ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-16439

July 20, 1961

DOCTRINE:

Article 40 of the Civil Code expressly limits the provisional personality by imposing the condition
that the child should be subsequently born alive: “provided it be born later with the condition
specified in the following article.” In this case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother’s womb.

FACTS:

In 1950, before Nita Villanueva and Oscar Lazo were married, Villanueva became pregnant. To
conceal her pregnancy from her parents and upon her aunt’s advice, she had an abortion by
Antonio Geluz, a physician. After Villanueva and Lazo got married, she became pregnant for the
second time. As she was an employee of the Commission on Elections and found it inconvenient,
she had her second abortion by Geluz in October 1953. In less than two years, she again became
pregnant. On 21 February 1955, Villanueva went to the clinic of Geluz in Manila accompanied by
her sister and her niece. Unknown to Lazo and without his consent, his wife had an abortion for
the third time, an abortion of a two-month old fetus. Villanueva paid Geluz fifty pesos. At that time,
Lazo was in Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board.

On the basis of the last abortion, Lazo instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against Geluz. The trial court ordered Geluz to pay Lazo damages, attorney’s fees and costs of
the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court. Hence, Geluz
filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Did the unborn child acquire civil personality?

HELD:

No, the unborn child did not acquire civil personality.

Article 40 of the Civil Code expressly limits the provisional personality by imposing the condition
that the child should be subsequently born alive: “provided it be born later with the condition
specified in the following article.” In this case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother’s womb.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury of death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf
of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death since no transmission to anyone can take
place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity
to act).

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights
of the deceased child, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect
either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral
damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus,
i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their
parental expectations as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant
them.

In this case, however, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for
an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee’s indifference to the previous
abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. Even after learning of the
third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal
cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from
the doctor a large money payment.

Hence, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without
costs.
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.

G.R. No. L-26795

July 31, 1970

DOCTRINE:

It is true that Article 40 prescribing that “the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it” adds further “provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article” (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother’s womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the
conceived child;; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and
ineffective.

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing’s family and Felix Icao were neighbors and had close and confidential
relations. Despite being married, Icao succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Carmen
several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent. Despite efforts and drugs
supplied by Isao, Carmen became pregnant and had to stop studying. Hence, she filed for support
at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney’s fees.

Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child
had been born. The trial judge sustained Icao’s motion and dismissed the complaint. Thereafter,
Carmen moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, she had later
given birth to a baby girl. However, the court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the
original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this
Court.
ISSUE:

May an action for support be filed for an unborn child?

HELD:

YES. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of
Ilao(whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the
said child is only “en ventre de sa mere;;” just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may
receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the
parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the
testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator (Article 854,
Civil Code).

The lower court’s theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation
of parents and illegitimate children “does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn,”
violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of
Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that “the conceived child shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it” adds further “provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article” (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother’s womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the
conceived child;; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and
ineffective.

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a
woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes
a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage
caused. Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself
had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint;; and the order dismissing it
for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee
Felix Icao. So ordered.
CONTINENTAL STEEL V. MONTANO

G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009

DOCTRINE:

Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article.

Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely
delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than
seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery
from the maternal womb.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and
obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will

FACTS:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental
Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-
Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim
for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the
Union. This, after his wife, Marife, had a pre-mature delivery which resulted to the death of their
unborn child.

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims
for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.
It posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child,
a fetus, without legal personality.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of his unborn child.

RULING:
Yes, Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits.
The Court emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an
employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who
suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising
from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but
died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died
subsequently.

The court also emphasized that life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire
civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and
Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the
Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño,
which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the
amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand
Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.

SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984

DOCTRINE:

Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being,
they would be living in constant violation of decency and law.

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the decision of the court finding accused Elias Borromeo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding that he and
Susana Taborada (the deceased) were legally and validly married because there was no marriage
contact executed in their wedding, hence he could be liable only for homicide, not parricide.

Other than the stand of appellants counsel against the existence of marriage in order to lessen or
mitigate the penalty imposable upon his client, accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the
deceased-victim was his legitimate wife.

ISSUE:

Was there a valid marriage between the accused-appellant and the deceased-victim?

RULING:

There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such
marriage. (Tolentino vs. Paras).

Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of the society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law.

The presumption in favor of the matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. The reason for
this presumption is well settled in Perido vs. Perido, thus:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage is not only
a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
indemnity of P12,000.00 is increased to P30,000.00. With costs.
TRINIDAD V. CA

G.R. No. 118904, April 20, 1988

Panganiban, J.:

DOCTRINE:

In order for the petitioner and his siblings to be recognized a legitimate children and heirs of
Inocentes Trinidad but the respondents claims that the latter has no proof of marriage between
their brother and the petitioner’s mother. The Article 22 of the Family Code which is about the
function of Marriage Certificate and it being a proof of union between two individuals.

FACTS:

Arturio Trinidad claims to be the son of Inocentes. Trinidad, who together with Felix and Lourdes,
his siblings, are heirs 4 parcels of land of their deceased father. He presented the following
evidences:

1. Testimony of Gerardo that Inocentes and his wife cohabited and had a child;

2. Testimony of Isabel Meren that she was present in the marriage of Arturio’s parents;

3. His own baptismal certificate (his birth certificate had been destroyed); and

4. Family pictures and his own testimony that he lived with Lourdes during his teenage
years until he got married.

Lourdes, the aunt of Inocentes, presented the following evidence to refute Arturio’s claims:

A. testimony of Briones that Inocentes was never married

B. her own testimony that Inocentes died childless and she claimed that Arturio was simply a
neighbor.

She denied knowledge of the pictures Arturio presented, where she is shown holding the baby
of Arturio, together with Arturio and his wife.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the above evidences are sufficient to prove that Arturio is the legitimate child of
innocents given that there is a question regarding the marriage of the supposedly parents
RULING:

Yes. Arturio presented the first 3. In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be
sufficient proof of marriage:

1. Fact of marriage ceremony;

2. Open cohabitation of the parties;

3. Birth certificate of the child; and

4. Other documents.

For filiation, when the birth certificate can’t be produced, other evidence like the baptismal
certificate is admissible. Use of surname without objection is also presumptive evidence of
legitimacy. Lourdes denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that
Exhibit B shows her holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioners daughter, she demurred that she did
so only because she was requested to carry the child before she was baptized. When shown
Exhibit A, she recognized her late brother — but not petitioner, his wife and the couple’s children
— slyly explaining that she could not clearly see because of an alleged eye defect. Although a
baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of the other means
allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws to show pedigree, as this Court ruled
in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals:

What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate
child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws, according to the Civil Code, or by evidence of proof in his favor that the
defendant is her father, according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy,
Handbook on the Family Code of the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246]

Hence, Arturio Trinidad and his siblings were legitimate children of the deceased and the
evidences were sufficient to prove such.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court's decision dated July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No
costs.
JERRYSUS L. TILAR VS. ELIZABETH A. TILAR AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 214529 July 12, 2017, PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE:

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation
of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

“Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal
consequences which are governed by the Family Code.”

FACTS: Jerrysus L. Tilar filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of his wife’s (Elizabeth) psychological incapacity based on Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Elizabeth failed to file her Answer despite being served with summons. The RTC then required
the Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether collusion existed. In his Manifestation
and Compliance, the Public Prosecutor certified as to the absence of collusion between the
parties. Trial, thereafter, ensued with Jerrysus and his witness testifying.

