MODULE-3-and-4 (1)

Ang Tibay vs.
Court of Industrial Relations

DATE: February 27, 1940 G.R. No: 46496
TICKLER: (Idk what to put as tickler kasi the antecedent facts are in Spanish language)
The cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in administrative proceedings are: 1) The
right to hearing; 2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; 3) There must be something to
support its decision; 4) The evidence must be substantial; 5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
DOCTRINE: affected; 6) The CIR or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision; and 7) The CIR must render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
Respondent National Labor Union prays for the vacation of judgment and remand the case to the CIR
for new trial, averring, among other issues, that Toribio Teodoro claimed that there was shortage of
Ang Tibay leather shoes thus it made him necessary to lay off the members of the National Labor
FACTS:
Union; that the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his contract with the Philippine
Army; and that Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice.
ISSUE: W/N the issues should be properly directed, resolved, or determined by the CIR.
Yes, the CIR may properly adjudicate the matter. The Court provided the following guidelines:
1. Right to hearing;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. There must be something to support its decision;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
HELD: 5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
6. The CIR or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
7. The CIR must render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
Court of Industrial Relations
● Created through CA No. 103

● As opposed to a court of justice that is passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked,
CIR is more active, affirmative, and dynamic
● Has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines
● It takes cognizance for purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout.
NOTES: ○ Provided that the number of employees involved exceeds 30; and
○ Such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of
Labor, or any of the parties certified by the Secretary of Labor
● Before hearing, it shall endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute
by amicable agreement
● It may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ
mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official
investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies
Acuzar vs. Jorolan
DATE: April 7, 2010 G.R. No: 177878
TICKLER: Police who allegedly had a relationship with Jorolan’s daughter
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a party is allowed to seek
DOCTRINE: the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of the means of the
administrative processes afforded to him.
SPO1 Leonito Acuzar was charged before the PLEB and a trial court for grave misconduct and
violation of RA 7610, respectively, for allegedly having an illicit relationship with Jorolan’s daughter.
PLEB issued a decision, favoring the dismissal of Acuzar. He filed a petition for certiorari before the
trial court.
FACTS:
The trial court annulled PLEB’s decision, ruling that he was deprived of due process. The CA reversed
the decision, and further explained that certiorari was not allowed to be availed of because the remedy
of appeal was available. Acuzar argued that the Board’s decision, having been rendered without
jurisdiction, appeal was not an appropriate remedy.
ISSUE: W/N certiorari was the appropriate remedy to question PLEB’s order;
No. Under Sec. 43(3) of RA 6975 (DILG Act of 1990), decisions involving demotion or dismissal
from the service may be appealed by either party with the regional appellate board. It is apparent that
the remedy of appeal was available to the petitioner.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a party is allowed to seek
HELD: the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of the means of the
administrative processes afforded to him. If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery
of the administrative agency, then this alternative should first be utilized before resort can be made to
the courts. This is to enable such body to review and correct any mistakes without the intervention of
the court.
Administrative Proceedings: Procedural Due Process
1. The right to actual or constructive notice;

2. An opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses
NOTES: and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights
3. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction;
4. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.
Carbonell vs. Civil Service Commission
DATE: September 7, 2010 G.R. No: 187689
Fake Career Service Professional Eligibility certificate; tried to obtain a new one
TICKLER:
The right to counsel under Sec. 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial
DOCTRINE: investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under para. 2, Sec. 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
Clarita Carbonel was an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Makati City. She
went to CSCRO IV to secure a copy of the result of the CATS Career Service Professional
Examination because she lost the original copy. She was directed to accomplish a verification slip.
However, the Examination Placement and Service Division noticed that petitioner’s personal and
physical appearance was entirely different from the picture of the examinee attached to the application
form and the picture seat plan. It was also discovered that the signature affixed on the application form
was different from that appearing on the verification slip.
FACTS:
Later, she admitted that she paid P10,000 to a certain Bettina Navarro to obtain a Career Service
Professional Eligibility by merely accomplishing an application form. Despite not taking the test, she
received a certificate of eligibility. CSCRO IV found her guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and
falsification of official documents.
She argues that CSC’s finding is faulty as it was based solely on her uncounselled admission taken
during the investigation, and hence her right to due process was violated because she was not afforded
the right to counsel when her statement was taken.
ISSUE: W/N her right to due process was violated.
No. The right to counsel under Sec. 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during
custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under para. 2, Sec. 12 of the Bill of Rights applies
only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative
investigation. The fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
HELD: may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the petitioner's capacity
to represent herself. The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit the
imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service.
NOTES:
Dela Cruz vs. Abille
TICKLER: Abille filed for exemption; dela Cruz’ land was included in Abille’s chosen area for retention
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
DOCTRINE:
proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Herminio Abille filed a petition for exemption under Operation Land Transfer of his landholdings.
Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance denied the
exemption, but instead granted the right of retention of not more than 7 hectares. Abille selected the
7-hectare retention area, which included the area belonging to Balbino dela Cruz.
The compulsory heirs of dela Cruz filed with DAR a petition for the issuance of emancipation patent,
FACTS:
however the same was denied due to the fact that the emancipation patent originally issued to dela
Cruz was already cancelled.
They filed a motion of reconsideration arguing that there was no due process. The same was treated as
an appeal and elevated to the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The same was also
denied. They appealed to the CA but it dismissed their petition. Hence, this petition before the SC.
ISSUE: W/N the heirs of dela Cruz was denied of due process
No. Although the petitioners were not given the opportunity to be heard when Regional Director
Antonio Nuesa issued his Order, in their petition for issuance of an emancipation patent, petitioners
were given the opportunity to be heard as they raised in issue the validity of the cancellation made by
Nuesa, which was resolved by DAR Regional Director Pacis in his Order, and also in their motion for
reconsideration, which was treated as an appeal by the Secretary and was also resolved.
HELD:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In this
case, petitioners were able to question the validity of said Order in their petition for issuance of
emancipation patent, which was resolved. Hence, they were given an opportunity to be heard.
NOTES:
Vivo vs. PAGCOR
DATE: November 12, 2013 G.R. No: 187689
TICKLER: Charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company
In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the
opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
DOCTRINE: complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
Ray Peter Vivo was employed by PAGCOR as its Managing Head of the Gaming Department. He
received a letter from Teresita Ela, the Senior Manager Head of PAGCOR’s Human Resources
Department, advising him that he was administratively charged with gross misconduct,
rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and loss of trust and confidence;
that he should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the same time being
placed under preventive suspension.
The petitioner received the summons for him to attend an administrative inquiry, instructing him to
appear before PAGCORs Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU). He also furnished the memorandum of
charges that recited the accusations against him and indicated the acts and omissions constituting his
alleged offenses. However, when his counsel requested to be furnished copies of the statements,
PAGCOR rejected the request on the ground that he had already been afforded the sufficient
opportunity to confront, hear, and answer the charges against him during the administrative inquiry.
The Adjudication Committee summoned the petitioner to appear before it on May 8, 2002 in order to
address questions regarding his case. His counsel moved for the rescheduling of the meeting because
FACTS:
he would not be available on said date, but the Adjudication Committee denied the request upon the
reason that the presence of counsel was not necessary in the proceedings.
Later, the petitioner received the letter from Ela informing him of the resolution of the PAGCOR
Board of Directors in its May 14, 2002 meeting to the effect that he was being dismissed from the
service.
Vivo filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. He appealed to the CSC, where the
same ruled in favor of him. PAGCOR then appealed to CA, which reversed CSC’s ruling. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner argues that the denial of his right to due process renders his dismissal illegal, and further,
that the refusal of the PAGCOR to reschedule the Adjudication Committee meeting was a violation of
his right to counsel.
ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioner was denied due process
2. W/N petitioner was denied of his right to counsel
No.
Right to due process in administrative proceedings

The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and
technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.
In this case, the petitioner actively participated in the entire course of the investigation and hearings
conducted by PAGCOR. He received the letter from Ela apprising him of his being administratively
charged for several offenses, and directing him to submit an explanation in writing. He was later on
properly summoned to appear before the CIU, which conducted its proceedings in his own residence
upon his request. During the administrative inquiry, the CIU served him a copy of the memorandum of
charges, which detailed the accusations against him and specified the acts and omissions constituting
his alleged offenses. He was also given the opportunity to appear before the Adjudication Committee
to answer clarificatory questions. Lastly, he was informed through a memorandum of the decision of
HELD:
the Board of Directors dismissing him from the service.
Petitioner’s right to counsel

