- For nullification of the Deed, and for payment of damages and attorney's

fees.
Dizon v. Beltran (2017) - For falsification of public document.
- He also caused the annotation of a notice of lis penden upon TCT
FACTS:
Eddie started working as a seafarer in the 1980s. His wife, Verona, was a housewife and her
The first TCT was cancelled
mother, together with his children, Bryan and James, resided in the house erected on a
- in its place, TCT No. T-146-2010002236 was issued in Vida's name
240-square-meter lot (disputed property) in Lanang, Davao City.
- The disputed property was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Eddie belatedly discovered about the foregoing fact sometime in May 2010 after Davao
- The registered owners were "[Verona], married to [Eddie]."
Light and Power Company cut off the electrical connection purportedly upon the advice of
the new owner of the disputed property.
In 2008, Verona filed before the RTC of Davao City a petition for the issuance of Temporary
and Permanent Protection Orders against Eddie and James.
- Spouses Dizon entered into a Compromise Agreement
M. Trial Court
- They contemplated selling the disputed property in the amount of not less
In June of 2010, Vida filed before the MTCC of Davao City an action for unlawful detainer
than ₱4,000,000.00, which price shall be increased by ₱100,000.00 for every
against the petitioners residing in the disputed property
succeeding year until the same is finally sold.
- Vida alleged that she is the registered owner of the disputed property.
- They would thereafter equally divide the proceeds from the sale.
- The Deed evidencing the conveyance in her favor was executed in 2009
- Eddie pre-signed the same on April 9, 2008 before he left to work abroad.
Eddie left the Philippines to work on board a ship. In October 2009, Verona was confined at
- The Spouses Dizon's respective lawyers witnessed the signing
the Adventist Hospital in Bangkal, Davao City, then was transferred to Ricardo Limso Medical
- After Verona's death, Vida tolerated the petitioners' stay in the disputed property.
Center.
On May 18, 2010, Vida sent a formal letter requiring the petitioners to vacate the
- She died in December 2009 due to cardio-respiratory arrest, with "leukonoid reaction
disputed property, but to no avail.
secondary to sepsis or malignancy (occult)" as antecedent cause.

The petitioners sought the dismissal of Vida's complaint arguing that at the time the Deed
Eddie claimed that he was unaware of Verona's hospital confinement.
was executed
- his brother Jun Dizon (Jun), called him through the Telephone and informed him
- Verona was already unconscious.
about Verona's death.
- Eddie could not have signed the Deed as well since he left the Philippines
- Eddie intended to promptly return to the Philippines before Verona's burial. He
- Further, Verona's signature appearing on the Deed was distinctly different from those
advised Jun to ask Verona's relatives to wait for his arrival.
she had affixed in her petition for the issuance of a temporary protection order and
- It took a while before Eddie's employer finally permitted him to go home. Verona was
Compromise Agreement
already buried before Eddie's arrival.
- Besides, the purchase price of ₱l,500,000.00 was not in accord with the Spouses
Dizon's agreement to sell the disputed property for not less than ₱4,000,000.00.
A copy of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed) was shown to Eddie.
- Its subject was the disputed property
The MTCC rendered a Decision directing the petitioners and their co-defendants to turn over
- conveyed to herein respondent, Yolanda Vida P. Beltran (Vida), for ₱1,500,000.00.
to Vida the possession of the disputed property, and pay monthly rent from July 12, 2010 until
the said property is vacated. Vida was, however, ordered to pay therein defendants the
Eddie alleged that the Deed was falsified, and his and Verona's signatures thereat were
remaining balance relative to the sale.
forgeries.
- Eddie filed two complaints against Vida.
RTC
The petitioners filed an appeal before the RTC. During its pendency
- Vida filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
- the RTC reversed the MTCC ruling, dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer
and denied Vida's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
- RTC: that when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the latter shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession
CA
Vida assailed the foregoing via a petition for review, which the CA granted in the herein
assailed decision and resolution.
- [Vida] was able to sufficiently allege and consequently established the requisites of
unlawful detainer.
ISSUE:
The instant petition is anchored on the issues of whether or not:
(1) Vida has a cause of action for unlawful detainer against the petitioners considering
that the Deed she relied upon in filing her complaint was falsified, hence, null; and
(2) the RTC correctly ruled that in an unlawful detainer case, the MTCC can resolve the
issue of ownership.
RULING
Ejectment
Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises? At the outset, we
stress that this is the main issue in ejectment proceedings.
- In the present case, petitioners failed to justify their right to retain possession of the
subject lots, which respondents own.
