Paycana

- appellant was charged with complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion before RTC
- set up self defense saying it was his wife who attacked him first
- so admits killed 7 month pregnant wife and unborn child
- accused is a butcher
- stabbed wife 14 times
- father of the victim heard cries of help of her daughter.
- turns out he saw a man coming out at the side of their house. so morning ato, live nlng daw separately.
pero ge stab siya sa iya wife pero naka sagang sha so iya ge stab iya asawa.

As distinguished from infanticide, 24 the elements of unintentional abortion 25 are as follows:

(1) that there is a pregnant woman;
(2) that violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion;
(3) that the violence is intentionally exerted; and
(4) that as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled
therefrom.

In the crime of infanticide, it is necessary that the child be born alive and be viable, that is, capable of
independent existence.  However, even if the child who was expelled prematurely and deliberately were
alive at birth, the offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6 months is not
viable.  In the present case, the unborn fetus was also killed when the appellant stabbed Lilybeth several
times. |||
 (People v. Paycana, Jr., G.R. No. 179035, [April 16, 2008], 574 PHIL 780-791)

Continental Case
- Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental
Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-
Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union)
- filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded
between Continental and the Union||| 
- The claim was based on the death of Hortillano's unborn child. Hortillano's wife, Marife V.
Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy.  According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus
died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. 
- Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano's claim for paternity leave but denied his claims
for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident
insurance||| (Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. v. Montaño, G.R. No. 182836, [October 13,
2009], 618 PHIL 634-650)
Ruling
- The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality
only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly
states that civil personality is extinguished by death||| 
- First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the  Civil
Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the
same Code||| (Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. v. Montaño, G.R. No. 182836, [October 13,
2009], 618 PHIL 634-650)
- We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity
and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn
 child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to
or assumed by the child's parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the
instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter's
death.||| (Continental Steel Manufacturing Corp. v. Montaño, G.R. No. 182836, [October 13,
2009], 618 PHIL 634-650)
- Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition
of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical
personality could die.
- And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.  Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child
inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception, 25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If
the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as death.
- ||Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel
itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or
sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else". Under said general definition,  26 even
an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano's child could not have reached 38-39
weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano's wife, for sustenance.
Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the
parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single
employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child
must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without
such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the
unborn fetus in the mother's womb.||| 
- It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it
was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was
conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.
- Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element
entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death
certificate of his unborn child. CSaIAc
- Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under
the CBA, Hortillano's claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.

Oposa v. Factoran
- The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented
and joined by their respective parents. ||| (Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, [July 30,
1993])
- Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and
for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
 expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in
its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.||| (Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, [July 30, 1993])

Missionary Sisters
- In order that a donation of an immovable property be valid, the following elements must be
present: (a) the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the
patrimony of the donee; (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi; (d) the
donation must be contained in a public document; and e) that the acceptance thereof be made in
the same deed or in a separate public instrument; if acceptance is made in a separate instrument,
the donor must be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments. 
- There is no question that the true intent of Purificacion, the donor and the owner of the
properties in question, was to give, out of liberality the subject house and lot, which she owned,
to the petitioner. This act, was then contained in a public document, the deed having been
acknowledged before Atty. Arcillas, a Notary Public. 36 The acceptance of the donation is
made on the same date that the donation was made and contained in the same instrument as
manifested by Mother Concepcion's signature. 37 In fine, the remaining issue to be resolved is
the capacity of the petitioner as donee to accept the donation, and the authority of Mother
Concepcion to act on its behalf for this purpose.
- Under Article 737 of the Civil Code, "[t]he donor's capacity shall be determined as of the time
of the making of the donation." By analogy, the legal capacity or the personality of the donee,
or the authority of the latter's representative, in certain cases, is determined at the time of
acceptance of the donation.
- Article 738, in relation to Article 745, of the Civil Code provides that all those who are not
specifically disqualified by law may accept donations either personally or through an
authorized representative with a special power of attorney for the purpose or with a general and
sufficient power.
- The Court finds that for the purpose of accepting the donation, the petitioner is deemed vested
with personality to accept, and Mother Concepcion is clothed with authority to act on the
latter's behalf.

