G.R. No.

L-16439
July 20, 1961
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

FACTS
Nita Villanueva knew the petitioner through her aunt. When Nita became pregnant out of marriage with
private respondent, she had herself aborted by petitioner to conceal her pregnancy from her parents.
After marriage with private respondent, she again became pregnant. However, she had herself aborted
again by petitioner because her pregnancy was inconvenient upon her, working in the COMELEC. In less
than two years, she again became pregnant. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in
consideration of the sum of fifty pesos. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes respondent's
basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application of the petitioner Geluz, CA granted
certiorari.

ISSUES
whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from
physician who caused the same.

ARGUMENTS
The petitioner stated that he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

RULING
It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the
Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. They would
normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the foetus, i.e.,
on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental
expectations, as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral
damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, clearly
indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower
court expressly found, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion and probably aware of the
first. Yet, he has taken no steps to investigate the causes and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, his only concern appears to have been directed at
obtaining from the doctor a large money payment.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
QUIMIGUING vs ICAO

FACTS
the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao,
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and
intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs
supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per
month, damages and attorney's fees. The trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the
complaint.

ISSUES
Whether or not support is an obligation to illegitimate children yet unborn

ARGUMENTS
Defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the
child had been born
Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later
given birth to a baby girl;

RULING
REYES A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for
all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-
appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said
child is only just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by
Article 742 of the same Code.

The order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao.
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING vs Montaño

FACTS
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel and a member of respondent Union filed a claim
for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union.

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife, had a
premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. According to the Certificate of Fetal
Death, the female fetus died during labor.

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.

ISSUES
whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA

whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that
were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents.

ARGUMENTS
The Union argued that CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born
alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by
the CBA death benefits.

Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 4216 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with
civil personality could die. A fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all.
Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality.

Atty. Montaño stated that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment
he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; therefore, the fetus was already a
dependent.

Continental Steel claimed the death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the
coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not
that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality.

RULING
CHICO-NOZARIO A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than "loss of human life",
especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to
assuage the employee and the latter’s immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather
than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel’s] insistence
that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
affirming the Resolution of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Montaño, which granted to Rolando P.
Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits, grounded on the death of his unborn child,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.
EUGENIO vs VELEZ

FACTS
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana, her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private
respondents Vargases filed a day before, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by
herein petitioner. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without
any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age,
single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.

The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the
writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of to the respondent sheriff and
stated that he had already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of
Health.

Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence
on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body.

Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents were granted leave to amend their petition.

ISSUES
propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding to recover custody of the dead body of a 25 year old
female, single, whose nearest surviving claimants are full blood brothers and sisters and a common law
husband.

ARGUMENTS
A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but
extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live person.

Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only after the filing of the habeas corpus petition,
private respondents Vargases alleged that petitioner who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was
wrongfully interfering with their duty to bury her.

RULING
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether
Vitaliana was dead or alive. After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the
habeas corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to
avoid multiplicity of suits. As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy
became moot and academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of liberty.
In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which
disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.
TITLE

Aruego vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 112193, March 13, 1996

FACTS

Respondent Antonia Aruego was rendered as an illegitimate child of Jose Aruego, Sr. with Luz
Fabian. The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open and
continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children."

Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction
on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of the Family Code of
the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the Family Code should be applied in this particular case.

ARGUMENTS

Private respondent's action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought under
the Civil Code which state the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents except if the father or mother died during the minority of the
child.

Petitioners, countered that with the advent of the New Family Code on August 3, 1988, it is
provided that an action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the "open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," must be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent without any exception, otherwise the action will be barred by
prescription.

RULING

The Supreme Court speaking through Justice Hermosisima, Jr. declared that the action brought
by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by
Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The
present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned as its
application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided.

With these reasons, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.
BERNABE vs ALEJO

FACTS
Late Fiscal Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of 23 years, respondent Carolina
Alejo. The son named Adrian Bernabe was born on September 18, 1981. Fiscal died on August 13, 1993,
while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving petitioner Ernestina as the sole
surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared
an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and be given his share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate,
which is now being held by petitioner.
The trial court ruled that since the putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian
Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged
father for him to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that Adrian should be allowed to prove that he
was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe for being born in 1981. His rights are governed by Article 285
of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has
attained the age of majority.