- Since possession is one of the attributes of ownership, respondents clearly are
entitled to physical or material possession.
Not Merely Tolerated
Possession
Petitioners argued that their occupation was not under the condition of tolerance
- since respondents had invited, offered and persuaded them to use those properties.
This Court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at the latter’s
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them
- are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the
property upon demand.
- A summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy to enforce this implied
obligation.
- The unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted
from the date of the demand to vacate.
Toleration
- the act or practice of permitting or enduring something not wholly approved of.
- those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity
- the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the
property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which one’s
property can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner,
who permits them out of friendship or courtesy.’
- even though this has continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by
prescription."
- There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely
tolerated.
- Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the part of the
possessor can be considered mere tolerance.
- By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization,
permission or license, acts of possession are realized or performed.
- The question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission.
We hold that the facts of the present case rule out the finding of possession by mere
tolerance.
- Petitioners were able to establish that respondents had invited them to occupy
the subject lots
- in order that they could all live near one another and help in resolving family
problems.
- By occupying those lots, petitioners demonstrated their acceptance of the
invitation.
- Hence, there was a meeting of minds, and an agreement
regarding possession of the lots impliedly arose between the parties.
The occupancy of the subject lots by petitioners was not merely "something not wholly
approved of" by respondents. Neither did it arise from what Tolentino refers to as
"neighborliness or familiarity."
In point of fact, their possession was upon the invitation of and with the complete
approval of respondents, who desired that their children would occupy the premises. It arose
from familial love and a desire for family solidarity, which are basic Filipino traits.
Right to Use the Lots Terminated
That Ismael and Teresita had a right to occupy the lots is therefore clear. The issue is the
duration of possession. In the absence of a stipulation on this point, Article 1197 of the
Civil Code allows the courts to fix the duration or the period.
"Article 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances
it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.
Article 1197, however, applies to a situation in which the parties intended a period.
Such qualification cannot be inferred from the facts of the present case.
To repeat, when Vicente and Rosario invited their children to use the lots, they did so out of
parental love and a desire for solidarity expected from Filipino parents. No period was
intended by the parties. Their mere failure to fix the duration of their agreement does not
necessarily justify or authorize the courts to do so.
When persistent conflict and animosity overtook the love and solidarity between the
parents and the children, the purpose of the agreement ceased. Thus, petitioners no longer
had any cause for continued possession of the lots. Their right to use the properties
became untenable. It ceased upon their receipt of the notice to vacate.
- because they refused to heed the demand, ejectment was the proper remedy
against them.
- Their possession, which was originally lawful, became unlawful when the reason
therefor -- love and solidarity -- ceased to exist between them.
No Right to Retain
Possession
Petitioners no adequate reasons to reverse the lower courts’ dismissal
- respectively, were allegedly allotted to them as part of their inheritance and given in
consideration for past debts.
The right of petitioners to inherit from their parents
- merely inchoate
- vested only upon the latters’ demise.
Rights of succession
- transmitted only from the moment of death of the decedent.
Assuming that there was an "allotment" of inheritance
- ownership nonetheless remained with respondents
- Moreover, an intention to confer title to certain persons in the future is not
inconsistent with the owners’ taking back possession in the meantime for any reason
deemed sufficient.
- Other than their self-serving testimonies and their affidavits, petitioners offered no
credible evidence to support their outlandish claim of inheritance "allocation."
Petitioners failed to prove the allegation that, through a dation in payment
- Lot T-78521 had been transferred to the latter as payment for respondents’ debts.52
The evidence presented by petitioners related only to the alleged indebtedness of the
parents arising from the latter’s purported purchases and advances.53 There was no
sufficient proof that respondents had entered into a contract of dation to settle the
alleged debt. Petitioners even stated that there was a disagreement in the accounting
of the purported debt,54 a fact that disproves a meeting of the minds with the
parents.
Petitioners also admitted that a portion of the alleged debt is the subject matter of a collection
case against respondents (Civil Case No. 0594-96).55 Thus, the former’s allegation that the
indebtedness has been paid through a dation cannot be given credence, inconsistent as it is
with their action to recover the same debt.
Despite their protestations, petitioners recognized the right of the parents to recover the
premises when they admitted in their Position Paper filed with the MTCC that respondents
had a title to the lots.
"The [respondents] want to get their property because the title is theirs, the [petitioners] do
not object but what is due the [petitioners] including the reparation for the tarnish of their
dignity and honor must be given the [petitioners] for the benefits of their children before the
premises will be turned over."56
As a rule, the right of ownership carries with it the right of possession.