Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil.
635 (1940) NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD,
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO
TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR
UNION, INC., respondents
Facts:
The Solicitor General in behalf of the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations has
filed a motion for reconsideration wherein
the court has considered the legal
conclusions stated in Spanish language.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc.,
on the other hand, prays for the vacation of
the judgment of the majority of this court
and remanded the case to the Court of
Industrial Relations for new trial averring
among other issues that Toribio Teodoro
claimed that there was shortage of Ang
Tibay leather shoes thus it made him
necessary to lay off the members of the
National Labor Union, Inc.
That the supposed lack of leather materials
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of
his contract with the Philippine Army.
That the employer Toribio Teodoro was
guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor
Union, Inc. and unjustly favoring the
National Workers’ Brotherhood.
Issue:
Whether or not the issues should be
properly directed, resolved or determined by
the Court of Industrial Relation.
Held:
Yes, The CIR is a special court whose
petitioners,
functions are specifically stated in the law of
its creation. It is more an administrative than
part of the integrated judicial system of the
nation. It is not intended to be a more
receptive organ of the Government.
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The CIR or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
The CIR should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from
the authority conferred upon it.
Accordingly, the motion for new trial should
be and the same is hereby granted, and the
entire record of this case shall be remanded
to the CIR with instruction that it reopen the
case, receive all such evidence as may be
relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance w/ the requirements set forth
herein above.
DOCTRINES OF THE CASE:
The Court of Industrial Relations is not
narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103
requires it to act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable
(Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et
al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact, however,
that the Court of Industrial Relations may be
said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justiciable cases coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of
due process in trials and investigations of
an administrative character.
There are cardinal primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of
this character. The first of these rights is the
right to hearing, which includes the right of
the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof. Not only must the party be
given an opportunity to present his case and
to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. While the
duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support
its decision. Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or conclusion,
but the evidence must be substantial. The
decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. The Court of Industrial
Relations or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. The Court of Industrial Relations
should, in all controvercial questions, render
its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for
the decisions rendered. The performance of
this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
FACTS:
Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber
slippers. There was a shortage of leather
soles, and it was necessary to temporarily
lay off members of the National Labor
Union. According to the Union however, this
was merely a scheme to systematically
terminate the employees from work, and
that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It
claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of unjust
labor practice because the owner, Teodoro,
is discriminating against the National Labor
Union, and unjustly favoring the National
Workers Brotherhood, which was allegedly
sympathetic to the employer. The Court of
Industrial Relation decided the case and
elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a
motion for new trial was raised by the NLU.
But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for
opposing the said motion.
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The motion for new trial was raised because
according to NLU, there are documents that
are so inaccessible to them that even with
the exercise of due diligence they could not
be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations. That these documents, which
NLU have now attached as exhibits are of
such far-reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered therein.
ISSUE:
Whether the union was denied due process
by CIR.
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HELD:
To begin with the issue before us is to
realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is
a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation
which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It
is more an administrative board than a part
of the integrated judicial system of the
nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the government.
Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are
presented to it by the parties litigant, the
function of the CIR, as will appear from
perusal of its organic law is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions
in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions
are far more comprehensive and extensive.
It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines,
to consider, investigate, decide, and settle
any question, matter controversy or
disputes arising between, and/ or affecting
employers and employees or laborers, and
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and
regulates the relations between them,
subject to, and in accordance with, the
provisions of CA 103.
SC had the occasion to point out that the
CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms and
shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.
The fact, however, that the CIR may be said
to be free from rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There are cardinal primary rights
which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the
right to present one’s cause and submit
evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence
presented;
Ezoic
(3) The decision must have something to
support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the
evidence presented at the hearing; or at
least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected;
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(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges
must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision
in such manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.
SC said there was a failure to grasp the
fundamental issue involved due to failure to
receive all relevant evidence. Thus, the
motion for a new trial was granted and the
entire record of this case is remanded to the
CIR.
Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations
on November 6, 2010
Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR
TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang
Tibay a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of
leather, Toribio caused the lay off of
members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU
averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is
not within the CBA. That there are two labor
unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National
Worker’s Brotherhood. That NWB is
dominated by Toribio hence he favors it
over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial
as they were able to come up with new
evidence/documents that they were not able
to obtain before as they were inaccessible
and they were not able to present it before
in the CIR. ISSUE: Whether or not there has
been a due process of law. HELD: The SC
ruled that there should be a new trial in
favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all
administrative bodies cannot ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process. They are; (1)
The right to a hearing which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to
present his
own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. (2)
Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented. (3)
While the duty to deliberate does not
impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support
its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, a place
when directly attached. (4)
Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5)
The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties
affected. (6)
The Court of Industrial Relations or any of
its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own
independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision.
(7)
The Court of Industrial Relations should, in
all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the vario issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from
the authority conferred upon it.
ANG TIBAY v. CIR, GR No. 46496, 1940-
02-27
Facts:
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc.,
on the other hand, prays for the vacation of
the judgment rendered by the majority of
this Court and the remanding of the case to
the Court of Industrial Relations for a new
trial, and avers:
"1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on
September 26, 1938, there was shortage of
leather soles in ang tibay making it
necessary for him to temporarily lay off the
members of the National Labor Union Inc.,
is entirely false and unsupported by the
records of the
Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather.
"2. That the supposed lack of leather
materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was
but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharge all the members of the National
Labor Union, Inc., from work.
"3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the
Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938,
(re supposed delay of leather soles from the
States) was but a scheme to systematically
prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite
the breach of his contract with the Philippine
Army.
"4. That the National Workers' Brotherhood
of ang TIBAY is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal.
(281 U. S., 548, petitioner's printed
memorandum, p. 25.)
"5. That in the exercise by the laborers of
their rights to collective bargaining, majority
rule and elective representation are highly
essential and indispensable. (Sections 2
and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
"6. That the century provisions of the Civil
Code which had been (the) principal source
of dissensions and continuous civil war in
Spain cannot and should not be made
applicable in interpreting and applying the
salutary provisions of a modern labor
legislation of American origin... where
industrial peace has always been the rule.
"7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was
guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor
Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the
National Workers' Brotherhood.
"8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even
with the exercise of due diligence they could
not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations.
"9. That the attached documents and
exhibits are of such far-reaching importance
and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered herein."
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an
opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations and to the motion for
new trial of the respondent National Labor
Uuion, Inc.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an
opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations and to the motion for
new trial of the respondent National Labor
Uuion, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and
to be hereinafter stated with reference to the
motion for a new trial of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the
opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon
the motion for reconsideration of the
Solicitor-General. We... shall proceed to
dispose of the motion for new trial of the
respondent labor union. Before doing this,
however, we deem it necessary, in the
interest of orderly procedure in cases of this
nature, to make several observations
regarding the nature of the powers of the
Court of
Industrial Relations and emphasize certain
guiding principles which should be observed
in the trial of cases brought before it. We
have re-examined the entire record of the
proceedings had before the Court of
Industrial Relations in this case, and we
have found no substantial... evidence to
indicate that the exclusion of the 89 laborers
here was due to their union affiliation or
activity. The whole transcript taken contains
what transpired during the hearing and is
more of a record of contradictory and
conflicting statements of opposing counsel,
with... sporadic conclusion drawn to suit
their own views. It is evident that these
statements and expressions of views of
counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special
court whose functions are specifically stated
in the law of its creation (Commonwealth
Act No. 103). It is more an administrative
board than a part of the integrated judicial
system of the nation. It is not intended to be
a mere... receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which
is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only
cases that are presented to it by the parties
litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial
Relations, as will appear... from perusal of
its organic law, is more active, affirmative
and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or
quasi-judicial functions in the determination
of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive.
