PFR week 4 digests:

QUIMIGING V. ICAO (34 SCRA 132)

Quimiguing and Icao were neighbors and had close and confidential
relations.

Icao, although married, had carnal intercourse with Quimiguing several

times by force and intimidation, and without her consent.

As a result, Quimiguing fell pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by

Icao, and she had to stop studying.

Quimiguing this claimed support at P120 per month, damages, and

attorney’s fees.

Carmen, assisted by her parents, sued Felix, her neighbor. She claimed
that Felix, although married, had succeeded in having sex with her against
her will & by force, & as a result, she became pregnant & had to drop out of
school. She thus filed this claim for the support of their child. Felix filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that Carmen failed to allege that the child had
been born; hence, there was no cause of action. The trial court granted the
motion to dismiss.

Case was dismissed for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not
allege that the child had been born. Quimiguing moved to amend the
complaint to allege that as a result for the intercourse, she later gave birth
to a baby girl. Court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the
original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff
appealed to this court.

ISSUE: WON the support be claimed for an unborn child?

YES, a conceived child, although unborn, is given by law a provisional

personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided
in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child,
therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee. It is true that Article 40, prescribing that “the conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to is" adds
further “provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article”. This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the
right of the conceived child, for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would
become entirely useless and ineffective.

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a
married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a
clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Thus, independently of the right to
support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action
or damages under the terms of the complaint pursuant to Article 21 of the
Civil Code.

HELD: The trial court erred when they granted the motion to dismiss. A
conceived child, though as yet unborn, has the right to support from its
progenitors, including the defendant, just as a conceived child, though
unborn, may be given donations or may succeed. Support can be granted
to children yet unborn.

We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A

conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided
in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child,
therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly the
defendant- appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose
of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only “en ventre de sa
mere’’; just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn may receive
donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being
ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced
heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child
should be born after the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code).

“ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be

accepted by those persons who would legally represent them if they were
already born.”

“ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the

compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution
shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.”

It is thus clear that the lower court’s theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code
declaring that “support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children”
does not contemplate “support to children as yet unborn,” violates Article
40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the
text of Article 291.

It is true that Article 40 prescribing that “the conceived child shall be

considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it” adds further:
“provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following
article’’ (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother’s womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition
precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of
Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.

RULING

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the
case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
conformable to this decision. Costs against Felix Icao. So ordered.

GELUZ V. CA (2 SCRA 801)

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva got pregnant in 1950 before she and the plaintiff were
legally married.

She decided to get an abortion following an advice from her aunt to conceal
her pregnancy from her parent. The abortion was performed by Antonio
Geluz, a physician whom she met through her aunt in 1948.

She got pregnant again after her marriage, but as she was employed in the
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy was inconvenient, she got
another abortion in October 1953.

Less than 2 years later on February 23, 1955, she again aborted her 2
month old fetus for the amount of 50 php. At this time, her husband was in
Cagayan campaigning for is election to the provincial board. He did not
know of, not gave consent, to the abortion.

The CA and the Trial Court predicated the award of Php3000 upon the
provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code, but this,
we believe to be a mistake because the amount indicated in the article
does not cover the case of an unborn fetus without personality.

ISSUE: W/N the parent could claim damages from the physician for
performing abortion on an unborn fetus.

HELD: NO. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal

injury or death pertains primarily to one injured, it is easy to see that if no
action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child
on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action did accrue on
behalf of the unborn child. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on
behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked
juridical personality. It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of
a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil Code because that same
article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should subsequently be born alive. In the present
case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
mother’s womb.

RULING: The decision appealed from is reversed and the complaint

ordered dismissed. Without costs.

In Geluz v. Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 801, the Supreme Court ruled that a
parent cannot invoke the concept of “provisional personality’’ of a
conceived child to obtain damages for and on behalf of an aborted child
considering that the conditions set in Articles 40 and 41 were not met.
However, the Supreme Court said that the parents can obtain damages in
their own right against the doctor who caused the abortion for the illegal
arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus,
i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss and
disappointment of their parental expectations. The parents, however, must
be shown not to have consented or acquiesced to the abortion.

DE JESUS V. SYQUIA (58 PHIL. 866) SPECIAL LAW: RA NO. 6809

FACTS:

Antonia Loanco was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant’s

brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant was an
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila. He got acquainted with
Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got
pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant

visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a Rev Father
confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the
child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters
which are solicitous of Antonia and the baby’s welfare. He made hospital
arrangements through his friend for Antonia’s delivery.

After giving birth, they lived together for about a year. When Antonia
showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and
married another woman.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant
who was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name
Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first
planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre and the other letters written by defendant
to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether the defendant should be compelled to acknowledge the child

Ismael Loanco.

HELD:

The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father and the other letters to Antonia
are sufficient proof of paternity. The mere requirement is that the writing
shall be indubitable.

