G.R. No.

L-16439

Antonio Geluz vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals

July 20, 1961

Facts:

Nita Villanueva became pregnant in 1950, before she married Oscar Lazo. She had an
abortion performed by the petitioner, Antonio Geluz, a physician, to conceal her pregnancy from
her parents and on the suggestion of her aunt. Villanueva fell pregnant for the second time after
marrying Lazo. She underwent her second abortion by Geluz in October 1953 since she worked
for the Commission on Elections and found it inconvenient. She became pregnant again in less
than two years. Villanueva traveled to the Geluz clinic in Manila with her sister and niece on
February 21, 1955. Unbeknownst to Lazo and without his agreement, his wife performed a third
abortion, this time on a two-month-old fetus. Geluz received fifty pesos from Villanueva. Lazo
was in Cagayan at the time, campaigning for election to the provincial board.

Lazo filed a case against Geluz in the Manila Court of First Instance based on the most
recent abortion. Geluz was ordered by the trial court to pay Lazo's damages, attorney's fees,
and litigation costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision. As a
result, Geluz petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not an unborn child has acquired a civil personality

Held:

The unborn infant does not have civil personality.

Article 40 of the Civil Code explicitly restricts the provisional personality by enforcing the
condition that the child be born later with the condition specified in the following article:
"provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article." In this case, there
is no doubt that the child was deceased when separated from its mother's womb.

Because an action for monetary damages based on personal injury or death is primarily
aimed at the injured party, it is simple to understand how, if no such action could be brought on
behalf of the unborn child due to the injuries it sustained, no such right of action could accrue to
its parents or heirs. In reality, even if a cause of action did arise on behalf of the unborn child, it
was extinguished by its prenatal death since no transfer to anybody may occur from an entity
that lacks legal personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act).
 In no way does this suggest that the parents are not entitled to any compensation.
However, such damages should be those inflicted straight on them, as opposed to any injury or
violation of the deceased child's rights, including his rights to life and physical integrity. Because
parents cannot expect any help, assistance, or services from an unborn baby, they are typically
restricted to moral damages for the unauthorised halting of the developmental stages of the
spes hominis that was the embryo, i.e., the emotional pain and grief attendant to its loss, as well
as the dissatisfaction of their parental expectations, as well as civil penalties, if the situation
warrants them.

However, in this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have found no basis
for awarding moral damages, presumably because the appellee's indifference to his wife's
previous abortions, also induced by the appellant herein, shows clearly that he was unworried
with the disappointment of his parental hopes and affections. Even after knowing of the
subsequent abortion, the appellee appears to have lost concern in the appellant's criminal and
administrative actions. His primary aim seems to have been extracting a hefty monetary payoff
from the doctor.

As a result, the appealed decision is reversed, and the case is dismissed.