It has jurisdiction... over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide,
and settle any question, matter controversy
or dispute arising between, and/or affecting,
employers and employees or laborers, and
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and
regulate the relations between them,...
subject to, and in accordance with, the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
(section 1).
It shall take cognizance for purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision and
settlement, of any industrial or agricultural
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout,... arising from differences as
regards wages, shares or compensation,
hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or
employment, between employers and
employees or laborers and between
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
provided that the number of employees,
laborers or tenants or... farm-laborers
involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial
or agricultural dispute is submitted to the
Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or
both of the parties to the controversy and
certified by the Secretary of Labor as
existing and proper to be dealth with by the
Court for the sake of public interest.
In the light of the foregoing fundamental
principles, it is sufficient to observe here
that, except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National
Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the
record is barren and does not satisfy the
thirst for a factual basis upon... which to
predicate, in a rational way, a conclusion of
law.
Issues:
act... according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms and
shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and
equitable." (Section 20,... Commonwealth
Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the
specific relief claimed or demands made by
the parties to the industrial or agricultural
dispute, but may include in the award, order
or decision any matter or determination
which may be deemed necessary or
expedient... for the purpose of settling the
dispute or of preventing further industrial or
agricultural disputes.
Ruling:
This result, however, does not now preclude
the concession of a new trial prayed for by
the respondent National Labor Union, Inc. In
the portion of the petition hereinabove
quoted of the National Labor Union, Inc., it
is alleged that "the supposed lack of leather
material... claimed by Toribio Teodoro was
but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharge all the members of the National
Labor Union, Inc., from work" and this
averment is desired to be proved by the
petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of...
native dealers in leather"; that "the National
Workers' Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is
a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, the existence and
functions of which are illegal." Petitioner
further alleges under oath that the exhibits
attached to the petition... to prove his
substantial averments "are so inaccessible
to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered
as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations", and that the documents attached
to the petition
"are of such far reaching importance and
effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered therein." We have
considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its
arguments against the petition. By and
large, after considerable... discussion, we
have come to the conclusion that the
interest of justice would be better served if
the movant is given opportunity to present
at the hearing the documents referred to in
his motion and such other evidence as may
be relevant to the main issue involved.
The... legislation which created the Court of
Industrial Relations and under which it acts
is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental
issue involved is not entirely attributable to
the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial
should be, and... the same is hereby
granted, and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the
case, receive all such evidence as may be
relevant, and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set
forth... hereinabove. So ordered.
Motion for new trial granted and cause
remanded with instructions.
Principles:
• David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171390, May 3,
2006
DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485,
171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424 May 3,
2006
TOPICS: Constitutional Law, PP 1017, Sec.
17, Article XII
FACTS:
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency and call upon AFP and
the to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the
country. Permits to hold rallies issued earlier
by the local governments were revoked.
Rallyists were dispersed. The police
arrested petitioner David and Llamas
without a warrant.
President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring
that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist. Petitioners filed petitions
with the SC, impleading Arroyo, questioning
the legality of the proclamation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation
No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
RULING:
No. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it
constitutes a call by the President for the
AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence whenever becomes necessary as
prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. However, the SC ruled that
under Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution, the President, in the absence
of legislative legislation, cannot take over
privately-owned public utility and private
business affected with public interest.
Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly
unconstitutional.
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID v. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GR NO. 171396,
2006-05-03
Facts:
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for
certiorari and prohibition allege that in
issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017
(PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O.
No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
committed grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners contend... that respondent
officials of the Government, in their
professed efforts to defend and preserve
democratic institutions, are actually
trampling upon the very freedom
guaranteed and protected by the
Constitution. Hence, such issuances are
void for being unconstitutional.
On February 24, 2006, as the nation
celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP
1017 declaring a state of national
emergency
On February 24, 2006, as the nation
celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP
1017 declaring a state of national
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested upon me by Section 18,
Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which... states that: "The President. . .
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may
call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and... order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion
and to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and as... provided in Section 17,
Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
She cited the following facts as bases
She cited the following facts as bases:
WHEREAS, over these past months,
elements in the political opposition have
conspired with authoritarians of the extreme
Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and
the extreme Right, represented by military
adventurists - the historical enemies of the...
democratic Philippine State - who are now
in a tactical alliance and engaged in a
concerted and systematic conspiracy, over
a broad front, to bring down the duly
constituted Government elected in May
2004... over these past months, elements in
the political opposition have conspired with
authoritarians of the extreme Left
represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the
extreme Right, represented by military
adventurists - the historical enemies of the...
democratic Philippine State - who are now
in a tactical alliance and engaged in a
concerted and systematic conspiracy, over
a broad front, to bring down the duly
constituted Government elected in May
2004
On the same day, the President issued G.
O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017
On the same day, the President issued G.
O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus
WHEREAS, over these past months,
elements in the political opposition have
conspired with authoritarians of the extreme
Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and
the extreme Right, represented by military
adventurists - the historical enemies of the...
democratic Philippine State - and who are
now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a
concerted and systematic conspiracy, over
a broad front, to bring down the duly-
constituted Government elected in May
2004
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the
powers vested in me under the Constitution
as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the
Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1017 dated February
24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent
and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless
violence in the country;
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after
the declaration of a state of national
emergency and after all these petitions had
been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She
issued Proclamation No. 1021
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after
the declaration of a state of national
emergency and after all these petitions had
been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She
issued Proclamation No. 1021 which reads:
WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have
effectively prevented, suppressed and
quelled the acts lawless violence and
rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, hereby declare
that the state of national emergency has
ceased to... exist.
In their presentation of the factual bases of
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents
stated that the proximate cause behind the
executive issuances was the conspiracy
among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New People's Army (NPA),
and some members of the political...
opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate
President Arroyo.[4] They considered the
aim to oust or assassinate the President
and take-over the reigns of government as a
clear and present danger.
Solicitor General argued that the intent of
the Constitution is to give full discretionary
powers to the President in determining the
necessity of calling out the armed forces.
He emphasized that none of the petitioners
has shown that PP 1017 was without
factual... bases. While he explained that it is
not respondents' task to state the facts
behind the questioned Proclamation,
however, they are presenting the same,
narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of
the issues.
For their part, petitioners cited the events
that followed after the issuance of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5.
Respondents further claimed that the
bombing of telecommunication towers and
cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also
considered as additional factual basis for
the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So
is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet
resulting in the death of three
(3) soldiers. And also the directive of the
Communist Party of the Philippines ordering
its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro
Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the
provinces in mass protests.