The RTC issued its assailed Decision dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

In so ruling, the RTC ratiocinated:

“Marriage is a sacrament according to the teaching of the Catholic Church. Being a sacrament,
the same is purely religious. Declaration of nullity, which is commonly called an annulment in the
Catholic Church, is a judgment rendered by an ecclesiastical tribunal determining that the
sacrament of marriage was invalidly contracted. The procedure is governed by the Church’s
Canon Law not by the civil law observed by the State in nullity cases involving civil marriages.
Ergo, the principle of separation of Church and State finds application in this case.

Clearly, the State cannot encroach into the domain of the Church, thus, resolving the validity of
the church marriage is outside the province of its authority. Although the Family Code did not
categorize the marriage subject of the petition for nullity or annulment, the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the State laid down the principle of separation, ergo, it is beyond cavil that
nullity of a church marriage cannot be taken out of the church jurisdiction. The court being an
entity of the State is bereft of any jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.”

Jerrysus filed a petition for review directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the courts have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of marriage pursuant to the provision
of the Family Code.

RULING:

Yes.

Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. The State is mandated to protect
marriage, being the foundation of the family, which in turn is the foundation of the nation.

Our law on marriage, particularly the Family Code, restates the constitutional provision to
protect the inviolability of marriage and the family relations.

Accordingly, Article 1 of the Family Code pertinently provides:

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation
of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

As marriage is a special contract, their terms and conditions are not merely subject to the
stipulations of the contracting parties but are governed by law. The Family Code provides for the
essential as well as formal requisites for the validity of marriage.

The contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the requirements and formalities
prescribed by law. The marriage of Jerrysus and Elizabeth which was solemnized by a Catholic
priest and was held in a church was in accordance with the above-quoted provisions. Although,
marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and legal consequences
which are governed by the Family Code. As Jerrysus correctly pointed out, the instant petition
only seeks to nullify the marriage contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code
of the Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage in the religious and
ecclesiastical aspect is another matter. Notably, the proceedings for church annulment which is
in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is still
considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of separation of
the church and state finds no application in this case.

As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the Family
Code has provided for the grounds for the termination of marriage. These grounds may be
invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of voidable marriage or in a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising
jurisdiction over the matter. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provides:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

xxxx

(15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which Jerrysus filed before the RTC falls
within its exclusive jurisdiction; thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.

———

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certjorari is GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte is ORDERED to PROCEED with the resolution of the case based
on the sufficiency of the evidence presented.
REPUBLIC V. ALBIOS

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

DOCTRINE:

It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties
whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not
for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is
no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way
or for any purpose.

FACTS:

Liberty Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Daniel
Lee Fringer, an American citizen.

She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband
and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations.

She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. Albios filed a motion to set case
for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion.

The Assistant Prosecutor reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both
parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.

The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio.

On appeal by the OSG, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not a marriage contracted for the purpose of obtaining foreign citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent.

2) What is marriage in jest?

RULING:

1. Respondent’s marriage is not void.

In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC explained that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the
respondent to acquire American citizenship.

The CA agreed and ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be

(1) freely given and

(2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.

A “freely given” consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into
the marriage.

Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the
vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation,
and undue influence.

Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.

Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.
Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to
do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage.

Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.

There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of
the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.

2) In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin
to a marriage by way of jest.

A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real
intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the
parties would not be bound.

The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.

It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties
whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio,
not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of
consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being
bound in any way or for any purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED
for utter lack of merit.
Alcantara vs Alcantara

G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

DOCTRINE:

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract,
or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued to the parties.

FACTS:

Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent
Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the
required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person
who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their
wedding before a certain priest. They got married on the same day. They went through another
marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived
separate lives. In her Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that
there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She alleged that Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three
children and that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA
affirmed the decision.

Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage with the Rosita was
celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila
City Hall and dealt with a “fixer” who arranged everything for them.

He and Rosita did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a
marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the Rosita was a
resident of the place.
The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight
because the certification states that “Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario” but their marriage contract bears the number
7054033 for their marriage license number.

ISSUE:

Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

HELD:

No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license,
the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the
petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was
also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise
in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely
Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact
issued to the parties herein. This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of
official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn
the validity of his marriage.

Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the parties are
residents of the city or municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that does not
affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage
does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is not impossible
to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error. It does not detract from the conclusion
regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, petitioner
cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now
insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily
went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage
ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the
marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited
to his lifestyle.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, petitioner, -versus- GLORIA GOO ABBAS, respondent.

G.R. No. 183896 • January 30, 2013 • Third Division • VELASCO, JR., J.

DOCTRINE:

A marriage is generally void ab initio if celebrated without a marriage license. Here, the marriage
between Syed and Gloria without the requisite marriage license should be declared null and
void.

FACTS:

Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani, decided to stay in the Philippines two (2) years after meeting
Gloria Goo Abbas, a Filipina. While Syed was staying at the house of Gloria’s mother in Manila,
Gloria’s mother arrived with two (2) men. Syed underwent a “ceremony” as a requirement for his
stay in the Philippines. They signed a document, which Syed learned later on was a “marriage
certificate”. Upon investigation, Syed discovered that the marriage license was procured in
Carmona, Cavite, where neither Syed nor Gloria resided. Likewise, the marriage license was
issued under a different name, and that no marriage license was ever issued for Syed and Gloria
per certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage between Syed and Gloria should be declared void ab initio based
on the lack of marriage license.

RULING:

Yes. As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order
No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that
would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows: Art. 3. The
formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage
license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony
which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age. Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A defect in any
of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Art. 35.
The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: x x x x (3) Those solemnized without a
license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

A marriage is generally void ab initio if celebrated without a marriage license. Here, the marriage
between Syed and Gloria without the requisite marriage license should be declared null and void.
A certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain
records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. The certification likewise enjoys the
presumption of regularity, and such presumption may only be rebutted upon proof of the claimant
that no diligent search was made or that the certification did not categorically state that no such
marriage license was made or found. In this case, not only did Gloria fail to explain why she
procured a marriage license in Carmona, Cavite, where neither party resides. There is also proof
that diligent search was made by the Municipal Civil Registrar to find Syed and Gloria’s marriage
license since they were able to trace the marriage license written at the marriage certificate, albeit
registered in another couple’s names.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling
the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
NINAL V. BAYADONG

328 SCRA 122

DOCTRINE:

• Cohabitation as an exception to marriage license must be without legal impediments.

• The validity of a void marriage may be questioned even after the death of either of the
parties.

Facts

Petitioners Niñal were the children of Pepito Niñal during marriage. Pepito killed their mother
and one year and 8 months later married respondent Bayadog without marriage license.
However, they executed an affidavit that they have cohabited together for at least five years and
thus were exempted from securing a marriage license. In Feb 1997, Pepito died and the
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the second marriage due to absence of
marriage license. The petition was grounded on the assumption that it might affect the
successional rights of the Niñals. Bayadog averred that Niñal have no cause of action and not
among the persons who could file an action for “annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the
Family Code.

The lower court dismissed the petition of the Niñals on the ground that Annulment/Voidable
must be a direct attack.

