS
AND JURISPRUDENCE;
II.

166

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the
action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
Ruling
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give
rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law
prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested
according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted.
6
As a general rule, the
nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment
of the governing law.
7
To illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was
void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the
intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage
between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The
Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by
the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.
8

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15,
2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil
Code.
9
Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family
Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective
in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
10

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,
11
the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code
and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the

167

marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog,
12
the children were
allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their
fathers marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a
marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable
one, and explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained
in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in
any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or
both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable
marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during
the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached,
and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there
must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a
final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the
death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then
the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
13

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes
cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the
absolute nullity of a marriage. According toCarlos v. Sandoval,
14
the plaintiff must still be the
party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for

168

it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name
of the real party in interest.
15
Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest"
can file the action.
16
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an
interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no
material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action.
When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of
lack of cause of action.
17

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material
interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the
suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of
succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the
conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate
children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to
the deceaseds estate.
18
Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action
hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late
Cresencianos surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for
the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this
case. We reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may
not be prejudiced.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late
Cresencianos surviving wife,
19
stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her
own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under
the old Civil Code required
a marriage license for their validity;
20
hence, her participation in this action is made all the
more necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without
a marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from
the requirement of a marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be
joined herein:

169

xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of
judicial power.1avvphi 1 It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court [that] the
action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.
21

We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025
entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v.
Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were
the legal owners of the property involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was
decided on November 26, 2009, and the petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied
on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to
have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter,
respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable party whose
substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should
likewise implead Leila.
The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action,
however, considering that Section 11,
22
Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the same
rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be made "on motion of any
party or on (the trial courts) own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as
are just."
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.
We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of
Appeals.
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its
records are returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for
further proceedings, with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory
pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-
defendants; then to determine whether the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants,
descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the time of his death as well as
whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza
entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed accordingly.

LLAVE VS REPUBLIC
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent
marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the
legitimate union of a married couple.

170

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision
1
dated August 17, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution
2
dated
September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita) marriage to
Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under
the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City
3
and, subsequently, under a
civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.
4
In
their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamanos
wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and
her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamanos legitimate children with Zorayda,
5
filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City
for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being
bigamous. The complaint
6
alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31,
1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita
in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been
celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased
Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same
while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status
being declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased
never divorced Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly
done so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant
Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with
Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one
contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they
(deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus
covered by this law;
7

Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the
court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4,
1995,
8
and again, another 15 days
9
or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court
granted.
10

Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss
11
on February
20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were

171

married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latters disbarment complaint
against Sen. Tamano.
12
Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving
Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.
The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for
declaration of nullity.
13
Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this
Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred
the petition to the CA
14
which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since
there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent
failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing
parties presented their evidence. When it was Estrellitas turn to adduce evidence, the
hearings set for such purpose
15
were postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court,
on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings
16
in view of the CAs temporary restraining
order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing the case.
17

Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated
September 30, 1996.
18
Estrellita then elevated the appellate courts judgment to this Court
by way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.
19

Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present
her evidence on June 26, 1997.
20
As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was
reset to July 9, 1997.
21
The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a
postponement.
22

Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit
the case for decision,
23
reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita
opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the
outcome of G.R. No. 126603.
24

On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,
25
stating as one of
the reasons that as sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in
cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court
of general jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our
Resolution dated August 24, 1998,
26
we denied Estrellitas motion for reconsideration
27
with
finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the
aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab
initio.
28

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed,
declared Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being

172

bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
29
The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second
marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his
first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very
beginning. The fact that the late Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in
any way affect the void character of the second marriage because, in this jurisdiction,
divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating the
effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent marriage was solemnized
under the Civil Code or Family Code.
30

In her appeal,
31
Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to
file her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano
is capacitated to marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is
governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal standing to
question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,
32
the CA held that Estrellita
can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard
but simply ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer
despite the lapse of around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules.
It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher
courts since, as an independent and original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in
the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellitas marriage to Sen.
Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and
Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute
divorce. It noted that their first nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent
Muslim celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal
standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamanos wife and, hence, the injured party in the
senators subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,
33
the CA denied Estrellitas Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional
errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutors report
on the existence of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of
Court
34
and Article 48 of the Family Code
35
will not invalidate the trial courts judgment as
the proceedings between the parties had been adversarial, negating the existence of
collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined before the RTC, the same is
attributable to Estrellitas refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellitas
allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to our remand to

173

the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the issue
on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellitas
marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in
upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the
opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against
the validity of her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias
36
laid down the rule
that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file an
answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while her
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality.
She maintains that she merely participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial courts
assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever action the High Court
will take on her petition questioning the RTCs jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this
commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the
records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.
37
She also
questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was
collusion, this being a prerequisite before further proceeding could be held when a party has
failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the
latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts
that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without
need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose
marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all
his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of the
deceased.
38

Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because
only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage
under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
39

Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CAs reasoning and
stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an
original action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the
RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol
Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in
the suit that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private
respondents legal standing to challenge the validity of Estrellitas purported marriage with
Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally a
void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the action as they are the ones
prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.

174

Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts judgment, even though the latter
was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting
for the Supreme Courts final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No.
126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process; and
c) the public prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether there was
collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was
bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellitas marriage
declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her
pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to
dismiss before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the
principal suit before the RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She
was never declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her
interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias
40
to justify the suspension of the period to file an
answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for certiorari questioning
the validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said
case, we affirmed the following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellitas basis
for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing an
Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her
Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality,
it behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The
Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the
Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section
4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but
in no case less than five (5) days computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of
the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x x
41
(Emphasis
supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court
is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before
it. Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings

175

should the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the
appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the
proceeding of the case because after it denied the wifes motion to dismiss, it immediately
proceeded to allow the husband to present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with
undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an
answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer, as she filed the
motion to dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial court after she
filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have
waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently,
before this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency
of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An
application for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a continuation of the
trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained of."
42
Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal
case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."
43
In fact, the trial court
respected the CAs temporary restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment
did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any
order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous
requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to
present her evidence when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait
first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to
present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to
benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the
trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed
Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither should the lower
court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor should it
wait for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the
propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
44
also requries the participation of the public prosecutor
in cases involving void marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his
investigation report to determine whether there is collusion between the parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after receipt of
the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall
submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies
thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.

176

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof
in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of
collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the
report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss
the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the
case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State
at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the
required report,
45
which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City
Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,
46
wherein he
attested that there could be no collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence
because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is
a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we
held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,
47
the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate
the proceedings in the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care
that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the
annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties.
There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any
of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal
to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
48

The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage
was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void
ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.
49
The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under
the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.
50
Under the marriage
provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 394
51
which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,
52
the law that codified Muslim personal laws.
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the
law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the
male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that

177

"Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both
in civil and Muslim rites."
53

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage
of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application
of its provisions unless otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code
shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein
except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to
extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate
prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably
expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against
the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the
Muslim Code to have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force
and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code in respect of civil acts
that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.
54

An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance
with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the
spouses register their mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be
considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent
between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose
marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already
settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at the time of
the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted
at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA
as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration
of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the
filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior
spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,
55
Estrellita relies on A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section
2(a)
56
thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the
validity of their own marriage.

178

Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason
behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the
exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on
Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable
marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be
filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section
3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages
or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief
that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other
hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.
57

Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to
the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior spouse
is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if
the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit
from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should
be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly
the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the
infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the
subsequent marriage.1wphi1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal
personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs
marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in application and does
not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.
58


179

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in
November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can
file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been
held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source
of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.
59
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the
deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in
interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit.
60

Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in
a way that would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous
marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on
September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.

LLUPA VS ABDULLA
The facts are summarized from the report of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
dated July 9, 2010.
2

The charge
The complainant alleges in support of the charge that the respondent exhibited ignorance of
his duties as clerk of court when he issued a certificate of divorce, (OCRG Form No. 102)
relying mainly on an illegal "Kapasadan" or Agreement. He claims that the agreement was
executed under duress and intimidation; the certificate of divorce itself is defective and
unreliable as there were erroneous entries in the document and unfilled blanks. He claims
that the respondent took away his beautiful wife by force or had a personal interest in her.
The complainant believes that the respondent should not have issued the divorce certificate
because divorce is not recognized in the country and the "Kapasadan" or separation
agreement had already been revoked by Philippine civil law. In a supplemental letter,
3
the
complainant alleges that he signed the "Kapasadan" because the Principal of the Mindanao
State University, a certain Mackno, and Police Officer Hadji Amin threatened to kill him. For
this reason, he wrote a letter to the SCC judge of Marawi City, assailing the agreement; he
even personally handed a copy of the letter to the respondent who took no action on the
matter.
To save his marriage with Nella Rocaya Mikunug originally solemnized on May 19, 1959,
based on the Maranao culture, and later renewed through a civil wedding before a Marawi
City judge the complainant filed a petition for restitution of marital rights
4
with the SCC,
Marawi City. To his dismay, the judge dismissed the petition without any notice or summons

180

to him. He suspects that the dismissal was due to the respondents "hukos-pukos" or
manipulation.
The respondents comment
In his comment dated March 19, 2010,
5
the respondent prays that the complaint be denied
for lack of merit. He mainly argues that his issuance of a certificate of divorce is not illegal,
capricious or whimsical as he acted within the bounds of his authority. He explains that as
court registrar, it is his ministerial duty to accept and register marriage contracts,
conversions to Islam and divorce certificates. When he performs this duty, he assumes no
responsibility with respect to the entries made by the applicants or owners of the documents
to be registered.
The respondent argues that contrary to the complainants claim, there was a divorce
agreement, in the Maranao dialect, attached to the divorce certificate. The complainant
even signed both pages of the agreement. Although the agreement was not labeled as
such, its essence indicates that the couple agreed to have a divorce and it was so
understood also by their children and the witnesses who signed the agreement.
The respondent denies that he took the complainants wife by force or that he was
interested in her; he claims that no evidence was ever adduced to prove these allegations.
With the divorce agreement, Mrs. Ilupa applied for a certificate of divorce which he issued
under Divorce Registry No. 2009-027 on November 5, 2009. He points out that in issuing
the certificate of divorce, he observed the same procedure applied to all applicants or
registrants.
On the complainants claim that there is no divorce in the Philippines, the respondent points
out that this is true only as far as the civil law is concerned, but not under the Muslim Law
which recognizes divorce. The civil marriage they subsequently entered into was just an
affirmation of their marriage vows under the Muslim Law. Also, the courts dismissal of the
complainants petition for restitution of marital rights
6
affirmed the divorce between the Ilupa
couple.
The administrative investigation
In compliance with the Courts Resolution dated August 25, 2010,
7
Executive Judge Gamor
B. Disalo of the RTC, 12th Judicial Region, Marawi City, investigated the complaint, and
submitted a Report and Recommendation dated January 19, 2010.
8

It appears from the report that Judge Disalo heard the complaint three times, i.e., on
December 15, 22 and 29, 2010. The respondent appeared at the hearing on December 15,
2010 and reiterated the arguments he earlier raised in his comment. He failed to appear at
the subsequent hearings.
The complainants non-cooperation prompted Judge Disalo to close the investigation and to
conclude, based on the facts gathered by the OCA and on the cited applicable laws, that
sufficient grounds existed to dismiss the complaint.

181

The Courts Ruling
We agree with the OCA and Judge Disalo that the complaint is devoid of merit. The
issuance of a certificate of divorce is within the respondents duties, as defined by law.
Articles 81 and 83 of the Muslim Code of the Philippines provide:
Article 81. District Registrar. - The Clerk of Court of the Sharia District Court shall, in
addition to his regular functions, act as District Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces,
Revocations of Divorces, and Conversions within the territorial jurisdiction of said court. The
Clerk of Court of the Sharia Circuit Court shall act as Circuit Registrar of Muslim Marriages,
Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and Conversations within his jurisdiction.
Article 83. Duties of Circuit Registrar. - Every Circuit Registrar shall:
a) File every certificate of marriage (which shall specify the nature and amount of the
dower agreed upon), divorce or revocation of divorce and conversion and such other
documents presented to him for registration;
b) Compile said certificates monthly, prepare and send any information required of
him by the District Registrar;
c) Register conversions involving Islam;
d) Issue certified transcripts or copies of any certificate or document registered upon
payment of the required fees[.]
We quote with approval the following excerpt from the OCAs Report:
Evidently, respondent Clerk of Court merely performed his ministerial duty in accordance
with the foregoing provisions. The alleged erroneous entries on the Certificate of Divorce
cannot be attributed to respondent Clerk of Court considering that it is only his duty to
receive, file and register the certificate of divorce presented to him for registration. Further,
even if there were indeed erroneous entries on the certificate of divorce, such errors cannot
be corrected nor cancelled through [his] administrative complaint.
Anent the legality of the divorce of the complainant and Dr. Nella Rocaya Mikunug-Ilupa,
this Office is bereft of any authority to rule on the matter. The issue is judicial in nature
which cannot be assailed through this administrative proceeding.
Finally, on the allegation that the respondent Clerk of Court manipulated the dismissal of his
petition for restitution of marital rights, we find the same unsubstantiated. Aside from
complainants bare allegation, there was no substantial evidence presented to prove the
charge. It is a settled rule in administrative proceedings that the complainant has the burden
of proving the allegations in his or her complaint with substantial evidence. In the absence
of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed
his duties will prevail (Rafael Rondina, et al. v. Associate Justice Eloy Bello, Jr., A.M. No.
CA-5-43, 8 July 2005).1avvphi1

182

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted, for the consideration of the Honorable Court,
is the recommendation that the administrative case against Macalinog S. Abdullah, Clerk of
Court II, Sharia Circuit Court, Marawi City, be DISMISSED for lack of merit.
9

We find this evaluation and recommendation fully in order, and accordingly approve the
Report. Thus, the complaint should be dismissed for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative matter against Macalinog S.
Abdullah, Clerk of Court II, Sharia Circuit Court, Marawi City, for abuse of authority is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

CARLOS VS SANDOVAL
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized
during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003.
The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision
1
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary judgment
2
of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of
property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to
their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are
particularly described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the
Court of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically
reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of
Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.

183

Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a
non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot
155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to
1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the
subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS,
more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot
28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun.
of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and
on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of
ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda
por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela
51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el
plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta
manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un
extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda
52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el
plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una
3

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The
agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn,
undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios
Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of
Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the

184

Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No.
160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were
registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two
(2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the
approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties
acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first
parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the
remaining land of the first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,
4
2,331 square meters of the second
parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square
meter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on
August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the
supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the
contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135,
against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a)
declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d)
reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch
256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license.
He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive
father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent
Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of
the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties
covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as
proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

185

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material
averments of petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details
regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo.
Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo
Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that
their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be
granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary
judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who
solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of
respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad
were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of
irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his
own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent
Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of
respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony,
respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.
5

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its
report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos
solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate
submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage
license;

186

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural,
illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum
of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of
filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the
portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061
of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to
cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel
TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole
name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval
and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval
and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim
for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and
litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.
6

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia,
that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment
annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an
illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
7

The CA opined:

187

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a
quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The
fact that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did
not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to recover upon
a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic)
to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented
and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a
misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the
petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly
proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have
traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution
of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively
dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own
brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for
thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the
latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call
for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case.
Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the
case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for
annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary
judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of
the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily
conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage,
the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the
marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo
Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as
appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary,
appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is
corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo
Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at
Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract

188

executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said
marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the
reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage
Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same."
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered
view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the
motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the
case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage -
is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-
presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not
procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be
emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the
legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of
the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the
basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it
had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of
appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son
of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the
said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his
entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's
bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an
indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support
what could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative
filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements, appellant
Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II
is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight
years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the
shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could have done in the
premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly
resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.
8

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision,
Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the

189

Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage,
petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that
the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and intended by
law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by
the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or
with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious
reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules
of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing
Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of
speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of
the laws and misapprehension of the facts.
9
(Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab
initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit
of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a
spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of
judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19
10
of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue,
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing
summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the
Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise
considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

190

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary
the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x
11

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was
correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the
application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or
annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by
the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003
12
is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the
case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to
matters involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be
proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.
13
In that
case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of
summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or
declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all
kinds of actions.
14
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right
and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the
declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State
should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered.
15

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting
attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor
sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no
suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be
presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x

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(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to
intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or
fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.
16

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity
of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be
filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the
spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is
enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot
be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition.Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of
their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of
the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.
17
(Underscoring
supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy,
loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build
the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They
are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they
alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds
allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The

192

Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988.
18

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the
beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of
marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
19

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family
Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003
20
is
prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps.
Medinaceli,
21
viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.
22
(Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995.
The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern
depends upon when the marriage took place.
23

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.
24
But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be
construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person
must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
25
Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real
party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
26

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about
the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is

193

not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of
action.
27

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,
28
where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who
can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it
affects their successional rights.
x x x x
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign
law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was
granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same
allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
and the same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court
should declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced
the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a
valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial
court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground
that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the
same.
29
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-
in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only
surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law
on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.
30

Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were
respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;

194

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
31

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a
collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he
still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code
provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes
collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession
by collateral relatives.
32
Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the decedent.
33

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that
collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the
decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings
but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of
his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil
Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is
found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of
marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate,
adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

195

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then
petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to
be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in
controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit.
This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,
34
or even an adopted
child
35
excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the
validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to
dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by
evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo
Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is
proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the
other causes of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of
the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should
not leave the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by
the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.
36

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
petitioner's bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is
insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However,
We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent
Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the
guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be
afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family
Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very
act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is
unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect
the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
37

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning
reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so,
as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was
null and void ab initio.

196

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the
status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of
marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted
son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the
action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED
AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to
give this case priority in its calendar.

BOLOS VS BOLOS
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a
review of the December 10, 2008 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original
action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna
and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16,
2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its
decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent final and
executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family
Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated
August 2, 2006, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980
as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both
petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal
consequences provided by law.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO)
copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
2

A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the
Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.

197

In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for
Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of
Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal was likewise
denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final
and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to
annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which
denied due course to Danilos appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the
motion to reconsider the September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order
which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo also prayed that
he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to
Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their
children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed
orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in
this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14,
1980 before the Family Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v.
Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli
3
to the effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends
only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on August 3, 1988."
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for
Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration
[of the Honorable Courts Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its
February 11, 2009 Resolution,
4
denied the motion for extension of time considering that the
15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142
SCRA 208. The motion for partial reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the
following
I S S U E S
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
DECISION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:

198

A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS.
MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING
THAT THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE
INSTANT CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE
HONORABLE COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN
ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE
PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO
THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD "MARRIAGES."
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON
DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES
SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY
HEREIN RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH
A PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL
IS NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND
THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
III
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF
THE ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND
WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER.
MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR
DELAY.
5

From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is whether
or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized
before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously
anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even
involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case
constituted a decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the
substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the said case,

199

both the marriages sought to be declared null were solemnized, and the action for
declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filed and
decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,
6
counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his
marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He
further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of the RTC declaring
their marriage as null and void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing the
mere "failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to
render marital obligations as required under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March
15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
7
The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.
8

The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that the phrase "under
the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the
word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt
or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for
application.
9
As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-
meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is
the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or
"from the words of a statute there should be no departure."
10

There is no basis for petitioners assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the
novelty and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a
relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of
procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere
expediency of claiming substantial merit.
11
As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for
doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely

200

indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial
business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.
12

The appellate court was correct in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion
for reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
13

The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible. The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs.
Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate courts denial of petitioners
motion for reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioners earlier motion for
extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for
filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already
attained finality when petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same
decision was already beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied
due course to respondents appeal and denying petitioners motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final
judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of his right to appeal.
14
In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas
City, Br. 254,
15
the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural
right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed
with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every
party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause,
free from the constraints of technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of
marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution.
This constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its
permanence and inviolability, thus:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.

201

This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family
as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
16

Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on
good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

QUIAZON VS BELEN
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The
petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo
was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother,
Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.
3
In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-
3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at
the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to
Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence
of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the
decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth
4
signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged
that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties
worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation
of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her
children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by
filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.
5
The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate,
6
Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of
his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,
7
the petition for
settlement of decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las
Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are
no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.

202

In a Decision
8
dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of
Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the
venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby discrediting the position
taken by the petitioners that Eliseos last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The
dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or
incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the
decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon,
after the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by
her.
9

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision
10
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the
findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and
Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of
Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate,
the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a
resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution
11
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO
QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC
OF LAS PIAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA
GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE
TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON
HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.
12

The Courts Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent
resides at the time of his death:

203

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
significant factor.
13
Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
14
Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."
15
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode.
16
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
17
Venue for
ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.
18
As
thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.
19

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was
properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo
resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason,
the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in
Eliseos Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate
should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a
decedents residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding
on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with
Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death
in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial
partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the
ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.
20
That Eliseo went to the extent of
taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners
position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It
disproves rather than supports petitioners submission that the lower courts findings arose
from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court,

204

when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this
Court.
21

Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage
has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime
of the parties to the marriage.
22
It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of
the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family
Code, making the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog
23
applicable four-square to the case at hand. In
Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it
but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
24

It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it
cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage.
25

Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage
even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an
action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.
Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,
26
has a cause of action for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to
the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now
proceed to determine whether or not the decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being
bigamous.
between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of
Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of
San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent
evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information
relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries
therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than
50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the
National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the

205

absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and
Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
27

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not
shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are
entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in
the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond,
or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of
the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in

206

estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming
evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners
pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a
desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to
her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.
29
Having a vested right in the
distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be
considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution,
arc AFFIRMED in toto.

REP VS OBRECIDO
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as
a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can
the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on
this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision
1
dated May 15, 2002, of
the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution
2
dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family
Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the
petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with
a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

207

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE
4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.
5
Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.
6

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her
to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution.
7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction
or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
. . .
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3)

208

that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue
is ripe for judicial determination.
8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also
ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues
and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had
come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26
thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No.
227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A
second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
38.
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by
the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at
the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on,
the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while
residing in the U.S.A.

209

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings
9
on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while
the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens.
For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be
validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law
only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.
10
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse
is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.
11
In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married.
The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same
year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who,
at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of
the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
12


210

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it,
the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present
in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment
would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible,
considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On
the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the
marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the
naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is
not evidence.
13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his
wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can
be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
14
Such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such
laws must be alleged and proved.
15
Furthermore, respondent must also show that the
divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.
Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter
into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino

211

citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on
respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen,
had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

CORPUZ VS STO TOMAS
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.
3
On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.
4
Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to
the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover
that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned
to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario,
Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree
took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.
5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns
marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982.
6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn
did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to
the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire
to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances.
She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,
7
the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded
that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

212

Code,
8
in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
9
Article 26 of the
Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
38.
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the
Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;
10
the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."
11

THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,
12
Gerbert filed the present petition.
13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to
that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision
applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly
stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the
Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested
with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be
prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the
Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,
14
both support Gerberts
position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

213

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void
15
and
voidable
16
marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity
or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the
other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.
17
Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.
18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an
alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the
Freedom Constitution,
19
enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the
Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
38.
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
20
and Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera.
21
In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of
marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still
married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just.
[The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."
23
The legislative intent is for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts
created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the
alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.
24
Without the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign
decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since
our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;
25
Article 17 of the
Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in
Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis

214

for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her
alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability
of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse
can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with
legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of
his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order
of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is
as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that

215

the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."
28
This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.
29
The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or
in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well
as the required certificates proving its authenticity,
30
but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce.
31
Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the
petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26
interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the
petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata
32
between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court.
33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will
not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

216

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based
on the mere presentation of the decree.
34
We consider the recording to be legally improper;
hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in
the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such
as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not."
35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of
Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of
persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.
x x x x
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices
the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the
civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;

217

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized
but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization
register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees
registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition
of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the
present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus,
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when
it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on
the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,
36
and Department of Justice
Opinion No. 181, series of 1982
37
both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the
civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to
law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi 1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend
to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in
the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil
registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil
Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil
registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in
detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It
also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located;
38
that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;
39
and that
the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
40
As
these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot
consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry
one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as

218

that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party
or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate
adversarial proceeding
41
by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured
and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October
30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its
February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished
the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

CATALAN VS CATALAN
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce
in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with
petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-
Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the
RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia,
considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested
person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of
Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy
was filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and
docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a
second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12
December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.
3
The trial court ruled that
since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not

219

recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not
valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the
trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It
considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of
petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to
Eusebio Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for
the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private
respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the
marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married
Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy
case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested
party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
4

After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been
dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters
of administration may have been filed by an "uninterested person," the defect was cured by
the appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a
better right to administer the decedents properties, the RTC should have first required the
parties to present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner
undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for review rather than
a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the
fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the
CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in
this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to
be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at
least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the
two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. A petition for
letters of administration is a special proceeding. A special proceeding is an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to
an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The only
party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant. Considering its nature, a

220

subsequent petition for letters of administration can hardly be barred by a similar pending
petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless both petitions are filed by the
same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by the
private respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a party to the petition
filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of the
petitioner must perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of
the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an "interested party,"
inasmuch as any person, for that matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the
estate sought to be administered, could be appointed as administrator for as long as he files
his petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of the rights of those specifically
mentioned in the order of preference in the appointment of administrator under Rule 78,
Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
x x x x x x x x x
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of
administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to administer the
estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like any other public
document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the
petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed
by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or
subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper
proceedings. The deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the
said case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan
has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to
deny the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a contrary
finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B.
Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in place.
x x x x x x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
5
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.
6
She alleged that the reasoning of
the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on
the other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with
her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
Hence, this Petition.

221

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the
finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio
Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it
follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of
the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both
the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A
was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was
established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
7
wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,
8
to wit:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided
they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once
proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce
from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could
"very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife
Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v.
Recio,
9
to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a

222

judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act
of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record
is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance
with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the
fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial
court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted
in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney,
Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the
marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus,
judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of
a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs
have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied
by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely
upon him.

223

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.1wphi1 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlandos
divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further
reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the
preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters
of administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of
kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,
10
in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by
Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with
the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However,
the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo
under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines
for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely
of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must
be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the
Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to
ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of
Orlando B. Catalan.

224

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch
70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance
with this Decision.

FUJIKI VS MARINAY
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines
2
on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon
City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
4
On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family
Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;
5
and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing
the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.
7
The RTC cited the
following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.
x x x x

225

Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where
the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of
filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the
above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a
ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."
8
Apparently, the RTC took the view that only
"the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to
declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage.
Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is
a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"
9
and
not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong."
10
In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the
status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of
the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines
11
on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.
12

In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void
marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
13
Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties
would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that
the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband
in the prior, pre-existing marriage."
14
Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil
Register Law (Act No. 3753)
15
in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.
16
The Civil Register
Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to
send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where
the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."
17
Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that
entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage"
and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or
correction.
18
The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the
Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely
erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated
that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,

226

because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki
cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court
19
which held that the "trial court cannot pre-
empt the defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu
proprio dismissing the case."
20
Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not
have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.
21
The trial court reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections
2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"
22
in the
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."
23
On the other hand,
the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the
Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken
together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."
24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The
City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.
25
The Court in Braza ruled that
"[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x
x."
26
Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a
collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."
27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.
28
Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition
was not authenticated as required under Section 5
29
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this
also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of
Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.
30
The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the
Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and
Motion.
31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement
that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and
that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.
32
The Solicitor General
argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to
declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General
cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic
33
which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

227

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
the Constitution.
34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.
35
In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,
36
this Court
held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."
37
WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese
Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who
is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to
record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil
registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the
entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
persons legal capacity and status x x x."
38
The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a
Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a
void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro
39
and Nial v. Bayadog
40
which
declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."
41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for
them to comment on the petition.
42
Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact
that she was previously married to Fujiki.
43
Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of
violence on Marinay.
44
On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose
the petition.
45
She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might
cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.
46

The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

228

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and
a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,
47
this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."
48

I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove
the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
49
Petitioner
may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office
which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.
50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the
form and contents of the petition,
51
the service of summons,
52
the investigation of the public
prosecutor,
53
the setting of pre-trial,
54
the trial
55
and the judgment of the trial court.
56
This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."
57
The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,
58
this
Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits,
the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial
the previously concluded litigation."
59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and
legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine
if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.
60
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties,

229

or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such
citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according
to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed
to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and
proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. ,
"want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations,
61
as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.
62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
63
Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven
under the rules of evidence.
64
Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce
law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when
his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.
65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground
of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from
the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.

230

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it
may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons
life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,
66
which the State
has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this
Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."
67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning thecivil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry
is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is
also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in
the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives
from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances
68
) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that
arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.
69
These property interests in
marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family"
70
and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,
72
but a spouses
right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.
73
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
integrity of his marriage.
74
In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this
substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage
to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary,
when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"
75
it refers to the husband or the wife of

231

the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband
nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the
one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
76
which penalizes
bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because
any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.
77
If anyone can file a
criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,
78
there is
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and
preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an
injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.
79
Juliano-Llave ruled that
the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens
the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."
80
Being a real party in interest, the prior
spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he
can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous
marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held
that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
81
Thus, the "validity
of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.
82
The
RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a
collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,
83
support pendente lite of the spouses and children,
84
the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,
85
and the investigation of the public prosecutor
to determine collusion.
86
A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is
also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the

232

Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located."
87
In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry
entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family
Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign
court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of
a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." InRepublic v. Orbecido,
88
this Court recognized the legislative intent of the
second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse"
89
under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly
that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a
foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being
tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her
country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign
divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v.
Romillo
90
which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served."
91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of
bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the
ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not

233

recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse
can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family
Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic
public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the
Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option
to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is
a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts
only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If
there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is
already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for
the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact
92
that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be
an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the
public records in the Philippines.1wphi 1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without
prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
93
The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of
bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

234

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address
the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.

MARABLE VS MARABLE
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. They were
classmates but initially, petitioner was not interested in respondent. He only became
attracted to her after they happened to sit beside each other in a passenger bus. Petitioner
courted respondent and they eventually became sweethearts even though petitioner
already had a girl friend. Later, respondent discovered petitioners other relationship and
demanded more time and attention from petitioner. Petitioner alleged that he appreciated
this gesture like a child longing for love, time and attention.
On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at
Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December
30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed with
five children.
As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels
became common occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy
because of it. The frequency of their quarrels increased when their eldest daughter
transferred from one school to another due to juvenile misconduct. It became worse still
when their daughter had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. The exceedingly serious
attention petitioner gave to his children also made things worse for them as it not only
spoiled some of them, but it also became another cause for the incessant quarrelling
between him and respondent.
Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another
woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. But
despite the end of the short-lived affair, their quarrels aggravated. Also, their business
ventures failed. Any amount of respect remaining between them was further eroded by their
frequent arguments and verbal abuses infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was
unloved, unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent.
When he could not bear his lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and stayed with
his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties which he and respondent had
accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later, he
converted to Islam after dating several women.

235

On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a
petition
4
for declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his
psychological incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of marital life.
In his petition, petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed
to the hardships of farm life at an early age. His father, although responsible and supportive,
was a compulsive gambler and womanizer. His father left their family to live with another
woman with whom he had seven other children. This caused petitioners mother and
siblings to suffer immensely. Thus, petitioner became obsessed with attention and worked
hard to excel so he would be noticed.
Petitioner further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked hard for the
company he joined. He rose from the ranks at Advertising and Marketing Associates, Inc.,
and became Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Finance Officer therein. But despite
his success at work, he alleged that his misery and loneliness as a child lingered as he
experienced a void in his relationship with his own family.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report
5
of Dr. Nedy L.
Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayags report
stated that petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder," characterized by a
pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness,
deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that petitioners personality
disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his
experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayags
conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioners marriage to respondent on the
ground of petitioners psychological incapacity.
Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC
decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between the
parties is declared valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
6

The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the
existence of petitioners psychological incapacity. The CA noted that Dr. Tayag did not fully
explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she give a concrete explanation as to how she
arrived at a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. The appellate court emphasized that
the root cause of petitioners psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. In addition,
the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.

236

On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
Essentially, petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in reversing the trial
courts decision.
Petitioner claims that his psychological incapacity to perform his essential marital
obligations was clearly proven and correctly appreciated by the trial court. Petitioner relies
heavily on the psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Tayag and quotes the latters
findings:
Petitioner had always been hungry for love and affection starting from his family to the
present affairs that he [has]. This need had afforded him to find avenues straight or not, just
to fulfill this need. He used charm, deceit, lies, violence, [and] authority just so to
accom[m]odate and justify his acts. Finally, he is using religions to support his claim for a
much better personal and married life which is really out of context. Rebellious and
impulsive as he is, emotional instability is apparent that it would be difficult for him to
harmonize with life in general and changes. Changes must come from within, it is not purely
external.
Clinically, petitioners self-absorbed ideals represent the grave, severe, and incurable
nature of Antisocial Personality Disorder. Such disorder is characterized by a pervasive
pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness, and
lack of remorse.
The psychological incapacity of the petitioner is attributed by jurisdictional antecedence as it
existed even before the said marital union. It is also profoundly rooted, grave and incurable.
The root cause of which is deep feelings of rejection starting from family to peers. This
insecure feelings had made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. Carrying it until his
marital life. Said psychological incapacity had deeply marred his adjustment and severed
the relationship. Thus, said marriage should be declared null and void by reason of the
psychological incapacity.
7

According to petitioner, the uncontradicted psychological report of Dr. Tayag declared that
his psychological incapacity is profoundly rooted and has the characteristics of juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability. Moreover, petitioner asserts that his psychological
incapacity has been medically identified and sufficiently proven. The State, on the other
hand, never presented another psychologist to rebut Dr. Tayags findings. Also, petitioner
maintains that the psychological evaluation would show that the marriage failed not solely
because of irreconcilable differences between the spouses, but due to petitioners
personality disorder which rendered him unable to comply with his marital obligations. To
the mind of petitioner, the assailed decision compelled the parties to continue to live under a
"non-existent marriage."
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a Comment
8
maintaining that petitioner failed to prove
his psychological incapacity. The OSG points out that Dr. Tayag failed to explain specifically
how she arrived at the conclusion that petitioner suffers from an anti-social personality
disorder and that it is grave and incurable. In fact, contrary to his claim, it even appears that
petitioner acted responsibly throughout their marriage. Despite financial difficulties, he and

237

respondent had blissful moments together. He was a good father and provider to his
children. Thus, the OSG argues that there was no reason to describe petitioner as a self-
centered, remorseless, rebellious, impulsive and socially deviant person.
Additionally, the OSG contends that since the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish
his psychological incapacity, the State is not required to present an expert witness where
the testimony of petitioners psychologist was insufficient and inconclusive. The OSG adds
that petitioner was not able to substantiate his claim that his infidelity was due to some
psychological disorder, as the real cause of petitioners alleged incapacity appears to be his
general dissatisfaction with his marriage. At most he was able to prove infidelity on his part
and the existence of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities." These,
however, do not constitute psychological incapacity.
Respondent also filed her Comment
9
and Memorandum
10
stressing that psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage should contemplate downright incapacity
or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the essential marital obligations, not a mere
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
The appeal has no merit.
The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the findings of the RTC for
lack of legal and factual bases.
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage.
11
These are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity
or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she
has contracted.
12
Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
13

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
14
the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36. The Court held,
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision.

238

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.1avvphi1
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition.
In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted
by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the examination
and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological
incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the
inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr.
Tayag failed to explain the root cause of petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. The
evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from
an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that
petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.
As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo,
15
the presentation of expert proof in cases for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough
and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Here, the
evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis
to declare as void petitioners marriage to respondent. In fact, we are baffled by Dr. Tayags
evaluation which became the trial courts basis for concluding that petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated, for the report did not clearly specify the actions of petitioner
which are indicative of his alleged psychological incapacity. More importantly, there was no
established link between petitioners acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is
indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
16


239

For sure, the spouses frequent marital squabbles
17
and differences in handling finances
and managing their business affairs, as well as their conflicts on how to raise their children,
are not manifestations of psychological incapacity which may be a ground for declaring their
marriage void. Petitioner even admitted that despite their financial difficulties, they had
happy moments together. Also, the records would show that the petitioner acted responsibly
during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his family, most
especially his children. Their personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder
tantamount to psychological incapacity.
Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father,
was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage.
However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of a general
dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal
history. His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was not shown to be
due to causes of a psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, the
records show that when respondent learned of his affair, he immediately terminated it. In
short, petitioners marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave
psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations.
It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that
petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity.
18
It must be shown that the acts of
unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
19
That not being the
case with petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that
psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party
was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,
20
the intention of the law is to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
21

All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and
respondent as valid and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to
establish petitioners psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

OCHOSA VS ALANO
It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in the AFP
while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind
romance that culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973
before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any
property. Neither did they incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976,

240

however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later
registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine
archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to
stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment,
except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort
Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio,
Makati City where they resided with their military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup
detat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their marriage when
Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she had illicit relations with other men.
Bona apparently did not change her ways when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she
entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was out of their living quarters. On
one occasion, Bona was caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with
Joses driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bonas sexual infidelity circulated in the military
community. When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military pass from his
jail warden and confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also
made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona
left with Ramona and went to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting
the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-
2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on
the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage.
Summons with a copy of the petition and its annexes were duly served upon Bona who
failed to file any responsive pleading during the reglementary period.
Pursuant to the order of the trial court, the Public Prosecutor conducted an investigation to
determine whether there was collusion between the parties. Said prosecutor submitted a
report that she issued a subpoena to both parties but only Jose appeared; hence, it can not
be reasonably determined whether or not there was collusion between them.
Trial on the merits of the case ensued. Petitioner along with his two military aides,
Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal and Demetrio Bajet y Lita, testified about respondents
marital infidelity during the marriage.

241

The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, who testified that after
conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that respondent was suffering from
histrionic personality disorder which she described as follows:
"Her personality is that she has an excessive emotion and attention seeking behavior.1wphi1 So
therefore they dont develop sympathy in feelings and they have difficulty in maintaining
emotional intimacy. In the case of Mr. Ochosa he has been a military man. It is his duty to
be transferred in different areas in the Philippines. And while he is being transferred from
one place to another because of his assignments as a military man, Mrs. Bona Alano
refused to follow him in all his assignments. There were only few occasions in which she
followed him. And during those times that they were not living together, because of the
assignments of Mr. Ochosa she developed extra marital affair with other man of which she
denied in the beginning but in the latter part of their relationship she admitted it to Mr.
Ochosa that she had relationship with respondents driver. I believe with this extra marital
affair that is her way of seeking attention and seeking emotions from other person and not
from the husband. And of course, this is not fulfilling the basic responsibility in a marriage."
According to Rondain, respondents psychological disorder was traceable to her family
history, having for a father a gambler and a womanizer and a mother who was a battered
wife. There was no possibility of a cure since respondent does not have an insight of what is
happening to her and refused to acknowledge the reality.
With the conclusion of the witnesses testimonies, petitioner formally offered his evidence
and rested his case.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition to the petition on the
ground that "the factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close
to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20
[1995])."
In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and nullified
the parties marriage on the following findings, viz:
x x x x
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides as follows:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Such a ground to be invalidative (sic) of marriage, the degree of incapacity must exhibit
GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that the psychological incapacity of the
respondent exhibited GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.

242

It is grave because the respondent did not carry out the normal and ordinary duties of
marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under everyday
circumstances of life and work. The gravity was manifested in respondents infidelity as
testified to by the petitioner and his witnesses.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent could be traced back to respondents history
as testified to by the expert witness when she said that respondents bad experience during
her childhood resulted in her difficulty in achieving emotional intimacy, hence, her
continuous illicit relations with several men before and during the marriage.
Considering that persons suffering from this kind of personality disorder have no insight of
their condition, they will not submit to treatment at all. As in the case at bar, respondents
psychological incapacity clinically identified as Histrionic Personality Disorder will remain
incurable.
4
Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial court Decision dated January 11, 1999 read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING the
marriage of JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA and BONA J. ALANO on October 27, 1973 at
Basilan City VOID AB INITIO on ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent under
Article 36 of the Family Code as amended with all the effects and consequences provided
for by all applicable provisions of existing pertinent laws.
After this Decision becomes final, let copies thereof be sent to the Local Civil Registrar of
Basilan City who is directed to cancel the said marriage from its Civil Registry, and the
Local Civil Registrar of Makati City for its information and guidance.
5

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling to the Court of Appeals
which sided with the OSGs contention that the trial court erred in granting the petition
despite Joses abject failure to discharge the burden of proving the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court Decision in its assailed
Decision dated October 11, 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, the appealed Decision dated 11 January 1999 in
Civil Case No. 97-2903 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, is
accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is entered DISMISSING the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
6

Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals for lack
of merit in its assailed Resolution dated March 10, 2005.
Hence, this Petition.
The only issue before this Court is whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

243

The petition is without merit.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the trial court hinges on
Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,
7
we observed that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.
Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of psychological incapacity as
mandated in Santos, we laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina
8
the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes theirpermanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties

244

exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outburst" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law
on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be
given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining

245

independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under
Canon 1095.
9
(Citations omitted.)
In Marcos v. Marcos,
10
we previously held that the foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinicallyidentified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychologicalcondition. For, indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
It is also established in jurisprudence that from these requirements arise the concept that
Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that
there never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction already then existing
was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.
11

A little over a decade since the promulgation of the Molina guidelines, we made a critical
assessment of the same in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,
12
to wit:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as
the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the
Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and
was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure
in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on
people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality
anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our
basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a
strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court,
in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.
13

However, our critique did not mean that we had declared an abandonment of
the Molina doctrine. On the contrary, we simply declared and, thus, clarified in the
same Te case that there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should
govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. Furthermore, we

246

reiterated in the same case the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And,
to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals.
14

In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
on the basis of Dr. Elizabeth Rondains testimony
15
and her psychiatric evaluation
report
16
as well as the individual testimonies of Jose
17
and his military aides - Mrs. Gertrudes
Himpayan Padernal
18
and Corporal Demetrio Bajet.
19

We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the evidence presented in this case,
that Bona had been, on several occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal to her
spouse, Jose. Likewise, we are persuaded that Bona had indeed abandoned Jose.
However, we cannot apply the same conviction to Joses thesis that the totality of Bonas
acts constituted psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the Family Code.
There is inadequate credible evidence that her "defects" were already present at the
inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity
did not satisfy the jurisprudential requisite of "juridical antecedence."
With regard to Bonas sexual promiscuity prior to her marriage to Jose, we have only the
uncorroborated testimony of Jose made in open court to support this allegation. To quote
the pertinent portion of the transcript:
Q: So, what was the reason why you have broken with your wife after several years -
A: Well, I finally broke up with my wife because I can no longer bear the torture because of
the gossips that she had an affair with other men, and finally, when I have a chance to
confront her she admitted that she had an affair with other men.
Q: With other men. And, of course this her life with other men of course before the
marriage you have already known
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: So, that this gossips because you said that you thought that this affair would go to end
after your marriage?
A: Yes, I was thinking about that.
Q: So, that after several years she will not change so thats why you cant bear it anymore?
A: Yes, maam.
20

Dr. Rondains testimony and psychiatric evaluation report do not provide evidentiary support
to cure the doubtful veracity of Joses one-sided assertion. Even if we take into account the
psychiatrists conclusion that Bona harbors a Histrionic Personality Disorder that existed
prior to her marriage with Jose and this mental condition purportedly made her helplessly

247

prone to promiscuity and sexual infidelity, the same cannot be taken as credible proof of
antecedence since the method by which such an inference was reached leaves much to be
desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in determining psychological
incapacity.
The psychiatrists findings on Bonas personality profile did not emanate from a personal
interview with the subject herself as admitted by Dr. Rondain in court, as follows:
Q: How about, you mentioned that the petitioner came for psychological test, how about the
respondent, did she come for interview and test?
A: No, maam.
Q: Did you try to take her for such?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And what did she tell you, did she come for an interview?
A: There was no response, maam.
21

As a consequence thereof, Dr. Rondain merely relied on her interview with Jose and his
witness, Mrs. Padernal, as well as the court record of the testimonies of other witnesses, to
wit:
Q: And you said you did interviews. Who did the interview?
A: I interviewed Mr. Ochosa and their witness Padernal, maam.
Q: When you say Padernal are you referring to Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal who testified
in this court?
A: Yes, maam.
x x x x
Q: Other than the interviews what else did you do in order to evaluate members of the
parties?
A: I also interviewed (sic) the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of other
witnesses, maam.
x x x x
Q: Was there also a psychological test conducted on the respondent?
A: Yes, your honor.

248

Q: It was on the basis of the psychological test in which you based your evaluation report?
A: It was based on the psychological test conducted and clinical interview with the other
witnesses, your Honor.
22

Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bonas psychological condition indirectly from the information
gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the
possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Joses cause, in
the absence of sufficient corroboration.
Even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the testimonies at issue since the trial court judge
had found them to be credible enough after personally witnessing Jose and the witnesses
testify in court, we cannot lower the evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on
Bonas pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in this case because
we have only the word of Jose to rely on. In fact, Bonas dysfunctional family portrait which
brought about her Histrionic Personality Disorder as painted by Dr. Rondain was based
solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose, the spouse who has the most to gain if
his wife is found to be indeed psychologically incapacitated. No other witness testified to
Bonas family history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of the marriage. Both Mrs.
Padernal and Corporal Bajet came to know Bona only during their employment in
petitioners household during the marriage. It is undisputed that Jose and Bona were
married in 1973 while Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet started to live with petitioners
family only in 1980 and 1986, respectively.
We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent level of evidentiary scrutiny
to cases like this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of
examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we
recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged
relations between the parties. For a determination though of a partys complete personality
profile, information coming from persons with personal knowledge of the juridical
antecedents may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows
flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps
spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.
23

However, we have also ruled in past decisions that to make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouses psychological condition based on the information fed by only
one side, similar to what we have pointed out in the case at bar, is, to the Courts mind, not
different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.
24

Anent the accusation that, even at the inception of their marriage, Bona did not wish to be
with Jose as a further manifestation of her psychological incapacity, we need only to look at
the testimonial records of Jose and his witnesses to be convinced otherwise, to wit:
JOSE OCHOSAS TESTIMONY:
Q: How long did you stay with your wife?

249

A: We were married in 1973 and we separated in 1988 but in all those years there were
only few occasions that we were staying together because most of the time Im in the field.
Q: Now, you said most of the time you were in the field, did you not your wife come with
you in any of your assignments?
A: Never, but sometimes she really visited me and stayed for one (1) day and then
Q: And, where did your wife stayed when she leaves you?
A: She was staying with her mother in Basilan.
Q: Where were you assigned most of the time?
A: I was assigned in Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Basilan.
Q: And, of course she would come to your place every now and then because it is not very
far
A: No, maam, once in a while only.
Q: Did you not go home to your conjugal home?
A: I have a chanced also to go home because we were allowed to at least three (3) days
every other month.
Q: So, if you start from the marriage up to 1988 so that is 16 years you were supposed to
have been living together?
A: No, actually in 19 middle of 1987 because in 1987 I was in x x x.
25

GERTRUDES PADERNALS TESTIMONY:
Q: Now, do you know when they lived together as husband and wife?
A: 1979.
Q: And you said that you have known the petitioner and the respondent in this case
because in fact, you lived with them together in the same quarters. Does the quarters have
different rooms?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: But very near each other?
A: Yes, maam.

250

Q: You know them because of the proximity of the quarters?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: It was only during this 1980 to 1983, three (3) years that you lived together that you have
a chance to be with the spouses?
x x x x
A: Since 1980 to 1983 we lived together in the same house.
x x x x
Q: Now, Madam Witness, after 1983, where did you reside together with your husband?
A: In Cagayan de Oro and in 1986 we came back to Manila, in Fort Bonifacio.
Q: You mean, in the same house where petitioner and the respondent lived together?
A: Yes. Maam.
Q: How long did you live in the house where the petitioner and the respondent stay?
A: Twelve years now since 1983 to 1995.
Q: Where was the petitioner working at that time, from 1982 to 1995?
A: He is a soldier, a Colonel.
Q: Do you know where he was assigned during this time?
A: Yes, maam, G-3.
Q: May we know where this G-3 is?
A: Fort Bonifacio, maam.
Q: What about the wife, where does she stay?
A: At Fort Bonifacio, in their house.
26

DR. ELIZABETH E. RONDAINS TESTIMONY:
Q: Now, they got married in 1973, am I correct?
A: Yes, maam.