By midnight of February 23, 2006, the
President convened her security advisers
and several cabinet members to assess the
gravity of the fermenting peace and order
situation. She directed both the AFP and the
PNP to account for all their men and ensure
that the chain of command... remains solid
and undivided.
Immediately, the Office of the President
announced the cancellation of all programs
and activities related to the 20th anniversary
celebration of Edsa People Power I; and
revoked the permits to hold rallies issued
earlier by the local governments. Justice
Secretary
Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies,
which to the President's mind were
organized for purposes of destabilization,
are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff
Michael Defensor announced that
"warrantless arrests and take-over of
facilities, including media, can... already be
implemented."
Undeterred by the announcements that
rallies and public assemblies would not be
allowed, groups of protesters (members of
Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National
Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo
Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various
parts of Metro
Manila with the intention of converging at
the EDSA shrine. Those who were already
near the EDSA site were violently dispersed
by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-
trained policemen used truncheons, big
fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear
gas to stop and break... up the marching
groups, and scatter the massed
participants. The same police action was
used against the protesters marching
forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the
corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That
same evening, hundreds of riot policemen
broke up an EDSA celebration... rally held
along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas
Street in Makati City.
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno,
the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for
the dispersal of their assemblies.
police arrested (without warrant) petitioner
Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper
columnist. Also arrested was his
companion, Ronald Llamas, president of
party-list
Akbayan.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of
February 25, 2006, operatives of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune
offices in Manila.
Also, on February 25, 2006, the police
arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran,
representing the Anakpawis Party and
Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU),
while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan.
When members of petitioner KMU went to
Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told
they could not be admitted because of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were
arrested and detained, while the rest were
dispersed by the police.
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued
PP 1021 declaring that the state of national
emergency has ceased to exist.
In the interim, these seven (7) petitions
challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this Court
against the above-named respondents.
Three (3) of these petitions impleaded
President Arroyo as respondent
Issues:
Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders
the petitions moot and academic.
Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional.
a. Facial Challenge... b. Constitutional
Basis... c. As Applied Challenge
Ruling:
I- Moot and Academic Principle
The Court holds that President Arroyo's
issuance of PP 1021 did not render the
present petitions moot and academic.
During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was
operative, the police officers, according to
petitioners, committed illegal acts in
implementing it. Are PP 1017... and G.O.
No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify
these alleged illegal acts? These are the
vital issues that must be resolved in the
present petitions. It must be stressed that
"an unconstitutional act is not a law, it
confers no rights, it imposes no duties,... it
affords no protection; it is in legal
contemplation, inoperative."
The "moot and academic" principle is not a
magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case.
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot
and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution;[31]... second,
the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is
involved;[32] third, when constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the... public;[33] and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.

All the foregoing exceptions are present
here and justify this Court's assumption of
jurisdiction over the instant petitions.
I. Review of Factual Bases
Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no
factual basis. Hence, it was not "necessary"
for President Arroyo to issue such
Proclamation.
Petitioners failed to show that President
Arroyo's exercise of the calling-out power,
by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of
factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor
General's Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of
the events leading to the issuance... of PP
1017, with supporting reports forming part of
the records. Mentioned are the escape of
the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat
of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the
military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from
the... communist leaders. There was also
the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and
Security Group of the Philippine Army
showing the growing alliance between the
NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent
any contrary allegations, the Court... is
convinced that the President was justified in
issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, President Arroyo was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do
nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such
power or duty must not stifle... liberty.
II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5 "on their faces" statutes in free speech
In the final analysis, the various approaches
to emergency of the above political theorists
- from Lock's "theory of prerogative," to
Watkins' doctrine of "constitutional
dictatorship" and, eventually, to McIlwain's
"principle of constitutionalism" --- ultimately
aim to solve... one real problem in
emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting
increasing areas of discretionary power to
the Chief Executive, while insuring that such
powers will be exercised with a sense of
political responsibility and under effective
limitations and... checks.
Fresh from the fetters of a repressive
regime, the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, in drafting the 1987
Constitution, endeavored to create a
government in the concept of Justice
Jackson's "balanced power structure."[102]
Executive, legislative, and judicial powers
are dispersed to the President, the
Congress, and the Supreme Court,
respectively. Each is supreme within its own
sphere. But none has the monopoly of
power in times of emergency. Each branch
is given a role to... serve as limitation or
check upon the other. This system does not
weaken the President, it just limits his
power, using the language of McIlwain. In
other words, in times of emergency, our
Constitution reasonably demands that we
repose a certain... amount of faith in the
basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief
Executive but, at the same time, it obliges
him to operate within carefully prescribed
procedural limitations.
a. "Facial Challenge"
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on
its face because of its "overbreadth." They
claim that its enforcement encroached on
both unprotected and protected rights under
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and
sent a "chilling effect" to the citizens.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine
is an analytical tool developed for testing
cases, also known under the American Law
as First Amendment cases.
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is
not primarily directed to speech or even
speech-related conduct. It is actually a call
upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence. In United States
v. Salerno,[104]... the US Supreme Court
held that "we have not recognized an
"overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment" (freedom of
speech).
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not
intended for testing the validity of a law that
"reflects legitimate state interest in
maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are... considered
"harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected
conduct."
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are
entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
"spoken words" and again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against...
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct."
Second, facial invalidation of laws is
considered as "manifestly strong medicine,"
to be used "sparingly and only as a last
resort," and is "generally disfavored;"
The reason for this is obvious.
Embedded in the traditional rules governing
constitutional adjudication is the principle
that a person to whom a law may be applied
will not be heard to challenge a law on the
ground that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other
situations... not before the Court.
In other words, a facial challenge using the
overbreadth doctrine will require the Court
to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws
and defects, not on the basis of its actual
operation to petitioners, but on the
assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause... others not before
the Court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground
of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge
to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that there can be no instance
when the assailed law may be valid. Here,
petitioners did not even... attempt to show
whether this situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of
PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This,
too, is unwarranted.
First Provision: Calling-out Power
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the
"void for vagueness doctrine" which holds
that "a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.
For one, it is also an analytical tool for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is
said that a litigant may challenge a statute
on its face only if it is vague in... all its
possible applications. Again, petitioners did
not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is
vague in all its application. They also failed
to establish that men of common
intelligence cannot understand the meaning
and application of PP 1017.
b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be
divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision:
"by virtue of the power vested upon me by
Section 18, Artilce VII ... do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well any act of insurrection or... rebellion"
Second provision:
"and to enforce obedience to all the laws
and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction;"
Third provision:
"as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency."... s stated earlier,
considering the circumstances then
prevailing, President Arroyo found it
necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her
Office's vast... intelligence network, she is in
the best position to determine the actual
condition of the country.
Under the calling-out power, the President
may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion and
rebellion. This involves ordinary police
action. But every act that goes beyond the
President's calling-out power is considered
illegal or... ultra vires. For this reason, a
President must be careful in the exercise of
his powers. He cannot invoke a greater
power when he wishes to act under a lesser
power. There lies the wisdom of our
Constitution, the greater the power, the
greater are the... limitations.
