PERSONS – CASE DIGESTS (2) A second reason for reversing the orders appealed
from is that for a married man to force a woman not his
ART 37 TO 51 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
QUIMIGUING VS ICAO
GR NO 26795
JULY 31, 1970
FACTS:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents,
sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it
was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan
City, and had close and confidential relations; that
defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having
carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force
and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a
result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs
supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying.
Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month,
damages and attorney's fees.
Defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of
action since the complaint did not allege that the child
had been born.
ISSUE:
WON Quimiguing should be givem support for her
unborn child. (Yes, 2 reasons)
RULING:
(1) Yes, a conceived child, although as yet unborn, is
given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the
conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article. (29a)
The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from
its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee
(whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of
the motion to dismiss.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article
291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an
obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not
contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates
Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that
nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that
Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it"
adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be
alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a
condition precedent to the right of the conceived child;
for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become
entirely useless and ineffective.
wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original
complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the
rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child
she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action
for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the
order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action
was doubly in error.
GELUZ VS CA
GR NO. 16439
JULY 20, 1961
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio
Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt
Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her
present husband before they were legally married.
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and
acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted
by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff,
she again became pregnant. As she was then employed
in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy
proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again
by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years
later, she again became pregnant. On February 21,
1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the
latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the
defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in
Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife.
Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in
consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine
currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of
Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial
board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the
abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's
basis in filing this action and award of damages.
Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award
of damages in the sum of P3,000.06. (basis Article 2206
- the amount of damages for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even
though there may have been mitigating circumstances)
ISSUE:
WON the award of damages is warranted despite the
death being a fetus only and not a person.
RULING:
No, this we believe to be error, for the said article, in
fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a
person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that
is not endowed with personality.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to
collect any damages at all. But such damages must be
those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from
the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his
right to life and physical integrity.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of
personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn
child on account of the injuries it received, no such right
of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or
heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on
behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished
by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone
can take place from on that lacked juridical personality
(or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to
act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality
of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under
Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article
expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later
with the condition specified in the following article".
In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was
dead when separated from its mother's womb.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking
the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity
to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible
act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the
consent of the woman or that of her husband does not
excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does
not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
LIMJOCO VS ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGANTE
GR NO. L-770
APRIL 27, 1948
FACTS:
Pedro Fragrante, a Filipino citizen, applied for a
certificate of public convenience to install and maintain
an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal.
Fragrante dies while his application was still pending. At
the time of his death, his intestate estate is financially
capable of maintaining the proposed service.
The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of
public convenience to the intestate estate of the
deceased through authorizing the said intestate estate
with its special or judicial administrator, appointed by the
Court, to maintain and operate the plant.
Limjoco (petitioner) argues that the intestate estate of
Fragrante cannot be substituted as the applicant for the
deceased and is a contravention of the law.
In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right
to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public
convenience — the evidence established that the public
needed the ice plant — was under the law conditioned
only upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability
to maintain and operate the service.
ISSUE:
WON the estate of Fragante is a person may be
considered as a citizen. (Yes)
RULING:
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice
unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a
"person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other
reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to
his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the
commission, not counting the expenses and
disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed
to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone
those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this
jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the
estate of a deceased person is also considered as
having legal personality independent of their heirs.
Within the framework and principles of the constitution
itself, under the Bill of Rights, it seems clear that while
the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases
relate to natural persons, the term “person” must be
deemed to include artificial or juridical persons.
It was the intent of the framers to include artificial or
juridical, no less than natural, persons in these
constitutional immunities and in other of similar nature.
Among these artificial or juridical persons fare estates of
deceased persons.