251

Q: But the matter of the work or assignment of the petitioner, he was assigned in different
Provinces or Barangays in the Philippines?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Now, when the wife or the respondent in this case did not go with the husband in
different places of his assignment did you ask her why what was the reason why she did not
like to go those places?
A: She just did not want to. The wife did not go with him because by transferring from one
place to another, she just dont want to go, she just wanted to stay in Basilan where her
hometown is, maam.
Q: Did the petitioner herein tell you why the respondent dont want to go with him?
A: Yes, I asked, the answer of the petitioner was she simply did not want to go with him
because she did not want him to be appointed to far away places.
Q: And would it be that since she did not like to go with the husband in some far away
different assignments she also assumed that the assignments were in this war regions they
were always fighting considering the place in Basilan they were in fighting atmosphere?
A: It is possible but he was transferred to Manila and she also refused to stay in Manila,
maam.
Q: When was that that she refused to come to Manila?
A: I think, sometime in 1983, maam. She did not follow immediately. She stayed with him
only for four (4) months, maam.
Q: Now, do you know if the petitioner and the respondent were living together as husband
and wife for this period of time during the relationship?
A: Yes, maam. After their marriage I believe their relationship was good for a few months
until he was transferred to Julu. I believe during that time when they were together the
husband was giving an attention to her. The husband was always there and when the
husband transferred to Basilan, the attention was not there anymore, maam.
27

It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Joses assertion, had
no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage and was, in fact,
living with him for the most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose
drove her away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it
was Jose who was constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later
incarceration. A reasonable explanation for Bonas refusal to accompany Jose in his military
assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that those locations were known
conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bonas desire to live with Jose would later
be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio
during the following decade.

252

In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her
sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time
after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and
225 of the Family Code.
28

While we are not insensitive to petitioners suffering in view of the truly appalling and
shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound by judicial precedents regarding the
evidentiary requirements in psychological incapacity cases that must be applied to the
present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED

YAMBAO VS REP
Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao (petitioner) is assailing the Decision
1
dated April 16, 2008 and
the Resolution
2
dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
89262. The CA affirmed the decision
3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
which denied petitioners Petition
4
for the annulment of her marriage to respondent Patricio
E. Yambao (respondent) on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at the Philamlife Church in
Quezon City.
5
On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage, petitioner filed a Petition
6
before
the RTC, Makati City, praying that the marriage be declared null and void by reason of
respondents psychological incapacity, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
7

In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her and
respondents married life had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to
the latters inability to comply with the essential obligations of married life.
8

Petitioner averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the only one who
earned a living and took care of the children. Respondent, she alleged, did nothing but eat
and sleep all day, and spend time with friends. When respondent would find a job, he would
not be able to stay in it for long. Likewise, respondent went into several business ventures,
which all failed. In addition, respondent loved to gamble and would gamble away whatever
money would come his way.
Petitioner also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not even help
to change their diapers or feed them, even while petitioner was recovering from her

253

caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about children.
9
Later,
respondent became insecure and jealous and would get mad every time he would see
petitioner talking to other people, even to her relatives. When respondent started
threatening to kill petitioner, she decided to leave the conjugal abode and live separately
from him.
10
She then consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was indeed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
11

In his Answer, respondent denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been
trying to find a decent job, but was always unable to because of his old age and lack of
qualifications. He also claimed that he did not stay long in the jobs he had because the
same could not support the needs of his family, and yielded benefits that were not
commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He had ventured into small businesses but they
failed due to various economic crises. Respondent further claimed that he was not, in fact,
contented with living with petitioners relatives since his every move was being watched with
eagle eyes.
12

Respondent denied that he gambled, positing that since he had no income, he would not
have the funds for such activity. He alleged that even without a steady source of income, he
still shared in the payment of the amortization of their house in BF Homes, Paraaque City.
As to the care of their children, respondent countered that no fault should be attributed to
him because that is the duty of the household help.
13

Respondent also denied that he threatened to kill petitioner, considering that there was
never any evidence that he had ever harmed or inflicted physical injury on petitioner to
justify the latter having a nervous breakdown.
14

He further alleged that he never consulted any psychiatrist, and denied that he was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
15

On February 9, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision
16
dismissing the petition for lack of
merit. The RTC held that petitioners evidence failed to support her argument that
respondent was totally unaware of and incapacitated to perform his marital obligations such
that the marriage was void from the beginning. The court said that, even as petitioner
claimed to be unhappy in the marriage, it is incontrovertible that the union lasted for over
thirty years and the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without suffering
any major parenting problems. The court also noted that respondent was faithful to
petitioner and never physically abused her. Likewise, when the parties lived with petitioners
parents, respondent got along well enough with her family.
17

The RTC recognized that respondent did indeed have many faults, such as his indolence
and utter irresponsibility. However, the RTC said, respondents failure to find decent work
was due to his not having obtained a college degree and his lack of other qualifications.
Likewise, respondents failure in business could not be entirely attributed to him, since
petitioner was a business partner in some of these ventures.
18

The RTC also rejected the supposed negative effect of respondents Dependent Personality
Disorder. The RTC said that, although the evidence tended to show that respondent would

254

unduly rely upon petitioner to earn a living for the family, there was no evidence to show
that the latter resented such imposition or suffered with the additional financial burdens
passed to her by her husband. On the contrary, the RTC averred that, despite a supposedly
horrible married life, petitioner was able to rise in the ranks in her company and buy
properties with hardly any help from respondent.
19

The RTC concluded that while respondent might have been deficient in providing financial
support, his presence, companionship, and love allowed petitioner to accomplish many
things. Thus, respondent could be relied on for love, fidelity, and moral support, which are
obligations expected of a spouse under Article 68 of the Family Code.
20

Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioners claim that she suffered through respondents
overbearing jealousy. It found that respondent only became jealous when he thought that
petitioner was cheating on him. The RTC determined that jealousy was not a character trait
that contributed to respondents psychological dysfunction; much less did it amount to
psychological or mental torture on petitioner.
21
Thus, the RTC concluded that the parties
might have indeed entered into a bad marriage, but this did not in itself prove that the
marriage did not exist, given the 30 years they remained together through the various ups
and downs of their volatile relationship.
22

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on May 21, 2007.
23
Petitioner
subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal,
24
which was given due course by the RTC in an
Order dated June 8, 2007.
25
She then appealed to the CA.
In a Decision
26
dated April 16, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA held that
petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. It pointed out that respondent exerted efforts to find a
source of income to support his family. However, his failure to find a suitable job and the
failure of his business ventures were not mental but physical defects and, hence, could not
be considered "psychological incapacity" as contemplated under the law.
The CA also found that petitioners claims that she lived in misery during the marriage and
that respondent failed to keep his promises to her were not duly established. The CA held
that the fact that the parties lived together for 35 years and raised three children well, and
the fact that respondent never physically abused petitioner belied the formers psychological
incapacity. The CA also held that respondents refusal to care for the children was not
psychological incapacity but "merely constituted refusal to perform the task," which is not
equivalent to an incapacity or inability.
27

The appellate court also rejected petitioners allegation of respondents unbearable
jealousy. It said that the same must be shown as a manifestation of a disordered personality
which would make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
the marital state.
28
The CA averred that a jealous attitude simply evinced respondents love
for his wife, whom he could not bear to lose to another man. Meanwhile, the CA construed
the purported threats to kill petitioner as "emotional immaturity" and not psychological
incapacity.
29


255

Lastly, the CA found the report of expert witness Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino)
to be unsupported by sufficient evidence since the findings therein were not corroborated by
any other witness. Moreover, the CA said, neither the report nor petitioners testimony
established that respondents psychological condition was grave enough to bring about the
inability of the latter to assume the essential obligations of marriage, so that the same was
medically permanent or incurable.
30

Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated August
4, 2008.
31

Petitioner is now before this Court in a last ditch effort to gain freedom from her marriage to
respondent. In her petition for review, petitioner submits the following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
FAILED TO SHOW THAT RESPONDENT WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT
WAS MERELY REFUSING TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
MARRIAGE AND NOT DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITATED OR UNABLE
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RESPONDENTS UNBEARABLE JEALOUSY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A
CHARACTER TRAIT CONTRIBUTING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION OF
RESPONDENT WAS GRAVE ENOUGH, INCURABLE AND HAD NO ANTECEDENCE
(sic)
32

Petitioner argues that respondents Dependent Personality Disorder was sufficiently
established by her testimony and that of her sister, which testimonies were both credible
considering that they have personal knowledge of the circumstances prior to and during the
parties marriage. On the other hand, respondents evidence consisted merely of his sole
testimony, which were self-serving and full of inconsistencies.
33
Petitioner points out that
what the CA characterized as respondents "efforts" in finding jobs were merely the result of
short-lived bursts of industry, failing to note that the jobs were few and very far
between.
34
The rest of the time, respondent did nothing but eat, sleep, and party with his
friends.
35
Petitioner also alleges that respondent was given the opportunity to finish his

256

studies, first by his parents, and then by petitioner herself, but he never took up these
offers.
36

Petitioner also highlighted respondents failure to earn his keep, participate in household
chores, or take care of their children. She argues that respondent had the obligation to help
and contribute to all the needs of the family, whether the same be in the form of material or
physical support.
37

Petitioner also refutes the CAs conclusion that respondent was merely refusing to attend to
his familys needs. She insists that respondents inability is due to a psychological affliction,
i.e., Dependent Personality Disorder, as attested to by the expert witness she presented
during trial.
38
Part of this same disorder, according to petitioner, is respondents jealous
tendencies, which the CA belittled and attributed to emotional immaturity.
39

Finally, petitioner argues against the CAs finding that respondents laziness and
dependence could not be characterized as inability but just plain refusal. Petitioner
contends that she has complied with the guidelines laid down by the Court in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina. She further contends that the framers of the Family Code
never intended to give such a suppressed definition of psychological incapacity, and, in fact,
declared that a restrictive definition would limit the applicability of the provision.
40
Moreover,
she asserts that she has proven that respondents unbearable jealousy and Dependent
Personality Disorder manifested themselves even before the marriage of the parties,
although not in the same degree as when they were already married.
41

The petition has no merit and, perforce, must be denied.
Article 36 of the Family Code states:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case for declaration of
nullity under the foregoing provision must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, but according to its own facts. And, to
repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
42
Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be
informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current
trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience.
43

While the Court has not abandoned the standard set in Molina,
44
the Court has reiterated
the tenet that the factual milieu of each case must be treated as distinct and, as such, each
case must be decided based on its own set of facts.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,
45
the Court held that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. These guidelines
do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically

257

incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified."
46
What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's
psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.
47

Hence, the issue in this case can be summed up, thus: Does the totality of petitioners
evidence establish respondents psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage?
The Court holds that it does not.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
48
Thus, for a marriage to be
annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse
must be shown to suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or
her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants.
49
It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
50

In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a psychological
condition so severe that he was unaware of his obligations to his wife and family. On the
contrary, respondents efforts, though few and far between they may be, showed an
understanding of his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much
success. Whether his failure was brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or
by some other external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing
an awareness to provide for his family, even with his many failings, does not suffer from
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will.
51
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit
oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the
essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.
52
It is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he
must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
53

That respondent, according to petitioner, "lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility"
54
does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to
help care for the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable
jealousy may indicate some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been
shown to amount to a psychological abnormality.

258

Moreover, even assuming that respondents faults amount to psychological incapacity, it
has not been established that the same existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
In his psychological report,
55
Dr. Tolentino merely said, "[b]ecause ones personality or
character is formed early in life, it has a clear ANTECEDENT and it has an enduring pattern
of inner experience that deviates from the expectations of the individuals culture,"
56
without
explaining this antecedent. Even petitioner, in her allegations, never explained how the
alleged psychological incapacity manifested itself prior to or at the time of the celebration of
their marriage.
Likewise militating against petitioners cause is the finding of the trial court, and the same
was affirmed by the CA, that respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused
petitioner or their children. In fact, considering that the children lived with both parents, it is
safe to assume that both made an impact in the childrens upbringing. And still, as found by
the RTC and the CA, the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood "without
any major parenting problems."
57
Such fact could hardly support a proposition that the
parties marriage is a nullity.1wphi1
Respondent may not have turned out to be the ideal husband, or may have failed to meet
petitioners exacting standards. Yet this Court finds it impossible to believe that, as
petitioner alleges, there was nothing but heartache and strife in their over 35 years (prior to
filing the petition for declaration of nullity) of marriage.
To be sure, respondent, perhaps with a little more effort on his part, could have been more
helpful and could have made life that much easier for his wife. The fact that he did not,
however, does not mean that he is psychologically incapacitated to discharge his marital
obligations, as to give the Court a reason to declare the marriage null and void.
Certainly, the marriage was beset by difficulties, or as petitioner puts it, "marred by
bickerings, quarrels, and recrimination." It is a fact, however, that all marriages suffer
through the same trials at one point or another, with some going through more rough
patches than others. The Court concedes that petitioner and respondents marriage, as
characterized by the former, may indeed be problematic, even tumultuous. However, that
they had gone through 35 years together as husband and wife is an indication that the
parties can, should they choose to do so, work through their problems.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated April 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 89262 are AFFIRMED.

REP VS GALANG
On March 9, 1994, the respondent and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga. They
resided in the house of the respondents father in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga.
The respondent worked as an artist-illustrator at the Clark Development Corporation,

259

earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, on the other hand, stayed at home as a housewife. They
have one child, Christopher.
On August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 9494. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to
exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler.
He claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents money, and often asked money
from their friends and relatives on the pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital.
According to the respondent, Juvy suffers from "mental deficiency, innate immaturity,
distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection [towards him and their]
child." He posited that Juvys incapacity was "extremely serious" and "appears to be
incurable."
5

The RTC ordered the city prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties.
Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama formally manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he found
no evidence of collusion between the parties. The RTC set the case for trial in its Order of
October 20, 1999. The respondent presented testimonial and documentary evidence to
substantiate his allegations.
In his testimony, the respondent alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast
because Juvy did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors
care; and Christopher almost got lost in the market when Juvy brought him there.
6

The respondent further stated that Juvy squandered the P15,000.00 he entrusted to her. He
added that Juvy stole his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the check
representing his (the respondents) fathers pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught
Juvy playing "mahjong" and "kuwaho" three (3) times. Finally, he testified that Juvy
borrowed money from their relatives on the pretense that their son was confined in a
hospital.
7

Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a
psychologist, who testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent.
According to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but the latter did not
respond.
8
In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the following findings:
Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-matured
individual. He is well-adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major
irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration tolerance which means he has a little ability
to endure anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and emotions which resulted
to unbearable emotional pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and gained emotional
tensions caused by his wifes behavior.
The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-wife:
(1) being very irresponsible and very lazy and doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility;
(2) her involvement in gambling activities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an
estafador which exhibits her behavioral and personality disorders; (4) her neglect and show
no care attitude towards her husband and child; (5) her immature and rigid behavior; (6) her

260

lack of initiative to change and above all, the fact that she is unable to perform her marital
obligations as a loving, responsible and caring wife to her family. There are just few reasons
to believe that the defendant is suffering from incapacitated mind and such incapacity
appears to be incorrigible.
x x x
The following incidents are the reasons why the couple separated:
1. After the marriage took place, the incapacity of the defendant was manifested on
such occasions wherein the plaintiff was the one who prepared his breakfast,
because the defendant doesnt want to wake up early; this became the daily routine
of the plaintiff before reporting to work;
2. After reporting from work, the defendant was often out gambling, as usual, the
plaintiff was the one cooking for supper while the defendant was very busy with her
gambling activities and never attended to her husbands needs;
3. There was an occasion wherein their son was lost in the public market because of
the irresponsible attitude of the defendant;
4. That the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders, there was
an occasion wherein the defendant [would] steal money from the plaintiff and use
them for gambling;
5. Defendant, being an estafador had been manifested after their marriage took
place, wherein the defendant would come with stories so that people [would] feel pity
on her and give her money. Through false pretenses she [would] be able to deceive
and take money from neighbors, relatives and other people.
6. That the plaintiff convinced the defendant to stop her unhealthy lifestyle
(gambling), but the defendant never listened to his advices;
7. That the plaintiff was the one who [was] taking care of their son, when the plaintiff
will leave for work, the defendant [would] entrust their son to their neighbor and go
[to] some place. This act reflects the incapacity of the defendant by being an
irresponsible mother;
8. That the defendant took their son and left their conjugal home that resulted into
the couples separation.
Psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and
behavioral disorders. These disorders are manifested through her grave dependency on
gambling and stealing money. She doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty
and these disorders appear to be incorrigible.
The plaintiff tried to forget and forgive her about the incidents and start a new life again and
hoping she would change. Tried to get attention back by showing her with special care,

261

treating her to places for a weekend vacation, cook[ing] her favorite food, but the defendant
didnt care to change, she did not prepare meals, wash clothes nor clean up. She neglected
her duties and failed to perform the basic obligations as a wife.
So in the view of the above-mentioned psychological findings, it is my humble opinion that
there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated
to perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son.
9

The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The trial court
saw merit in the testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and concluded that:
After a careful perusal of the evidence in the instant case and there being no controverting
evidence, this Court is convinced that as held in Santos case, the psychological incapacity
of respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations of his marriage with petitioner,
which Dr. Gerardo Veloso said can be characterized by (a) gravity because the subject
cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any
average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work; (b) antecedence,
because the root cause of the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject before
marriage although its overt manifestations appear over after the wedding; and (c)
incurability, if treatments required exceed the ordinary means or subject, or involve time and
expense beyond the reach of the subject are all obtaining in this case.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is granted and the marriage
between petitioner and defendant is hereby declared null and void pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines.
10

The CA Decision
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the
CA. The CA, in its decision dated November 25, 2004, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
The CA held that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations. It explained that Juvys indolence and lack of sense of responsibility, coupled
with her acts of gambling and swindling, undermined her capacity to comply with her marital
obligations. In addition, the psychologist characterized Juvys condition to be permanent,
incurable and existing at the time of the celebration of her marriage with the respondent.
11

The petitioner moved to reconsider this Decision, but the CA denied his motion in its
resolution dated May 9, 2005.
12

The Petition and the Issues
The petitioner claims in the present petition that the totality of the evidence presented by the
respondent was insufficient to establish Juvys psychological incapacity to perform her

262

essential marital obligations. The petitioner additionally argues that the respondent failed to
show the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Juvys condition.
13
The
respondent took the exact opposite view.
The issue boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the respondents marriage to Juvy
on the ground that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from
psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying with her essential marital
obligations.
The Courts Ruling
After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition, and hold that no sufficient basis
exists to annul the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under the terms of
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 of the Family Code
and Related Jurisprudence
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization."
14

In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
15
the Court first declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. The defect should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to "the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."
16
We laid down more definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina, whose salient points are
footnoted below.
17
These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in
Santos.
18

In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos,
19
we further clarified that it is not absolutely
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. Thereafter, the Court promulgated
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages)
20
which provided that "the complete facts should allege
the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time
of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged."
Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te
21
placed some
cloud in the continued applicability of the time-tested Molina
22
guidelines. We stated in this
case that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket; it
forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. This is

263

contrary to the intention of the law, since no psychological incapacity case can be
considered as completely on "all fours" with another.
Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting
23
and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito
Suazo,
24
however, laid to rest any question regarding the continued applicability of
Molina.
25
In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te
26
did not abandon Molina.
27
Far from
abandoning Molina,
28
Ngo Te
29
simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent
requirements. We also explained that Suazo
30
that Ngo Te
31
merely stands for a more
flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on
32

The Present Case
In the present case and using the above guidelines, we find the totality of the respondents
evidence the testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and the latters
psychological report and evaluation insufficient to prove Juvys psychological incapacity
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
a. The respondents testimony
The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to
prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the
house; (c) squandered a huge amount of theP15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to
her; (d) stole the respondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in
his account; (e) falsified the respondents signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up
false stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.
These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the
law requires. We stress that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. In Republic of the
Philippines v. Norma Cuison-Melgar, et al.,
33
we ruled that it is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he
or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not
physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage had to be shown.
34
A cause has to be shown and linked with the
manifestations of the psychological incapacity.
The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys condition is a manifestation of a
disordered personality rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition
that rendered her unable to discharge her essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts
attributed to Juvy only showed indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility,
resulting in nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations. In Ricardo B. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring,
35
we emphasized that irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the
like do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as these may only
be due to a person's difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage

264

that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code
addresses.
In like manner, Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents signature to encash a check, of
stealing the respondents ATM, and of squandering a huge portion of the P15,000.00 that
the respondent entrusted to her, while no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be
equated with a psychological disorder, especially when the evidence shows that these were
mere isolated incidents and not recurring acts. Neither can Juvys penchant for playing
mahjong and kuwaho for money, nor her act of soliciting money from relatives on the
pretext that her child was sick, warrant a conclusion that she suffered from a mental malady
at the time of the celebration of marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital
duties and obligations. The respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy engaged in these
behaviors (gambling and what the respondent refers to as "swindling") only two (2) years
after their marriage, and after he let her handle his salary and manage their finances. The
evidence also shows that Juvy even tried to augment the familys income during the early
stages of their marriage by putting up a sari-sari store and by working as a manicurist.
b. The Psychologists Report
The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondents cause, as it glaringly
failed to establish that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital duties at the material time required by Article 36 of the Family Code.
To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions
exclusively from the information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondents
description of Juvy would contain a considerable degree of bias; thus, a psychological
evaluation based on this one-sided description alone can hardly be considered as credible
or sufficient. We are of course aware of our pronouncement in Marcos
36
that the person
sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated need not be examined by the
psychologist as a condition precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If the incapacity can be
proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be
admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a
psychologists examination and report. In this case, however, no such independent
evidence has ever been gathered and adduced. To be sure, evidence from independent
sources who intimately knew Juvy before and after the celebration of her marriage would
have made a lot of difference and could have added weight to the psychologists report.
Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the psychologists report simply
stressed Juvys negative traits which she considered manifestations of Juvys psychological
incapacity (e.g., laziness, immaturity and irresponsibility; her involvement in swindling and
gambling activities; and her lack of initiative to change), and declared that "psychological
findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders
x x x she doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty, and these disorders
appear to be incorrigible."
37
In the end, the psychologist opined without stating the
psychological basis for her conclusion that "there is sufficient reason to believe that the
defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife and
mother to their only son."
38


265

We find this kind of conclusion and report grossly inadequate. First, we note that the
psychologist did not even identify the types of psychological tests which she administered
on the respondent and the root cause of Juvys psychological condition. We also stress that
the acts alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurred during the marriage; there
was no showing that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage. Second,
the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvys alleged condition, specifically, why
and to what extent the disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply with her
marital duties. Significantly, the report did not even categorically state the particular type of
personality disorder found. Finally, the report failed to establish the incurability of Juvys
condition. The reports pronouncements that Juvy "lacks the initiative to change" and that
her mental incapacity "appears incorrigible"
39
are insufficient to prove that her mental
condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means
to undertake.
c. The Psychologists Testimony
The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical antecedence,
gravity or incurability of Juvys alleged psychological defect as she merely reiterated what
she wrote in her report i.e., that Juvy was lazy and irresponsible; played mahjong and
kuhawo for money; stole money from the respondent; deceived people to borrow cash; and
neglected her child without linking these to an underlying psychological cause. Again,
these allegations, even if true, all occurred during the marriage. The testimony was totally
devoid of any information or insight into Juvys early life and associations, how she acted
before and at the time of the marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered personality
developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvys psychological
condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability.1wphi 1 In these
respects, she merely stated that despite the respondents efforts to show love and affection,
Juvy was hesitant to change. From this premise, she jumped to the conclusion that Juvy
appeared to be incurable or incorrigible, and would be very hard to cure. These unfounded
conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code
requires. To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be
reluctant to change is another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed, psychological
incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
40

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic
social institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable
institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions
for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage
lies with the plaintiff.
41
Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave
and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are compelled to
uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
42


266

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we GRANT the petition. We SET
ASIDE the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated November 25, 2004
and May 9, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 70004. Accordingly, we DISMISS
respondent Nestor Galangs petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy
Salazar under Article 36 of the Family Code. Costs against respondent Nestor Galang.

AURELIO VS AURELIO
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on
March 23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
4
In her petition, respondent
alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and
complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged
that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the
marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
shall likewise be void, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondents petition are the following
allegations, to wit:
x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically
incapable of performing and complying with their essential marital obligations. Said
psychological incapacity was existing prior and at the time of the marriage. Said
psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his
lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited
consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile
defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the maintenance of the family. He refused to
foot the household bills and provide for his familys needs. He exhibited arrogance. He was
completely insensitive to the feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass his
wife even in the presence of their children.
Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her
feelings change very quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-
to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally
immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her
needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits
immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to
accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their
marriage. Private respondent manifested psychological aversion to cohabit with her
husband or to take care of him. The psychological make-up of private respondent was

267

evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of both husband
and wife to perform their marital obligations is grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private
respondent suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas
petitioner suffers from passive aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder that renders
him immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage.
5

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
6
the petition. Petitioner principally
argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the
standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order
7
denying petitioners motion.
On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however,
denied by the RTC in an Order
8
dated December 17, 2003. In denying petitioners motion,
the RTC ruled that respondents petition for declaration of nullity of marriage complied with
the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious
would depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial, to wit:
A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court of
Appeals (268 SCRA 198), otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of
the root cause of the psychological incapacity of both the petitioner and the respondent
contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The manifestation of juridical
antecedence was alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The allegations constituting
the gravity of psychological incapacity were alleged in paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition.
The incurability was alleged in paragraph 10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding of
incurability was quoted in paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a cause of action presented
in the petition for the nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the proofs to be presented by
both parties. This, in turn, will entail the presentation of evidence which can only be done in
the hearing on the merits of the case. If the Court finds that there are (sic) preponderance of
evidence to sustain a nullification, then the cause of the petition shall fail. Conversely, if it
finds, through the evidence that will be presented during the hearing on the merits, that
there are sufficient proofs to warrant nullification, the Court shall declare its nullity.
9

On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition for
certiorari
10
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition, the dispositive
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the] instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
11

In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

268

In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondents complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the
Family Code and the Molina doctrine revealed the existence of a sufficient cause of action.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this Courts consideration, to
wit:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONS
CONTAINED IN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO DECLARE THE NULLITY OF
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA AND DANILO.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS ACTION FOR
CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO
DISMISS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PATENTLY AND UTTERLY TAINTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS NOT A PLAIN,
ADEQUATE OR SPEEDY REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
12

Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondents complaint been filed after
March 15, 2003, this present petition would have been denied since Supreme Court
Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10
13
prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in actions for
annulment of marriage. Be that as it may, after a circumspect review of the arguments
raised by petitioner herein, this Court finds that the petition is not meritorious.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
14
this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts
in the disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
clearly explained in the decision.
the marriage.
incurable.
assume the essential obligations of marriage.

269

of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition,
as the case may be, to the petition.
15

This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified
the above pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of
the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still,
Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
16

Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondents
petition are insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply with three of
the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
alleged in the complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied
marital obligation must be stated in the petition.
17

First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological
incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of
respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in
the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent
and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a
nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from
Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder.lawph! 1 The incapacity of both parties to
perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with
were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition,
respondents allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that "the

270

husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support."
It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first
instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines would show that the same contemplate a
situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have testified, and
that a decision has been reached by the court after due hearing. Such process can be
gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by the RTC after trial
on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first
instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are sufficient to substantiate a
case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.
Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.
18
It would thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it
would be in the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the
evidentiary value of the testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses
presented by the parties.
Given the allegations in respondents petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the
RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. By
grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave
abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at
all in contemplation of law.
19
Even assuming arguendo that this Court were to agree with
petitioner that the allegations contained in respondents petition are insufficient and that the
RTC erred in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, the same is merely an error of
judgment correctible by appeal and not an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
20

Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioners petition. As a general rule, the denial of a
motion to dismiss, which is an interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioners
remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his motion to dismiss, as defenses in his answer to the
petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal the
decision in due time.
21
The existence of that adequate remedy removed the underpinnings
of his petition for certiorari in the CA.
22

WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2005 Decision
and October 26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238,
are AFFIRMED.

KALAW VS FERNANDEZ

271

A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts. It is the
plaintiffs burden to convince the court of the existence of these facts.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in
1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4,
1976. They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or
Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn
Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in March 1983.
5

In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four
children with Tyrone.
6
Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three
more children.
7

In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his
four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a
househelp and a driver.
8
The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children
whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the
children stayed with Malyn on weekends.
9

In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to go to Japan for
a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to
the US.
10
After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical
custody of the two younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on,
the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans
with their father.
11

Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.
12
He
alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the
essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further
claimed that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and
irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by
Malyns following acts:
1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all
day and all night;
2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the
following day; and

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3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante
delicto.
13

During trial,
14
Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyns alleged infidelity. According to
him, on June 9, 1985, he and his brother-in-law, Ronald Fernandez (Malyns brother),
proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned that Malyn was occupying a room with a certain
Benjie Guevarra (Benjie). When he proceeded to the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn
inside.
15
At rebuttal, Tyrone elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a towel around his
waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After an exchange of words, he
agreed not to charge Malyn with adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital
and parental rights.
16
They put their agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law
expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior
her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends
may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).
17
NPD is present when a person
is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant
others.
18
Malyns NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.
19

Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder "may have been evident even prior to
her marriage" because it is rooted in her family background and upbringing, which the
psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and without a proper maternal role model.
20

Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad
Kalaw (Tyrones sister-in-law), and the son Miggy. She also read the transcript of Tyrones
court testimony.
21

Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment. He concluded that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties.
22
He explained that her
psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role
allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the point that her needs became priority, while her kids
and husbands needs became secondary. Malyn is so self-absorbed that she is incapable of
prioritizing her familys needs.
Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not disorders by
themselves. They only constitute psychological incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of
time are spent on these activities to the detriment of ones familial duties.
23
Fr. Healy
characterized Malyns psychological incapacity as grave and incurable.
24

He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report
of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyns expert witness.
25
He clarified that he did not
verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyns "habits" because he
believed it is the courts duty to do so.
26
Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption
that the factual allegations are indeed true.
Malyns version

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Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.
27
While she admitted playing mahjong,
she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone alleged. She maintained that she did so only
two to three times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only.
28
And in those
instances, she always had Tyrones permission and would often bring the children and their
respective yayas with her.
29
She maintained that she did not neglect her duties as mother
and wife.
Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however, explained that she
did so only to escape her physically abusive husband.
30
On the day she left, Tyrone, who
preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset that Malyn was preparing to go to work. He
called up the security guards and instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone
then placed cigarette ashes on Malyns head and proceeded to lock the bedroom doors.
Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their bedroom and into her mother-in-laws
room. She blurted that Tyrone would beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave her P300
to leave the house.
31
She never returned to their conjugal home.
Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones wishes, because she wanted to
be self-sufficient. Her resolve came from her discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn
and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn.
32

Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at
the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so drunk after partying with friends. She admitted
finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained
being fully clothed at that time.
33
Malyn insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her
spousal and parental rights under duress.
34

After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously visiting them in
school. She later obtained partial custody of the children as an incident to the legal
separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which action was subsequently dismissed for
lack of interest).
As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from
psychological incapacity, as manifested by his drug dependence, habitual drinking,
womanizing, and physical violence.
35
Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as
her expert witness.
Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her psychological
evaluation of the spouses. The factual narrations culled from these interviews reveal that
Tyrone found Malyn a "lousy" mother because of her mahjong habit,
36
while Malyn was fed
up with Tyrones sexual infidelity, drug habit, and physical abuse.
37
Dr. Dayan determined
that both Tyrone and Malyn were behaviorally immature. They encountered problems
because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise of their
marriage. Her diagnostic impressions are summarized below:
The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning. Both of them
were not truly ready for marriage even after two years of living together and having a child.
When Malyn first met Tyrone who showered her with gifts, flowers, and affection she
resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she could take him or leave him. But the

274

minute she started to care, she became a different person clingy and immature, doubting
his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his
life. She became relationship-dependent. It appears that her style then was when she
begins to care for a man, she puts all her energy into him and loses focus on herself. This
imbalance between thinking and feeling was overwhelming to Tyrone who admitted that the
thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that when he was in his younger years,
he was often out seeking other women. His interest in them was not necessarily for sex, just
for fun dancing, drinking, or simply flirting.
Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted to her husband
who was a moody man with short temper and unresolved issues with parents and siblings.
He was a distancer, concerned more about his work and friends tha[n] he was about
spending time with his family. Because of Malyns and Tyrones backgrounds (both came
from families with high conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in their marriage. The
conflicts they had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out of control Their individual
personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of their marriage.
38

Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn exhibited
significant, but not severe, dependency, narcissism, and compulsiveness.
39

On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship problems with
Tyrone, she appeared to have a good relationship with her kids.
40
As for Tyrone, he has
commitment issues which prevent him from committing himself to his duties as a husband.
He is unable to remain faithful to Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this
duty.
41

Childrens version
The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their needs,
and loved them. Rio testified that they would accompany their mother to White Plains on
days that she played mahjong with her friends. None of them reported being neglected or
feeling abandoned.
The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only Ria who
admitted actually witnessing physical abuse inflicted on her mother.
42
The two elder kids
also recalled that, after the separation, their mother would visit them only in school.
43

The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver during the time
that their dad was abroad.
44
While they did not live with their mother while they were housed
in Valle Verde, the kids were in agreement that their mother took care of them on weekends
and would see to their needs. They had a common recollection that the househelp would
call their mother to come and take care of them in Valle Verde whenever any of them was
sick.
45

Other witnesses
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified that,
for the duration of Tyrones confinement, the couple appeared happy and the wife was

275

commendable for the support she gave to her spouse.
46
He likewise testified that Tyrone
tested negative for drugs and was not a drug dependent.
47

Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they found Malyn
with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel room. Contrary to Tyrones version, he testified that neither he
nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the hallway. He likewise did not recall seeing
Benjie or Malyn half-naked.
48

Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyns group of
friends. He stated on the stand that they would go on nights-out as a group and Malyn
would meet with a male musician-friend afterwards.
49

Social worker
The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct a social
case study on the parties as well as the minor children. Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone
and Malyn; the minor children Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrones live-in partner,
Jocelyn;
50
and Tyrone and Malyns only daughter, Ria. While both parents are financially
stable and have positive relationships with their children, she recommended that the
custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the interviews of family
members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more available to the children and to
exercise better supervision and care. The social worker commended the fact that even after
Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made efforts to visit her children clandestinely in
their respective schools. And while she was only granted weekend custody of the children, it
appeared that she made efforts to personally attend to their needs and to devote time with
them.
51

On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couples de facto
separation, simply left the children for several years with only a maid and a driver to care for
them while he lived with his second family abroad.
52
The social worker found that Tyrone
tended to prioritize his second family to the detriment of his children with Malyn. Given this
history during the formative years of the children, the social worker did not find Tyrone a
reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
53

After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that
both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code. The courts Decision is encapsulated in this paragraph:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity
to perform their essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
parties entered into a marriage without as much as understanding what it entails. They
failed to commit themselves to its essential obligations: the conjugal act, the community of
life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of their children to
become responsible individuals. Parties psychological incapacity is grave, and serious such
that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The

276

incapacity has been clinically established and was found to be pervasive, grave and
incurable.
54

The trial court then declared the parties marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code.
55

56

Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA.1wphi 1 The CA reversed the trial courts ruling
because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both parties allegations and
incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological incapacity. The
parties faults tend only to picture their immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their
marital and familial obligations. At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal
separation.
57
Moreover, the psychological report submitted by petitioners expert witness, Dr.
Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It
failed to satisfy the legal and jurisprudential requirements for the declaration of nullity of
marriage.
58

Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration
59
but the same was denied on December 15,
2004.
60

Petitioners arguments
Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial
court, which is the court that is in the best position to appreciate the evidence. He opines
that he has presented preponderant evidence to prove that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:
a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that
respondents egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-obsession and self-centeredness
were manifestations of respondents NPD;
61

b) these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD is grave and incurable and
prevents her from performing her essential martial obligations;
62
and
c) that respondents NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage
because it is rooted in her upbringing, family background, and socialite lifestyle prior
to her marriage.
63

Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of
psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioners part.
64

Respondents arguments
Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her alleged
65
She argues that the testimonies of her children and the findings
of the court social worker to the effect that she was a good, loving, and attentive mother are
sufficient to rebut Tyrones allegation that she was negligent and irresponsible.
66


277

She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did not
interview her, their common children, or even Jocelyn. Moreover, her report failed to state
that Malyns alleged psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.
67
Fr. Healys
testimony, on the other hand, was based only on Tyrones version of the facts.
68

Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the trial court Decision is intrinsically
defective for failing to support its conclusion of psychological incapacity with factual
findings.
Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a change of
heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Withdraw Comment and
Memorandum.
69
She manifested that she was no longer disputing the possibility that their
marriage may really be void on the basis of Tyrones psychological incapacity. She then
asked the Court to dispose of the case with justice.
70
Her manifestation and motion were
noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution.
71

Issue
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological
incapacity
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial
courts Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code
which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations.
72
The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on
the plaintiff.
73
The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her
actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or
her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The
psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must
be incurable.
74

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from
psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses
who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of
these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had
not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of
respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends,
adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged

278

habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to
her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the
conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary
evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected
their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that
she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a
wife. Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a week.
She maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her
husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this,
saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home.
Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong
sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two
of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of
respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second
grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong,
its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the
beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No
proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent
partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent
during these nights-out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but
Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming
arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with
another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with
obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal
separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors
described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed
psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally
remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not
once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they
narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food
they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts to see and take care of her children
despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows
abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons,
Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is
nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyns actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion
of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling

279

that there was psychological incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely summarized the
allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually
assess the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of
the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its
legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have
constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children.
There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that
voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals May
27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240
are AFFIRMED.

TORING VS TORING
Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his aunts house in Cebu. Teresita was then
his cousins teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his aunts house.
Despite their slight difference in age (of five years), the younger Ricardo found the dance
teacher attractive and fell in love with her. He pursued Teresita and they became
sweethearts after three months of courtship. They eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of
another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the
City Court of Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric
Jayson.
On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for
annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to
the celebration of their marriage. He asked the court to declare his marriage to Teresita null
and void.
At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation
and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr.
Albarans respective testimonies. Teresita did not file any answer or opposition to the
petition, nor did she testify to refute the allegations against her.
3

Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita was an
adulteress and a squanderer. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly sent money to
his wife to cover the familys living expenses and their childrens tuition. Teresita, however,
was not adept in managing the funds he sent and their finances. Many times, Ricardo would
come home and be welcomed by debts incurred by his wife; he had to settle these to avoid
embarrassment.

280

Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from other people, Teresita likewise failed
to remit amounts she collected as sales agent of a plasticware and cosmetics company.
She left the familys utility bills and their childrens tuition fees unpaid. She also missed
paying the rent and the amortization for the house that Ricardo acquired for the family, so
their children had to live in a small rented room and eventually had to be taken in by
Ricardos parents. When confronted by Ricardo, Teresita would simply offer the excuse that
she spent the funds Ricardo sent to buy things for the house and for their children.
Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was pregnant with
another mans child. During one of his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresitas
stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical examination but she
refused. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions.
Ricardo alleged that the child could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual
contact with Teresita were characterized by "withdrawals"; other than these, no other sexual
contacts with his wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month
of living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his wife represented
herself to others as single, and went out on dates with other men when he was not around.
Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and
demanding person, who mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for the nightlife and
was very averse to the duties of a housewife; was stubborn and independent, also most
unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices
for their family; and was most painfully unmindful of him.
4
He believed that their marriage
had broken down beyond repair and that they both have lost their mutual trust and love for
one another.
5

Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the
marriage was Teresitas Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations. To quote Dr. Albaran:
Teresita, the respondent[,] has [sic] shown to manifest the following pervasive pattern of
behaviors: a sense of entitlement as she expected favorable treatment and automatic
compliance to her wishes, being interpersonally exploitative as on several occasions she
took advantage of him to achieve her own ends, lack of empathy as she was unwilling to
recognize her partners [sic] feelings and needs[,] taking into consideration her own feelings
and needs only, her haughty and arrogant behavior and attitude and her proneness to
blame others for her failures and shortcomings. These patterns of behavior speaks [sic] of a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which started to manifest in early adulthood. The disorder
is considered to be grave and incurable based on the fact that individuals do not recognize
the symptoms as it is ego syntonic and they feel there is nothing wrong in them. Because of
that[,] they remain unmotivated for treatment and impervious to recovery.
6

She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her psychological evaluation
on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresitas eldest son). She admitted, though, that
she did not personally observe and examine Teresita; she sent Teresita a personally-
delivered notice for the conduct of a psychiatric evaluation, but the notice remained
unanswered.

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In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended
that there was no basis to declare Teresita psychologically incapacitated. It asserted that
the psychological evaluation conducted on Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed
a vague and general conclusion on these parties personality traits but not on Teresitas
psychological makeup. The OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically
identify and sufficiently prove the medical cause of the alleged psychological incapacity.
Neither did the evidence indicate that the alleged psychological incapacity existed prior to or
at the time of marriage, nor that the incapacity was grave and incurable.
The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to Teresita. In short, the RTC
believed Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation and testimony and, on the totality of
Ricardos evidence, found Teresita to be psychologically incapacitated to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial courts findings did not satisfy the
rules and guidelines set by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.
7
The RTC
failed to specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused Teresitas psychological
incapacity, and likewise failed to show that the incapacity already existed at the time of
celebration of marriage.
The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation do not
appear to have been drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and dwelt mostly on
hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA found that Ricardos allegations on
Teresitas overspending and infidelity do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring the
marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. These allegations, even if true,
could only effectively serve as grounds for legal separation or a criminal charge for adultery.
THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS
Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, particularly the
expert testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial court in declaring the nullity of
the marriage fully complied with Molina.
In its Comment,
8
the OSG argued that the CA correctly reversed the RTCs decision,
particularly in its conclusion that Ricardo failed to comply with this Courts guidelines for the
proper interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. Reiterating its earlier
arguments below, the OSG asserts that the evidence adduced before the trial court failed to
show the gravity, juridical antecedence, or incurability of the psychological incapacity of
Teresita, and failed as well to identify and discuss its root cause. The psychiatrist, likewise,
failed to show that Teresita was completely unable to discharge her marital obligations due
to her alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Ricardos Reply
9
reiterated that the RTC decision thoroughly discussed the root cause of
Teresitas psychological incapacity and identified it as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. He
claimed that sufficient proof had been adduced by the psychiatrist whose expertise on the
subject cannot be doubted. Interestingly, Ricardo further argued that alleging the root cause
in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary,
citing Barcelona v. Court of Appeals.
10


282

These positions were collated and reiterated in the memoranda the parties filed.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA committed no reversible error when it set
aside the RTCs decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
11
we held that psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The
psychological incapacity should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."
12

We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and laid down definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and application of this article. These guidelines incorporate
the basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability established in
the Santos case, as follows:
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
ofejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

283

exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
an essential obligation of marriage.
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
13

Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic guidelines to
varying factual situations, thus confirming the continuing doctrinal validity of Santos. In so
far as the present factual situation is concerned, what should not be lost in reading and
applying our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the application of Article
36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the
disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning
and significance to the marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the psychological
illness and its root cause must have been there from the inception of the marriage. From
these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really
dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place
because the affliction already then existing was so grave and permanent as to deprive
the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he
or she was to assume or had assumed.
14

In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the petitioners
evidence to be insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to

284

perform her duties as a wife. As already mentioned, the evidence presented consisted of
the testimonies of Ricardo and Dr. Albaran, and the latters psychological evaluation of
Ricardo and Richardson from where she derived a psychological evaluation of Teresita.
a. Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation and testimony
Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita suffers from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to assume essential
marital obligations. To support her findings and conclusion, she banked on the statements
told to her by Ricardo and Richardson, which she narrated in her evaluation. Apparently
relying on the same basis, Dr. Albaran added that Teresitas disorder manifested during her
early adulthood and is grave and incurable.
To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and evaluation that, in
this case, became the basis for the conclusion that no marriage really took place because of
the psychological incapacity of one of the parties at the time of marriage.
We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and
Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological tests administered only on
Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita
suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This Court has long been negatively critical
in considering psychological evaluations, presented in evidence, derived solely from one-
sided sources, particularly from the spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage.
In So v. Valera,
15
the Court considered the psychologists testimony and conclusions to be
insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the finding of respondents
psychological incapacity because the facts, on which the conclusions were based, were all
derived from the petitioners statements whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be
discounted. In another case, Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,
16
the Court declared that while
the various tests administered on the petitioner-wife could have been used as a fair gauge
to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement could not be made with
respect to the respondent-husbands psychological condition. To our mind, conclusions and
generalizations about Teresitas psychological condition, based solely on information fed by
Ricardo, are not any different in kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
17

To be sure, we have recognized that the law does not require that the allegedly
incapacitated spouse be personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
18
This recognition, however, does not signify that the evidence, we shall
favorably appreciate, should be any less than the evidence that an Article 36 case, by its
nature, requires.
Our recognition simply means that the requirements for nullity outlined in Santos and Molina
need not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still
essential although from sources other than the respondent spouse to show his or her
personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause of the

285

inability to appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence
and incurability of the condition.
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to
them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on
the allegedly incapacitated spouses condition at or about the time of marriage, or to
subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the
time of marriage.
In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give
statements for purposes of Teresitas psychological evaluation was Richardson, the
spouses eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36
case because he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not
have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until long after his
birth.
We confirm the validity of this observation from a reading of the summary of Richardsons
interview with the pyschologist: Richardsons statement occupied a mere one paragraph
(comprising eleven sentences) in the psychological evaluation and merely recited isolated
instances of his parents fighting over the foreclosure of their house, his fathers alleged
womanizing, and their differences in religion (Ricardo is a Catholic, while Teresita is a
Mormon).
19

We find nothing unusual in these recited marital incidents to indicate that Teresita suffered
from some psychological disorder as far back as the time of her marriage to Ricardo, nor do
we find these fights to be indicative of problems traceable to any basic psychological
disorder existing at the time of marriage. For one, these points of dispute are not
uncommon in a marriage and relate essentially to the usual roots of marital problems
finances, fidelity and religion. The psychologist, too, never delved into the relationship
between mother and son except to observe their estranged relationship due to a previous
argument a money problem involving Ricardos financial remittances to the family. To
state the obvious, the psychologists evaluation never explained how the recited incidents,
made by one who was not even born at the time of the spouses marriage, showed a
debilitating psychological incapacity already existing at that time.
Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardos cause, is the failure of Dr. Albarans
psychological evaluation to fully explain the details i.e., the what, how, when, where and
since when of Teresitas alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. It seems to us that,
with hardly any supporting evidence to fall back on, Dr. Albaran simply stated out of the blue
that Teresitas personality disorder manifested itself in early adulthood, presuming thereby
that the incapacity should have been there when the marriage was celebrated. Dr. Albaran
never explained, too, the incapacitating nature of Teresitas alleged personality disorder,
and how it related to the essential marital obligations that she failed to assume. Neither did
the good doctor adequately explain in her psychological evaluation how grave and incurable
was Teresitas psychological disorder.
Dr. Albarans testimony at the trial did not improve the evidentiary situation for Ricardo, as it
still failed to provide the required insights that would have remedied the evidentiary gaps in

286

her written psychological evaluation. In fact, Dr. Albarans cross-examination only made the
evidentiary situation worse when she admitted that she had difficulty pinpointing the root
cause of Teresitas personality disorder, due to the limited information she gathered from
Ricardo and Richardson regarding Teresitas personal and family history. To directly quote
from the records, Dr. Albaran confessed this limitation when she said that "[t]he only data
that I have is that, the respondent seem [sic] to have grown from a tumultuous family
and this could be perhaps the [sic] contributory to the development of the personality
disorder."
20
Dr. Albarans obvious uncertainty in her assessment only proves our point that a
complete personality profile of the spouse, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated,
could not be determined from meager information coming only from a biased source.
b. Ricardos testimony
Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer and an adulteress. We do not,
however, find Ricardos characterizations of his wife sufficient to constitute psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity
or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty,"
"refusal, or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the
spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or
illness.
21

Ricardos testimony merely established that Teresita was irresponsible in managing the
familys finances by not paying their rent, utility bills and other financial obligations.
Teresitas spendthrift attitude, according to Ricardo, even resulted in the loss of the house
and lot intended to be their family residence. This kind of irresponsibility, however, does not
rise to the level of a psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the Family Code.
At most, Teresitas mismanagement of the familys finances merely constituted difficulty,
refusal or neglect, during the marriage, in the handling of funds intended for the familys
financial support.
Teresitas alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does not constitute psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as
psychological incapacity, the respondents unfaithfulness must be established as a
manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state;
22
there must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated her from complying with the
obligation to be faithful to her spouse.
23

In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimony to prove that Teresita suffered from a
disordered personality of this kind. Even Ricardos added testimony, relating to rumors of
Teresitas dates with other men and her pregnancy by another man, would not fill in the
deficiencies we have observed, given the absence of an adverse integral element and link
to Teresitas allegedly disordered personality.
Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresitas alleged character traits already existed at
the inception of their marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the psychological
incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage, even if such incapacity

287

becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
24
In the absence of this element, a marriage
cannot be annulled under Article 36.
Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be alleged in a petition for
annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code
Citing Barcelona,
25
Ricardo defended the RTC decision, alleging that the root cause in a
petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary. We find
this argument completely at variance with Ricardos main argument against the assailed CA
decision i.e., that the RTC, in its decision, discussed thoroughly the root cause of
Teresitas psychological incapacity as Narcissistic Personality Disorder. These conflicting
positions, notwithstanding, we see the need to address this issue to further clarify our
statement in Barcelona, which Ricardo misquoted and misinterpreted to support his present
petition that "since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root
cause of the psychological incapacity."
26

In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for annulment for its failure to state the "root
cause" of the respondents alleged psychological incapacity. The Court resolved this issue,
ruling that the petition sufficiently stated a cause of action because the petitioner instead
of stating a specific root cause clearly described thephysical manifestations indicative
of the psychological incapacity. This, the Court found to be sufficiently compliant with the
first requirement in the Molina case that the "root cause" of the psychological incapacity
be alleged in an Article 36 petition.
Thus, contrary to Ricardos position, Barcelona does not do away with the "root cause"
requirement. The ruling simply means that the statement of the root cause does not need to
be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the root causes of many psychological
disorders are still unknown to science. It is enough to merely allege the physical
manifestations constituting the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Section 2,
paragraph (d) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (Rules)
27
in fact provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
x x x x
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specially allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative
of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert
opinion need not be alleged.
As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging the root cause in a petition for
annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code was not dispensed with by the adoption of

288

the Rules. What the Rules really eliminated was the need for an expert opinion to prove the
root cause of the psychological incapacity. The Court further held that the Rules, being
procedural in nature, apply only to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
adoption.1avvphi 1
To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that Teresita suffered
from psychological incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of marriage must fail. Ricardo
merely established that Teresita had been remiss in her duties as a wife for being
irresponsible in taking care of their familys finances a fault or deficiency that does not
amount to the psychological incapacity that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. We
reiterate that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity, as the same may only be due to a persons difficulty, refusal or neglect to
undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that
Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.
28

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. Costs against the petitioner.