President Arroyo's declaration of a "state of
rebellion" was merely an act declaring a
status or condition of public moment or
interest, a declaration allowed under
Section 4 cited above.
In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a
provision calling on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence,... invasion or
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17,
Article XII, a provision on the State's
extraordinary power to take over privately-
owned public utility and business affected
with public interest.
Some of the petitioners vehemently
maintain that PP 1017 is actually a
declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What
defines the character of PP 1017 are its
wordings. It is plain therein that what the
President invoked was her calling-out
power.
Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017
is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no
more than a call by the President to the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. As such, it cannot be used to
justify acts that only under a valid
declaration of Martial Law can... be done. Its
use for any other purpose is a perversion of
its nature and scope, and any act done
contrary to its command is ultra vires.
Justice Mendoza further stated that
specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without
judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) take-over of news media
and agencies and press censorship; and (d)
issuance of Presidential Decrees, are
powers which can be exercised by the
President as Commander-in-Chief only
where there is a valid declaration of Martial
Law or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Based on the above disquisition, it is clear
that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial
Law. It is merely an exercise of President
Arroyo's calling-out power for the armed
forces to assist her in preventing or
suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: "Take Care" Power
The second provision pertains to the power
of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. This is based on Section
17, Article VII
SEC. 17. The President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
In the exercise of such function, the
President, if... needed, may employ the
powers attached to his office as the
Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces
of the country,[117] including the Philippine
National Police[118] under the Department
of Interior and Local Government.[119]
Petitioners... argue that PP 1017 is
unconstitutional as it arrogated upon
President Arroyo the power to enact laws
and decrees in violation of Section
1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests
the power to enact laws in Congress. They
assail the clause "to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction.
A reading of PP 1017 operative clause
shows that it was lifted[120] from Former
President Marcos' Proclamation No. 1081
The President is granted an Ordinance
Power under Chapter 2, Book III of
Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative
Code of 1987).
President Arroyo's ordinance power is
limited to the foregoing issuances. She
cannot issue decrees similar to those issued
by Former President Marcos under PP
1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which
are of the same category and binding force
as statutes because... they were issued by
the President in the exercise of his
legislative power during the period of Martial
Law under the 1973 Constitution.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017
is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
"decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to
all decrees and laws through the military?
President Arroyo has no authority to enact
decrees. It follows that these decrees are
void and, therefore, cannot be enforced.
With respect to "laws," she cannot call the
military to enforce or implement certain
laws, such as customs laws, laws...
governing family and property relations,
laws on obligations and contracts and the
like. She can only order the military, under
PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its
duty to suppress lawless violence.
Third Provision: Power to Take Over
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:...
x x x and to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders, and
regulations promulgated by me personally
or upon my direction; and as provided in
Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do
hereby declare a state of national...
emergency.
The import of this provision is that President
Arroyo, during the state of national
emergency under PP 1017, can call the
military not only to enforce obedience "to all
the laws and to all decrees x x x" but also to
act pursuant to the provision of Section 17,
Article XII which... reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the
State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately-owned public utility or...
business affected with public interest.
During the existence of the state of national
emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the
President, without any authority or
delegation from Congress, to take over or
direct the operation of any privately-owned
public utility or business affected with
public... interest.
Petitioners, particularly the members of the
House of Representatives, claim that
President Arroyo's inclusion of Section 17,
Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment
on the legislature's emergency powers.
A distinction must be drawn between the
President's authority to declare "a state of
national emergency" and to exercise
emergency powers. To the first, as
elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article
VII grants the President such power, hence,
no... legitimate constitutional objection can
be raised. But to the second, manifold
constitutional issues arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution
reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of
two-thirds of both Houses in joint session
assembled, voting separately, shall have
the sole power to declare the existence of a
state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared
national... policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second
paragraph of the above provision refers not
only to war but also to "other national
emergency." If the intention of the Framers
of our Constitution was to withhold from the
President the authority to declare a "state of
national... emergency" pursuant to Section
18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant
it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the
Framers could have provided so. Clearly,
they did not intend that Congress should
first authorize the President before... he can
declare a "state of national emergency."
The logical conclusion then is that President
Arroyo could validly declare the existence of
a state of national emergency even in the
absence of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers,
such as the taking over of privately owned
public utility or business affected with public
interest, is a different matter. This requires a
delegation from Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood
as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of private business
affected with public interest is just another
facet of the emergency powers generally
reposed upon Congress. Thus, when
Section 17 states that the
"the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest," it
refers to Congress, not the President.
Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends
that the term "emergency" under Section
17, Article XII refers to "tsunami," "typhoon,"
"hurricane" and "similar occurrences."
E... mergency, as a generic term, connotes
the existence of conditions suddenly
intensifying the degree of existing danger to
life or well-being beyond that which is
accepted as normal. Implicit in this
definitions are the elements of intensity,
variety, and perception.[127] Emergencies,
as perceived by legislature or executive in
the United Sates since 1933, have been
occasioned by a wide range of situations,
classifiable under three (3) principal heads:
a) economic,[128] b) natural... disaster,[129]
and c) national security.[130]
Following our interpretation of Section 17,
Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in
issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such
Proclamation does not authorize her during
the emergency to temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or... business affected with
public interest without authority from
Congress.
In short, the President has no absolute
authority to exercise all the powers of the
State under Section 17, Article VII in the
absence of an emergency powers act
passed by Congress.
c. "A... c. "AS APPLIED CHALLEN... c. "AS
APPLIED CHALLENGE"
PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the
President's calling-out... power. Its general
purpose is to command the AFP to
suppress all forms of lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished
the end desired which prompted President
Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is
nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police,
expressly or impliedly,... to conduct illegal
arrest, search or violate the citizens'
constitutional rights.
Now, may this Court adjudge a law or
ordinance unconstitutional on the ground
that its implementor committed illegal acts?
The answer is no. The criterion by which the
validity of the statute or ordinance is to be
measured is the essential basis for the
exercise of power,... and not a mere
incidental result arising from its exertion.
[138] This is logical. Just imagine the
absurdity of situations when laws maybe
declared unconstitutional just because the
officers implementing them have acted
arbitrarily. If this... were so, judging from the
blunders committed by policemen in the
cases passed upon by the Court, majority of
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
would have been declared unconstitutional
a long time ago.
one requirement for these rules to be valid
is that they must be reasonable, not
arbitrary or capricious.
G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP
to immediately carry out the "necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence."
Unlike the term "lawless violence" which is
unarguably extant in our statutes and the
Constitution, and which is invariably
associated with "invasion, insurrection or
rebellion," the phrase "acts of terrorism" is
still an amorphous and vague concept.
Congress has yet to enact a... law defining
and punishing acts of terrorism.
The absence of a law defining "acts of
terrorism" may result in abuse and
oppression on the part of the police or
military.
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5
authorizing the military or police to commit
acts beyond what are necessary and
appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless
violence, the limitation of their authority in
pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts
are... considered illegal.
The ringing truth here is that petitioner
David, et al. were arrested while they were
exercising their right to peaceful assembly.
They were not committing any crime,
neither was there a showing of a clear and
present danger that warranted the limitation
of that... right. As can be gleaned from
circumstances, the charges of inciting to
sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere
afterthought.