“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous
possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was
long enough to reveal the father’s resolution to admit the status”.
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court compelling
Syquia to provide support for the child Ismael Loanco.

LIMJUCO V. THE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTE (45 OG NO. 9, P.

397)

FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied
for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in
San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the
proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of
public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said
Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by
the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said
plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate
is a contravention of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial

personality.

HELD:

The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality

because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be
considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement
and distribution of his properties”. It should be noted that the exercise of
juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of
Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights
involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public
Service Commission.

Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the purposes of the prosecution of
said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final
conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must
be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service
Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution.

DUMLAO V. QUALITY PLASTICS (G.R. NO. L-27956, 30 APRIL 1976)

On June 1960, Qualify Plastics filed a case against Pedro Oria and four
other people for failure to pay the amount of the judgment. Trial Court thus
ordered the foreclosure of the land of Pedro Oria, which he had given as
security. Unknown to Qualify plastics, Oria had already died in 1959.
Deputy Sheriff Soliven personally received and signed the summons and
copies of the complaint on behalf of his co- defendants. On March 1963 the
heirs of Oria sued Quality plastics for annulment of the judgment. Quality
Plastic in its answer alleged that the heirs were aware of the suit and they
were estopped to question the court’s jurisdiction.

FACTS:

On February 28, 1962 the CFI of Pangasinan rendered a judgment

ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio,
Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic
Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from
November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case the defendants
failed to pay the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality
Plastic Products, Inc. “is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A,
in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the judgment”.

Upon defendants’ failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the
decision had become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic
Products, Inc., ordered the “foreclosure” of the surety bond and the sale at
public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security
under the bond. The sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order of
November 20, 1962.

It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960
when the action was filed. Oria’s death was not known to Quality Plastic
AND that Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending. On
March 1, 1963 all testamentary heirs in Oria’s duly probated will, sued
Quality Plastic Products, Inc., for the annulment of the judgment against
Oria and the execution against his land for lack of jurisdiction

ISSUE: Does the Court have jurisdiction for the execution of Oria’s estate?

HELD:

The lower court’s judgment against Oria is void for lack of jurisdiction over
his person. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity,
which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through
death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).

Oria could not have been validly served his summons.

The execution sale of Oria’s land is also void. However, Quality plastics
cannot be held liable for damages and other costs because they were in
good faith in including Oria as defendant for no one informed them of his
death.

POE-LLAMANZARES V. COMELEC & ELAMPARO, G.R. NO. 221697,

MARCH 18, 2016

In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared
that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence
up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted
from May 24, 2005.

Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and
was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS
SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in
1991 after her marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at
the US. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.

On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s

deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually died on February
3,2005. She then quit her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and
finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.

On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had
reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a
voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport.

In 2010, before assuming her post as appointed Chairperson of the

MTRCB , she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225
requirements as to Reacquisition of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she
stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy
on the ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a
natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her
bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc
cancelled her candidacy on the ground

that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she
committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a

vote of 9-6 that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.

Timeline of events:

Foundling

○ Sept 3, 1968 - found abandoned as newborn in Parish Church of Jaro,

found by Edgardo Militar

○ Sept 6, 1968 - transferred the custody to Emiliano Militar; registered as

foundling, Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar

○ 5 Years Old - Susan Roces & Fernando Poe Jr filed for adoption

○ May 13, 1974 - trial court granted petition; Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe

○ 2nd half 2005 - Susan Roces found that lawyer who handled adoption
failed to secure new Certificate of Live Birth indicating new name & new
parents

○ May 4, 2006 - secured new certificate of live birth

- Marriage & US Citizenship

○ July 27, 1991 - married Teodoro Llamanzares, dual Philippine-US citizen

○ July 29, 1991 - flew to US

○ Oct 18, 2001 - naturalized US citizen

○ Dec 19, 2001 - received US passport

Back to Philippines

○ Dec 13, 2004 - Feb 3, 2005 - came back due to fathers health
○ 1st quarter of 2005 - moved back permanently

○ May 24, 2005 - came back to the Philippines

○ 2nd half of 2005 - purchased a condo in San Juan

○ Feb 20, 2006 - condo titles transferred w Kids started attending Philippine
schools ○ Feb 14 - Mar 11, 2006 - US trip to dispose remaining belonging○
Mar 2006 (late) - informed USPS of abandonment of address

○ Apr 27, 2006 - sold US home

○ Early 2006 - acquired lot in Corinthian Hills QC

○ July 7, 2006 - took oath of allegiance pursuant to RA 9225

○ July 10, 2006 - filed with Bureau of Immigration petition to reacquire

citizenship + for kids

○ July 18, 2006 - BI ruled in favor & issued Identification Certificates

○ Aug 31, 2006 - registered voter in Brgy Santa Lucia, San Juan

○ 2006/2007 - acquired Philippine passport

○ Oct 6, 2010 - Pnoy appointed Grace as Chair of MTRCB

○ Oct 20, 2010 - executed Affidavit of renunciation of allegiance to the US

& of citizenship

○ Oct 21, 2010 - submitted above affidavit to BI & then took oat as chair of
MTRCB ○ July 12, 2011 - executed oath/affirmation of renunciation of US
citizenship before the vice consul at US Embassy Manila. Grace stated that
she had resided outside of the US from Sept 3, 1968 - July 29, 1991 & May
2005 to present (July 12, 2011)

○ Dec 9, 2011 - US Vice Consul issued certificate of loss of nationality

effective Oct 21, 2010

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino
citizen (2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement.