ISSUES
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner for recognition
and partition with accounting after the putative father’s death in the absence of any written
acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
Whether or not respondent had four years from the attainment of minority to file an action for
recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code
Whether Adrian’s right to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil
Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code.

ARGUMENTS
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition, because Article 285
of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter
Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right would be impaired. Respondent further
contends that the filing of an action for recognition is procedural in nature and that "as a general rule,
no vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws."

RULING

we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his
petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot
impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior
to its enactment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
RENE RONULO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS

Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other at the Sta. Rosa Catholic
Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating
priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to
secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey and Claire, who were already in their wedding attires,
together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Aglipayan Church. They requested
the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having
been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He
conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and
secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.

ISSUES

whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an "illegal
marriage ceremony"

ARGUMENTS

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple
was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.

The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife. Second, under the principle of
separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the
administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing" into a "marriage
ceremony.

The petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving
moral guidance to the couple.

RULING

One of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present
case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted
the "blessing" of their relationship. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s
knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
MORIGO vs PEOPLE

FACTS

Petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates for four years who, even after
losing contact, became sweethearts and maintained contact with each other. Lucia was then working in
Canada when she came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition Morigo to join her in Canada.
Both agreed to get married. Few days after marriage, Lucia went back to her work in Canada. A year
later, Lucia filed in the Ontario court a petition for divorce which took effect on February 17, 1992.
Petitioner got married to Maria Lumbago on October 4, 1992.

On September 21, 1993, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seek the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage
with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993,
petitioner was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

ISSUES

whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid

ARGUMENTS

The respondent relies upon our ruling in MarbellaBobis v. Bobis, which held that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 of the Family
Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of
the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly,
which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing.

RULING

In the instant case, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own., The mere private act of
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage in accordance with Articles 3 and 4
of the Family Code and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.

Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.
Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or
lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals as well as
the resolution of the appellate court denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of
BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
ALCANTARA vs ALCANTARA

FACTS

Petitioner and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall
to look for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro,
who for a fee, arranged their wedding. They got married on the same day. They went through another
marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church after more than 3 months. The marriage was
likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license,
procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a
resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar
of the said place. Respondent gave birth to their and in 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives.

ISSUES

Whether or not the marriage of the parties is void

ARGUMENTS

Petitioner submits that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated with no marriage license
because they just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a "fixer" who arranged everything for
them. The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall. They did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to
apply for a marriage license. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot
be given weight because the certification states that there is a discrepancy in their Marriage License
number and marriage contract number.

In reply, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage
license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite and
that petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.

RULING

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code.

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite enjoys the presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the
regular conduct of official business. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a
typographical error on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar

Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he "initiated it." Petitioner is an educated
person. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony.
The church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity
or defect attended the civil wedding.

The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
ABBAS vs ABBAS

FACTS

Syed, a Pakistani citizen met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married at the
Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. In the Philippines, he was at his mother-in-law’s residence when his mother-
in-law arrived with two men. He was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. He and
Gloria signed a document but he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him
later.

ISSUES

Whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple.

ARGUMENTS

He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he
had never resided in that area. He went to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a
copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. The Municipal
Civil Registrar issued a certification to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the
marriage contract he submitted was the number of another marriage license issued to another couple.

The respondent, Gloria presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof. She and her
mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the
sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them,
and after several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and
Syed did.

RULING

Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law to the marriage of
the parties. Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and
relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said
license. The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite issued a certification to the effect that no such
marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued and that the serial number of the marriage license
pertained to another couple. All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license.

With these reasons, the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed is void ab initio.
CARIÑO vs CARIÑO

FACTS

During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, was first married in 1969, with petitioner Susan
Nicdao with whom he had two offspring. Then in 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño with whom he
had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.

He passed away under the care of respondent, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner was able to collect from “MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” while respondent received from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and
burial (SSS).”

Respondent filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner to return to her at
least one-half of the collectively denominated as “death benefits” which petitioner received. Despite
service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in
default.

ISSUES

The validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death
benefits” is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married.