On the basis of the above principles, the
Court likewise considers the dispersal and
arrest of the members of KMU et al. (G.R.
No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their
dispersal was done merely on the basis of
Malacañang's directive canceling all
permits... previously issued by local
government units. This is arbitrary. The
wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally
is a blatant disregard of the principle that
"freedom of assembly is not to be limited,
much less denied, except on a showing of a
clear and present... danger of a substantive
evil that the State has a right to prevent."
Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to
regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged
with the local government units. They have
the power to issue permits and to revoke
such permits after due notice and hearing
on the determination of the presence of
clear and present... danger. Here,
petitioners were not even notified and heard
on the revocation of their permits.
The Court has passed upon the
constitutionality of these issuances. Its
ratiocination has been exhaustively
presented. At this point, suffice it to reiterate
that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by
the President of the military to prevent or
suppress lawless violence,... invasion or
rebellion. When in implementing its
provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the
military and the police committed acts which
violate the citizens' rights under the
Constitution, this Court has to declare such
acts unconstitutional and illegal.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly
granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is
CONSTITUTIONAL insofa
r as it constitutes a call by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. However, the
provisions of
PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce
laws not related to lawless violence, as well
as decrees promulgated by the President,
are
DAVID vs. ARROYO G.R. No. 171396 May
3, 2006 Locus Standi
OCTOBER 30, 2017
FACTS:
On February 24,2006, during the
celebration of the 20th anniversary of Edsa
People Power I, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo issued PP 1017
declaring a state of National Emergency
which subject to certain conditions by the
framers of our constitution. The basis of the
declaration is the conspiracy of the
opposition, the extreme left and extreme
right which have repeatedly tried to bring
down the republican government.
Petitioners allege that President Arroyo has
committed a grave abuse of discretion in
declaring a State of National Emergency,
assailing that PP 1017 on the grounds that it
encroaches on the emergency powers of
Congress; it is a subterfuge to avoid the
constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law; and it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press, of speech and of assembly.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioners have legal standing?
RULING:
This Court holds that all the petitioners
herein have locus standi. In view of the
number of petitioners suing in various
personalities, the Court deems it imperative
to have a more than passing discussion on
legal standing or locus standi. The difficulty
of determining locus standi arises in public
suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
“public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative
of the general public. He may be a person
who is affected no differently from any other
person. He could be suing as a “stranger,”
or in the category of a “citizen,” or
‘taxpayer.” In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. In other words, he has to
make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The locus standi of petitioners in particularly
David and Llamas, is beyond doubt.
David vs. Arroyo G.R. No. 171396 (May 3,
2006)
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo
issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out
power] by virtue of the powers vested upon
me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: The
President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed
forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .
and in my capacity as their Commander-in-
Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law
and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and [power
to take over] as provided in Section 17,
Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5
implementing PP1017, directing the
members of the AFP and PNP "to
immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the
grounds that (1) it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a
subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial
law; and (3) it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of
speech and of assembly. They alleged
“direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest”
and “unlawful search” committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General
argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and
GO 5 have factual basis, and contended
that the intent of the Constitution is to give
full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the
armed forces. The petitioners did not
contend the facts stated b the Solicitor
General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be
divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power
vested upon me by Section 18, Article VII …
do hereby command the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17,
Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as
provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the
calling-out power is that “whenever it
becomes necessary,” the President may call
the armed forces “to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.”
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of
rebellion” was merely an act declaring a
status or condition of public moment or
interest. Are these conditions present in the
instant cases? The Court said, considering
the circumstances then prevailing, President
Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP1017.
Owing to her office’s vast intelligent
network, she is in the best position to
determine the actual condition of the
country.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power
of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. This is based on
Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
The President can only issue Executive
Orders, Administrative Orders,
Proclamations, Memorandum Orders,
Memorandum Circulars, General or Special
Orders.
President Arroyo’s ordinance power is
limited to the foregoing issuances. She
cannot issue decrees similar to
those issued by Former President Marcos
under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are
laws which are of the same category and
binding force as statutes because they were
issued by the President in the exercise of
his legislative power during the period of
Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017
is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
“decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that
“[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.” To be sure, neither
Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify President
Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees.
This is an area that needs delineation.
A distinction must be drawn between the
President’s authority to declare "a state of
national emergency" and to exercise
emergency powers. To the first, as
elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article
VII grants the President such power, hence,
no legitimate constitutional objection can be
raised. But to the second, manifold
constitutional issues arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution
reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of
two-thirds of both Houses in joint session
assembled, voting separately, shall have
the sole power to declare the existence of a
state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national
emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second
paragraph of the above provision refers not
only to war but also to "other national
emergency." If the intention of the Framers
of our Constitution was to withhold from the
President the authority to declare a "state of
national emergency" pursuant to Section 18,
Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to
Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the
Framers could have provided so. Clearly,
they did not intend that Congress should
first authorize the President before he can
declare a "state of national emergency."
The logical conclusion then is that President
Arroyo could validly declare the existence of
a state of national emergency even in the
absence of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers,
such as the taking over of privately owned
public utility or business affected with public
interest, is a different matter. This requires a
delegation from Congress.
Generally, Congress is the repository of
emergency powers. This is evident in the
tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing
it to delegate such powers to the President.
Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power
not reposed upon it. However, knowing that
during grave emergencies, it may not be
possible or practicable for Congress to meet
and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow
Congress to grant emergency powers to the
President, subject to certain conditions,
thus:
(1) There must be a war or other
emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited
period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be
exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress
Section 17, Article XII must be understood
as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of private business
affected with public interest is just another
facet of the emergency powers generally
reposed upon Congress. Thus, when
Section 17 states that the "the State may,
during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest," it
refers to Congress, not the President. Now,
whether or not the President may exercise
such power is dependent on whether
Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to
a law prescribing the reasonable terms
thereof.
Let it be emphasized that while the
President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over
privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. Nor can he
determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise,
without legislation, the President has no
power to point out the types of businesses
affected with public interest that should be
taken over. In short, the President has no
absolute authority to exercise all the powers
of the State under Section 17, Article VII in
the absence of an emergency powers act
passed by Congress.
---
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly
granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is
CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes
a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. However, the provisions of PP
1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws
not related to lawless violence, as well as
decrees promulgated by the President, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In
addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring
national emergency under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution is
CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration
does not authorize the President to take
over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest
without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it
provides a standard by which the AFP and
the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e.
whatever is "necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence."
Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not
yet been defined and made punishable by
the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SUBJECT: Constitutional Law TOPIC: Due
Process – Void for Vagueness TITLE:
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO
TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY
L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN,
ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI,
ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES,
CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG,
Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
EDUARDO
ERMITA,
HON.