Hence, the Court held that within the framework of the
Constitution, the estate of Fragante should be
considered an artificial or juridical person for the purpose
of the settlement and distribution of his estate which
include the exercise during the judicial administration
thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those
obligations of his which survived after his death.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if
he had lived, in view of the evidence of record, he would
have obtained from the commission the certificate for
which he was applying. The situation has suffered but
one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of
a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the
service of an ice plant was the same that it received from
the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary
showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be
assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not,
there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate
or enjoining them from inheriting it.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the
purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the
Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both
the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante
must be deemed extended, within the meaning and
intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony
with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
MOY YA LIM YAO VS CID
41 SCRA 292
FACTS:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a
passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-
immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with
her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the
Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing
at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand)
uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month. She
was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13,
1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one
month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On the date
of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount
of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that said Lau
Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines
on or before the expiration of her authorized period of
stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized representative might properly allow. After
repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was
allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13,
1962 (MORE THAN A YEAR). On January 25, 1962,
she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of respondent to
confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay,
she brought this action for injunction with preliminary
injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a
half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner
Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or
Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak
either English or Tagalog. She could not name any
Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa.
She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or
sisters-in-law.
It is also emphasized by said appellants that during the
hearing in the lower court, held almost ten months after
the alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung
was already carrying in her womb for seven months a
child by her husband.
OSG’s contentions:
That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted
as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a
deliberate and voluntary representation that she will
enter and stay only for a period of one month and
thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her
representation to stay permanently without first departing
from the Philippines as she had promised.
That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien
does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine
citizenship. The alien wife must possess all the
qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen
by naturalization and none of the disqualifications.
ISSUE:
WON Lau Yeun is a Filipino Citizen.
RULING:
Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have
become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on January 25,
1962.
We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been
here as a temporary visitor but who has in the
meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still
leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply
thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of
showing that he is entitled to come back, when after all,
such right has become incontestible as a necessary
concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by
whatever legal means this has been conferred upon him.
Consider for example, precisely the case of the minor
children of an alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable
that they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines.
Could it be the law that before they can be allowed
permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad
so that they may be processed to determine whether or
not they have a right to have permanent residence here?
The difficulties and hardships which such a requirement
entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against
such a rather absurd construction.
In other words, the applicable statute itself more than
implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a
Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of
conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship
including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the
Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the
Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only
because by its very nature and express provisions, the
Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is
inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense
thus discussed therefore, appellants' second and fourth
assignments of error are well taken.
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien
woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under
Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath
as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from
any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
"The status of the wife follows that of the husband, ...
and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicile
became her domicile." And the presumption under
Philippine law being that the property relations of
husband and wife are under the regime of conjugal
partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is
also that of the other.
the procedure for an alien wife to formalize the
conferment of Filipino citizenship is as follows:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien
woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the
Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman
must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien
certificate of registration alleging, among other things,
that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not
disqualified from acquiring her husband’s citizenship
pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should
be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the
petitioner does not belong to any of the groups
disqualified by the cited section from becoming
naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter
promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the
petition.
REPUBLIC VS BATUIGAS
GR NO 183110
OCTOBER 7, 2013
FACTS:
Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the
RTC of Zamboanga del Sur.
Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; that she
has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the period of her stay in the Philippines,
as well as in her relations with the constituted
Government and with the community in which she is
living; that she has mingled socially with the Filipinos and
has evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace their
customs, traditions, and ideals; that she has all the
qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA473).
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September
28, 1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena has never
departed the Philippines since birth.
Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and
Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and tertiary
education were taken in Philippine schools,i.e.,
Margosatubig Central Elementary School in 1955,
Margosatubig Academy in1959, and the Ateneo de
Zamboanga in 1963, graduating with a degree in
Bachelor of Science in Education. She then practiced
her teaching profession at the Pax High School for five
years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil for two years, and in
Talisayan High School in Misamis Oriental for another
two years.
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago
Batuiga (Santiago),a natural-born Filipino citizen. They
have five children, namely Cynthia, Brenda, Aileen,
Dennis Emmanuel, and Edsel James. All of them studied
in Philippine public and private schools and are all
professionals, three of whom are now working abroad.
After her stint in Talisayan High School, Azucena and
her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail
business of and later on in milling/distributing rice, corn,
and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted
their joint annual tax returns and balance sheets.