A void marriage is subject to collateral attack: (1) Case can be filed by interested parties or heirs
even after the lifetime of the parties. (2) Can also be raised in an estate proceeding involving
property.

Issues

Will the successional rights of the Niñals be affected because of their father’s second
marriage with Bayadog?

Is Bayadog’s contention correct?

Ruling:

No, because the second marriage is void. As a general rule, a marriage license is a requirement
for marriage but there are exceptions: one of which is cohabitation for at least 5 years without
legal impediments (Article 76 Old Civil Code). No third party must be involved during those 5
years to be exempt from marriage license, otherwise, the law will encourage immorality. In this
case, Pepito and Bayadog cannot claim their 5-year cohabitation as an exception because such
is an adulterous one. Thus, their marriage was void and the successional rights of the Niñals will
not be affected.

No. Bayadog contends that the Niñals have no cause of action because they are not among those
listed under Article 47 of the Family Code. Article 47 provides causes or grounds of action where
a marriage may be annulled. However, these are grounds for voidable marriages and not for void
marriages. Void marriages may be questioned even after the death of either of the parties (this is
sometimes called “can be collaterally attacked”) but voidable marriages may only be questioned
during the lifetime of the parties. The reason why a voidable marriage may only be questioned
during the lifetime of the parties is that it may leave their offspring as legitimate. On the converse,
once any of the party of a voidable dies, it will be disastrous to declare their offspring as illegitimate
which once lived up with the knowledge of the legitimacy of their parent’s marriage. Here,
Bayadog’s and Pepito’s marriage was void, therefore Article 47 does not apply. Furthermore, the
heirs of Niñals may validly question such subsequent marriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said
case is ordered REINSTATED.
Republic v. Dayot

November 22, 2016

G.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x

G.R. No. 179474

FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

Chico-Nazario, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Article 34 “No license shall be necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediments to marry
each other…

FACTS: On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City through the
execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity and that
being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. Then Jose
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa
filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan,
Laguna. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and
Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage
was secured through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for the ground
that the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa
was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals the Court
of Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of
a marriage license. Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was
that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article
34 of the New Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal condition
that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation
executed by him and Felisa was false.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio?

RULING: Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the requirements of valid
marriage in which the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper because
they started living together five months before the celebration of their marriage. That according to
the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 34 “No license shall be necessary for
the marriage for a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years and without any legal impediments to marry each other… “ it means that a five years
period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding
the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead
or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties.

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly,
it rendered an Amended Decision that the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson
is void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa
Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
REINEL ANT B. DE CASTRO v. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, GR No. 160172, 2008-
02-13

DOCTRINE:

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that
the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties' marriage.

Facts:

This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,[2]
declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that
the... marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.

They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in
October 1994, and had... regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the
Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push
through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March
1995 stating that... they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The
couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the
ceremony,... petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live
together as husband and wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since
the child's birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government
dentist and from her private practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.[3] In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to
petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his... responsibility/obligation to financially support
her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child."

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio
since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from... embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state

Issues:

This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166,[2]
declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that
the... marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.

Ruling:

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a... continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication... of every applicant's name
for a marriage license.[26] In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect;
in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent
executed so they could push through... with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere
scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to
obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,[5] the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it
declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and... thus obliged to give her support.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that
the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties' marriage. In... addition, the
Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner's refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity
and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge
with respondent, saying that petitioner's "forgetfulness should not... be used as a vehicle to relieve
him of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible."[6] Moreover, the Court of Appeals
noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that
he is the legitimate... father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the
trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same
case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting... attorney or fiscal, to see
to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for
declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests
upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised... in an action for declaration of nullity, and not
in the instant proceedings.

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the
testimony of the latter, but also by respondent's own admission in the course of his testimony
wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they... were sweethearts, he
used to visit petitioner at the latter's house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have
sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their
marriage, though invalid, as earlier ruled.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , G.R. No. 200233 JULY 15, 2015

DOCTRINE:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained
the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.

Facts: Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G.
Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty,"
while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit. 5 The prosecution adduced evidence that
Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974,

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence
of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the
affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first marriage. It also held that it
was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated
without a need for a marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is
an admission that she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage." 9Thus,
the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and
one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor
as maximum.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab
initio for having been celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which
provides an exemption from the requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their marriage. In
her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and wife for
five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license
effectively rendered their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy. The RTC
refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11Accused Santiago submits that it is her
marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on the validity
of her marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do. The best support to her
argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage.
Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage null and void in these proceedings.

On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not
known of the previous marriage of Santos. Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the
prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent the lack
of a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put
the validity of her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction
for bigamy. 12

ISSUES: petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she
was not aware of Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.

Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the
absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those
marriages exempt from a marriage license, because they have not previously lived together
exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the records
that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing
the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.

Held: In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being
aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous
undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused.
(Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to
Galang. Both courts consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality
of the following circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the
house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was incredible for a
learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the
more credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former
was the legal wife of Santos.

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took
place without a marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their
Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the
Family Code. The provision reads as follows:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained
the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February
1996 32 and that after six months of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any
objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in
Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she
was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked
him.35 On cross examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime
in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her piglets.36

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for
only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at
least five years prior to their marriage.

Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although
the records do not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34
of the Family Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and
misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each
other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in
which the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because
the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.

The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage

The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation
perpetrated by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face
an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal
actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that they had not
satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than
her marriage contract.

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in
an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an
individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had the occasion to emphasize that
the State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with
the promise of futurity and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage
and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a
mockery of the sanctity of marriage. 40

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded." 41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a
transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result, litigants
shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest
or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of
bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage
license. But as elucidated earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior their
marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while
knowing full well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under
Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow
petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.

No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this
fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is
DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.

DOCTRINE:

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court
judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.

Facts:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000,
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the
requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed
away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties”
left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia,
a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a
certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17
February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he
agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking
and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from
his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the
marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.

Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license
shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
Issue: whether or no Marriage is valid.

Held:

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may
not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of
the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid
or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge
did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
RENE RONULO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 182438, 2 July 2014.

BRION, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple take
each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing
which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer.

FACTS:

Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry on 29 March 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. But on the day of the wedding, the church's officiating
priest refused to solemnize the marriage because of lack of a marriage license.

With the couple and the guests already dressed for the wedding, they headed to an Aglipayan
Church. The Aglipayan priest, herein petitioner Ronulo, conducted a ceremony on the same day
where the couple took each other as husband and wife in front of the guests. This was despite
Petitioner's knowledge of the couple's lack of marriage license.

Petitioner was eventually charged of violating Article 352 of the RPC for performing an illegal
marriage ceremony.

The MTC did not believe Petitioner's defense that what he did was an act of blessing and was
not tantamount to solemnization of marriage and was found guilty.

The decision was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner committed an illegal marriage.

RULING: Yes.

Article 352 of the RPC penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are:
 1. authority of the solemnizing officer; and

2. his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

The first element is present since Petitioner himself admitted that he has authority to solemnize
a marriage.

The second element is present since the alleged "blessing" by Petitioner is tantamount to the
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.

There is no prescribed form or rite for the solemnization of a marriage. However, Article 6 of the
Family Code provides that it shall be necessary:

1. for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and

2. declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each
other as husband and wife.