Sy v. Eufemio
- An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation
of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil
Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the
innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing
that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a
decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the
 death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur
cum persona.
- A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are
solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the
plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.||

- From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains (or of the absolute community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to
any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to
inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary
provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and
disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the
persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult
to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is
not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to
warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.|||

- A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even
if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of a decree of separation,
their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence,
so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death
supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a
more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.

- As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his

marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the
death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her
demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by
either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved
and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the
appellant.

- In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under
Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted
with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been
generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of
the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code,
requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the
parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have
resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings
of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in
the annulment proceeding.

PP v. Lipata
 - charged with murder
- namatay during the trial
- At the outset, we declare that because of appellant's death prior to the promulgation of the CA's
decision, there is no further need to determine appellant's criminal liability. Appellant's death
has the effect of extinguishing his criminal liability. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code provides:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
- || What this Court will discuss further is the effect of appellant's death with regard
to his civil liability. In 1994, this Court, in People v. Bayotas, 25 reconciled the
differing doctrines on the issue of whether the death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes his civil liability. We concluded that "[u]pon death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal." 26
We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability  ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a
separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines
against whom the same shall be enforced."
We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and
based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission: aDSIHc

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .
 e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action

for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably
with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible deprivation of right by prescription. 30 (Emphases
supplied)
The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in 2000 provided for the effect
of the death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action to reflect
our ruling in Bayotas:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after
arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil
liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted
under Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability
arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal
representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the
case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
- ||| ueno died because of appellant's fault. Appellant caused damage to Cueno through deliberate
acts. 32 Appellant's civil liability ex quasi delicto may now be pursued because appellant's
death on 13 February 2011, before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his
criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto.||| (People v. Lipata y Ortiza, G.R. No. 200302,
[April 20, 2016], 785 PHIL 520-537)

Alabang
- The definition of the term "lack of capacity to sue" enunciated in the said case still applies to
the case at bar. Indeed, as held by this Court and as correctly cited by the CA in the case
of Columbia: "[l]ack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his
civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have
the character or representation he claims[;] 'lack of capacity to sue' refers to a plaintiff's general
disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical
personality or any other general disqualifications of a party. . . ." 6 In the instant case,
petitioner lacks capacity to sue because it no longer possesses juridical personality by reason of
its dissolution and lapse of the three-year grace period provided under Section 122 of
the Corporation Code||| (Alabang Development Corp. v. Alabang Hills Village Association,
G.R. No. 187456, [June 2, 2014], 734 PHIL 664-673)
 - The Court, however, agrees with the CA that in the abovecited cases, the corporations involved
filed their respective complaints while they were still in existence. In other words, they already
had pending actions at the time that their corporate existence was terminated.
- The import of this Court's ruling in the cases cited by petitioner is that the trustee of a corporation
may continue to prosecute a case commenced by the corporation within three years from its
dissolution until rendition of the final judgment, even if such judgment is rendered beyond the
three-year period allowed by Section 122 of the Corporation Code. However, there is nothing in
the said cases which allows an already defunct corporation to initiate a suit after the lapse of the
said three-year period. On the contrary, the factual circumstances in the abovecited cases would
show that the corporations involved therein did not initiate any complaint after the lapse of the
three-year period. In fact, as stated above, the actions were already pending at the time that they
lost their corporate existence.
- In the present case, petitioner filed its complaint not only after its corporate existence was
terminated but also beyond the three-year period allowed by Section 122 of the Corporation
Code. Thus, it is clear that at the time of the filing of the subject complaint petitioner lacks the
capacity to sue as a corporation. To allow petitioner to initiate the subject complaint and pursue it
until final judgment, on the ground that such complaint was filed for the sole purpose of
liquidating its assets, would be to circumvent the provisions of Section 122 of the Corporation
Code. SADECI
- As to the last issue raised, the basic and pivotal issue in the instant case is petitioner's capacity to
sue as a corporation and it has already been settled that petitioner indeed lacks such capacity.