ARGUMENTS

Respondent admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage until the funeral
of the deceased, where petitioner introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action
for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license.

RULING

YNARES-SANTIAGO the marriage between petitioner and the deceasedt is undoubtedly void ab initio.
However, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Considering that the marriage of
respondent and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, the monetary benefits belong to the deceased
alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. Unless respondent presents proof, it
could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary
benefits.
As to the property regime of petitioner and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs which
applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage
license. Wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties
in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and
the other did not contribute thereto. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both
parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death
benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half
pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children
with Susan Nicdao.

For purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a
marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.
GARCIA vs RECIO

FACTS

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon in 1987.
They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. More than two years later, a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. In 1992, respondent
became an Australian citizen. Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were married in 1994 in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and
"Filipino”. A year later, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of
their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided in accordance
with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy as she claimed that she
learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in 1997.

ISSUES

whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and

whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

ARGUMENTS

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a
written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity
and due execution.

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

RULING

The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. On its
face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: "1. A party to a marriage
who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy." This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent did
not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. As it is, however,
there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Hence, we
believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may
declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro
Manila and the other, in Cabanatuan City.
VAN DORN vs ROMILLO

FACTS

Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that
they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines; that they begot two children; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in
1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

In 1983, Private respondent filed suit against petitioner on the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City, stating
that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner
be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right
to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of
action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

ISSUES

1. Whether the divorce issued by Nevada court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines and its declared national policy;

ARGUMENTS

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they
had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and
that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over
the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a
foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

RULING

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. To maintain, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint
filed in Civil Case
REPUBLIC vs OBRECIDO

FACTS

Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines
and was blessed with a son and daughter. Five years later, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with
the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUES

Whether or not respondent can remarry under article 26 of the family code

ARGUMENTS

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case
because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage. The proper remedy is to file a petition for annulment
or for legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s
situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.

For his part, respondent but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article
II of the Constitution.

RULING

QUISUMBING Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Thus, taking
into consideration the legislative intent, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage.

Annulment in this particular case is not feasible. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie.

However, there is no sufficient evidence submitted that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American so we are unable to declare that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his
favor.
REPUBLIC vs ALBIOS

FACTS

In 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married Mandaluyong City (MeTC) as evidenced
by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the
RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. Summons was served on Fringer
but he did not file his answer. The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. It explained that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as
they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking.

ISSUES

Whether or not a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent

ARGUMENTS

She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife
because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null
and void ab initio.

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer
to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, consent should be
distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.

Albios reiterated her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore,
void from the beginning.

RULING

MENDOZA Respondent’s marriage not void. Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be
freely given and made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. There was, thus, an apparent
intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose of
application for citizenship. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid. This Court cannot leave
the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just
as easily nullified when no longer needed.
ENGRACIA vs NORMA BAYADOG

FACTS

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones but then years later, she was shot by Pepito resulting in
her death. One year and 8 months thereafter Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.

ISSUES

Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab
initio;

ARGUMENTS

Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are
not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the
Family Code.

RULING

YNARES-SANTIAGO there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license
is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous
and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. In this case, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. Their
five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature
of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at
all and the death of either extinguished nothing. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party. However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
CORPUZ vs STO. TOMAS

FACTS

Petitioner was a Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. In 2005,
petitioner married respondent Daisylyn, a Filipina, in Pasig City. However, petitioner left for Canada soon
after the wedding due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to Philippines
sometime in April 2005, he discovered that she was having an affair with another man. Petitioner then
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce which the Superior Court of Justice, Windsor,
Ontario, Canada granted on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later.

Two years after the divorce, petitioner found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new
Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, petitioner went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered
the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. But an official of the National
Statistics Office informed Gerbert that his marriagewith Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine
court.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn offered no opposition to Gerbert’s
petition.

The RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute
the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.

ISSUES

whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a
court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

ARGUMENTS

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code. He contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse.

The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, both support Gerbert’s
position.