The business name and the business permits issued to
the spouses’ store, ‘Azucena’s General Merchandising,’
are registered in Santiago’s name, and he is also the
National Food Authority licensee for their rice and corn
business.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that
she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known
lucrative trade.
ISSUE:
WON Azucenza can be Naturalized. (Yes)
RULING:
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine
citizenship through either judicial naturalization under
CA 473 or administrative naturalization under
Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called
derivative naturalization, which is available to alien
women married to Filipino husbands is found under
Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
"any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to
a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines."
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to
Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine
citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that
they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the
time of their marriage nor do they have to submit
themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from
similar laws in the United States which has since been
amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section 15
of CA 473, which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino
citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative naturalization.
Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena
applied before the then Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. 030705 by reason
of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her
application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside
the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient
evidence that Azucena’s husband is a Filipino
citizen as only their marriage certificate was presented
to establish his citizenship.
Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena
was constrained to file a Petition for judicial
naturalization based on CA 473. While this would have
been unnecessary if the process at the CID was granted
in her favor, there is nothing that prevents her from
seeking acquisition of Philippine citizenship through
regular naturalization proceedings available to all
qualified foreign nationals. The choice of what option to
take in order to acquire Philippine citizenship rests with
the applicant. In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a
Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. The fact
that her application for derivative naturalization under
Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not prevent her
from seeking judicial naturalization under the same law.
It is to be remembered that her application at the CID
was denied not because she was found to be
disqualified, but because her husband’s citizenship
was not proven. Even if the denial was based on other
grounds, it is proper, in a judicial naturalization
proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there
are in fact grounds to deny her of Philippine citizenship
based on regular judicial naturalization proceedings.
The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the ground
that Azucena does not have the qualification required in
no. 4 of Section 2 of CA 473 as she does not have any
lucrative income, and that the proceeding in the lower
court was not in the nature of a public hearing.
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually
exercised her profession before she had to quit her
teaching job to assume her family duties and take on her
role as joint provider, together with her husband, in order
to support her family. Together, husband and wife were
able to raise all their five children, provided them with
education, and have all become professionals and
responsible citizens of this country. Certainly, this is
proof enough of both husband and wife’s lucrative
trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can resume
teaching at anytime. Her profession never leaves her,
and this is more than sufficient guarantee that she
will not be a charge to the only country she has
known since birth.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main
objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien
wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family
members, thus:
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished
traditions of family unity and identity that a husband
should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the
national treatment of one should be different from that of
the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband’s interests
in property and business activities reserved by law to
citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership
and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot,
through her own efforts but for the benefit of the
partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare
instances should the identity of husband and wife be
refused recognition, and we submit that in respect of our
citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where
the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.
This case however is not a Petition for judicial
declaration of Philippine citizenship but rather a Petition
for judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the
petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a
court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine
citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is
an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the
privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on
requirements required under CA 473.Azucena has
clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is
qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court will
not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly
Filipino family.
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
GR NO. 120295
 JUNE 28, 1996
FACTS:
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo
filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of
Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On
March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another
candidate, filed a petition4 with the Comelec docketed as
SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified
from seeking or holding any public office or position by
reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and
that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo
remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995
elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted
for during the elections held on said date.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new
petition, docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the
annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and
for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30,
1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his
petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed
with the Special Committee on Naturalization in
September 1994 had been granted". As such, when "the
said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . .
was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995
at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal
impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor
. . ." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the
two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor - not
Lee - should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division
promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding that
Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes,"
was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected
governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the
highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the
office of governor of Sorsogon.
(2) Lee further contends that assuming the assailed
repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be
effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the
citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local
Government Code "must exist on the date of his
election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed
ISSUE:
WON Frivaldo is a citizen thus qualified to hold office of
governor? (yes)
RULING:
The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is
by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings
were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of
repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply
with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
725 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even
the rules and regulations to implement the said decree
were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is
not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien
covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in
repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino
who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous
citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly
a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served
his country and his province prior to his naturalization in
the United States -- a naturalization he insists was made
necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a
dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience
embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the
re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in
returning to his country of birth to offer once more his
talent and services to his people.
