Ang Tibay v.

CIR

FACTS:

● Toribio Teodoro, owner of Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army, averred that a number of his employees were temporarily laid off due to alleged
shortage of leather soles.
● On the other hand, the National Labor Union, Inc prayed for the vacation of the judgement
rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial
Relations for a new trial, contended that:
● The reason for employees lay off is entirely false and unsupported by the records of
the BOC and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
● The supposed lack of leather materials was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of the bond with the Philippine Army, despite the breach of contract
● The National Worker’s Brotherhood registered employee’s union dominated by
Teodoro is illegal for its existence and functions.
● Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the NLU
Inc. and unjustly favoring the National Worker’s Brotherhood
● Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.
● The case then reached the CIR and eventually elevated to the SC, but a motion for new trial
by the NLU contending there were inaccessible documents which could not be offered in the
CIR. That these documents, which NLU have now attached as exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification
and reversal of the judgment rendered therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union Inc, was deprived of due process

RULING:
YES. The SC concluded that the Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). Unlike a court of justice
which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that
are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will
appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees
but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations
between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
(section 1).
The SC had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice
and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and
shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical
 rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.)

Further the SC enumerated the requisites of administrative due process embodied as primary rights:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.

Barroso v. COA

Administrative Officer II Mag-abo was granted a cash advance for the payment of the salaries of
the BSU employees for March 16-31, 2005. Mag-abo went to Landbank - Malaybalay to encash the
payroll check. Since there were several customers at that time, she left the check with the bank
verifier and returned to BSU.

Mag-abo went back to Landbank - Malaybalay together with four other BSU employees who had
business there. After encashing the check, Mag-abo et al. walked back to BSU.
As they passed Caltex gasoline station, an unidentified man grabbed Mag-abo's bag containing
the payroll money. The man immediately ran to the other side of the street, boarded a motorcycle,
and drove towards the direction of Cagayan de Oro City. The incident was reported to BSU Chief
Administrative Officer Gregory who accompanied Mag-abo to the police station to report the
incident.
By Audit Observation Memorandum6 dated April 1, 2005, COA Audit Team Leader Teresita
Quijada informed petitioner of Mag-abo's cash shortage of 574,215.27. Quijada also issued a
Demand Letter to Mag-abo directing her to produce the unliquidated amount and explain
within 72 hours why the cash shortage occurred.

The ruling surprised petitioner, considering he was never a party to the case and was never even
furnished copy of Torres' affidavit. Thus, petitioner filed his own motion for reconsideration,
invoking his right to due process and questioning the basis of his supposed liability.
COA ruled that petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process. For although he was not
impleaded in the proceedings below, he was able to file a motion for reconsideration anyway
right after he was found solidarily liable with Mag-abo and Gregory.

Issue:
Whether or to COA violated petitioner’s right to due process.

Ruling:

requisites of due process in administrative proceedings, viz.:

1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in
support thereof;
2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3) The decision must have something to support itself;
4) The evidence must be substantial;
5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties;
 6)The tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the facts
and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision; and
7)The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the pmiies to the proceeding will know the variou~ is~ues involved, and the reasons for the decision.

The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot cure the due process defect, especially if the
motion was filed precisely to raise the issue of violation of the right to due process and the lack of
opportunity to be heard on the merits remained.

In other words, if a person has not been given the opportunity to squarely and intelligently
answer the accusations or rebut the evidence presented against him, Dr raise substantive
defences through the proper pleadings before a quasi-judicial body (like the COA) where he or
she stands charged, then a due process problem exists.

petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to present and submit evidence to establish non-
culpability via memorandum or oral arguments before the COA

Though petitioner raised this due process violation issue before the COA Proper, the latter never
addressed his concern. It simply ruled that the very pleading which raised due process violation was
the very pleading which afforded him due process. But this cannot be the case. For a perusal of
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration before the COA Proper reveals that he never had the
opportunity to thoroughly argue the merits of his case precisely because he was not properly informed
of what he was supposed to argue against the accusations and statements against him in Mag-abo's
submissions. Thus, petitioner was constrained to limit the discussion in his motion for reconsideration
to the issue of due process. Surely, this cannot be considered the opportunity to be heard within the
concept of administrative due process.

JINGGOY ESTRADA v. OMBUDSMAN

Facts:
The Ombudsman, in furnishing Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and
documents, fully complied with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and Section 4, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
Administrative Order No. 7.

Both the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of
the complainant and affidavits of his supporting witnesses. Neither of these Rules require the
investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his co-respondents.

The right of the respondent is only "to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant," as
expressly stated in Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. This Court has
unequivocally ruled in Paderanga that "Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-
affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine." Moreover, Section 4 (a,
b and c) of Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rule of Procedure, read together, only require the
investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and his
supporting witnesses.

There is no law or rule requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies
of the affidavits of his co-respondents.

In the 7 May 2014 Joint Order, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen.
Estrada with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents whom he specifically named, as
well as the counter-affidavits of some of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the
Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration because the
Ombudsman granted Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to formally
respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully complied with the
existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the
Rules required. Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this
is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Ombudsman.

Sen. Estrada also raised in this Petition the same issue he raised in his Motion for Reconsideration of
the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution of the Ombudsman finding probable cause. While his Motion for
Reconsideration of the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution was pending, Sen. Estrada did not wait for the
resolution of the Ombudsman and instead proceeded to file the present Petition for Certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman violated petitioner’s right to due process in not furnishing
copies

Ruling:

There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of
the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.

Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination,
copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter affidavits of his co-respondents
violates his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule
which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation
that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II
of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim.

Although Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides
that a respondent "shall have access to the evidence on record," this provision should be construed in
relation to Section 4(a) and (b) of the same Rule, as well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. First,
Section 4(a) states that " the investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting
 witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaint." The "supporting witnesses" are the
witnesses of the complainant, and do not refer to the co-respondents.

Second, Section 4(b) states that "the investigating officer shall issue an order attaching thereto a copy
of the affidavits and all other supporting documents, directing the respondent" to submit his counter-
affidavit. The affidavits referred to in Section 4(b) are the affidavits mentioned in Section 4(a).
Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the respondent are the affidavits of the complainant
and his supporting witnesses.

Third, Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[t]he
respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may
not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense." A respondent’s right to examine refers only
to "the evidence submitted by the complainant."

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining

whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a
well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.

the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are merely statutory rights, not
constitutional due process rights. An investigation to determine probable cause for the filing of an
information does not initiate a criminal action so as to trigger into operation Section 14(2), Article III
of the Constitution.30 It is the filing of a complaint or information in court that initiates a criminal
action.

the right to a preliminary investigation is merely a statutory right, not part of the "fundamental
and essential requirements" of due process. Thus, a preliminary investigation can be taken
away by legislation.

Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes
hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay evidence.

Sen. Estrada did not file any pleading, much less a motion for reconsideration, to the 27 March 2014
Order inOMB-C-C-13-0313. Sen. Estrada immediately proceeded to file this Petition for Certiorari
before this Court.

A motion for reconsideration allows the public respondent an opportunity to correct its factual and
legal errors. Sen. Estrada, however, failed to present a compelling reason that the present Petition falls
under the exceptions41 to the general rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is required
prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari. This Court has reiterated in numerous decisions that a
motion for reconsideration is mandatory before the filing of a petition for certiorari.

The "exhaustion" principle applies when the ruling court or tribunal is not given the opportunity tore-
examine its findings and conclusions because of an available opportunity that a party seeking recourse
against the court or the tribunal’s ruling omitted to take. Under the concept of "due process," on
the other hand, a violation occurs when a court or tribunal rules against a party without giving
him or her the opportunity to be heard. Thus, the exhaustion principle is based on the perspective
of the ruling court or tribunal, while due process is considered from the point of view of the litigating
party against whom a ruling was made.

Third. Sen. Estrada’s present Petition for Certiorari constitutes forum shopping and should be
summarily dismissed.

The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Motion for Reconsideration in its 4 June 2014 Joint Order.
Clearly, Sen. Estrada expressly raised in his Motion for Reconsideration with the Ombudsman the
violation of his right to due process, the same issue he is raising in this petition.

The rule against forum shopping is not limited to the fulfilment of the requisites of litis pendentia. To
determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask
is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicatain another.53 Undergirding the principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a
party isnot allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same
cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same matter should not be the
subject of controversy in court more than once in order that possible conflicting judgments may be
avoided, for the sake of the stability in the rights and status of persons.

Sen. Estrada resorted to simultaneous remedies by filing this Petition alleging violation of due process
by the Ombudsman even as his Motion for Reconsideration raising the very same issue remained
pending with the Ombudsman. This is plain and simple forum shopping, warranting outright dismissal
of this Petition.

Justice Velasco’s dissent prefers thatSen. Estrada not "be subjected to the rigors of a criminal
prosecution incourt" because there is "a pending question regarding the Ombudsman’s grave abuse of
its discretion preceding the finding of a probable cause to indict him." Restated bluntly, Justice
Velasco’s dissent would like this Court to conclude that the mere filing of the present Petition for
Certiorari questioning the Ombudsman’s denial of Sen. Estrada’s Request should have, by itself,
voided all proceedings related to the present case.
Justice Velasco’s dissent faults the majority for their refusal to apply the Reyes case to the present
Petition. Justice Velasco’s dissent insists that "this Court cannot neglect to emphasize that, despite the
variance in the quanta of evidence required, a uniform observance of the singular concept of due
process is indispensable in all proceedings."

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA,

Petitioner
vs.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Facts:
Respondent claims denial of due process because her case was allegedly not heard by an impartial
tribunal. She reiterates that the six (6) Justices ought to have inhibited themselves on the grounds of
actual bias, of having personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, and of having acted as a
material witness in the matter in controversy. Respondent also argues denial of due process when the
Court supposedly took notice of extraneous matters as corroborative evidence and when the Court
 based its main Decision on facts without observing the mandatory procedure for reception of
evidence.

By way of Comment, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), seeks a denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration for being proforma. In any
case, the OSG argues that respondent's motion lacks merit as there was no denial of due process and
that quo warranto is the appropriate remedy to oust an ineligible impeachable officer. The OSG adds
that the issue of whether respondent is a person of proven integrity is justiciable considering that the
decision-making powers of the JBC are limited by judicially discoverable standards. Undeviating
from its position, the OSG maintains that the petition is not time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court does not apply to the State and that the peculiar circumstances of the instant case
preclude the strict application of the prescriptive period.