CAMACHO REYES VS REYES
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.
In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a finding
of psychological incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where
there are none. On the other hand, blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the
Constitution
1
and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social
institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of
psychological incapacity, trenches on the very reason why a marriage that is doomed from
its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA -G.R. CV No. 89761
2
which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854.
3

First, we unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University
of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They
were simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent cross-enrolled from
the UP Los Baos campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a
boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she
thought was free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and
traditions.
4
Since both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and
drove home together from the university.

289

Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtship which included dining
out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university students budget. At
that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant.
Petitioners good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latters habit of
cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB
Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year,
and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioners graduation and her fathers death,
petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.
Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family in Mandaluyong City. All living
expenses were shouldered by respondents parents, and the couples respective salaries
were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly
allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a
child entailed expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00
from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner.
When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told
her that he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business.
Respondents game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying
hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business
took respondent away from his young family for days on end without any communication.
Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the situation will change.
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live
separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further
financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income
earner of the household, respondents business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at
business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to
petitioner sporadically. Compounding the familys financial woes and further straining the
parties relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his
business took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert
any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in
with petitioners mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the
parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a
family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son.
At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either
the petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting

290

nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital
bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business stopped operations.
Although without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work
for the family business. Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in
scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondents business ventures, this did not
succeed and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but
petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair.
She overheard respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone
inquiring if the latter liked respondents gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent
was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly,
remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties marriage was a surgical
operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated
on, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper,
and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled
into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of
respondents lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the
recovery room.
Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage.
Petitioner approached respondents siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that
she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even respondents siblings waved the white flag on
respondent.
Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a
marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder
couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not
improve the parties relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological
assessment to "determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." As with all
other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical
psychologists recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.
At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents siblings, told respondent
to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner.
With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondents
relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001,
5
petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

291

Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was
psychologically incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing
his obligations to his familyboth as a spouse to petitioner and father to their children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella
Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC
granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the
ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus:
Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the petition is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA
CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES contracted on December 4, 1976 at the
Archbishops Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and void under
Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved.
Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.
Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO
REYES, who are already of age and have the full civil capacity and legal rights to decide for
themselves having finished their studies, are free to decide for themselves.
The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the
parties. Entry of Judgment shall be made if no Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or
Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.
Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if the
parties have no properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe the procedure prescribed
in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.
The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10
SC) shall be issued by the Court only after compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family
Code as implemented under the Rules on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property
(Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where the parties have properties.
The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Mandaluyong and Quezon City.
Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City,
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at their
respective office addresses.
SO ORDERED.
6

Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for
reconsideration of the respondent, affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.

292

Taking exception to the trial courts rulings, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals,
adamant on the validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the
respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the parties marriage as valid and subsisting.
Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from the majority decision
and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23,
2007 and Order dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89
in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
7

Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following
issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING ON IT.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES
OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS
OF MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.

293

VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES MARRIAGE,
WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE STATE CONCERNING
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE
CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE.
VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED PETITION
WAS VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.
8

Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the parties
is void ab initio on the ground of both parties psychological incapacity, as provided in Article
In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and documentary
evidence obtained from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The
RTC ratiocinated, thus:
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds merit in the
petition.
Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization."
and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:
"The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support."
Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital partner towards
each other and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express the duties of parents
toward their children.
Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the determination of
the same solely to the Court on a case to case basis.
x x x x
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological
incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the
pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the
assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on

294

the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the
parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity" which
pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and
socially towards each other in relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love,
fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In
short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of respondent which
created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the
truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that
respondent is suffering from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to
fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to
their profession, the Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product
of an honest evaluation on the psychological status of the respondent. This psychological
incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is
serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his
structural constellation. It is beyond the respondents impulse control. In short, he is
weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply because
he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that
nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their relationship as a
normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to
them by his original family members to save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too
insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of
petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already that she finally revealed her
misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their marriage.
However, the hard position of the respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to
leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the respondent were unanimous that
separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent
confirmed this stand of his siblings.
x x x x
The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and not a one
sided one. It also requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential duties to the marriage
which must naturally be observed by the parties as a consequence of their marriage.
Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage between the parties did not create a
monument of marital integrity, simply because the personality disorder of the respondent
which renders him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage, is
deeply entombed in his structural system and cure is not possible due to his belief that there
is nothing wrong with them.
The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent. Petitioner, too,
is to be blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted with psychological
incapacity as her personality cannot be harmonized with the personality of the respondent.
They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a perfectionist while
respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the respondent
cannot be catered by the petitioner and vice-versa.

295

Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the thunder bolt or
principal culprit on their inability to nurture and reward their marital life with meaning and
significance. So much so that it is a pity that though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still
it is an empty kingdom due to their psychological incapacity which is grave, incurable and
has origin from unhealthy event in their growing years.
Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they are entitled to
live in a peaceful and orderly environment conducive to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of
the Family Code provides remedy to any party aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of
the parties is already a settled matter due to their psychological incapacity. In the words of
Dra. Magno, their marriage, at the very inception, was already at the funeral parlor. Stated
differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it never existed at all. The Court finds
that with this reality, both parties suffer in agony by continuously sustaining a marriage that
exists in paper only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage
remains in its crib with its boots and diaper due to factors beyond the physical, emotional,
intellectual and social ability of the parties to sustain.
9

In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the
appellate court diverged from the findings of the RTC in this wise:
On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis--vis the
totality of evidence presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the latter failed to
sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of
herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically
incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering
from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality
Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an
Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas
diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type,
associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and
narcissistic features.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in
character. A court may place whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It may
even reject them, if it finds that they are inconsistent with the facts of the case or are
otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither clinical psychologist Magno nor
psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the [respondent].
Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas are
hearsay. They are "unscientific and unreliable" as they have no personal knowledge of the
psychological condition of the [respondent] as they never personally examined the
[respondent] himself.
x x x x

296

[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported psychological
incapacity of [respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner] would like this Court to think. It
bears stressing that [respondent] was referred to Dayan for "psychological evaluation to
determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." The undeniable fact is that
based on Dayans personal examination of the [respondent], the assessment procedures
used, behavioral observations made, background information gathered and interpretation of
psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help the [respondent]
through individual therapy and counseling sessions.
Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as
his failure to give regular support, substance abuse, infidelity and "come and go" attitude
are true, the totality of the evidence presented still falls short of establishing that
[respondent] is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
x x x x
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quos findings regarding the [respondents]
alleged mixed personality disorder, his "come and go" attitude, failed business ventures,
inadequate/delayed financial support to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to
[petitioners] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits,
unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed business activities,
taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on
serious marital difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. [Respondents] "defects" were not present at the inception
of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the first few years of their marriage,
which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that
initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the
tradition in most Filipino households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned
from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his
business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with
Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].
x x x x
As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas Psychiatric
Report states that [petitioner] "manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that
made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great
amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.
However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the
complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of celebration [thereof] even if
such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration xxx. In fact, what was merely
prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to

297

be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at
the time of the celebration of marriage x x x.
x x x x
What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their marriage.
However, it is jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations, it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
While [petitioners] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and
void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the
unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the State.
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be
read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that
would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that
would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. x x x
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its
recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
10

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate
courts ruling that the psychological incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently
established. We disagree with its decision declaring the marriage between the parties as
valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Santos v. Court of Appeals
11
solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the
factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations
are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
12


298

As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a
personality disorder, to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE
[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an average
social status, intellectual achievement is quite important to the family values (sic). All
children were equipped with high intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents proud
of them. Father was disabled, but despite his handicap, he was able to assume his financial
and emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited extent, his social functions (sic).
Despite this, he has been described as the unseen strength in the family.
Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home. Doing volunteer
and community services, she was not the demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional
mother (sic). Her love and concern came in the form of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and
encouragements (sic), but not the caressing, sensitive and soothing touches of an
emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home environment did not permit one to nurture a
hurt feeling or depression, but one has to stand up and to help himself (sic). This trained her
to subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.
Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any undertakings
(sic). She is organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal,
competent and has a strong sense of duty (sic). But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her
analytical resources and strong sense of objectivity predisposed her to a superficial
adjustments (sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and reason, and less of how she
feels (sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in a heterosexual
relationship, especially to her husband, who has deep seated sense of inadequacy,
insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth despite his intellectual assets (sic). Despite this,
[petitioner] remained in her marriage for more than 20 years, trying to reach out and lending
a hand for better understanding and relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time when
others, like her husband would make decision for her (sic), instead of being depended upon.
But the more [petitioner] tried to compensate for [respondents] shortcomings, the bigger
was the discrepancy in their coping mechanisms (sic). At the end, [petitioner] felt unloved,
unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their marriage as very much lacking in
relationship (sic).
On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the second set of
brood (sic), where there were less bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing up stage.
Additionally, he was acknowledged as the favorite of his mother, and was described to have
a close relationship with her. At an early age, he manifested clinical behavior of conduct
disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his apparent high intellectual potentials
(sic), he felt that he needed a "push" to keep him going. His being a "free spirit", attracted
[petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted, without being bothered by
untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing ideas from other people. He presented no
guilt feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His

299

studies proved too much of a pressure for him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite
his apparent high intellectual resources (sic).
His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit
work from his family employment and ventured on his own. With no much planning and
project study, his businesses failed. This became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts,
the lack of relationships (sic) and consultations (sic) with each other, his negativistic
attitudes (sic) and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his spitting at her face which
impliedly meant "you are nothing as compared to me" were in reality, his defenses for a
strong sense of inadequacy (sic).
As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this seemed not
coupled with emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience, maturity, direction, focus,
adequacy, stability and confidence to make it work. He complained that he did not feel the
support of his wife regarding his decision to go into his own business. But when he failed,
the more he became negativistic and closed to suggestions especially from [petitioner]. He
was too careful not to let go or make known his strong sense of inadequacy, ambivalence,
doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss
of pride. When things did not work out according to his plans, he suppressed his hostilities
in negative ways, such as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.
His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight and primitive
drives. He seemed to feel more comfortable in being untraditional and different from others.
Preoccupation is centered on himself, (sic) an unconscious wish for the continuance of the
gratification of his dependency needs, (sic) in his mother-son relationship. From this stems
his difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his wife, as pressures, stresses, (sic)
demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital relationship. Strong masculine
strivings is projected.
For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to assume his
duties and responsibilities as a husband and father, but because of a severe psychological
deficit, he was unable to do so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner]
manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the
emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
[Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is
suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is
characterized by his inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily govern many
aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His being a "free spirit" associated with no
remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His
prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to
boost his ego.

300

The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense
mechanisms, or the unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts.
His prolonged and closed attachments to his mother encouraged cross identification and
developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine strivings. He
therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral
and forceful decision making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial
acts. His narcissistic supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital
demands and stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in
his psychological development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality
structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree, because it hampered, interrupted and
interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis
supplied)
13

2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic. According to
them, respondent has not really taken care of his wife and children. He does not seem to
have any direction in life. He seems to be full of bright ideas and good at starting things but
he never gets to accomplish anything. His brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now
[respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when they see that [respondent] is not
himself. He likes to bum around and just spends the day at home doing nothing. They wish
that hed be more responsible and try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his wife[,] is
the breadwinner of the family because she has a stable job. [Respondent]s brothers
learned from friends that [petitioner] is really disappointed with him. She has discussed
things with him but he always refused to listen. She does not know what to do with him
anymore. She has grown tired of him.
When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he stopped taking
it in 1993. His brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to
stop taking drugs when he had been hooked to it for the past 22 years. When [respondent]
was also asked what his problems are at the moment, he mentioned that he feels lonely
and distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He feels that he and his wife [have]
drifted apart. He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things with this person but he
is not given the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak points is that he is very
tolerant of people[,] that is why he is taken advantage of most of the time. He wants to avoid
conflict so hed rather be submissive and compliant. He does not want to hurt anyone [or] to
cause anymore pain. He wants to make other people happy.
x x x x
Interpretation of Psychological Data
A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning
x x x x

301

B. Vocational Preference
x x x x
C. Socio Emotional Functioning
x x x x
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and
detached attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of
inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from
association with others. He feels that he is "different" and as a result is prone to anticipate
rejections. Because of the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid
personal and social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with himself and
accentuates his tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt
to be the less dominant partner. He feels better when he has to follow than when he has to
take the lead. A self-contained person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in
order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a small need of companionship and is
most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his more tender
feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry within but he may choose to
repress this feeling. [Respondents] strong need for social approval, which could have
stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes him submissive and over [compliant].
He tends to make extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he] already feels
victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of
interpersonal conflicts. Despite
his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and disapproval
[of] others. Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations
which is likewise apt to be repressed.
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable
tension and anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is
also entertaining feelings of hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought. He
feels that he is up in the air but with no sound foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he
knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty
concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but
he cant accomplish anything because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling of
hopelessness is further aggravated by the lack of support from significant others.
Diagnostic Impression
Axis I : Drug Dependence
Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]
Axis III : None

302

Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
Severe
He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to accomplish
anything; unable to give priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning Fair (Emphasis supplied)
14

3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
Summary and Conclusion
From the evidence available from [petitioners] case history and from her psychological
assessment, and despite the non-cooperation of the respondent, it is possible to infer with
certainty the nullity of this marriage. Based on the information available about the
respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial personality disorder with narcissistic and
dependent features that renders him too immature and irresponsible to assume the normal
obligations of a marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and conscientious
person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her
achievements in
this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her comprehension of
human situations is very shallow for a woman of her academic and professional
competence. And this explains why she married RRR even when she knew he was a
pothead, then despite the abuse, took so long to do something about her situation.
Diagnosis for [petitioner]:
Axis I Partner Relational Problem
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouses immaturity, drug abuse,
and infidelity)
Severity: 4-severe
Diagnosis for [respondent]
Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and
dependent features

303

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)
Severity: 4 (severe)
x x x x
One has to go back to [respondents] early childhood in order to understand the root cause
of his antisocial personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood of 11.
His elder siblings were taken cared of by his grandmother. [Respondents] father was kind,
quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared] by his mother. Unfortunately, [respondents]
mother grew up believing that she was not her mothers favorite child, so she felt "api,
treated like poor relations." [Respondents] mothers reaction to her perceived rejection was
to act outwith poor impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent money like water,
had terrible temper tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became [respondents] role
model.
However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he learned to use
his good looks and his charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to lie
convincingly and to say what people wanted to hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked
admiration and attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In the process,
his ability to love and to empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot sustain a
relationship with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a marriage.
[Respondents] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self-centeredness
(e.g. moved to Mindoro and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family in Manila); his
grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. he would just "come and go," without telling his
wife his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g. felt entitled to a mistress because
[petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally exploitative (e.g. let his
wife spend for all the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g.
when asked to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he would think about it,
etc.) The aggressive sadistic personality features were manifested whom he has physically,
emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on drugs; and his dependent
personality features were manifested by his need for others to assume responsibility for
most major areas of his life, and in his difficulty in doing things on his own.
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic
features and aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render support for his
spouse and children. A personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over
time.
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner]
and [respondent is] null and void from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)
15

Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of
Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and
interviewed the respondent.

304

We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person
diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the
doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their
exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition,
16
necessarily involves only two persons. The totality
of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and
genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual
assessment of the present state of the parties marriage from the perception of one of the
parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to
interact with, and experience, respondents pattern of behavior which she could then validly
relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based solely
on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as
respondents own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified
on their own observations of respondents behavior and interactions with them, spanning
the period of time they knew him.
17
These were also used as the basis of the doctors
assessments.
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,
18
citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV),
19
instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria
for personality disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the
expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the
following areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional
response)
(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and
social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational or other important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to
adolescence or early adulthood.

305

E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of
another mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a
drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).
Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring
since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:
(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by
repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for
personal profit or pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or
assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent
work behavior or honor financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt,
mistreated, or stolen from another
B. The individual is at least 18 years.
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of
schizophrenia or a manic episode.
20

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make
up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted
with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this
case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-
diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate
diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of
experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the
psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable.

306

The appellate court is mistaken.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general,
recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to
manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddocks textbook entitled Synopsis of
Psychiatry,
21
treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed
kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans recommendation that
respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that
respondents psychological incapacity is incurable.
Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
22
As aptly stated
by Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals & Molina:
23

[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such
cases. Data about the persons entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a
partys mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged
and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
[Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective
testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have
problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and
work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance
abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has
personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of
nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists finding of a personality
disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by
one of the parties or both parties psychological incapacity.
On more than one occasion, we have rejected an experts opinion concerning the supposed
psychological incapacity of a party.
24
In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,
25
we ruled that, even without
delving into the non-exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina,
26
the
stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals
27
must be independently met by
the party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We
declared, thus:
It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary
a link drawn between the "psychodynamics of the case" and the factors characterizing the
psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable
conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential

307

marital obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not
illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating effect on their
marriage x x x.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders was not
supported by psychological tests properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically
trained in the tests' use and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the
parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully established by
psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of
people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.
x x x x
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of
interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial
court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory
or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts
that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion
is founded.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual antecedents
(narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the
inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit
the following clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even
charming and ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many areas of disordered life
functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and
illegal activities are typical experiences that patients report as beginning in childhood. x x x
Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their mental
content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In
fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress observers
as having good verbal intelligence.
x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task
or adhere to any conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of
remorse for these actions; that is, they appear to lack a conscience.
28


308

In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1)
sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with
the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioners purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CAs
ruling thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete
facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In fact, what was merely
the time of the celebration of the marriage x x x
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioners] Amended Petition was indeed
amended to conform to the evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court, Dr. Villegas finding that [petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an Inadequate
Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a
debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage.1avvphi1 In fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical
psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be a
"good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the
needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are praiseworthy." Even in Dr.
Villegas psychiatric report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain in their
marriage for more than 20 years "trying to reach out and lending a hand for better
understanding and relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than
[petitioners] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is psychologically
incapacitated within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
29

All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in
his separate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:
30

x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another
case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition,
we find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.

309

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R.
CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No
costs.

BACCAY VS BACCAY
Noel and Maribel were schoolmates at the Mapua Institute of Technology where both took
up Electronics and Communications Engineering. Sometime in 1990, they were introduced
by a mutual friend and became close to one another. Noel courted Maribel, but it was only
after years of continuous pursuit that Maribel accepted Noels proposal and the two became
sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type, which traits he
found attractive.
5

Noels family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring Maribel to their house.
Noel observed that Maribel was inordinately shy when around his family so to bring her
closer to them, he always invited Maribel to attend family gatherings and other festive
occasions like birthdays, Christmas, and fiesta celebrations. Maribel, however, would try to
avoid Noels invitations and whenever she attended those occasions with Noels family, he
observed that Maribel was invariably aloof or snobbish. Not once did she try to get close to
any of his family members. Noel would talk to Maribel about her attitude towards his family
and she would promise to change, but she never did.
Around 1997, Noel decided to break up with Maribel because he was already involved with
another woman. He tried to break up with Maribel, but Maribel refused and offered to accept
Noels relationship with the other woman so long as they would not sever their ties. To give
Maribel some time to get over their relationship, they still continued to see each other albeit
on a friendly basis.
Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, however, Noel and Maribel had
several romantic moments together. Noel took these episodes of sexual contact casually
since Maribel never demanded anything from him except his company. Then, sometime in
November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon advice
of his mother, Noel grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. Noel and Maribel were immediately
wed on November 23, 1998 before Judge Gregorio Dayrit, the Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noels family in their
house at Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City. During all the time she lived with Noels family,
Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would
just come and go from the house as she pleased. Maribel never contributed to the familys
coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support. Also, she refused to have any
sexual contact with Noel.

310

Surprisingly, despite Maribels claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms
of pregnancy in her. He asked Maribels office mates whether she manifested any signs of
pregnancy and they confirmed that she showed no such signs. Then, sometime in January
1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came home she announced to Noel
and his family that she had a miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General Hospital
where her sister worked as a nurse.
Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February 1999. The
discussion escalated into an intense quarrel which woke up the whole household. Noels
mother tried to intervene but Maribel shouted "Putang ina nyo, wag kayo makialam" at her.
Because of this, Noels mother asked them to leave her house. Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel
called her parents and asked them to pick her up. Maribel left Noels house and did not
come back anymore. Noel tried to communicate with Maribel but when he went to see her
at her house nobody wanted to talk to him and she rejected his phone calls.
6

On September 11, 2000 or after less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition
7
for
declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of Manila. Despite summons, Maribel did not
participate in the proceedings. The trial proceeded after the public prosecutor manifested
that no collusion existed between the parties. Despite a directive from the RTC, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) also did not submit a certification manifesting its agreement or
opposition to the case.
8

On February 5, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of the parties hereto
celebrated on November 23, 1998 at the sala of Judge Gregorio Dayrit of the Metropolitan
Trial Court in Quezon City as NULL and VOID.
The Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Chief of the National Statistics Office are
hereby directed to record and enter this decree into the marriage records of the parties in
their respective marriage registers.
The absolute community property of the parties is hereby dissolved and, henceforth, they
shall be governed by the property regime of complete separation of property.
With costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
9

The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage,
and such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder
characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical
psychologist. The RTC cited the findings of Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist presented
as witness by Noel, that Maribel was a very insecure person. She entered into the marriage
not because of emotional desire for marriage but to prove something, and her attitude was
exploitative particularly in terms of financial rewards. She was emotionally immature, and

311

viewed marriage as a piece of paper and that she can easily get rid of her husband without
any provocation.
10

On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
Branch 38 declaring as null and void the marriage between petitioner-appellee and
respondent is hereby REVERSED. Accordingly, the instant Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
11

The appellate court held that Noel failed to establish that Maribels supposed Narcissistic
Personality Disorder was the psychological incapacity contemplated by law and that it was
permanent and incurable. Maribels attitudes were merely mild peculiarities in character or
signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect to perform marital obligations which did not amount to
psychological incapacity, said the appellate court. The CA noted that Maribel may have
failed or refused to perform her marital obligations but such did not indicate incapacity. The
CA stressed that the law requires nothing short of mental illness sufficient to render a
person incapable of knowing the essential marital obligations.
12

The CA further held that Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with Noel did not
constitute a ground to find her psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family
Code. As Noel admitted, he had numerous sexual relations with Maribel before their
marriage. Maribel therefore cannot be said to be incapacitated to perform this particular
obligation and that such incapacity existed at the time of marriage.
13

Incidentally, the CA held that the OSG erred in saying that what Noel should have filed was
an action to annul the marriage under Article 45 (3)
14
of the Family Code. According to the
CA, Article 45 (3) involving consent to marriage vitiated by fraud is limited to the instances
enumerated under Article 46
15
of the Family Code. Maribels misrepresentation that she was
pregnant to induce Noel to marry her was not the fraud contemplated under Article 45 (3) as
it was not among the instances enumerated under Article 46.
16

On June 13, 2006, the CA denied Noels motion for reconsideration. It held that Maribels
personality disorder is not the psychological incapacity contemplated by law. Her refusal to
perform the essential marital obligations may be attributed merely to her stubborn refusal to
do so. Also, the manifestations of the Narcissistic Personality Disorder had no connection
with Maribels failure to perform her marital obligations. Noel having failed to prove Maribels
alleged psychological incapacity, any doubts should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
17

Hence, the present petition raising the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE CASE OF CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF
APPEALS DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.

312

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS NOT SUFFERING FROM
NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER; AND THAT HER FAILURE TO
PERFORM HER ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
18

The issue to be resolved is whether the marriage between the parties is null and void under
Article 36 of theFamily Code.
Petitioner Noel contends that the CA failed to consider Maribels refusal to procreate as
psychological incapacity. Insofar as he was concerned, the last time he had sexual
intercourse with Maribel was before the marriage when she was drunk. They never had any
sexual intimacy during their marriage. Noel claims that if a spouse senselessly and
constantly refuses to perform his or her marital obligations, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity rather than to stubborn refusal. He insists
that the CA should not have considered the pre-marital sexual encounters between him and
Maribel in finding that the latter was not psychologically incapacitated to procreate through
marital sexual cooperation. He argues that making love for procreation and consummation
of the marriage for the start of family life is different from "plain, simple and casual sex." He
further stresses that Maribel railroaded him into marrying her by seducing him and later
claiming that she was pregnant with his child. But after their marriage, Maribel refused to
consummate their marriage as she would not be sexually intimate with him.
19

Noel further claims that there were other indicia of Maribels psychological incapacity and
that she consistently exhibited several traits typical of a person suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder before and during their marriage. He points out that Maribel would only
mingle with a few individuals and never with Noels family even if they lived under one (1)
roof. Maribel was also arrogant and haughty. She was rude and disrespectful to his mother
and was also "interpersonally exploitative" as shown by her misrepresentation of pregnancy
to force Noel to marry her. After marriage, Maribel never showed respect and love to Noel
and his family. She displayed indifference to his emotional and sexual needs, but before the
marriage she would display unfounded jealousy when Noel was visited by his friends. This
same jealousy motivated her to deceive him into marrying her.
Lastly, he points out that Maribels psychological incapacity was proven to be permanent
and incurable with the root cause existing before the marriage. The psychologist testified
that persons suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder were unmotivated to participate
in therapy session and would reject any form of psychological help rendering their condition
long lasting if not incurable. Such persons would not admit that their behavioral
manifestations connote pathology or abnormality. The psychologist added that Maribels
psychological incapacity was deeply rooted within her adaptive system since early
childhood and manifested during adult life. Maribel was closely attached to her parents and
mingled with only a few close individuals. Her close attachment to her parents and their
over-protection of her turned her into a self-centered, self-absorbed individual who was
insensitive to the needs of others. She developed the tendency not to accept rejection or
failure.
20


313

On the other hand, the OSG maintains that Maribels refusal to have sexual intercourse with
Noel did not constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code as her
traits were merely mild peculiarities in her character or signs of ill-will and refusal or neglect
to perform her marital obligations. The psychologist even admitted that Maribel was capable
of entering into marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Also, it was
established that Noel and Maribel had sexual relations prior to their marriage. The OSG
further pointed out that the psychologist was vague as to how Maribels refusal to have
sexual intercourse with Noel constituted Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals
21
that the phrase "psychological incapacity" is
not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as expressed by Article 68
22
of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality
In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,
23
the Court laid down the guidelines in
resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family
Code, to wit:
emphasizes theirpermanence, inviolability and solidarity.

314

exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable.1avvphi 1 Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
an essential obligation of marriage.1avvphi 1
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
great respect by our courts. x x x.
x x x x

315

Canon 1095. (Emphasis ours.)
In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding
that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noels evidence merely established that
Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left
him after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to
prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements
of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by the CA, the
report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how
the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential
obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist even testified that Maribel was
capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain
one.
24
Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law.
The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that private
respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder
renders her "truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."
25
Psychological incapacity must be
more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated
in Marcos v. Marcos:
26

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74581 is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

AGRAVIADOR VS AGRAVIADOR
The petitioner first met the respondent in 1971 at a beerhouse where the latter worked. The
petitioner, at that time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs, while
the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. Their meeting led to a courtship, and they
eventually became sweethearts. They often spent nights together at the respondents
rented room, and soon entered into a common-law relationship.
On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent contracted marriage in a ceremony
officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo, Manila. The petitioners family

316

was apprehensive about this marriage because of the nature of the respondents work and
because she came from a broken family. Out of their union, the petitioner and the
respondent begot four (4) children, namely: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey.
On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
5
The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-081. He alleged that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was
carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking;
stayed away from their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not
take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and
refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities.
The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with him since 1993
because she became "very close" to a male tenant in their house. In fact, he discovered
their love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room several times.
The respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the root cause of her
psychological incapacity was not medically identified and alleged in the petition.
6
The RTC
denied this motion in its order dated July 2, 2001.
7

In her answer,
8
the respondent denied that she engaged in extramarital affairs and
maintained that it was the petitioner who refused to have sex with her. She claimed that the
petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their former
household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took care of their
son at the hospital before he died.
The RTC ordered the city prosecutor and/or the Solicitor General to investigate if collusion
existed between the parties.
9
The RTC, in its Order of November 20, 2001, allowed the
petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.
10
The petitioner, thus, presented testimonial and
documentary evidence to substantiate his claims.
In his testimony, the petitioner confirmed what he stated in his petition, i.e., that the
respondent was carefree, irresponsible, immature, and whimsical; stubbornly did what she
wanted; did not stay long in the conjugal dwelling; refused to do household chores; refused
to take care of him and their children; and consulted a witch doctor in order to bring bad luck
upon him.
The petitioner further confirmed that the respondent abandoned their sick child, which led to
the latters death. The petitioner further stated that the respondent became very close to a
male border of their house; he discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them
inside his room several times.
The petitioner declared that he filed the petition for nullity because the respondent refused
to change; he loves his children and does not want their children to be affected by their
mothers conduct. He intimated that he might remarry if it would benefit their children.

317

Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage
contract (Exh. "B")
11
and the psychiatric evaluation report (Exh. "A")
12
of Dr. Juan Cirilo L.
Patac.
In his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac made the following findings:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the information gathered from Enrique, his son and their helper, the psychological
report and the mental status examination, Enrique is found to be psychologically capable to
fulfill the essential obligations of marriage. He coped with Erlindas selfish and irresponsible
behavior as he dutifully performed what she failed to do for the family. He patiently tried to
understand her and exerted every effort to make her realize the harm caused by her neglect
to the family. Throughout their marriage, he provided emotional and material support for the
family. He engaged in other business endeavors aside from his employment as he
maintained to be financially productive.
The same data revealed that Erlinda failed to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage.
She manifested inflexible maladaptive behavior even at the time before their marriage. She
is known to be stubborn and uncaring who did things her way without regard to the feelings
of others. She is an irresponsible individual who selfishly ignored and neglected her role as
daughter to her parents as wife to Enrique and mother to their children. Before the marriage
at a young age of 17, Erlinda defied her parents as she lived alone, rented a room for
herself and allowed Enrique to sleep with her. She did not care about the needs of Enrique
before and after marriage and she maintained to be so with her children. She abandoned
and relegated her duty to her family to their helper. She never stayed long in their house
despite pleadings from her children and Enrique. Her irresponsible, uncaring behavior even
led to the death of one of their children. Likewise, she does not show concern and ignores a
daughter who is presently manifesting behavioral problem. She kept secrets as she never
allowed her husband and children know where she stays when shes not at work. She
falsified documents as she hid her marital status when she used her maiden surname in her
present employment. She is having illicit affairs and is reported to be presently having an
affair with a lesbian. Her desire to bring bad fate and death to Enrique through her
consultation with a "mangkukulam" point out her lack of care, love, and respect to Enrique.
Erlindas lack of motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render love, respect
and support to her family.
The above data shows that Erlinda is suffering from a Personality Disorder (Mixed
Personality Disorder). She has been having this disorder since her adolescence. There is
no definite treatment for this disorder. She is deemed psychologically incapacitated to
perform the obligations of marriage.
In fairness to Erlinda, she is recommended to undergo the same examination as Enrique
underwent.
13

The RTC Ruling

318

The RTC nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent in its decision of April
26, 2002. It saw merit in the petitioners testimony and Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation
report, and concluded that:
Without contradiction the recitation by Petitioner and the findings of the doctor show that
Respondent is indeed suffering from "Mixed Personality Disorder" that render her incapable
of complying with her marital obligations. Respondents refusal to commit herself to the
marriage, her tendencies to avoid a close relationship with Petitioner, preferring to be with
her lover and finally abandoning their home for a lesbian, a disregard of social norm, show
that she was never prepared for marital commitment in the first place. This incapacity is
deeply rooted from her family upbringing with no hope for a cure. Therefore, for the good of
society and of the parties themselves, it is best that this marriage between ENRIQUE
AGRAVIADOR Y ALUNAN and ERLINDA AMPARO AGRAVIADOR be annulled as if it
never took place at all. The Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and the General Civil
Registrar, National Census and Statistics Office, East Avenue, Quezon City, are hereby
requested to make the necessary correction of the civil record of the marriage between the
parties and on their respective civil status.
The children ERISQUE AGRAVIADOR, EMMANUEL AGRAVIADOR, EVELYN
AGRAVIADOR and EYMAREY AGRAVIADOR will however remain as their legitimate
children.
It is SO ORDERED.
14

The CA Decision
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the
RTC decision to the CA. The CA, in its decision
15
dated May 31, 2005, reversed and set
aside the RTC resolution, and dismissed the petition.
The CA held that Dr. Patacs psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the
respondents personality disorder was serious, grave and permanent; it likewise did not
mention the root cause of her incapacity. The CA further ruled that Dr. Patac had no basis
in concluding that the respondents disorder had no definite treatment because he did not
subject her to a mental assessment.
The CA added that the "psychiatric remarks" in the Report were nothing but a showcase of
respondents character flaws and liabilities. There was no proof of a natal or supervening
factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent from accepting and complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. If at all, these character flaws may only give rise to a legal
separation suit.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its
resolution of December 6, 2005.
16

The Petition and Issues

319

The petitioner now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal
of the CA ruling, based on the following arguments:
I. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY [HIM] WAS MORE THAN SUBSTANTIAL TO
ESTABLISH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE RESPONDENT[;]
II. THE GUIDELINES SET FORTH IN REPUBLIC V. MOLINA [HAD BEEN] SATISIFIED[;]
III. THE ADMISSIBILITY XXX OF THE PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION REPORT XXX STILL
STANDS FOR NOT HAVING BEEN CONTESTED XXX BY THE STATE AND/THE
RESPONDENT[; and]
IV. THE DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED IN CIVIL CASES HAD BEEN SATISIFIED[.]
The issue in this case essentially boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the
petitioners marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
The Courts Ruling
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to
annul the marriage, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
The totality of evidence presented
failed to establish the respondents
psychological incapacity
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family
Code which provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization." It introduced the concept of psychological incapacity as a
ground for nullity of marriage, although this concept eludes exact definition.
The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code was that it did not involve a species of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and
Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code,
conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but
was, nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. Dr. Arturo Tolentino
likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the
consent to the marriage."
17

18
the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer
to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive

320

of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage."
19
It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals
20
(the Molina case) where we said:
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
profession or employment in a job. x x x

321

root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
great respect by our courts. x x x
Canon 1095.
These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. A later case,
Marcos v. Marcos,
21
further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion
in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be
duly established.
A later case, Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,
22
declared that it may have been inappropriate for the Court
to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. We stated that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became
a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound
by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because,
with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with
another. Ngo Te, therefore, put into question the applicability of time-tested guidelines set
forth in Molina.
Ting v. Velez-Ting
23
and the fairly recent case of Suazo v. Suazo
24
squarely met the issue
and laid to rest any question regarding the applicability of Molina. In these cases, we
clarified that Ngo Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply
suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also explained in Suazo that Ngo

322

Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.
Under these established guidelines, we find the totality of the petitioners evidence
insufficient to prove the respondents psychological incapacity.
a. Petitioners court testimony
For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent portions of the petitioners testimony that essentially
confirmed what the petition alleged:
Q: Out of your marriage with the said respondent, were you blessed with children, and how
many?
A: Yes, sir, we were blessed with four (4), two (2) boys and two (2) girls.
Q: Where are they now?
A: All grown up with the exception of one who died of pneumonia due to the neglect and
fault of my said wife who abandone[d] him at the time of his illness.
Q: Is that the reason why you file[d] the instant petition, Mr. Witness?
A: It is only one of the several reasons, Sir.
Q: Can you cite these reasons, you mentioned?
A: She appears to be carefree, irresponsible, immature, whimsical and used to impose what
she wanted to get, she refused to do household chores, like cooking, caring for the husband
and children, used to stay from the conjugal dwelling, initially for weeks, then for months
and lately fully abandoned the family house and stay with a lesbian. [sic]
At first, I discovered a love note while being so secretive and used to be very close to a
male renter in the ground floor of their house and caught them several times alone in his
room, thus explaining the reason why she refused to have sex since 1993, up to and until
the present time.
Lately, we discovered that she used to consult a cult "mangkukulam" to bring bad fate
against the family and death for me.
Q: By the way did you give her the chance to change?
A: I gave her but she refused to reform.
x x x x
Q: Can you not give a last chance for you to save your marriage?

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A: I think I cannot since she does not accept her fault and she does not want to change for
the sake of our family.
25

These exchanges during trial significantly constituted the totality of the petitioners testimony
on the respondents supposed psychological or mental malady. We glean from these
exchanges the petitioners theory that the respondents psychological incapacity is premised
on her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of
unpleasant personality traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law
requires, and should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect," in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some
marriages.
26
The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders existing at the time of the
marriage clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
27
The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at
the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume.
28

In the present case, the petitioners testimony failed to establish that the respondents
condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or
debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the
essential marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had
some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage; his testimony
sorely lacked details necessary to establish that the respondents defects existed at the
inception of the marriage. In addition, the petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the
respondents condition; neither did he mention that the respondents malady was incurable,
or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondents means to undertake. The
petitioners declarations that the respondent "does not accept her fault," "does not want to
change," and "refused to reform" are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental
defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
In a similar case, Bier v. Bier,
29
we ruled that it was not enough that the respondent, alleged
to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations,
or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations had to be shown.
b. Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report
The Court finds that Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. We
emphasize that Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in
fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to "undergo the same
examination [that the petitioner] underwent."
30
Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed
by the petitioner, the parties second child, Emmanuel, and household helper. Sarah.
Largely, the doctor relied on the information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his

324

Report can be used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioners own psychological condition
(as he was, in fact, declared by Dr. Patac to be psychologically capable to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage), the same statement cannot be made with respect to the
respondents condition. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required
depth and comprehensiveness of the examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from a psychological disorder.
31

We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated is mandatory. We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the person sought
to be declared psychologically incapacitated must be personally examined by a
psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.
32
If a psychological
disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent
proof cannot be admitted and given credit.
33
No such independent evidence appears on
record, however, to have been gathered in this case.
In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the juridical antecedence of the respondents
condition by stating that the respondent manifested "inflexible maladaptive behavior" before
marriage, pointing out how the respondent behaved before the marriage the respondent
defied her parents and lived alone; rented a room for herself; and allowed the petitioner to
sleep with her. These perceived behavioral flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish
that the incapacity was rooted in the history of the respondent antedating the marriage. Dr.
Patac failed to elucidate on the circumstances that led the respondent to act the way she
did, for example, why she "defied her parents" and decided to live alone; why she
"neglected her obligations as a daughter;" and why she often slept with the petitioner. This
is an area where independent evidence, such as information from a person intimately
related to the respondent, could prove useful. As earlier stated, no such independent
evidence was gathered in this case. In the absence of such evidence, it is not surprising
why the Psychiatric Report Evaluation failed to explain how and why the respondents so-
called inflexible maladaptive behavior was already present at the time of the marriage.
Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove the gravity or seriousness
of the respondents condition. He simply made an enumeration of the respondents
purported behavioral defects (as related to him by third persons), and on this basis
characterized the respondent to be suffering from mixed personality disorder. In the
"Background History" portion of his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr. Patac mentioned that
the respondent employed one of her siblings to do the household chores; did not help in
augmenting the familys earnings; belittled the petitioners income; continued her studies
despite the petitioners disapproval; seldom stayed at home; became "close" to a male
border; had an affair with a lesbian; did not disclose the actual date of her departure to
Taiwan; threatened to poison the petitioner and their children; neglected and ignored their
children; used her maiden name at work; and consulted a witch doctor to bring bad fate to
the petitioner. Except for the isolated and unfounded statement that "Erlindas lack of
motivation and insight greatly affected her capacity to render love, respect and support to
the family,"
34
there was no other statement regarding the degree of severity of the
respondents condition, why and to what extent the disorder is grave, and how it
incapacitated her to comply with the duties required in marriage. There was likewise no
showing of a supervening disabling factor or debilitating psychological condition that
effectively incapacitated the respondent from complying with the essential marital

325

obligations. At any rate, the personality flaws mentioned above, even if true, could only
amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, which do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Interestingly, Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report highlighted only the respondents
negative behavioral traits without balancing them with her other qualities. The allegations of
infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity, as well as the claim that the respondent refused to
engage in sexual intercourse since 1993, of course, came from the petitioner, but these
claims were not proven. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these accusations were
true, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report did not indicate that unfaithfulness or
promiscuousness were traits that antedated or existed at the time of marriage. Likewise, the
accusation that the respondent abandoned her sick child which eventually led to the latters
death appears to be an exaggerated claim in the absence of any specifics and
corroboration. On the other hand, the petitioners own questionable traits his flirtatious
nature before marriage and his admission that he inflicted physical harm on the respondent
every time he got jealous were not pursued. From this perspective, the Psychiatric
Evaluation Report appears to be no more than a one-sided diagnosis against the
respondent that we cannot consider a reliable basis to conclusively establish the root cause
and the degree of seriousness of her condition.1avvphi1
The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac came
to the conclusion that the respondents personality disorder had "no definite treatment." It
did not discuss the concept of mixed personality disorder, i.e., its classification, cause,
symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited
this disorder in order to create a necessary inference that the respondents condition had no
definite treatment or is incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the Psychiatric
Evaluation Reports failure to support its findings and conclusions with any factual basis. It
simply enumerated the respondents perceived behavioral defects, and then associated
these traits with mixed personality disorder. We find it unfortunate that Dr. Patac himself
was not called on the witness stand to expound on the findings and conclusions he made in
his Psychiatric Evaluation Report. It would have aided petitioners cause had he called Dr.
Patac to testify.
Admittedly, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological
evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle
that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the
indissolubility of the marital vinculum.
35
Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the
State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where the prices of
evidence presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to
assume and perform the essential marital duties.
The petitioners marriage to the respondent may have failed and appears to be without hope
of reconciliation The remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. We stress that Article 36 of the Family Code
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to assume and fulfill the basic marital
obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the

326

errant spouse. It is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves. The State, fortunately or unfortunately,
has not seen it fit to decree that divorce should be available in this country. Neither should
an Article 36 declaration of nullity be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the
like.
36
Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of
them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the
marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus
could not then have validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision
and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2005 and December 6, 2005,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75207. Costs against the petitioner.

REPUBLIC VS DE QUINTOS
Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the
Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan.
2
The couple was not blessed with a child due to
Catalinas hysterectomy following her second miscarriage.
3

On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage,
4
citing Catalinas psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital
obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given
her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
5
After
conducting an investigation, the public prosecutor determined that there was no collusion
between Eduardo and Catalina.
6

Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged
in petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that
she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the household chores
and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances
as an overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in
1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.
7

Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr.
Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on Catalina,
8
Dr.
Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no
longer treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalinas disorder was mainly characterized by her
immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations.
9

Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her Answer/Manifestation,
10
whereby she
admitted her psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without
Eduardos consent and flirting with different men. She insisted that she had only one live-in

327

partner; and that she would not give up her share in the conjugal residence because she
intended to live there or to receive her share should the residence be sold.
11

Ruling of the RTC
The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Honorable Court finds for the
plaintiff and judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C. de Quintos and Catalina delos
Santos de Quintos, a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of Lingayen,Pangasinan to cancel the
marriage of the parties from the Civil Register of Lingayen, Pangasinan in
accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
12

The RTC ruled that Catalinas infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with
her family, and her incessant gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected
her duty to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It held that considering that
the matter of determining whether a party was psychologically incapacitated was best left to
experts like Dr. Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes was the
best evidence of Catalinas psychological incapacity.
13

Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the State raised the lone error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE PARTIES MARRIAGE NULL AND
VOID, DEFENDANT CATALINA DELOS SANTOS-DE QUINTOS PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.
On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC. The
CA concluded that Eduardo proved Catalinas psychological incapacity, observing that the
results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes showed that Catalina
had been "mentally or physically ill to the extent that she could not have known her marital
obligations;" and that Catalinas psychological incapacity had been medically identified,
sufficiently proven, duly alleged in the complaint and clearly explained by the trial court.
Issue
In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urges that the
CA gravely erred because:
I

328

THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINAS ALLEGED PERSONALITY TRAITS
ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE
TIME OF MARRIAGE CELEBRATION; NOR ARE THEY OF THE NATURE
CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic] CATALINA WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE
A SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
III
ABANDONMENT OF ONES FAMILY IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL
SEPARATION.
IV
GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT LIKEWISE ESTABLISHED TO BE A
SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
V
THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR. ANNABELLE
REYES FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF CATALINAS INCAPACITY AND
PROVE THAT IT EXISTED AT THE INCEPTION OF MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND
INCURABLE.
14

The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA did not conform
to the guidelines laid down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina);
15
and that
Catalinas refusal to do household chores, and her failure to take care of her husband and
their adopted daughter were not "defects" of a psychological nature warranting the
declaration of nullity of their marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty, refusal or
neglect to perform her marital obligations.
The OSG further argues that Catalinas infidelity, gambling habits and abandonment of the
conjugal home were not grounds under Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no
proof that her infidelity and gambling had occurred prior to the marriage, while her
abandonment would only be a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family
Code; that the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish
Catalinas psychological incapacity; that Dr. Reyes was not shown to have exerted effort to
look into Catalinas past life, attitudes, habits and character as to be able to explain her
alleged psychological incapacity; that there was not even a finding of the root cause of her
alleged psychological incapacity; and that there appeared to be a collusion between the
parties inasmuch as Eduardo admitted during the trial that he had given P50,000.00 to
Catalina in exchange for her non-appearance in the trial.
The OSG postulated that Catalinas unsupportive in-laws and Eduardos overseas
deployment that had required him to be away most of the time created the strain in the

329

couples relationship and forced her to seek her friends emotional support and company;
and that her ambivalent attitude towards their adopted daughter was attributable to her
inability to bear children of her own.
Issue
The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity
of Catalinas marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Ruling
We grant the petition for review.
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of:
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer
to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c)
the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed
to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential
that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological
illness.
16

17
we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a
mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion that may
arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, we then laid down the following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina,
18
viz:
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.
x x x x
symptoms may be physical. x x x.
x x x x
the marriage. x x x.