As regards the supposed denial of the petitioners right to counsel, it is underscored that PAGCOR
denied his request to reschedule the conference before the Adjudication Committee because his
counsel would not be available on the day fixed for that purpose. In an administrative proceeding like
that conducted against the petitioner, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel.
As such, the right to counsel is not imperative because administrative investigations are themselves
inquiries conducted only to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against
erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government
service.
In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the
opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
NOTES:
Globe Telecom vs. National Telecommunications Commission
DATE: July 26, 2004 G.R. No: 143964
TICKLER: NTC penalized Globe for its SMS service
In any event, it has been ruled that every party subject to administrative regulation deserves an
DOCTRINE: opportunity to know, through reasonable regulations promulgated by the agency, of the objective
standards that have to be met, a rule integral to due process, as it protects substantive rights.
Smart filed a complaint with NTC praying that NTC order the immediate interconnection of Smart’s
and Globe’s GSM networks, particularly their respective SMS or texting services. Smart alleged that
Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smart’s request for the interconnection of
SMS.
NTC issued the Order assailed herein, noting that Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their
lack of cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for interconnection and for having
unduly maneuvered the situation into the present impasse. It also declared that both Smart and Globe
have been providing SMS without authority from it, in violation of Section 420(f) of NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 which requires them to secure prior approval from the NTC to
provide value-added services.
FACTS:
Hence, the Order directed the parties to secure the requisite authority to secure the requisite authority
to provide SMS within 30 days, subject to the payment of fine in the amount of 200 pesos from the
date of violation and for every day during which such violation continues.
Globe filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order. CA
issued a TRO. 3 months later, CA promulgated a decision affirming NTC’s Order. Globe filed a
motion for partial reconsideration but the same was denied.
Before this Court, Globe argues that the NTC has no power under Section 17 of the Public Service
Law to subject Globe to an administrative sanction and a fine without prior notice and hearing.
Specifically, due process was denied because the hearing actually conducted dwelt on different issues.
ISSUE: W/N Globe was denied of due process;
Yes. The assailed Order was promulgated by NTC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, hence,
the requirements of due process attendant to the exercise of quasi-judicial power apply to the present
case. The requirements are those that are laid out in the case of Ang Tibay.
HELD:
Globe’s right to due process were denied due to the following reasons:
First. The NTC Order is not supported by substantial evidence. Neither does it sufficiently explain the
reasons for the decision rendered. The “finding” in the said Order is nothing more than bare assertions,
unsupported by substantial evidence. It reveals that no deep inquiry was made as to the nature of SMS
or what its provisioning entails. In other words, no clear explanation was provided. (See p. 10 of full
text for full discussion.)
Second. G lobe and Smart were denied opportunity to present evidence on the issues relating to the
nature of value-added service and the prior approval. It is clear that before NTC could penalize Globe
and Smart for unauthorized provision of SMS, it must first establish SMS is VAS. Since there was no
express rule or regulation on that question, Globe and Smart would be well within reason if they
submitted evidence to establish that SMS was not VAS. Unfortunately, no such opportunity arose and
no such arguments were raised simply because Globe and Smart were not aware that the question of
their authority to provide SMS was an issue at all. Neither could it be said that the requisite of prior
authority was indubitable under the existing rules and regulations. (See p. 12 of full text for full
discussion.)
he imposition of fine is void for violation of due process.

Third. T
Sections 17 and 21 of the Public Service Act confer two distinct powers on NTC. Under Section 17,
NTC has the power to investigate a PTE compliance with a standard, rule, regulation, order, or other
requirement imposed by law or the regulations promulgated by NTC, as well as require compliance if
necessary. By the explicit language of the provision, NTC may exercise the power without need of
prior hearing. However, Section 17 does not include the power to impose fine in its enumeration. It is
Section 21 which adverts the power to impose fine and in the same breath requires that the power may
be exercised only after notice and hearing.
Section 21 requires notice and hearing because fine is a sanction, regulatory and even punitive in
character. Indeed, the requirement is the essence of due process. Notice and hearing are the bulwark of
administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even
in administrative proceedings. The right is guaranteed by the Constitution itself and does not need
legislative enactment. The statutory affirmation of the requirement serves merely to enhance the
fundamental precept. The right to notice and hearing is essential to due process and its non-observance
will, as a rule, invalidate the administrative proceedings. In citing Section 21 as the basis of the fine,
NTC effectively concedes the necessity of prior notice and hearing. (See p. 13 of full text for full
discussion.)
NOTES:
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Manuel Valencia
DATE: April 13, 2011 G.R. No: 183890
TICKLER: Incorrectly-filled SALNs
In administrative proceedings, the law does not require evidence beyond reasonable doubt or
DOCTRINE: preponderance of evidence. Substantial evidence is enough. This presupposes, however, that the
evidence proffered is admissible under the rules.
Manuel Valencia allegedly understated his amounts in his SALNs. It was alleged that he maintained 2
US dollar time deposit accounts with the Far East Bank and Trust Company. Due to this, a complaint /
motion for subpoena was filed with the Ombudsman for violation of RA 1379 in relation to Sec. 8 of
RA 3019.
Petitioner argued that before joining the Bureau of Customs, his family had been in the textile and
garment business for more than 15 years, and that because of their business, his family was able to
purchase a house and lot.
The Ombudsman, being of the view that Valencia maintained a lavish lifestyle and lived beyond the
modest means that his salary as a government official could offer, opined that he must have derived his
income from unlawful sources. This, according to him, constituted deception and dishonesty which
FACTS: warranted his dismissal from office.
The CA reversed the decision of the Ombudsman and has explained that the charge of unexplained
wealth in relation to Sec. 8 of RA 3019 was separate and distinct from the offense of dishonesty. It
held that to hold Valencia liable for dishonesty when in fact the charge against him was for
unexplained wealth, violated Valencia’s right to due process, especially his right to be informed of the
charges against him. It added that even if the offense were to be considered, there was no substantial
evidence presented as the pieces of evidence presented were of no value, as these were only
photocopies of petitioner’s TCTs, alleged letters of agreement and unauthenticated copies of
Valencia’s BPI Mastercard transactions. The CA ordered Valencia’s reinstatement.
Hence, this petition.
1. W/N Valencia was deprived of due process;

ISSUE:
2. W/N there is enough evidence to hold Valencia administratively liable;
HELD: 1. No, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that Valencia was not deprived of his right to due
process. An accused charged with unexplained wealth cannot claim to have been denied due
process should he be held administratively liable for dishonesty. It should be pointed out that
the actual recital of facts of the complaint shows that the nature and cause of the accusation
hurled by Guerrero includes the charge of dishonesty.
2. No. Administrative proceedings are governed by the “substantial evidence rule.” Otherwise
stated, a finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it
is supported by substantial evidence. This presupposes, however, that the evidence proffered is
admissible under the rules. With respect to the photocopied private documents, the rule is that
before it can be considered admissible in evidence, its due execution or genuineness should be
first shown. Failing in this, the photocopies are inadmissible in evidence; at the very least, it
has no probative value. Assuming it had probative value, the Ombudsman totally ignored the
affidavit of BPI Service Manager certifying that he could not locate nay time deposit record
belonging to Valencia.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a
NOTES: reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally
reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners
DATE: May 26, 1969 G.R. No: L-25018
TICKLER: Accused of malpractice; counsel of complainant wants Pascual to take the witness stand
As held in the case of Cabal vs. Kapunan, while the proceeding for forfeiture is administrative in
character, such proceeding possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The right against self-incrimination of
DOCTRINE:
the defendant includes the right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the
witness stand.
Salvador and Entiqueta Gatbonton filed a complaint against Arsenio Pascual, Jr. for alleged
malpractice. Counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness Pascual
himself. Pascual made a record of his objection, invoking his right to be exempt from being a witness
against himself. The Board of Examiners took note of such plea and at the same time stated that at the
next scheduled hearing, Pascual would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless he could secure
a restraining order from a competent authority.
FACTS:
The trial court ordered a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the respondent Board
commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with the administrative case. The Board
answered that the right against self-incrimination is available only when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is asked of a witness. The Gatbontons also alleged that the right against
self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
ISSUE: W/N the right against self-incrimination is available in an administrative hearing.
Yes. As held in the case of Cabal vs. Kapunan, while the proceeding for forfeiture is administrative in
character, such proceeding possesses a criminal or penal aspect. The case at bar is not dissimilar; the
petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the
HELD:
revocation of his license as medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation. The right
against self-incrimination of the defendant includes the right to forego testimony, to remain silent,
unless he chooses to take the witness stand.
NOTES:
Dumarpa vs. Dimaporo
DATE: September 13, 1989 G.R. No: 87014-16
TICKLER: Cited in contempt because Dumarpa provided a legal opinion that Dimaporo is not the rightful Mayor
Power to punish contempt is inherently judicial and may be exercised only by the administrative body
when expressly conferred by law and if the same is engaged in the performance of its quasi-judicial
DOCTRINE:
powers. The power to hold in contempt, must be exercised, not on the vindictive, but on the
preservative principle.
Datu Jamil Dimaporo was proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers as Mayor-elect of Marogong.
Petitions were filed questioning the election results. While these petitions were pending adjudgment by
the COMELEC First Division, the Secretary of Local Governments issued on May 19, 1988 a
memorandum designating Maclis Balt as Officer-In-Charge, Office of the Mayor of Marogong. The
designation of the OIC was made in view of the election controversy that has arisen over the mayoralty
race, and to ensure that the democratic process is respected throughout the transition period.
The petitions seeking annulment of Datu Dimaporo’s proclamation were ultimately dismissed by the
COMELEC First Division. A motion for reconsideration was filed.
Dimaporo lost no time in seeking official recognition of his status as mayor-elect of Marogong, as
confirmed by the COMELEC. His counsel sent a letter to the Provincial Governor praying that official
matters involving the affairs of the Municipality of Marogong be accorded to Dimaporo. This letter,
along with other documents collated by the Office of the Governor, were referred to the Provincial
Fiscal for legal opinion on the matter.
FACTS:
The legal opinion, signed by Asst. Provincial Fiscal Danganan and with the conformity of Provincial
Fiscal Dumarpa, is that Datu Maclis Balt is still the mayor of the Municipality considering that a
motion for reconsideration was timely filed by the OIC and hence the decision of the Division is not
yet final and executory.
On learning of this legal opinion, Datu Dimaporo filed with the COMELEC en banc a motion to hold
Fiscals Dumarpa and Danganan, and Vice Governor Alauya in contempt, that their communication is
an act of improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice; that OIC Maclis Balt had no right to file a motion for reconsideration as he
has never been a candidate for Mayor in Marogong during the local elections.
The COMELEC issued a resolution declaring the Dumarpa et al. guilty of contempt. They filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition for nullification of
COMELEC’s resolution.
ISSUE: W/N Dumarpa, Danganan and Alauya should be cited in contempt.