Disputing respondent's claims, the OSG reiterates that respondent's repeated failure to file her
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) and her non-submission thereof to the JBC
which the latter required to prove the integrity of an applicant affect respondent's integrity. The OSG
concludes that respondent, not having possessed of proven integrity, failed to meet the constitutional
requirement for appointment to the Judiciary.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is deprived of due process.
Whether or not quo warranto is an improper remedy in removing a public official.
whether respondent is eligible to occupy the position of Chief Justice.

Ruling:
Respondent also harps on the alleged bias on the part of the six (6) Justices and that supposedly, their
failure to inhibit themselves from deciding the instant petition amounts to a denial of due process.
Respondent's contentions were merely a rehash of the issues already taken into consideration and
properly resolved by the Court. To reiterate, mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough
ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. Acts or conduct clearly indicative
of arbitrariness or prejudice has to be shown. 3 Verily, for bias and prejudice to be considered
sufficient justification for the inhibition of a Member of this Court, mere suspicion is not enough.
Moreover, as discussed in the main Decision, respondent's allegations on the grounds for inhibition
were merely based on speculations, or on distortions of the language, context and meaning of the
answers given by the concerned Justices as resource persons in the proceedings of the Committee on
Justice of the House of Representatives.

the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction extends to impeachable officers.

Accordingly, the Court could assume jurisdiction over the instant quo warranto petition against an
impeachable officer.

Quo warranto and impeachment are two distinct proceedings, although both may result in the ouster
of a public officer. Strictly speaking, quo warranto grants the relief of "ouster", while impeachment
affords "removal."
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine a person's right or title to a public
office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. 11 It is the proper action to inquire into a public
officer's eligibility12 or the validity of his appointment.

Impeachment, on the other hand, is a political process undertaken by the legislature to determine
whether the public officer committed any of the impeachable offenses, namely, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. 14
It does not ascertain the officer's eligibility for appointment or election, or challenge the legality of his
assumption of office. Conviction for any of the impeachable offenses shall result in the removal of the
impeachable official from office.

Accordingly, respondent's continued reliance on the Court's pronouncement in Mayor Lecaroz v.

Sandiganbayan, 19 Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan,20 Jn Re Gonzales,21 Jarque v. Desierto22 and Marcoleta v.
Borra23 (Lecaroz etc.) is misplaced. Not one of these cases concerned the validity of an impeachable
officer's appointment. To repeat, Lecaroz involved a criminal charge against a mayor before the
Sandiganbayan, while the rest were disbarment cases filed against impeachable officers principally for
acts done during their tenure in public office. The officers' eligibility or the validity of their
appointment was not raised before the Court. The principle laid down in said cases is to the effect that
during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that
carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to
qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend
to actions assailing the public officer's title or right to the office he or she occupies. The ruling
therefore cannot serve as authority to hold that a quo warranto action can never be filed against an
impeachable officer.

The Court's quo warranto jurisdiction over impeachable officers also finds basis in paragraph 7,
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which designates it as the sole judge of the qualifications of
the President and Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers. With this authority, the
remedy of quo warranto was provided in the rules of the Court sitting as the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET).

The Court is not convinced. The argument, to begin with, acknowledges that the Constitution in fact
allows quo warranto actions against impeachable officers, albeit respondent limits them to the
President and Vice-President. This admission refutes the very position taken by respondent that all
impeachable officials cannot be sued through quo warranto because they belong to a "privileged
class" of officers who can be removed only through impeachment.

This Court has the constitutional mandate to exercise jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions. And as
Estrada and the PET Rules show, impeachable officers are not immune to quo warranto actions.
Thus, a refusal by the Court to take cognizance of this case would not only be a breach of its duty
under the Constitution, it would also accord respondent an exemption not given to other impeachable
officers.

Lack of qualifications for appointment or election is evidently not among the stated grounds for
impeachment. It is, however, a ground for a quo warranto action over which this Court was given
original jurisdiction under Section 5(1) of Article VIII.
T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting as judges or other judicial officers,
cannot be treated as a substitute for quo warranto or be rightfully called upon to perform any of the
functions of the writ. If there is a court, judge or officer de facto, the title to the office and the right to
act cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an intruder takes possession of a judicial office, the person
dispossessed cannot obtain relief through a writ of prohibition commanding the alleged intruder to
cease from performing judicial acts, since in its very nature prohibition is an improper remedy by
which to determine the title to an office.

Determining title to the office on the basis of a public officer's qualifications is the function of quo
warranto. For this reason, impeachment cannot be treated as a substitute for quo warranto.
Furthermore, impeachment was designed as a mechanism "to check abuse of power." 41 The grounds
for impeachment, including culpable violation of the Constitution, have been described as referring to
"serious crimes or misconduct"42 of the "vicious and malevolent" kind.

Underlying all constitutional provisions on government service is the principle that public office is a
public trust.47 The people, therefore, have the right to have only qualified individuals appointed to
public office.

this Court's action never intends to deprive the Congress of its mandate to make a determination on
impeachable officials' culpability for acts committed while in office.

Quo warranto is not a figment of imagination or invention of this Court. It is a mandate boldly
enshrined in the Constitution52 where the judiciary is conferred original jurisdiction to the exclusion of
the other branches of the government. Quo warranto, not impeachment, is the constitutional remedy
prescribed to adjudicate and resolve questions relating to qualifications, eligibility and entitlement to
public office.