330

x x x x
incurable. x x x.
x x x x
root causes. x x x.
x x x x
great respect by our courts. x x x.
x x x x
General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.
19

The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential
guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the
Court has declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly
on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations.
20
Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence
presented during trial,
21
making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the
existence of the psychological incapacity.
22

Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA, insisting that they thereby explained
the gravity and severity of Catalinas psychological incapacity that had existed even prior to
the celebration of their marriage.
23

We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement of
sufficiently explaining the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalinas purported
psychological incapacity. Rather, they were liberal in their appreciation of the scanty
evidence that Eduardo submitted to establish the incapacity.
To start with, Catalinas supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors,
leaving the house without Eduardos consent, refusal to do the household chores and to

331

take care of their adopted daughter, and gambling), were not even established. Eduardo
presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At best, his
testimony was self-serving and would have no serious value as evidence upon such a
serious matter that was submitted to a court of law.
Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-
psychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes despite the paucity of factual foundation to support
the claim of Catalinas psychological incapacity. In particular, they relied on the following
portion of the report of Dr. Reyes, to wit:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality. This is characterized, mainly by
immaturity in several aspects of the personality. One aspect is in the area of personal
relationships, where a person cannot really come up with what is expected in a relationship
that involves commitments. They are generally in and out of relationships, as they do not
have the patience to sustain this [sic] ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who has to be
attended to as they might end up doing things which are often regrettable. These people
however usually do not feel remorse for their wrongdoings. They do not seem to learn from
their mistakes, and they have the habit of repeating these mistakes to the detriment of their
own lives and that of their families. Owing to these characteristics, people with these pattern
of traits cannot be expected to have lasting and successful relationships as required in
marriage. It is expected that even with future relationships, things will not work out.
Families of these people usually reveal that parents relationship are not also that ideal. If
this be the background of the developing child, it is likely that his or her relationships would
also end up as such.
x x x x
With all these collateral information being considered and a longitudinal history of defendant
made, it is being concluded that she was not able to come up with the minimum expected of
her as a wife. Her behavior and attitude before and after the marriage is highly indicative of
a very immature and childish person, rendering her psychologically incapacitated to live up
and meet the responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage. Catalina miserably
failed to fulfill her role as wife and mother, rendering her incapacitated to comply with her
duties inherent in marriage. In the same vein, it cannot be expected that this attitude and
behavior of defendant will still change because her traits have developed through the years
and already ingrained within her.
24

Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of
Catalinas supposed psychological incapacity. Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr.
Reyes a source of vital information that the report missed out on. Aside from rendering a
brief and general description of the symptoms of borderline personality disorder, both the
report and court testimony of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause that
could have brought about such behavior on the part of Catalina. They did not specify which
of Catalinas various acts or omissions typified the conduct of a person with borderline
personality, and did not also discuss the gravity of her behavior that translated to her

332

inability to perform her basic marital duties. Dr. Reyes only established that Catalina was
childish and immature, and that her childishness and immaturity could no longer be treated
due to her having already reached an age "beyond maturity."
25

Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a
grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
26
We have explained this
need in Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,
27
stating:
is founded.
28

But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not personally seek out and
meet with other persons, aside from Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established
the conduct of the spouses before and during the marriage. For that reason, Dr. Reyes
report lacked depth and objectivity, a weakness that removed the necessary support for the
conclusion that the RTC and the CA reached about Catalinas psychological incapacity to
perform her marital duties.
Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes did not present the
gravity and incurability of Catalinas psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no
evidence showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality disorder and that
such disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly pronounced that the
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, with
its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence
presented during trial.
29

What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo adduced was Catalinas
immaturity and apparent refusal to perform her marital obligations. However, her immaturity
alone did not constitute psychological incapacity.
30
To rule that such immaturity amounted to
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts were manifestations of a
disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, which inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity.
31

Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo
32
that there must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with
the basic marital obligations, viz:
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in
the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with

333

his essential marital obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the
like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her Answer, was her
abandonment of the conjugal home to live with another man. Yet, abandonment was not
one of the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also
constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under
Article 55(10) of the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid
ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, considering that there
should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered
personality that made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
marriage.
33
Needless to state, Eduardo did not adduce such evidence, rendering even his
claim of her infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis.
Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with Catalina.
The assertion was based on his admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of
P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal home in order to convince her not to oppose his
petition or to bring any action on her part,
34
to wit:
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL MUERONG
Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the hearing, your wife, the herein defendant,
Catalina delos Santos-de Quintos, has been religiously attending the hearing, but lately, I
noticed that she is no longer attending and represented by counsel, did you talk to your
wife?
A No, sir.
Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better for both of you, if, she will not
attend the hearing of this case you filed against her, is it not?
A No, sir. I did not.
Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your wife had an agreement regarding this
case?
A None, sir.
Q And you were telling me something about an agreement that you will pay her an amount
of P50,000.00, please tell us, what is that agreement that you have to pay her P50,000.00?
A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir.

334

Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or acquired at the time of your
marriage?
A Yes, sir.
Q And why did you agree that you have to give her P50,000.00?
A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house thereat, that is why I agreed, sir.
Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not oppose this petition for declaration of
marriage which you filed against her?
A She does not opposed [sic], sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern [sic] about this case is the division
of your conjugal properties?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as her share of your conjugal
properties, so that she will not pursue whatever she wanted to pursue with regards to the
case you filed against her, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00, Mr. witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because she has already gotten her share of P50,000.00 that is the reason why she
is no longer around here?
A Yes sir, it could be.
35

Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and
Eduardo.1wphi1 To recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of
conceding her psychological incapacity, but she nonetheless made it clear enough that she
was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that Eduardo
willingly gave her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his
recognition of her unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that
whether or not he did so also to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance
of not opposing the petition for nullity of the marriage should by no means be of any
consequence in determining the issue of collusion between the spouses.
In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of
Catalina, we cannot but resolve in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.
36


335

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision the
Court of Appeals promulgated on July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of merit.

MENDOZA VS REPUBLIC
To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality
of the evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity
was grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.
Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003,
1
whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City (RTC)
declaring her marriage with respondent Dominic C. Mendoza (Dominic) as null and void.
Antecedents
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in
Papua New Guinea. They had been next-door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting
while they were still in college she, at Assumption College while he, at San Beda College
taking a business management course. After a month of courtship, they became intimate
and their intimacy ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter whom they named
Allysa Bianca. They got married on her eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites solemnized
in Pasay City on June 24, 1991,
2
after which they moved to her place, although remaining
dependent on their parents for support.
When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow funds from petitioners
best friend to settle the hospital bills. He remained jobless and dependent upon his father
for support until he finished his college course in October 1993. She took on various jobs to
meet the familys needs, first as a part-time aerobics instructor in 1992 and later, in 1993, as
a full-time employee in Sanofi, a pharmaceutical company. Being the one with the fixed
income, she shouldered all of the familys expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their
childs educational needs).
On his part, Dominic sold Colliers Encyclopedia for three months after his graduation from
college before he started working as a car salesman for Toyota Motors in Bel-Air, Makati in
1994.
3
Ironically, he spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends
inasmuch as she shouldered all the household expenses and their childs schooling
because his irregular income could not be depended upon. In September 1994, she
discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, his co-employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually,
communication between them became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms,
thereby affecting their sexual relationship.
4

In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present. Later
on, he asked her to issue two blank checks that he claimed would be for the cars insurance
coverage. She soon found out, however, that the checks were not paid for the cars
insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she also found out that he did not

336

pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car,
leaving her to bear the balance of P120,000.00.
To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with
P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After petitioner
and her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner discovered that he had also swindled many
clients some of whom were even threatening petitioner, her mother and her sister
themselves.
5

On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner asked
him for "time and space to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at
reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family
immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity of
her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition.
Ruling of the RTC
In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr.
Rocheflume Samson, and Professor Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear
during trial and presented no evidence.
On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and Dominic an
absolute nullity,
6
holding in part:
xxx. The result of Dr. Samsons clinical evaluation as testified to by her and per Psychiatric
Report she issued together with one Dr. Doris Primero showed that petitioner appears to be
mature, strong and responsible individual. Godly, childlike trust however, makes her
vulnerable and easy to forgive and forget. Petitioner also believes that marriage was a
partnership "for better and for worse", she gave all of herself unconditionally to respondent.
Unfortunately, respondent cannot reciprocate. On the one hand, respondent was found to
have a personality that can be characterized as inadequate, immature and irresponsible.
His criminal acts in the present time are mere extensions of his misconduct established in
childhood. His childhood experiences of separations and emotional deprivation largely
contributed to this antisocial (sociopathic) attitude and lifestyle.
She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to comply with what is required of him
as a husband and father. Besides from his adulterous relationship and irresponsibility, his
malevolent conduct and lack of true remorse indicate that he is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill the role of a married man.
7

The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity,
antecedence and incurability, as set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina),
8
were
attendant, establishing Dominics psychological incapacity, viz:

337

Gravity from the evidence adduced it can be said that respondent cannot carry out the
normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple
existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work. Respondent is totally incapable of
observing mutual love, respect and fidelity as well as to provide support to his wife and
child. Ever since the start of the marriage respondent had left all the household concerns
and the care of their child to petitioner while he studied and indulged in night outs with
friends. This continued even when he finished his studies and landed a job. He concealed
his salary from the petitioner and worse, had the gall to engage in sexual infidelity. Likewise
worthy of serious consideration is respondents propensity to borrow money, his
deceitfulness and habitual and continuous evasion of his obligations which (sic) more often
than not had led to the filing of criminal cases against him.
Antecedence Before the marriage petitioner was not aware of respondents personality
disorder and it was only after marriage that it begun to surface. Dr. Samson declared that
respondents behavioral equilibrium started at a very early age of fifteen. His dishonesty and
lack of remorse are mere extensions of his misconduct in childhood which generally
attributable to respondents childhood experiences of separation and emotional
deprivations. In fine, his psychological incapacity is but a product of some genetic causes,
faulty parenting and influence of the environment although its over manifestation appear
only after the wedding.
Incurability Respondents personality disorder having existed in him long before he
contracted marriage with petitioner, there appears no chance for respondent to recover any
(sic) ordinary means from such incapacity.
All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent show that he does not possess
the proper outlook, disposition and temperament necessary for marriage. Indeed, this
ultimate recourse of nullity is the only way by which petitioner can be delivered from the
bondage of a union that only proved to be a mockery and brought pain and dishonor to
petitioner.
9

Ruling of the CA
The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that Dominics
personality traits either constituted psychological incapacity existing at the time of the
marriage or were of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code; that the
testimony of the expert witness, while persuasive, was not conclusive upon the court; and
that the real reason for the parties separation had been their frequent quarrels over
financial matters and the criminal cases brought against Dominic.
10

On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the
RTC.
11
Specifically, it refused to be bound by the findings and conclusions of petitioners
expert witness, holding:
It has not been established to our satisfaction as well that respondents condition, assuming
it is serious enough, was present before or during the celebration of the marriage. Although
petitioners expert witness concluded that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated even
before the parties marriage, the Court refuses to be bound by such finding, in view of the

338

fact that the witness findings, admittedly, were concluded only on the basis of information
given by the petitioner herself, who, at the time of the examination, interview, was already
head strong in her resolve to have her marriage with the respondent nullified, and harbored
ill-feelings against respondent throughout her consultation with Dr. Samson.
12

The CA held the testimonies of petitioners witnesses insufficient to establish Dominics
psychological affliction to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or
clinically rooted. Relying on the pronouncements in Republic v. Dagdag,
13
Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals
14
and Pesca v. Pesca,
15
the CA observed:
In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature, deceitful and without
remorse for his dishonesty, and lack of affection. Such characteristics, however, do not
necessarily constitute a case of psychological incapacity. A persons inability to share or
take responsibility, or to feel remorse for his misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with
family members, are indicative of an immature mind, but not necessarily a medically rooted
psychological affliction that cannot be cured.
Even the respondents alleged sexual infidelity is not necessarily equivalent to psychological
incapacity, although it may constitute adequate ground for an action for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. Nor does the fact that the respondent is a criminal
suspect for estafa or violation of the B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes a ground for the nullification of
his marriage to petitioner. Again, it may constitute ground for legal separation provided the
respondent is convicted by final judgment and sentenced to imprisonment of more than six
(6) years.
16

Hence, this appeal by petitioner.
Issues
Petitioner assails the CAs refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and psychiatric
evaluation she had presented in the trial of the case, and the CAs reliance on the
pronouncements in Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca, supra. She contends that the report on
the psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Samson more than complied with the
requirements prescribed in Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995,
240 SCRA 20) and Molina. She insists that the CA should have applied the ruling in Marcos
v. Marcos (G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755) to the effect that personal
medical or psychological examination was not a requirement for a declaration of
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
We consider the CAs refusal to accord credence and weight to the psychiatric report to be
well taken and warranted. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored
towards Dominic, which she admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished
the basis to doubt the findings of her expert witness; that such findings were one-sided,
because Dominic was not himself subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by

339

petitioners expert; and that he also did not participate in the proceedings; and that the
findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were solely based on the
self-serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations of him rendered by petitioner and
her witnesses.
Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her to resort to other people in
order to verify the facts derived from petitioner about Dominics psychological profile
considering the ill-feelings she harbored towards him. It turned out, however, that the only
people she interviewed about Dominic were those whom petitioner herself referred, as the
following testimony indicated:
Fiscal Zalameda
Q: So youre saying that the petitioner have an ill-feeling towards the respondent? At the
time you interviewed?
A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview.
Q: How about during the subsequent interview?
A: During the subsequent interview more or less the petitioner was able to talk regarding
her marital problems which is uncomfort(able), so she was able to adapt, she was able to
condition herself regarding her problems, Sir.
Q: But the ill-feeling was still there?
A: But the feeling was still there, Sir.
Q: Now, considering that this ill feeling of the petitioner insofar as the respondent is
concerned, would you say that the petitioner would only tell you information negative
against the respondent?
A: Yes, may be Sir. But I do try to conduct or verify other people the facts given to me by
the petitioner, Sir.
Q: And these other people were also people given to you or the name are given to you by
the petitioner, Madame Witness?
A: Yes, Sir.
17

In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself naturally cast serious doubt on
Dr. Samsons findings. The CA rightly refused to accord probative value to the testimony of
such expert for being avowedly given to show compliance with the requirements set in
Santos and Molina for the establishment of Dominics psychological incapacity.
The CAs reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not misplaced. It is easy to see
why.

340

In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that
the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the
alleged psychological incapacity of her husband."
18
But here, the experts testimony on
Dominics psychological profile did not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his
psychological incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in person before
completing her report but simply relied on other peoples recollection and opinion for that
purpose.
In Hernandez, we ruminated that:
xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception
of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
19

but the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed
psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity
existed at the inception of the marriage.
The Court in Pesca observed that:
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let
alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of
the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with
20

Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence of the medical
experts testimony alone that was crucial but rather petitioners failure to satisfactorily
discharge the burden of showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the inception
of the marriage. In other words, the totality of the evidence proving such incapacity at and
prior to the time of the marriage was the crucial consideration, as the Court has reminded in
Ting v. Velez-Ting:
21

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding
the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such
opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but
not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual

341

medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The
trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not
solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of the proceedings.
Petitioners view that the Court in Marcos stated that the personal medical or psychological
examination of respondent spouse therein was not a requirement for the declaration of his
22
is not entirely accurate. To be clear, the statement in Marcos ran
as follows:
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine
qua non in the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical
examination of Dominic was to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented
was enough to support a finding of his psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the
presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological
incapacity would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the "presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition," as the Court
said in Marcos.
But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to present the professional and
expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged
psychological incapacity, then the opinions should be presented and be weighed by the trial
courts in order to determine and decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the
marriages.
It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base
their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality
of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.
23

We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic
was psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he
suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage. Accordingly, the
CA did not err in dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
We have time and again held that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that must concomitantly be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage that, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual

342

obligations to live together, to observe love, respect and fidelity, and to render help and
support. We have also held that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. To qualify as psychological incapacity as a ground for nullification of marriage, a
persons psychological affliction must be grave and serious as to indicate an utter incapacity
to comprehend and comply with the essential objects of marriage, including the rights and
obligations between husband and wife. The affliction must be shown to exist at the time of
marriage, and must be incurable.
Accordingly, the RTCs findings that Dominics psychological incapacity was characterized
by gravity, antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny. The medical report failed
to show that his actions indicated a psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature
that it was medically or clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of
remorse for his dishonesty and lack of affection did not necessarily constitute psychological
incapacity. His inability to share or to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his
misbehavior or to share his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity,
was not necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that was incurable. Emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with psychological incapacity.
24
Nor were his
supposed sexual infidelity and criminal offenses manifestations of psychological incapacity.
If at all, they would constitute a ground only for an action for legal separation under Article
Finally, petitioner contends that the Courts Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered
appeals by the OSG no longer required, and that the appeal by the OSG was a mere
superfluity that could be deemed to have become functus officio if not totally disregarded.
25

The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The Resolution nowhere stated that
appeals by the OSG were no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly
required the OSG to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings, to wit:
a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the
date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same
period.
26

b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with
the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda support of their
claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the
Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of
court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered
submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
27

c) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be
served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent
summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the
decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
28


343

d) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the
parties.1wphi1 Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new
trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor
General.
29

e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing
a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal
on the adverse parties.
30

The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to appear as counsel for the
State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose
petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently
evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical antecedence-would succeed.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on March 19, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68615.

REP VS ENCELAN
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita
5
and the union bore two children, Maricar and
Manny.
6
To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On
June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an
illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,
7
Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with
her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June
16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity
of his marriage based on Lolitas psychological incapacity.
8

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an
associate in her promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically
incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law.
9

At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and subsequent abandonment
of the family home.
10
He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and
their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.
11

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report
12
on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda
Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not
suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness,"
13
but had been "unable to provide the
expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship";
14
her "transferring
from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as
her impatience in attaining her ambitions";
15
and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad
signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship."
16


344

The RTC Ruling
In its June 5, 2002 decision,
17
the RTC declared Cesars marriage to Lolita void, finding
sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA originally
18
set aside the RTCs verdict, finding that Lolitas abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological
illness. Lolita merely refused to comply with her marital obligations which she was capable
of doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity is only a ground for legal separation,
not for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage.
Cesar sought reconsideration
19
of the CAs decision and, in due course, attained his
objective. The CA set aside its original decision and entered another, which affirmed the
RTCs decision. In its amended decision,
20
the CA found two circumstances indicative of
Lolitas serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolitas
unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolitas willful and
deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
The OSG then filed the present petition.
The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita
had been suffering from a psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological
incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.
The Case for the Respondent
Cesar submits that Lolitas infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations
established her grave and incurable psychological incapacity.
The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify
Cesars marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesars marriage to Lolita on the
ground of psychological incapacity.

345

Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
on Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration
of nullity of marriage. It provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity
contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations";
21
not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on
the part of the errant spouse.
22
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical
antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and
incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.
23

Cesar failed to prove Lolitas
In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged psychological incapacity.
Cesar testified on the dates when he learned of Lolitas alleged affair and her subsequent
abandonment of their home,
24
as well as his continued financial support to her and their
children even after he learned of the affair,
25
but he merely mentioned in passing Lolitas
alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal
separation.
26
To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital
obligations.
27
No evidence on record exists to support Cesars allegation that Lolitas
infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her
alleged psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that
Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric illness.
28
Dr. Flores observation on Lolitas
interpersonal problems with co-workers,
29
to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration
for the conclusion that she was at the time of her marriage psychologically incapacitated
to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wifes
psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work
relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital
counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to
one another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of
comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and
submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores further belief that Lolitas refusal to go with
Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship
30
is a mere
generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot
support.

346

In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolitas psychological incapacity;
thus, the CA committed a reversible error when it reconsidered its original decision.1wphi 1
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution
31
protected by the
State. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation
and against its dissolution and nullity.
32
It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor
by transgressions made by one party to the other during the marriage.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS
respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita
Castillo-Encelan.

PIMENTEL VS PIMENTEL
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an
action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled
to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No.
04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before
the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner
asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case
filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005
3
holding that the pendency of
the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension
of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case
No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be
tried even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC
Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the
[Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
4


347

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,
5
the RTC Quezon
City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005
and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of
Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the
offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did
not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment
of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal
case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of
frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is
required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the
crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals
decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage
is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide against petitioner.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
6
provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal
action. In this case, the Information
7
for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It
was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on

348

the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and
trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7
February 2005.
8
Respondents petition
9
in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November
2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed
after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil
action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending,
and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.
10
A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that
it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action,
it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
11

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide,
12
which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."
13
The
relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from
murder
14
or homicide.
15
However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship
between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case,
since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all
the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will.
16
At the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The
subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is
granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and

349

respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.1avvphi 1
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals
17
that "the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity
of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal
liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the
Court ruled inTenebro that "[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences."
18
In fact, the Court
declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
concerned."
19

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in
Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case
No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

JARILLO VS PEOPLE
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
praying that the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its
Resolution
2
dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-
08-11:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of the crime of
BIGAMY, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S.
Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the
said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage
was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.

350

On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial
proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding
ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal
(Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church
wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26,
TSN dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter,
Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel
Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge
Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated
November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church
wedding in Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City x x x.
x x x x
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their
marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion
of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria
Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as
maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of
accuseds bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This
aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-
93582.

351

Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order
3

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were
null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the
time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null
and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy
knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July
21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with
Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet
been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous
marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck
down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioners contentions that her marriages were
celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as
far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28,
2003, declaring petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on
the ground of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory
on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of
nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8,
2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,
4
denied reconsideration and ruled that
"[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal
consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy."
5

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
where petitioner alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING
WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO
THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE
SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO
ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND
VICTORIA S. JARILLO.

352

CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL
SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER
THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is
true that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for
suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration
of nullity of petitioners marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial
question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The
RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,
6
the Court categorically stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy,
and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency
of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x
x x x x
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a
first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x
7

The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,
8
where it was held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage
void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case.
We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant]
had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case
for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

353

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first
and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
9

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioners conviction of
the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of
bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioners
marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the
nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference.
10
As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code],
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage."
11

Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which
is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides
that "[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years," while
Article 91 states that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence,
prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of
defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce
evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-
serving.
12
Thus, for petitioners defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon
her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of
her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to
present sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioners testimony that her own
mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire
belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly
observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person who allegedly actually
told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the
confirmatory testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she
allegedly did is hearsay.
13


354

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,
14
"the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy
should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being counted from the date
of registration of the bigamous marriage.
15
Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that
the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.1avvphi 1
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the
Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it
entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long
as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the
periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only
in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
16

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision
mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1
day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore,
correct as it is still within the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor
should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years.
Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioners marriage to Alocillo
has after all been declared by final judgment
17
to be void ab initio on account of the latters
psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative
abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus,
petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two
(2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years
and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby
MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum.

VALDES VS RTC 102

355

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during
the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the
declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code (docketed
Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the
hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court,
1
in its decision of 29 July 1994,
granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-
Valdez is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital
obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario
shall choose which parent they would want to stay with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother,
herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are
in the custody of the other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code,
and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within
thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of marriages.
2
(Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance
with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code
contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions
without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that
the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own
their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall
apply.
3

356

In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial
court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner
and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime
of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since
Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute
community of property.
4

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October
1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family
Code should be held controlling: he argues that:
I
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychologically incapacitated.
II
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern
the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab
initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of
the spouses.
III
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on
the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read
consistently with Article 129.
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to
stay.
5

The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article
147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous
cases;
6
it provides:

357

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of
the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in
the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of
the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"
7
of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household."
8
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified
Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-ownership
property, without consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the
co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of
the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving

358

descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place
upon the termination of the cohabitation
9
or declaration of nullity of the marriage.
10

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do
not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by
both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions
and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of
any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner already heretofore expressed.
11

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to
resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling
that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property
in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not
Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129,
12
of the Family Code, should aptly
prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case
until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3),
(4) and 95) of Article 43,
13
relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40
14
of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage
contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a
special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now
requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously
contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status
of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles
41
15
and 42,
16
of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is
not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand,
between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between
common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary
rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the
provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the
property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial
court are AFFIRMED. No costs.

MBTC VS PASCUAL
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985.
During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square

359

meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City.
Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-101473/T-510 covering the
purchased lot was canceled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 156283
1
of the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City was issued in the name of Florencia, "married to Nelson Pascual" a.k.a.
Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23533. After trial, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 94 in Quezon City rendered, on July 31, 1995, a Decision,
2
declaring the
marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity
on the part of Nicholson. In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution
and liquidation of the ex-spouses conjugal partnership of gains. Subsequent events saw
the couple going their separate ways without liquidating their conjugal partnership.
On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained
a PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To
secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate
mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including one involving the lot covered by TCT No.
156283. Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of TCT
No. 156283, a photocopy of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a document
denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson purportedly executed on April 9, 1995. The waiver,
made in favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein,
but did not incidentally include the lot in question.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it
fell due, Metrobank, on November 29, 1999, initiated foreclosure proceedings under Act No.
3135, as amended, before the Office of the Notary Public of Makati City. Subsequently,
Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of sale on three issues of Remate.
3
At the
auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder.
Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the
RTC in Makati City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed
property, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-789 and eventually raffled to Branch 65 of the
court. In it, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was
mortgaged without his consent.
Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim,
4
alleged that the disputed lot,
being registered in Florencias name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted having
approved the mortgage in good faith.
Florencia did not file an answer within the reglementary period and, hence, was
subsequently declared in default.
The RTC Declared the REM Invalid
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered, on September 24, 2001, judgment finding for
Nicholson. The falloreads:

360

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment declaring the real estate
mortgage on the property covered by [TCT] No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds for
the City of Makati as well as all proceedings thereon null and void.
The Court further orders defendants [Metrobank and Florencia] jointly and severally
to pay plaintiff [Nicholson]:
1. PhP100,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. PhP75,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and
3. The costs.
SO ORDERED.
5

Even as it declared the invalidity of the mortgage, the trial court found the said lot to be
conjugal, the same having been acquired during the existence of the marriage of Nicholson
and Florencia. In so ruling, the RTC invoked Art. 116 of the Family Code, providing that "all
property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved." To the trial court, Metrobank had not overcome the
presumptive conjugal nature of the lot. And being conjugal, the RTC concluded that the
disputed property may not be validly encumbered by Florencia without Nicholsons consent.
The RTC also found the deed of waiver Florencia submitted to Metrobank to be fatally
defective. For let alone the fact that Nicholson denied executing the same and that the
signature of the notarizing officer was a forgery, the waiver document was allegedly
executed on April 9, 1995 or a little over three months before the issuance of the RTC
decision declaring the nullity of marriage between Nicholson and Florencia.
The trial court also declared Metrobank as a mortgagee in bad faith on account of
negligence, stating the observation that certain data appeared in the supporting contract
documents, which, if properly scrutinized, would have put the bank on guard against
approving the mortgage. Among the data referred to was the date of execution of the deed
of waiver.
The RTC dismissed Metrobanks counterclaim and cross-claim against the ex-spouses.
Metrobanks motion for reconsideration was denied. Undeterred, Metrobank appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA), the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74874.
The CA Affirmed with Modification the RTCs Decision
On January 28, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision affirmatory of that of the RTC, except for
the award therein of moral damages and attorneys fees which the CA ordered deleted. The
dispositive portion of the CAs Decision reads:

361

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION with respect to the award of moral damages and attorneys
fees which is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
6

Like the RTC earlier held, the CA ruled that Metrobank failed to overthrow the presumption
established in Art. 116 of the Family Code. And also decreed as going against Metrobank
was Florencias failure to comply with the prescriptions of the succeeding Art. 124 of the
Code on the disposition of conjugal partnership property. Art. 124 states:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy x x x.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers
of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
As to the deletion of the award of moral damages and attorneys fees, the CA, in gist, held
that Metrobank did not enter into the mortgage contract out of ill-will or for some fraudulent
purpose, moral obliquity, or like dishonest considerations as to justify damages.
Metrobank moved but was denied reconsideration by the CA.
Thus, Metrobank filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, raising the
following issues for consideration:
a. Whether or not the [CA] erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by
applying Article 116 of the Family Code.
b. Whether or not the [CA] erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of
marriage between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga ipso
facto dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses.
c. Whether or not the [CA] erred in ruling that the petitioner is an innocent purchaser
for value.
7

Our Ruling
A modification of the CAs Decision is in order.

362

The Disputed Property is Conjugal
It is Metrobanks threshold posture that Art. 160 of the Civil Code providing that "[a]ll
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife," applies. To Metrobank,
Art. 116 of the Family Code could not be of governing application inasmuch as Nicholson
and Florencia contracted marriage before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988. CitingManongsong v. Estimo,
8
Metrobank asserts that the presumption of conjugal
ownership under Art. 160 of the Civil Code applies when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Metrobank adds, however, that for the presumption of
conjugal ownership to operate, evidence must be adduced to prove that not only was the
property acquired during the marriage but that conjugal funds were used for the acquisition,
a burden Nicholson allegedly failed to discharge.
To bolster its thesis on the paraphernal nature of the disputed property, Metrobank
cites Francisco v. Court of Appeals
9
and Jocson v. Court of Appeals,
10
among other cases,
where this Court held that a property registered in the name of a certain person with a
description of being married is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses
marriage.
On the other hand, Nicholson, banking on De Leon v. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation
11
and Wong v. IAC,
12
contends that Metrobank failed to overcome the legal
presumption that the disputed property is conjugal. He asserts that Metrobanks arguments
on the matter of presumption are misleading as only one postulate needs to be shown for
the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to arise, that is, the fact of acquisition during
marriage. Nicholson dismisses, as inapplicable, Francisco and Jocson, noting that they are
relevant only when there is no indication as to the exact date of acquisition of the property
alleged to be conjugal.
As a final point, Nicholson invites attention to the fact that Metrobank had virtually
recognized the conjugal nature of the property in at least three instances. The first was
when the bank lumped him with Florencia in Civil Case No. 00-789 as co-mortgagors and
when they were referred to as "spouses" in the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage. Then came the published notice of foreclosure sale where Nicholson was again
designated as co-mortgagor. And third, in its demand-letter
13
to vacate the disputed lot,
Metrobank addressed Nicholson and Florencia as "spouses," albeit the finality of the decree
of nullity of marriage between them had long set in.
We find for Nicholson.
First, while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the
Family Code, is the applicable legal provision since the property was acquired prior to the
enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its theory that, before conjugal ownership could be
legally presumed, there must be a showing that the property was acquired during
marriage using conjugal funds. Contrary to Metrobanks submission, the Court did not,
inManongsong,
14
add the matter of the use of conjugal funds as an essential requirement
for the presumption of conjugal ownership to arise. Nicholson is correct in pointing out that
only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the

363

property is conjugal. Indeed, if proof on the use of conjugal is still required as a necessary
condition before the presumption can arise, then the legal presumption set forth in the law
would veritably be a superfluity. As we stressed in Castro v. Miat:
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that "all
property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be
prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This article does
not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property
was acquired does not appear.
15
Second, Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce Metrobanks theory. Metrobank would thrust
on the Court, invoking the two cases, the argument that the registration of the property in
the name of "Florencia Nevalga, married to Nelson Pascual" operates to describe only the
marital status of the title holder, but not as proof that the property was acquired during the
existence of the marriage.
Metrobank is wrong. As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the acquisition of the
property during the existence of the marriage, then the presumption of conjugal ownership
applies. The correct lesson of Franciscoand Jocson is that proof of acquisition during the
marital coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by the
spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that the property
belongs exclusively to said spouse.
16

The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of Nicholsons arguments regarding Metrobank
having implicitly acknowledged, thus being in virtual estoppel to question, the conjugal
ownership of the disputed lot, the bank having named the former in the foreclosure
proceedings below as either the spouse of Florencia or her co-mortgagor. It is felt, however,
that there is no compelling reason to delve into the matter of estoppel, the same having
been raised only for the first time in this petition. Besides, however Nicholson was
designated below does not really change, one way or another, the classification of the lot in
question.
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does
not ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal Ownership
Metrobank next maintains that, contrary to the CAs holding, Art. 129 of the Family Code is
inapplicable. Art. 129 in part reads:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following
procedure shall apply:
x x x x
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the
profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different

364

proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there
has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
Apropos the aforequoted provision, Metrobank asserts that the waiver executed by
Nicholson, effected as it were before the dissolution of the conjugal property regime,
vested on Florencia full ownership of all the properties acquired during the marriage.
Nicholson counters that the mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not
automatically result in a regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no
liquidation of the conjugal assets.
We again find for Nicholson.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond
and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such
declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and
partition of the partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the
Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal partnerships assets and liabilities which is
generally prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to
185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant
provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a
regime of separation of property reigns.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation following its
dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into an implied ordinary co-
ownership among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
17

In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property
relationship between the former spouses, where:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997,
or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31,
1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the
property relations of the former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted
Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2)
undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However,
the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that
Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2
undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage
of his undivided half.

365

The conclusion would have, however, been different if Nicholson indeed duly waived his
share in the conjugal partnership. But, as found by the courts a quo, the April 9, 1995 deed
of waiver allegedly executed by Nicholson three months prior to the dissolution of the
marriage and the conjugal partnership of gains on July 31, 1995 bore his forged signature,
not to mention that of the notarizing officer. A spurious deed of waiver does not transfer any
right at all, albeit it may become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent buyer for
value.
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobanks right, as mortgagee and as the successful
bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2 undivided portion thereof
heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other undivided half belongs to
Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in question, Metrobank may ask for
the partition of the lot and its property rights "shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to [the bank] in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership."
18
This
disposition is in line with the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract
must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do soquando res non valet ut ago,
valeat quantum valere potest.
19

In view of our resolution on the validity of the auction of the lot in favor of Metrobank, there
is hardly a need to discuss at length whether or not Metrobank was a mortgagee in good
faith. Suffice it to state for the nonce that where the mortgagee is a banking institution, the
general rule that a purchaser or mortgagee of the land need not look beyond the four
corners of the title is inapplicable.
20
Unlike private individuals, it behooves banks to exercise
greater care and due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment
of the status or condition of the property offered as security and the validity of the
mortgagors title must be standard and indispensable part of the banks operation.
21
A bank
that failed to observe due diligence cannot be accorded the status of a bona
fide mortgagee,
22
as here.
But as found by the CA, however, Metrobanks failure to comply with the due diligence
requirement was not the result of a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity or breach of a
known duty for some interest or ill-will that partakes of fraud that would justify damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision of the CA dated
January 28, 2004, upholding with modification the Decision of the RTC, Branch 65 in Makati
City, in Civil Case No. 00-789, isAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the REM over
the lot covered by TCT No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City is hereby
declared valid only insofar as the pro indiviso share of Florencia thereon is concerned.
As modified, the Decision of the RTC shall read:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the real estate mortgage on the property covered by TCT No.
156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City and all proceedings thereon
are NULL and VOID with respect to the undivided 1/2 portion of the disputed property
owned by Nicholson, but VALID with respect to the other undivided 1/2 portion belonging to
Florencia.

366

The claims of Nicholson for moral damages and attorneys fees are DENIED for lack of
merit.

DINO VS DINO
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In
1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they
were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner
alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and
had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees
and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged
that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing
of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the
summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period.
Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her
marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May
2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel
V. Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no indicative
facts of collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report
establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was
deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that
respondents disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish
respondents psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayags
psychological report, the allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand,
clearly made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court
found that respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of
the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of

367

her under Article 68 of the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent
abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA.
CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL
and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon
compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General,
Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Pias City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Las Pias City, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
4

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the
absolute community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be
issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18
October 2006 Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA.
CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL
and VOID from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias
City, for their information and guidance.
5

Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue

368

The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages
6
(the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage,
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation
is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
7
Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,
8
such as
petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.

369

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
9

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section
19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the
court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented
under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in
Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or
annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
10

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the
delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership
shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated
in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved,
had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement
of the judgment.

370

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the
parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or
absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which
should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous
marriage was contracted.1avvphilUnder Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void." Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage
void.
11

Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning,
marriages which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in
an action for annulment.
12
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are
governed either by absolute community of property
13
or conjugal partnership of
gains
14
unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage
settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a
need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could
be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36
15
of the
Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes,
the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
16
The rules
on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil
Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the
same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the
decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts
decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

371

ATIENZA VS BRILLANTES
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety
against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living
together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in
said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on
his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had
been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and
instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the
affection of his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has
five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he
had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the
filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air
residence, which was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a
witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against
complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest
complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five
children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony
before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for
lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went
through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party
applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their
children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California
on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes,
that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code
provides:

372

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of
the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family
Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is
particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any
vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected
(Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule
no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the
institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget
him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law
in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was
already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know
that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an
opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for
the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his
sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in
the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan
Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued
when he was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his
behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged
by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his
judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be

373

overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness
of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or
agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This
decision is immediately executory.

CAMACHO REYES VS REYES
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.
In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a finding
of psychological incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where
there are none. On the other hand, blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the
Constitution
1
and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social
institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of
psychological incapacity, trenches on the very reason why a marriage that is doomed from
its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA -G.R. CV No. 89761
2
which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854.
3

First, we unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University
of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They
were simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent cross-enrolled from
the UP Los Baos campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a
boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she
thought was free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and
traditions.
4
Since both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and
drove home together from the university.
Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtship which included dining
out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university students budget. At
that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant.
Petitioners good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latters habit of
cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB
Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year,
and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.

374

On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioners graduation and her fathers death,
petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.
Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family in Mandaluyong City. All living
expenses were shouldered by respondents parents, and the couples respective salaries
were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly
allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a
child entailed expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00
from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner.
When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told
her that he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business.
Respondents game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying
hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business
took respondent away from his young family for days on end without any communication.
Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the situation will change.
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live
separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further
financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income
earner of the household, respondents business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at
business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to
petitioner sporadically. Compounding the familys financial woes and further straining the
parties relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his
business took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert
any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in
with petitioners mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the
parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a
family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son.
At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either
the petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting
nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital
bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business stopped operations.
Although without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work
for the family business. Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in
scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondents business ventures, this did not
succeed and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but
petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.

375

Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair.
She overheard respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone
inquiring if the latter liked respondents gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent
was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly,
remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties marriage was a surgical
operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated
on, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper,
and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled
into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of
respondents lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the
recovery room.
Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage.
Petitioner approached respondents siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that
she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even respondents siblings waved the white flag on
respondent.
Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a
marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder
couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not
improve the parties relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological
assessment to "determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." As with all
other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical
psychologists recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.
At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents siblings, told respondent
to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner.
With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondents
relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001,
5
petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was
psychologically incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing
his obligations to his familyboth as a spouse to petitioner and father to their children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella
Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC
granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the
ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus:

376

Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the petition is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA
CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES contracted on December 4, 1976 at the
Archbishops Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and void under
Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved.
Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.
Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO
REYES, who are already of age and have the full civil capacity and legal rights to decide for
themselves having finished their studies, are free to decide for themselves.
The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the
parties. Entry of Judgment shall be made if no Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or
Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.
Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if the
parties have no properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe the procedure prescribed
in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.
The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10
SC) shall be issued by the Court only after compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family
Code as implemented under the Rules on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property
(Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where the parties have properties.
The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Mandaluyong and Quezon City.
Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City,
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at their
respective office addresses.
SO ORDERED.
6

Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for
reconsideration of the respondent, affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.
Taking exception to the trial courts rulings, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals,
adamant on the validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the
respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the parties marriage as valid and subsisting.
Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from the majority decision
and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23,
2007 and Order dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89
in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
7


377

Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following
issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING ON IT.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES
OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS
OF MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES MARRIAGE,
WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE STATE CONCERNING
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE
CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE.
VIII

378

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED PETITION
WAS VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.
8

Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the parties
is void ab initio on the ground of both parties psychological incapacity, as provided in Article
In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and documentary
evidence obtained from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The
RTC ratiocinated, thus:
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds merit in the
petition.
Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization."
and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:
"The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support."
Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital partner towards
each other and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express the duties of parents
toward their children.
Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the determination of
the same solely to the Court on a case to case basis.
x x x x
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological
incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the
pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the
assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on
the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the
parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity" which
pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and
socially towards each other in relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love,
fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In
short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of respondent which
created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the
truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.

379

The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that
respondent is suffering from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to
fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to
their profession, the Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product
of an honest evaluation on the psychological status of the respondent. This psychological
incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is
serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his
structural constellation. It is beyond the respondents impulse control. In short, he is
weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply because
he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that
nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their relationship as a
normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to
them by his original family members to save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too
insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of
petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already that she finally revealed her
misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their marriage.
However, the hard position of the respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to
leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the respondent were unanimous that
separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent
confirmed this stand of his siblings.
x x x x
The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and not a one
sided one. It also requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential duties to the marriage
which must naturally be observed by the parties as a consequence of their marriage.
Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage between the parties did not create a
monument of marital integrity, simply because the personality disorder of the respondent
which renders him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage, is
deeply entombed in his structural system and cure is not possible due to his belief that there
is nothing wrong with them.
The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent. Petitioner, too,
is to be blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted with psychological
incapacity as her personality cannot be harmonized with the personality of the respondent.
They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a perfectionist while
respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the respondent
cannot be catered by the petitioner and vice-versa.
Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the thunder bolt or
principal culprit on their inability to nurture and reward their marital life with meaning and
significance. So much so that it is a pity that though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still
it is an empty kingdom due to their psychological incapacity which is grave, incurable and
has origin from unhealthy event in their growing years.
Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they are entitled to
live in a peaceful and orderly environment conducive to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of
the Family Code provides remedy to any party aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of

380

the parties is already a settled matter due to their psychological incapacity. In the words of
Dra. Magno, their marriage, at the very inception, was already at the funeral parlor. Stated
differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it never existed at all. The Court finds
that with this reality, both parties suffer in agony by continuously sustaining a marriage that
exists in paper only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage
remains in its crib with its boots and diaper due to factors beyond the physical, emotional,
intellectual and social ability of the parties to sustain.
9

In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the
appellate court diverged from the findings of the RTC in this wise:
On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis--vis the
totality of evidence presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the latter failed to
sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of
herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically
incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering
from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality
Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an
Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas
diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type,
associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and
narcissistic features.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in
character. A court may place whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It may
even reject them, if it finds that they are inconsistent with the facts of the case or are
otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither clinical psychologist Magno nor
psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the [respondent].
Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas are
hearsay. They are "unscientific and unreliable" as they have no personal knowledge of the
psychological condition of the [respondent] as they never personally examined the
[respondent] himself.
x x x x
[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported psychological
incapacity of [respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner] would like this Court to think. It
bears stressing that [respondent] was referred to Dayan for "psychological evaluation to
determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." The undeniable fact is that
based on Dayans personal examination of the [respondent], the assessment procedures
used, behavioral observations made, background information gathered and interpretation of
psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help the [respondent]
through individual therapy and counseling sessions.

381

Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as
his failure to give regular support, substance abuse, infidelity and "come and go" attitude
are true, the totality of the evidence presented still falls short of establishing that
[respondent] is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
x x x x
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quos findings regarding the [respondents]
alleged mixed personality disorder, his "come and go" attitude, failed business ventures,
inadequate/delayed financial support to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to
[petitioners] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits,
unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed business activities,
taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on
serious marital difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. [Respondents] "defects" were not present at the inception
of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the first few years of their marriage,
which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that
initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the
tradition in most Filipino households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned
from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his
business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with
Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].
x x x x
As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas Psychiatric
Report states that [petitioner] "manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that
made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great
amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.
However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the
complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of celebration [thereof] even if
such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration xxx. In fact, what was merely
the time of the celebration of marriage x x x.
x x x x
What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their marriage.
However, it is jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations, it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

382

While [petitioners] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and
void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the
unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the State.
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be
read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that
would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that
would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. x x x
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its
recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
10

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate
courts ruling that the psychological incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently
established. We disagree with its decision declaring the marriage between the parties as
valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Santos v. Court of Appeals
11
solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the
factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations
are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
12

As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a
personality disorder, to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE
[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an average
social status, intellectual achievement is quite important to the family values (sic). All
children were equipped with high intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents proud
of them. Father was disabled, but despite his handicap, he was able to assume his financial

383

and emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited extent, his social functions (sic).
Despite this, he has been described as the unseen strength in the family.
Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home. Doing volunteer
and community services, she was not the demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional
mother (sic). Her love and concern came in the form of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and
encouragements (sic), but not the caressing, sensitive and soothing touches of an
emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home environment did not permit one to nurture a
hurt feeling or depression, but one has to stand up and to help himself (sic). This trained her
to subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.
Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any undertakings
(sic). She is organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal,
competent and has a strong sense of duty (sic). But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her
analytical resources and strong sense of objectivity predisposed her to a superficial
adjustments (sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and reason, and less of how she
feels (sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in a heterosexual
relationship, especially to her husband, who has deep seated sense of inadequacy,
insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth despite his intellectual assets (sic). Despite this,
[petitioner] remained in her marriage for more than 20 years, trying to reach out and lending
a hand for better understanding and relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time when
others, like her husband would make decision for her (sic), instead of being depended upon.
But the more [petitioner] tried to compensate for [respondents] shortcomings, the bigger
was the discrepancy in their coping mechanisms (sic). At the end, [petitioner] felt unloved,
unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their marriage as very much lacking in
relationship (sic).
On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the second set of
brood (sic), where there were less bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing up stage.
Additionally, he was acknowledged as the favorite of his mother, and was described to have
a close relationship with her. At an early age, he manifested clinical behavior of conduct
disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his apparent high intellectual potentials
(sic), he felt that he needed a "push" to keep him going. His being a "free spirit", attracted
[petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted, without being bothered by
untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing ideas from other people. He presented no
guilt feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His
studies proved too much of a pressure for him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite
his apparent high intellectual resources (sic).
His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit
work from his family employment and ventured on his own. With no much planning and
project study, his businesses failed. This became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts,
the lack of relationships (sic) and consultations (sic) with each other, his negativistic
attitudes (sic) and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his spitting at her face which
impliedly meant "you are nothing as compared to me" were in reality, his defenses for a
strong sense of inadequacy (sic).

384

As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this seemed not
coupled with emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience, maturity, direction, focus,
adequacy, stability and confidence to make it work. He complained that he did not feel the
support of his wife regarding his decision to go into his own business. But when he failed,
the more he became negativistic and closed to suggestions especially from [petitioner]. He
was too careful not to let go or make known his strong sense of inadequacy, ambivalence,
doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss
of pride. When things did not work out according to his plans, he suppressed his hostilities
in negative ways, such as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.
His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight and primitive
drives. He seemed to feel more comfortable in being untraditional and different from others.
Preoccupation is centered on himself, (sic) an unconscious wish for the continuance of the
gratification of his dependency needs, (sic) in his mother-son relationship. From this stems
his difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his wife, as pressures, stresses, (sic)
demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital relationship. Strong masculine
strivings is projected.
For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to assume his
duties and responsibilities as a husband and father, but because of a severe psychological
deficit, he was unable to do so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner]
manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the
emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
[Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is
suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is
characterized by his inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily govern many
aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His being a "free spirit" associated with no
remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His
prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to
boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense
mechanisms, or the unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts.
His prolonged and closed attachments to his mother encouraged cross identification and
developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine strivings. He
therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral
and forceful decision making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial
acts. His narcissistic supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital
demands and stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in
his psychological development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality
structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree, because it hampered, interrupted and

385

interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis
supplied)
13

2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic. According to
them, respondent has not really taken care of his wife and children. He does not seem to
have any direction in life. He seems to be full of bright ideas and good at starting things but
he never gets to accomplish anything. His brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now
[respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when they see that [respondent] is not
himself. He likes to bum around and just spends the day at home doing nothing. They wish
that hed be more responsible and try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his wife[,] is
the breadwinner of the family because she has a stable job. [Respondent]s brothers
learned from friends that [petitioner] is really disappointed with him. She has discussed
things with him but he always refused to listen. She does not know what to do with him
anymore. She has grown tired of him.
When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he stopped taking
it in 1993. His brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to
stop taking drugs when he had been hooked to it for the past 22 years. When [respondent]
was also asked what his problems are at the moment, he mentioned that he feels lonely
and distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He feels that he and his wife [have]
drifted apart. He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things with this person but he
is not given the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak points is that he is very
tolerant of people[,] that is why he is taken advantage of most of the time. He wants to avoid
conflict so hed rather be submissive and compliant. He does not want to hurt anyone [or] to
cause anymore pain. He wants to make other people happy.
x x x x
Interpretation of Psychological Data
A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning
x x x x
B. Vocational Preference
x x x x
C. Socio Emotional Functioning
x x x x
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and
detached attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of
inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from
association with others. He feels that he is "different" and as a result is prone to anticipate

386

rejections. Because of the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid
personal and social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with himself and
accentuates his tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt
to be the less dominant partner. He feels better when he has to follow than when he has to
take the lead. A self-contained person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in
order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a small need of companionship and is
most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his more tender
feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry within but he may choose to
repress this feeling. [Respondents] strong need for social approval, which could have
stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes him submissive and over [compliant].
He tends to make extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he] already feels
victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of
interpersonal conflicts. Despite
his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and disapproval
[of] others. Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations
which is likewise apt to be repressed.
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable
tension and anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is
also entertaining feelings of hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought. He
feels that he is up in the air but with no sound foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he
knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty
concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but
he cant accomplish anything because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling of
hopelessness is further aggravated by the lack of support from significant others.
Diagnostic Impression
Axis I : Drug Dependence
Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]
Axis III : None
Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
Severe
He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to accomplish
anything; unable to give priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning Fair (Emphasis supplied)
14

3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno

387

Summary and Conclusion
From the evidence available from [petitioners] case history and from her psychological
assessment, and despite the non-cooperation of the respondent, it is possible to infer with
certainty the nullity of this marriage. Based on the information available about the
respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial personality disorder with narcissistic and
dependent features that renders him too immature and irresponsible to assume the normal
obligations of a marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and conscientious
person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her
achievements in
this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her comprehension of
human situations is very shallow for a woman of her academic and professional
competence. And this explains why she married RRR even when she knew he was a
pothead, then despite the abuse, took so long to do something about her situation.
Diagnosis for [petitioner]:
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouses immaturity, drug abuse,
and infidelity)
Severity: 4-severe
Diagnosis for [respondent]
Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and
dependent features
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)
Severity: 4 (severe)
x x x x
One has to go back to [respondents] early childhood in order to understand the root cause
of his antisocial personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood of 11.
His elder siblings were taken cared of by his grandmother. [Respondents] father was kind,
quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared] by his mother. Unfortunately, [respondents]

388

mother grew up believing that she was not her mothers favorite child, so she felt "api,
treated like poor relations." [Respondents] mothers reaction to her perceived rejection was
to act outwith poor impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent money like water,
had terrible temper tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became [respondents] role
model.
However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he learned to use
his good looks and his charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to lie
convincingly and to say what people wanted to hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked
admiration and attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In the process,
his ability to love and to empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot sustain a
relationship with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a marriage.
[Respondents] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self-centeredness
(e.g. moved to Mindoro and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family in Manila); his
grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. he would just "come and go," without telling his
wife his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g. felt entitled to a mistress because
[petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally exploitative (e.g. let his
wife spend for all the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g.
when asked to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he would think about it,
etc.) The aggressive sadistic personality features were manifested whom he has physically,
emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on drugs; and his dependent
personality features were manifested by his need for others to assume responsibility for
most major areas of his life, and in his difficulty in doing things on his own.
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic
features and aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render support for his
spouse and children. A personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over
time.
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner]
and [respondent is] null and void from the very beginning. (emphasis supplied)
15

Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of
Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and
interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person
diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the
doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their
exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition,
16
necessarily involves only two persons. The totality
of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and
genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual

389

assessment of the present state of the parties marriage from the perception of one of the
parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to
interact with, and experience, respondents pattern of behavior which she could then validly
relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based solely
on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as
respondents own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified
on their own observations of respondents behavior and interactions with them, spanning
the period of time they knew him.
17
These were also used as the basis of the doctors
assessments.
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,
18
citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV),
19
instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria
for personality disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the
expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the
following areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional
response)
(3) interpersonal functioning
(4) impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and
social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational or other important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to
adolescence or early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of
another mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a
drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).
Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring
since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:

390

(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by
repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for
personal profit or pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or
assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent
work behavior or honor financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt,
mistreated, or stolen from another
B. The individual is at least 18 years.
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of
schizophrenia or a manic episode.
20

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make
up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted
with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this
case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-
diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate
diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of
experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the
psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable.
The appellate court is mistaken.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general,
recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to
manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddocks textbook entitled Synopsis of
Psychiatry,
21
treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed
kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans recommendation that
respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that
respondents psychological incapacity is incurable.