No. It appears that the resolution in question not only lacks factual foundation of any sort but is
contradicted by such relevant facts as may be discerned from record.
That opinion was rendered in answer to the inquiry of the Acting Governor as to whether or not, in
view of the judgment by the First Division of the COMELEC upholding the proclamation by the Board
of Canvassers of Datu Dimaporo as Mayor-Elect of Marogong, the duly designated OIC Mayor,
therefore acting as such, Datu Maclis Balt, could still be recognized as the Mayor of the Municipality.
The inquiry had been made necessary in view of the conflict in claims to the mayoralty then being
asserted by both Datu Dimaporo and Datu Balt, which conflict had to be swiftly and legally resolved to
prevent its resolution by arms and bloodshed.
The fiscals' opinion was based on "Sec. 3, paragraph C, Article IX of the Constitution which mandates
that motions for reconsideration from a decision of a Division of the Commission on Elections shall be
decided En Banc by the Commission." They declared that since "a motion for reconsideration was
timely filed by the OIC, the decision of the Division is not final and executory. The decision of the
HELD:
Commission En Banc is not yet even final until and after 5 days whenever no restraining order is
issued by the Supreme Court."
The Court, quite frankly, sees in the text of the opinion nothing even remotely resembling an affront to
the COMELEC, or a criticism of the First Division's judgment. On the contrary, the opinion simply
paraphrases --- correctly, it would appear the COMELEC's own Rules of Procedure on the subject it
addresses. But even if, as the questioned Resolution declares, the views therein expressed are clearly
wrong, it cannot for that reason alone be considered contumacious otherwise, liability for contempt
would invariably attach to every declared instance of orders or judgments rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, or otherwise attended by serious error of one
kind or another. The absurdity of such a rule or policy need not be belabored.
Nor may the Acting Governor be faulted for consulting the lawyers of the province as to the effects of
a judgment on the authority and actuations of municipal or provincial officials, or the fiscals for
advising him on such matters.
NOTES:
Encinas vs. Agustin
DATE: April 11, 2013 G.R. No: 187317
TICKLER: Asked for 5k in exchange of securing their positions; fire officers
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the
DOCTRINE:
exercise of administrative powers.
Respondents were both fire officers in Nueva Ecija. They claimed that Encinas, who was then the
Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija, informed them that unless they gave him P5,000, they would
be relieved from their station at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-flung areas. Four days after,
Agustin and Caubang came up short and was only able to give P2,000. When they failed to deliver the
balance, Encinas issued instructions effectively reassigning respondents.
Respondents filed with the Bureau of Fire Protection a letter-complaint for illegal transfer of personnel
under the DILG Act of 1990 (RA 6795). Later, it was docketed by the BFP for preliminary
investigation for violation of RA 3019. The BFP recommended the dismissal of the administrative
complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
FACTS: Respondents likewise filed with the CSC Regional Office in Pampanga. Essentially the same facts but
this time, their action is based on Sec. 4(c) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees. The formal charge was dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service. The CSCRO ordered his dismissal from service.
Encinas proffered the defense of res judicata. The CSCRO rejected such argument and ruled that the
dismissal of the BFP complaint was not a judgment on the merits rendered by a competent tribunal.
Encinas then filed an appeal memorandum with the CSC main office, wherein he argued that the
respondents were guilty of forum-shopping for having filed 2 separate administrative complaints. The
same was denied.
He filed a petition before the CA, which was also denied. Hence this recourse to the Court.
ISSUE: W/N the respondents are guilty of forum-shopping
No.
Forum-shopping
HELD: Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same
interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded
on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other case.
Applying the foregoing requisites to this case, we rule that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint does
not constitute res judicata in relation to the CSCRO Complaint. Thus, there is no forum-shopping on
the part of respondents.
Res judicata
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d)
there must be between the first and the second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject
matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and
liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objections;"or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point.”
In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the definition above. The
dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 was the result of a fact-finding
investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should
be filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined therein with finality.
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to
those purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a
quasi-judicial character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported
by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to
NOTES:
the matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending
parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and
obligations of the parties.
ADMIN DIGESTS
25. - Soriano v. Laguardia

DATE: April 29, 2009 G.R. No: 587 SCRA 79
TICKLER: Ang Dating Daan; cussed on live television.
Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative,

investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be
conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or authority
DOCTRINE:
as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an
agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as
existing, the authority given should be liberally construed.
Petitioner, as host of Dating Daan, during a broadcast made cussing remarks directed towards
a certain Michael stating:
“Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang
gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O,
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra
ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.”
Two days later, affidavit complaints were filed in the MTRCB against petitioner in
connection with the said broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly
alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV
program Ang Tamang Daan. After notice and a preliminary conference, the MTRCB
FACTS:
preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan for 20 days. Petitioner filed a MR
but eventually sought to withdraw it after filing with the Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to nullify the preventive suspension order issued.
The MTRCB rendered judgement imposing a 3-month suspension on Soriano from his
program, “Ang Dating Daan”. Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner argues, among others, that PD 1986 is not complete in itself and does not provide
for a sufficient standard for its implementation thereby resulting in an undue delegation of
administrative power since the law does not provide for the penalties for violations of its
provisions. Moreover, he argues that the IRR provisions are invalid insofar as PD 1986 do
not expressly authorize the MTRCB to issue preventive suspension.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was undue delegation of legislative power.
No, there was no undue delegation of legislative power.

HELD:
Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative,
investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the 􀀲five, as may be
G. CERTEZA | H. ESCARCHA | M. VILLARUBIA

ADMIN DIGESTS
conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They have in 􀀲fine only such powers or
authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining
whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once
ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally construed.
PD 1986 expressly empowered the MTRCB to regulate and supervise television programs to
obviate the exhibition of broadcast of indecent or immoral materials and to impose sanctions
for violations and to prevent further violations as it investigates. Simply put, MTRCB’s
mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority to issue the
challenged order of preventive suspension as this authority stems naturally from, and is
necessary for the exercise of its power of regulation and supervision.
There was no undue delegation of legislative power as Section 3 of the IRR neither amended
PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. Neither did the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed
preventive suspension, outrun its authority under the law. More so, the preventive suspension
was done in furtherance of it.
Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a

preliminary step in an administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and impose
NOTES:
penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and,
during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint.

ADMIN DIGESTS
26. - Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

DATE: April 18, 1990 G.R. No: 88550
TICKLER: Coal mining
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction – In cases where the determination of an issue requires

the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because
DOCTRINE: technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained
in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though
the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the courts.
Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the
Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) for the exploration of two
coal blocks in Eastern Samar. Subsequently, IEI also applied with the then Ministry of Energy
for another coal operating contract for the exploration of three additional coal blocks which,
together with the original two blocks, comprised the so-called "Giporlos Area." However, IEI
was later advised that in line with the country’s over all coal supply-demand balance, the
logical coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation
(MMIC). Thus, agreement whereby IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights and
interests in the two coal blocks was initiated.
Subsequently, IEI filed an action for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement with
FACTS:
damages against MMIC. They alleged that MMIC took over the coal blocks before the MOA
was finalized and approved by the BED; that MMIC failed to apply for a coal operating
contract and likewise failed/refused to pay the reimbursement agreed upon as provided in the
MOA. They prayed that the Energy Minister approve the return of the coal operating contract
to IEI.
The trial court ordered the rescission of the Memorandum and declared the efficacy of the
coal operating contract in favor of IEI. The CA, however, reversed the decision of the trial
court and held that the judgement was not proper as there were genuine issue in controversy
between the parties that the trial court had no jurisdiction upon considering that the BED, as
according to PD 1206, has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration,
exploitation and development of coal blocks. Hence, this petition.
Whether or not the civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for rescission of the
ISSUE:
Memorandum of Agreement concerning a coal operating contract over the coal blocks.
Yes, the courts have jurisdiction to decide the suit for rescission. However, it does not
preclude the fact that the BED still has primary jurisdiction over the case at hand and thus the
case should firstly be decided by them.
HELD:
The BED, as the successor to the Energy Development Board is tasked with the function of
establishing a comprehensive and integrated national program for the exploration,
exploitation, and development and extraction of fossil fuels, such as the country's coal

ADMIN DIGESTS
resources; adopting a coal development program; regulating all activities relative thereto; and
undertaking by itself or through service contracts such exploitation and development, all in
the interest of an effective and coordinated development of extracted resources.
IEI’s cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to
it of the operation of the coal blocks. Consequently, it is the BED who has the primary
jurisdiction too decide over such cases.
In this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and
which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical
determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized
expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters
concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of
mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It
behooves the courts to stand aside even when, apparently, they have statutory power to
proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.
The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the
courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
NOTES: issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of
an administrative body; in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of
such issues to the administrative body for its view.”

ADMIN DIGESTS
27. - Caballes, et. al. v. Perez-Sison

DATE: March 23, 2004 G.R. No: 131759
TICKLER: Optometry
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow
the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities
DOCTRINE: within the specialized areas of their respective competence. Furthermore, reasons of law,
comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination
by administrative agencies.
Samahan ng Mga Optomeritrist sa Pilipinas, through its President, filed a Letter-Affidavit

with the Board of Optometry of the PRC, charging herein appellants, all employees of Vision
Express Philippines, Inc. (VEPI for brevity) with unethical and/or unprofessional conduct.
They contended that the Caballes and the other optometrists charged herein violated Section
3(e), Article III of the Code of Ethics for Optometrists as they were apparently holding
themselves to the public as an optometrist under the name of VEPI which they are not allowed
to do. The complainant likewise alleged that Caballes allowed themselves to be part of the
corporation’s illegal practice of optometry.
FACTS:
Caballes admitted that they are employees of VEPI but denied that they were engaged in the
practice of optometry. They imputed bad faith on the part of Ho (herein complainant) and
subsequently, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action for the reason
that the complaint failed to state the unethical or unprofessional conduct they apparently had
done. The motion was dismissed by the Board. The CA also dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by the appellants holding that the pronouncement of the Board to decide
whether to punish an optometrist by mere employment in a corporation has to be given great
weight and substance.
Whether or not herein respondents acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
ISSUE:
excess of jurisdiction.
No, they did not act in grave abuse of discretion.
Republic Act 8050 vests in the Board of Optometry the power to conduct hearings and
investigations to resolve complaints against practitioners of optometry for malpractice,
unethical and unprofessional conduct, or violation of any of the provisions of the Act or any
HELD: of its regulations and authorizes the said Board to render a decision thereon as long as the
vote of three (3) members is obtained.
It is presumed that an administrative agency, in this case, the Board of Optometry, if afforded
an opportunity to pass upon a matter, would decide the same correctly, or correct any previous
error committed in its forum. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and

ADMIN DIGESTS
discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.
Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining
cases proper for determination by administrative agencies.
Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that

is:
(a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction;
(b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or,
NOTES:
(c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not
promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order
maintaining the plaintiffs’ baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go
through protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case.