There is nothing in Our Constitution that says that impeachable officers are immuned, exempted, or
excluded from quo warranto proceedings when the very issue to be determined therein is the status of
an officer as such. No amount of public indignation can rewrite or deface the Constitution.

the Republic charges respondent of unlawfully holding or exercising the position of Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court. The contents of the petition pose an attack to respondent's authority to hold or
exercise the position. Unmoving is the rule that title to a public office may not be contested except
directly, by quo warranto proceedings.

When it is the qualification for the position that is in issue, the proper remedy is quo warranto, but
when it is the act of the appointing power that is placed under scrutiny and not any disqualification on
the part of the appointee, a petition for certiorari challenging the appointment for being
unconstitutional or for having been done in grave abuse of discretion is the apt legal course.

This Court had likewise amply laid down the legal and factual bases for its ruling against the
dismissal of the instant petition on the ground of prescription.

We find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that persons claiming a
right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover
said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having
lost their right thereto by abandonment.
 On another point, the one-year prescriptive period was necessary for the government to be
immediately informed if any person claims title to an office so that the government may not be faced
with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one for the person actually holding it albeit
illegally, and another to the person not rendering service although entitled to do so.

Stated in a different manner, the purpose of the instant petition is not to inform the government that it
is facing a predicament of having to pay two salaries; rather, the government, having learned of the
predicament that it might be paying an unqualified person, is acting upon it head-on.

n fine, Our pronouncement in the assailed Decision as to this matter explained that certain
circumstances preclude the absolute and strict application of the prescriptive period provided under
the rules in filing a petition for quo warranto.
Thus, this Court finds no reason to reverse its ruling that an action for quo warranto is imprescriptible
if brought by the State at its own instance, as in the instant case.

the peculiarities of the instant case preclude strict application of the one-year prescriptive period
against the State.

Respondent's actions prevented the State from discovering her disqualification within the prescriptive
period. Most certainly, thus the instant case is one of those proper cases where the one-year
prescriptive period set under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court should not apply.

respondent's SALNs for 1986, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 are
not in its possession and from the Ombudsman that based on its records, there is no SALN filed by
respondent except that for 1998

offenses against the SALN laws are not ordinary offenses but violations of a duty which every public
officer and employee owes to the State and the Constitution.

Integrity contemplates both adherence to the highest moral standards and obedience to laws and
legislations. Integrity, at its minimum, entails compliance with the law.

respondent failed to file the required SALN upon her assumption of office, which is a clear violation
of Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution.

In light of her previous failure to file her SALNs for several years while she was a UP College of Law
Professor, her failure to file her SALN upon assuming office in 2010 as Associate Justice of this
Court constitutes culpable violation of the Constitution, a violation committed while she was already
serving as an impeachable office.

FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR., PROTESTANT, VS. MARIA LEONOR

"LENI DAANG MATUWID" G. ROBREDO, PROTESTEE.

On November 9, 2020, protestant filed a "Strong Manifestation with Extremely Urgent Omnibus
Motion for the:
I. Inhibition of Associate Justice Mario Victor F. Leonen;
 II. II. Re-raffle of this Election Protest;
III. III. Resolution of all the Pending Incidents in the Above Entitled Case.

" He alleges that since October 2019, the protest has "remained in limbo."
He further alleges that the pronouncements of Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice
Leonen) "in a number of landmark cases, his previous employment history as well as the manner in
which he has handled the election protest. . . will prove that he will not be a fair and impartial
ponente."

the Solicitor General moves for Justice Leonen's inhibition for the best interest of the State and
the People. He avers that the expeditious resolution of the protest will finally reveal the real
winner in the vice-presidential elections.

The Solicitor General asserts that Justice Leonen showed his "loathsome attitude"22 towards the
entire Marcos family in his dissenting opinion in the Marcos burial case when he accused the whole
Marcos family as beneficiaries of ill-gotten wealth despite their age, status, and lack of participation.
The Solicitor General continues that Justice Leonen's obvious disdain over President Rodrigo
Duterte's order to allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) in the
Libingan ng mga Bayani as a symbol of closure, healing, and reconciliation, shows his deeply-rooted,
personal hatred of the whole Marcos family.

It is all too clear that Justice Leonen's scornful remarks in his dissent, comprising 94 pages and
containing a litany of expressions beyond the legal issues presented in the Marcos burial cases,
established his hatred towards the Marcos family, to which protestant belongs.24

the Solicitor General emphasizes that undue delay characterized the proceedings under the previous
and current members in charge: "The inaction of the current Member-in-Charge, the Honorable
Justice Leonen, for the past 11 months, coupled with his expressed disdain to the members of the
Marcos family, duly recorded in his opinions as Associate Justice, compel us, with due respect, to
move for his inhibition.

Issue:
whether or not Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen should inhibit from this
election protest.

Ruling:
None of protestant and the Solicitor General's arguments cited a clear ground to warrant
Justice Leonen's inhibition under the Rules. There were no prior proceedings where he may have
participated. He had no professional engagement with, pecuniary interest relative to, or relation within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to any of the parties or their counsels.

Protestant urges Justice Leonen to voluntarily inhibit. However, a movant seeking the inhibition of a
magistrate is duty-bound to present clear and convincing evidence of bias to justify such request.

Protestant failed to do so.

Republic Act No. 1793 was passed in 1957, "[t]o fill in the void in the 1935 Constitution[.]"51 At that
time, there was no institution tasked to resolve election contests for the positions of President and
Vice-President.
Under the 1973 Constitution, Republic Act No. 1793 was impliedly repealed since the President will
not be directly voted by the citizens anymore but will come from the members of National Assembly.
Further, "the position of Vice-President was constitutionally non-existent."52
When the direct election of the President and the Vice-President were restored, the National Assembly
passed Batas Pambansa Blg. 884, otherwise known as "An Act Constituting an Independent
Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear, and Decide Election Contests in the Office of the
President and Vice-President of the Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes.