HELD:

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that,

she satisfied the constitutional requirement that only natural-born Filipinos
may run for Presidency.

(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown
in her physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact
that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there
is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing
99% chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability and
circumstantial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules
on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born-

citizens as based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional
Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there
is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be
natural born citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born

citizenship as to the country where they are being found, as covered and
supported by the UN Convention Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency

because she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to
remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of
not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting
May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented
overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon
permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application
to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for
Presidency was granted by the SC.

FRIVALDO V. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 120295, 28 JUNE 1996)

FACTS:
Juan Frivaldo filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) on March 20, 1995.
Raul Lee made a petition to cancel the COC for being disqualified to seek
public office because he was not a Filipino Citizen, which was granted by
the COMELEC.

Frivaldo filed a motion for reconsideration which remained unacted upon

until after May 1995 election. His candidacy continued and he was elected
as Governor. However, the COMELEC affirmed his disqualification on May
11, 1995. Raul Lee having garnered the 2nd highest number of votes was
proclaimed Governor.

Frivaldo filed a petition to annul the proclamation on the grounds that:

1. He took an Oath of Allegiance on June 30 as his petition for

naturalization in September 1994 had been granted;

2. There is no more legal impediment for his proclamation;

3. The Vice Governor and not Lee should occupy the seat as Governor in
case of vacancy due to disqualification.

ISSUE: WON Juan Frivaldo a Filipino Citizen during his election as

Governor?

HELD:

Yes. It is true that he was disqualified by the Court in the 1988 and 1992
elections on the issue of his citizenship and he was stateless when he filed
his COC for the 1995 elections, thus making him ineligible to hold public
office. But his case is unique and the law should be interpreted liberally on
his favor.

1. He sought American citizenship to escape prosecution of the Martial

Law, not to denounce his being a Fiipino.

2. He took an Oath of Allegiance every time he files his COC despite being
denied several times.

3. He demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-acquire his

citizenship despite technical setbacks.
4. Assured of a life of ease and plenty as an American Citizen he opted on
returning and serving his country which gives no doubt as to his loyalty and
dedication to this country.

5. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times which
makes him deserving to govern the people.

Frivaldo was upheld as the rightful Governor of Sorsogon and granted

Filipino citizenship.

UYTENGSU V. REPUBLIC (50 OG 4781/L-6379, 29 SEPTEMBER 1954)

FACTS:

Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros

Oriental on October 6, 1927, where he also finished his primary and
secondary education. He went to the United States, where, from 1947 to
1950, he was enrolled in the Leland

Stanford Junior University, in California. In April of 1950 he returned to the

Philippines for a four -month vacation, then on July 15, 1950, filed an
application for naturalization. Forthwith, he returned to the United States
and took a postgraduate course, in chemical engineering, in another
educational institution. He finished this course in July 1951 but did not
return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951.

Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word “residence”, as
used in the aforesaid provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous
with domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost by physical absence, until
another domicile is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to
be domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Philippines, his purpose in
staying in the United States, at that time being, merely to study.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted, when

petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition.

HELD:
While domicile and residence mean the same thing, residence combined
with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an established abode,
fixed permanently for a time for business or other purposes, constitutes a
residence, though there may be an intent, existing all the while, to return to
the true domicile.

Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his
petition for naturalization and did not return until several months after the
first date set for the hearing, notwithstanding his explicit promise, under
oath, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines “from the date of
the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine
citizenship”, he has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a judgment
in his favor.

However, the denial of his petition does not bar him to reapply for
citizenship and undergo the same process again. He has to be committed
to comply with the requirements.

MORALES V. DE GUIA, G.R. NO. 247367, DECEMBER 5, 2022

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC
FACTS:
Imelda was a little over 8 years old when her parents established domicile
in Tacloban, Leyte. She finished her studies and got her degree in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to Manila in 1952 to work for her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office at the House of Representatives. In
1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and consequently became a registered voter
there.
When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in
San Juan. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as
member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during
1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative
of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, also
a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification” with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under
residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words “since
childhood” in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on
March 29, 1995 and that “she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to
the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said
months.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1 year residency requirement to be
eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The
court favors the conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence
or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7
months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s
domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to
Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed
to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the
term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political
Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium
necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos,
her action of returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban,
Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.
The petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a
seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the
First District of Leyte.