ADMIN DIGESTS
28 - Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology

DATE: November 18, 2004 G.R. No: 156109
TICKLER: Refused to pay ticket, was not allowed to take exams.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law,
comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative
remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given the appropriate
opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative
DOCTRINE:
forum.
Exception to this rule is when the issue presented is purely legal and well within the
jurisdiction of the court, as the present case.
Regino was a first-year computer science student in Pangasinan Colleges of Science and
Technology (PCST). In 2002, PCST held a dance party event in which students are required
to pay for two tickets at the price of 100 pesos each. In the event that they refused to do so,
the students (who did not pay) will not be allowed to take their final examinations. Regino,
prohibited by her religion to attend dance parties, refused to pay the ticket thereby prompting
her teachers, herein respondents, to disallow her to take the final examinations.
Regino then filed a complaint for damages against PCST and her teachers. Herein
FACTS:
respondents, on the other hand, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of petitioner’s failure
to exhaust administrative remedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved
the determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of the PCST therefore the case
should’ve been initiated before the CHED. Regino, however, argued that her action was not
administrative in nature, but one purely of damages arising from respondents’ breach of the
laws on human relations therefore, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies will not apply.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.
Whether or not the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies applies to the case at
ISSUE:
hand.
No, the doctrine does not apply to the case at hand.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law,
comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative
HELD: remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given the appropriate
opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative
forum.
In the present case, petitioner is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. She’s
neither demanding it to allow her to take her final examinations. Her action is for a complaint

ADMIN DIGESTS
for damages against her school and teachers, an issue that is within the jurisdiction of the
courts and not CHED. CHED cannot award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have
commenced her action there.
Lastly, the exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which is when the case involves
an issue that is purely legal. Petitioner’s action for damages inevitably calls for the application
and interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls upon the Courts of Law.
A complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on
its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. The complainant
has two causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) liability for tort.
In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly, in the
middle of the semester. It exacted the dance party fee as a condition for the students' taking
NOTES: the final examinations, and ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a course.
The fee, however, was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of the
school year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the enrollees.
Academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine

for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may
be admitted to study.

ADMIN DIGESTS
29. - Paat, et. al., v. Court of Appeals

DATE: January 10, 1997 G.R. No: 111107
TICKLER: Truck, replevin.
Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
DOCTRINE:
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted 􀀲first before court's judicial power
can be sought.
The truck of private respondent, De Guzman, was seized by the DENR personnel after the
driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in
the truck. The truck was eventually forfeited after the owner failed to submit an explanation
as to why such should not be forfeited. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
with the DENR but was denied. Pending an appeal, private respondents filed a suit for
replevin in the RTC who then issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private
respondents.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the private respondents had no cause of
action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies, which was eventually denied. The
CA likewise denied their petition for certiorari ruling that the question involved is a purely
legal question hence exhaustion of administrative remedies can be dispensed with.
FACTS: Petitioners:
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial
court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under
administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O.
277.
Respondents:
Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle
asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification
that: (1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and
(2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds:
(a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and
forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and
(b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.
Whether or not an action for replevin will prosper to recover a movable property which is the
subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment
ISSUE:
and Natural Resources without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

ADMIN DIGESTS
No, the action for replevin cannot prosper without violating the doctrine.
Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted 􀀲first before court's judicial power
can be sought.
In the present case, there is no doubt that the private respondents are aware that there is an
adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of law
HELD:
which is their appeal to the Secretary. Thus, they cannot, without violating the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek the court’s intervention by filing an action for
replevin for the grant of relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.
Likewise, the DENR is the administrative body vested with the enforcement of forestry laws,
rules and regulations. The DENR should be given leeway to determine a controversy which
is well within their jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin
suit 􀀲led by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of
the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant
a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which
is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies can be disregarded:

(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
NOTES:
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nulli􀀲cation of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

ADMIN DIGESTS
30. - Shell Philippines Exploration v. Jalos

DATE: September 8, 2010 G.R. No: 179918
TICKLER: Fishermen, pipelines.
The Pollution Adjudication Board is the administrative body specialized with the knowledge
and skills to determine the cause and effects of pollution. These knowledge and skills are not
DOCTRINE:
within the competence of ordinary courts. Consequently, resort must have been first made to
the PAB.
Shell Philippines Exploration and the Republic of the Philippines entered into Service
Contract 38 for the exploration and extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan.
Eventually, Shell discovered natural gas in the Camago-Malampaya area and thus pursued its
development of a well by constructing and installing a pipeline from Shell’s production
platform to its gas processing plant in Batangas. The said installation prompted herein
respondents to file a complaint for damages in the RTC of Oriental Mindoro, alleging that as
fishermen, they were adversely affected by the operation of Shell’s natural gas pipeline.
Apparently, respondent’s fish catch became few after the construction considering that the
pipeline affected coral reefs and led to stress of the marine life in the Mindoro sea and has
then driven out the fish population out of coastal waters.
Shell filed a MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction contending that it is the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB) which has primary jurisdiction over pollution cases. Likewise, it
FACTS: reasoned that they cannot be sued pursuant to the Doctrine of State Immunity without the
State’s consent considering that they served merely as an agent of the PH government in the
development of the Malampaya reserves. Lastly, lack of cause of action was also raised.
RTC:
It dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction since it should be the PAB whom the
complaint was filed.
COURT OF APPEALS:
It reversed such order and ruled that Shell is not being sued for committing pollution but
rather by constructing and operating a natural gas pipeline to the detriment of the fishermen.
Second, Shell can likewise be sued since the State gave its consent to be sued when it entered
into a contract with Shell. Third, the respondents’ fishermen rights were violated. Hence, it
gave rise to a cause of action for damages.
Whether or not the complaint is a pollution case that falls within the primary jurisdiction of
ISSUE:
the PAB.
HELD: Yes, it is a pollution case and so jurisdiction falls to the PAB.

ADMIN DIGESTS
Although the respondents did not necessarily use the term ‘pollution’ in their complaint, the
allegations presented by them that Shell’s pipeline produced some kind of poison or emission
that drove the fish away from the coastal areas falls under the definition of pollution as defined
by law.
Section 2(a) of PD 984 defines pollution as, ‘any alteration of the physical, chemical and
biological properties of any water which will adversely affect their utilization for domestic,
commercial, industrial and other legitimate purposes.’
That being said, EO 192 transferred to the PAB the powers and functions of the National
Pollution and Control Commission. They are now the ones vested with the primary
jurisdiction to serve as an arbitrator for the determination of reparation or restitution of the
damages and losses resulting from pollution. Jalos should’ve resorted to an administrative
remedy first before coming to the Courts for relief.
Issue on Cause of Action – Jalos has a cause of action in the case. There are three elements
of a cause of action: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a duty on the part of the
defendant to respect such right; (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of such
right.
Jalos obviously has all three: (1) he had a right to the preferential use of marine and fishing
resources as guaranteed by the Constitution; (2) Shell has the corresponding duty to refrain
from acts or omission that could impair Jalos’ rights; (3) Shell’s construction and operation
NOTES: of the pipeline impaired the natural habitat of fish which thus resulted to the reduction of fish
catch and income for Jalos.
Claims of Immunity – Shell is not an agent of the government but merely a service contractor
for the exploration and development of one of the country’s natural gas reserves. An agent is
defined as someone who represents his principal and bring about business relations between
the latter and third persons. An agent has the power to execute contractual relations in behalf
of the principal, while a service contractor cannot.

ADMIN DIGESTS
31. - SSS Employees Association v. Bathan-Velasco

DATE: August 27, 1999 G.R. No: 108765
TICKLER: ACCESS, SSSEA, Election protest.
A party must exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting to the courts and the
premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one's cause of action
necessitating the dismissal of the petition.
DOCTRINE:
This rule would give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself
correctly, and prevent the unnecessary and premature clogging of the court’s docket.
Respondent Alert and Concerned Employees for Better Social Security System (ACCESS for
brevity) filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certification election to
determine the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees of
respondent Social Security System (SSS). The Bureau of Labor Relations ordered a
certification election to be conducted among the rank-and-file employees of the SSS, with
Social Security System Employees Association, herein petitioner, as ACCESS’ competitor.
The certification elections were held with ACCESS gaining winning over SSSEA after
obtaining 1,378 votes as oppose to the latter with 1,116 votes. 40 votes were devoted for ‘No
Union.’
FACTS:
Consequently, SSSEA filed a petition an election protest and motion to annul the certification
election to the Bureau of Labor Relations arguing ACCESS is a company initiated, dominated
or supported union and that there was no certification election held in the regional offices.
The Bureau denied the protest. SSSEA then filed the same protest to the SSS Regional Office
which likewise denied it and thus declared ACCESS the winner of the certification election
thereby certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file
employees of the SSS.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
Whether or not petitioner correctly resorted to the Courts for relief without exhausting all of
ISSUE:
his available administrative remedies.
No, petitioner is incorrect.
The rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before
resorting to the courts and the premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to
HELD: one's cause of action necessitating the dismissal of the petition. This rule would give the
administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, and prevent the
unnecessary and premature clogging of the court’s docket.
In this case, petitioner failed to take an appeal from the order of the Director, Bureau of Labor
Relations to the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code. Absent a

ADMIN DIGESTS
showing that petitioner had availed itself of and exhausted the appropriate administrative
remedies, a premature resort to the courts would result in the dismissal of the petition.
The petition is dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
On petition for certiorari – The issues raised by petitioner call for a review of the factual
findings of the public respondent as they were arguing that there’s no certification election
held in the regional offices of SSS thereby resulting in an incomplete certification election,
making ACCESS’ proclamation, null and void.
NOTES:
Unfortunately, factual issues are not proper subjects of an original petition for certiorari as
the SC’s power to review is limited to questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
of judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or officials.