RULING

BRION The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. We deem it more appropriate to
take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s
(Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of
a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by
which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari. We order the REMAND of the case to the
trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above.
FUJIKI vs MARINAY ET AL

FACTS

Petitioner Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Marinay in the Philippines in 2004. He
could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides and eventually lost contact with each other. In 2008,
Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara whom she got married to in the same year in the
Philippines without the first marriage being dissolved. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left and started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and
Marinay met in Japan and were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. In 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in
the National Statistics Office (NSO).

ISSUES

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages is applicable.

(2) Whether a spouse of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation
or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

ARGUMENTS

The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family
Code of the Philippines on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.

Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage for being the
husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court is applicable.

RULING

CARPIO The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact if they are successfully proven under
the rules of evidence. There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground
of bigamy. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
because it concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to
file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. In the recognition of foreign judgments,
Philippine courts can’t substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law and can
only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party. However, the recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.

BAYOT vs CA

FACTS

Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American was married in 1979 in Mandaluyong City. They had a
daughter named Alix. Sometime in 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican
Republic which ordered the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after
completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. In less
than a month, she filed for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC-Makati but later moved to
withdraw the petition. On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating she
is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that Alix is not
a child of Vicente. On 2001, Rebecca again filed another petition in Manila for absolute nullity of
marriage on the ground of dissolution of partnership gain, monthly support for their daughter and that
Vicente is psychological incapacitated.

ISSUES

Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

ARGUMENTS

Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her
Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the DOJ, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

RULING

VELASCO, Jr. At the time of the divorce, Rebecca, assuming for argument that she was in fact later
recognized, is a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At
the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to
govern her marital relationship. She secured personally said divorce as an American citizen and was
bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. The
property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated. Veritably, the foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca was valid.
OCA vs NECESSARIO ET AL

FACTS

The audit team created by OCA headed to Cebu City in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC
in Cebu City. A female and male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as a couple looking to get
married. The female lawyer went inside and inquired about the marriage application process to the
staff. The female lawyer found that the marriage process could be rushed in a sum of P3,000 only. On
the examination of the judicial audit team, they found that the logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate
a higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts’
custody. There is also an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of
the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu. There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage
licenses obtained on the same day.

ISSUES

Whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of gross ignorance of the
law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct

ARGUMENTS

The Judges came into an argument that it is not their duty to verify the signature on the marriage license
since it is the local civil registrar who evaluates the documents submitted by the parties. They claim that
there is nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date of the issuance of the marriage license
and with the fact that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place where neither of the
parties resided. In addition, it was a process server who was in-charge of recording marriages on the
logbook, keeping the marriage certificates, and reporting the total number of marriages monthly. The
task of collecting the fee belongs to the Clerk of Court. And that solemnization of marriage is not a
judicial duty.

RULING

SUPREME COURT The OCA described the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages. The
respondent judges and court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of the parties
and the proper administration of justice. They solemnized marriages without following the proper
procedure laid down by law. The Judges solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by
the couples were incomplete and of questionable character, therefore, implies negligence,
incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness. The judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty
regarding the payment of solemnization fees. They also solemnized marriages where a contracting party
is a foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. They
should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents required for the marriage license issuance. The
judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article 34 of
the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such as
minority of a party.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in the law they
are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary layman. The respondent judges violated Canons 2 and 6 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of their
duties.

Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice; parties seeking
redress from the courts for grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank or position, as
part of the Judiciary. Therefore, they are expected to act and behave in a manner that should uphold the
honor and dignity of the Judiciary, if only to maintain the people's confidence in the Judiciary
REPUBLIC vs MANALO

FACTS

Respondent is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national. On January 10, 2012,
respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of Entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce Japanese court. The petition is
filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of their marriage, pursuant to Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid
divorce decree; and that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname.

ISSUES

whether, under Article 26 (2), a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after
initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien
spouse who is capacitated to remarry.

ARGUMENTS

Petitioner stated that she and her divorce Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact,
petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former husband. That there is an
imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled in
order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who
is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid
entry of marriage.

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

RULING

PERLTA Both Dacasin v. Dacasin and Van Dorn already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody
and property relation, respectively. There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his
or her alien spouse To make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of
whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair and gives undue favor to one and
unjustly discriminate against the other. A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more
harm than good.

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved. Since the divorce was raised by Manalo,
the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity
to remarry, fall squarely upon her.