Gloria
- On the second issue, the petitioner claims that respondent SSHA failed to present any evidence
showing that it is a legally organized juridical entity, authorized by law to sue or be sued in its
own name. Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 24 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it has no
legal capacity to file this suit before the HLURB and the Court of Appeals.
- SSHA counters that it has the capacity to sue as an association, since it is a member of the
Federation of Valenzuela Homeowners Association, Inc., which is registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. In the alternative, the individual members of SSHA who signed both
the resolution and the complaint in this case may, as natural persons, pursue the action.
- There is merit in petitioner's contention. Under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,
only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action. Article 44 25 of the Civil Code enumerates the various classes of juridical persons. Under
said Article, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality
separate and distinct from that of its members. 26 The records of the present case are bare of any
showing by SSHA that it is an association duly organized under Philippine law. It was thus an
error for the HLURB-NCR Office to give due course to the complaint in HLURB Case No.
REM-070297-9821, given the SSHA's lack of capacity to sue in its own name. Nor was it proper
for said agency to treat the complaint as a suit by all the parties who signed and verified the
complaint. The members cannot represent their association in any suit without valid and legal
authority. Neither can their signatures confer on the association any legal capacity to sue. Nor
will the fact that SSHA belongs to the Federation of Valenzuela Homeowners Association, Inc.,
suffice to endow SSHA with the personality and capacity to sue. Mere allegations of membership
in a federation are insufficient and inconsequential. The federation itself has a separate juridical
personality and was not impleaded as a party in HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821 nor in this
case. Neither was it shown that the federation was authorized to represent SSHA. Facts showing
the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a
 party, must be averred. 27 Hence, for failing to show that it is a juridical entity, endowed by law
with capacity to bring suits in its own name, SSHA is devoid of any legal capacity, whatsoever,
to institute any action.

Pepito
- he evidence shows that Johnny P. Uy who was named in the deed of sale as the buyer, was
actually born on March 1, 1980. The said deed of sale in his favor was executed on January 4,
1979. Thus, the appellate court correctly found that since said Johnny P. Uy was not even
conceived yet at the time of the alleged sale, he therefore had no legal personality to be named
as a buyer in the deed of sale. Neither could he have given his consent thereto. The contract of
sale is perfected at the moment there is meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object
of the contract and upon the price. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. Unemancipated
minors, insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write can not
validly give consent to contracts. In the instant case, Johnny P. Uy could not have validly given
his consent to the contract of sale, as he was not even conceived yet at the time of its alleged
perfection. The appellate court, therefore, correctly ruled that for lack of consent of one of the
contracting parties, the deed of sale is null and void.

Vercles
- We have held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record,or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.|||
- The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten instruments of petitioner
which establish Verna Aiza's filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the
array of evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us,
are convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner's illegitimate
child.|||
rticles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. They are as
follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. cEaDTA
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
 Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case
the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Geluz
- fixing a minimum award of P3,000 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an
unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la
criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consecuencia es un ser no
nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado" Vol. 1, p. 49).
being incapable of having rights and obligations.
- Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf
of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to
anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity, as
distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a
conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the
child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the conditions specified
in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
- The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and is generally held that recovery
can not be had for the death of an unborn child.
- This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or
violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the
parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would
normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of
the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e. on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss,
and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code, Art. 2217), as well as to
exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case
before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award
of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his
wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of
the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite
the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or
pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even
after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the
administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been
directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000
 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of
record, was clearly exaggerated.

quimiging
- A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from it progenitors, particularly
of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if
as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its
being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls
the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the
testator (Article 854, Civil Code)|||
- t is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that
support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that
nowhere appears in the text of Article 291.
- It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for ail
purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely
delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the
right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely
useless and ineffective.