ADMIN DIGESTS
32. - Industrial Power Sales, Inc. v. Sinsuat, et. al.

DATE: April 15, 1988 G.R. No: 29171
TICKLER: Trucks, bidding. (sobrang labo ng case na ‘to guys sorry if it doesn’t make sense.)
There are exceptions to the principle known as exhaustion of administrative remedies, these
being: (1) where the issue is purely a legal one, (2) where the controverted act is patently
illegal or was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; (3) where the respondent
DOCTRINE:
is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the latter's implied
or assumed approval, unless actually disapproved; or (4) where there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
Two invitations to bid were advertised by the Bureau of Supply Coordination of the
Department of General Services. The first called for eight units of trucks for the use of the
Bureau of Telecommunications. Among the bidders were Industrial Power Sales, Inc (PSI)
and Delta Motor Corporation (Delta). The bid was eventually awarded to IPSI. Delta
protested the awards claiming that the trucks offered by IPSI were not factory built, as
stipulated in the requisition and invitation to bid. The Director, however, rules that the bidding
was done in compliance with the technical specification and requirements stated by the
Bureau.
FACTS:
IPSI appealed from the Secretary’s decision to award the purchase contract of Delta to the
Office of the President as well as the Office of the Auditor General. Despite the appeal, the
Letter-Order in favor of Delta was released. IPSI then filed with the CFI a petition for
certiorari and mandamus, with the application for preliminary and mandatory injunction,
which ruled unfavorably against IPSI. IPSI then appealed to the Court and such appeal is
being questioned by Secretary Sinsuat who claims that IPSI had gone to Court without first
exhausting all administrative remedies.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
Yes.
Certain universally accepted axioms govern judicial review through the extraordinary actions
of certiorari or prohibition of determinations of administrative officers or agencies: 􀀲first,
that before said actions may be entertained in the courts of justice, it must be shown that all
the administrative remedies prescribed by law or ordinance have been exhausted; and second,
HELD:
that the administrative decision may properly be annulled or set aside only upon a clear
showing that the administrative official or tribunal has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
There are however exceptions to the principle known as exhaustion of administrative

remedies, these being: (1) where the issue is purely a legal one, (2) where the controverted
act is patently illegal or was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; (3) where

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the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the
latter's implied or assumed approval, unless actually disapproved; or (4) where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
Application of these established precepts to the undisputed facts, hereunder

briefly set out, impels the grant of the writ of certiorari to annul the administrative
decision complained of in the proceedings at bar.
NOTES:

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33. Castro v. Gloria, et. al.

DATE: August 20, 2001 G.R. No: 132174
TICKLER: Illicit affair; teacher was dismissed at first offense when it should only be a suspension.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction
before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-exhaustion of
DOCTRINE:
administrative remedies implies absence of cause of action, which is one of the grounds for
dismissal. However, the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is not absolute.
One exception is, when the case involves only a legal question, as in the case at bar.
Gutang filed with the DECS a complaint against petitioner Castro for disgraceful and immoral
conduct for allegedly having an illicit affair with Gutang’s wife, petitioner’s co-teacher at the
same school. DECS ruled in favor of Gutang, meting out for the petitioner a penalty of
dismissal from service. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by DECS
prompting him to file a petition for mandamus with the RTC imploring that judgement be
rendered ordering respondent Secretary to (1) reduce his penalty from dismissal to one year
FACTS: suspension; (2) consider his one-year suspension already served considering that he has been
out of service for more than 10 years; (3) to reinstate him in his former position and; (4) to
pay his back salaries.
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, holding that the petitioner should’ve first appealed to the CSC pursuant to the
provisions of Executive Order No. 292.
hand.
ISSUE:
Sub-issue:
Whether or not dismissal from service is the proper penalty for the 1 st offense of disgraceful
and immoral conduct.
No, the said doctrine does not apply in the present case.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction
before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. It is settled that non-
HELD:
observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds
allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. However, the said doctrine
is not absolute, as one where the case involves purely questions of law. This is because issues
of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer.
Instances where exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed:

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1) When the question raised is purely legal;

2) when the administrative body
is in estoppel;
3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;
4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;
5) when the claim involved is small;
6) when irreparable damage will be suffered;
7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
8) when strong public interest is involved; and
10) in quo warranto proceedings.
Sub-issue:
No, it is not the proper penalty.
Executive Order 292 provides that the penalty for disgraceful and immoral conduct for a first-
time offender is suspension for six months and 1 day to one year. Dismissal as a penalty can
only be meted out on the offender’s second offense.
Petitioner’s plea for payment of back wages is unmeritorious. Such payment of salaries
corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he
is found innocent of the charges. However, if the employee is not completely exonerated of
the charges such as when the penalty of dismissal is reduced to mere suspension, he would
not be entitled to the payment of his back salaries.
A public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service.
Question of law – when the doubt or differences arise as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts;
NOTES:
Question of fact – when the doubt or differences arise as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
acts.

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34. - Pagara, et. al., v. Court of Appeals, et. al.

DATE: March 12, 1996 G.R. No: 96882
TICKLER: Land was adjudicated to someone else through the gov’t program
The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is not
applicable (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction; or (3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an
DOCTRINE: alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless
actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention and other cases cited. Said principle may also be
disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, where there
is no due process observed, or where the protestant has no other recourse.
Private respondents acquired a land from Ceniza in 1967. In 1973, the DAR sent a telegram
to the private respondent informing him that the several parcels had been placed under the
Operation Land Transfer of the Land Reform Program of the government. Eventually, the
parcels were adjudicated to private petitioners and corresponding Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) Certificates were issued to them.
Private respondents then filed a complaint in the Ministry of Agrarian Reform contesting the
issuance of the certificates. After the local agency had failed to act on the protest, they
elevated their case to the Minister of Agrarian Reform but the matter remained pending with
the agency. They now finally decided to file a complaint against petitioners in the RTC to
FACTS: regain possession of the parcels of land, as well as for the annulment and cancellation of the
OLT certificates. Private respondents argues that petitioners were not qualified under the
program as each of them already owned over 4 hectares of agricultural land and that the land
not being tenanted, was not covered by the land reform program.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the private respondents
failed to first refer the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reforms, which was denied. The
lower court ruled in favor of private respondents finding that they had substantially complied
with the requirement of having the case first referred to the DAR and that the latter’s
recommendatory resolution that found the existence of a tenant-landlord relationship was not
binding on the court.
ISSUE:
hand.
No, the said doctrine does not apply in the present case.
HELD:
The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies admits to certain exceptions, one of
which is that when the question in dispute is purely a legal one. The issue of tenancy in this

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case involves legal questions as tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what
the alleged tenants does upon the land, but it is also a legal relationship. Another exception
that applies to this case is one of the principal respondents herein is the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform who acts as an alter ego of the President, and whose act of issuing land transfer
certificate is the subject matter of this case.
Likewise, there was also a claim of denial of due process in the issuance of the land transfer
certificate for it was only after the certificates were issued that the plaintiffs were able to
protest. Finally, it is evident that the plaintiffs availed of the administrative processes but 14
years had already lapsed and the Department Secretary has yet to resolve their protest leaving
plaintiffs no other recourse but to seek the relief of the Courts.
NOTES:

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TAN vs DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

DATE: October 27, 1983 G.R. No: L-24548
Public Bidding for Timber License; Olongapo Watershed; Non-exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
TICKLER:
(1) When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the executive department of
the government, the courts will not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted.
DOCTRINE:
(2) Considering that the president has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the
respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part
to exhaust his administrative remedies
The Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087 which advertised for public bidding for a timber license
a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales. The public forest land is located
within the former US Naval Reservation which was turned over to the Philippine Government by the US
Government. In 1961, Petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Tan submitted his application in due form after
paying the necessary fees and posting the required bond.
In 1963, of the 10 applicants for the bidding, the area was awarded to herein petitioner Wenceslao Tan
by the Director of Forestry. However, the Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in
December 1963 promulgated General Memorandum Order No. 60, revoking the authority of the Director
of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses. It now requires that the issuance and renewals of timber
licenses shall be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
On the same date of the promulgation of the General Memorandum Order, an Ordinary Timber License
FACTS: in the name of Wenceslao Tan was issued by the Acting Director of Forestry without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, in 1964, upon knowledge by the Secretary, he
declared an order nullifying and voiding the Ordinary Timber License issued in the name of Tan.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a special civil action
before the CFI of Manila.
The Director of Forestry filed a motion to dismiss, alleging, among others, that the court has no
jurisdiction and that the respondent has not exhausted all available administrative remedies. It further
contends that purely administrative and discretionary functions of administrative officials may not be
interfered with by the courts. The lower court ruled in favor of herein respondents. Petitioner-appellant
then appealed directly to this Court.
Meanwhile, then President Diosdado Macapagal issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 which
established the area covered by petitioner-appellant’s timber license as the Olongapo Watershed Forest
Reserve
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner-appellant exhausted all available administrative remedies.
HELD:
NO, petitioner-appellant failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies

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When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the executive department of the
government, the courts will not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted. In other words,
the administrative remedies afforded by law must first be exhausted before resort can be had to the
courts, especially when the administrative remedies are by law exclusive and final.
In this case, petitioner-appellant’s speedy and adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the
Philippines. However, he did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary declaring his Ordinary
Timber License null and void to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation
238. Considering that the president has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the
respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to
exhaust his administrative remedies.
Therefore, petitioner Wenceslao Tan failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies.
NOTES:

ADMIN DIGESTS
CALO vs FUERTES
DATE: June 29, 1962 G.R. No: L-16537
Cadastral Case; Withdrawal of Appeal to the President; Non-exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

TICKLER:
Appeal to the President of the Philippines is the last step that the aggrieved party should take. The
withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President is tantamount to not appealing at all thereto. Such
DOCTRINE:
withdrawal is fatal.
In Cadastral Case titled “Francis Calo v. Delfin Fuertes”, the Director of Lands rendered an opinion
denying and dismissing the former’s claim and contest against the homestead application of Delfin
Fuertes and ordered him to vacate the premises within 60 days from receipt of the opinion. After his
reconsideration having been denied, Francisco Calo brought the case to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, who modified the opinion of the Director Lands and ordered Fuertes to reimburse
Calo of the improvements that Calo introduced on the land and the value of the consequential benefits
derived by Fuertes.
Still dissatisfied with the modified opinion, Francisco Calo asked the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to reconsider, but was denied. Hence, he appealed to the President of the Philippines,
FACTS:
but he withdrew the same before the President could act thereon.
Petitioner Calo filed in the CFI of Agusan a petition for writ of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction praying that the opinions of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources be enjoined. The court rendered judgment dismissing the petition, reasoning, among others,
that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available to him in the ordinary course of
law.
Petitioner appealed to the CA, contending that as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the
alter ego of the President and his acts and decisions are also those of the latter, he need not anymore file
his appeal to the President. He maintains that he already exhausted all available administrative remedies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal to the President is a condition precedent to the appeal to the Courts of Justice.
YES, an appeal to the President is a condition precedent to the appeal to the Courts of Justice.
In exhausting administrative remedies, the appeal to the President of the Philippines is the last step an
HELD: aggrieved party should take. Such withdrawal of an appeal taken to the President is tantamount to not
appealing at all thereto.
In this case, the appellant clearly withdrew his appeal to the President. Such withdrawal is fatal because
the appeal to the President is the last administrative remedy he should take. The appellant’s contention

ADMIN DIGESTS
that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President, he need not
anymore file an appeal to the President, is untenable.
A special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court lies only when
"there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In the
NOTES:
case at bar, appeal from an opinion or order by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to
the President of the Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner

ADMIN DIGESTS
CADABA vs ALUNAN III

DATE: March 16, 1989 G.R. No: 83578
PNP Grave Misconduct; NAPOLCOM no jurisdiction; DILG Secretary dapat ang nagdecide.
TICKLER:
(1) Appeals from decisions of the National Appellate Board and the Regional Appellate Board must
be filed before the Secretary of Local Government.
(2) Pursuant to complementary laws on discipline of government officials and employees, the PNP
DOCTRINE: falls within the definition of “civil service” in the Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution.
The Civil Service Law provides that in cases where the decision rendered by a bureau or office is
appealable to the Commission, the same may initially be appealed to the department and finally to
the Commission.
A complaint for grave misconduct, arbitrary detention, and dishonesty was filed with the Office of the
CHR by private respondent Mario Valdez against the petitioners who are PNP personnel. The complaint
was referred to the PNP Eight Regional Command (PNP RECOM 8), which, after investigation, filed an
administrative charge of grave misconduct against the petitioners and summary dismissal proceedings.
The Regional Director of PNP RECOM 8 found petitioners guilty of the charge and ordered their
dismissal from the police service. Pursuant to this decision, Special Order 174 was issued.
Petitioners appealed before the Regional Appellate Board of the Eighth Regional Command (RAB 8).
The RAB 8 affirmed the decision of the Regional Director and denied petitioners’ subsequent motion
for reconsideration.
FACTS:
Petitioners Cabada and De Guzman then filed with the Secretary of DILG and Chairman of the
NAPOLCOM their Appeal and Petition for Review. The NAPOLCOM, through commissioner Alexis
Canonizado, denied due course to the appeal and petition for review for lack of jurisdiction, it appearing
that both the Decision and Resolution of the RAB had long become final and executory and there being
no showing that the RAB failed to decide respondents’ appeal within the reglementary period of 60 days.
Hence, the instant petition.
The OSG seeks to dismiss this petition on the ground of prematurity because the petitioners failed to
exhaust administrative remedies, in that they should have instead appealed to the Civil Service
Commission pursuant to the Administrative Code, which vests upon the CSC appellate jurisdiction over
disciplinary cases of government personnel where the penalty imposed is dismissal from office.
(1) Whether or not the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course, for
ISSUE: lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners’ appeal from and petition for review of the decision of the RAB 8.
(2) Whether or not the petitioners failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
HELD:
(1) YES, NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners’ appeal from and
petition for review.

ADMIN DIGESTS
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides that if the RAB fails to decide an appeal within the
reglementary period of 60 days, the appealed decision becomes final and executory without, however,
prejudice to the right of the aggrieved party to appeal to the SECRETARY OF THE DILG.
Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one way or the other. The NAPOLCOM did not have
authority over the appeal and the petition for review. In this case, the mentioning of the Secretary of
DILG as Chairman or Presiding Officer of the NAPOLCOM in both petitions does not bring them within
the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. The NAPOLCOM has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions
rendered by the NAB and the RAB pursuant to the DILG Act of 1990.
(2) NO, the petitioners did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies.
This Court would have sustained this contention by the OSG if it was the Secretary of DILG who denied
due course to or dismissed the appeal of petitioner Candaba and the petition for review of petitioner De
Guzman. But herein, it was the NAPOLCOM who denied the petitions. If it was indeed the DILG who
denied the petitions, the appeal therefrom shall be filed with the Civil Service Commission pursuant to
the DILG Act of 1990 and the Administrative Code of 1987.
The decision of the NAPOLCOM is declared null and set aside.

The Secretary of DILG was directed to resolve the petitions (Appeal and Petition for Review) filed by
herein petitioners.
NOTES:
The issue here is not mainly on the exhaustion of administrative remedies. It decided on the lack of
jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM to decide the case since it should be the Secretary of the DILG. And if
the DILG were the one who decided, the exhaustion of administrative remedies was observed by
petitioners.

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NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS

DATE: February 9, 1996 G.R. No: 115121-25
Public bidding for security contracts; Protection of NFA properties; Non-applicability of the principle
TICKLER: of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is subject to some
DOCTRINE:
limitations and exceptions
The National Food Authority conducted a public bidding to award security contracts for the protection
of its properties and facilities all over the country. 12 security agencies were awarded 1 year contracts,
among whom were private respondents Col. Felix Manubay, Masada Security Agency, Continental
Watchman & Security Agency, Alberto Lasala, and Norman Mapagay.
Later on, when petitioner Romeo David became the NFA Administrator, he caused a review of all
security service contracts, procedures on the accreditation of private security agencies and the bidding
for security services. He extended the services of private respondents and the other incumbent security
agencies on a periodic basis. Pursuant to these actions, Romeo David issued a Special order creating a
Prequalification, Bids, and Awards Committee (PBAC).
When the time of the bidding came, two of herein respondents, Lanting Security and Watchman Agency
FACTS: and Lasala, failed to qualify for failure to comply with documentary requirements. They filed their
complaints with the RTC to restrain the Administrator from proceeding with the public bidding. During
the pendency of the writ of preliminary injunction, NFA Administrator terminated the contracts of the
security agencies, citing their expired contracts and that they had lost the confidence of the NFA.
Thereafter, the NFA engaged the services of 7 new security agencies.
Respondents filed another complaint with the RTC to restrain NFA from terminating their services, and
it was granted. The Court of Appeals also favored the respondents but granted the NFA to terminate
expired contracts.
On appeal to this Court, the NFA maintains that respondents did not exhaust administrative remedies
and hence their complaint is premature, in that the respondents should have first appealed to the NFA
Board. It also stressed that the negotiated contracts upheld by the NFA was executed in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents’ filing of the complaints to the Court is premature
NO, it is not premature.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is subject to some
HELD: limitations and exceptions.
In this case, private respondents’ contracts were terminated in the midst of bidding preparations and their
replacements hired barely five days after their termination. In fact, Respondent Masada, a prequalified
bidder, submitted all requirements and was preparing for the pubic bidding only to find out that contracts

ADMIN DIGESTS
had already been awarded by negotiation. Indeed, an appeal to the NFA Board or Council of Trustees
and the Secretary of Agriculture was not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The urgency of the situation compelled private respondents to go to court to stop the implementation
of these negotiated security contracts.
The Court is neither impressed by petitioners' claim that the subject contracts were negotiated as a
necessity to stave off a crisis that gripped the NFA. Assuming arguendo that an emergency actually
existed and the negotiated contracts were justified, petitioners' continued failure to conduct a public
bidding and select the bidder within a reasonable time casts doubts on the good faith behind the
negotiated contracts.
NOTES:

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DAR vs APEX INVESTMENT AND FINANCING CORP

DATE: April 10, 2003 G.R. No: 149422
Compulsory acquisition of lots; CARP Law; exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
TICKLER: remedies
The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is a relative concept and is flexible depending
on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. This doctrine is
DOCTRINE: disregarded where:
1. There are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention
2. The administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction
Respondent APEX Investment and Financing Corporation (now SM Investments Corporation) owns
several lots located at Barangay Paliparan, Dasmarinas, Cavite. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO) of Dasmarinas initiated a compulsory acquisition proceedings over those lots pursuant to the
CARP Law of 1988. MARO issued a Notice of Coverage informing respondent of the compulsory
acquisition and sent these notices to respondent’s office. Respondent, however, denied receiving the
same as it was no longer holding office thereat. Respondent learned of the compulsory acquisition
proceedings 3 years later from the issue of the Balita stating that the TCT of respondent has been placed
FACTS:
under compulsory acquisition program.
Respondent filed a protest with the PARO (Provincial Agrarian Reform Office) on the ground that their
lots were classified as residential even before the effectivity of the law, and thus not covered by the
CARP Law. Only 1 year from said protest was it forwarded to the DAR. In the meantime, APEX’s
certificate of title had been cancelled. Thus, respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
the CA, but DAR contended that respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
NO, it did not violate the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is a relative and is flexible depending on the
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. This doctrine is
disregarded where (1) there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention and (2) the
HELD: administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In this case, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply. Records show that the
PARO did not take immediate action on respondent’s Protest, and it was only after more than 1 year that
it was forwarded to the DAR. Since then, what petitioner has done was to require respondent every now
and then to submit copies of supporting documents which were already attached to its Protest. Aggrieved
landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their letter-protests after it had sat on them
for quite unreasonable time before they resort to judicial process.