There is no rule requiring that an election protest should be decided within twenty (20) months55 or
twelve (12) months.56 The allegation of undue delay is severely unfounded.
In this Tribunal's October 15, 2019 Resolution,57 the parties were informed of the results of the
revision and appreciation of ballots in the 5,415 clustered precincts in the pilot provinces. In the
interest of due process, the parties were directed to submit a Memorandum containing their comments
and positions on specifically delineated issues within 20 working days.

Protestant and the Solicitor General misconstrue what bias and impartiality mean. Bias means a
preconceived notion, which may be favorable or unfavorable to a party. Bias does not pertain to an
instance when this Tribunal does not rule however you wish it to.
In the same manner, protestant and the Solicitor General mistakenly equate impartiality with "tabula
rasa" or the theory that people are born as blank slates, with our knowledge only formed along the
way through our experiences and perceptions. Impartiality does not entail tabula rasa.
The absence of relationships or lack of opinion on any subject is not what makes a person impartial.
Rather, it is the acknowledgment of initial or existing impressions, and the ability to be humble and
open enough to rule in favor of where evidence may lie.

Protestant and the Solicitor General's ground to inhibit Justice Leonen for dissenting in Ocampo v.
Enriquez69 fails to persuade.
First, protestant is not President Marcos. They are two different people. All the quoted portions of
Justice Leonen's opinion which are allegedly biased against President Marcos are irrelevant here.

Second, when Justice Leonen analyzed the arguments, weighed the evidence, and arrived at a
conclusion in that case, he was not exhibiting bias. Rather, he was exercising his judicial function. To
put in elementary terms, he was simply doing his job.

In the same manner, when the other Justices voted for the majority, they were not exhibiting bias but
merely exercising their judicial functions.

Justice Leonen's description of President Marcos' regime and its effect on the nation was based
on law, history, and jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly described the Marcos regime
as authoritarian, referred to "the Marcoses and their cronies"; acknowledged the illegal wealth the
Marcoses stashed away which the government has been attempting to recover; and noted the suffering
the Marcos regime had wrought on the Filipino people.
Like the cases before that have referred generally to the Marcoses and their cronies, and the need to
recover their illegally gotten wealth, Republic Act No. 10368 itself expressly mentions President
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, and their immediate relatives by consanguinity or affinity, as well as their
close relatives. Thus, the conclusion in Justice Leonen's dissenting opinion, that Republic Act No.
10368 implies that Marcos' spouse, relatives, associates, cronies, and subordinates were active
participants is based on the text of Republic Act No. 10368.

Justice Leonen's dissenting opinion did not introduce in this jurisdiction the terminology and concepts
objected to in the Motions for Inhibition.

Each case has its own unique set of facts and circumstances. Some cases may appear to be similar but
have different outcomes. Further, courts need not rule on every conceivable issue, particularly when
the issue does not affect the result.

To move for the inhibition of a justice because of a perceived notion of bias or partiality against a
party based on past decisions would not hold water. Ironically, it was protestant himself who gave
evidence of Justice Leonen's impartiality when he cited a case where Justice Leonen voted for
members of the Marcos family.

People's Tribune has been defined as:

[A]n instance when the Solicitor takes a position adverse and contrary to the Government's because it
is incumbent upon him to present to the Court what he considers would legally uphold government's
best interest, although the position may run counter to a client's position.99

The Office of the Solicitor General is the law office of the government. Its default client is the
Republic of the Philippines, but ultimately, "the distinguished client of the Office of the Solicitor
General is the people themselves."100 Its status as People's Tribune is properly invoked only if the
Republic of the Philippines is a party litigant to the case.

Here, the Republic of the Philippines is not a party litigant. Protests ac filed this election protest in his
bid to oust the elected Vice President. Simply, this involves private individuals only. Yet the Solicitor
General comes to this Tribunal without, at the very least, asking for leave of court as courtesy to this
Tribunal.

The resolution of the electoral protest is of utmost importance. Thus, the member-in-charge urged the
Tribunal to focus on the merits of the case and suggested that matters not directly related to the issues
in the electoral protest, such as the Office of the Solicitor General's statement that it is acting as the
People's Tribune and its breach of confidentiality, may be addressed separately at a much later time.

For now, the Tribunal recognizes that forgiveness and toleration may be the most decent response to
misguided acts done due to counsel's and the Solicitor General's misunderstandings. The parties, their
counsels, and all others acting for and on their behalf are all put on notice to be more circumspect in
their pleadings and in their public pronouncements. All counsels including the Solicitor General are
reminded to attend to their cases with the objectivity and dignity demanded by our profession and
keep their passions and excitement in check.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Tribunal resolves to DENY protestant's Strong Manifestation
with Extremely Urgent Omnibus Motion for the: I. Inhibition of Associate Justice Mario Victor F.
Leonen; II. Re-raffle of this Election Protest; III. Resolution of all the Pending Incidents in the Above
Entitled Case dated November 9, 2020.