Francisco
- As aptly held by the CA, petitioners, who have already benefitted from the loan and mortgage
transaction, are already estopped from assailing the validity and due execution of the second
mortgage deed, which all three of them signed on May 27, 2002 despite their knowledge that
petitioner Janet Acosta Francisco was still a minor at that time. Having given their approval and
conformity to the mortgage which was relied upon by the respondents, petitioners are bound by
said contract. Janet's minority only rendered the contract voidable to the extent of her share in
the property, pursuant to Articles 1327 3 and 1390 4 of the New Civil Code. Since Janet failed
to seek the annulment thereof within the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1391 5 of
the same Code, she is deemed to have ratified the contract. While petitioners are correct in
pointing out that a defective notarization will strip the mortgage deed of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument, nonetheless, their admission of their indebtedness to
respondents and the non-payment thereof, and the fact that they actually signed the questioned
mortgage deed, preponderate against the alleged invalidity of said document.||| (Francisco v.
Montes, G.R. No. 212801 (Notice), [September 1, 2014])

Samahan
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the
protection of these aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling
minors to attend both official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church
but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free
expression are also covered by these items given that the minors' attendance in the official
activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the
Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon
City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In
relation to their right to travel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to and from
the places where these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City
Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-
being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is
perceivably more prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to
run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours .
As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as
an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by
their parents or guardian," as accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in
its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this
exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference
is not superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself
prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these
ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving
proper consent due to their incapability to fully understand the import and consequences of their
actions. In one case it was observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the
rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens
patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of
their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender
years deserve its protection.
- Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity,
and balancing the same against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and
prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City
Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional.
Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance
with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or
modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes
the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.
- While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions
concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child,
the [S]tate may act to promote these legitimate interests." 66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which
harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or
welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents'
qualified right to control the upbringing of their children." 67
- As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of these
rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to
 parental supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo, 68 this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens
patriae in protecting minors, viz.:
[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as  parens patriae. To it is cast the
duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or
incapacity are in an unfavorable position,  vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they
are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political community to look
after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to
such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court:
"This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every
State, x x x." 69 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As pare ns patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral
development of their children, 70 and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their
parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[l]egal restriction on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and
maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the
Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example,
who have the primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of the
laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." 71
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their
role of promoting their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these
ordinances further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the
prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents to
rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only
more exposed to potential physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the night; their
moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions
during this time. 72
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the
minors are not — whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) — accompanied by
their parents. This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of
parental authority and the importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given
unfettered authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise
them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the
parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without parental
accompaniment during the curfew hours. 73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an
over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate
their authority to influence or control their minors' activities. 74 As such, the Curfew Ordinances
only amount to a minimal — albeit reasonable — infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or
her child.

Malto
-he sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed against or
without the consent of the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It
requires proof that the accused and the victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual
relations.
 - For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under  RA
7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person.
- Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct
with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is
a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed. HAECID
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. 31 This is on the rationale that
she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the
nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the
risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves
fully. 32 Those of tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a child's bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely
more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful
consequences 34 of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. 35 For this reason, a child should not be
deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of
ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse,
exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or even
unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child
is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual
intercourse. 36
This must be so if we are to be true to the constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote
the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the youth. 37 This is consistent
with the declared policy of the State
[T]o provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for
prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse,
exploitation, and discrimination. 38 (emphasis supplied)

as well as to

intervene on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian, teacher or person having
care or custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse,
exploitation, and discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed
by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the
same. 39 (emphasis supplied)
This is also in harmony with the foremost consideration of the child's best interests in all
actions concerning him or her. cESDCa
The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all
actions concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent
with the principles of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the
welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy
life. 40 (emphasis supplied)
||| 