(2) From the above, it will be noted that the law does not
specify any particular date or time when the candidate
must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence
(which must consist of at least one year's residency
immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at
least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for
holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that
no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another
nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit
of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to
discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term
of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his
citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day the term
of office of governor (and other elective officials)
began -- he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the
functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In
short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his
native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that
should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on
qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such
law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as
distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be
noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code
speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such
qualification be required at the time of election or at the
time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee
insists? Literally, such qualifications -- unless
otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of
age and residence -- should thus be possessed
when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to
govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the
start of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995.
Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and
Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship
requirement is to ensure that our people and country do
not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing
allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose
would not be thwarted but instead achieved by
construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the
time of proclamation of the elected official and at the
start of his term.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we
also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his
application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the
Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled
exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute
is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it
CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates
a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby
filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble,
P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many
Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship
by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the
existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of
repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the
termination of their marital status" and who could neither
be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision
allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain
her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of
the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women
who had married aliens before said constitution took
effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these
women -- the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even
during their marital coverture, which right did not exist
prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also
provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other
"natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine
citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D.
725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the
tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but
with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire
their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure
of repatriation.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can
the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering
that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while
Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on
January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later,
on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the
time that Frivaldo became an American citizen,
nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which
is to be given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation
granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to
be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his
application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this
is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the
legislative authority that the law should apply
to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing
even before the law came into being -- in order to benefit
the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby
enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally
guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative
intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression,
then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in
a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations,
events and transactions subsequent to the passage of
such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on
June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as
of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is
nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a
contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority;
and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to
anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from
giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee
shown that there will result the impairment of any
contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or
breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people
repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of
Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his
nationality should now be deemed mooted by his
repatriation.
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS COMELEC
248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate
of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election
Supervisor on March 8, 1995.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy
Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position,
filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with
the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did
not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In
his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made
by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772 and
in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order
be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and
canceling the certificate of candidacy."
Petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since
childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's
petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the
head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner
averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original
Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify by adding
the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution
allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of
the canvass show that she obtained the highest number
of votes in the congressional elections in the First District
of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC
reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing
that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the
event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner
from running for the congressional seat of the First
District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution
suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this
court for relief.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of
the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the
time of the May 9, 1995 elections. (yes)
RULING:
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second
Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of
settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in
election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in
agreement with the general proposition that for the
purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute
or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a
conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.
As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the
exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place
of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic this court
took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's
"permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that
they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile
includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or
physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual
relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the
physical presence of a person in a given area,
community or country. The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves
the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a
place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or
health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose
is established it is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly
normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a
single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another
domicile of choice.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and
domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political
laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election
law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the
fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law
that in these and other election law cases, this Court has
stated that the mere absence of an individual from his
permanent residence without the intention to abandon it
does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the
residence qualification for certain elective positions have
placed beyond doubt the principle that when the
Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it
actually means only "domicile".
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner
Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency
requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned
entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her
residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as
seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate
of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not and individual has satisfied the
constitution's residency qualification requirement. The
said statement becomes material only when there is or
appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform,
or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to
deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely
committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven"
in the space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the
questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her
period of residence in the First district, which was "since
childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances
and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's
Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a
different interpretation. For instance, when herein
petitioner announced that she would be registering in
Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First
District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same,
claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not
Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of
actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa,
Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her
Certificate of Candidacy.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in

her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of
petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner
had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence
or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and
Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the
second requiring domicile — coupled with the
circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a
voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
unintended entry for which she could be disqualified.
This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to
negate the fact of residence in the First District if such
fact were established by means more convincing than a
mere entry on a piece of paper.

Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the

Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as
the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.