AVELINO
CRUZ
II,
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF
OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL
ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
CITATION: G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the
Filipino nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017,
implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a
state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested upon me by Section 18,
Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which
states that: “The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the)
armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion
and to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and as provided in Section 17,
Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of
PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents
stated that the proximate cause behind the
executive issuances was the conspiracy
among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New People’s Army, and
some members of the political opposition in
a plot to unseat or assassinate President
Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or
assassinate the President and take-over the
reins of government as a clear and present
danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested
without warrants on February 24, 2006 on
their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices
of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was
perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched
without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on
February 25, 2006. Seized from the
premises – in the absence of any official of
the Daily Tribune except the security guard
of the building – were several materials for
publication. The law enforcers, a composite
team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as
basis of the warrantless arrests and the
warrantless search and seizure was
Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in
the exercise of her constitutional power to
call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the warrantless
arrests of petitioners David, et al., made
pursuant to PP 1017, are valid. 2. Whether
or not PP 11017 is constitutional.
HELD: 1. No, the warrantless arrests of
petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to
PP 1017, were not valid.
Searches, seizures and arrests are normally
unreasonable unless authorized by a validly
issued search warrant or warrant of arrest.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides [for the
following circumstances of valid warrantless
arrests:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
- A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)
When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. (b)
When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and Justice
Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a
declaration of Martial Law. It is no more
than a call by the President to the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. As such, it cannot be used to
justify acts that only under a valid
declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its
use for any other purpose is a perversion of
its nature and scope, and any act done
contrary to its command is ultra vires.
Justice Mendoza further stated that
specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without
judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) take-over of news media
and agencies and press censorship; and (d)
issuance of Presidential Decrees, are
powers which can be exercised by the
President as Commander-in-Chief only
where there is a valid declaration of Martial
Law or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. Based on the above disquisition, it
is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of
Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyos calling-out power for the
armed forces to assist her in preventing or
suppressing lawless violence
2. Partially. The Court rules that PP 1017 is
constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call
by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. However, the provisions of PP
1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws
not related to lawless violence, as well as
decrees promulgated by the President, are
declared unconstitutional. In addition, the
provision in PP 1017 declaring national
emergency under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution is constitutional, but such
declaration does not authorize the President
to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest
without prior legislation.
The Court partially granted the petitions.
• Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986)
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F.
SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity
as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity
as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
ETC., ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915
December 29, 1986
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause the publication of
various Presidential Decrees (PDs),
letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters
of implementation and administrative
orders, in the Official Gazette.
Petitioners invoked that a law, to be valid
and enforceable, must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated. The government
argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was “otherwise provided,” as when the
decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately
upon their approval.
The SC, in its decision in 1985, affirmed
the necessity of the publication of the
presidential issuances which are of
general application. Petitioners then
moved for reconsideration/clarification
asserting that the clause “unless it is
otherwise provided” meant that the
publication required therein was not
always imperative.
ISSUE:
Whether publication is an indispensable
requirement for the effectivity of the
presidential issuances in question.
HELD:
YES. Publication of presidential
issuances at bar is an indispensable
requirement for their effectivity despite
the special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect.
Art. 2 of the Civil Code provides that
“laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such
publication.” The phrase “unless it is
otherwise provided” refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. All statutes, including
those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
In the case at bar, the SC held that all
presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution, shall be
published as a condition for their
effectivity. On the other hand,
interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published.
Therefore, the Court declared that all
laws aforementioned shall be published
in full in the Official Gazette to become
effective in accordance with Article 2 of
the Civil Code.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – The publication
of all presidential issuances of public nature
or general applicability is mandated by law.
Such publication is a requirement of due
process whereby a person may be bound
by law only when he is first officially and
specifically informed of its contents.
CIVIL LAW – Such publication is important
because there shall be no basis for the
application of the Latin maxim, “ignoratia
legis non excusat”, without such notice and
publication, especially when the law-making
process is not made in public.
FACTS
Petitioners Lorenzo Tañada and others files
a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent
Juan Tuvera, et.al. to publish in the Official
Gazette various presidential decrees, letters
of instruction, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation, and administrative orders
issued by the Office of the President. They
invoke the constitutional right of the people
to be informed, as well as the principle that
laws are valid and enforceable after their
publication in the Official Gazette.
The Respondent opposed the petition by
contending that the publication in the Official
Gazette is not a sine qua non requirements
for the effectivity of the laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. The presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the
date they are to take effect considering that
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws
shall take effect as well when otherwise
provided. Thus, the publication in the
Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity.
Advertisements
REPORT THIS AD
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the publication in the
Official Gazette is required in order to for
the presidential issuances to become valid
and effective.
2. Whether or not non-publication shall
render the presidential issuances invalid
and ineffective even though they have been
enforced or implemented prior to their
publication.
RULING
1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the
Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude
the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity. In fact,
Commonwealth Act 638 provides that laws
shall be published in the Official Gazette.
Such publication is important because there
shall be no basis for the application of the
Latin maxim, “ignoratia legis non excusat”,
without such notice and publication,
especially when the law-making process is
not made in public.
Further, the word “shall” in Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 imposes upon the
Respondent an imperative duty to enforce
the right of the people to be informed of the
matters of public concern. The publication of
all presidential issuances of public nature or
general applicability is mandated by law.
Such publication is a requirement of due
process whereby a person may be bound
by law only when he is first officially and
specifically informed of its contents.
2. NO. The Court ruled that the
implementation or enforcement of
presidential decrees prior to the publication
in the Official Gazette is an operative fact
which may have consequences which
cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial
declaration that an all-inclusive statement of
a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
The Court ordered the Respondents to
PUBLISH in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application. Non-publication
shall render such issuances as having no
binding force and effect.
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F.
SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as
Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ,
ETC., ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915
December 29, 1986
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish
and/or cause the publication of various
Presidential Decrees (PDs), letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementation
and administrative orders, in the Official
Gazette.
Petitioners invoked that a law, to be valid
and enforceable, must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it
was not so when it was “otherwise
provided,” as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.
The SC, in its decision in 1985, affirmed the
necessity of the publication of the
presidential issuances which are of general
application. Petitioners then moved for
reconsideration/clarification asserting that
the clause “unless it is otherwise provided”
meant that the publication required therein
was not always imperative.
ISSUE:
Whether publication is an indispensable
requirement for the effectivity of the
presidential issuances in question.
HELD:
YES. Publication of presidential issuances
at bar is an indispensable requirement for
their effectivity despite the special
provisions as to the date they are to take
effect.
Art. 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one
year after such publication.” The phrase
“unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. All statutes, including
those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.
In the case at bar, the SC held that all
presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the
same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred
by the Constitution, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity. On the other
hand, interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public, need not be
published.
Therefore, the Court declared that all laws
aforementioned shall be published in full in
the Official Gazette to become effective in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986),
10/31/2020
0 COMMENTS
Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986),
FACTS:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al.
invoked due process in demanding the
disclosure of a number of Presidential
Decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by Law.
The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was
not so when it was otherwise provided, as
when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately
upon approval.
The Court decided on April 24, 1985 in
affirming the necessity for publication of the
decrees. The court ordered the
respondents to publish in the official gazette
all unpublished Presidential Issuances
which are of general force and effect.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not publication in the official
gazette is indispensable.
RULING:
YES. The very first clause of Section I of
Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall
be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The
word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes
a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or
excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances
"of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. It is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide
for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden on
the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such
as administrative and executive orders need
not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all
concerned.