Catalan
- In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor's capacity to give
consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity
impinges on consent freely given. 25 However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests
upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be
presumed. ||| (Catalan v. Basa, G.R. No. 159567, [July 31, 2007], 555 PHIL 602-614)
- From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia does
not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the
existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the
donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties. Thus,
the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this
condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. 30 Sufficient proof of his
infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established when the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan declared him an incompetent on December 22, 1953
- It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Feliciano's capacity at the time he
donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental competence when he entered into
a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his other
properties in their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute
contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts . Competency
and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts
executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. ||| (Catalan v. Basa, G.R. No.
159567, [July 31, 2007], 555 PHIL 602-614)

Hesse
Strictly speaking, a person acting under any of the exempting circumstances commits a crime
but cannot be held criminally liable therefor. The exemption from punishment stems from the
complete absence of intelligence or free will in performing the act. The defense of insanity is thus in
the nature of a confession or avoidance. The accused who asserts it is, in effect, admitting to the
commission of the crime. Hence, the burden of proof shifts to him, and his side must then prove his
insanity with clear and convincing evidence. 15
The defense of insanity rests on the test of cognition on the part of the accused. Insanity, to be
exempting, requires the complete deprivation of intelligence, not only of the will, in committing the
criminal act. 16 Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused
must be so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent. He must be deprived of reason,
and must be shown to have acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence
of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly
throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's
general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct inconsistent with his
previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his
improvident bargains.
Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the
person whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the act which is the subject
of inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for
 a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in question. Direct
testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to establish
insanity as a defense. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts:
thereby we read the thoughts, motives and emotions of a person; and through which
we determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
Based on the foregoing, the accused-appellant did not establish the exempting circumstance
of insanity. His mental condition at the time of the commission of the felonies he was charged with
and found guilty of was not shown to be so severe that it had completely deprived him of reason or
intelligence when he committed the felonies charged. Based on the records, he had been administered
medication to cure his mental illness, but there was no showing that he suffered from complete
deprivation of intelligence. On the contrary, the medical professionals presented during the trial
conceded that he had been treated only to control his mental condition.
There was also no showing that the accused-appellant's actions manifested his insanity
immediately after the hacking incidents. His own sister, Araceli Haloc-Ayo, declared that he had
recognized her and had surrendered the bolo to her after his deadly assault. Clearly, he had not been
totally deprived of the capacity of cognition.
The accused-appellant was subjected to medical tests after the hacking incidents. According
to Dr. Imelda Escuadra, the psychiatrist of the Don Susano Memorial Mental Hospital in Cadlan, Pili,
Camarines Sur, the medications previously prescribed to him were medicines administered to a
patient suffering psychosis. She did not categorically state, however, that he had been psychotic.
Nonetheless, even if we were to deduce from her testimony that he had been suffering some form of
psychosis, there was still no testimony to the effect that such psychosis had totally deprived him of
intelligence or reason.
In view of all the foregoing, the accused-appellant's actions and actuations prior to,
simultaneously with and in the aftermath of the lethal assaults did not support his defense of insanity.
This, coupled with the presumption of law in favor of sanity, now warrants the affirmance of his
convictions, for he had not been legally insane when he committed the felonies.
Neither should his mental condition be considered as a mitigating circumstance. As we have
noted, the Defense presented no evidence to show that his condition had diminished the exercise of
his will power.

Dionesio
The Court, further, cannot appreciate the exempting circumstance of insanity in favor of
appellant.
Paragraph 1, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code provides that an imbecile or insane person
is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted during a lucid interval. "[It] requires a complete
deprivation of rationality in committing the act, i.e., that the accused be deprived of reason, that there
be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete absence of the power to
discern." 17 The law presumes that every person is sane. 18 Anyone who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden to prove that he was completely deprived of reason when
he committed the crime charged. 19 Note that the proof of an accused's insanity must "relate to the
time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is
charged." 20
Here, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. As correctly observed by the
CA, Dr. Domingo's report could not positively and certainly conclude that appellant's state of
imbecility afflicted him at the time he raped AAA. Moreover, we agree with the CA's observation,
 affirming the findings of the trial court, that the actions of appellant negated complete destruction of
intelligence at the time the rape was committed.