The first requirement is present since petitioner admitted to it. The second requirement is likewise
present since the prosecution, through the testimony of its witnesses, proved that the contracting
parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

The penalty for violating Article 352 of the RPC is in accordance with the provision of the Marriage
Law, specifically Article 44, which states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically
penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by
a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or
both, in the discretion of the court.

As such, Petitioner was held guilty of violating Article 352 and was fined P200 as penalty.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
LUCIO MORIGO Y CACHO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 145226, 2004-02-06

Principles:

We must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-
Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

Facts:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The
former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.

Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication.

Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both
agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on
February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa
Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic)
among others, the declaration of nullity of accused's marriage with Lucia, on... the ground that no
marriage ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information[5] filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio
and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place.

No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.

Issues:

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so,
whether his defense of good faith is valid.

Ruling:

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner's claim that his first marriage to
Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled
that want of a valid marriage... ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held
that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both
spouses may resort merely for the purpose of... obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to
determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not
entitled to recognition anywhere.The trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020
declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony
actually took place.

No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent
declaration of nullity of Lucio's marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit
Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349[12] of the Revised Penal
Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved.
Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid
defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15[13] of the
Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy... in this jurisdiction. Under Article
17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a
judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction. The trial court found that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what
transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held... that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance
with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. "This simply means that there was no marriage
to begin... with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In
other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first
marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage,... the accused was,
under the eyes of the law, never married."

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married.
But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there
is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a... marriage being declared
void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null;
it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner
was not married to Lucia at the... time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The
existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy,
it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of. The... petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge. No
marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid... marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly
valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he... contracts a subsequent marriage.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court
dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY
on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

QUISUMBING, J.:

DOCTRINE:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

Facts:

Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981. They were blessed with a with a son and
a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California.

He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the
same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision
of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
Held:

Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code be
interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,one of them became naturalized as
a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree.

The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two
Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed, she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the US. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if
the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he was still barred
from remarrying.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
REPUBLIC v. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, GR No. 221029, 2018-04-24

DOCTRINE:

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.[42]
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife.

Facts:

Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage
in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a
Japanese court.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the
Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf.
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition
considering that, based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. As a result, Manalo moved to admit an
Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended Petition, which captioned that it is also
a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:

1. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named

YOSHINO MINORO

2. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after due
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese
Cour

3. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorced Japanese
husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living
separately from said Japanese former husband;
 4. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San
Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's
marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that
petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is
no longer married to her; furthermore, in the event that petitioner decides to be remarried,
she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage;

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether
they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related
to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages."

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita,
et al.[7] ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in
view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice to consider Manalo
as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her

For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.
Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr.[8] where the marriage between a
foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a divorce filed abroad by the latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

Issues:

whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine
law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or
her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.

Ruling:

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two types:
(1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.[9] In this jurisdiction, the
following rules exist: 1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it.[10] 2. Consistent with Articles 15[11] and 17[12] of the New Civil Code, the marital
bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.[13]
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.[14] 4. In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.[15]

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage.[20] It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.[21] Philippine courts cannot try
the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.[22] Under the principles
of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality,
but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations
of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.

Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted.

It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign
divorce proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision
and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076, are
AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
Marlyn Monton Nullada vs. The Hon. Civil Registrar of Manila, Akira Ito, Shin Ito and all persons
who have claim or claim any interest.

DOCTRINE:

“The letter of the law (Art. 26 par. 2 of the Family Court) does not demand that the alien spouse
should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted.”

FACTS:

In 1997, Marlyn and Akira (a Japanese national) got married in Japan. The document was
registered with both the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the then National Statistics
Office, Civil Registry Division.

The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito. Their relationship, however,
eventually turned sour and so they later decided to obtain a divorce by mutual agreement. In
2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan. The Divorce Certificate that was
issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines.

Marlyn and Akira’s acceptance of the notification of divorce by agreement was supported by an
Acceptance Certificatethat was issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku in Japan.

Hence, Marlyn sought a recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines by filing a Petitionfor
registration and/or recognition of foreign divorce decree and cancellation of entry of marriage that
was filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code.

Akira did not file an Answer to the petition, notwithstanding summons by publication. The Republic
also did not offer any evidence to rebut the case of Marlyn.

The RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition. According to the RTC, the fact that Marlyn
also agreed to the divorce and jointly filed for it with Akira barred the application of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, which would have otherwise allowed a Filipino spouse
to remarry after the alien spouse had validly obtained a divorce. While the intent of the law is to
equalize Filipinos with their foreigner spouses who are free to marry again after the divorce, the
Filipino spouse cannot invoke the intention of equity behind the law when he or she is an initiator
or active participant in procuring the divorce.
Dissatisfied, Marlyn moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. This
prompted Marlyn to file the present petition for review on certiorari directly to the Supreme Court
(this Court).

ISSUES:
A. Whether Marlyn’s direct recourse to the Supreme Court from the decision of RTC is proper.

B. Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code has a restrictive application so
as to apply only in cases where it is the alien spouse who sought the divorce, and not where the
divorce was mutually agreed upon by the spouses.

C. Whether there is a need to prove the foreign divorce decree despite the lack of opposition
from the OSG.

RULING:
A.
The direct recourse is proper. This Court explains that it allows the direct recourse from the
decision of the RTC on the ground that the petition raises a pure question of law on the proper
application of Article 26 of the Family Code. “Direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and
final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved” [Rep. of
the Phils. v. Olaybar, 726 Phil. 378, 384 (2014)]. In this case, the RTC’s resolve to dismiss the
petition filed before it delved solely on its application of the statutory provision to the facts
undisputed before it.

B.
The legal provision that is pertinent to the case is Article 26 of the Family Code, which states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), [36, 37] and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

The facts in Rep. of the Phils. v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo [G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018], are
similar to the circumstances in this case. It was held that Article 26 of the Family Code should
apply even if it was Manalo (a Filipino) who filed for divorce. The decree made the Japanese
spouse no longer married to Manalo; he then had the capacity to remarry. It would be unjust to
still deem Manalo married to the Japanese who, in turn, was no longer married to her. The fact
that it was Manalo who filed the divorce was inconsequential.

Applying the same legal considerations and considering the similar factual milieu that attended
in Manalo, the present case warrants a reversal of the RTC’s decision that refused to recognize
the divorce decree that was mutually obtained by Marlyn and her foreigner spouse in Japan solely
on the ground that the divorce was jointly initiated by the spouses.

When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should
not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of
absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live
together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status
and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital
bond.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien

capacitating him or her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. “The legislature is presumed to know
that meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the
use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words
of a statute there should be no departure.”

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result:
the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a
distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreing divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operation of the latter’s national law.

C. While Marlyn and Akira’s divorce decree was not disputed by the OSG, a recognition of the
divorce, however, could not extend as a matter of course. Under prevailing rules and
jurisprudence, the submission of the decree should come with adequate proof of the foreign law
that allows it. The Japanese law on divorce must then be sufficiently proved. “Because our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven x x x like any
other fact” [Ando v. Department of Foreign Affairs, 742 Phil. 37, 48 (2014)].