ADMIN DIGESTS
Therefore, respondent did not violate the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
NOTES:

ADMIN DIGESTS
MAGLALANG vs COURT OF APPEALS

DATE: December 11, 2013 G.R. No: 190566
Casino Filipino; Discourtesy complaint against a PAGCOR teller; Exceptions to the exhaustion of
TICKLER: remedies doctrine
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the following
exceptions:
1. When there is violation of due process

2. When the issue involved is purely a legal question
3. When the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
4. When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned
5. When there is irreparable injury
6. When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears
DOCTRINE: the implied and assumed approval of the latter
7. When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable
8. When it would amount to a nullification of a claim
9. When the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings
10. When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
11. When there are circumstances, indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable
delay would greatly prejudice the complainant
12. Where no administrative review is provided by law
13. Where the rule of qualified political agency applies
14. Where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot
Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino which was operated by respondent PAGCOR, a GOCC
existing by virtue of PD 1869. Petitioner alleged that, while he was performing his functions as a teller,
a certain Cecilia approached him in his booth and handed him an undetermined amount of cash
consisting of mixed 1k and 500 bills. There were 45 P1,000 and 10 P500 bills for the amount of P50,000.
Following the casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board. However, he erroneously
spread the bills into only 4 clusters instead of 5 worth 10,000 per cluster. He then placed markers for
P10,000 each cluster and declared the total amount of P40,000 to Cecilia. Perplexed, Cecilia accused
Maglalang of trying to shortchange her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of her money.
FACTS:
Petitioner tried to explain for the error, but Cecilia continued to berate and curse him. As a result of the
tension, petitioner and Cecilia were invited to the casino’s Internal Security Office to air their respective
sides. Petitioner was required to file an Incident report which he submitted on the same day.
Petitioner received a Memorandum from the casino’s Branch Manager, informing him that he was being
charged with discourtesy towards a customer and directing him to explain why he should not be
sanctioned. Petitioner then submitted his letter-explanation. 2 months later, petitioner received another
memo which found him guilty of Discourtesy and imposed him on a 30-day suspension. Aggrieved, he
filed a motion for reconsideration and prayed in the alternative that the penalty should be only a
reprimand as it is the appropriate penalty.

ADMIN DIGESTS
Subsequently, PAGCOR issued a memorandum addressed to petitioner, informing him that the Board
of Directors denied his appeal for reconsideration for lack of merit. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA, but was denied for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking recourse from the CA.
Whether or not CA is correct in dismissing the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
ISSUE:
remedies
NO, the CA is incorrect.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he should have availed himself of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him. However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits
of the following exceptions (SEE DOCTRINE)
The case before us falls squarely under exception #12 since the law per se provides no administrative
review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law,
rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days. Section 37 (a) and (b)
HELD: of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines provides for the unavailability of any appeal. Nevertheless,
decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still subject
to judicial review.
The judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case is a special civil action for certiorari ascribing
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not appeal.
There being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view
of petitioner’s allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, the CA’s basis of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing.
Therefore, the CA is incorrect.
NOTES:

ADMIN DIGESTS
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs COMELEC
COMELEC Public Bidding; Automated Election System; 2 Stage-System; Exceptions to the exhaustion
TICKLER: of administrative remedies doctrine
The instances when the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded, as follows:
1. When there is a violation of due process

2. When the issue involved is purely a legal question
3. When the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
4. When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned
5. When there is irreparable injury
DOCTRINE: 6. When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears
the implied and assumed approval of the latter
7. When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable
8. When it would amount to a nullification of a claim
9. When the subject matter is a private land in land case
10. When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
11. When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention
Congress passed RA 8046 which authorized COMELEC to conduct a nationwide demonstration of

computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot test the system in the March 1996
elections in ARMM. Congress then enacted RA 8436 authorizing COMELEC to use an automated
election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting votes and canvassing the results of the national
and local elections. Intending to implement the automation, COMELEC eventually decided against full
national implementation and limited it to the ARMM. However, due to the failure of the machines to
read correctly some automated ballots, the manual counting of the ballot was ordered. In the May 2001
elections, the canvassing of votes for both national and local positions were also done manually.
In 2002, COMELEC adopted a Resolution which resolved to conduct biddings for the 3 phases of its
Automated Election System: Phase I – Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II – Automated
FACTS: Counting and Canvassing System; Phase III – Electronic Transmission. In compliance with this
Resolution, the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of COMELEC convened a pre-bid conference and
gave prospective bidders enough time to submit their bids, and the poll body released the Request for
Proposal which provided that bids from manufacturers forming into a joint venture may be entertained
provided that the Philippine ownership thereof shall be at least 60%.
Basically, the public bidding was to be conducted under a 2 Stage System. The first stage should establish
the eligibility of the bidder to bid and its qualification to perform the acts if accepted. The second stage
would be the Bid itself. Out of the 57 bidders, the BAC found MPC and the Total Information
Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. But before BAC files its recommendation, the COMELEC
had already awarded the contract the respondent MPC. Five individuals and entities including herein
petitioner Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines wrote to the COMELEC Chairman,
protesting that the award of contract to respondent MPC due to irregularities in which the bidding process
had been conducted. The Chairman rejected the protest.

ADMIN DIGESTS
Hence, the present petition.
1. Procedural Issue: Whether or not the petition is premature for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
ISSUES: 2. Substantive Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it awarded
to MPC the contract for the 2nd phase of the Automated Election System.
1. NO, it is not premature
The Court holds that petitioners need not exhaust administrative remedies as the instance case
falls under the instances which would allow for the disregard of the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine. These are the following exceptions (SEE DOCTRINE)
The present controversy precisely falls within the exceptions listed in #7, #10, and #11. The
COMELEC itself made the exhaustion of administrative remedies legally impossible, or at the
very least, unreasonable. This is because the COMELEC came out with a Resolution awarding
the project to Respondent MPC even before the BAC managed to issue its written report and
recommendation. Thus, how could petitioners have appealed the BAC’s recommendation to the
head of the Commission, when the COMELEC en banc had already approved the award of the
contract to MPC even before petitioners learned of the BAC recommendation? It is obvious that
petitioners could have appealed the BAC’s report and recommendation to the COMELEC Chair
(head of the Commission) only upon their discovery thereof. But, in this case, the COMELEC
already awarded the contract to MPC even before the recommendation.
Therefore, the petition is not premature.

HELD:
2. YES, COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.
The public bidding system designed by COMELEC under its Request for Proposal mandated
the use of 2 Stage System. The first stage was to contain legal documents, which includes, among
other things, a copy of the joint venture agreement, the consortium agreement or memorandum
of agreement.
In the instant case, no such instrument was submitted to COMELEC during the bidding process.
There is also no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement, consortium agreement,
memorandum of agreement, or business plan executed among the members of the purported
consortium. Thus, it follows that there was no documentary or other basis for COMELEC to
conclude that a consortium had actually been formed amongst the respondents herein.
Notwithstanding such vital deficiencies, COMELEC still deemed the “consortium” eligible to
participate in the bidding, proceeding with the 2nd Stage.
At any rate, it is clear that COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in arbitrarily failing to
observe its own rules, policies, and guidelines with respect to the bidding process.
NOTES:

ADMIN DIGESTS
EJERA vs MERTO
Reassignment to a far-flung area; Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies

TICKLER:
A public servant who has an issue against a directive for her re-assignment must exhaust her available
DOCTRINE: administrative remedies before resorting to judicial action. The non-exhaustion of available
administrative remedies is fatal to the resort to judicial action.
Petitioner Marichu Ejera held the position of Agricultural Center Chief I in the Office of the Provincial
Agriculturist, the next-in-rank to the position of Supervising Agriculturist. Upon retirement of the
Supervising Agriculturist, she applied for that position, but one Daisy Kirit was eventually appointed.
She filed a protest against the appointment of the latter before the Civil Service Commission Regional
Office, but was dismissed. The Central CSC Office affirmed the dismissal.
Meanwhile, respondent Provincial Agriculturist Henry Merto issued Office Order 008 to provide
intensive agricultural extension services to residents of interior barangays under Barangay Agricultural
Development Center (BADC) Program in the province. The petitioner was one of the personnel re-
assigned under the Office Order as the team leader in Lake Balanan and Sandulot in the Municipality of
Siaton. When she refused to obey the office order, Merto ordered her to explain why she should not be
sanctioned. Having failed to submit her explanation, Merto and his counsel summoned her to a
conference.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed in the RTC her complaint for final injunction with temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction and damages against Merto, and moved further for a supplemental complaint to
implead Gregorio Paltinca, the OIC of the Office of the Provincial Agriculturist for issuing another Order
(Office Order 005) reassigning her to another far-flung area. She alleges that Office Order Nos. 008 and
005 were illegal for violating the rule against indiscriminate and whimsical reassignment enunciated in
the Administrative Code of 1987; that the issuances were really intended to banish her to the far-flung
isolated mountainous areas in Negros Oriental. Gregorio Paltinca, moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
The RTC dismissed the case, holding on the legality of the Office Orders and that petitioner should have
first gone to the CSC in challenging the Orders. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling
Whether or not petitioner’s complaint constitutes an exception to the rule on the exhaustion of
ISSUE:
administrative remedies
NO, petitioner’s complaint does not constitute an exception to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine.
HELD:
The reassignment of the petitioner was a “personnel” and “Civil Service” matter to be properly addressed
in accordance with the rules and guidelines prescribed by the CSC. Her resort to judicial intervention