391

Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
22
As aptly stated
by Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals & Molina:
23

[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such
cases. Data about the persons entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a
partys mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged
and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
[Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective
testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have
problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and
work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance
abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has
personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of
nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists finding of a personality
disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by
one of the parties or both parties psychological incapacity.
On more than one occasion, we have rejected an experts opinion concerning the supposed
psychological incapacity of a party.
24
In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,
25
we ruled that, even without
delving into the non-exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina,
26
the
stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals
27
must be independently met by
the party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We
declared, thus:
It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary
a link drawn between the "psychodynamics of the case" and the factors characterizing the
psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable
conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not
illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating effect on their
marriage x x x.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders was not
supported by psychological tests properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically
trained in the tests' use and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the
parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully established by
psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of
people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.

392

x x x x
is founded.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual antecedents
(narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the
inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit
the following clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even
charming and ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many areas of disordered life
functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and
illegal activities are typical experiences that patients report as beginning in childhood. x x x
Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their mental
content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In
fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress observers
as having good verbal intelligence.
x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task
or adhere to any conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of
remorse for these actions; that is, they appear to lack a conscience.
28

In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1)
sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with
the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioners purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CAs
ruling thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete
facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if

393

such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In fact, what was merely
the time of the celebration of the marriage x x x
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioners] Amended Petition was indeed
amended to conform to the evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court, Dr. Villegas finding that [petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an Inadequate
Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a
debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage.1avvphi1 In fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical
psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be a
"good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the
needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are praiseworthy." Even in Dr.
Villegas psychiatric report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain in their
marriage for more than 20 years "trying to reach out and lending a hand for better
understanding and relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than
[petitioners] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is psychologically
incapacitated within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
29

All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in
his separate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:
30

x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another
case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition,
we find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R.
CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No
costs.

GO TAN VS TAN
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan
(Steven) were married.
3
Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra

394

Danielle
4
and Kristen Denise.
5
On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the
marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Protective Order (TPO)
6
against Steven and her parents-in-law,
Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC.
She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal,
psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)
7
of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262,
8
otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004."
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice
9
granting petitioner's
prayer for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to
the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on
the Petition,
10
contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons
since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No.
9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition
11
to
respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by
R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the
protection and safety of victims of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution
12
dismissing the case as to
respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner,
they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under
the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
13

On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for
Reconsideration
14
contending that the doctrine of necessary implication
should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due
process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration
15
arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly
broadened the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the
offender and the alleged victim was an essential condition for the application
of R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution
16
denying petitioner's

395

Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include
respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained
interpretation of the provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA,
PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE
WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".
17

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the
provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the
suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the
provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily
applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of
design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home;
and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically;
that respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for
complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No.
9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be
related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual
relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a
factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for
review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or
necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary
but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders
under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their
children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a
common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats

396

of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to
the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it
does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the
RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory
application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised
Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory
application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses
which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to
such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A.
No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,
18
the Court applied suppletorily the provision on
subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act
No. 3992, otherwise known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that
the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant could be
sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,
19
the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the
service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused
who was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known
as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of similar rules
under the special law.
In People v. Chowdury,
20
the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19
of the RPC to define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories"
under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas

397

Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were not defined therein, although
the special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable
for the crime of illegal recruitment.
In Yu v. People,
21
the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence of an
express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,
22
the Court applied suppletorily the
principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the
absence of a contrary provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the
RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express
provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law.
Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act
of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators
are principals.
23

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes
that the acts of violence against women and their children may be committed
by an offender through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:
x x x
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or
through another, thatalarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private
places;

398

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the
woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the
woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting
harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that may be issued
under this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or
committing, personally or through another, any of the acts mentioned
in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly
or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law,
thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the
protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law
24
and that this intent
must be effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language
of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as
will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its true
intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence
against women and children.

399

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est
exclusio alterius" finds no application here. It must be remembered that this
maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of universal
application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of
discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not
be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.
25

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the
attendance of circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of
Steven and respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses
upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be
threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the
present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts.
26
It is thus premature for
petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only
on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a petition
under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best
passed upon after a trial on the merits.
Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether
respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so
would be an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions
dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are
hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the
petition against respondents is concerned.
SO ORDERED.

ANG VS CA SAGUID
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a
former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on
it.
The Indictment

400

The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads:
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless conduct, sent through the Short
Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish
Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a
completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud
who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial
emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.
1

The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused
Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish
and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned
afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten
pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to
elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected
the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child.
Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and
sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages,
namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to
ask him to leave her alone.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service
(MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irishs face superimposed on
the figure (Exhibit A).
2
The senders cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-
8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of
her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).
3

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted
that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he
threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent
to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang
tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."
4

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under
police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in
sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess
Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking
it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They
searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While
Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"

401

Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an
expert in information technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much
possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of
another woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer
to make it appear that the face and the body belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the
face was not proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the
picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B.
Finally, Gonzales explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer
to a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in
October 2003 and their relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after
their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he
told her that his girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out
on him.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess
Resort as she needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two
police officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and
brought him to the police station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her
identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the senders
number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back
obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This
explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his
cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture
(Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he identified as Irish
(Exhibits 2 to 7).
5

Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustans wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures.
Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that
contained them because she was jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of
Irish. But, while the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear
naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be
seen. Irish denied that she was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7,
the woman in the picture was fully dressed.
After trial, the RTC found Irishs testimony completely credible, given in an honest and
spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience,
prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible expression of pain and anguish
for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the
victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne
out of human nature and experience."
6
Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC
found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

402

On Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),
7
the latter rendered a decision dated
January 31, 2008,
8
affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustans motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for
review on certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone
message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish,
psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this
term is defined in R.A. 9262;
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in
this case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in
violation of his constitutional rights; and
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture
presented in the case.
The Courts Rulings
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a
person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such
acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
x x x x
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these
include any form of harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to a woman. Thus:

403

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following
acts:
x x x x
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through
another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
x x x x
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence
against women through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress
to her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused
Rustan had a "dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating
relationship" includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved over time and
on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus:
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing
basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization
between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the
offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a
sexual act. He cites Websters Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which
provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to
make love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her."
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance"
that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended
woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couples relationship, i.e., "a love
affair."
9


404

R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a
series of acts committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual
relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating
relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single
sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating
relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual
intercourse taking place between those involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off"
variety (away-bati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and
on a continuing basis." But the two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself
admits, from October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a
relationship of mutual trust and love.
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their
taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed
broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish
explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustans messages, he would get
angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as
continuous.
10

Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be
considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and
set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series
of acts" that constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of
harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to
protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would
license isolated ones.
Rustan alleges that todays women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that
her getting one could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial
emotional or psychological distress. He claims having previously exchanged obscene
pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was
not impressed with their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself
(Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not
clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustans wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent,
except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not
know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the pictures. Later,
however, she said that she did not have time to delete them.
11
And, if she thought that she
had deleted all the pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep
and hide such memory card. There would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew
that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for several

405

years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything connected to
Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony.1avvphi1
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustans
low regard for the alleged moral sensibilities of todays youth. What is obscene and injurious
to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on the circumstances of
each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irishs
head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one.
Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized
and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as
Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see.
That must have given her a nightmare.
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him
without any warrant, the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible.
But the fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence either the cellphone or the
SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution
did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a
photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone
Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irishs testimony that she
received the obscene picture and malicious text messages that the senders cellphone
numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously in communication.
Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used
such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did.
12
Consequently, the
prosecution did not have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that
Rustan sent those messages.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.
13
His defense
was that he himself received those messages from an unidentified person who was
harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan
never presented the cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to
him to authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither
will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had
merely tried to help her identify the sender.
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message
constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an
electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit
A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected
to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He
should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
14


406

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.
15

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of
the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25,
2008.

OCAMPO VS ARCAYA CHUA
These consolidated cases
1
stemmed from the administrative complaints filed against
respondent Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua. A decision has been rendered in A.M. No. RTJ-
07-2093, entitled Sylvia Santos v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua, from which the
respondent sought reconsideration. The immediately preceding case was consolidated with
the subsequent administrative complaints filed against respondent Judge in a Resolution
dated April 14, 2009 of the Court en banc.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ
In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), Francisco P. Ocampo charged
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua with harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance
of the law, gross misconduct, manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
In his letter-complaint dated April 24, 2007 to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
Francisco Ocampo stated that he was the respondent in Special Proceedings (SP) No. M-
6375, entitled Milan Arceo Ocampo v. Francisco P. Ocampo, which was pending before the
sala of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
On November 27, 2006, Francisco Ocampo's wife, Milan Arceo Ocampo, filed a petition
claiming the sole custody of their minor daughters, namely, Ma. Francesca P. Ocampo
(Francesca), born on June 1, 1994, and Ma. Fatima Patricia A. Ocampo (Fatima), born on
October 13, 1995. Summons was served upon Francisco Ocampo on December 12, 2006
and the case was set for hearing the following day, December 13, 2006.
During the hearing, upon agreement of the parties, respondent Judge issued an Order
enjoining Francisco Ocampo from taking their minor daughters out of the country without
the court's permission and directing him to allow his wife, Milan, visitation rights over their
minor daughters in their residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Since then, Milan exercised
visitation rights over the minors and communicated with them through their cellular phones.
Francisco Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging
that he and Milan were residents and registered voters of Meycauayan, Bulacan. He then

407

served written interrogatories to his wife, and presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to prove that his wife was not really a resident of Makati City.
In an Order dated March 22, 2007, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss.
Francisco Ocampo questioned the dismissal of his motion since Milan never presented any
evidence to controvert the evidence which he submitted in support of his motion to dismiss.
Francisco Ocampo, thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied
by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in an Order dated April 3, 2007. On even date,
respondent Judge issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), requiring complainant
Ocampo to turn over the custody of their minor daughters to his wife, to stay away from his
wife's residence at 1211 West Ayala Condominium, 252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City, to
refrain from committing acts that would harass, intimidate or threaten and create an
unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of their minor daughters and his wife, and
to provide monthly support of P50,000.00 to their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of
expenses for medication and education.
Francisco Ocampo faulted respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua for issuing the TPO as the
period to file his answer had not yet expired when respondent Judge issued the said Order.
Moreover, he was directed to give monthly support of P50,000.00 to his wife and minor
daughters, even if his wife alleged that he is not the father of the said minors and in the
absence of any factual finding as to the resources of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient. In directing the payment of support to his wife, respondent Judge also ignored the
factual circumstances relating to the adulterous relations of his wife and the pendency of the
legal separation case based on his wife's sexual infidelity and abandonment.
Francisco Ocampo further alleged that respondent Judge caused the implementation of the
TPO as if it was a matter of life and death. When her branch sheriff was not available,
respondent Judge dispatched another sheriff to implement the Order. Around 6:00 a.m. on
April 5, 2007, a Maundy Thursday, the sheriff dispatched by respondent Judge barged into
the home of Francisco Ocampos parents in Baguio City and woke up all the occupants
therein. At that time, Francisco Ocampo, his minor daughters and family were having their
Holy Week vacation. The sheriff went inside the house and opened the rooms against the
will of the occupants and without regard to their privacy. When the sheriff learned that
Francesca and Fatima were still sleeping, he demanded that they be roused from their
sleep, even as Ocampo assured him that he will peacefully bring his minor daughters to his
wife. The sheriff also insisted that Francisco Ocampo pay the support of P50,000.00 right
there and then, although he was told by Francisco that he did not have such amount of
money. Francesca and Fatima refused to go with the sheriff, but because of the court order,
Francisco Ocampo told them to go with him.
Francisco Ocampo then filed a motion for inhibition, as well as an urgent ex parte motion to
recall or rectify the Order dated April 3, 2007, but both motions were denied by respondent
Judge in an Order dated April 13, 2007.
The irregular acts attributed to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua are as follows: (1) she
denied the motion to dismiss filed by Francisco Ocampo, respondent therein, despite
overwhelming evidence submitted that therein petitioner was not a resident of Makati City;

408

(2) she scheduled the hearing of the case immediately a day after the summons was served
on therein respondent; (3) she issued a TPO despite the fact that therein respondent's
period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed; (4) she ordered the payment of support without
sufficient basis; and (5) she caused the implementation of the TPO over-zealously, even
designating a special sheriff to serve it in Baguio City on a Maundy Thursday. These,
coupled with complainant Ocampo's account that respondent Judge demanded money from
his wife, constitute the first set of charges filed against her.
In her Comment,
2
respondent Judge explained that the order setting SP No. M-6375 for
hearing on the petitioner's application for a TPO and Hold Departure Order was issued on
December 8, 2006, a Friday, and was received for service by the Process Server on the
same day. Based on the officer's return, the Order was attempted to be served twice by the
Process Server on December 11, 2006, a Monday, at complainant Francisco Ocampo's
house, but nobody was there. On December 12, 2006, substituted service was resorted to
by the Process Server.
Respondent Judge stated that the hearing could not have been set earlier since the court
calendar was full, nor later, because December 13, 2006 was the last hearing date, before
the court went on Christmas recess, for cases requiring the presence of the public
prosecutor. While Francisco Ocampo may have felt harassed by the suddenness of the
court hearing, respondent Judge professed that she did not have such intention. The nature
of therein petitioner's prayers required immediate action by the court and the December 8,
2006 Order could have been served on him on December 11, 2006, but, as previously
mentioned, was unsuccessful.
Respondent Judge pointed out that had complainant Ocampo really felt harassed by the
suddenness of the hearing, he could have complained during the hearing of December 13,
2006. Nonetheless, he never brought such issue to the attention of the court, until the filing
of the administrative complaint, or four (4) months after the fact. At any rate, the scheduled
hearing on December 13, 2006 did not push through because Francisco Ocampo filed a
motion to dismiss on the same day. Francisco Ocampo himself set the hearing of his motion
for reconsideration of the Order dated March 22, 2007 Order (which denied the Motion to
Dismiss) on April 3, 2007, a Holy Tuesday. For utter lack of merit, reconsideration was
denied and the TPO was issued on the same day.
Respondent Judge stated that the issuance of the TPO was anchored on the provision of
Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262. The Court also took into account the provisions
of Articles 176 and 220 of the Family Code, which deal with the right of the mother to
exercise parental authority over illegitimate children and her right to keep them in her
company. Moreover, Francisco Ocampos contention in his Answer that he was not
contesting his wifes claim that the subject minors were not his children bolstered the
propriety of the award of custody over the subject minors to his wife, Milan.
Respondent Judge asserted that she was not over-zealous in causing the implementation of
the TPO, as the law itself mandates that the court order the immediate personal service of
the TPO on the respondent. The Order that directed the implementation of the TPO was
dated April 4, 2007, and it was received by Milan's counsel on the same day. Sheriff Manuel
Q. Tangangco was deputized to serve it since the Branch Sheriff was not available. Milan

409

Ocampo herself and her counsel coordinated with the sheriff regarding its service, also on
the same day. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua explained that had she opted to defer
action on Milan's prayer for the issuance of a TPO as well as its implementation, it would
have been Milan who would have charged her administratively, considering that the Petition
was filed as early as November 23, 2006, but the proceedings on the merits were delayed
due to the filing by Francisco Ocampo of a Motion to Dismiss. In fact, therein petitioner,
Milan Ocampo, filed on February 1, 2007 an Omnibus Motion (To Resolve Petitioner's
Application for a Permanent Protection Order, etc.), claiming that Francisco Ocampo's
motion to dismiss was purely dilatory.
As regards the date, time and manner the TPO was served by the sheriff, respondent Judge
maintained that she was not privy to it, since the said TPO would have been served on April
4, 2007, pursuant to the Order bearing the same date. The sheriff's arrogance, if any, was
his personal accountability.
Respondent Judge noted that the Sheriffs Report and handwritten notation on the lower
portion of the Order dated April 3, 2007, which was also signed by Kagawad Artemio S.
Zaparita of Baguio City and SP04 Arthur A. Curno of the Baguio City Police, stated that
respondent Francisco Ocampo voluntarily turned over the custody of subject minors to the
petitioner. During the hearing on May 10, 2007, the subject minors themselves belied the
claims of Francisco Ocampo regarding the alleged arbitrary manner the TPO was served by
the sheriff. Respondent Judge also pointed out that the court did not receive any complaint
from Francisco Ocampo or anyone concerned about the manner the TPO was served. It
was only in the present administrative complaint that the same was raised, leading to the
inference that Francisco Ocampos claims were concocted.
Respondent Judge maintained that it was irrelevant that the subject minors may not have
been in danger, but were safe in the custody of complainant Francisco Ocampo. The court
arrived at a preliminary determination that Milan, being the biological mother and the subject
minors being her illegitimate children, was entitled to custody over them. Moreover, Milan
may have been granted and was exercising visitation rights over subject minors, yet the
duration thereof, as stated in the Order dated December 13, 2006, was only until the court
resolved complainant Ocampo's Motion to Dismiss, which was resolved with finality on April
3, 2007. Further, there is a whale of a difference between exercise of visitation rights and
custody. During the hearing on May 10, 2007, subject minors, who were over seven years
old, declared that they preferred to stay with their mother, Milan Ocampo, and likewise
confirmed the physical violence committed by complainant Francisco Ocampo against Milan
Ocampo.
According to respondent Judge, Milan Ocampos prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a
Permanent Protection Order (PPO) was anchored mainly on R.A. No. 9262. Section 15 of
R.A. No. 9262 is explicit that the TPO should be issued by the court on the date of the filing
of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued. Milan's
prayer for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO, based on R.A. No. 9262, was incorporated in
the Petition that was filed as early as November 23, 2006. Thus, it was not necessary for
the court to await the filing of complainant Ocampo's Answer or the expiry of the period
within which to file it before issuing the TPO.

410

Respondent Judge explained that the award of support was in favor of Milan alone as the
legal wife of complainant Ocampo. This was clarified in an Order dated April 16, 2007.
Among Milan's prayers in her Petition was for an award of monthly support of not less
than P150,000.00, but the court awarded only P50,000.00, as that was the amount found
reasonable by it. At any rate, the support granted by the court was only temporary.
Likewise, although complainant Francisco Ocampo had not yet complied with the directive
to give support as alleged by Milan, the court did not impose a sanction against him
precisely because the court was then completing the hearing for the issuance of a TPO.
Moreover, Francisco Ocampo had really no reason to complain about the award of support,
because the directive to provide monthly support was already held in abeyance in the Order
dated May 2, 2007.
Respondent Judge stated that Francisco Ocampo's allegations regarding Milan's adulterous
relationships and the legal separation case do not have any bearing on SP No. M-6375.
She further asserted that, as can be gleaned from the records, the courses of action taken
by the counsel of complainant Francisco Ocampo did not conform to normal rules of
procedure. One, on April 10, 2007, he filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition, but two days
later, or on April 12, 2007, he still filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Recall or Rectify Order
dated April 3, 2007. Two, on April 24, 2007, he filed the instant administrative complaint, but
two days later, or on April 26, 2007, he still filed an Opposition to Petitioner's Motion dated
April 23, 2007 with Ex Parte Motion for Examination of the Minors, and a day later, on April
24, 2007, filed a Second Motion to Inhibit. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua asseverated
that from all appearances, the administrative complaint was filed for the sole objective of
compelling her to inhibit herself from handling SP No. M-6375. Three, on May 11, 2007, he
filed a Motion to Terminate Proceedings, which was an indication that complainant Ocampo
did not really have any genuine administrative cause of action against her. As things turned
out, all that complainant Ocampo wanted to hear from the subject minors was their
declaration that they preferred to stay with their mother.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the OCA, through then Court
Administrator Christopher O. Lock, informed the Office of the Chief Justice in a
Memorandum dated May 11, 2007 of the reports about the rampant selling of TPOs and
PPOs in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144, which was the sala
presided by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
The said reports were thereafter confirmed by Judges Winlove M. Dumayas, Marissa
Macaraig-Guillen, Tranquil P. Salvador and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino, particularly with
respect to SP Case No. M-6373, entitled Albert K. S. Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella
Pulliam, a child custody case.
In a Resolution
3
dated June 5, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the Memorandum of Court
Administrator Christopher O. Lock as a complaint for gross ignorance and gross misconduct
against Judge Arcaya-Chua, directed respondent Judge to file a Comment on the complaint
within 10 days from receipt of notice, and suspended respondent Judge pending resolution
of the administrative case.

411

It appears that on May 7, 2007, respondent Judge issued a TPO in the said case, granting,
among others, the custody of the subject minor, Rafi Pulliam, to therein petitioner, Albert
Chang Tan, and directing therein respondent, Stephanie Pulliam, to stay away from the
home and office of Chang Tan as well as from the school of the subject minor. Per the
sheriff's return dated May 8, 2007, the Order was not fully implemented insofar as the
custody of the subject minor was directed to be turned over to Chang Tan. This
development irked Chang Tan, resulting in a heated argument between Chang Tan and the
Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Branch 144. Chang Tan insisted that a break open order be
issued or that the sheriff be permitted to enter the premises of Pulliam's house to search for
the child and then bring her to court. On the same day, May 8, 2007, respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua issued an order authorizing the sheriff "to enter the open premises where
subject minor may be found for the purpose of turning over custody to petitioner, but is
admonished to maintain peace and order in the conduct thereof."
According to OCA, although it was not shown that Judge Arcaya-Chua received money
from Chang Tan in exchange for the issuance of the TPO, the facts clearly indicate that she
was remiss in issuing the TPO. Her speedy issuance of the Orders dated May 7, 2007 and
May 8, 2007 not only showed her unusual interest in the case, but it also appeared that the
Order dated May 8, 2007 was tailor-fitted to suit the wishes of Chang Tan, as expressed in
the latter's heated argument with the OIC of Branch 144.
OCA also pointed out that it was not the only case wherein respondent Judge displayed
unusual interest. On April 17, 2007, Judge Zenaida Galapate-Laguilles of RTC, Branch 143,
Makati City issued an order in Civil Case No. 07-352, entitled Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC) v. Moreno, setting the application for a writ of preliminary attachment
for hearing on May 9, 2007. In view of the leave of absence of Judge Galapate-Laguilles,
respondent Judge was later designated as the pairing judge. On April 20, 2007, respondent,
as pairing judge, cancelled the previously scheduled May 9, 2007 hearing and re-scheduled
the hearing to April 23, 2007, where she ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment in favor of RCBC. According to OCA, what was highly suspicious in
respondents actuation was that there was really no urgency in the application for a writ of
preliminary attachment.
In her Comment
4
dated June 9, 2007, respondent Judge explained that SP No. M-6373,
entitled Albert K. S. Chang Tan II v. Stephanie Estrella Pulliam, was originally raffled to the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 60 under Judge Marissa Macaraig-Guillen. After Judge
Macaraig-Guillen recused from the case, it was re-raffled to her branch on April 30, 2007,
and the records of the case were transmitted to her on the same day.
Respondent Judge explained that the May 7, 2007 Order is justified under Sections 8 and
15 of R.A. No. 9262, as well as under Circular No. 03-04-04-SC, which specifically applies
to a petition for custody of minors. Contrary to OCAs finding that the application filed by
petitioner Chang Tan in SP No. M-6373 did not contain the requisite allegation of violence
committed by therein respondent Stephanie Pulliam on her minor child, Rafi, paragraph 17
of the Application was explicit that a complaint for child abuse was filed against Stephanie
Pulliam, based on, among other evidence, a handwritten letter of Rafi wherein she
enumerated the many abuses that her mother had committed upon her. The complaint for
child abuse was attached as an annex to the Application as well as to the Petition. Other

412

annexes attached to the Application, mentioning in detail the acts of violence committed by
Stephanie Pulliam against Rafi, consisted of the statements of yaya Josie Leynes and Rafi
herself, as well as the Psychiatric Evaluation Report of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez.
Respondent Judge stated that although Article 176 of the Family Code provides that an
illegitimate child shall be under the parental authority of the mother, an exception is when
the court orders otherwise. The mother may be divested of her parental authority over her
illegitimate child when the court finds compelling reasons to do so. In all cases involving a
child, his best interest is of paramount consideration. The court awarded provisional custody
over the subject minor and a TPO in favor of therein petitioner Chang Tan, but effective for
a period of 30 days only, after a careful consideration of the allegations in the pleadings and
the supporting documentary evidence. Rafi was already more than seven years old at the
time the Order dated May 7, 2007 was issued, as evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth.
Respondent Judge countered that the Order dated May 7, 2007 was not speedily issued. As
was her standard operating procedure with respect to newly raffled and re-raffled cases,
she immediately studied the records of SP No. M-6373. Even before Chang Tan's
Application was filed on May 4, 2007, she had already arrived at a preliminary determination
that the issuance of a Provisional Order and a TPO was warranted. She also studied Chang
Tan's Application on the same day it was filed, a Friday. Her study thereof continued the
following day, a Saturday, also in her office. She was then planning to avail of her forfeitable
leave of absence of 30 days in June 2007, inasmuch as she did not avail of the same the
previous year. To expedite the resolution of motions and preparation of decisions, and to
avoid being saddled with much work on her return from her leave, she had been reporting to
her office on alternate Saturdays beginning April 2007. SP No. M-6373 was not the only
case that she studied on that Saturday, but other cases as well. Her study of SP No. M-
6373 resumed on Monday, May 7, 2007, which culminated in the issuance of an Order at
almost lunchtime of the same day. Granting that the one week period in which she issued
the May 7, 2007 Order may be considered speedy, such circumstance should not be taken
against her as she was really a fast worker. She was accustomed to speedy preparation of
orders and decisions as a result of her training in the Supreme Court as a Court Attorney for
13 years.
Respondent Judge maintained that it was necessary to implement the Order dated May 7,
2007 at once, because the courts are so mandated to cause the immediate implementation
of the TPO under Section 15, R.A. No. 9262.
As regards the alleged heated argument between Chang Tan and the OIC of Branch 144,
respondent Judge surmised that the same could be merely concocted, as it was neither
reported to her nor brought to her attention. Moreover, the doors of her chambers were
always wide open and she could have clearly heard it if it really transpired.
Respondent Judge averred that during the hearing dated May 11, 2007, she gave a
directive holding in abeyance further implementation of the May 7, 2007 Order. Thus, she
asserted that if she really received money or anything from Chang Tan or from anybody in
his behalf, she would have ensured complete implementation of the Order dated May 7,
2007, instead of holding it in abeyance. Moreover, she should have declared Pulliam and

413

her counsel guilty of the indirect contempt charge against them if it were really true that she
received money from Chang Tan.
Respondent Judge stated that if it were true that she had been engaged in rampant selling
of TPO/PPO or any order in her branch, she and her family would not have found
themselves in such state of financial drain after she had been preventively suspended.
As regards her participation in Civil Case No. 07-352, entitled Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation v. Moreno, respondent Judge narrated that an Ex Parte Motion for Immediate
Resolution of Prayer for the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Attachment was forwarded to
her sala being the Pairing Judge of Branch 143. Immediately after reading the motion, she
inquired from the Clerk of Court of Branch 143 about the alleged leave of absence of therein
Presiding Judge Zenaida Galapate Laguilles. She learned that Judge Galapate-Laguilles
indeed left for the United States on April 19, 2007 to attend a convention on Intellectual
Property and would be back on May 7, 2007. She likewise gathered information from the
same Branch Clerk of Court that Judge Galapate-Laguilles's trip abroad was the reason
behind the Application's setting on May 9, 2007, not because the Presiding Judge did not
see any urgency in the Application. The Presiding Judge also lacked ample time to act
thereon since she had a previously scheduled leave of absence. Thus, she determined from
the allegations in the ex parte Motion and the Complaint the urgency to act on the prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. She also took into account the following:
(1) the circumstance of prolonged absence of the Presiding Judge of Branch 143; (2) the
reason for the setting on May 9, 2007; and (3) the mandatory wordings of Supreme Court
Circular No. 19-98, i.e., "the judge of the paired court shall take cognizance of all cases
thereat as acting judge therein."
Respondent Judge explained that she granted the Application because the allegations in
the complaint were adequately supported by documentary and testimonial evidence. She
received the records of the RCBC Case on April 20, 2007, a Friday, and as was her
standard practice, immediately studied them. She continued her study of the records, and
the records of other cases, on April 21, 2007, a Saturday, and on April 23, 2007, a Monday,
which culminated in the preparation of the Order on the same day.
In her Supplemental Comment
5
dated June 22, 2007, respondent Judge added that the
manner by which the incidents in the Chang Tan and RCBC cases were resolved must not
be taken in isolation, but in relation to the manner all incidents were resolved and all
decisions and orders were rendered in her sala, such that she resolved all incidents and
rendered all her rulings immediately.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 (the Judicial Audit Case), a judicial audit was conducted on May
15 to 17, 2007 at the RTC of Makati City, Branch 144, which was the sala presided by
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, following reports of alleged irregularities committed by
respondent.
In a Memorandum dated August 10, 2007 by the OCA to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock submitted for the Courts consideration the initial

414

report of the Judicial Audit Team, informing the Court of an incident that happened on May
17, 2007 in Branch 144 of the RTC of Makati City.
The initial audit report stated that as early as May 12, 2007, a Saturday, the Court ordered
the padlocking of Branch 144 and assigned guards thereat on a 24-hour basis. Before the
audit team began its audit on May 15, 2007, the members made it clear to OIC Victoria C.
Jamora and the court personnel present that actions on the records, including stitching
should be held in abeyance and that no records should be brought outside the court until
after the audit.
At 8:05 a.m. of May 17, 2007, the guards on duty, Joel Gregorio and Alexander Dayap,
noticed Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I of Branch 144, disposing a plastic bag. The
guards followed Indicio, and retrieved the plastic bag from a trash bin located right outside
the court. The plastic bag was surrendered to the audit team and was found to contain
copies of marriage certificates of marriages solemnized by Judge Chua numbering to
hundreds. When confronted, Indicio stated that he was disposing the documents upon
respondent Judge's instruction made several days ago. He could not offer any explanation
why he chose to dispose of the documents that morning despite the ongoing audit. He,
nonetheless, disclosed that there were other bags for disposal still kept inside the room
where the stenographers, particularly OIC Victoria C. Jamora, held office. The bags, when
retrieved, turned out to contain more copies of marriage certificates. Jamora explained to
the audit team that she was aware of the copies of marriage certificates being kept inside
their room. However, she alleged that she had no control over them, because matters
pertaining to solemnization of marriages were personally handled by Judge Arcaya-Chua.
In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua was charged in connection with
the 1,975 copies of marriage certificates for marriages she solemnized for the period
covering January 2004 to April 2007 for the following acts: (1) for allegedly ordering
Salvador Indicio, Jr., Utility Worker I, to dispose of the said copies of marriage certificates;
(2) for the unpaid marriage solemnization fees of one thousand eight hundred nine (1,809)
marriages as verified from the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Office of the Clerk of Court
(OCC), Makati City and the RTC, OCC, Makati City, thereby depriving the Court of the said
fees in the total amount of Five Hundred Forty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos
(P542,700.00) at the rate of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) per marriage; and (3) for
failing to reflect said marriages in the Monthly Report of Cases.
6

In a Resolution
7
dated September 16, 2008, the Court resolved to consider the
Memorandum dated August 10, 2007 of the OCA as a formal complaint against respondent
Judge; require respondents Judge Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora to comment on the
Memorandum within 10 days from notice thereof; and refer A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ
and A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 to Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
On February 10, 2009, respondent Judge filed her Affidavit,
8
in lieu of Comment, on the
OCA Memorandum dated August 10, 2007.
Re: Ordering Salvador Indicio, J r. to dispose of the copies of marriage certificates

415

In regard to the disposal of the marriage certificates, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
recounted that in the second week of April 2007, she, with the help of Noel Umipig (a City
Hall employee detailed to her sala), started to pack her personal belongings in anticipation
of the impending transfer of her sala from the Gusali ng Katarungan to the Makati City Hall.
She asked Umipig to discard her piles of yellowish scratch papers. Umipig put her scratch
papers inside big plastic bags and then tied the bags. They also emptied the steel cabinet in
her chambers which contained, among other things, the files of marriage certificates, as well
as official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees. She previously bundled the said
marriage certificates according to month and year of solemnization of the weddings,
improvising paper bundles for the purpose. Umipig then put all the marriage certificates
inside four, more or less, big plastic bags and placed them in the small room that was
between her chambers and the stenographers' room. They were kept untied so that it would
be easy to add or get a file. Immediately thereafter, Umipig asked permission to go home as
he was then getting allergic reactions due to the dust, then took with him the bags of scratch
papers out of her chambers to be thrown away. The following morning, she noticed that
there were red patches on the face and arms of Umipig so she did not ask him anymore for
help. She removed the official receipts of the marriage solemnization fees from the worn-out
boxes, wrapped them with approximately six paper bundles then placed them inside the
plastic bags containing the marriage certificates.
In the first week of May 2007, she was told by the City Hall Engineer that the transfer to the
Makati City Hall would not push through yet because the furnitures were not complete and
portions of the holding room were still being painted. She was told to just standby and to
wait for an update about the schedule of transfer. With that advice, she did not find it
necessary to return the files of marriage certificates and official receipts of the marriage
solemnization fees inside the steel cabinet.
About the second week of May 2007, upon learning that the bags of garbage had
accumulated, she reminded Salvador Indicio, Jr. to throw them away. On May 15, 2007, she
was placed under preventive suspension. On May 18, 2007, Indicio told her, through
telephone, that he was caught the previous day throwing marriage certificates that were
placed in plastic bags. He explained that he thought those bags contained the garbage that
she asked him to throw away the previous week. She was then outraged by the news and
scolded Indicio, telling him that under the law, it is her duty to maintain copies of marriage
certificates being the solemnizing officer. In fact, Indicio stated in his affidavit that her
specific instruction was "to dispose all the garbage which were stocked" in her sala and "it
just turned out that what the plastic bag contained were copies of marriage contracts."
Thus, Indicio simply mistook the plastic bags containing the marriage certificates and official
receipts of the marriage solemnization fees to be the garbage that she instructed him the
previous week to throw away.
Respondent Judge stressed that she did not and would not have ordered Indicio to dispose
of the copies of the marriage certificates, citing the haphazard manner in which Indicio
disposed of the same, and the fact that she had nothing to hide and that she would gain
nothing by the disposal thereof.
Re: Unpaid marriage solemnization fees

416

Respondent Judge averred that the best proofs of payment of the marriage solemnization
fees were the official receipts. She categorically stated that all the official receipts of the
marriage solemnization fees were inside the plastic bags, together with the marriage
certificates.
She stressed that she could not have allowed non-payment of the marriage solemnization
fees, because it is of public knowledge that she had been solemnizing a big number of
weddings per day, aside from the fact that she had solemnized weddings of several
celebrities, which also included celebrities as sponsors; thus, attracting the attention of
many court employees. She was also aware of the consequences of solemnizing a
marriage without the solemnization fee so she was very meticulous when it came to
checking, among other things, whether there was an official receipt evidencing payment of
said fee. She also knew that the Office of the Civil Registrar of Makati City would not allow
the registration of a marriage certificate if there was no accompanying official receipt of
payment of the marriage solemnization fee. Moreover, considering the pervading financial
crisis everywhere, any person would not part with his money without demanding an official
receipt. No couple or nobody had ever complained about the absence of the official receipt
of the marriage solemnization fee. Further, the Audit Team found from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Makati City that all the marriage certificates of the weddings that she
solemnized were duly registered therein.
Respondent Judge also pointed out that the respective Clerks of Court of the OCC of the
MeTC and RTC adopted a wrong and unreliable procedure in verifying from their records
whether there was payment of the marriage solemnization fees, simply because most of the
dates of the wedding indicated in the marriage certificates were not the same as the dates
indicated in the official receipts. She explained that a couple would often pay the
solemnization fee at a certain date, but the solemnization of the wedding would take place
on another date for one reason or another. Thus, when the Clerks of Court of the Office of
the Clerk of Court checked the dates from the copies of their official receipts on file, the
dates did not reflect payment of the fees, because payments were made on dates different
from the wedding dates.
Re: Failure to reflect the marriages in the Monthly Report of Cases
Respondent Judge related that the Monthly Reports of cases were typed by her staff,
namely: Civil-in-Charge Celedonio Hornachos and Criminal-in-Charge Mary Jane Rafael.
As regards the number of marriages solemnized, they would inquire from her and she would
then give them the figure as stated in her own logbook. When the Reports were turned over
to her for signature, she would first verify the entries from her own logbook before affixing
her signature. Thus, she was shocked when she learned that the Courts copy of the
Reports contained incorrect figures and was different from that which she signed.
She asserted that she could not have failed to reflect the correct number of marriages in the
Monthly Reports, because apart from the fact that she was very meticulous in the accuracy
of the entries, she had nothing to gain by not reflecting the correct figures of solemnized
marriages.

417

She believed that the blank and incorrect figures appearing in the number of marriages
solemnized in the Monthly Reports from January 2004 to March 2007 were the handiwork of
Umipig, who most probably tampered the same, because of a serious grudge against her.
She added that it was also Umipig who transferred the plastic bags of marriage certificates
and official receipts from the small room to the stenographer's room in an attempt to expose
the big number of weddings that she had solemnized, which, through his machinations,
were not reflected in the Monthly Reports.
Re: Compliance with Article 8 of the Family Code, and violation of Circular No. 9-98
9

Respondent Judge claimed that she solemnized the marriages inside her chambers or
courtroom, and as proof thereof, she pointed to the entry in the marriage certificates
reflecting the place of solemnization. On few occasions, she had also solemnized weddings
in a house or place designated by both contracting parties, but not without the required
affidavit of request. She explained that she was able to solemnize many weddings per day,
because the rites took only about 10 minutes and involved a maximum of eight couples per
batch.
She stressed that neither did she demand nor receive money for solemnization of
marriages, and only the official receipts of the solemnization fees were given to her.
In regard to Victoria Jamora, she explained in her Amended Comment dated October 2,
2008 that she failed to reflect in the Monthly Report of Cases the correct number of
marriages solemnized by Judge Arcaya-Chua for the following reasons:
1. She was not instructed by Judge Arcaya-Chua to be present during the marriage
ceremony;
2. She had no personal knowledge of the actual number of marriages solemnized by
respondent Judge;
3. She merely relied on the entries in the Monthly Report as to the number of
marriages solemnized. The Monthly Report was prepared by Jane Rafael, who was
in charge of criminal cases. When she asked Rafael why there were only such
number of marriages solemnized from June 2005 to April 2007, Rafael replied that
was the advice of respondent Judge. Besides, Judge Arcaya-Chua signed the
reports. As a subordinate designated by respondent Judge as OIC, she was not in a
position to question her superior, Judge Arcaya-Chua, and signed in good faith the
Monthly Reports in question.
The administrative case was again referred to Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-
Fernando of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Investigation of the Administrative Complaints
On October 9, 2008, Investigator Justice Salazar-Fernando scheduled the consolidated
cases for hearing at 10:00 a.m. on October 23, 2008.

418

During the hearing on October 23, 2008 of A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo
Case), complainant Francisco Ocampo appeared with his counsel, Atty. Jose Aliling IV,
while Atty. James Navarrete and Atty. Fe C. Aguila appeared for OCA. Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua appeared in her own behalf. During the said hearing, complainant Ocampo
submitted a Supplemental Affidavit and additional documentary evidence.
10
Respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua also furnished complainant Ocampo's counsel with a copy of her
Affidavit, which incorporated her Comments in the two cases, the Supplemental Comment,
the Motion to Recall Preventive Suspension and the Motion to Resolve. Complainant
Ocampo testified on direct examination, affirming the truth of the contents of his Complaint
and the authenticity of the annexes attached thereto. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
cross-examined him, but reserved further cross-examination as to the Supplemental
Affidavit. Hearing resumed the following day, October 24, 2008, and respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua cross-examined complainant Ocampo specifically on his Supplemental
Affidavit. Justice Salazar-Fernando also asked complainant Ocampo questions.
During the hearing on October 29, 2008, complainant Ocampo submitted his Offer of
Documentary Evidence. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua testified on direct examination,
whereby she affirmed the statements in her Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit, and
identified her exhibits, after which, she was cross-examined by complainant Ocampo's
counsel. Justice Salazar-Fernando also asked respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua questions.
Thereafter, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua rested her case and formally offered her
documentary evidence, insofar as OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ was concerned. For the
guidance and information of Justice Salazar-Fernando, the entire original records of SP No.
M-6375, entitled Milan Arceo Ocampo v. Francisco P. Ocampo, was ordered brought to her
office.
On November 3, 2008, OCA started presenting evidence in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the
Chang Tan/RCBC Case). Judge Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles testified and submitted her
Affidavit, and was cross-examined, and was asked questions on redirect-examination. The
scheduled hearing for November 4, 2008 was cancelled due to the unavailability of two (2)
witnesses, namely, Judges Marissa Macaraig-Guillen and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino.
Hearing on the case resumed on November 10, 2008. OCA presented Judges Marissa
Macaraig-Guillen and Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino, who both submitted their Affidavits,
which were considered as their testimony on direct. They were questioned by Justice
Salazar-Fernando and cross-examined by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. Court records
pertaining to SP No. M-6373, entitled Albert K.S. Chang Tan v. Stephanie N. Estrella
Pulliam, were likewise directed to be brought to the office of Justice Salazar-Fernando for
reference and information.
During the hearing on November 11, 2008, the Executive Judge of the RTC of Makati City,
Judge Winlove Dumayas, appeared, and questions were propounded to him by Justice
Salazar-Fernando, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua and Atty. James Navarrete from OCA.
In order to expedite the proceedings, respondent Judge was allowed to present her
defense, and marked in evidence several documents,
11
which formed part of her direct
testimony. Since the documents submitted by respondent Judge were voluminous, Atty.
Navarrete was given until November 20, 2008 to conduct his cross-examination.

419

On November 25, 2008, Atty. James Navarrete continued with the marking of additional
documents and submitted in evidence his exhibits.
12
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua was
cross-examined by Atty. Navarrete. Respondent Judge was also allowed to ask Atty.
Navarrete some questions. Thereafter, respondent Judge submitted her Formal Offer of
Evidence. Atty. Navarrete was given until November 27, 2008 to file his Opposition, while
respondent Judge was given five days to file her Counter-Manifestation.
On November 26, 2008, Atty. Navarrete filed his Comment, interposing no objection to
respondent's Formal Offer of Exhibits.
On December 2, 2008, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua filed a Counter-Manifestation and
Motion to Correct Transcript of Stenographic Notes.
On January 16, 2009, Justice Salazar-Fernando received the rollo of A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141
(Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua and Court Stenographer
Victoria Jamora, formerly A.M. No. 07-5-263-RTC, Re: Initial Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144, Makati City), which he noted to have
been consolidated with A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua) per Resolution of the Court en banc dated January 15, 2008.
Since A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 was not included in the earlier investigation, Justice Salazar-
Fernando set A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 for hearing on February 8, 2009.
Hearing on A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 started on February 10, 2009, during which the counsels
for OCA and respondent stenographer Victoria Jamora appeared. Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua also attended the hearing.
OCA proposed several stipulations for admission to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. She
admitted that she solemnized marriages while she was the Judge of the MeTC, Branch 63,
Makati City and RTC, Branch 144, Makati City. After going over the certificates of marriage
from January 2004 to August 2004, she admitted that she solemnized those marriages. She
also admitted that she solemnized marriages in her chambers or inside her courtroom,
except for two other marriages that she could not remember, but proper documents were
presented to her. She further admitted that payments of solemnizing fees must be paid
before conducting or solemnizing the marriage, and as part of her regular duties, she signed
the Monthly Reports.
Hearing resumed on February 18, 2009. OCA presented Atty. Fe Corcelles-Aguila, who
testified on the incident that occurred on May 17, 2007, which led to the inventory of the
certificates of marriage, and the audit conducted on May 15-17, 2007. Atty. Corcelles-
Aguila's affidavit
13
formed part of the records of the case.
In the hearing of March 3, 2009, OCA presented Salvador Indicio, Jr., Arnel Magsombol,
Lucia Ticman and Joel Gregorio as its witnesses. The witnesses were questioned by OCA,
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua and Justice Salazar-Fernando. Per request of OCA, notice
of hearing was sent to German Averia, for him to appear on the next scheduled hearing as
the last witness of OCA.