In ATCI Overseas Corp., et al. v. Echin, 647 Phil. 43 (2010), the Court reiterated the following
rules on proof of foreign laws:

To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which read:

Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by his seal of office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.

Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The records only include a photocopy of
excerpts of The Civil Code of Japan, merely stamped “LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture
Center, Embassy of Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City 1300”.This clearly does not
constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on proof of Japan’s law on divorce. In any case,
similar to the remedy that was allowed by the Court in Manalo to resolve such failure, a remand
of the case to the RTC for further proceedings and reception of evidence on the laws of Japan on
divorce is allowed, as it is hereby ordered by the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 21,
2016 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43 of Manila in Special Proceedings Case No. 14-132832
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED.
Fujiki vs. Marinay (2013)

DOCTRINE:

While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate
a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. In
this case, there is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy.

FACTS:

Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese national, married Maria Marinay in the Philippines in 2004. However,
they eventually lost contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay married Shinichi Maekara, another
Japanese, without her prior marriage with Fujiki being dissolved. Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara and so she left the latter and reestablished her relationship with
Fujiki.

Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void for being bigamous. Subsequently, Fujiki filed a petition
before the RTC titled “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)” and prayed that the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized in the Philippines
and the subsequent marriage of Fujiki to Maekera be declared void ab initio under Articles 35 (4)
and 41 of the Family Code.

The RTC denied the petition stating that the petition was in gross violation of Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (AM No. 02-11-10-
SC). It took the view that only “the husband or the wife”, in this case either Maekara or Marinay,
can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not AM No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable in this case.

(2) Whether or not Fujiki, a husband of a prior marriage, can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between Marinay and Maekera on the ground of
bigamy.

RULING:

1. No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered.

2. Yes. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained
a divorce decree abroad.

In this case, there is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. The Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution
dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-
11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
LONTOC-CRUZ, vs. CRUZ G.R. No. 201988 October 11, 2017 Psychological Incapacity

MARCH 15, 2019

DOCTRINE:

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations
or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations
of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as
a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness.

FACTS:

Marivi Lontoc met Nilo Cruz and they became sweethearts in 1986.

The couple married in a civil ceremony followed by a church wedding. The marriage produced
two sons.

Sometime in 2005, Marivi filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based
on psychological incapacity. In support of her claim that she and Nilo were suffering from
psychological incapacity, Marivi presented Dr. Villegas, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Encarnacion, a
clinical psychologist.

According to Dr. Villegas, both parties could not tolerate each others’ weaknesses and that the
incapacities of the parties are grave because they preferred to satisfy their own needs rather than
to give in to the other’s needs.

Dr. Encarnacion supported Dr. Villegas’ diagnosis.

The RTC denied the Petition.

From the RTC’s verdict, petitioner appealed to the CA.

The CA united with the RTC in rejecting the alleged existence of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:

Whether the psychological conditions of the parties fall under Article 36 of the Family Code to
warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage.

RULING:

We sustain the findings of both the RTC and the CA.

Article 36 of the Family Code states:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

We have laid down guidelines in interpreting and applying this provision. In Republic v. De
Gracia, we reiterated the doctrine in Santos v. Court of Appeals, “that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by:

(a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage);

(b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and

(c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved).”

Also, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, we reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving

petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, as embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals, viz.:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.x x x.

xxxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.
xxxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ‘the time of the celebration’ of the marriage.x
x x.

xxxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. x x
x.

xxxx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, ‘mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts’ cannot be accepted as root causes.x x x.

xxxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x
x.

xxxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. x x x.

Notably, “mere showing of ‘irreconcilable differences’ and ‘conflicting personalities’ [as in the
present case,] in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.” “Nor does failure of the parties to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons” amount to psychological incapacity. We
further elucidated in Yambao v. Republic that the psychological condition should render the
subject totally unaware or incognitive of the basic marital obligations:

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations
or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations
of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as
a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness.

Upon the view we take of this case, thus, this Court believes that the protagonists in this case are
in reality simply unwilling to work out a solution for each other’s personality differences, and have
thus become overwhelmed by feelings of disappointment or disillusionment toward one another.
Sadly, a marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

YOLANDA E. GARLET v. VENCIDOR T. GARLET, GR No. 193544, 2017-08-02

DOCTRINE:

The Court already declared that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that a spouse is
suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which makes the spouse completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of marriage.

Facts:

Petitioner Yolanda E. Garlet assails in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45... which
reversed and set aside the Decision[2] dated November 27, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)... and (2) Resolution... of the appellate court in the same case, which denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner and respondent Vencidor T. Garlet met each other sometime in 1988. They became
intimately involved and as a result, petitioner became pregnant. Petitioner gave birth to their son,
Michael Vincent Garlet (Michael), out of wedlock on November 9, 1989. Petitioner and respondent
eventually got married on March 4, 1994. Their union was blessed with a second child, Michelle
Mae Garlet (Michelle), on January 23, 1997. However, petitioner and respondent started
experiencing marital problems. After seven years of marriage, petitioner and respondent
separated in 2001. Petitioner now has custody over their two children.

On May 6, 2005, petitioner filed a Petition[4] for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground
of respondent's psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations to petitioner and
their children.

In its Decision dated November 27, 2006, the RTC gave weight to Ms. De Guzman's conclusion
that respondent was suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder... and ruled that:Based on
the evidence submitted, the parties never shared a true married life.

RTC adjudged: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between
YOLANDA EREVE GARLET and VENCIDOR TAEP GARLET held at the Office of the Mayor,
Morong, Rizal on March 4, 1994, as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO on [the] ground of psychological
incapacity of the respondent to perform the essential marital obligations in accordance with Article
36 of the Family Code, with all the legal effects thereon.
Court of Appeals Decision reads:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant
appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated November 27, 2006 and
the Order dated February 26, 2007 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage
between herein parties is hereby declared as still subsisting and valid.[

OURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
YOLANDA GARLET AND VENCIDOR GARLET TO BE SUBSISTING

Issues:

COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
YOLANDA GARLET AND VENCIDOR GARLET TO BE SUBSISTING.

Petitioner argues that based on Marcos v. Marcos,[47] it is not required that the psychologist
personally examine the spouse who is alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. What
matters is that the totality of petitioner's evidence establish psychological incapacity.

Ruling:

Petitioner argues that based on Marcos v. Marcos,[47] it is not required that the psychologist
personally examine the spouse who is alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. What
matters is that the totality of petitioner's evidence establish psychological incapacity.

It bears to stress that the burden of proving the nullity of the marriage falls on petitioner.
Petitioner's evidence shall still be scrutinized and weighed, regardless of respondent's failure to
present any evidence on his behalf. Any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage. Tested against the present guidelines, the Court agrees with the
Court of Appeals that the totality of petitioner's evidence is insufficient to establish respondent's
psychological incapacity.

aside from petitioner's bare allegations, no concrete proof was proffered in court to establish
respondent's unfaithfulness to petitioner. Petitioner failed to provide details on respondent's
supposed affairs, such as the names of the other women, how the affairs started or developed,
and how she discovered the affairs. Ms. De Guzman, in her Psychological Report, quoted
respondent's brother, Avelino, as saying that different women often looked for and visited
respondent at the latter's house after petitioner and respondent separated, but this is still
insufficient evidence of respondent's marital infidelity.
The Court already declared that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that a spouse is
suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which makes the spouse completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of marriage.[6

While the Court does not hold respondent totally without blame or free of shortcomings, but his
failings as husband and father are not tantamount to psychological incapacity which renders their
marriage void from the very beginning. Worthy of reiterating

1] that:... herein is the declaration of the Court in Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador[71] that:

It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove
that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of
the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due
to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature.