The objective is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which
are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis
non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
Tanada v. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915
April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F.
SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as
Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President
, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his
capacity as Director, Malacañang Records
Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing,
respondents.
Facts:
The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus
from the Court in order to compel the
respondent public officials to publish in the
Official Gazette various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive
implementations, and administrative orders.
They did so because of the right of the
people to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. In
addition, petitioners stress that Article 2 of
the Civil Code requires the publication of
laws as a requirement for their effectivity.
Issue:
Can laws of general application take effect
even without being published as long as it
provides the date of effectivity?
Ruling:
No. “Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity.” This is because if
laws are allowed to take effect without
publication, the public would not be
informed of the existence of the law that
essentially governs them. Without such
publication, Article 3 of the Civil Code,
which provides that “ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith”
would have no basis. Thus, the Court ruled
that all unpublished laws which are of
general application have no binding force
and effect.
NOTES
Another Issue
• There is another issue in this case, which
is the legal standing of the petitioners. It has
been ruled by the Court that since the
matter involves a public right and therefore
a concern for the public, the petitioners
have the standing in this case.
Legislative Powers of the President
• The Court recognized in this case the
importance of publication of laws since the
president now has the power to make laws.
They point out that while the public can be
aware of the laws made by the legislative
department through the broadcasting of
debates and deliberations in the Batasang
Pambansa, they do not have the same
privilege with legislation made by the
president.
Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986),
10/31/2020
0 COMMENTS
Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986),
FACTS:
Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al.
invoked due process in demanding the
disclosure of a number of Presidential
Decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by Law.
The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was
not so when it was otherwise provided, as
when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately
upon approval.
The Court decided on April 24, 1985 in
affirming the necessity for publication of the
decrees. The court ordered the
respondents to publish in the official gazette
all unpublished Presidential Issuances
which are of general force and effect.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not publication in the official
gazette is indispensable.
RULING:
YES. The very first clause of Section I of
Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall
be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The
word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes
a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or
excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances
"of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. It is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide
for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden on
the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such
as administrative and executive orders need
not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all
concerned.
The objective is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which
are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis
non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
Tanada v. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915
April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F.
SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as
Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President
, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his
capacity as Director, Malacañang Records
Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing,
respondents.
Facts:
The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus
from the Court in order to compel the
respondent public officials to publish in the
Official Gazette various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive
implementations, and administrative orders.
They did so because of the right of the
people to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. In
addition, petitioners stress that Article 2 of
the Civil Code requires the publication of
laws as a requirement for their effectivity.
Issue:
Can laws of general application take effect
even without being published as long as it
provides the date of effectivity?
Ruling:
No. “Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity.” This is because if
laws are allowed to take effect without
publication, the public would not be
informed of the existence of the law that
essentially governs them. Without such
publication, Article 3 of the Civil Code,
which provides that “ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith”
would have no basis. Thus, the Court ruled
that all unpublished laws which are of
general application have no binding force
and effect.
NOTES
Another Issue
• There is another issue in this case, which
is the legal standing of the petitioners. It has
been ruled by the Court that since the
matter involves a public right and therefore
a concern for the public, the petitioners
have the standing in this case.
Legislative Powers of the President
• The Court recognized in this case the
importance of publication of laws since the
president now has the power to make laws.
They point out that while the public can be
aware of the laws made by the legislative
department through the broadcasting of
debates and deliberations in the Batasang
Pambansa, they do not have the same
privilege with legislation made by the
president.
Tanada v. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446 (1986)
G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986
Fact: Due process was invoked by the
petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a
number of presidential decrees which they
claimed had not been published as required
by law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was
not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as
when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately
upon their approval. In the decision of this
case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed
the necessity for the publication of some of
these decrees, orders respondents to
publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force
and effect. The petitioners are now before
us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision.
Specifically, they ask the What is meant by
“law of public nature” or “general
applicability”? Must a distinction be made
between laws of general applicability and
laws which are not? What is meant by
“publication”? Where is the publication to be
made? When is the publication to be made?
the petitioners suggest that there should be
no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that
publication means complete publication;
and that the publication must be made
forthwith in the Official Gazette
Issue: Whether the Publication of Laws and
Decrees in the Official Gazette and
Newspaper of General Circulation is a
mandatory requirement of the Constitution?
Held: Yes, Publication is indispensable in
every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day
period shall be shortened or extended. It is
not correct to say that under the disputed
clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason. is that such
omission would offend due process insofar
as it would deny the public knowledge of the
laws that are supposed to govern the
legislature could validly provide that a law e
effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of, it is not unlikely
that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so
not because of a failure to comply with but
simply because they did not know of its
existence, Significantly, this is not true only
of penal laws as is commonly supposed.
One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which
must also be communicated to the persons
they may affect before they can begin to
operate. The conclusive presumption that
every person knows the law, which of
course presupposes that the law has been
published if the presumption is to have any
legal justification at all. It is no less
important to remember that Section 6 of the
Bill of Rights recognizes “the right of the
people to information on matters of public
concern,” and this certainly applies to,
among others, and indeed especially, the
legislative enactments of the government.
Tañada vs. Tuvera
136 SCRA 27
G.R. No. L-63915
April 24, 1985
Ezoic
Tañada vs. Tuvera
Facts:
The petitioners filed for a writ of mandamus
in order to compel respondents to publish
various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementations,
and administrative orders.
Summary of Arguments
Ezoic
Petitioners
Respondent
Petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not;

that publication means complete
publication; and
that the publication must be made forthwith
in the Official Gazette.
Issuances intended only for the internal
administration of a government agency or of
particular persons did not have to be
published;
that publication, when necessary, must be
in full and in the Official Gazette; and
that, however, the decision under
reconsideration was not binding because it
was not supported by eight members of the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the clause “unless it is
otherwise provided” in Art 2 of the NCC
refers to the effectivity of laws and not to the
requirement of publication?
Ruling:
For the people to have a reasonable
amount of time to learn about certain laws
or decrees being enacted by their
government, sufficient appropriation of time
and publication is necessary. According to
Article 2 of the Civil Code, all laws must be
given 15 days upon its publication in the
Official Gazette for it to be enacted. This is
to give sufficient time for the people to learn
of such laws as well as to respect their right
to be informed. The respondents however
brought up the fact that the Official Gazette
may not be the most effective medium for
the people to be educated of certain new
laws given its erratic publication dates as
well as its limited number of readers, with
lieu of more potent mediums of instructions
such as newspapers of general circulation
because of its wide readership and regular
dates of printing. The court nevertheless
rules that such periodicals are not what is
required by the Civil Code and such
amendments are left to the legislative
branch of the government. Having said this,
the court finds in favor of publishing all laws,
presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, executive orders, and
administrative orders with a 15 day leeway,
or unless stated, for them to take into effect.
Summary of Principles:
1. The clause “unless it is otherwise
provided” in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the
effectivity of laws and not to the requirement
of publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of
the arguments of the parties, both on the
original petition and on the instant motion,
we have come to the conclusion, and so
hold, that the clause “unless it is otherwise
provided” refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date, without
its previous publication.
2. The prior publication of laws before they
become effective cannot be dispensed with.