420

In the hearing of March 23, 2009, German Averia testified in his capacity as Chief Judicial
Staff Officer of the Statistical Records Division, Court Management Office (CMO) of the
Supreme Court. He confirmed having issued certifications and inventory on the monthly
report of cases submitted by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua to the CMO in compliance
with Administrative Circular No. 4-2004. In the same hearing, the counsel for OCA
categorically stated that their evidence in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 was limited only to the
alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriage as well as the falsification of the
monthly reports.
14

With the continuance of the investigation on April 8, 2009, OCA presented in evidence the
originals of the monthly reports, and the certified true copies of the monthly reports, whose
originals were unavailable. OCA, thereafter, rested its case. In the same hearing,
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua started presenting her exhibits.
15
She manifested that her
Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit would serve as her testimony on direct examination.
On April 21, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua presented additional exhibits.
16
Her
Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit, as well as the Affidavit of her son, Robert Maurice
Chua, formed part of their direct testimonies. Respondent Judge was, thereafter, cross-
examined by OCA.
During the hearing on May 5, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua offered in evidence her
Second Supplemental Affidavit. She also presented additional exhibits.
17
Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's daughter, Beau Mairi Chua testified, with her Affidavit constituting her direct
testimony. No cross-examination was conducted on her by the opposing counsel.
Respondent Jamora also testified as witness for respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
At the resumption of the hearing on May 18, 2009, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua recalled
respondent Jamora to the stand and propounded additional questions. Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua rested her case after respondent Jamora's testimony. Respondent Jamora,
thereafter, testified in her own behalf, with her Amended Comment constituting her direct
testimony. No cross-examination was conducted on her by OCA. Respondent Jamora,
thereafter, rested her case.
With the conformity of the parties, Justice Salazar-Fernando directed them to file their
respective memorandum. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua filed her memorandum on July
21, 2009, while respondent Jamora filed her memorandum on August 3, 2009. OCA did not
file a memorandum; hence, Justice Salazar-Fernando deemed that it waived the filing of its
memorandum. Per this Court's Resolution dated August 24, 2009, the case was submitted
for report and recommendation to the Supreme Court.
Findings of the Investigating Justice
Findings in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case)
In regard to the denial of the Motion to Dismiss in the Ocampo Case, without necessarily
ruling on the correctness of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chuas Order, Justice Salazar-
Fernando believed that respondent Judge's disposition thereof fell within the ambit of
discretion vested upon her as a judge. Not giving credence to the evidence presented by

421

the movants with respect to the residence of Milan Ocampo was well within her judicial
discretion. Assuming the same was erroneous, no administrative liability attached thereon in
the absence of sufficient evidence that she ruled in such manner, because of a corrupt or
dishonest motive, bad faith, fraud or malice. The evidence presented by complainant
Ocampo as to Milan's residence might constitute proof of her "domicile," but such evidence
was not necessarily irreconcilable with the fact that Milan might be maintaining residence
elsewhere other than Meycauayan, Bulacan, considering her estranged relationship with
complainant Ocampo.
As regards the alleged suddenness of the scheduled TPO hearing, Justice Salazar-
Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's explanation acceptable. The order
setting the case for hearing on December 13, 2006 was issued on December 8, 2006. Thus,
there was an interim of at least five days from the issuance of the order and the date of the
scheduled hearing. It did not appear that respondent Judge had any hand in the belated
service of the notice to the complainant. Justice Salazar-Fernando held that respondent
Judge cannot be faulted as to the alleged suddenness of the said hearing, because a
prayer for TPO requires to be acted upon with dispatch. In that respect, no wrong-doing,
fraud, bad faith, malice or even arbitrariness can be attributed to respondent Judge.
According to the Investigating Justice, the alleged precipitate issuance of the TPO had no
leg to stand on. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua correctly stated that the issuance of the
TPO can be made upon the filing of the application after ex parte determination by the judge
that the same be issued. This is in accordance with Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 9262, thus:
SEC. 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refer to the
protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte
determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or
all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court
shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration
of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the
respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents
for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the
issuance of a PPO.
18

Hence, the issuance of the TPO by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua even before
complainant Ocampo could file his answer was neither irregular nor improper.
Justice Salazar-Fernando was convinced by the reasons why respondent Judge issued the
TPO. A preliminary determination of the facts of the case justified the issuance of the TPO
as it appeared that the subject minors therein were the illegitimate children of the petitioner,
Milan Ocampo, having been conceived through artificial insemination without the required
written authorization or ratification of the husband, complainant Francisco Ocampo. The
pertinent provision of the Family Code states:
ART. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the
husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his

422

wife, provided that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall
be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.
Moreover, Milan Ocampo appended evidence of complainant Ocampo's alleged perversity
and violent behavior. A sworn affidavit
19
of Emelita S. Valentino, narrating alleged perverse
behavior of complainant Ocampo, as well as the certification
20
from the Philippine National
Police of Meycauayan, stating acts of violence committed by complainant Ocampo on
Milan, were appended to the Petition. The totality of the evidence thus presented, while not
exactly conclusive, justified a prima facie determination of the necessity of a TPO.
While Justice Salazar-Fernando found complainant Ocampo's objections to the matter of
support apt and plausible, the same could be merely considered as an error of judgment or
an abuse of discretion, but respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua cannot be held administratively
liable thereon. Considering that the matter of support therein was merely provisional,
respondent Judge could not be faulted for readily granting the prayer for support without
further evaluating evidence with respect thereto. Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's error in that respect was not gross, the same having been
brought about by an innocuous reliance on the Rule on Provisional Orders, A.M. No. 02-11-
12-SC. Under the said rule, provisional orders for protection and support may be issued
without hearing. However, the said rule specifically applies to petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage, annulment of marriage or legal separation. In this case, the matter of
support was among the principal reliefs sought for in the petition for custody.
Justice Salazar-Fernando found that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's alleged over-
zealousness in causing the immediate implementation of the TPO was without solid basis.
A TPO, much like a TRO in civil cases, is required to be served immediately, precisely to
serve its purpose as a protective relief. Respondent Judge issued the TPO on April 3, 2007,
a Holy Tuesday, right after the hearing on complainant Ocampo's motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to dismiss. She clarified that the date of the
hearing on the motion for reconsideration on April 3, 2007 was set by complainant
Ocampo's counsel himself. The following day, April 4, 2007, a Holy Wednesday, she
directed the implementation of the TPO. Hence, Justice Salazar-Fernando found nothing
improper or wayward in the dispositions made by respondent Judge in the case. There was
no evidence that respondent Judge purposely sought the issuance of the TPO during the
Holy Week, as it was complainant Ocampo's counsel himself who, wittingly or unwittingly,
chose the hearing date. Considering the urgency and immediacy of a TPO, it was not
improper or illegal that respondent Judge caused its immediate implementation.
Justice Salazar-Fernando believed that respondent Judge could not have been privy to the
brazen manner in which the TPO was served by the designated sheriff. In the first place, it
was only the designated sheriff, Sheriff Tangangco, who was administratively charged by
complainant Ocampo for the allegedly offensive manner the TPO was served. As correctly
argued by respondent Judge, such was the personal accountability of Sheriff Tangangco.
Further, Justice Salazar-Fernando found complainant Ocampo's allegation of bribery
against respondent Judge to be hearsay. During the hearing conducted by Justice Salazar-

423

Fernando on October 24, 2007, complainant Ocampo confirmed that he had no personal
knowledge of the alleged bribery of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua.
Justice Salazar-Fernando recommended that A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo
Case) should be dismissed. She stated that as a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous.
21
She cited Espaol v.
Mupas,
22
which held thus:
x x x While the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that would
violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people's faith in the judiciary,
nonetheless, we have repeatedly stated that the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of
guilt in administrative cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the absence of
contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly
performed his or her official duties. In administrative proceedings, complainants have the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in their complaints. Thus, when
the complainant relies mainly on secondhand information to prove the charges against the
respondent, the complaint is reduced into a bare indictment or mere speculation. The Court
cannot give credence to charges based on mere credence or speculation. As we held in a
recent case:
Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must always be examined with a
discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are by their nature highly penal, such that
the respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. Mere
imputation of judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient proof to sustain the same will
never be countenanced. If a judge should be disciplined for misconduct, the evidence
against him should be competent.
23

Findings in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 ( the Chang Tan/RCBC Case)
Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that in the Chang Tan Case, the OCA primarily asserted
that the TPO issued by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua could not be legally justified under
R.A. No. 9262, because the said law applies only if the applicant for TPO is a woman.
The Investigating Justice partly agreed with the OCA on that score. R.A. No. 9262 is known
as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. It is specifically
applicable to "women and their children," not to men. Thus, while the TPO may be justified
with respect to the protection accorded the minor, the same is not legally tenable with
respect to the petitioner, Albert Chang Tan. Under R.A. No. 9262, a TPO cannot be issued
in favor of a man against his wife. Certainly, such a TPO would be absurd. Hence, Justice
Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's error in this regard to be gross
ignorance of the law. She cited the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. in
Officers and Members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Baguio-Benguet Chapter v.
Pamintuan,
24
which stated, thus:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elementary a rule, a
law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and

424

undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority (De
Guzman, Jr. v. Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1629, March 26, 2001). When the law is sufficiently
basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law (Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510,
November 6, 2000).
Justice Salazar-Fernando averred that as a family court judge, respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua should be the last person to err in the application of R.A. No. 9262, and, in this case,
issue a TPO applied for a man, purportedly to protect the latter against his wife. Such is
unthinkable under R.A. No. 9262. A careful evaluation of the records in the Chang Tan
Case showed that there was not even any allegation of violence committed by Stephanie
Pulliam against her husband, Chang Tan. Thus, Justice Salazar-Fernando found that the
TPO against Stephanie, insofar as it directed the latter to stay away from the home and
office of petitioner, to cease and desist from harassing, intimidating or threatening petitioner
and to refrain from acts of commission or omission that create an unreasonable risk to the
health, safety or welfare of petitioner, was anomalous.
Be that as it may, with respect to the issue of custody, Justice Salazar-Fernando found
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's reasons for granting custody over subject minor to Albert
Chang Tan to be legally tenable. While not exactly conclusive, the evidence relied upon by
respondent Judge in granting custody in favor of Chang Tan was substantial enough to
warrant a prima facie determination that a TPO in favor of the minor was necessary and
would serve her paramount interest. Justice Salazar-Fernando found nothing improper in
respondent Judge's reliance on the psychological evaluation report of Dr. Sonia Rodriguez
and the statements of yaya Josie Leynes and the subject minor herself, Rafi Pulliam, which
all confirmed that Stephanie has not been a good influence to her daughter, Rafi. As far as
the latter's paramount interest was concerned, Stephanie was not the ideal person to whom
custody should be awarded. On this premise, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's award of
temporary custody to the father could be justified. However, Justice Salazar-Fernando
stated that she does not necessarily affirm the correctness of the custody award to the
father, Chang Tan, since respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's Order dated May 7, 2007 was
annulled and set aside by the Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals in a Decision dated
October 31, 2007.
25

In regard to the alleged bribery and unusual interest which respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
allegedly displayed in the said case, Justice Salazar-Fernando found no substantial
evidence to support such allegations. The OCA's Memorandum itself admitted that there
was no proof that respondent Judge received money from Chang Tan.
Moreover, not one of the witnesses of OCA confirmed having personally witnessed the
alleged heated argument between Chang Tan and the OIC of the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 144, except for their secondhand accounts that they heard that such incident
actually transpired. Justice Salazar-Fernando found it speculative to attribute the
commission of bribery or wrongdoing to respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua solely on such
account. The Investigating Justice stated that respondent Judge appeared to have no
personal or actual participation in that incident, because the "heated argument" was
allegedly between Chang Tan and the OIC, Victoria Jamora.

425

As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in
the RCBC Case,Justice Salazar-Fernando found no evidence against respondent of any
irregularity or undue interest in the case. Respondent convincingly elaborated the
circumstances surrounding her issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment, particularly
the manner in which she studied and evaluated the application for the writ. Justice Salazar-
Fernando was convinced that while the order granting the writ was indeed speedily issued
the ex partehearing on the application having been held on a Friday, followed immediately
by the issuance of the writ on the succeeding business day, a Monday there was really
nothing impossible or irregular in such feat. Per respondents account, she had been
unofficially reporting for work on Saturdays during that time and she did not have to
evaluate the totality of the evidence for the purpose of ruling on the propriety of issuing the
writ. Further, considering respondent's habit of immediately disposing pending motions
before her court, Justice Salazar-Fernando found no sufficient basis to attach a sinister
significance to the speedy issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. The Investigating
Justice also found respondent Judge's reasons for issuing the writ of preliminary attachment
to be apt.
Justice Salazar-Fernando held that in the absence of evidence that she was motivated by
any dishonest or corrupt motive in issuing the writ, respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is
entitled to the presumption that she regularly performed her duties. She cited, thus:
In administrative proceedings, the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by
substantial evidence, the averments of his complaint. Notatu dignum is the presumption of
regularity in the performance of a judge's functions, hence bias, prejudice and even undue
interest cannot be presumed, specially weighed against a judge's sacred allegation under
oath of office to administer justice without respect to any person and do equal right to the
poor and to the rich. In a long line of cases decided by this Court, it was held that bare
allegations of bias are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice
according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. In Sinnott v. Barte, it was further
held, mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and
convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required
to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error that
may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so
erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the
decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge.
26

Findings in the Judicial Audit Case (Re: Marriage Certificates and Monthly Reports)
Justice Salazar-Fernando found that there is substantial evidence of an anomaly in
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's solemnization of marriages in her court and failure to
reflect the correct number of marriages in her Monthly Reports.
The Investigating Justice stated that at once, the timing of the disposal of the marriage
certificates, which were said to have been contained in four (4) plastic bags, is highly
suspect, because it occurred during the time the judicial audit was being conducted.
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua admitted the fact that she ordered Salvador Indicio, Jr.,
her utility worker, to dispose of some garbage contained in blue plastic bags. However, as

426

regards the timing of disposal, she explained that she ordered Indicio to dispose of her
garbage on the second week of May, days before the judicial audit.
27
Such fact was
confirmed by Indicio in his testimony.
28
He testified that he was ordered by respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua to dispose of the garbage on May 9, 2007. Indicio stated that the
garbage was due for disposal on May 14, 2007, but since it was election day, the disposal
of the garbage was postponed until May 17, 2007, at which time, the disposal of the plastic
bags caught the attention of the security detail of the Supreme Court.
The Investigating Justice stated that based on the foregoing account, if the order to dispose
of the garbage was indeed made on May 9, 2007, it is perplexing why such a simple task of
throwing away a garbage of barely four plastic bags, which would take only a couple of
minutes to accomplish, could tarry for several days. Why no attempt to dispose of the
supposed garbage was made on May 9, 10, and 11 (May 12 & 13 were Saturday and
Sunday, respectively, while May 14 was Election Day, and May 15 to 17 was the period of
judicial audit) was not sufficiently explained. The logical implication is that the order to
dispose could not have been made on May 9, 2007, but more likely later when the judicial
audit was already being conducted. Such conclusion jibes with the account of Atty. Fe
Corcelles-Aguila, one of the members of the judicial audit team, that upon being
immediately confronted why he chose that particular day to dispose of the supposed
garbage despite the ongoing audit, Indicio "could not offer any explanation."
29
Indicio could
not remember the exact date when the order to dispose of the garbage was made by
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. He testified, thus:
CROSS-EXAMINATION
JUDGE CHUA:
You mentioned in your Affidavit and in your testimony this morning that you executed
an Affidavit on May 17 and the throwing away of the garbage was also done at 8:00
oclock in the morning of May 17 upon my instruction. When did I give my instruction
to you to throw away the garbage?
MR. INDICIO:
You told me before the audit to throw all your trash.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Did you know when that particular day was?
MR. INDICIO:
That was election day, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Election day of May, 2007?

427

MR. INDICIO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Was that the exact date when Judge Chua told you to throw the garbage?
MR. INDICIO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUDGE CHUA:
May I draw your attention to paragraph 2 of your Affidavit. This was subscribed to on
May 17. So the last week that you mentioned here was a week before May 17. You
mentioned here that last week, I was instructed by the Presiding Judge to dispose of
the garbage which were stocked in her branch. Do you confirm the statement in
paragraph 2 of your Affidavit?
MR. INDICIO:
Judge Chua told me to throw the garbage because it was election day.
JUDGE CHUA:
I am sorry, Your Honor, but I do not get the fact straight.
May I draw your attention now to paragraph 5 of your Affidavit. You said here that
the said garbage was scheduled to be disposed last May 14, 2007. However, since it
was election day, same was not collected.
MR. INDICIO:
Yes, maam, it was scheduled on May 14, but the janitor was busy so it was only on
May 17 that he had an opportunity to throw it.
JUDGE CHUA:
To clarify the matter, Mr. Indicio, when did I give the instruction to you to throw away
the garbage?
MR. INDICIO:
I was told before the audit.
JUDGE CHUA:

428

The audit was conducted on May 15 up to May 17. Based on paragraph 2 of your
Affidavit, I gave the instruction to you a week before May 17, so I gave the
instruction to you probably on May 10, is that what you are saying?
MR. INDICIO:
I do not remember the exact date but I was instructed by Judge Chua.
xxxx
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
When you told us that before the audit was conducted, Judge Chua already
instructed you to throw those garbage bags placed inside the stenographers room,
how many days after that instruction was given to you did you comply with her
instruction?
MR. INDICIO:
Eight (8) days, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So if you instructed Beldad to throw those garbage bags on May 17 minus 8 that
would be May 9, is that correct?
MR. INDICIO:
Yes, your Honor.
30

According to Justice Salazar-Fernando, apart from the timing of the disposal, the manner of
disposing the plastic bags of marriage certificates was also open to suspicion. Although
there were four plastic bags ready for disposal, which according to Indicio himself were
really not too heavy,
31
only one was taken out by the janitor to be disposed, leaving three
other plastic bags inside the courtroom. Taking out the plastic bags one by one could have
been purposely sought to surreptitiously remove the said bags from the courtroom, and
avoid detection by the security personnel detailed by the judicial audit team.
Justice Salazar-Fernando noted that despite repeated references to the supposed garbage,
which were allegedly contained in similar plastic bags containing the marriage certificates,
the whereabouts of the said plastic bags of garbage were never accounted for. If what were
mistakenly attempted to be disposed of by Indicio were the plastic bags containing the
marriage certificates, the plastic bags containing the garbage could have been found
elsewhere in the courtroom. However, as things turned out, there were really no plastic
bags of garbage, but only more plastic bags of marriage certificates. Respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's account of the plastic bags of garbage was unsubstantiated.

429

The Investigating Justice did not give credence to respondent Judges theory as to why the
plastic bags of marriage certificates were found in the stenographer's room, causing Indicio
to mistake it for the garbage which she supposedly ordered him to dispose of. Respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua theorized that a certain Noel Umipig, a casual employee in her staff,
who harbored a deep-seated grudge against her for not being able to borrow money from
her, could have been responsible in transferring the plastic bags of marriage certificates
from the small room in her chambers to the stenographer's room before her courtroom was
padlocked. According to her, Umipig could have heard of the impending administrative
investigation on her. Hence, to expose the big number of weddings she had been
solemnizing, which, purportedly, through Umipig' s machinations had not been reflected in
her monthly reports, Umipig could have taken out the plastic bags of marriage certificates
from the small room in her chambers and transferred them to the stenographer's room, so
that once the plastic bags were taken out to the garbage can along the corridor, the
documents would be discovered by the audit team.
Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judges theory difficult to swallow. According to
her, it was fantastic that respondent Judge attached too much cunning to Umipig for the
latter to have deviously perpetrated all the acts being attributed to him. If the intention was
only to expose the big number of weddings, it is hard to understand why Umipig would have
to go the difficult way of trespassing on her chambers when all he would have to do was
spread rumors about the weddings, as he had been wont to do, per respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua's own account.
In regard to the non-payment of the marriage solemnization fees, the certifications
32
issued
by the Clerks of Court of the MeTC and RTC of Makati City attest to the fact that out of the
1,975 marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, only 166 marriages were
paid the corresponding solemnization fees. Justice Salazar-Fernando found no reason to
doubt the reliability or integrity of the said certifications, the contents of which were
confirmed by Arnel Magsombol and Lucila Ticman, the same persons who personally
verified from their records whether or not the solemnization fees of the marriages
solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua were paid.
Respondent Judge assailed the reliability of the procedure undertaken by Magsombol and
Ticman in verifying the payment of solemnization fees, positing that they could have merely
relied on the dates of the wedding as stated in the marriage certificates, which were often
not the same dates stated in the receipts. She contended that most parties paid their
solemnization fee on a date different from their wedding; hence, the dates of the receipts
would not be the same date as that of the wedding. Thus, respondent Judge postulated that
when Magsombol and Ticman verified payment of the solemnization fees based on the
dates of the wedding as stated in the marriage certificates, they would find no receipt to
show payment of the solemnization fees, because payment was made on some other date.
Justice Salazar-Fernando did not believe the foregoing postulation of respondent Judge
Arcaya-Chua in the light of the categorical declarations of Magsombol and Ticman that they
did not merely based their verification on the dates of the wedding, but, specifically, they
verified the payment of solemnization fees based on the names of the contracting parties to
the wedding. Pertinent portions of the testimonies of Magsombol and Ticman state as
follows:

430

DIRECT EXAMINATION
x x x x
ATTY. BUGTAS:
So how did you verify these marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua?
MR. MAGSOMBOL;
I checked the names that were handed to me one by one.
ATTY. BUGTAS:
Did you check all the records?
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, I based on the daily cash collection records beginning the first day of January
2004 up to the last day of office of December 2005.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Are your daily cash collection records complete from January 2004 to December
2005?
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
How about the other basis which you said, receipts?
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
In our daily collection report, we indicate the OR number.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Did you also check those OR numbers and the receipts?
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, I matched the daily collection to the receipts which I brought with me, Your
Honor.

431

xxxx
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So in the years 2004 and 2005, marriages solemnized by the MeTC Judge were
supposed to be recorded in your daily cash collection book?
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, Your Honor, the ones that are being paid.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So if they are not paid, they do not appear in your book?
MR. MAGSOMBOL:
Yes, we dont know if the marriage happened or not.
xxxx
(Direct Examination of Lucila D. Ticman)
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Did you verify from your records if the solemnization fees of the marriages that were
listed in the document were paid?
MS. TICMAN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
What was the result of your verification?
MS. TICMAN:
Only 20 parties paid the solemnization fees.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Only 20? Twenty out of?
ATTY. BUGTAS:
More than a thousand, Your Honor. 1,300 plus.

432

x x x x
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
What was the basis of your findings?
MS. TICMAN:
My basis Your Honor is the one coming from the Supreme Court, and the names
supplied us by the Supreme Court were verified by us if they were paid or not.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
What documents did you check to determine whether the fees were paid or not?
MS. TICMAN:
The Certificates of Marriage.
x x x x
ATTY. BUGTAS:
What documents or records did you examine in order to determine the marriages
that paid the corresponding fees?
MS. TICMAN:
The logbook of the Accounting Section and official receipts.
x x x x
ATTY. BUGTAS:
Based on your records or receipt that you have, you can inform the inquiring party
whether that person or party paid the corresponding fees or not?
MS. TICMAN:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. BUGTAS:
In the 3rd paragraph of your Affidavit, based on your records, you enumerated just
20 marriages as appearing to have paid the corresponding fees.
MS. TICMAN:

433

Yes, sir.
ATTY. BUGTAS:
But based on the records available, the Supreme Court furnished you with a list
numbering around 1,344 names of parties for verification but you came out with an
Affidavit enumerating only those parties that paid the corresponding fees. Is there a
possibility that the contracting parties paid the fees, but your records would not
reflect their names?
MS. TICMAN:
No, sir.
ATTY. BUGTAS:
So only those that paid will appear in your records.
MS. TICMAN:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. BUGTAS:
If a party did not pay, his or her name will not appear in your records?
MS. TICMAN:
Yes, sir.
xxxx
ATTY. BUGTAS:
In the 3rd paragraph of your Affidavit, you stated that after a thorough examination of
the records of this office (referring to your office) has been ascertained that only 20
marriages have been paid in the OCC RTC Makati city, and you enumerated the 20
marriages that paid the corresponding fees based on your records.
When you say you thoroughly examined, can you tell us whether the examination
was thorough enough so that your Affidavit is accurate as to its contents?
MS. TICMAN:
We examined our logbook one by one, the names of the parties given by the
Supreme Court.
33


434

Justice Salazar-Fernando was fully convinced by the findings of Magsombol and
Ticman that the solemnization fees of a substantial number of marriages solemnized
by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua were unpaid.
As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's failure to reflect the marriages in her monthly
reports, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judges defense of forgery, nay
tampering, to be unsubstantiated. She carefully perused respondent Judges signatures in
the monthly reports and compared the same to her signatures in the pleadings, which she
submitted during the investigation, as well as in the orders and decisions contained in the
records, and found no substantial discrepancies therein or any indication that the same had
been forged. According to Justice Salazar-Fernando, while all her signatures did not exactly
appear to be 100 percent similar, there was no reason to suppose that her signatures in the
monthly reports and other signatures extant in the records were not signed by one and the
same person. Moreover, Justice Salazar-Fernando failed to see any tell-tale signs of
tampering, and this could be the reason why respondent Judge herself withdrew such
defense.
Justice Salazar-Fernando disbelieved the argument of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua that
the anomaly attributed to her was the work of Umipig. The Investigating Justice found it
incredible that since January 2004 up to April 2007 or for a period of more than three years,
Umipig had been silently working on his sinister scheme, patiently and clandestinely forging
respondent Judge's signatures in her monthly reports as vengeance for not lending him
money. Justice Salazar-Fernando found it difficult to imagine how Umipig could have
harbored such a deep-seated grudge against respondent Judge just because the latter
refused to loan him money for his enrolment in law school, which purportedly was the
reason why Umipig failed to become a lawyer.
Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua presented text messages allegedly coming from Umipig to
show the latter's extreme hatred of her. The Investigating Justice stated that apart from the
fact that it could not be established that it was indeed Umipig who sent the text messages,
the tenor of the text messages did not show that Umipig was the author of all the anomalies
relating to the marriage certificates and monthly reports. Respondent Judge quoted Umipig
saying, "Hindi bale, may ebidensya naman ako laban sa inyo," which, according to her,
could only betray the fact that Umipig had indeed been up to something. According to
Justice Salazar-Fernando, Umipigs statement could only confirm the existence of the
anomalies in respondent Judges court, rather than attribute authorship to Umipig for the
anomalies pertaining to the marriage certificates and monthly reports.
Further, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge Arcaya-Chuas procedure of
signing the monthly reports ahead of her OIC to be irregular, since it is contrary to prevailing
procedure and protocol. Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua admitted that she signed the
monthly reports first before her OIC, Ms. Mabalot, during her stint in the MeTC, or Ms.
Jamora, in the RTC. Respondent Judge testified, thus:
x x x x
JUSTICE FERNANDO:

435

Could you repeat the statement?
JUDGE CHUA:
I signed the monthly reports at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Your Honor, and then
the following morning at around 8:00 o clock, I would see the reports on top of the
table of Ornachos or Rafael still unsigned by Mabalot or Jamora. My focus was on
the typewritten name of Mabalot or Jamora without their signatures.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
And you expect the reports to be signed on the same afternoon when you signed?
JUDGE CHUA:
Not necessarily, Your Honor, but my point is I showed to Ornachos or Rafael that I
have signed the monthly reports.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Do you have to sign first before the clerk of court?
JUDGE CHUA:
With due respect to Mrs. Jamora, Your Honor, because the branch clerk of court of
MeTC Branch 63 was not a lawyer because she was assigned on detail to the OCC
a few months ago and Mrs. Jamora, likewise, is not a lawyer so I would rather do the
checking myself, sign and then require them to affix their signatures.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
Contrary to the usual procedure that the Judge would sign last?
JUDGE CHUA:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
In your case, you sign first before the OIC?
JUDGE CHUA:
Yes, Your Honor.
34

Justice Salazar-Fernando disbelieved respondent Judges justification for signing
first before her OIC, reasoning that it does not take a lawyer to know what to indicate

436

in the monthly reports, let alone the mechanical task of indicating how many cases
were disposed or how many marriages were solemnized in a month.
As regards respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's compliance with Article 8 of the Family Code
concerning the place of solemnization of the marriage, the Investigating Justice found no
evidence that would show that she disregarded the strictures of the said provision. There is
also no concrete evidence showing that respondent Judge demanded and/or received
money from the contracting parties for solemnizing the marriage. However, it can be
inferred that respondent Judge financially benefited from solemnizing the numerous
marriages by the fact that these were not correctly reflected in the monthly reports and
insufficient solemnizing fees were paid to the court.
Anent respondent Judge Arcaya-Chuas liability in this case, Justice Salazar-Fernando
stated:
x x x [T]aken as a whole, the undersigned Investigator respectfully submits that there is
convincing and substantial evidence to support a finding that anomalies were committed in
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's court with respect to the solemnization of marriages. The
circumstances magnificently fit together: plastic bags containing about 1,975 marriage
certificates were surreptitiously being spirited out of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua's court
during the occasion of the judicial audit; when confronted, the person seen disposing the
plastic bags stated that he was acting upon the order of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua;
when verified, the solemnization fees of the marriages covered by the said marriage
certificates were found to have not been paid; despite openly admitting having solemnized
all the weddings covered by the said marriage certificates, the monthly reports of
respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua reflected only a very minimal number of weddings
solemnized. Taken together, the circumstances lead to no other conclusion that
irregularities were obviously perpetrated by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in solemnizing
marriages in her court.
In regard to respondent Court Stenographer Jamora's culpability, Justice Salazar-Fernando
found sufficient reasons to hold her accountable for her signatures in the monthly reports.
She cannot feign ignorance as to the correct number of weddings solemnized by
respondent Judge. Jamoras justification that she could not have questioned respondent
Judge Arcaya-Chua even if there were erroneous entries in the monthly reports is in itself
pregnant with admission that something anomalous could have indeed been taking place.
She testified, thus:
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So you affixed your signature without knowing whether the report is accurate or not?
MS. JAMORA:
Your Honor, to answer honestly, I was not in the position to question my superior
Judge Chua.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:

437

So, by force of circumstances, you just affixed your signature without any question
asked, whether they are correct, inaccurate, incomplete, you just affixed your
signature. Is that your job as OIC?
ATTY. VILLANUEVA:
Your Honor, I think she stated her position already in her Comment.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
That is why I am asking her for confirmation.
MS. JAMORA:
Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. VILLANUEVA:
More or less, that is the substance of her Comment, Your Honor.
JUSTICE FERNANDO:
So without knowing anything about the figures, you just affixed your signature
because you saw already the signature of Rafael and the signature of Judge Chua?
MS. JAMORA:
Yes, Your Honor.
35

Justice Salazar-Fernando found unacceptable respondent Jamora's pretended ignorance of
the incorrectness of the monthly reports she had been signing, let alone the figures relating
to the number of marriages solemnized by respondent Judge. He stressed that it does not
take a lawyer to count or at least approximate the number of weddings that respondent
Judge had been solemnizing in her court, considering the unusually big number of
weddings she had solemnized. Knowing the figures stated in the monthly reports to be
incorrect, Jamora condoned the wrongdoing, if she was actually not a willing participant, by
affixing her signatures therein.
Justice Salazar-Fernando held that the reprehensible act or omission of respondent Jamora
constitutes dishonesty amounting to grave misconduct. Moreover, she stated that during the
investigation, it was revealed that although Jamora was an OIC Clerk of Court, she had no
knowledge of her duties and responsibilities, and had neither control over the employees
under her nor did what was expected of her.
Justice Salazar-Fernando stated that respondent Jamora's plea for compassion and
understanding, citing the fact that she was not a lawyer and that the position of OIC Clerk of
Court was merely thrust upon her by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, which she reluctantly
accepted, was hollow, because her transgression did not have any connection with her

438

status as a non-lawyer or being a reluctant OIC. Her insistence upon her ignorance or lack
of knowledge of the incorrectness of the figures stated in the monthly reports, specifically on
the number of marriages solemnized, aggravates her offense as it makes a mockery of her
oath.
The Court agrees with the findings of Investigating Justice Salazar-Fernando.
It is settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish
malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt, but substantial evidence, i.e., that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
36

In A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, there is substantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua
did not report in her Monthly Reports
37
the actual number of marriages she solemnized
during her stint in the MeTC, Makati City, Branch 63 and in the RTC, Makati City, Branch
144, and that the solemnization fees that were paid did not correspond to the number of
marriages that were solemnized by her.
The monthly reports of cases on record showed that Judge Arcaya-Chua reported zero or a
lesser number of marriages solemnized by her compared with the marriage certificates that
were seized from her office. Just to mention a portion of the evidence submitted against her:
In April 2004, she reported
38
that she did not solemnized any marriage, but there were 29
marriage certificates issued on the said month contained in the plastic bags that were taken
from her office.
39
In May 2004, she reported
40
that she did not solemnize any marriage, but
36 marriage certificates issued on the said month were found in the same plastic bags.
41
In
June 2004, she likewise reported
42
that she did not solemnize any marriage, but 45
marriage certificates issued on the said month were contained in the plastic bags.
43
From
November 2005 to March 2007, her Monthly Reports
44
indicated that she did not solemnize
any marriage, but 1,068 marriage certificates issued by her during the said period are in the
custody of the Court.
45

Atty. Neptali D. Abasta, Clerk of Court V, OCC, MeTC, Makati City, in his
Certification
46
dated June 8, 2007, stated that only 146 of the marriages solemnized by
Judge Arcaya-Chua from January 2004 to June 13, 2005 paid the corresponding marriage
fee. Moreover, Atty. Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr., Clerk of Court VII, OCC, RTC, Makati City,
declared in his Certification
47
dated June 8, 2007 that from the list furnished by this Court of
marriages solemnized by Judge Arcaya-Chua, only 20 marriages were paid to the said
office per RTC official receipts covering the period from June 14, 2005 to April 2007. Hence,
out of the 1,975 marriage certificates discovered in Branch 144, only a total of 166
marriages were paid.
In the light of the substantial evidence against her, she cannot shift the blame to Noel
Umipig absent any proof of weight that he forged her signature in the Monthly Reports.
In regard to respondent Victoria Jamora, her signature on the Monthly Reports represented
that she attested to the correctness thereof; hence, it is presumed that she verified or

439

should have verified the facts stated therein. The Monthly Reports specifically state that the
signatories thereto, including Victoria Jamora, "declare under oath that the information in
this Monthly Report is true and correct to the best of our knowledge, pursuant to the
provisions of existing rules/administrative circulars."
Respondent Jamora admitted that she was designated as OIC of Branch 144 from July
2005 to April 2007.
48
It is incredible that Victoria Jamora, as OIC, was unaware of the big
number of weddings solemnized by respondent Judge from November 5 to March 2007,
which totaled 1,068 marriages per the confiscated marriage certificates, but she attested in
the Monthly Reports for the said period that no marriage was ever solemnized. Thus, the
Investigating Justice correctly stated that she knew that the figures stated in the Monthly
Reports were incorrect, but she condoned the wrongdoing by affixing her signature therein,
if she was not actually a willing participant.
The Court sustains the findings of Justice Salvador-Fernando in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 that
respondents Judge Arcaya-Chua and Victoria Jamora are guilty of gross misconduct.
In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 (the Chang Tan/RCBC Case), the Court upholds the finding of
Justice Salvador-Fernando that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance
of the law for issuing a TPO in favor of petitioner Albert Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373,
since a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife under R.A. No. 9292,
known as the AntiViolence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Indeed, as a
family court judge, Judge Arcaya-Chua is expected to know the correct implementation of
R.A. No. 9292.
In A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ (the Ocampo Case), the Court sustains the
recommendation of Justice Salvador-Fernando that the case be dismissed in the absence
of substantial evidence that respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is liable for the charge of
"harassment, grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct,
manifest partiality and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service."
We now resolve the motion for reconsideration of respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in A.M.
No. RTJ-07-2093.
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093
In A.M. RTJ-07-2093, Sylvia Santos filed a Complaint dated July 14, 2005 against Judge
Arcaya-Chua for serious misconduct and dishonesty.
Complainant, an aunt of respondent Judges husband, alleged that in the first week of
September 2002, she asked respondents help regarding the cases of her friend, Emerita
Muoz, pending before the Supreme Court. At that time, respondent was the Presiding
Judge of the MeTC of Makati City, Branch 63. Respondent, a former employee of the
Supreme Court, said that she could help as she had connections with some Justices of the
Court; she just needed P100,000.00 which she would give to an employee of the Court for
the speedy resolution of the said cases. In the first week of October 2002, complainant gave
respondent P100,000.00 in the privacy of the latters chamber. When complainant followed
up the cases in February 2003, respondent told her that there was a problem, as the other

440

party was offering P10 million to the Justices. Complainant asked respondent to return
theP100,000.00; however, respondent could no longer be contacted.
49

In her Comment dated August 19, 2005, respondent denied the charges against her and
averred that in the months adverted to by complainant, she (respondent) was facing
protests, damaging newspaper reports and administrative cases which caused her
hypertension; thus, she could not have agreed to the supposed transaction of complainant.
When she became a judge, complainant asked a lot of favors from her, and knowing that
she worked as a Court Attorney of the Supreme Court, complainant asked her to talk to a
certain Mario Tolosa of the Third Division, to whom complainant gave P50,000.00 for a
favorable resolution of Muoz cases. Respondent declined. Thereafter, complainant started
spreading malicious imputations against her. On April 23, 2005, complainant begged
respondent to talk to anyone in the Third Division to recover the money she gave Tolosa.
Respondent again refused. Complainant then repeatedly tried to talk to her until April 25,
2005 when complainant threatened to file a case against respondent with the Supreme
Court. Complainant sent two demand letters addressed to respondent's court asking for the
return of the P100,000.00 complainant allegedly gave her, which letters were read by
respondent's Clerk of Court. Complainant also told respondent's husband, outside
respondent's house, that she (respondent) was corrupt, as she asked for money in order to
settle cases in court. Respondent filed cases of Grave Oral Defamation, Intriguing Against
Honor and Unjust Vexation against complainant, while complainant filed an estafa case
against her.
50

The Court, in its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, referred this case to Associate Justice
Marina L. Buzon of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
During the preliminary conference held on September 4, 2007, complainant manifested her
desire to move for the dismissal of her complaint against respondent.
51
In a Verified
Manifestation
52
dated September 6, 2007, complainant stated that in the latter part of
August 2007, she and respondent had a long and serious discussion about the dispute and
bad feelings between them; that after a sincere exchange of views, it dawned on
complainant that her accusation against respondent was brought about by
misunderstanding, confusion and misapprehension of facts concerning the incident subject
of the present administrative case; that for the sake of unity and harmonious relations in
their family, the complainant and respondent had reconciled and restored friendly relations
with each other; and that in view of the foregoing, complainant was no longer interested in
pursuing her administrative case against respondent.
In her Report dated October 5, 2007, Justice Buzon recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case in view of paucity of evidence upon which a conclusion could be drawn,
brought about by the withdrawal by Santos of her complaint and her failure and refusal to
prove the allegations in her Complaint.
In a Resolution
53
dated December 5, 2007, the Court, adopting the recommendation of
Justice Buzon, dismissed the complaint against respondent for lack of evidence. The Court,
in the same Resolution, also ordered complainant to show cause why she should not be
held in contempt of Court for filing an unfounded verified Complaint dated July 14, 2005
against respondent.

441

Complainant submitted her Compliance dated January 6, 2008 stating that:
x x x x
2. Contrary to the impression of the Honorable Court, her administrative complaint
against Judge Evelyn Ar[c]aya-Chua is not unfounded;
3. All the allegations therein are true and based on respondents personal
knowledge;
4. The main reason why respondent did not anymore pursue her complaint was
because of the pressure of her family to forgive Judge Chua, for the sake of unity
and harmony in the family, given the fact that Judge Chuas husband is her nephew;
5. On several occasions in August 2007, Judge Chua, her husband and their
children came to respondents house and pleaded for forgiveness. Later,
respondents sister, husband and children, as well as her close friends persuaded
her to forgive Judge Chua and let bygones be bygones, for the sake of peace and
unity in the family;
6. It is solely due to the foregoing events as well as for humane reasons that
respondent gave up her complaint against Judge Chua.
54

In its Resolution
55
dated March 3, 2008, the Court found that complainant's compliance was
not satisfactory, and that she was trifling with court processes. The Court then resolved to
reprimand complainant with a stern warning that a more severe penalty would be imposed
on her in the event of a repetition of the same offense; recall the Resolution of the Court
dated December 5, 2007; reopen the administrative case against respondent; direct Justice
Rebecca D. Salvador
56
to conduct an investigation and submit her report and
recommendation; and directed complainant to attend all hearings scheduled by Justice
Salvador under pain of contempt of court.
In her Report dated September 23, 2008, Investigating Justice Salvador found sufficient
grounds to hold respondent liable for the offenses charged and recommended that
respondent be administratively penalized for grave misconduct and dishonesty.
Justice Salvadors findings, as stated in the Resolution dated February 13, 2009, are as
follows:
Justice Salvador found that: complainant was able to present substantial evidence in
support of her complaint against respondent; while respondent denied that she asked for
and received from complainant P100,000.00 for the facilitation of a favorable decision on
Muoz' cases, respondent, however, admitted meeting complainant in her office in
September 2002, claiming only a different reason for such meeting; that is, complainant was
there to console her for the protests against respondent at the time; respondent claims to
have incurred complainant's ire for declining complainants request for favors in June 2004;
however, it was respondent who asserted that the complainant asked her to talk to Mario
Tolosa of the Supreme Court; complainant asserted that she had not heard of Tolosa

442

before; however, it was respondent's comment and her husband's affidavit which stated that
complainant informed them on April 23, 2005 that Tolosa had gone on absence without
leave; it was respondent, as a former employee of the Supreme Court who stood to know
who Tolosa was; there was also a strong reason to believe that respondent knew and
associated with Muoz prior to the parties' falling out, since the affidavit of Robert Chua
(Robert), respondent's husband, stated that Muoz was introduced to them by complainant
in September 2003, and that they went to Tagaytay with her in 2004; Robert claimed,
however, that the topic of case-fixing never cropped up; although respondent filed a
complaint for grave oral defamation, intriguing against honor and unjust vexation on June
20, 2005 before complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, it cannot be denied,
however, that respondent at the time had already been served complainant's demand
letters dated April 28, 2005 and May 27, 2005; respondent's failure, both as a judge and as
a lawyer, to reply to complainants first demand letter, was unusual; considering
complainants advanced age and illnesses, respondent's claim--that complainant's motive
for filing the administrative case was respondent's refusal to give in to complainant's request
to intercede in the cases of the latter's friend--was too paltry an explanation for
complainant's willingness to expend the time, money, effort and aggravation entailed by the
administrative case as well as the criminal case filed by and against her; complainants
compliance with the Court's Resolution, which directed her to show cause why she should
not be held in contempt for filing an unfounded complaint against respondent, stated that
the allegations in her complaint were true and based on personal knowledge, and it was
only because of respondent and their family's pleas, as well as for humane reasons, that
she gave up her complaint against respondent.
57

During the hearing conducted on September 3, 2008, Investigating Justice Salvador
observed that although complainant appeared weary of the demands entailed by the
administrative case, she staunchly stood pat over the veracity of her complaint and the
reasons why she decided to withdraw the same. According to Justice Salvador, respondent
had no reason to ask forgiveness from complainant, if indeed complainant falsely instituted
the administrative case against her.
Justice Salvador also gave weight to complainants testimony that the return of the money
by respondent, in addition to familial interests, induced her to withdraw the complaint.
The Court sustained the findings and recommendation of Justice Salvador, and rendered
decision against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 144,
Makati City is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from office
for six (6) months without salary and other benefits. She is WARNED that the commission
of the same or a similar act in the future shall merit a more severe penalty.
58

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that:
(1) The Honorable Supreme Court failed to appreciate the failure of Sylvia Santos to
present Emerita Muoz, from whom Santos procured the P100,000.00, in the
proceedings before Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador;

443

(2) The Honorable Supreme Court failed to appreciate that one of the bases for the
dismissal of the present case of 5 December 2007 was the Affidavit of Retraction
filed by Muoz on 12 January 2006;
(3) The Honorable Supreme Court erred in sustaining the finding of Justice Salvador
that [respondent] did not refute Santos declaration during the clarificatory hearing
that [respondent] returned the money to her;
(4) The Honorable Supreme Court erred in sustaining the other findings of Justice
Salvador; and
(5) The Honorable Supreme Court erred in not considering [respondents] testimonial
and documentary evidence.
59

Respondent prayed that Stenographer Diana Tenerife be directed to submit to this Court
the fully transcribed stenographic notes of the proceedings held on September 17, 2008
and to submit her tape of the proceedings on the said date, and that her motion for
reconsideration be granted and that the instant case be dismissed.
Respondents prayer for submission to this Court of the fully transcribed stenographic notes
of the proceedings held on September 17, 2008 is an attempt to clarify alleged inaccuracies
in the said transcript of stenographic notes. The Court notes that respondent Judge had
earlier filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008 on this matter, which was already resolved in
the Resolution of the Court promulgated on February 13, 2009, thus:
Respondent filed a Motion dated October 10, 2008, claiming that there were significant
omissions of testimonies in the Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN) particularly in the
statement "Ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera;" and that such question was also beyond the
scope of clarificatory questions that may be propounded, as nowhere in the previous
testimonies of complainant, either in the direct or the cross-examination, did she mention
the return of the money, and it was only during the clarifiactory hearing that it surfaces; thus,
she (respondent) was deprived of her right to cross-examine complainant. Respondent
prayed that corrections on the TSN be made, or that the testimonies of complainant that
"the money was returned to me" and "ibinalik naman ho nila and pera" be stricken off; and
in case the correction of the TSN was no longer proper, her manifestation that the said
testimony of complainant was given only during the clarificatory hearing and, in effect,
without an opportunity for her to cross-examine the complainant.
In the Resolution dated November 26, 2008, the Court denied respondents prayer that the
corrections on the TSN be made, and that the subject testimonies of complainant be
stricken off. The Court, however, granted her prayer and noted her Manifestation that the
subject testimony was given only during the clarificatory hearing and in effect without
granting her an opportunity to cross-examine complainant about the same.
60
1avvphi1
Respondent contends that the failure of Santos to present Emerita Muoz, from whom
Santos procured theP100,000.00, during the proceedings before Justice Salvador was fatal
to Santos claims against her, and, on that basis alone, provided a reason to dismiss the
present case.

444

The Court is not persuaded.
Santos was an eyewitness to the procurement of the P100,000.00, and her testimony alone,
found credible in this case, is sufficient to prove the administrative liability of respondent.
Contrary to the allegations of respondent, the Court, in sustaining the findings of
Investigating Justice Salvador, took into consideration the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by her.
The Court reiterates its statement in the Resolution dated February 13, 2009, thus:
x x x [M]ost telling of all the circumstances pointing to respondents guilt is the unwavering
stance of complainant that respondent did solicit and receive P100,000.00 from her in order
to facilitate a favorable ruling in Muoz cases.
As aptly observed by Justice Salvador, complainant, when repeatedly asked during the
hearing, was consistent in her testimony:
J. DE GUIA-SALVADOR:
At the start of this afternoons proceedings, you affirmed the truth of the matters
stated in your verified complaint?
MS. SANTOS:
Opo.
And according to you they are based on your personal knowledge?
MS. SANTOS:
My complaint is true. That is all true.
x x x x
Ano ba ang totoo?
MS. SANTOS:
Ang sabi ko sa kanya, "Evelyn, tulungan mo lang si Emerita kasi napakatagal na ng
kaso niya. Hindi niya malaman kung siya ay nanalo o hindi." Ang sabi niya, "Sige,
Tita, tutulungan ko."

445

Evelyn, sasabihin ko and totoo ha. Huwag kang magagalit sa akin.
Just tell us what happened.
MS. SANTOS:
Sabi niya, "Tita, sige, bigyan mo ako ng P100,000.00 at tutulungan ko. Pagka sa
loob ng tatlong buwan walang nangyari ibabalik ko sa iyo ang P50,000.00." Which is
true ha. Sinabi ko doon sa humihingi ng pabor sa akin. Okay siya. Dumating ang
panahon. It took already years walang nangyari. Siyempre ako ngayon ang ginigipit
nung tao. Ngayon, kinausap ko siya. Sabi ko, "Evelyn, kahit konti magbigay ka sa
akin para maibigay ko kay Emelita." Unang-una iyang Emelita may utang sa akin
ng P20,000.00 sa alahas dahil ako, Justice, nagtitinda ng alahas. Bumili sya.
JUDGE ARCAYA-CHUA:
Your honor, at this point, may I request that the complainant be told not to continue
with her testimony because she is already through with her direct examination.
Noted. But allow her testimony to remain in the record.
Complainant's testimony during the clarificatory hearing also revealed her true
reasons for withdrawing her complaint. As borne out by the records and correctly
pointed out by Justice Salvador in her Report:
I have another question regarding the verified manifestation counsel.
Alright, we go to the verified manifestation which you filed on September 7, 2007,
and which had been marked as Exhibits "1," "1-A," "l-B" and submarkings for
respondent. You stated in the verified complaint that the accusation against
respondent was brought about due to misunderstanding, misapprehension of facts
and confusion. Please clarify what do you mean by "the accusation against
respondent was brought about due to misunderstanding, misapprehension of facts
and confusion"?
MS. SANTOS:
Para matapos na po ang problemang iyan kaya nagka-intindihan na kamit
nagkabatian. Sa totoo lang po Justice, matagal kaming hindi nagkibuan. Ngayon,
dahil nakiusap nga po sila sa akin, kaya ako naman ho, sige, pinatawad ko na sila
dahil pamilya ko ho sila, ang asawa niya. Kung hindi lang ho anak ng kapatid ko yan,
baka ewan ko, baka hindi ko tuluyan iyan.

446

So it is not true that there were facts regarding the incident which you misunderstood
or misapprehended?
MS. SANTOS:
Naintindihan ko po iyan, Justice. Kaya nga ho, iyun na nga ho, sa pakiusap po nila
na magkasundo na po kami, ibinalik naman ho nila ang pera, kaya ang sabi ko ho,
tama na. Iyan po ang buong katotohanan, Justice.
61

These testimonies on record are evidence against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua. The
Investigating Justice observed the demeanor of complainant and found her a credible
witness. It is settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given
great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment
of the witnesses as they testified.
62
The Court found no reason to depart from such rule
since Justice Salvadors observations and findings are supported by the records.
The conduct of Judge Arcaya-Chua in this case and in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141 is violative of
the provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, thus:
Canon 1, Sec. 4. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to
advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Canon 2, Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that
it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
Canon 2, Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Canon 4, Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
Administrative Sanctions
Any disciplinary action against respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua will be based on the
provisions of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
63
while disciplinary action against respondent
Victoria Jamora will be based on the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, serious charges include gross misconduct
constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and gross ignorance of the law or
procedure.
Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that if the respondent Judge is guilty of
a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

447

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations: Provided, however,
That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Under the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave misconduct is classified as
a grave offense and punished with dismissal for the first offense.
The Court sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that respondent Victoria Jamora is
guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141.
The Court also sustains Justice Salvador-Fernandos finding that respondent Judge Arcaya-
Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049
and A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, respectively. Respondent Judges motion for reconsideration is
denied in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093.
The Court has held:
All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds the exhortation that the
administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels, are the
gems in the vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked upon as the embodiments
of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression.
Those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity have no
place in the judiciary. xxx This Court will not withhold penalty when called for to uphold the
peoples faith in the judiciary.
64

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that:
1. in A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, the charges against Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-
Chua of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144 is DISMISSED.
2. in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law and punished with SUSPENSION from office for six (6) months
without salary and other benefits.
3. in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2093, the motion for reconsideration of Judge Arcaya-Chua is
DENIED for lack of merit. The penalty of SUSPENSION from office for a period of six
(6) months without salary and other benefits imposed upon her is RETAINED.
4. in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Judge Arcaya-Chua is found GUILTY of gross
misconduct and punished with DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all

448

benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any
government agency or instrumentality.
5. in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2141, Victoria C. Jamora, Court Stenographer of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 144 is found GUILTY of grave misconduct and
punished with DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits,
excluding accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any government
agency or instrumentality.
Immediately upon service on Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua and Victoria C. Jamora of this
decision, they are deemed to have vacated their respective office, and their authority to act
as Judge and Court Stenographer, respectively, are considered automatically terminated.
These consolidated administrative cases are referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
investigation, report and recommendation regarding the possible disbarment of Judge
Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua from the practice of the legal profession.