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social
institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution
protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the
plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of
them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious
psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated June 21, 2010 and Resolution dated August 24, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89142 are AFFIRMED.
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. CASE DIGEST [G.R. No. 201061, July
3, 2013, CARPIO, J.]

TOPIC: Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage (Article 148)

DOCTRINE: Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions, in accord with
Article 148.

FACTS: Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979. Sally’s father was against
the relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a
purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered. Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification
of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous
and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for
the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family
Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and
for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered
properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven
properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.

The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage
with Azucena. The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not having a marriage
license

2. Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property relations

3. Whether bigamy was committed by the petitioner

HELD:
 1. YES.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary,
“shall be void from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them
and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by
the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under
Section 3 of Article 35which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under
Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent
and void from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s
ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.

2. YES.

The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which
states: Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence
of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.
The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired
by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given
by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before
the trial court even admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties
to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x.”

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the CA is more in accord
with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
were in the name of Benjamin with the descriptive title “married to Sally.” The property covered
by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally with the descriptive title “married
to Benjamin” while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the
name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words “married to” preceding the
name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words
do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there
can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.

3. NO.

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage
shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one
that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity
on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of
the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy
was not committed. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.In this case, there was
really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract
without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar
and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist.
They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III v. NORA REYES BAKUNAWA, GR No. 217993, 2017-08-09

DOCTRINE:

While the Court has declared that there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician,[24] much less be
subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds application only if the totality of evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.

Facts:

Manuel and Nora met in 1974... and became sweethearts. When Nora became pregnant, she
and Manuel got married on July 26, 1975... they lived with Manuel's parents Manuel had to stop
his studies to help his father Manuel... assigned to provincial projects... came home only during
weekends.

However, whenever Manuel came back from his provincial assignments... he chose to spend his
limited time with friends and girlfriends instead of his family. Nora resented this and they started
quarreling about Manuel's behavior. Worse, Manuel depended on his father and on Nora for their
family's needs.

Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's parents. Their verbal quarrels escalated to
physical violence.

1977, Nora gave birth to their second child. However, nothing changed in their relationship...
eventually left Nora and their children in 1980 to cohabit with his girlfriend. They considered
themselves separated

In 1985,... Nora became pregnant again and thereafter gave birth to their third child

2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage... on the ground that he and
Nora are psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

A psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), who testified that Manuel has Intermittent
Explosive Disorder, characterized by irritability and aggressive behavior that is not proportionate
to the cause. Dr. Villegas diagnosed

Nora with Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder, marked by a display of negative attitude and
passive resistance in her relationship with Manuel Her findings were based on her interview with
Manuel and the parties' eldest son, Moncho
Issues:

CA ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES DESPITE
MORE THAN CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO DECLARE ITS NULLITY DUE TO THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF EITHER OR BOTH PARTIES TO PERFORM THEIR
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS

Ruling:

The totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising of his testimony and that of Dr. Villegas,
as well as the latter's psychological evaluation report, is insufficient to prove that he and Nora are
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang,[20] the Court held that "[i]f the incapacity can be proven
by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to
support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a psychologist's examination
and report."[21] In Toring v. Toring, et al.,[22] the Court stated that:Other than from the spouses,
such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends
or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouses'
condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots
to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.

In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the spouses'
psychological evaluation was Moncho, who could not be considered as a reliable witness to
establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to Article 36 of the Family Code,
since he could not have been there at the time his parents were married.

While the Court has declared that there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician,[24] much less be
subjected to psychological tests, this rule finds application only if the totality of evidence presented
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 27, 2014
and Resolution dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98579
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner -versus- MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, respondent.

GR No. 189538 • 10 February 2014 • Third Division • PERALTA, J.

Civil Law │ Persons and Family Relations │ Marriage │ Void Ab Initio

DOCTRINE:

In Fujiki v. Marinay, the Court held that a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the
civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary
to prevent\ circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. In this case, in allowing the correction
of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not,
in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

FACTS:

Merlinda Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend. Upon its receipt, she
discovered she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune in 2002. However, she denied havi
ng contracted marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband. Her signature
was also allegedly forged. Thus, she filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage
Contract, especially the wife portion thereof.

The Office of the Solicitor General argued that in directing the cancellation of the entries in the
wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage void ab initio.
Thus, the petition instituted by Merlinda was actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding which provides the procedure for cancellation or correction
of entries in the civil registry.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the cancellation of “ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE
ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT” is in effect declaring the marriage void ab initio.

RULING:

No. In Fujiki v. Marinay, the Court held that a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in
the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.

In this case, with the testimonies and other evidence presented, the RTC held that Merlinda’s
signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and was forged. Therefore, it was established
that no marriage was celebrated. On the contrary, aside from the certificate of marriage, no such
evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage. In allowing the correction of the
subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any
way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial
Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Braza v. the City Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental G.R. No. 181174
December 4, 2009 Legitimacy and Filiation, Rule 108, Correction of Entry

JULY 8, 2021

DOCTRINE:

It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

FACTS:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres and Pablo Sicad Braza, were married on January 4, 1978. The
union bore Ma. Cristina’s co-petitioners Paolo Josef, Janelle Ann, and Gian Carlo.

Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.

During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille
Titular began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza as her and Pablo’s
son.

Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries and obtained Patrick’s birth certificate from the Local Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental which showed that he was born on 01 January
1996, to Lucille Celestial Titular and Pablito S. Braza; “Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito
Braza on January 13, 1997”; and Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April
22, 1998 at Manila.

Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were
married on April 22, 1998.

Hence, she and her co-petitioners filed before the RTC of Himamaylan City, a petition to correct
the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.

Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between
Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage
between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for

(1) the correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name
of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name “Braza”;
2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick,
to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and

3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for
this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

The trial court dismissed the petition.

in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court
under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and
Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence,
the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

Upon denial of thei motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the present petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of
Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test can be brought in a special proceeding
for correction of entry.

RULING:

The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages
and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which
an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein
may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors
in the civil registry.

The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify
the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s
filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.

Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth
records and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.

Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo
and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes
of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March
15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a
Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.

It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
ESTRELLITA JULIAJVO-LLAVE v. REPUBLIC, GR No. 169766, 2011-03-30

DOCTRINE:

Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides... that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized
in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines."

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively
override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano
and Zorayda.

Facts:

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice -initially under the
Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City[3] and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.[4]

In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano's civil status was indicated as 'divorced.'

Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano's wife,
and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23,1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her
son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano's
legitimate children with Zorayda,[5] filed a complaint with the RTC... for the declaration of nullity
of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint[6] alleged,
inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this
marriage remained... subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court
for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995,[8] and again,
another 15 days[9] or until February 18, 1995,... both of which the court granted.[10]

Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss[11] on February 20,
1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married
under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latter's disbarment... complaint against Sen.
Tamano.
The trial court denied Estrellita's motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration
of nullity.