People v. Sapla

Facts:

In an Information dated 14 January 2014, the appellant was charged with violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The accusatory portion of the said Information reads:

"That at around 1:20 in the afternoon of January 10, 2014 at Talaca, Agbannawag, Tabuk City,
Kalinga and within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the said accused, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession, control and custody four (4) bricks of
marijuana leaves, a dangerous [drug], with a total net weight of 3,9563.11[1] grams and transport
in transit through a passenger [jeepney] with Plate No. AYA 270 the said marijuana without
license, permit or authority from any appropriate government entity or agency.

The next day, or on 15 January 2014, [accused-appellant Sapla] was committed to the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology (BJMP) at Tabuk City, Kalinga.

Upon his arraignment on 29 January 2014, [accused-appellant Sapla] pleaded "not guilty" to the crime
charged against him. In the court a quo's Pre-Trial Order dated 11 March 2014, the Prosecution and
the Defense stipulated their respective legal issues to be resolved by the court a quo. Also, the
Prosecution identified and marked its pieces of evidence, while the Defense made no proposals nor
pre-mark[ed] any exhibits.

on 10 January 2014, at around 11:30 in the morning, an officer on duty at the RPSB office received
a phone call from a concerned citizen, who informed the said office that a certain male individual
[would] be transpiring marijuana from Kalinga and into the Province of Isabela. PO2 Mabiasan then
relayed the information to their deputy commander, PSI Ngoslab, who subsequently called KPPO-
PAIDSOTG for a possible joint operation. Thereafter, as a standard operating procedure in drug
operations, PO3 Labbutan, an operative of KPPO-PAIDSOTG, coordinated with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

At around 1:00 in the afternoon, the RPSB hotline received a text message which stated that the
subject male person who [would] transport marijuana [was] wearing a collared white shirt with green
stripes, red ball cap, and [was] carrying a blue sack on board a passenger jeepney, with plate number
AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela.

The passenger jeepney then arrived at around 1:20 in the afternoon, wherein the police officers at the
Talaca checkpoint flagged down the said vehicle and told its driver to park on the side of the road.
The said officers then requested [accused-appellant Sapla] to open the blue sack. After [accused-
 appellant Sapla] opened the sack, officers Labbutan and Mabiasan saw four (4) bricks of suspected
dried marijuana leaves, wrapped in newspaper and an old calendar.
Thereafter, PO2 Mabiasan seized the four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves and brought
[them] to their office at the Talaca detachment for proper markings.

The Ruling of the RTC

On January 9, 2017, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting accused-appellant Sapla for violating
Section 5 of R.A. 9165. The RTC found that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the
corpus delicti of the crime.

The Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, the CA denied accused-appellant Sapla's appeal and affirmed the RTC 's
Decision with modifications.

Issue: whether there was a valid search and seizure conducted by the police officers.

Ruling:

The Constitutional Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

the Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their
rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This
explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position
of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power." 11

And in the Bill of Rights, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is "at the top of
the hierarchy of rights, next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and
property, x x x for the right to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the
foundation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure."

Hence, as a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the authorities is reasonable only
when a court issues a search warrant after it has determined the existence of probable cause
through the personal examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses presented before the court, with the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized particularly described.

Valid Warrantless Searches and Seizures

1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(2) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(3) search of a moving vehicle;
(4) consented warrantless search;
(5) customs search;
(6) stop and frisk; and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances

Search of a Moving Vehicle and its Non-Applicability in the Instant Case

 In order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable searches, the search must be limited to the following:
(a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fair grounds;
(b) where the officer simply looks into a vehicle;
(c) where the officer flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors;
(d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
(e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and
(f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable
cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.

The Line of Philippine Jurisprudence on the Inability of a Solitary Tip to Engender Probable Cause
law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay
no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any
other circumstance that will arouse suspicion."

[e]xclusive reliance on information tipped by informants goes against the very nature of probable
cause. A single hint hardly amounts to "the existence of such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched."

Neither should the officers rely on the still-unverified tip from the unidentified informant,
without more, as basis to initiate the search of the personal effects. The officers were themselves
well aware that the tip, being actually double hearsay as to them, called for independent
verification as its substance and reliability, and removed the foundation for them to rely on it
even under the circumstances then obtaining. In short, the tip, in the absence of other
circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming to the knowledge of the searching or
arresting officer, was not yet actionable for purposes of effecting an arrest or conducting a
search.

the search undertaken on accused-appellant Sapla was extensive, reaching inside the contents of the
blue sack that he allegedly possessed. Second, the search was directed exclusively towards accused
appellant Sapla; it was discriminatory. Third, there is no allegation that the search was conducted with
the intent of ensuring public safety. At the most, the search was conducted to apprehend a person
who, as relayed by an anonymous informant, was transporting illegal drugs. Lastly, the Court is not
convinced that sufficient precautionary measures were undertaken by the police to ensure that no
evidence was planted against accused-appellant Sapla, considering that the inventory, photographing,
and marking of the evidence were not immediately conducted after the apprehension of accused-
appellant Sapla at the scene of the incident.

The Absence of Probable Cause in the Instant Case

The tip was relayed merely through a text message from a completely anonymous person.

The police did not even endeavor to inquire how this stranger gathered the information. The
authorities did not even ascertain in any manner whether the information coming from the complete
stranger was credible. After receiving this anonymous text message, without giving any second
thought, the police accepted the unverified information as gospel truth and immediately proceeded in
establishing the checkpoint. To be sure, information coming from a complete and anonymous
stranger, without the police officers undertaking even a semblance of verification, on their own,
cannot reasonably produce probable cause that warrants the conduct of an intrusive search.