Dr. Domingo's Report is likewise inconclusive as to the state of appellant's mental

faculties at the time of the rape. While the report extensively discussed his condition
in early 2013, it does not conclude that he was afflicted with imbecility, or that he
was unaware of what he was doing, at the time he raped AAA. The report only
concluded that 'at present, the patient is deemed INCOMPETENT to stand the rigors
of court trial.' Unfortunately, such incompetence merely means that appellant's
mental state is not fit for trial. It does not mean that he was completely deprived of
reason and freedom of will at the time he committed the crime.
Furthermore, We agree with the RTC that appellant's actions at the moment
of the rape reveal that appellant was aware of what he was committing, and that what
he was doing was wrong. Appellant, as convincingly testified to by AAA, and
corroborated by [Bartulay], dragged AAA into a secluded spot, thereby isolating
himself and AAA to facilitate the commission of his lust. When AAA tried to call for
help, appellant covered her mouth, ensuring that they would not be disturbed. Such
precautions make it difficult to believe that appellant was in such a state that he could
not discern what was right from wrong, or that he was completely deprived of
intelligence or will.

Ortega
- According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be
considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the
proper objects of the testator's bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this
test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of
property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects
of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier,
the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of
fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, 25 which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental
aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of
mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere
weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not
render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make
a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to
know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or
unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary
incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of
unsound mind."
Silverio

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his
birth records compatible with his present sex.(emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became
entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. 11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right. 12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.
||| 
- Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause
or any compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from“ while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute." 26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein,
including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
- Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization),events (such as
births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or
recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name).These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the
legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the
laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership. 27 DHaEAS
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own
will,such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status ... include such matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects,
such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes
even succession. 28 (emphasis supplied)
A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person's
legal capacity and civil status.
Cagandahan
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate"
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much
androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a
(1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing
more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the
ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such
as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to
18,000 children are born with CAH. DcIHSa
CAH is one of many conditions 21 that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth
century, medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be
classified as either male or female. 22 The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia,
intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes,
genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female
sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies,
intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.  23 Since
the rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous
external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female
genitals. 24 More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder"
which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime
medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or
female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested
that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a 'no-man's land' for those individuals who are
neither truly 'male' nor truly 'female'." 25 The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels
that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and
scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the subject's
birth certificate entry is in order. IaSAHC
- To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
"incompetent" 27 and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male
will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the
Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent's position and his personal judgment of
being a male.||| (Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, [September 12, 2008], 586 PHIL
637-653)

Arcaba
 - The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family
Code to the circumstances of this case. After a review of the records, we rule in the
affirmative.||| (Arcaba v. Vda. de Batocael, G.R. No. 146683, [November 22, 2001], 421 PHIL
1096-1106)
In Bitangcor v. Tan, 28 we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and
wife" means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation,
of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may
no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a
woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to
the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not
constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. 29 In this jurisdiction, this Court has
considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties, 30 a
conviction of concubinage, 31 or the existence of illegitimate children. 32
Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco
resided under one roof for a long time. It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship,
since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the
very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient,
but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress,
there are other indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura
presented documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." As previously stated,
these are an application for a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor, 33 a sanitary permit to
operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate, 34 and the death certificate of Francisco. 35 These
documents show that Cirila saw herself as Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have
used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Francisco's lessees in "Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs.
Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy," RTC Civil Case No. 4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees
referred to Cirila as "the common-law spouse of Francisco." Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand
from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but
Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law. 36 It is
difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason
would thus lead to the conclusion that she was Francisco's common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived
together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation
made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

Ching
- Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to
morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine after he
had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived
and from whence they derived their support. The sale was subversive of the stability of
the family, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects
Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling
property to each other subject to certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between
spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because if transfers or
conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the
system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to
 prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to
protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. The
prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of
marriage, otherwise, "the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to
be better than those in legal union." Those provisions are dictated by public interest
and their criterion must be imposed upon the will of the parties. . . . 12 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his common-law-wife-
herein petitioner, it was null and void. cDIaA