Thus, Estrellita filed... a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the denial of her Motion to
Dismiss. We referred the petition to the CA... the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in
its Decision

Estrellita then elevated the appellate court's judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review
on certiorari

The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared
Sen. Tamano's subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ah initio for being bigamous under Article
35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of... the Philippines.

As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita's marriage to Sen. Tamano
is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is
governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute... divorce.

the CA denied Estrellita's Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration

where it debunked the additional errors she raised.

Issues:

Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous

Ruling:

Estrellita s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her
pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss
before the higher courts does not at all suspend the trial... proceedings of the principal suit before
the RTC of Quezon City.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites.[49] The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the... provisions of which only
one marriage can exist at any given time.[50] Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized except during the efifectivity of Republic Act No. 394[51] which was not
availed of... during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano's prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by
way of divorce under PD 1083,[52] the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides... that the law applies to "marriage
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines."

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively
override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano
and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its... provisions

The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively,
unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily
implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the... retroactive operation of
laws. Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions
applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law,
specifically, the Civil Code - in respect of civil acts... that took place before the Muslim Code's
enactment.[54]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September
13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
KALAW vs. FERNANDEZ G.R. No. 166357 September 19, 2011 Psychological Incapacity
Art. 36 Family Code

JUNE 17, 2018

DOCTRINE:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

FACTS:

Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973,
maintained a relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong and subsequently had four
children. Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with
Jocelyn Quejano who gave birth to a son.

In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone
started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.

In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four
children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and
a driver.

The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got
sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on
weekends.

Tyrone brought the two elder children, Rio and Ria to the US. After just one year, Ria returned to
the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.

Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody
of the two younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children
refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father.

Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at the
time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was
manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their
co-habitation

Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert,
Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity.

Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual
infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a
narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).

The trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations under the Family Code.

The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity.

RULING:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts
Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to

assume the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the
plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or
behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological
problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently
proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents constant
mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their
children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly
to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute
a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described
as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair
assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties.

The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of
psychological incapacity.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological
incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

REPUBLIC v. RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, GR No. 108763, 1997-02-13

DOCTRINE:

Facts:

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of
a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.

the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985... that a son, Andre
O. Molina was born... that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers
and friends... that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with
his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them... that sometime
in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since... then Roridel had been
the sole breadwinner of the family... that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel,
as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from
her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City... that a few weeks later, Reynaldo
left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them... that Reynaldo had thus shown
that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrelsome... individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served... that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void
in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical

Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
Issues:

the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological
incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application
thereof to the facts of the case,

Ruling:

psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and
that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment... of the law has been to confine the meaning
of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
This psychologic condition must exist at the... time the marriage is celebrated.

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal"
or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of

"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological

incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties
as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable... of doing so, due to
some psychological (not physical) illness.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines,... (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
LEONILO ANTONIO v. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, GR NO. 155800, 2006-03-10

DOCTRINE:

Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by
Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual... help and support. As noted by the
trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the
basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Facts:

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent
was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married

Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,[7] petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null
and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the... essential obligations of
marriage. He asserted that respondent's incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present.[8]

As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that

respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things,...

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,[10] and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family.

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her
when in fact, no such incident occurred.

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician... and told some of her friends
that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.[13]

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording
Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent
lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make
it appear that she earned a higher income.

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates
to monitor his whereabouts.

In support of his petition, petitioner presented, a psychiatrist, a clinical psychologist, who stated,
based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy
and... conservative type of person.

On the other hand, they observed that respondent's persistent and constant lying to petitioner
was abnormal or pathological.

They further... asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological.

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held that respondent's
propensity to lying about almost anything-her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among others-had been duly established. According to the trial court,... respondent's
fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of
make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage.[36]

The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court
of Appeals nevertheless held that the... totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to
establish respondent's psychological incapacity.

Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this
Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent's psychological
incapacity.

Issues:

petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
Ruling:

The factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to
dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered... that respondent had
consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity,
consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina... guidelines.

the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of
his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his
allegations on his wife's behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and... the Philippine
Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent's claims pertinent to her alleged singing career.

Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
court's decision.

Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time
of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she... kept petitioner in the dark
about her natural child's real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the
truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had
shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the... exasperated petitioner left his wife.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced
by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual... help and support. As
noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to
commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church.
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but
also by canonical bodies.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological
incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her,
desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive... jealousy.
From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent's condition is incurable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

CELERINA J. SANTOS v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, GR No. 187061, 2014-10-08

DOCTRINE:

The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a parly
from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission
of the controversy

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals'
resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring her presumptively... dead.

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had
filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of... remarriage
on June 15, 2007.[1] Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.[... business did not prosper.[5]
As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong.[6]

She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left
Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again.[8]... icardo further alleged that he
exerted efforts to locate Celerina.[

He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their daughter's
whereabouts.[10] He also inquired about her from other relatives... and friends, but no one gave
him any information.[11

Ricardo claimed that it w... as almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition
since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.[12]

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when
she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate
remedies.[13]

On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment[14] be... efor... e... he
Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud an... nd... lack of jurisdiction. S
According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue,
Quezon City.[16] This residence had been her and

Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.[17] As a result of Ricardo's
misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition
declaring her presumptively dead.[18

Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic
helper abroad.[20] Neither did she go to an employment agency in February 1995.[21] She also
claimed that it was not true that she... had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she
never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City.[22] It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in
May 2008 to cohabit with another woman.[23] Celerina referred to a joint... affidavit executed by
their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his petition.[2

Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it
had never been published in a newspaper.[25] She added that the Office of the Solicitor General
and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished... copies of Ricardo's petition.

he Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's
petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy.[27] According to the Court
of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the... civil registry, declaring
her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.[28]

Issues:

The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring
presumptive death.

Ruling:

The petition is meritorious. Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article
42 of the Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the spouse
seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's
death.[31] She added that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did
not disappear in the first place.[32] She insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper
when the declaration of presumptive death is... obtained fraudulently.[33]
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family Code
would not be a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment
declaring her presumptive death.[

Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or
resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the... petitioner."[36]

The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

It is... extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a parly
from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission
of the controversy

Celerina claimed that because of these, she was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose
Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively... dead.

elerina further claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Provincial

Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's petition.[44]

Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment[45] on November 17, 2008. This was less
than two years from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and about a
month from her discovery of the decision in October 2008. The petition... was, therefore, filed
within the four-year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred
by laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction

The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions,
presumptions, and conditions.

The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or
her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared absent or
presumptively dead

A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent
marriage may be considered valid when the following are present:

1. The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;

2. The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;
 3. There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse; and

4. There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.[55]

Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally
considered bigamous and void.

If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her
presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent marriage, such marriage would be
considered void for being bigamous under Article 35(4) of the Family Code.

Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the
subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is
not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not... nullify the
effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family
Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and
the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid...
marriages."[61] If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage
conceived before the termination shall still be considered legitimate.[62] Moreover, a judgment
declaring presumptive death is a defense... against prosecution for bigamy

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence
of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
Rosanna L. Tan-Andal vs. Mario Victor M. Andal

G.R. No. 196359; May 11, 2021

En Banc

Leonen, J.