Invalid Consented Warrantless Search

the Court held that there can only be an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures if the following requisites are present:

1. It must appear that the rights exist

2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 112

The fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto."

The Exclusionary Rule or Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine

Known as the exclusionary rule, "evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures [is] deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.

In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."

The prosecution is left with no evidence left to support the conviction of accused-appellant Sapla.
Consequently, accused-appellant Sapla is acquitted of the crime charged.

*** By disregarding basic constitutional rights as a means to curtail the proliferation of illegal drugs,
instead of protecting the general welfare, oppositely, the general welfare is viciously assaulted.

Luz v. People

Facts:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station
as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the
morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to
Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag
down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear
helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-
station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station;
that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal
ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that
he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the
latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in
size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing
the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he
 noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled
out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two
(2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.

The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Upon review, the CA
affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

Issue: Whether or not there was a lawful search and seizure

Ruling:

First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a
traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for
dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the
driver’s license of the latter.

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said
to have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive
him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which
petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by
the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-station
was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of that place. Hence, it was only for the
sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into
custody.

Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be induced
"to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely:

1. detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. A

motorist’s expectations, when he sees a policeman’s light flashing behind him, are that he will
be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer
checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he
most likely will be allowed to continue on his way.
2. the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the
officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some
pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation
substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at
least to some degree.

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the
failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules
 of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense
penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made
for such an offense.

The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed:

(i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
(ii) search of evidence in "plain view;"
(iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search;
(v) customs search;
(vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and
(vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.

None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable
to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was
not in "plain view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket.
Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.

Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.17 It must be voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.

Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given:
(1) the age of the defendant;
(2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location;
(3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on;
(4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found;
(7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.25 The drugs are the very
corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility
precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

Mallillin v. People

Facts:

On the strength of a warrant6 of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, a
team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City
on 4 February 2003. The search—conducted in the presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup
 as well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma—allegedly yielded two (2)
plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said
substance.

the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged.
the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the judgment of the trial court but
modifying the prison sentence to an indeterminate term of twelve (12) years as minimum to seventeen
(17) years as maximum.

Issue: Whether or not there was a lawful search and seizure.

Ruling:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be.36 It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from
the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the
item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

The Court takes note of the unrebutted testimony of petitioner, corroborated by that of his wife,
that prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets petitioner was sent out of his house to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store. Equally telling is the testimony of Bolanos that he posted some of the
members of the raiding team at the door of petitioner's house in order to forestall the likelihood of
petitioner fleeing the scene. By no stretch of logic can it be conclusively explained why petitioner was
sent out of his house on an errand when in the first place the police officers were in fact apprehensive
that he would flee to evade arrest. his fact assumes prime importance because the two filled sachets
were allegedly discovered by Esternon immediately after petitioner returned to his house from the
errand, such that he was not able to witness the conduct of the search during the brief but
crucial interlude that he was away.

It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was petitioner himself who handed to him the items
to be searched including the pillow from which the two filled sachets allegedly fell. Indeed, it is
contrary to ordinary human behavior that petitioner would hand over the said pillow to Esternon
knowing fully well that illegal drugs are concealed therein. In the same breath, the manner by which
the search of Sheila's body was brought up by a member of the raiding team also raises serious doubts
as to the necessity thereof. The declaration of one of the police officers that he saw Sheila tuck
something in her underwear certainly diverted the attention of the members of petitioner's household
away from the search being conducted by Esternon prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets.
Lest it be omitted, the Court likewise takes note of Esternon's suspicious presence in the bedroom
while Sheila was being searched by a lady officer. The confluence of these circumstances by any
objective standard of behavior contradicts the prosecution's claim of regularity in the exercise of duty.
 Esternon's failure to deliver the seized items to the court demonstrates a departure from the
directive in the search warrant that the items seized be immediately delivered to the trial court
with a true and verified inventory of the same.

In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving the
guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not
on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused,
for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown. 54 In dubio pro reo. When
moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably
becomes a matter of right.

Petitioner Junie Malillin y Lopez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is accordingly ordered
immediately released from custody unless he is being lawfully held for another offense.

Quinto v. Comelec

Facts:

This controversy actually stems from the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election
system (AES).
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436, entitled "AN ACT
AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION
SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT
NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof reads:
SEC. 11. Official Ballot. - The Commission shall prescribe the size and form of the official ballot
which shall contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to be voted upon in
an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates shall be arranged
alphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the
chairman of the Board of Election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticate the official
ballot shall be provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty
(120) days before the elections: - Provided, That, any elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
president and vice president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of the campaign period
corresponding to the position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period.