Hapitan
he Amicable Settlement, which Nolan signed, aims to recall the lower courts' finding of
nullity of the sale of the house and lot to the Spouses Terosa. In effect, by agreeing to the validity of
the sale, Nolan disposed of or waived his and Esmeralda's rights over the house and lot, which the
lower courts found to be part of their conjugal property.
Such disposal or waiver by Nolan is not allowed by law. Article 124 47 of the Family
Code requires that any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written
consent of the other spouse; otherwise, such disposition is void. 48 Further, under Article 89 49 of
the Family Code, no waiver of rights, interests, shares, and effects of the conjugal partnership of
gains 50 during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of property. Clearly,
Esmeralda did not consent to Nolan disposing or waiving their rights over the house and lot through
the Amicable Settlement. In fact, she even objected to the Amicable Settlement, as evidenced by her
pleadings filed before the courts. She further expressed disbelief that Nolan would want the CA to
reverse its decision when its ruling, saving Nolan and Esmeralda's conjugal property, is favorable to
him.

Paghubasan
- As correctly ruled by the CA, Rafael and Norie's property regime was co-ownership under
Article 148 of the Family Code, 4 which provides that only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In this case, since
Norie failed to substantiate her claim that she was financially capable to buy the subject
property, said purchase was considered as solely financed by Rafael. Hence, Rafael's
registration of the subject property under Norie's name was tantamount to a void donation under
Article 739 (1) 5 of the Civil Code. 6 All told, the CA properly ordered the reconveyance of the
subject property to Amparo and to Rafael's estate.||| 

Muller
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain .
Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. 9 The primary purpose of the
constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.||| (Muller v. Muller, G.R. No.
149615, [August 29, 2006], 531 PHIL 460-470)
Beumer
In this case, petitioner's statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the
subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a
joint affidavit that respondent's personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1, 28 he likewise claimed that
his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his
untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded
from seeking any equitable refuge. HADTEC
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner
given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional
purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done
indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 29 Surely, a contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal
effect at all. 30 Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, 31 petitioner cannot have the
subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof.
The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds
them. 32 Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered
into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioner's claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment
||| 

Matthews
- The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private
lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. 25 There is no rule
more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent
the provision by trying to own lands through another. In a long line of cases, we have settled
issues that directly or indirectly involve the above constitutional provision. We had cases where
aliens wanted that a particular property be declared as part of their father's estate;  26 that they
be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property titled in the name of another; 27 that an
implied trust be declared in their (aliens') favor; 28 and that a contract of sale be nullified for
their lack of consent.||| 
- n light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify
the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely
prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn
appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole
ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin's claim that he provided the funds
for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust
was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration
can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the
spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent
lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely
exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a
theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the
property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest
and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have
Taina
Given the plain and explicit language of this constitutional mandate, it has been held that
"[a]liens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the
constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony." 39
In the case at bench, Taina herself admitted that it was really Mike who paid with his own
funds the subject lot; hence, Mike was its real purchaser or buyer. More than that, it bears stressing
that if the deed of sale at all proclaimed that she (Taina) was the purchaser or buyer of the subject
property and this subject property was placed under her name, it was simply because she and Mike
wanted to skirt or circumvent the constitutional prohibition barring or outlawing foreigners or aliens
from acquiring or purchasing lands in the Philippines. Indeed, both the CA and the RTC exposed and
laid bare Taina's posturing and pretense for what these really are: that in the transaction in question,
she was a mere dummy, a spurious stand-in, for her erstwhile common-law husband, who was not a
Filipino then, and never attempted to become a naturalized Filipino citizen thereafter.
Borromeo
- herefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to
Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not
Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church
Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, 30 the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a
number of cases 31 that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered
cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.