DOCTRINE: Psychological Incapacity

Psychological incapacity as a ground provided in Article 36 of the Family Code:

ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization

Facts

Mario and Rosanna first met each other in 1975. They exchanged letters until 1978, when they
lost contact with each other. They reconnected in 1995 when Mario sought out Rosanna through
their childhood friends. On June 17, 1995, Mario proposed and Rosanna agreed to marry him.
Afterwards, the parties married on December 16, 1995. However, after four years of marriage,
the couple separated in 2000. Rosanna kept the sole custody of their only child, Ma. Samantha.

On August 6, 2003, Rosanna filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage, claiming that
Mario was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to her.

Rosanna claimed that before marrying Mario showed signs of “emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility, irritability, and psychological imbalance” which he continued after marriage. He
would leave their house for several days without informing Rosanna of his whereabouts. Once he
returned home, he would refuse to go out and would sleep for days. Mario was also “hyper-active”
late at night. Rosanna confronted Mario about his behavior. To Rosanna’s shock, Mario admitted
that he was using marijuana, although he claimed that he was not addicted and that he could stop
anytime. He then promised to stop using it. Not keeping his promise, Mario continued with his
drug use.

That on July 1999, an electrician working on the wires of the house opened the door to a small
room. He found Mario and Ma. Samantha inside, with the room filled with smoke that did not quite
smell of cigarettes. The electrician informed Rosanna of what he saw, and Rosanna knew that
Mario relapsed into his drug use.
Rosanna contended that Mario’s drug use was the manifestation of a grave personality disorder
“deeply rooted within Mario’s adaptive system.” She thus prayed that the trial court nullify their
marriage. To prove Mario’s psychological incapacity, Rosanna presented Dr. Garcia, a physician-
psychiatrist, as expert witness.

In her Judicial Affidavit, Dr. Garcia declared that she interviewed Rosanna and gathered data on
Rosanna’s family, educational, and employment history. She likewise conducted mental status
examinations on Rosanna. For data on Mario’s social, sexual, and marital history, Dr. Garcia
interviewed Rosanna, Ma. Samantha, and Jocelyn Genevieve, Rosanna’s sister.

After evaluating the data, Dr. Garcia found Rosanna “psychologically capacitated to comply with
her essential marital obligations.” As for Mario, Dr. Garcia diagnosed him with narcissistic
antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder with psychotic features.

RTC Ruling: It ruled in favor of Rosanna and declared the marriage void.

CA Ruling: It reversed the RTC Ruling. The Court of Appeals found Dr. Garcia’s psychiatric
evaluation of Mario to be “unscientific and unreliable” since she diagnosed Mario without
interviewing him. The CA ruled that Dr. Garcia “was working on pure suppositions and second-
hand information fed to her by one side.”

Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Rosanna and Mario is void due to psychological
incapacity.

Ruling: Yes. With clear and convincing evidence, Rosanna proved that Mario was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to her. Their marriage is void ab
initio.

Psychological incapacity as a ground provided in Article 36 of the Family Code:

ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
To recall, the term “psychological incapacity” was first defined by this Court in Santos as a “mental
(not physical) incapacity” to comply with the essential marital obligations. The term was confined
to “the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.”

By equating psychological incapacity to a “mental incapacity” and to “personality disorders,” this

Court went against the intent behind Article 36. The Code Committee was clear that psychological
incapacity is not a mental incapacity. Among the earlier wordings of the provision on psychological
incapacity included “mentally incapacitated,” and “mentally” is obviously absent in the present
Article 36. This means that for the Code Committee, “mental” is not synonymous with
“psychological.”

In light of the foregoing, this Court now categorically abandons the second Molina
guideline. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that
must be proven through expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring
aspects of a person’s personality, called “personality structure,” which manifests itself through
clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse’s personality structure
must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with
his or her essential marital obligations.

Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses
who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify
on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse.
From there, the judge will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity
to assume the essential marital obligations. In this way, the Code Committee’s intent to limit the
incapacity to “psychic causes” is fulfilled

Thus, psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of
understanding and concomitant compliance with one’s essential marital obligations due to psychic
causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence, expert
opinion is not required. As an explicit requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity must
be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a
durable aspect of one’s personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married.
Furthermore, it must be shown caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove
psychological incapacity, a party must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence.
Considering the foregoing, this Court finds Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligations. Rosanna discharged the burden of proof required to
nullify her marriage to Mario. Clear and convincing evidence of Mario’s psychological
incapacity consisted mainly of testimony on Mario’s personality structure and how it was
formed primarily through his childhood and adult experiences, well before he married
Rosanna.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals'
February 25, 2010 Decision and April 6, 2011 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 90303
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The May 9, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City, Branch 260, in Civil Cases 01-0228 and 03-0384 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Asusano Kikuchi etc. G.R. No.243646, June 22, 2022

DOCTRINE:

Under Article 26 of Executive Order No. 209, series of 1987, as amended, or The Family Code of
the Philippines, a divorce between a foreigner and a Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines
as long as it was validly obtained according to the foreign spouse’s national law.

FACTS:

In 2015, respondent Jocelyn Asusano Kikuchi filed before the RTC a petition for judicial
recognition her foreign divorce. She claimed she married Fumio U. Kikuchi in 1993, and in 2007,
they jointly filed for divorce before the City Hall of Sakado City, Saitama Prefecture. The Sakado
City Mayor issued an Acceptance Certificate stating that her and Fumio’s written notification of
divorce had been accepted. The Acceptance Certificate was accompanied by an Authentication
from the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan.

The RTC granted Jocelyn’s petition, holding that the latter was able to establish the fact of divorce
and the national law of Japan. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, moved
to reconsider the RTC decision, but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed before
the Court of Appeals (CA), which denied the same, prompting the former to elevate the matter
before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER was able to establish the fact of divorce and the
national law of Japan

HELD:

The Court held that while Jocelyn established the fact of divorce by submitting the Acceptance
Certificate as authenticated by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, she was not able to
establish the law of Japan on divorce.

The Court underscored that for a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce to prosper, the
party pleading it must prove the fact of divorce and the national law of the foreign spouse.

Under Article 26 of Executive Order No. 209, series of 1987, as amended, or The Family Code of
the Philippines, a divorce between a foreigner and a Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines
as long as it was validly obtained according to the foreign spouse’s national law.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by the court, the party pleading it must first
prove the fact of divorce and its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

To prove that the divorce was valid under Japanese laws, Jocelyn submitted a photocopy of the
English translation of the Civil Code of Japan, published by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc. and stamped
with “LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture Center, Embassy of Japan, 2627 Roxas
Boulevard, Pasay City.”

The Court was not convinced. It held that such document is devoid of any probative value. “Not
being an official translation, the document submitted by Jocelyn does not prove the existing law
on divorce in Japan. Unfortunately, without such evidence, there is nothing on record to establish
that the divorce between Jocelyn and Fumio was validly obtained and is consistence with the
Japanese law on divorce,” it said.

It added: “Given that Jocelyn was able to prove the fact of divorce but not the Japanese law on
divorce, a remand of the case rather than its outright dismissal is proper. This is consistent with
the policy of liberality that the Court has adopted in cases involving the recognition of foreign
decrees to Filipinos in mixed marriage.”

Thus, the Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed November
15, 2018 Decision of the CA.