DOLINA VS VALLECERA
This case is about a mothers claim for temporary support of an unacknowledged child,
which she sought in an action for the issuance of a temporary protection order that she
brought against the supposed father.
The Facts and the Case
In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02-07
1
for alleged woman and child abuse
under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.
2
In filling out the blanks in thepro-forma complaint, Dolina
added a handwritten prayer for financial support
3
from Vallecera for their supposed child.
She based her prayer on the latters Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as the
childs father. The petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines, Valleceras
employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem
appropriate.
Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolinas petition was essentially one for
financial support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses; that he was not
the childs father; that the signature appearing on the childs Certificate of Live Birth is not
his; that the petition is a harassment suit intended to force him to acknowledge the child as
his and give it financial support; and that Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with
Dolina, rendering unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him.
On March 13, 2008
4
the RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since no prior judgment
exists establishing the filiation of Dolinas son and granting him the right to support as basis
for an order to compel the giving of such support. Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration
but the RTC denied it in its April 4, 2008 Order,
5
with an admonition that she first file a

449

petition for compulsory recognition of her child as a prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied,
Dolina filed the present petition for review directly with this Court.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed
Dolinas action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for
her child.
The Courts Ruling
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A.
9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who
are victims of abuse or violence.
6
Although the issuance of a protection order against the
respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this
assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support.
Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her child.1avvphil But it became
apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim,
neither she nor her child ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her
action was to get financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the
father. He of course vigorously denied this.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of
the child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support
for her son is based on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not
entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his
relation to him.
7
The childs remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against
Vallecera for compulsory recognition.
8
If filiation is beyond question, support follows as
matter of obligation.
9
In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional
rights but their filiation must be duly proved.
10

Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for
compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively,
she may directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may
be integrated and resolved.
11

It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the entire case
based solely on the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation between Vallecera and
Dolinas child since the main issue remains to be the alleged violence committed by
Vallecera against Dolina and her child and whether they are entitled to protection. But of
course, this matter is already water under the bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on
review. This omission lends credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of
the petition is to obtain support from Vallecera.
While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and
filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the
privacy and peace of the putative fathers legitimate family.
12
Vallecera disowns Dolinas

450

child and denies having a hand in the preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This
issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Regional Trial Court of
Tacloban Citys Order dated March 13, 2008 that dismissed petitioner Cherryl B. Dolinas
action in P.O. 2008-02-07, and Order dated April 4, 2008, denying her motion for
reconsideration dated March 28, 2008.

DABALOS VS RTC BR 59
The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a provision that would render it
toothless in the pursuit of the declared policy of the State to protect women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders dated
September 13, 2010
2
and October 5, 2010
3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles
City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 which denied petitioners Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information.
The Facts
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles
City, Branch 59, in an Information which states:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the boyfriend
of the complainant, x x x did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use personal
violence on the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainants back, shoulder and
left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the complainants intrinsic worth and dignity as
a human being, in violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.
4

After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently,
issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009. The latter posted a
cash bond for his provisional liberty and on August 12, 2010, filed a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred
that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating
relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended
prior to the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the
money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from
petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted.
Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her the
physical injuries alleged in the Information.
The RTC Ruling

451

The RTC denied petitioners motion. It did not consider material the fact that the parties
dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had
admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act
of violence against women and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.
Issues
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues: 1) whether the RTC has jurisdiction
over the offense; 2) whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the
accused; and 3) whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to what has been admitted
should be quashed.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not
covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead,
he claims that the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised
Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The Court is not persuaded.
Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their
children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual
or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. x x x.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of
acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely:
1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offenders wife, former
wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a
common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals,
5
the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence
against women through harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and

452

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress
to her.
6

Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with
the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of
violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be
inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of
violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as
long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such
relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.
Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to
petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating
relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of
lenity
7
because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction.
While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266
8
of the Revised Penal
Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the
former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the
offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom they have or had a sexual
or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end in view of promoting the protection
of women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime,
such as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of
violence committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent,
the offense is covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in
accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law which reads:
SEC. 7. Venue The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under
this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the
case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was
committed at the option of the complainant.
Finally, the Court finds the Order
9
of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2) days
to amend the Information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship between the
petitioner and the offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based on an
alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court
shall order that an amendment be made.1wphi 1
Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused

453

enters his plea. In the present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been arraigned,
hence, the RTC was correct in directing the amendment of the Information and in denying
the motion to quash the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 13, 2010 and
October 5, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal
Case No. 09-5210 are AF.FI RM ED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court
is LIFTED and the RTC is directed to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
09-5210.

GARCIA VS DRILON
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos-
or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million adhering to the teachings of Jesus
Christ.
1
Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as
Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her
2
failed to prevent, or even to curb, the
pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of
Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence
comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these
reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands
and live-in partners."
3

Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups,
Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.
4

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband;
former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom the woman has a common child.
5
The law provides for protection orders from the
barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines
the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court
personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local government officials in
responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being
violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in
behalf of her minor children, a verified petition
6
(Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO)
against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be

454

a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of
marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support.
7

Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former
was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17
years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted;
Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.
8

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved
around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is
dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He
forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she
took up law, and even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner
trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous
of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening
that he would have any man eyeing her killed.
9

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of
Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner
admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even
boasted to the household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner
told private respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of their
accounts with the bank.
10

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and
emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on
both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another
time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding.
Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text
messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-
Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When private respondent decided to leave
petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner
would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their
6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of his
cruelty to private respondent.
11

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair.
On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was
found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her
to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time
petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private
respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant
medications.
12


455

When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to
file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the
manager's job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving
her for good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family
home, that private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not
cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.
13

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would
take her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously
warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.
14

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He
is the President of three corporations 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation of which he and private respondent are both
stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private
respondent merely draws a monthly salary of P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the
Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than P200,000.00
a month are paid for by private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn,
are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for utilities.
15

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of
thousands of pesos from the corporations.
16
After private respondent confronted him about
the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the
businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full
information about said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not
given private respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of which she had
helped raise to millions of pesos.
17

Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO
18
on
March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family
home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he
refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling;
this order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236
Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is
to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling
without any danger from the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime
the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the
Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.

456

The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26
March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her
children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household
help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the
Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or
indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers,
letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO
in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK
and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the
Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He
should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or
control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of
a house for them, and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he
received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which
himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the
Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall
be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every
15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite,
and considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the
Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up
a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two
sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion
19
of private respondent, the trial court issued an
amended TPO,
20
effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional
provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the
Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in
Paraaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go
to Manila.

457

k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two
sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could
be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Renewal of the TPO
21
seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the
grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of
hearing. He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by
private respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading
Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from P5,000,000.00 to a
more manageable level at P100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved
22
for the modification of the TPO to allow
him visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the
following modifications prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal
belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for
Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the
conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours
from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters
to remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt
of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48
hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her
representatives can remove things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of
the household furniture, equipment and other things in the conjugal home, which
shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and
Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
indirect contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the
Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel;

458

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.
23

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully
comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children,
private respondent filed another application
24
for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She
alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which
the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan
Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was
served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that
scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.
25

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly
attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go
back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann,
by the arm and threatened her.
26
The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann
subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also
known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids
working at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against
private respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to
said home to get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a
housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for
qualified theft against Jamola.
27

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,
28
effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as
follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through
another, acts of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or
agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J.
Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver
Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin
Gayona and the petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of 1,000
meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are
temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore,
that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly in

459

any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees directly,
otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will
be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther
PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and
Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and
support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of
Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508
and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver
said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which
is the one taken by J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of
the conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only
and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J.
Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in
No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which
are conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-
1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be
served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to
allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties
to any person, entity or corporation without the personal presence of petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of
Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order
to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal
partnership of gains.
In its Order
29
dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for
another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show
cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's
manifestation,
30
however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to
modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order
31
dated October 6, 2006 that
petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order
32
dated a day earlier,
October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The
pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
x x x x

460

x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary
Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30)
days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until
further orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it
would only be an "exercise in futility."
33

Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals
(CA) a petition
34
for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and
temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being
violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the
modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining
Order
36
(TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders
pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed
36
the petition
for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court
in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the
challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued
by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution
37
dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY
THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK
ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE
THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.

461

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A.
9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE
TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL
INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS
INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION
OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.
38

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the
petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity
so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not
raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.
39
Courts will not anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.
40

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of
Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction
that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."
41

We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of
1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
domestic violence against women and children.
42
In accordance with said law, the Supreme
Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family
Court in each of several key cities identified.
43
To achieve harmony with the first mentioned
law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family
Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the
latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under
this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the

462

case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was
committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether
civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty
or insolvency.
44
It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute,
45
"this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law."
46
The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in
all RTCs.
47
We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA
48
that, "plainly the Constitution
contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of
inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
x x x
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
x x x x
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could
have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection
order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject
to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their
Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition
to the petition and not an answer.
49
Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition
which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and
shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-
party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated
in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

463

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-
claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of
constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for
money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party.
50
A
cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein.
51
Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may,
with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.
52
As pointed out by Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action
that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.
Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo
because the right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very
statute the validity of which is being attacked
53
by petitioner who has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A.
9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection
order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have
deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by
evidence.
54
Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the
conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further
hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be
presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the
form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in
one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the
temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection
order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period
of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the

464

extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of
the parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to
litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for
the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition
with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698).
Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior
court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-
SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against
any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the
appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and
other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking
its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is
prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not
stay its enforcement,
55
with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days
at a time,
56
should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself
entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.
57
In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,
58
the Supreme Court
of the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to
their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if
such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from
prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a
prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone
ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable
injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully
the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex
parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction
against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to
determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We
have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues,
and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment
59
to the
instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest.
And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

465

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and
child abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender
alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.
60

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,
61
which became R.A.
9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as
Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure"
62

an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-
Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"
63
providing protection to "all family
members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to
women as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse,
64
nonetheless, it was eventually
agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent
portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's
groups have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include
domestic violence apart from against women as well as other members of the household,
including children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address
domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives,
the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record.
How does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves
"WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic
violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed
here members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective
measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those
related with the family.
65

x x x
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
x x x x
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to
women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I
have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember
correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation
period.

466

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me
wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the
domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the
opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not
decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming
they can at all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the
already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am
sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree
with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it
or not, no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities
especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel
that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.
x x x x
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill
because the family members have been included in this proposed measure since the other
members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While
women are most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure
focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be
victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried
that there may not be enough protection extended to other family members particularly
children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less,
addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection
orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men,
fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However,
we should also recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts
which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically
entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the
family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations
between men and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent
rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family members,
particularly children.

467

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members
as a critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs,
experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda
would be removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on
women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale
mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure
now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept
this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment,
Mr. President.
x x x x
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
x x x x
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished
proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso,
mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na
talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from
this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

468

Senator Sotto. more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of
fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I
have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers.
And it breaks my heart to find out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will
update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only
women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the
bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
amendment, as amended, is approved.
66

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute.
67
Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members
of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to
women and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this
proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this
judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it
is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of
powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and
expediency of any law.
68
We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution.
However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union
69
is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application
of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid
the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not

469

require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the
same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping
of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification
is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification
is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on
a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the
equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to
whom the State extends its protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As
Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of
true equality."
70

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender
Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be
closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise
known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think
men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while
women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in
society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power comes
the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of
controlling women to retain power.
71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its
Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on
December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically
unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and
discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of

470

women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which
women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men."
72

Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-
based violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered
during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004,
the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The
patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his
control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy the institutional
rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both
physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine
or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if
she endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions
oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of
society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent
Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one
and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s,
English common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus,
common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with
a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or
inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given
more importance than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English
common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to
strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair,
choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is
not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of
the law that the husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The
temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the
evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed
saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was
joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They

471

fought for women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist
movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public
gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less
than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the
victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that
nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The
[American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates," because
the nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because
surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women
who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to
the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence
is probably double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically
assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the
United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of
these incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place,
moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible
form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of
women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they
perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in
shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no other source of
income... Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of
Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States
are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their
male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The
United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality
of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN
General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in
Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on
the Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half and full steps of all these women's
movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State

472

to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on
March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against
women and children show that
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing
55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381
reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of
women in especially difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated
cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total
number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than
90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were
committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.
73

Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on
violence against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with
violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its
implementation in 2004,
74
thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*
Reported
Cases
200
4
200
5
200
6
200
7
200
8
200
9
2010 2011
Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832
Incestuous
Rape
38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Attempted
Rape
194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Acts of 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625

473

Lasciviousne
ss
Physical
Injuries
3,55
3
2,33
5
1,89
2
1,50
5
1,30
7
1,49
8
2,018 1,588
Sexual
Harassment
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
RA 9262 218 924
1,26
9
2,38
7
3,59
9
5,28
5
9,974 9,021
Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213
Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15
Concubinag
e
121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62
Abduction
/Kidnapping
29
16 34 23 28 18 25 22

Unjust
Vexation
90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Total
6,27
1
5,37
4
4,88
1
5,72
9
6,90
5
9,48
5
15,10
4
12,94
8
*2011 report covers only from January to August
Source: Philippine National Police Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence
against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps,
because many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom,

474

32% of women who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more)
times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced
domestic violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more
incidents of domestic violence.
75
Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a
woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent
versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their spouses are much less likely
to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience
sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are
in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional abuse.
76

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men
in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn
vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by
their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said
ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its
application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those
animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be
non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be
negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing
ones, as not to constitute a menace to the health of the community."
77
The mere fact that the
legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal
protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces
inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.
78

C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes
against women are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was
argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief
sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as
a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection
Clauses. He stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized
historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double
victimization" first at the hands of the offender and then of the legal system.
79

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723
that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and
advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to
the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be
withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution
reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence."
80

Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.

475

In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference
to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a
live-in partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate
relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being
motivated by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested property.
81
Such
remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases
and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination
through specific measures focused on women does not discriminate against
men.
82
Petitioner's contention,
83
therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an
"anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a
State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women."
84
Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift
changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will
require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and
the judges."
85

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is
to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of
Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of
women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children,
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against
women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention
on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the
Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on
August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the
Philippines on October 6, 2003.
86
This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord
to women equality with men before the law
87
and shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations on the basis of equality of men and women.
88
The Philippines likewise ratified the

476

Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols.
89
It is, thus, bound by said
Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of
women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section
3 thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is
not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman
or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her
child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to
watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her
child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room
with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual
activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or
other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or
emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment,
stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and
marital infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or
psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

477

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in
any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds
as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to
the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in
common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable
to research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described
here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women.
90
Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what
constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is
tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.
91
Yet, petitioner
insists
92
that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a
legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital
infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every
quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are
clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.
93

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father
as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-
neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman
encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender
be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,
94
the parents-in-
law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case

478

filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly
abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all
protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis
of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is
stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation,
all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened."
95

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and
their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in
their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
96

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended
party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim.
This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and
any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent
the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the
victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the
children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their
financial support."
97

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner
98
thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation
therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be
prevented,"
99
the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice
and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is
reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the
immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to
recur.
100

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte
order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to
attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.
101

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and
hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property,
102
in the same way, the victim of VAWC
may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and
possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural

479

due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests,
103
among which
is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order
that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within
five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition
and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are
initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.
104

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance
and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the
petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and
hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.
105

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be issued.
106

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order
should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his
side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money,
children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an
inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of
due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to
be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.
107

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24,
2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to
allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September
26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would
just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned
TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the
continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do
so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case
from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a
"blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.
108

The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination
suggest that this is so. It states:

480

SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any,
some or all of the following reliefs:
x x x x
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party,
regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting
the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent
must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement
agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has
gathered his things and escort him from the residence;
x x x x
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence,
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such
removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How
then can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as
petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging
mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to
"protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."
109

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue
thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the
Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as
follows:
110

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding
for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining
positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence,
however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the
issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues
in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently
unable to participate equally with the person against whom the protection order has been
sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which,
under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as
may be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials
to issue protection orders.
111
The pertinent provision reads, as follows:

481

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. Barangay
Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay
ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this
Act.1wphi1 A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection
order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the
application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the
application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued
by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay
Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the
BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex
parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of
the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the
Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
112
On the other hand,
executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is
the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."
113

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay
or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator
to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to
cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is,
thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code
to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."
114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the
existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official
conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an
exercise of judicial powers."
115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or
proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must
determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a
BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and
other law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and
abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the
chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other

482

law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain
peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a
clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other
words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.
116
In the instant case,
however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to
warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress
and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said
in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,
117
courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious
of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the
facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the
majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement
against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against
the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the
struggle of women for equality but will be its fulfillment."
118
Accordingly, the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.

ABLAZA VS REP
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the
legal issue to be determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that
purpose has been dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that he, not being a party in
the assailed marriage, had no right to bring the action.
Antecedents
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan,
Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
1
The
case was docketed as Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of
Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza,
petitioner.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9,
1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a

483

marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had
died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any
person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano
and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being
void ab initio.
2

Ruling of the RTC
3
the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:
Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to
DISMISS the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had
long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev.
Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion
for reconsideration on November 14, 2000.
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:
The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the
petitioner is not a party to the marriage.
In its decision dated January 30, 2003,
4
however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the
RTC, thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does
not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper
party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. In the instant
case, the petition was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a
party to the marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The
contention of petitioner-appellant that he is considered a real party in interest under Section
2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as he stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage will not
prosper if persons other than those specified in the law file the case.
Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the
subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even
impleaded as a party to said case.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.

484

SO ORDERED.
5

Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49 AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN
SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS
AND JURISPRUDENCE;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the
action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
Ruling
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give
rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law
prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested
according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted.
6
As a general rule, the
nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment
of the governing law.
7
To illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was
void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the
intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage
between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The
Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by
the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.
8

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15,
2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the

485

husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil
Code.
9
Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family
Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective
in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
10

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,
11
the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code
and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time
of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the
marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog,
12
the children were
allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their
fathers marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a
marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable
one, and explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise:
establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there
must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a
party can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a
final judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the

486

marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
13

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes
cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the
absolute nullity of a marriage. According toCarlos v. Sandoval,
14
the plaintiff must still be the
party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for
it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name
of the real party in interest.
15
Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest"
can file the action.
16
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an
interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no
material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action.
When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of
lack of cause of action.
17

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material
interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the
suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of
succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the
conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate
children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to
the deceaseds estate.
18
Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action
hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late

487

Cresencianos surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for
the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this
case. We reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may
not be prejudiced.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late
Cresencianos surviving wife,
19
stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her
own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under
the old Civil Code required
a marriage license for their validity;
20
hence, her participation in this action is made all the
more necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without
a marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from
the requirement of a marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be
joined herein:
xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of
judicial power.1avvphi 1 It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court [that] the
action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.
21

We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025
entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v.
Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were
the legal owners of the property involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was
decided on November 26, 2009, and the petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied
on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to
have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter,
respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable party whose
substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should
likewise implead Leila.
The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action,
however, considering that Section 11,
22
Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the same
rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be made "on motion of any
party or on (the trial courts) own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as
are just."
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.
We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of
Appeals.

488

Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its
records are returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for
further proceedings, with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory
pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-
defendants; then to determine whether the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants,
descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the time of his death as well as
whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza
entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed accordingly.

NINAL VS BAYADOG
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death
on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof,
Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their
father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was
filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an
action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for
the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial,
with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father
Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant
is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second
marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death.
1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and
void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of

489

the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action for
annulment of marriage.
2
Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a pure
question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of
petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and correct"." It was thus
treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of
the 1997 Rules.
3
However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.
4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was
the law in effect at the time of their celebration.
5
A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,
6
the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)
7
in relation to Article 58.
8
The requirement
and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.
9
This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution."
10
Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by
the State.
11
This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of
permanent union"
12
and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment."
13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,
14
referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant's
name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status.
15
To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising
from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating
that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other."
16
The
only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated
under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year
continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together

490

and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous
period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married,
which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife
for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on
the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the
special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should
be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous
5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage
being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same
missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should
be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who
is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to
the local civil registrar.
17
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil
registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge
of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar
or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings
thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void,
18
subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was

491

dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.
19
The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding
day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting
with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already
been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where
there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make
any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code
20
cannot be applied
even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file
an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47
pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare
the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is
annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab
initio is considered as having never to have taken place
21
and cannot be the source of
rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription
while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally
except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
perfectly valid.
22
That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can
assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no
legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses,
regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,
23
and its effect on
the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43
and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property

492

regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from
a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It
should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.
establish the nullity of a marriage.
24
"A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
jurisdiction."
25
"Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
and is made good ab initio.
26
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that
there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before
a party can enter into a second marriage
27
and such absolute nullity can be based only on
a final judgment to that effect.
28
For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
29
Corollarily, if the
marriage an absolute nullity.1wphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1wphi 1. nt


493

CARLOS VS SANDOVAL
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized
during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003.
The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision
1
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary judgment
2
of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of
property, reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to
their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are
particularly described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the
Court of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically
reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of
Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a
non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot
155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to
1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the
subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS,
more or less.
PARCEL No. 4

494

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot
28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun.
of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and
on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of
ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda
51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el
plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda
52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el
plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una
3

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The
agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn,
undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios
Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of
Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No.
160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were
registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two
(2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

495

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the
approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties
acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first
parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the
remaining land of the first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,
4
2,331 square meters of the second
parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square
meter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on
August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the
supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the
contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135,
against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a)
declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d)
reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch
256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license.
He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive
father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent
Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of
the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties
covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as
proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material
averments of petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details
regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo.
Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo
Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that

496

their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be
granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary
judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who
solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of
respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad
were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of
irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his
own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil
Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent
Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of
respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony,
respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.
5

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its
report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos
solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate
submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage
license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural,
illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum
of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of
filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the
portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061
of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to
cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

497

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel
TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole
name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval
and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval
and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim
for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and
litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.
6

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia,
that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment
annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an
illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
7

The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a
quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The
fact that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did
not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to recover upon
a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic)
to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented
and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a
misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the

498

petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly
proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have
traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution
of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively
dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own
brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for
thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the
latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call
for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case.
Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the
case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for
annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary
the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily
conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage,
the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the
marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo
Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as
appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary,
appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is
corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo
Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at
Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract
executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said
marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the
reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage
Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same."
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered
view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the
motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the
case on the merits.

499

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage -
is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-
presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not
procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be
emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the
legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of
the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the
basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it
had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of
appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son
of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the
said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his
entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's
bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an
indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support
what could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative
filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements, appellant
Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II
is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight
years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the
shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could have done in the
premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly
resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.
8

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision,
Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the
Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage,
petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that
the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and intended by
law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by
the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or
with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,

500

petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious
reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules
of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing
Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of
speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of
the laws and misapprehension of the facts.
9
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab
initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit
of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a
spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of
judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19
10
of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue,
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing
summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the
Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise
considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary
the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x
11

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was
correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

501

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the
application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or
annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by
the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003
12
is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the
case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to
matters involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be
proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.
13
In that
case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of
summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or
declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all
kinds of actions.
14
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right
and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the
declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State
should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered.
15

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting
attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor
sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no
suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be
presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to
intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or
fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.
16


502

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity
of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be
filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the
spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is
enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot
be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition.Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of
their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of
the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.
17
(Underscoring
supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy,
loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build
the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They
are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they
alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds
allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The
Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
18

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the
beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of
marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the
compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

503

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
19

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family
Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003
20
is
prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps.
Medinaceli,
21
viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.
22
(Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995.
The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern
depends upon when the marriage took place.
23

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.
24
But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be
construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person
must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
25
Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real
party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
26

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about
the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is
not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of
action.
27

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,
28
where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who
can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can

504

demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it
affects their successional rights.
x x x x
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign
law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was
granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same
allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
and the same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court
should declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced
the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a
valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial
court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground
that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the
same.
29
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-
in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only
surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law
on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.
30

Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were
respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

505

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
31

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a
collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he
still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code
provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes
collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession
by collateral relatives.
32
Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the decedent.
33

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of
marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that
collateral relatives, like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the
decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings
but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of
his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil
Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is
found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of
marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate,
adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then
petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to
be protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in
controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit.
This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,
34
or even an adopted
child
35
excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

506

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the
validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to
dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by
evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo
Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is
proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the
other causes of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of
the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should
not leave the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by
the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.
36

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
petitioner's bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is
insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However,
We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent
Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the
guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be
afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family
Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very
act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is
unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect
the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
37

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning
reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so,
as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was
null and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the
status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of
marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

507

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted
son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the
action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED
AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to
give this case priority in its calendar.

MORIGO VS PEOPLE
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from
1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each
other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to
join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August
30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant
Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition
for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992
and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago
4
at
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage
with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

508

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information
5
filed by
the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
6

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for
judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy
case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by
the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No.
8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio
Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months
of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
7

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,
8
the
trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,
9
which
held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which
one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no
jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by
said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith
in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v.
Bitdu,
10
everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his
act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the
marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initiosince no marriage ceremony actually took
place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

509

SO ORDERED.
11

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could
not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349
12
of the
Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage
had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the
beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15
13
of
the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under
Article 17
14
of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by
a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the
doctrine in Mendiola v. People,
15
allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the
effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.
16
However,
the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice
Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared
void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the
law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
C.

510

THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and
if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The
petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal
in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised
Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a
complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the intent to commit the
crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his
intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,
18
which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted
provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40
19
of the Family Code, a
judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the
petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know
the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith because he
relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No.
6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must
first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-
Bobis v. Bobis,
20
we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence
of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in
Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the
annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete

511

on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of
Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.
21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio
and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court
thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3
22
and 4
23
of the
Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes,
reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of
the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never
married."
24
The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning."
The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted
the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being
an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner,
must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.
25
In the
latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."
26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not
just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and
then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first
marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

512

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute
in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of
innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we
held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry
on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is
now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the
appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven
with moral certainty.

JARILLO VS PEOPLE
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Victoria S.
Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the
said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage
was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial
proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding
ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal
(Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church
wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26,
TSN dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter,
Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel
Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before then Hon. Judge
Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated
November 22, 2000).

513

On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church
wedding in Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for annulment of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City x x x.
x x x x
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for declaration of nullity of their
marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive portion
of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused Victoria
Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor, as
maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the nullity of
accuseds bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and their property. This
aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 99-
93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that assailed Order
3

For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were
null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the
time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null
and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy
knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July
21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with
Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet
been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous
marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck
down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioners contentions that her marriages were

514

celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as
far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28,
2003, declaring petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on
the ground of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory
on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of
nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8,
2004, the CA, citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,
4
denied reconsideration and ruled that
"[t]he subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal
consequences, among which is incurring criminal liability for bigamy."
5

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
where petitioner alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PROCEEDING
WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO
THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE THE
SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO
ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE AT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND
VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO AND EMMANUEL
SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER
THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is
true that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for
suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration
of nullity of petitioners marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial
question. In her appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Uy, initiated by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The

515

RTC denied her motion for suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,
6
the Court categorically stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy,
and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency
of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x
x x x x
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and
purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not
erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a
first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x
7

The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,
8
where it was held thus:
9

For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioners conviction of
the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of
bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioners
marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the
nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference.
10
As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a

516

liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code],
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage."
11

Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which
is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides
that "[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years," while
Article 91 states that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence,
prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of
defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce
evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-
serving.
12
Thus, for petitioners defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon
her to adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of
her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to
present sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioners testimony that her own
mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire
belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly
observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person who allegedly actually
told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that without the
confirmatory testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of any act which she
allegedly did is hearsay.
13

As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,
14
"the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy
should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being counted from the date
of registration of the bigamous marriage.
15
Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that
the period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.1avvphi 1
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the
Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it
entirely within the sound discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long
as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the

517

periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only
in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.
16

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy is prision
mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1
day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore,
correct as it is still within the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor
should be imposed in its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years.
Again, the trial court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioners marriage to Alocillo
has after all been declared by final judgment
17
to be void ab initio on account of the latters
psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative
abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus,
petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two
(2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years
and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are hereby
MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum.

TENEBRO VS CA
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration
of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological
incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not
retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws
are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the
subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant
Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the
City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and
without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had
been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro
showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking

518

this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with
Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
1

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 15.
2
When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,
3
Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
4
The Information,
5
which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united
in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the
essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".
6

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with
whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married
to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.
7
He
alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his
office in connection with his work as a seaman.
8
He further testified that he requested his
brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all
between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.
9

On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a
decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.
10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS
ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE
FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME
OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE

519

ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.
11

After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
12

Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the
existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity
of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged
indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to
the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.
13
Hence, petitioner argues that all
four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.
14

Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove
the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence
presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and
Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at
the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;
15
and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to
Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally
married.
16

To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued
by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995;
17
and (2) a certification issued by
the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997.
18
Both these documents attest that
the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B.
Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the
marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the
existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.

520

All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of
Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage
contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original
of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof
(Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract
plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on
November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public
documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National
Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on
February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that
there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices
have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is
quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or
documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage,
especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage
contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity
of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the
marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
19
There is no evidence
presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the
accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony
that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and petitioners own
conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for
validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the
first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-
existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics
Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3,
1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage to
his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.

521

The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial
declaration
20
of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to
Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.
21

This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner
fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity.
22
Since a
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law,
or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during
the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a
subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal
laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of
this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of
the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has
undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by
the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent
freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)
23
and formal (authority of the
solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties
personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence
of at least two witnesses).
24
Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles
37
25
and 38
26
may contract marriage.
27


522

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied
by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily
contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr.
of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without
legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.
28
There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability
for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in
some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in
this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted
marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still
subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes
of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity
of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special
contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a
deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic social institution, the States
criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of
bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be
entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence,
the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced
petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner
Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

ANTONE VS BERONILLA

523

On 12 March 2007, herein petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint
4
for
Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. She
alleged that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when
the latter contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991.
On 21 June 2007, the prosecution filed the corresponding Information
5
before the Regional
Trial Court, Pasay City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM and
raffled to Branch 115.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent moved to quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
6
He informed
the court that his marriage with petitioner was declared null and void by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran on 26 April 2007;
7
that the decision became final and
executory on 15 May 200[7];
8
and that such decree has already been registered with the
Municipal Civil Registrar on 12 June 2007.
9
He argued that since the marriage had been
declared null and void from the beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak of.
Absent a first valid marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the crime
of bigamy.
10

In its comment/opposition to the motion,
11
the prosecution, through herein petitioner,
maintained that the respondent committed an act which has all the essential requisites of
bigamy. The prosecution pointed out that the marriage of petitioner and respondent on 18
November 1978 has not yet been severed when he contracted a second marriage on 16
February 1991, for which reason, bigamy has already been committed before the court
declared the first marriage null and void on 27 April 2007.
12
The prosecution also invoked
the rulings of the Supreme Court holding that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission
of the facts alleged in the information, and that facts contrary thereto are matters of defense
which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.
13

After a hearing on the motion,
14
the court quashed the Information.
15
Applying Morigo v.
People,
16
it ruled:
Hence, contrary to what was stated in the Information, accused Beronilla was actually never
legally married to Myrna Antone. On this score alone, the first element appears to be
missing. Furthermore, the statement in the definition of Bigamy which reads "before the first
marriage has been legally dissolved" clearly contemplates that the first marriage must at
least be annullable or voidable but definitely not void, as in this case. xxx [I]n a similar case,
[the Supreme Court] had the occasion to state:
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." xxx
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime
of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there
is no first marriage to speak of. xxx
17


524

The prosecution, through herein petitioner, moved for reconsideration of the said Order
18
on
the ground, among others, that the facts and the attending circumstances in Morigo are not
on all fours with the case at bar. It likewise pointed out that, in Mercado v. Tan,
19
this Court
has already settled that "(a) declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense."
20

In its Order of 6 December 2007,
21
the court denied the motion for reconsideration stating
that Mercado has already been superseded by Morigo.
In the interim, in a Petition for Relief from Judgment
22
before the Regional Trial Court of
Naval, Biliran, petitioner questioned the validity of the proceedings in the petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage in Civil Case No. B-1290 on 5 October 2007. On 24 March
2008, the court set aside its Decision of 26 April 2007 declaring the marriage of petitioner
with respondent null and void, and required herein petitioner (respondent in Civil Case No.
B-1290) to file her "answer to the complaint."
23
On 21 July 2008, the court DISMISSED the
petition for nullity of marriage for failure of herein respondent (plaintiff in Civil Case No. B-
1290) to submit his pre-trial brief.
24
Respondent, however, challenged the orders issued by
the court before the Court of Appeals.
25
The matter is still pending resolution thereat.
26

Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed on 26 March
2008 before the Court of Appeals,
27
herein petitioner alleged that the Pasay City trial court
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case of bigamy and denied her motion for
reconsideration.
In its Resolution of 29 April 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition stating that:
The present petition xxx is fatally infirm in form and substance for the following reasons:
1. The verification is defective as it does not include the assurance that the
allegations in the petition are based on authentic records.
2. Since the petition assails the trial courts dismissal of the criminal information for
bigamy filed against private respondent Leo Beronilla, the petition, if at all warranted,
should be filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by the Office of the Solicitor
General, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases.
3. There is a violation of the rule on double jeopardy as the dismissal of the subject
criminal case is tantamount to an acquittal based on the trial courts finding that the
first essential element of bigamy, which is a first valid marriage contracted by private
respondent is wanting. There is no clear showing in the petition that the dismissal
was tainted with arbitrariness which violated petitioners right to due process.
Notably, petitioner filed her comment/opposition to private respondents motion to
quash before the trial court issued its Order dated September 20, 2007 dismissing
the information. Hence, if there is no denial of due process, there can be no grave
abuse of discretion that would merit the application of the exception to the double
jeopardy rule.
28


525

On 18 July 2008, the Court of Appeals denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration of
the aforequoted Resolution for lack of merit.
29

30

Our Ruling
I
We are convinced that this petition should be given due course despite the defect in the
pleading and the question of legal standing to bring the action.
The Rules of Court provides that a pleading required to be verified which lacks a proper
verification shall be treated as unsigned pleading.
31

This, notwithstanding, we have, in a number of cases, opted to relax the rule in order that
the ends of justice may be served.
32
The defect being merely formal and not jurisdictional,
we ruled that the court may nevertheless order the correction of the pleading, or even act on
the pleading "if the attending circumstances are such that xxx strict compliance with the rule
may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice xxx may be served."
33
At any rate, a
pleading is required to be verified only to ensure that it was prepared in good faith, and that
the allegations were true and correct and not based on mere speculations.
34

There is likewise no dispute that it is the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which has the
authority to represent the government in a judicial proceeding before the Court of Appeals.
The Administrative Code specifically defined its powers and functions to read, among
others:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
xxx It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings
in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
35

As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to:
(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to
assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in cases involving their
respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision and control over such
legal officers with respect to such cases.
36

Thus, in Republic v. Partisala,
37
we held that the summary dismissal of an action in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines, when not initiated by the Solicitor General, is in
order.
38
Not even the appearance of the conformity of the public prosecutor in a petition for

526

certiorari would suffice because the authority of the City Prosecutor or his assistant to
represent the People of the Philippines is limited to the proceedings in the trial court.
39

We took exceptions, however, and gave due course to a number of actions even when the
respective interests of the government were not properly represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General.
In Labaro v. Panay,
40
this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order or
ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one
to question the order or ruling before us.
41
xxx
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff
People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground.
Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some
cases.
42
In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own
the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative,
Inc.,
43
without requiring the Office of the Solicitor General to file a comment on the petition,
this Court determined the merits of the case involving a novel issue on the nature and
scope of jurisdiction of the Cooperative Development Authority to settle cooperative
disputes as well as the battle between two (2) factions concerning the management of the
Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI) "that inevitably threatens
the very existence of one of the countrys major cooperatives."
44

And, lest we defeat the ends of justice, we opt to look into the merit of the instant petition
even absent the imprimatur of the Solicitor General. After all, "for justice to prevail, the
scales must balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone."
45
To borrow
the words of then Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario in another case where the dismissal of a
criminal case pending with the trial court was sought:
[T]he task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic society
under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who [come or are brought to court] are afforded
a fair opportunity to present their side[s]. xxx The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to
its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case.
46

II
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the filing of this petition is in violation of the
respondents right against double jeopardy on the theory that he has already been
practically acquitted when the trial court quashed the Information.
Well settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent

527

jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is
convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express
consent.
47

The third and fourth requisites are clearly wanting in the instant case as (a) respondent has
not yet entered his plea to the charge when he filed the Motion to Quash the Information,
and (2) the case was dismissed not merely with his consent but, in fact, at his instance.
48

We reiterate, time and again, that jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on
account of an order sustaining a motion to quash.
49
More specifically, the granting of a
motion to quash anchored on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
is "not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense."
50
Thus:
It will be noted that the order sustaining the motion to quash the complaint against petitioner
was based on Subsection (a) of Section 2 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court that the facts
charged in the complaint do not constitute an offense. If this is so then the dismissal of said
complaint will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, for it is provided in
Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court [now Section 6 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure] that an order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in Section 2,
Subsection[s] (f) and (h) of this rule [now substantially reproduced in Section 3, Subsections
(g) and (i) of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] xxx.
51

III
We now determine the merit of the petition did the trial court act without or in excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion when it sustained respondents motion to quash on
the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the information?
Petitioner maintains that the trial court did so because the motion was a hypothetical
admission of the facts alleged in the information and any evidence contrary thereto can only
be presented as a matter of defense during trial.
Consistent with existing jurisprudence, we agree with the petitioner.
We define a motion to quash an Information as
the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information
filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the Information.
52

This motion is "a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information,"
53
for which
reason, the court cannot consider allegations contrary to those appearing on the face of the
information.
54

As further elucidated in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:
55


528

It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to
constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss/quash on the ground that it
charges no offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in considering a
motion to quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will
establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.
Contrary to the petitioners contention, a reading of the information will disclose that the
essential elements of the offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It is not proper therefore
to resolve the charges at the very outset, in a preliminary hearing only and without the
benefit of a full-blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination. Given the circumstances
of this case, we feel it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the
proceedings and to dismiss the informations on the basis only of the petitioners evidence,
such as [this].
56

As in the recent case of Los Baos v. Pedro,
57
where we found no merit in respondents
allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because "the Information duly
charged a specific offense and provide[d] the details on how the offense was
committed,"
58
we see no apparent defect in the allegations in the Information in the case at
bar. Clearly, the facts alleged in its accusatory portion, which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1991, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, LEO R.
BERONILLA, having been united in a lawful marriage with one MYRNA A. BERONILLA,
which marriage is still in force and subsisting and without having been legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with one
Cecile Maguillo, which subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites
for validity.
59

sufficiently constitute an offense. It contained all the elements of the crime of Bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code hereunder enumerated:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
60

The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is null and void from the beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become
final and executory and duly registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran
are pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the
Information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted

529

a subsequent marriage. This should not have been considered at all because matters of
defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
Neither do we find a justifiable reason for sustaining the motion to quash even after taking
into consideration the established exceptions to the rule earlier recognized by this Court,
among others: (1) when the new allegations are admitted by the prosecution;
61
(2) when the
Rules so permit, such as upon the grounds of extinction of criminal liability and double
jeopardy;
62
and (3) when facts have been established by evidence presented by both
parties which destroyed the prima facie truth of the allegations in the information during the
hearing on a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, and "it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and
still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to
support possible conviction xxx."
63

For of what significance would the document showing the belated dissolution of the first
marriage offer? Would it serve to prevent the impracticability of proceeding with the trial in
accordance with People v. dela Rosa thereby warranting the non-observance of the settled
rule that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
information? We quote:
[W]here in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground that the allegations of
the information do not charge an offense, facts have been brought out by evidence
presented by both parties which destroy theprima facie truth accorded to the allegations of
the information on the hypothetical admission thereof, as is implicit in the nature of the
ground of the motion to quash, it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to
said facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak
even to support possible conviction, and hold the accused to what would clearly appear to
be a merely vexatious and expensive trial, on her part, and a wasteful expense of precious
time on the part of the court, as well as of the prosecution.
64
We find that there is none.
With the submission of the documents showing that the court has declared the first
marriage void ab initio, respondent heavily relied on the rulings
65
in People v. Mendoza and
Morigo declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a void ab initio marriage will not
prosper because there is no need for a judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio
marriage is invalid;
66
and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect
such that there would be no first valid marriage to speak of after all, which renders the
elements of bigamy incomplete.
67

Both principles, however, run contrary to the new provision of the Family Code, which was
promulgated by the late President Corazon C. Aquino in 1987, a few years before
respondents subsequent marriage was celebrated in 1991.
The specific provision, which reads:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.

530

was exhaustively discussed in Mercado,
68
where this Court settled the "conflicting"
jurisprudence on "the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage."
After establishing that Article 40 is a new provision expressly requiring a judicial declaration
of nullity of a prior marriage and examining a long line of cases,
69
this Court, concluded, in
essence, that under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the
first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. Otherwise stated, this Court declared that a person, who contracts a
subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous one, is guilty
of bigamy.
70

Notably, Morigo, was indeed promulgated years after Mercado. Nevertheless, we cannot
uphold the Order dated 6 December 2007 of the trial court, which maintained that Morigo
has already superseded Mercado. In fact, in Morigo, this Court clearly distinguished the two
(2) cases from one another, and explained:
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the
latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after
the second marriage was already celebrated. xxx
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized xxx.
Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared
void ab initio.
71

The application of Mercado to the cases following Morigo even reinforces the position of this
Court to give full meaning to Article 40 of the Family Code. Thus, in 2004, this Court ruled in
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:
72

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, xxx said marriage is not without legal effects.1avvphil. zw+ Among
these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law
itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. xxx.
73
(Emphasis
supplied.)
Finally, in Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia
Serafico,
74
this Court pronounced:

531

In a catena of cases,
75
the Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. xxx
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial
for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not
constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be
interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established
rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which
may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.
All considered, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when, in so
quashing the Information in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM, it considered an evidence
introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding the settled rules that a motion to
quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the information; and that facts not
alleged thereat may be appreciated only under exceptional circumstances, none of which is
obtaining in the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay City as well as the Resolutions dated 29 April 2008
and 18 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 07-
0907-CFM is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

TEVES VS PEOPLE
On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and
Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma) at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Metro
Manila.
3

After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would only come home to the
Philippines for vacations. While on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that her husband
had contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon (Edita). To verify the information, she
went to the National Statistics Office and secured a copy of the Certificate of
Marriage
4
indicating that her husband and Edita contracted marriage on 10 December 2001
at the Divine Trust Consulting Services, Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On 13 February 2006, Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma, filed before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Malolos City, Bulacan a complaint
5
accusing petitioner of
committing bigamy.
Petitioner was charged on 8 June 2006 with bigamy defined and penalized under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in an Information
6
which reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December, 2001 up to the present, in the municipality of
Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

532

Court, the said Cenon R. Teves being previously united in lawful marriage on November 26,
1992 with Thelma B. Jaime and without the said marriage having legally dissolved, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with one Edita T.
Calderon, who knowing of the criminal design of accused Cenon R. Teves to marry her and
in concurrence thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cooperate in
the execution of the offense by marrying Cenon R. Teves, knowing fully well of the
existence of the marriage of the latter with Thelma B. Jaime.
During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the Regional Trial Court , Branch 130,
Caloocan City, rendered a decision
7
dated 4 May 2006 declaring the marriage of petitioner
and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Said
decision became final by virtue of a Certification of Finality
8
issued on 27 June 2006.
On 15 August 2007, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
Cenon R. Teves, also known as Cenon Avelino R. Teves, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged
in the Information dated June 8, 2006. Pursuant to the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
9

Refusing to accept such verdict, petitioner appealed the decision before the Court of
Appeals contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal action or liability
had already been extinguished. He also claimed that the trial court erred in finding him guilty
of Bigamy despite the defective Information filed by the prosecution.
10

On 21 January 2009, the CA promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated August 15, 2007 in
Criminal Case No. 2070-M-2006 is AFFIRMED in TOTO.
11

On 11 February 2009, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision.
12
This
however, was denied by the CA in a resolution issued on 2 July 2009.
13

Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, "there is in
effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of."
14
He differentiates a
previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage null and void ab initio, and posits that
the former requires a judicial dissolution before one can validly contract a second marriage
but a void marriage, for the same purpose, need not be judicially determined.

533

Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan
15
is inapplicable in
his case because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy was initiated before the
declaration of nullity of marriage was filed. In petitioners case, the first marriage had
already been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. There is nothing in the law that would
sustain petitioners contention.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
16

The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in
affirming the conviction of petitioner.
Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or subsequent marriage with Edita on 10
December 2001 in Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his
marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision
declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006 or about five
(5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or subsequent marriage of
petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner has in fact not
disputed the validity of such subsequent marriage.
17

It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His contention that
he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is
bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on
the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
18


534

The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted
what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage
should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again.
19

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
20
1avvphi1
In numerous cases,
21
this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier
marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a
complaint against him. We note that in petitioners case the complaint was filed before the
first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was
overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioners argument,
even assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can
still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the filing
of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so would make the crime of
bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to
immediately act on complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioners
strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of
the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by
law, and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is
material only for determining prescription.
22
The crime of bigamy was committed by
petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The
finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to
Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 21
January 2009 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

NOLLORA VS PEOPLE
On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed an
Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. ("Nollora") and Rowena P. Geraldino
("Geraldino") for the crime of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

535

"That on or about the 8th day of December 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., being then legally married to one JESUSA
PINAT NOLLORA, and as said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a subsequent or second
marriage with her [sic] co-accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented
and agreed to be married to her co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing him to
be a married man, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party JESUSA PINAT
NOLLORA."
Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel, refused to
enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court for him. Accused
Geraldino, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 14, 2005.
On even date, pre-trial conference was held and both the prosecution and defense entered
the following stipulation of facts:
"1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and Jesusa
Pinat Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with Rowena P.
Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;
3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he admitted that he
contracted the second marriage to Rowena P. Geraldino;
4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the Certificate
of Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December 8, 2001;
5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. as
admitted in her Counter-Affidavit."
The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTCs resolution is whether or not
the second marriage is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial conference was terminated and the
case was set for initial hearing. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of prosecution
witnesses were as follows:
"xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and accused Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah
Naval Base Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999, they got
married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan
(Exhibit A). While working in said hospital, she heard rumors that her husband has another
wife and because of anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and returned to the
Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the Philippines, the private
complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage with

536

co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit B) when she secured a
certification as to the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit C) from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in November 2003.
Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted Rowena P. Geraldino at
the latters workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig and asked her if she knew of the first marriage
between complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly
affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
because she loves him so much and because they were neighbors and childhood friends.
Private complainant also knew that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her marriage with Atilano
O. Nollora, Jr., because when she (private complainant) was brought by Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. at the latters residence in Taguig, Metro Manila and introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr.s parents, Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the house together with a friend and she
heard everything that they were talking about.
Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to Saudi Arabia to work as
a Staff Midwife thereby losing income opportunity in the amount of P34,000.00 a month,
more or less. When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that what
happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained [thoughts] of committing suicide.
She added that because of what happened to her, her mother died and she almost got
raped when Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their residence in Saudi Arabia.
However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she
just asked for the return of her money in the amount of P50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005,
pages 4-14).
Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the marriage between the
private complainant and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in
said wedding. Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private complainant to
accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena P. Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro
Manila. She declared that the private complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a
confrontation and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that she (Rowena) knew of
the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the private complainant but she still went on
to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him very much (TSN, October 24, 2005,
pages 3-5).
Evidence for the Defense
The defenses version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is as follows:
"Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2) marriages, the first with
private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however,
claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he
contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a [M]uslim convert, he is
allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.
To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to the private complainant,
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by
one Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin wherein it is

537

stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992
(Exhibit 2, 3 and 4). Aside from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge of
Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueo and
approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin (Exhibit 7).
He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim convert prior to their
marriage because she [sic] told this fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the
reason why said private complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having learned
of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further testified that Rowena P.
Geraldino was not aware of his first marriage with the private complainant and he did not tell
her this fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not want to lose her if
she learns of his first marriage.
He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is indicated that he was a
Catholic Pentecostal but that he was not aware why it was placed as such on said
contract. In his Marriage Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion Catholic was also
indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim since the society does
not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also indicated that he was single despite his first
marriage to keep said first marriage a secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).
Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueo testified that he is the founder and president
of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the Philippines and as such president, he has the
power and authority to convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He alleged that
sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini (Manila) who was then
going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied to become a Muslim (Exhibit 14) and after
receiving the application, said accused was indoctrinated regarding his obligations as a
Muslim. On January 10, 1992, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. embraced the Muslim faith. He was
then directed to report every Sunday to monitor his development.
In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a certification because of
the filing of the instant case. On October 2, 2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion
wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since January 10, 1992.
Apart from the above-mentioned document, their Imam also issued a Pledge of Conversion
(Exhibit 7). He declared that a Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the
Holy Koran. However, before marrying his second, third and fourth wives, it is required that
the consent of the first Muslim wife be secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there
is no necessity to secure her consent (TSN, October 9, 2006, pages 2-12).
During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert gets married not in
accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim faith.
A Muslim also can marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them equally. He
claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was aware of the second. Since his
second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino was not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he
advised Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino in accordance with Muslim
marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25,
2007, pages 3-7).