Almost a decade thereafter, Congress amended the law on January 23, 2007 by enacting R.A. No.
9369, entitled "AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436, ENTITLED "AN ACT
AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO USE AN AUTOMATED ELECTION
SYSTEM IN THE MAY 11, 1998 NATIONAL OR LOCAL ELECTIONS AND IN SUBSEQUENT
NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTORAL EXERCISES, TO ENCOURAGE TRANSPARENCY,
CREDIBILITY, FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY OF ELECTIONS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE BATAS PAMPANSA BLG. 881, AS AMEMDED, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7166 AND
 OTHER RELATED ELECTION LAWS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES." Section 13 of the amendatory law modified Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, thus:
SEC. 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 15. Official Ballot.- The Commission shall prescribe the format of the electronic display
and/or the size and form of the official ballot, which shall contain the titles of the position to be filled
and/or the propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where practicable,
electronic displays must be constructed to present the names of all candidates for the same position in
the same page or screen, otherwise, the electronic displays must be constructed to present the entire
ballot to the voter, in a series of sequential pages, and to ensure that the voter sees all of the ballot
options on all pages before completing his or her vote and to allow the voter to review and change all
ballot choices prior to completing and casting his or her ballot. Under each position to be filled, the
names of candidates shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly indicated using the
same type size. The maiden or married name shall be listed in the official ballot, as preferred by the
female candidate. Under each proposition to be vote upon, the choices should be uniformly indicated
using the same font and size.
A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election inspectors shall affix his/her signature to
authenticate the official ballot shall be provided.
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his
certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.

Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing in assailing the provision of the said Act
Whether or not the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 violated
petitioners’ right to equal protection
Whether or not the Comelec Resolution No. 8678 and Section 13 of RA No. 9369 violate petitioners’
equal protection rights.

Ruling:
I. The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the
standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A
restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to
choose their public officials. The rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend
themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical,
correlative effect on voters.24 The Court believes that both candidates and voters may challenge,
on grounds of equal protection, the assailed measure because of its impact on voting rights.

II. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. The equal protection of the law clause in the
Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.- If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection
guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.- It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate.-
It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
 enforced.- The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.-
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid
classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The
classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The
measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and
in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.

***The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to
whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the
government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010
elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the
government to wield influence in the political world.

While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office are those who
occupy relatively high positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone, or with
them alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective office is universal, open and unrestrained,
subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the laws. These
qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest participation of the
citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of one's highest aspirations to public office. Such is the
essence of democracy.

Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be
partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level.
Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such
a sweeping scale.36

Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures that unduly restrict
guaranteed freedoms of the citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all
governmental power emanates from them.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third
paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

*** Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for
a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8,
Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are
strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or [taking] part in any election
except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

Dissenting opinion
Puno, J.:

Section 4(a) is consistent with existing laws and jurisprudence on the matter.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a faithful
reflection of the present state of the law and jurisprudence on the matter.

the reputation of impartiality is probably as crucial as the impartiality itself; the knowledge that a
clerk in the assessor's office who is running for the local zoning board has access to confidential files
which could provide ?pressure? points for furthering his campaign is destructive regardless of whether
the clerk actually takes ad-vantage of his opportunities. For all of these reasons we find that the state
indeed has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its public work force.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.103 It does not require the universal application of the
laws on all persons or things without distinction.104 What the clause simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. 105 By classification is meant the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars.

The test for a valid classification is reasonableness, 107 which criterion is complied with upon a
showing of the following:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Preliminarily, the equal protection clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for
the classification.109 The statute is accorded a strong presumption of validity, and the challenger must
 bear the burden of showing that the act creates a classification that is "palpably arbitrary or
capricious;"110 otherwise, the legislative determination as to what is a sufficient distinction to warrant
the classification will not be overthrown.111 The challenger must refute all possible rational bases for
the differing treatment, whether or not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the
enactment.112 The case law is to uphold the statute if we can conceive of any reason to justify the
classification;113 that the constitutionality of the law must be sustained even if the reasonableness of
the classification is "fairly debatable."

There is no constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and every class to which it
might be applied;119 that the Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none. 120
The state is free to regulate one step at a time, recognizing degrees of harm and addressing itself to
phases of a problem which presently seem most acute to the legislative mind. 121 For when the
Legislature creates a statute, it is not required to solve all the evils of a particular wrong in one fell
swoop.

The Legislature can decide that to start somewhere is better than to start nowhere. 125 Therefore, it is
not necessarily fatal that a law is underinclusive by failing to include some who share characteristics
of the included class, so long as there is a rational justification for excluding part of the affected class.

Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may
justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in
utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will of the people. In other words, complete deference
is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term
for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes
of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the
public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it
wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign
will.

Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may
justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in
utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will of the people. Complete deference is accorded to
the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they
were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes
of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the
public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it
wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign
will.

Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code are not overbroad.

the ponencia manifestly fails to take into account a different kind of possible threat to the government
created by the partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse
perpetuated by a "powerful political machine" that has amassed "the scattered powers of government
workers" so as to give itself, and its incumbent workers an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power."

the avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" 137 which could give a political machine
an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power"138 is reason enough to impose a restriction on the
candidacies of all appointive public officials without further distinction as to the type of positions
being held by such employees or the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto.

Adhering to the view that the concerns of a truly partisan office and the temptations it fosters are
sufficiently different from those involved in an office removed from regular party politics [so as] to
warrant distinctive treatment140 in a statute similar to the ones being assailed, the ponencia would have
the challenged restriction on candidacy apply only in situations where the elective office sought is
partisan in character.

in order to have a statute declared as unconstitutional or void on its face for being overly broad,
particularly where, as in this case, "conduct" and not "pure speech" is involved, the overbreadth must
not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.

the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office even as
they actively pursue elective posts far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected
candidacies curtailed because of the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute.
 Consti Law II Cases

Right to Privacy
Case Facts Issue Ruling
Utak vs Comelec W/N the law in
question violates the
right to free speech of
PUV and Transport
Terminal owners.
–
YES.

W/N the law in

question violates the
equal protection clause
–
YES