ADMIN DIGESTS
could not take the place of the grievance procedure then available to her. For one, petitioner was aware
that Merto’s superior was the Provincial Governor. Thus, she could have challenged the wisdom and
legality of the Orders before the Provincial Governor. Only the Provincial Governor could competently
determine the soundness of the Orders or the propriety of its implementation, for the Provincial Governor
had the power to supervise and control programs, projects, services, and activities of the province
pursuant to the Local Government Code.
Her having shrouded her complaint in the RTC with language that presented a legal issue against the
assailed Office Orders of Merto and Paltinca did not excuse her premature resort to judicial action.
NOTES:

ADMIN DIGESTS
PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION vs CAGAYAN ELECTRIC

POWER AND LIGHT
DATE: April 25, 2002 G.R. No: 127371
Injunction; Power supply from NAPOCOR to CEPALCO; Non-interference by Trial Courts with co-
TICKLER: equal administrative bodies
Where the law provides for an appeal from the decisions of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court
or to the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the RTCs in terms of rank and
DOCTRINE: stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. It bears stressing that this doctrine of non-
interference by trial courts with co-equal administrative bodies is intended to ensure judicial stability in
the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be
opened, modified, or vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.
Pursuant to a Cabinet Memorandum approved and issued by President Corazon Aquino, respondent
Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., (CEPALCO) grantee of a legislative franchise to distribute
electric power to certain municipalities of Misamis Oriental, filed with the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB) a petition seeking the discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power by the National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR) within CEPALCO’s franchise area. After due notice and hearing, the ERB
granted the petition. NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration with the ERB, but was denied. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time and therefore,
the assailed decision became final and executory. This Court affirmed the CA’s resolution.
To implement the decision, CEPALCO wrote to herein petitioner Philippine Sinter Corporation (PSC)
FACTS:
and advised the latter of its desire to have the power supply of PSC disconnected, cut, and transferred
directly from NAPOCOR to CEPALCO. Petitioner refused CEPALCO’s request, citing its contract for
power supply with NAPOCOR effective until its expiration. To restrain the execution of the ERB
Decision, PSC filed a complaint for injunction against CEPALCO with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro
City, averring that there exists no legal basis to cut-off PSC’s power supply with NAPOCOR and
substitute the latter with CEPALCO. The RTC ruled in favor of PSC. CEPALCO appealed to the CA
which was granted. PSC filed the instant petition after its motion for reconsideration was denied by the
CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not injunction lies against the final and executory judgment of the ERB
NO, injunction does not lie against the final and executory judgment of the ERB.
HELD: An injunction to stay a final and executory decision is unavailing except only after a showing that facts
and circumstances exist which would render execution unjust or inequitable, or that a change in the
situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such exception exists. To disturb the final and executory
decision of the ERB in an injunction suit is to brazenly disregard the rule on finality of judgments.

ADMIN DIGESTS
Corallarily, Section 10 of EO 172 (the law creating the ERB) provides that a review of its decisions or
orders is lodged in the Supreme Court. Settled is the rule that where the law provides for an appeal from
the decisions of administrative bodies to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, it means that such
bodies are co-equals with the RTC in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the
latter. Hence, the trial court, being co-equal with the ERB, cannot interfere with the decision of the latter.
It bears stressing that this doctrine of non-interference of trial courts with co-equal administrative bodies
is intended to ensure judicial stability in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court
of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified, or vacated by any court of concurrent
jurisdiction.
Therefore, injunction does not lie against the final and executory decision the ERB.
As a rule, to justify the injunctive relief prayed for, the movant must show:
(1) the existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and
(2) the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.
NOTES:
In the case at bar, petitioners failed to show any clear legal right which would be violated if the power
supply of PSC from the NAPOCOR is disconnected and transferred to CEPALCO.

ADMIN DIGESTS
ARBOLEDA vs NLRC
TICKLER: Misappropriation of Company Funds; Valid dismissal; MERALCO; Labor Arbiter vs NLRC
(1) The principle that factual findings of administrative bodies are binding upon this Court may be
sustained only when no issue of credibility is raised. But when the findings of fact of the NLRC do
not agree with those of the Labor Arbiter, this Court must of necessity review the records to
DOCTRINE: determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts
(2) The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action complained of.
Petitioner Enrique Arboleda, an employee for 25 years of respondent MERALCO, was dismissed for
misappropriating or withholding company funds. He was found to have received without official receipt
the amount of P1,200 as payment for Antonio Sy’s Found Connection (FC) bills. Sy had been found
twice to have illegal connections. Sy’s meter was thereafter installed without the go signal from
MERALCO. This irregularity was discovered by Marcelo Umali, branch manager of MERALCO, who
FACTS:
recommended petitioner’s investigation. Petitioner, notified of the charge against him, denied the charge.
However, Sy identified petitioner as the one who received the P1,200 payment of his FC bills, but did
not issue a receipt. Petitioner was thereafter terminated. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter who rendered judgment in his favor. The NLRC, on appeal,
reversed the Labor Arbiter. Hence, this recourse
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner is valid
YES, it is valid.
The principle that factual findings of administrative bodies are binding upon this Court may be sustained
only when no issue of credibility is raised. But when the findings of fact of the NLRC do not agree with
those of the Labor Arbiter, this Court must of necessity review the records to determine which findings
should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts
HELD:
The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action complained of. Before an employee can be validly
dismissed, the Labor Code requires the employer to furnish the employee with 2 notices. This
requirement was substantially complied with by MERALCO when it notified Arboleda of the charges
against him and of his right to be represented by a lawyer, and when it gave him notice by letter of his
dismissal and the reasons therefor.
Requisites for a valid dismissal:

NOTES: 1. The employee must be afforded due process, i.e., he must be given an opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself, and
2. The dismissal must be for a valid cause as provided in Art. 282 of the Labor Code

ADMIN DIGESTS

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Ang Tibay vs.

Court of Industrial Relations

● Created through CA No. 103

TICKLER: Police who allegedly had a relationship with Jorolan’s daughter

Administrative Proceedings: Procedural Due Process

1. The right to actual or constructive notice;

ISSUE: W/N her right to due process was violated.

Right to due process in administrative proceedings

Petitioner’s right to counsel

TICKLER: NTC penalized Globe for its SMS service

ISSUE: W/N Globe was denied of due process;

​ he imposition of fine is void for violation of due process.

TICKLER: Incorrectly-filled SALNs

Hence, this petition.

1. W/N Valencia was deprived of due process;

ISSUE: W/N the right against self-incrimination is available in an administrative hearing.

ISSUE: W/N Dumarpa, Danganan and Alauya should be cited in contempt.

TICKLER: Asked for 5k in exchange of securing their positions; fire officers

ISSUE: W/N the respondents are guilty of forum-shopping

25. - Soriano v. Laguardia

TICKLER: Ang Dating Daan; cussed on live television.

Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative,

ISSUE: Whether or not there was undue delegation of legislative power.

No, there was no undue delegation of legislative power.

G. CERTEZA | H. ESCARCHA | M. VILLARUBIA

Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a

G. CERTEZA | H. ESCARCHA | M. VILLARUBIA

26. - Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

TICKLER: Coal mining

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction – In cases where the determination of an issue requires

G. CERTEZA | H. ESCARCHA | M. VILLARUBIA

G. CERTEZA | H. ESCARCHA | M. VILLARUBIA

27. - Caballes, et. al. v. Perez-Sison

Samahan ng Mga Optomeritrist sa Pilipinas, through its President, filed a Letter-Affidavit

No, they did not act in grave abuse of discretion.

G. CERTEZA | H. ESCARCHA | M. VILLARUBIA

Under certain situations, recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that

G. CERTEZA | H. ESCARCHA | M. VILLARUBIA

28 - Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology

TICKLER: Refused to pay ticket, was not allowed to take exams.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.

No, the doctrine does not apply to the case at hand.

G. CERTEZA | H. ESCARCHA | M. VILLARUBIA

Academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine

G. CERTEZA | H. ESCARCHA | M. VILLARUBIA

29. - Paat, et. al., v. Court of Appeals

TICKLER: Truck, replevin.

G. CERTEZA | H. ESCARCHA | M. VILLARUBIA

The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies can be disregarded:

G. CERTEZA | H. ESCARCHA | M. VILLARUBIA

30. - Shell Philippines Exploration v. Jalos

TICKLER: Fishermen, pipelines.

HELD: Yes, it is a pollution case and so jurisdiction falls to the PAB.

G. CERTEZA | H. ESCARCHA | M. VILLARUBIA

G. CERTEZA | H. ESCARCHA | M. VILLARUBIA

31. - SSS Employees Association v. Bathan-Velasco

TICKLER: ACCESS, SSSEA, Election protest.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

No, petitioner is incorrect.

G. CERTEZA | H. ESCARCHA | M. VILLARUBIA

The petition is dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

G. CERTEZA | H. ESCARCHA | M. VILLARUBIA

32. - Industrial Power Sales, Inc. v. Sinsuat, et. al.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

he imposition of fine is void for violation of due process.