538

Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in this incident of
bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not know the private complainant Jesusa
Pinat Nollora and only came to know her when this case was filed. She insists that she is
the one lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to the latter since
December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with
the private complainant, she confronted the former who admitted the said marriage. Prior to
their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and the latter responded
that he was single. She also knew that her husband was a Catholic prior to their marriage
but after she learned of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim
convert. She also claimed that after learning that her husband was a Muslim convert, she
and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married in accordance with the Muslim rites. She also
belied the allegations of the private complainant that she was sought by the private
complainant and that they had a confrontation where she admitted that she knew that
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married to the private complainant and despite this knowledge,
she went on to marry him because she loved him very much. She insisted that she only
came to know the private complainant when she (private complainant) filed this case (TSN,
August 14, 2007, pages 2-8)."
5

The Trial Courts Ruling
In its Decision
6
dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and acquitted
Geraldino.
The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for bigamy: Article
41
7
of the Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article 180
8
of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited
Article 27 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the
qualifications for allowing Muslim men to have more than one wife: "[N]o Muslim male can
have more than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship and just
treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases."
In convicting Nollora, the trial courts Decision further stated thus:
The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is allowed only to
meet urgent needs. Only with the permission of the court can a Muslim be permitted to have
a second wife subject to certain requirements. This is because having plurality of wives is
merely tolerated, not encouraged, under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal
Status in the Philippines by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition,
Pages 64-65). Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract
subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall notify the Sharia Circuit Court of the place
where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife or wives.
Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall be constituted. If said
council fails to secure the wifes consent to the proposed marriage, the Court shall, subject
to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines).
Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P. Geraldino,
did not comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In fact, he did not even

539

declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages, indicating his criminal intent. In his
converting to the Muslim faith, said accused entertained the mistaken belief that he can just
marry anybody again after marrying the private complainant. What is clear, therefore, is
[that] a Muslim is not given an unbridled right to just marry anybody the second, third or
fourth time. There are requirements that the Sharia law imposes, that is, he should have
notified the Sharia Court where his family resides so that copy of said notice should be
furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first wife is not required since she
is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to notify the said court rests upon accused
Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to interpret the Sharia law. It is the Sharia Court that has
this authority.
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated their marriage
in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer cure the criminal liability
that has already been violated.
The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano Nollora, Jr.,
only. There is no sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena P. Geraldino down.
The evidence presented by the prosecution against her is the allegation that she knew of
the first marriage between private complainant and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,]
being open to several interpretations. Private complainant alleged that when she was
brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr., to the latters house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P.
Geraldino was there standing near the door and heard their conversation. From this
incident, private complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she
and Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it could
not be reasonably presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino understands what was going on
between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that "(E)very circumstance favoring
accuseds innocence must be taken into account, proof against him must survive the test of
reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment" (People vs.
Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court, therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for
failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. This court hereby renders judgment imposing upon him a prison
term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.
b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for
failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
9


540

Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary liberty under
the same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court granted Nolloras motion.
Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the trial court:
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged
despite the prosecutions failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
10

The Appellate Courts Ruling
On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nolloras appeal and affirmed the
trial courts decision.
11

The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his second marriage to Geraldino was in
lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the Quran. The appellate court
denied Nolloras invocation of his religious beliefs and practices to the prejudice of the non-
Muslim women who married him pursuant to Philippine civil laws.1avvphi1Nolloras two marriages
were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the
Family Code of the Philippines should apply. Nolloras claim of religious freedom will not
immobilize the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare.
In a Resolution
12
dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nolloras motion for
reconsideration. The allegations in the motion for reconsideration were a mere rehash of
Nolloras earlier arguments, and there was no reason for the appellate court to modify its 30
September 2009 Decision.
Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy.
The Courts Ruling
Nolloras petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and of the trial
court.
Elements of Bigamy
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are:

541

1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, theabsent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
13

The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is
legally married to Pinat;
14
(2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not been legally dissolved
prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence of his second
marriage to Geraldino;
15
and (4) Nollora and Geraldinos marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.
16

The marriage certificate
17
of Nollora and Pinats marriage states that Nollora and Pinat were
married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on
6 April 1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the IEMELIF Church officiated the
ceremony. The marriage certificate
18
of Nollora and Geraldinos marriage states that Nollora
and Geraldino were married at Maxs Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro
Manila on 8 December 2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.
A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar General reads:
We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on February
22, 1968 from ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT, appears in our
National Indices of Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to 2002 with the following
information:
Date of Marriage Place of Marriage

a) April 06, 1999 b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN
a) December 08,
2001
b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd
District)
19

Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his sole defense.
He alleged that his religion allows him to marry more than once. Granting arguendo that
Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of celebration of both marriages,
20
Nollora
cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:
Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Sharia and not subject to

542

stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain extent fix the property relations
of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following
essential requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent
persons after the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent
persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen years of age
and any Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not suffering from any
impediment under the provisions of this Code may contract marriage. A female is presumed
to have attained puberty upon reaching the age of fifteen.
x x x.
Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is required but
the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and the two competent witnesses. The declaration shall be set
forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed or marked by the contracting parties and said
witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to
the contracting parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer
who shall keep the third.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under
Muslim law to solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Sharia District Court or Sharia Circuit Court or any person
designated by the judge, should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to
authorize the solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque,
office of the Sharia judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wali,
or at any other suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the
contracting parties (mahr-musamma) before, during or after the celebration of marriage. If

543

the amount or the value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower (mahr-mithl) shall,
upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court according to the social standing of the
parties.
Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a
marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order No.
209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply." Nolloras religious affiliation is
not an issue here. Neither is the claim that Nolloras marriages were solemnized according
to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption
from liability for the crime of bigamy.
21

Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is "single."
Moreover, both of Nolloras marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although
the truth or falsehood of the declaration of ones religion in the marriage certificate is not an
essential requirement for marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Nolloras liability
for bigamy. Nolloras false declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by
these omissions.
[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here as your
religion, Catholic Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January 10, 1992, you are
already a [M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you are already a [M]uslim convert
since January 10, 1992. However, in your marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no
indication here that you have indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage
contract?
[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didnt know why they did not
place any Catholic there.
x x x
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to your marriage
contract with your co-accused in this case, Rowena Geraldino, x x x will you please
tell us, Mr. Witness, considering that you said that you are already a [M]uslim convert
on January 10, 1992, why in the marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you
indicated there your religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was keeping it as a
secret my being my Balik-Islam, thats why I placed there Catholic since I know that
the society doesnt approve a Catholic to marry another, thats why I placed there
Catholic as my religion, sir.
Q: How about under the column, "civil status," why did you indicate there that youre
single, Mr. Witness?

544

A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married.
22
(Emphasis supplied)
x x x
[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be indicated as
Catholic when in fact you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to be put in your marriage
contract?
x x x
[A:] I dont think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get married under
the Catholic rights [sic] because after that we even got married under the [M]uslim rights
[sic], your Honor.
x x x
Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under your faith to
secure the permission of your first wife to get married?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?
A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at me, at the
start, she was always very mad, maam.
23

In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his marriage to
Geraldino.1avvphi 1 Nollora may not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate himself
from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors to allowing the
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals:
24

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void
ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws
on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise
of futurity and commitment.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 31538 promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution promulgated on 23

545

February 2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment with a term of two years, four months and one day ofprision correccional as
minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum of his indeterminate
sentence, as well as the accessory penalties provided by law.

VILLATUYA VS TABALINGCOS
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar
Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S.
'L1halingcos (resrondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or
Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross immorality for
marrying two other women while respondents first marriage was subsisting.
1

In a Resolution
2
dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required
respondent to file a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005.
3
The Complaint was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the record.
4

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a
Notice
5
setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005.
During the conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and
respondent. They submitted for resolution three issues to be resolved by the Commission
as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
nonpayment of fees to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.
6

The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers.
Respondent filed his verified Position Paper,
7
on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted
his on 01 August 2005.
8

Complainants Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial
consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latters numerous
petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that they
had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to P 50,000 for every Stay Order
issued by the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the
fees paid by their clients. He alleged that, from February to December 2002, respondent
was able to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were
working on together. Complainant also claimed that he was entitled to the amount

546

of P 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with
respondent, and a total of P 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients.
9
Complainant
appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of the fees he
believes are due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of
Section 27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two
financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link,
Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant
supported his allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of
Jesi and Jane,
10
letter-proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates
11
and
proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients.
12

On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two
counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was
subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos,
herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano,
which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma.
Rowena Garcia Pion in the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary
Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila.
13

Respondents Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant
was not an employee of his law firm Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office
14
but of
Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a major stockholder.
15
Respondent
alleged that complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a
financial consultant, resulting in the latters dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they
presented in their court cases.
16
Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal
agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional
fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had
been paid.
17

As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended
that his law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm
would handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would
attend to the financial aspect of the case such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans
to be presented in court. To support this contention, respondent attached to his Position
Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos
and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.;
18
and an Affidavit
executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of the said company.
19

On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William
Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no
probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself.
20
Respondent did not
specifically address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two
other women.

547

On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage
Contracts.
21
To the said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage
Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO.
22
The appended Marriage
Contracts matched the dates, places and names of the contracting parties indicated in the
earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three marriages entered into by respondent. The
first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that took place between respondent and
Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980.
23
The second marriage contract
was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Pion, and it took place at the Metropolitan
Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987.
24
The third Marriage Contract
referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on
7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage Contracts,
respondent was described as single under the entry for civil status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by
complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory conference
or submitted during the hearing of the case.
25
Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of
the opportunity to controvert those documents.
26
He disclosed that criminal cases for
bigamy were filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila. Respondent further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare
Null and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Pion at the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bian, Laguna, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.
27
He also filed another
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-
Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271.
28
In both petitions, he claimed
that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the records of the
NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar Lozano on
different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they were purportedly null and
void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a
clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007.
29
While complainant manifested to the
Commission that he would not attend the hearing,
30
respondent manifested his willingness to
attend and moved for the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against the
latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the
nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be bearing his name.
31

On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies
of two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."
32
The first criminal case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent
with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid.
33
The
other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with having
committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his
marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting.
34
Each of the Informations recommended
bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as accused in the criminal cases.
35

On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same
proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the

548

outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the RTCLaguna. Thus, the
Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.
36

IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent.
37
The first charge,
for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of
merit. The Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper courts
since it was only empowered to determine respondents administrative liability. On this
matter, complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.
38
On the second
charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of
client for having advertised his legal services and unlawfully solicited cases. It
recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to point out exactly
the specific provision he violated.
39

As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality
for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through
documentary evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying two other
women while the latters first marriage was subsisting.
40
Due to the gravity of the acts of
respondent, the Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be
stricken off the roll of attorneys.
41

On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154,
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
42
On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends that the
Commission should have suspended the disbarment proceedings pending the resolution of
the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his
name as having entered into those contracts with other women. He further contends that
the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that the latter committed bigamy was not
substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the
administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately filed with the
RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage Contracts.
43

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and
affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondents disbarment.
44

The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees

549

While we affirm the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur
with the rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the formers
share in the fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule
9.02
45
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to
divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to
practice law. Based on the allegations, respondent had agreed to share with complainant
the legal fees paid by clients that complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant,
however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David
46
that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson
to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that
the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that
complainants allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the
charge against respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal
services through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence
to prove that Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned
and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the latters legal services and to solicit
clients. In its Report, the IBP established the truth of these allegations and ruled that
respondent had violated the rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the
specific provision that was breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities
mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be
specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated
Rule 2.03
47
of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of
profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety
arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as
to be inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises
when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional
employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the
lawyers behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the
practice of law.
48

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a
vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for
corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C"
49
of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane

550

Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The
letter clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees,
respondent would render legal services related to the formers loan obligation with a bank.
This circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is
signed by respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or
associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.08
50
of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether
the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those
occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations
governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and not in the other.
51
In
this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering
consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this
practice by respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating
Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To
substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage
Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to
the introduction of these documents, claiming that they were submitted after the
administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to
controvert them.
52
We are not persuaded by his argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the
qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the
procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:
53

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings
and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we
see no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a
component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it
involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the
continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the
violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public
concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.1wphi1 For the court
to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
convincing and satisfactory proof.
54
In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true
copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latters first marriage

551

was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third
marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not
dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he contracted those two
other marriages. He submitted copies of the two Petitions he had filed separately with the
RTC of Laguna one in Bian and the other in Calamba to declare the second and the
third Marriage Contracts null and void.
55

We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the
authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage
Contracts presented by complainant to prove the formers marriages to two other women
aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts
bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he
committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The
documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records
pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a person. Having been issued by a
government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much evidentiary weight and carries
with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any
competent evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he
filed civil actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for
Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated the second and the third marriage
contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the
then Civil Code provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code
provisions on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code. Respondents regard
for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the
sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to
annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage
twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,
56
we
held thus:
We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not
only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued
membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was
committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a
lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen
at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he
who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do
so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor
are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations.
The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of
the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that
the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

552

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.
57
His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and
are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
58

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his
name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos
as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly
immoral conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos
in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of
Attorneys.

MONTANEZ VS CIPRIANO
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan.
3
On
January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio
V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna.
4
In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of
Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latters
psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256,
rendered an Amended Decision
5
declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null
and void. Said decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003.
6

On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaez, Silverios daughter from the first
marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint
7
for
Bigamy against respondent, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to
the complaint was an Affidavit
8
(Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004,
thumb-marked and signed by Silverio,
9
which alleged, among others, that respondent failed
to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an
Information
10
for Bigamy was filed against respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:

553

That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with
one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first marriage with SOCRATES FLORES
has not been judicially dissolved by proper judicial authorities.
11

On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion
to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint)
12
alleging that her marriage
with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more
marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic
element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also
claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already
prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment
13
arguing that the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that
the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid, while
the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void by the
court.
In its Order
14
dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's
argument that with the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more first
marriage to speak of and thus the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to
have been laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan
15
where we held:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the
first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him
with bigamy. For contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he
committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. x x x
16

As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that while
the second marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive
period for the crime of bigamy, the commission of the crime was only discovered on
November 17, 2004, which should be the reckoning period, hence, prescription has not yet
set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration
17
claiming that the Mercado ruling was not
applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family
Code; that the petition for annulment was granted and became final before the criminal
complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given any
retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a
declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,
18
the dispositive portion of
which reads:

554

Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be
entered quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage on
January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not
require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a
subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent on the
issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The
RTC found that both marriages of respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family
Code, thus, considering the unsettled state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before commencing a second marriage and the
principle that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that the
absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the accused whose second
marriage was declared once and for all valid with the annulment of her first marriage by the
RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by
respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling,
among others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount
to a mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all, and for this
reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code
and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity
is a valid defense for a charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage prior to the
enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the
Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of
securing a declaration of nullity of the first marriage before entering a second marriage
ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a subsequent marriage without the
annulment of the first without incurring criminal liability.
19

Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the
Information for bigamy was filed by private complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) which should represent the government in all judicial proceedings filed
before us.
20

Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In
Antone v. Beronilla,
21
the offended party (private complainant) questioned before the Court
of Appeals (CA) the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her
husband, and the CA dismissed the petition on the ground, among others, that the petition
should have been filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its
statutory counsel in all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we

555

had given due course to a number of actions even when the respective interests of the
government were not properly represented by the OSG and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order ruling
of the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to
question the order or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff
People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground.
Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some
cases. In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the
instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
22

Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it did,
praying that the petition be granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the petition filed
with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in
quashing the Information for bigamy filed against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage.
23
It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not
for the subsistence of the first marriage.
24

In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in
1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same
had not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements
of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion to Quash the Information, she
alleged, among others, that:
x x x x
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said
Socrates Flores was declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the

556

Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision was never appealed, and
became final and executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with
Mr. Flores had already been declared void from the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other
words, there was only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore
wanting.
25

Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question now is whether the declaration of nullity
of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed
against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,
26
we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the
first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy
had already been consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the first was
still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,
27
we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
28
Even if
the accused eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the
point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.
29

In Tenebro v. CA,
30
we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration
of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant
to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children
conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the
States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately
ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment.
31

And in Jarillo v. People,
32
applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's
conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused contracted a second marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy
was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage,

557

the accuseds first marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still
subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned
jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first
marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the
essential elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA
33
is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity of
the previous marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case where the
declaration was rendered before the information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a
person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
34
Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
35

Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were
contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot
be given retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of
securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void marriage.
We are not persuaded.
In Jarillo v. People,
36
where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that
since her marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the
applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613),
37
instead of Article 40 of the
Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a
person may contract a subsequent marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and
said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256
of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The
reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws.1wphi1

558

In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions
of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of his
first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution
for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent
marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and
that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity
of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage license and thereafter contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption
that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on
bigamy.
38

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated
September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.

PEOPLE VS ODTUHAN
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).
3
respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).
4
Sometime in August 1994, he filed a
petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina.
5
On February 23, 1999, the RTC of
Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondents petition and declared his marriage with Modina
void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.
6
On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In
the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of
respondents previous marriage with Modina.
7
She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit
8
charging
respondent with Bigamy.
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information
9
for Bigamy committed as
follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
being then legally married to JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage having been
legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or
subsequent marriage with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent marriage has
all the essential requisites for validity.
Contrary to law.
10

On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion
11
praying that he be allowed to
present evidence to support his motion; that his motion to quash be granted; and that the
case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds,

559

to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action
or liability has been extinguished.
12

On September 4, 2008, the RTC
13
issued an Order
14
denying respondents Omnibus Motion.
The RTC held that the facts alleged in the information that there was a valid marriage
between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been dissolved,
respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon constitute the crime of bigamy. The
trial court further held that neither can the information be quashed on the ground that
criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability. Respondents motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order
15
dated February 20, 2009.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court
16
before the CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information
despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina was declared null and void ab initio prior
to the filing of the bigamy case.
17

On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
The RTC, Branch 27, Manila is hereby ordered to give due course to and receive evidence
on the petitioners motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
18

The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People,
19
and held that there
is cogent basis in looking into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence
would establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one essential element of the
crime of bigamy would be lacking.
20
The appellate court further held that respondent is even
better off than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such doctrine, considering that
respondent contracted the second marriage after filing the petition for the declaration of
nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable declaration before the complaint
for bigamy was filed against him.
21
The CA thus concluded that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in denying respondents motion to quash the information, considering that the
facts alleged in the information do not charge an offense.
22

With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a petition
before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RENDERED
ITS DECISION DATED DECEMBER 17, 2009 GRANTING RESPONDENTS PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI AND THE RESOLUTION DATED MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING
PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
I.

560

THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES
ALL THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE.
II.
THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING RESPONDENTS FIRST
MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID NOT EXTINGUISH RESPONDENTS CRIMINAL
LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID JUDGMENT.
23

The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in Montaez v.
Cipriano,
24
Teves v. People,
25
and Antone v. Beronilla.
26

In Montaez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the
subsistence of their marriage on January 24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001,
respondent filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of
psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner
filed a complaint for bigamy against respondent. The latter, however, moved for the quashal
of the information and dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that her first marriage had
already been declared void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of their
marriage on December 10, 2001, he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner
obtained a declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and void on the ground that the
latter is physically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. On June 8, 2006, an
Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner. The court eventually convicted petitioner
of the crime charged.
In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their
marriage, respondent contracted a second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent
obtained a declaration of nullity of her first marriage which decision became final and
executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an information for
bigamy against respondent which the latter sought to be quashed on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the above
cases. As in Antone and Montaez, respondent moved to quash the information on the
grounds that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and that his criminal liability has
been extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The RTC
refused to quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the CA, however, reached a
different conclusion.
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused
assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency
on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information." It
is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in
determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the

561

facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the
information are not to be considered.
27
To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a
defect in the information which is evident on its fact.
28
Thus, if the defect can be cured by
amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment.
29
If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another
complaint or information be filed
30
except when the information is quashed on the ground of
extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.
31

An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency
of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of
the crime as provided for in Article 349
32
of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
(1) That the offender has been legally married;
(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code;
(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
33

Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally
married to Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that
respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Alagon;
and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. Respondents
evidence showing the courts declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and void from
the beginning because of the absence of a marriage license is only an evidence that seeks
to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a first valid marriage was
subsisting at the time he contracted the second marriage. This should not be considered at
all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
34
It is notproper,
therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial.
The issues require a fuller examination and it would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at
this stage of the proceedings and to quash the information on the basis of the document
presented by respondent.
35
With the presentation of the court decree, no facts have been
brought out which destroyed the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the
information on the hypothetical admission thereof.
Respondents motion to quash was founded on the trial courts declaration that his marriage
with Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration, one of the
elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do not charge the
offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished his criminal liability.
Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on the Courts pronouncement in Morigo v.
People
36
where the accused therein was acquitted because the elements of the crime of
bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first marriage was declared null and void,

562

because the parties only signed the marriage contract without the presence of a
solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the declaration of nullity retroacts to the
date of the first marriage, the Court held that there was no marriage to speak of when the
accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused was acquitted.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.1wphi1 A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense.
37
It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or
else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
38

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
39
Parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted
to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that
the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
40
If we allow respondents line of defense and the CAs ratiocination, a person who
commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered
therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.
41

Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against
him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the
complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such contention. In addition to
the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender
upon the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or
information is material only for determining prescription.
42

Thus, as held in Antone:
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial
for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not
constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be
interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established
rule that facts contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which
may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.
43

In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to
quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are

563

SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.

CAPILI VS PEOPLE
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili
and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.
3

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a
pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of
Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared
null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the
civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial
question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of
the filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or
incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the
ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the
legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for
the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second
marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order
4
dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioners Manifestation
and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision
dated December 1, 2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage)
nullifying the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and
said decision is already final.

564

In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others,
that the issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this
above-captioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not
determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this
Court is of the humble opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the
accused as it appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and
Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of
Antipolo City which has declared "the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the
said second marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision
5
dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs
decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
6

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was
denied in a Resolution[
7
] dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL
COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE
OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND
DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER
PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF
WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER
P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL
AND VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES

565

WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043,
IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND
IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF
THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO
APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS
AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS
IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL
BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE
INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE
BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL
INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL
AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND
SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF
THE DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY
RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK
IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE.
8

In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second
marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as
follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally
married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3)

566

that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
9

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present
when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC
of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between
petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second
marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the
crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the
crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was
celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,
10
the Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for bigamy ruling that the
crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
11

In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled
that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a

567

second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.
12

Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished
as provided by law.
13
It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner
from the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality
of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners second marriage does not impede the filing
of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February
1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.

FUJIKI VS MARINAY
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines
2
on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon
City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
4
On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family
Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;
5
and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing
the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.
7
The RTC cited the
following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

568

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife.
x x x x
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where
the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of
filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the
above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a
ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."
8
Apparently, the RTC took the view that only
"the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to
declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage.
Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is
a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"
9
and
not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong."
10
In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the
status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of
the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines
11
on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.
12

In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void
marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
13
Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties
would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that
the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband
in the prior, pre-existing marriage."
14
Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil
Register Law (Act No. 3753)
15
in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.
16
The Civil Register
Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to
send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where
the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."
17
Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that
entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage"

569

and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or
correction.
18
The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the
Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely
erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated
that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki
cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court
19
which held that the "trial court cannot pre-
empt the defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu
proprio dismissing the case."
20
Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not
have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.
21
The trial court reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections
2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"
22
in the
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."
23
On the other hand,
the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the
Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken
together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."
24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The
City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.
25
The Court in Braza ruled that
"[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x
x."
26
Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a
collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."
27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.
28
Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition
was not authenticated as required under Section 5
29
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this
also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of
Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.
30
The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the
Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and
Motion.
31


570

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement
that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and
that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.
32
The Solicitor General
argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to
declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General
cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic
33
which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
the Constitution.
34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.
35
In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,
36
this Court
held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."
37
WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese
Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who
is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to
record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil
registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the
entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
persons legal capacity and status x x x."
38
The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a
Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a
void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro
39
and Nial v. Bayadog
40
which
declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."
41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for
them to comment on the petition.
42
Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact
that she was previously married to Fujiki.
43
Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of
violence on Marinay.
44
On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose
the petition.
45
She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might
cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.
46


571

The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and
a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
We grant the petition.
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,
47
this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."
48

I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove
the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
49
Petitioner
may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office
which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.
50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the
form and contents of the petition,
51
the service of summons,
52
the investigation of the public
prosecutor,
53
the setting of pre-trial,
54
the trial
55
and the judgment of the trial court.
56
This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."
57
The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,
58
this
Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits,

572

the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial
the previously concluded litigation."
59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and
legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine
if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.
60
Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines,
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such
citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according
to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed
to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and
proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. ,
"want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations,
61
as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.
62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
63
Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven
under the rules of evidence.
64
Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce
law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when
his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.
65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground
of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from

573

the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it
may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons
life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,
66
which the State
has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this
Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."
67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning thecivil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry
is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is
also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in
the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives
from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances
68
) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that
arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.
69
These property interests in
marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family"
70
and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,
72
but a spouses
right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.
73
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
integrity of his marriage.
74
In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this

574

substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage
to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary,
when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"
75
it refers to the husband or the wife of
the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband
nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the
one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
76
which penalizes
bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because
any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.
77
If anyone can file a
criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,
78
there is
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and
preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his
marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an
injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.
79
Juliano-Llave ruled that
the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens
the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."
80
Being a real party in interest, the prior
spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he
can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous
marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held
that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
81
Thus, the "validity
of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.
82
The
RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a
collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent

575

circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,
83
support pendente lite of the spouses and children,
84
the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,
85
and the investigation of the public prosecutor
to determine collusion.
86
A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is
also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located."
87
In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry
entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family
Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign
court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of
a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." InRepublic v. Orbecido,
88
this Court recognized the legislative intent of the
second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse"
89
under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly
that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a
foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being
tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her
country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign
divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v.
Romillo
90
which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served."
91


576

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of
bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the
ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe foreign spouse
can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family
Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic
public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the
Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option
to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is
a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts
only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If
there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is
already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for
the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact
92
that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be
an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the
public records in the Philippines.1wphi 1

577

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without
prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
93
The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of
bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address
the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.

ATIENZA VS BRILLANTES
ARMAS VS CALISTERIO
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James
William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without
a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on
08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was
presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of
Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition
entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y
Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of
Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa
Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed that her son
Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of the estate of the
deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the
estate would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with
James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being
unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the
administration of the estate of the decedent.
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C.
Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the
intestate estate of Teodorico.

578

On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia;
it adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the petitioner and against
the oppositor whereby herein petitioner, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is declared as
the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos.
1

Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals,
formulating that
1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code in the instant
case despite the fact that the controversy arose when the New Civil Code was the
law in force.
2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor-appellant and
the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failure of the former to secure a
decree of the presumptive death of her first spouse.
3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at No. 32 Batangas
Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, is the conjugal property of the
oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a legal heir of
deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration should be granted
solely in favor of oppositor-appellant.
2

On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.,
promulgated its now assailed decision, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring as follows:
(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City, belong to the conjugal partnership property with the
concomitant obligation of the partnership to pay the value of the land to
Teodorico's estate as of the time of the taking;
(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is entitled to one
half of her husband's estate, and Teodorico's sister, herein petitioner Antonia
Armas and her children, to the other half;
(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of Marietta E.
Calisterio to act as administrator of Teodorico's estate, and if so found
competent and willing, that she be appointed as such; otherwise, to

579

determine who among the deceased's next of kin is competent and willing to
become the administrator of the estate.
3

On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, prompting her to interpose the present appeal. Petitioner
asseverates:
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and
setting aside the decision of the trial court is not in accord with the law or with the
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court.
4

It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage between the
deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would be determinative of her
right as a surviving spouse.
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized
on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code
which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code
5
itself limited its
retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:
alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the
time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any
of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or
dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For the
subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held
valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must
have done so in good faith.
6
Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of wrong it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty
through some motive of interest or ill will.
7
The Court does not find these circumstances to
be here extant.

580

A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary
8
as long as the
prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these
exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until
declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in
these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage
may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The
prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or
two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of
the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can
institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is
consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent
marriages as so provided in Article 41
9
, in relation to Article 40,
10
of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James
William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before
she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This
second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus
be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death
of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to
indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon
its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two
equal portions one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the
estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse
over the net estate
11
of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or
nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the
brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews and
nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation in the presence of uncles and
aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right
which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in
representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to
succeed. The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive
portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own
mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional rights over the estate of her deceased
brother.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51574 is
AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion
thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise entitled, along with her, to the other half of
the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the
decedent's estate pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own children. No costs.


581

REP VS NOLASCO
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet
Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage
be declared null and void.
1

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of
Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The
Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead,"
2
and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the
same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage.
3

During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met
Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port
calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent
Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San
Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January
1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites
officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained
another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose,
Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter
from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter
informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately
asked permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked
in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing
spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where
he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired
from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet
Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that
his wife continued to refuse to give him such information even after they were married. He
also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the
Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that
her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before
she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her daughter-
in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica
never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that
she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just
fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica

582

P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for England. She further
claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive
Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as presumptively
dead Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.
4

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed
to show that there existed a well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had
sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for
Review where the following allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there
existed a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker
was already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the
petition was a proper case of the declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41, Family Code.
5

The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a
well-founded belief that his wife is already dead."
6

The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code
which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
death under the circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
spouse. (Emphasis supplied).

583

When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it
superseded,
7
the following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the
presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry.
8
Also, Article 41 of the Family
Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either
that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code.
9
The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee
is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
10

Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements.
11

Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to
prove that he had complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded
belief" that the absent spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife
with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas,
12
is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing
spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the
defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not
exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the
whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He
did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of
Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her
whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was
dead. He admits that the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had
been absent. . . .
13

In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by
respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to

584

form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he
arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking
the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy,
14
he secured another seaman's contract
and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts
to inquire the whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to
London and I went to London to look for her I could not find
her (sic).
15
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this
casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's
justification of the mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical
difference between London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio
the two places could mean one place in England, the port where his ship
docked and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they
leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Paraaque,
would announce to friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This
apparent error in naming of places of destination does not appear to be
fatal.
16

is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one
hand, and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-
General, are around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that
walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping
into one particular person there which is in effect what Nolasco says he did can be
regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information
as to her personal background even after she had married respondent
17
too convenient an
excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters
respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he
had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had
inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify
those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to
rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its

585

nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility.
18
As noted
before, there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said
testimony merely tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their
common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in
January 1983, he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique.
However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he
allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached San
Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring
about her parents and their place of residence.
19
Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not
even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his
wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very
difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda,
20
the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public
is deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot
terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any contract they make. . . .
.
21
(Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing
that one of them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the
policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his
marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw,
22
the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it
impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for
maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to
satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of
the Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the familyand an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
23
the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation
of which the State bas the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is

586

of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there
is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the
Philippines in Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social
institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no
custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be
recognized or given effect.
24

In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law
that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the
trial court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby
REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against
respondent.

VALDEZ VS REPUBLIC
Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. On December 13, 1971,
petitioner gave birth to the spouses only child, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and
Sofio argued constantly because the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any
money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for
him to return but, finally, in May 1972, petitioner decided to go back to her parents home in
Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Three years passed without any word from Sofio. In October
1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1st. He and petitioner talked for several hours and they
agreed to separate. They executed a document to that effect.
1
That was the last time
petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didnt hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts or
even if he was alive or not.
2

Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20,
1985.
3
Subsequently, however, Virgilios application for naturalization filed with the United
States Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioners marriage to Sofio
was subsisting.
4
Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of
Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
The RTC rendered its Decision
5
on November 12, 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of
merit. The RTC held that Angelita "was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her

587

husband Sofio Polborosa was already dead." It said that under Article 41 of the Family
Code, the present spouse is burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent and that
she has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. This belief, the RTC said, must be the result
of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the
absent spouse.
The RTC found that, by petitioners own admission, she did not try to find her husband
anymore in light of their mutual agreement to live separately. Likewise, petitioners daughter
testified that her mother prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC also said there
is a strong possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering that he would have been only 61
years old by then, and people who have reached their 60s have not become increasingly
low in health and spirits, and, even assuming as true petitioners testimony that Sofio was a
chain smoker and a drunkard, there is no evidence that he continues to drink and smoke
until now.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
6
She argued that it is the Civil Code that applies
in this case and not the Family Code since petitioners marriage to Sofio was celebrated on
January 11, 1971, long before the Family Code took effect. Petitioner further argued that
she had acquired a vested right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the stricter
provisions of the Family Code should not be applied against her because Title XIV of the
Civil Code, where Articles 384 and 390 on declaration of absence and presumption of
death, respectively, can be found, was not expressly repealed by the Family Code. To apply
the stricter provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights petitioner had acquired under
the Civil Code.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated December 10, 2007.
7

Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the RTC Decision and
Motion for Reconsideration.
In its Manifestation and Motion,
8
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended
that the Court set aside the assailed RTC Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio
presumptively dead. The OSG argues that the requirement of "well-founded belief" under
Article 41 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case. It said that petitioner
could not be expected to comply with this requirement because it was not yet in existence
during her marriage to Virgilio Reyes in 1985. The OSG further argues that before the
effectivity of the Family Code, petitioner already acquired a vested right as to the validity of
her marriage to Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed death of Sofio under the Civil Code.
This vested right and the presumption of Sofios death, the OSG posits, could not be
affected by the obligations created under the Family Code.
9

Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by Article 41 of
the Family Code.
10
Title XIV of the Civil Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly
repealed by the Family Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family Code provides that its
provisions shall not be retroactively applied if they will prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights.
11


588

The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed. However, we must state
that we are denying the Petition on grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly
appeal to this Court from a decision of the trial court only on pure questions of law. A
question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is
on a certain set of facts; on the other hand, a question of fact exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not
disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law or
jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.
12

The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner
needed to prove a "well-founded belief" that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied
Article 41 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on
January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the
auspices of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the
time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any
of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:

589

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not
know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to
be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
13

Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the subject of court
proceedings independent of the settlement of the absentees estate.
In re Szatraw
14
is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted marriage with a Polish
national in 1937. They lived together as husband and wife for three years. Sometime in
1940, the husband, on the pretext of visiting some friends, left the conjugal abode with their
child and never returned. After inquiring from friends, petitioner found that her husband went
to Shanghai, China. However, friends who came from Shanghai told her that the husband
was not seen there. In 1948, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive
death of her husband arguing that since the latter had been absent for more than seven
years and she had not heard any news from him and about her child, she believes that he is
dead. In deciding the case, the Court said:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not
appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired
no property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is
merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the
fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This
presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a
special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent
court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death
cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding. In this
case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner
against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right
or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880),
for the petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but
merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard
from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The
petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this

590

declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because
such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect,
even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still
disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or
declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent
court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or
determine finally the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of
which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is
decided by a final judgment, or such right or status determined, or such particular fact
established, by a final decree, then the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the
decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes
res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially
provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or
become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been
unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such
particular fact finally determined.1avvphi1 If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively
dead, because he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and
executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be
taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a
petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the
petitioner.
15

In Lukban v. Republic,
16
petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco
Chuidian on December 10, 1933. A few days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes
after a violent quarrel. She did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent search,
inquiries from his parents and friends, and search in his last known address, proved futile.
Believing her husband was already dead since he had been absent for more than twenty
years, petitioner filed a petition in 1956 for a declaration that she is a widow of her husband
who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent
marriage. On the other hand, the antecedents in Gue v. Republic
17
are similar to Szatraw.
On January 5, 1946, Angelina Gues husband left Manila where they were residing and
went to Shanghai, China. From that day on, he had not been heard of, had not written to
her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to his whereabouts. Despite her efforts and
diligence, she failed to locate him. After 11 years, she asked the court for a declaration of
the presumption of death of Willian Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a petition for judicial
declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained
because it is not authorized by law.
18

From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death
is established by law
19
and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since
death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence,
20
Sofio is to be
presumed dead starting October 1982.

591

Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to
petitioners capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of
the Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of "well-founded belief" is not
required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the
Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of
the Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-
founded belief" will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was
valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go
against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on the presumption of
Sofios death can be granted under the Civil Code, the same presumption having arisen by
operation of law. However, we declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at
the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is legal and
valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.

REP VS TANGO
On March 9, 1987, Ferventino and Maria were married
4
in civil rites before then Mayor
Ignacio Bunye of Muntinlupa City. None of Marias relatives witnessed the ceremony as
they were opposed to her relationship with Ferventino. The two had only spent a night
together and had been intimate once when Maria told Ferventino that she and her family will
soon be leaving for the United States of America (USA). Maria assured Ferventino,
however, that she will file a petition so he can live with her in the USA. In the event that said
petition is denied, she promised to return to the Philippines to live with him. On March 13,
1987, Maria and her family flew to Seattle, USA.
Ferventino alleges that Maria kept in touch for a year before she stopped responding to his
letters. Out of resentment, he burned all the letters Maria wrote him. He claims to have
forgotten her address since.
Ferventino recounts the efforts he made to find Maria. Upon inquiry from the latters uncle,
Antonio Ledesma, in Las Pias, Ferventino learned that even Marias relatives were
unaware of her whereabouts. He also solicited the assistance of a friend in Texas, Capt.
Luis Aris of the U.S. Air Force, but to no avail. Finally, he sought the aid of his parents
Antonio and Eusebia in Los Angeles, and his aunt Anita Castro-Mayor in Seattle. Like,

592

Ledesma though, their attempts to find Maria proved fruitless. The next 14 years went by
without any news of Maria.
On the belief that his wife had died, Ferventino filed a verified petition
5
dated October 1,
2001 before the Ligao City RTC for the declaration of presumptive death of Maria within the
contemplation of Article 41 of the Family Code.
When the case was called for initial hearing on January 8, 2002, nobody entered any
opposition. On July 22, 2002, Ferventino presented evidence ex parte and testified in court
about the details of his search. On July 23, 2002, Branch 11 of the Ligao City RTC issued
an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring MARIA JOSE V. VILLARBA, wife of
FERVENTINO U. TANGO, presumptively dead within the meaning of Article 41 of the
Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
6

This prompted the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the Republic, to file a Notice of
Appeal.
7
Acting thereon, Presiding Judge Romulo SG. Villanueva of the Ligao City RTC had
the records of the case transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, affirmed the RTCs Order. It held that Marias absence for 14 years without
information about her location despite diligent search by Ferventino was sufficient to
support a well-founded belief of her death. The appellate court observed that neither the
OSG nor the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor objected to the evidence which Ferventino
presented on trial. It noted, in particular, that the OSG did not dispute the adequacy of
Ferventinos basis to engender a well-founded belief that Maria is dead. Hence, in a
Decision dated November 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the Republics appeal in
this tenor:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the July 23, 2002 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Ligao City, Branch 11 in Spec. Proc. No. 357 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
8

Before us, petitioner anchors this petition for review on certiorari on the following two
grounds:
I.
THE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT ON THE ALLEGED EFFORTS MADE BY HIS
FRIEND AND RELATIVES IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE IN SEATTLE, UNITED
STATES, IS HEARSAY AND DEVOID OF PROBATIVE VALUE[; AND]
II.

593

EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE AFORESAID TESTIMONY MAY BE CONSIDERED IN
EVIDENCE, THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENTS FRIEND AND RELATIVES
IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE IN SEATTLE, UNITED STATES, DO NOT
SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF" THAT RESPONDENTS
ABSENT SPOUSE IS PROBABLY DEAD.
9

Unadorned, the issues for our determination are: (1) whether the testimony of respondent
Ferventino is hearsay; and (2) whether respondent Ferventino has established a basis to
form a well-founded belief that his absent spouse is already dead.
The Republic, through the OSG, contests the appellate courts holding that the absence of
respondents wife Maria for 14 years provides sufficient basis to entertain a well-founded
belief that she is dead. The OSG discounts respondents testimony, on the steps he took to
find Maria, as hearsay because none of the persons who purportedly helped in his search
testified in court. Notably, the OSG observes that only Capt. Aris gave a detailed account of
his efforts to track down Maria. According to Capt. Aris, he went over the Seattle phone
directory for Marias name and inquired about her from the registrars office in Seattle, but
both efforts proved to be in vain.
The OSG belittles its failure to object to the admissibility of respondents testimony during
trial. Instead, it invokes Constitutional provisions that advocate the state policy of preserving
marital institutions.
On March 16, 2007, respondents counsel, Atty. Richie R. Regala, manifested to this Court
his intent to withdraw as counsel for respondent. According to Atty. Regala, he received a
letter by which respondent expressed a desire to withdraw from the proceeding.
10
In view of
this, the Court issued a Resolution
11
on April 21, 2008 which deemed as waived the filing of
respondents comment on the petition. Previously, the Court of Appeals had also issued a
Resolution
12
dated October 15, 2003 submitting the case for decision and ordering its re-
raffling for respondents failure to file an appellees brief. In other words, apart from the
verified petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Maria dated October 1, 2001,
which respondent filed before the Ligao City RTC, he has not submitted any other pleading
in connection with the petition.
Respondents apparent lack of desire to pursue the proceedings notwithstanding, the Court
is inclined to rule against the Republic.
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered
in summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous
decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN
THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the
Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply
in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases
shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

594

In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters
two and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are
applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had
of the trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying,
however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of
Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the
Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the
Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum.
13
From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing
party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an
appeal.
14
1avvphi1
In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious procedural lapse when it filed a notice
of appeal in the Court of Appeals instead of a petition for certiorari. The RTC equally erred
in giving due course to said appeal and ordering the transmittal of the records of the case to
the appellate court. By no means did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction to review the
judgment of the RTC which, by express provision of law, was immediately final and
executory.
Adding to the confusion, the Court of Appeals entertained the appeal and treated the same
as an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. As it were, the Court of Appeals
committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the
Republic on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of the law, the
judgment was not appealable.
15

Before us, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. But, even if petitioner used the correct mode of appeal at this level, the hands of the
Court are tied. Without a doubt, the decision of the trial court had long become final.
Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable. As such, it may no longer be modified in any
respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
16
In

595

light of the foregoing, it would be unnecessary, if not useless, to discuss the issues raised
by petitioner.
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy
and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the
award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law. The
only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc
pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust
and inequitable.
17
None of the exceptions obtains here to merit the review sought.
WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to
costs.

NAVARRO VS DOMOGTOY
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which,
he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the
law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar
A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated
from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.
Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent
judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional
area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers
away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that
the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else,
who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as
a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC,
which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter
No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still
pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of
having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from
his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first

596

wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.
1
With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in
question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted
were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.
2

Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not
been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and
respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by
themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga
states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding
ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit
by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge
Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.
3
The affidavit was not
issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In their
affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D.
Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children,
Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been
heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof
of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed with the
marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of
spouse. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is
clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which

597

has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages
where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is
factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains
married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part
of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such
neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the
beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's
jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge
or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-
general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both
parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having
solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his
court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of
the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death,
(2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del
Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request
presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del
Rosario.
4

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the
solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority
of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others,
"any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or
qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-
compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

598

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines
to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.
5

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the
exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The
legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and
uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a
lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in
the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case.
6
It is not too much to expect
them to know and apply the law intelligently.
7
Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent
judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the
status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void,
there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-
month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a
bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of
respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be
more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby
SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.


599

REP VS GRANADA
This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23 January
2009
1
and 3 April 2009
2
issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the grant by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the
absent spouse of respondent.
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus)
at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company in Paranaque where both were then
working. The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their
marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to
Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received any
communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified
that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead. The Petition was raffled to Presiding Judge Avelino Demetria of RTC
Branch 85, Lipa City, and was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2002-0530.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner
argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to
prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. However, in an Order dated 29
June 2007, the RTC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably under Rule 41,
Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial
proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not
appealable.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolandas Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,
3
the CA ruled that
a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a
summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon
notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated 3 April 2009.
4

Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.
Issues

600

1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the
Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not
subject to ordinary appeal
2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the
evidence that respondent presented
Our Ruling
1. On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the
Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to
ordinary appeal
In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the Petition assailing
the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,
5
the appellate
court noted that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of
remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC
Decision therein is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties, by express
provision of Article 247 of the same Code. The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary
appeal, and the attempt to question it through a Notice of Appeal is unavailing.
We affirm the CA ruling.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring supplied.)
Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose
of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding "as provided for" under the Family Code.
Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled "Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family
Law." Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238 and 247, which provide:

601

Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in
all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall
be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
x x x x x x x x x
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:
applicable.
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a
petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the
court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,
6
the Republic likewise appealed the CAs affirmation of the
RTCs grant of respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent
spouse. The Court therein held that it was an error for the Republic to file a Notice of Appeal
when the latter elevated the matter to the CA, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period
within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by
express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and
executory."
x x x x x x x x x
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar,
let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately final and
executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal,
and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction
over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result reached by
the Court in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that what the OSG should
have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review under Rule 45.
In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by
the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v. Jomoc,
7
issued a few months later.
In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of
her absent husband for the purpose of remarriage. Petitioner Republic appealed the RTC
Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the
ground that, under the Rules of Court,
8
a record on appeal is required to be filed when
appealing special proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA,

602

this Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or absence under Rule 72,
Section 1(m), expressly falls under the category of special proceedings, a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code. Since its purpose was to
enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage, petitioners action was a summary
proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family Code, rather than a special proceeding under
Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering that this action was not a special proceeding,
petitioner was not required to file a record on appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to
the CA.
We do not agree with the Republics argument that Republic v. Jomoc superseded our
ruling in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino. As observed by the CA, the Supreme Court in
Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding under the Family
Code. In contrast, the Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its ruling on the
impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial courts Decision in a
summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code was intended "to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and
the bar."
At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of
judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled in
Republic v. Tango:
9

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered
in summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous
decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN
THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the
Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply
in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases
shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters
two and three of the same title. It states:
applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had

603

of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying,
however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of
Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the
Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the
Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing
party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an
appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the
ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party
may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republics Notice of
Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death of respondents spouse was immediately final and executory and, hence, not subject
to ordinary appeal.
2. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the
evidence that respondent had presented
Petitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the evidence
required to establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead, as
expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code. Petitioner cites Republic v.
Nolasco,
10
United States v. Biasbas
11
and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro
12
as
authorities on the subject.
In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CAs affirmation of the RTCs
grant of respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of his absent spouse, a
British subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after giving birth to their son while
respondent was on board a vessel working as a seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought the
reversal of the ruling on the ground that respondent was not able to establish his "well-
founded belief that the absentee is already dead," as required by Article 41 of the Family
Code. In ruling thereon, this Court recognized that this provision imposes more stringent
requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil Code.
13
The Civil Code provision merely
requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is
generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is
presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family
Code provision prescribes a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before

604

a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As noted by the Court in that
case, the four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are
as follows:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a "well-
founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited United
States v. Biasbas,
14
which it found to be instructive as to the diligence required in searching
for a missing spouse.
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in
ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife, considering his admission that that he only
had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that suspicion was the fact of
her absence.
Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic sought the
reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the respondent therein had not
been able to prove a "well-founded belief" that his spouse was already dead. The Court
reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and provided the following criteria for determining the
existence of a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that
he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present
spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a
well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester que su creencia sea firme se
funde en motivos racionales."
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act.1wphi1 It may be
proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight
degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any
fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity
and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their

605

actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light
on their intentions, competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a
well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn
from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the
absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
(Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent
Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother
Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the
latters relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. In
short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues
that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or
assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have
also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these
omissions.
The Republics arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the
Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded
belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare
him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed,
"[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion
of fact or law."
15

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED.

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