Ezoic
Ezoic
lt is not correct to say that under the
disputed clause publication may be
dispensed with altogether. The reason is
that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to
govern it. Surely, if the legislature could
validly provide that a law shall become
effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or
after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons
not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
result; and they would be so not because of
a failure to comply with it but simply
because they did not know of its existence.
Significantly, this is not true only of penal
laws as is commonly supposed. One can
think of many non-penal measures, like a
law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.
3. For purposes of the prior publication
requirement for effectivity, the term “laws”
refer not only to those of general
application, but also to laws of local
application, private laws; administrative
rules enforcing a statute; city charters.
Central Bank circulars to “fill-in the details of
the Central Bank Act; but not mere
interpretative rules regulating and providing
guidelines for purposes of internal
operations only.
The term “laws” should refer to all laws and
not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people
in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. An example is a law
granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was
decreed instant naturalization. It surely
cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably
does not apply directly to all the people. The
subject of such law is a matter of public
interest which any member of the body
politic may question in the political forums
or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts
of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing
on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of
the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.
Ezoic
4. All statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential
decrees and executive orders promulgated
by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
Ezoic
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must
be published notwithstanding that it applies
to only a portion of the national territory and
directy affects only the inhabitants of that
place. All presidential decrees must be
published, including even, say, those
naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements. The circulars
issued by the Monetary Board must be
published if they are meant not merely to
interpret but to “fill in the details” of the
Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce.
5. Internal instructions issued by an
administrative agency are not covered by
the rule on prior publication. Also not
covered are municipal ordinances which are
governed by the Local Government Code.
However, no publication is required of the
instructions issued by, say, the Minister of
Social Welfare on the case studies to be
made in petitions for adoption or the rules
laid down by the head of a government
agency on the assignments or workload of
his personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule but
by the Local Government Code.
Ezoic
6. Publication of statutes must be in full or
it is no publication at all.
We agree that the publication must be in full
or it is no publication at all since its purpose
is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the mere mention of the number
of the presidential decree, the title of such
decree, its whereabouts (e.g., “with
Secretary Tuvera”), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the
Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement. This is not even
substantial compliance. This was the
manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a
presidential decree undeniably of general
applicability and interest, was “published” by
the Marcos administration. The evident
purpose was to withhold rather than
disclose information on this vital law.
7. Prior publication of statutes for purposes
of effectivity must be made in full in the
Official Gazette and not elsewhere.
Ezoic
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to
rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal
or modify it if we find it impractical. That is
not our function. That function belongs to
the legislature. Our task is merely to
interpret and apply the law as conceived
and approved by the political departments
of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we
have no choice but to pronounce that under
Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazette,
and not elsewhere, as a requirement for
their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period
provided by the legislature.
8. Laws must be published as soon as
possible.
We also hold that the publication must be
made forthwith, or at least as soon as
possible, to give effect to the law pursuant
to the said Article 2. There is that possibility,
of course, although not suggested by the
parties that a law could be rendered
unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its
publication as required. This is a matter,
however, that we do not need to examine at
this time.
• Ermita – Malate Hotel & Motel Operators
v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL v. CITY MAYOR
OF MANILA, GR No. L-24693, 1967-07-31
Facts:
The petition for prohibition against
Ordinance No. 4760
There was the assertion of its being beyond
the powers of the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila to enact insofar as it would
regulate motels, on the ground that in the...
revised charter of the City of Manila or in
any other law, no reference is made to
motels... impose P6,000.00 fee per
annum... for first class motels and
P4,500.00 for second class motels... require
the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel, motel,
or lodging house to refrain from entertaining
or accepting any guest or... customer or
letting any room or other quarter to any
person or persons without his filling up the
prescribed form in a lobby open to public
view at all times and in his presence,
wherein the surname, given name and
middle name, the date of birth, the address,
the occupation,... the sex, the nationality,
the length of stay and the number of
companions in the room, if any, with the
name, relationship, age and sex would be
specified
The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a
writ of preliminary injunction ordering
respondent Mayor to refrain... from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from
and after July 8, 1963.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a
decision is the absence of any evidence to
offset the presumption of validity that
attaches to a challenged statute or
ordinance
The challenged ordinance then "proposes to
check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients
and guests to fill up a registration form,
prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open
to... public view at all times, and by
introducing several other amendatory
provisions calculated to shatter the privacy
that characterizes the registration of
transients and guests."... exercise of the
police power, which, it cannot be too often
emphasized, is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety and general...
welfare of the people
Issues:
whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of
Manila is violative of the due process
clause.
The... statute here questioned deals with a
subject clearly within the scope of the police
power.
Ruling:
Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of
the enactment of said law, and the state in
order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and... occupations
Persons and property may be subjected to
all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state... the judgment of the
lower court is reversed and the injunction
issued lifted forthwith
Principles:
Licenses for non-useful occupations are
also incidental to the police power and the...
right to exact a fee may be implied from the
power to license and regulate, but in fixing
amount of the license fees the municipal
corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the
former
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society
will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail
over liberty... because then the individual
will fall into slavery.
Ermita Malate v City of Manila
2021-03-07administrator
G.R. No. L-24693
July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU,
petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.

Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law
Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for
intervenor-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association with one of its
members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu,
the president and general manager of the
second petitioner, filed a petition for
prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760
against the respondent Mayor of the City of
Manila who was sued in his capacity as
such charged with the general power and
duty to enforce ordinances of the City of
Manila and to give the necessary orders for
the execution and enforcement of such
ordinances.
It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock
corporation is dedicated to the promotion
and protection of the interest of its eighteen
members operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly
licensed by both national and city authorities
and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged
that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board
of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the
then acting City Mayor, Vice-Mayor
Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged
grievances against the ordinance were set
forth in detail. There was the assertion of its
being beyond the powers of the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar
as it regulate motels, on the ground that in
the revised charter of the City of Manila or in
any other law, no reference is made to
motels. it also being provided that the
premises and facilities of such hotels,
motels and lodging houses would be
open for inspection either by the City Mayor,
or the Chief of Police, or their duly
authorized representatives. The lower court
on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary
injunction ordering respondent Mayor to
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No.
4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
Issue:
Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the
City of Manila is unconstitutional, therefore,
null and void.
Held:
No. A decent regard for constitutional
doctrines of a fundamental character ought
to have admonished the lower court against
such a sweeping condemnation of the
challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot
be allowed to stand, consistently with what
has been the accepted standards of
constitutional adjudication, in both
procedural and substantive aspects.
“The presumption is towards the validity of a
law.” However, the Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when
there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police
regulation.
There is no question but that the challenged
ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals, particularly fornication and
prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the
licensing fees was intended to discourage
“establishments of the kind from operating
for a purpose other than legal” and at the
same time, to increase “the income of the
city government.”
Police power is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety, and general
welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal
protection, and other applicable
constitutional guarantees, however, the
power must not be unreasonable or violative
of due process. There is no controlling and
precise definition of due process. It has a
standard to which the governmental action
should conform in order that deprivation of
life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate
case, be valid. What then is the standard of
due process which must exist both as a
procedural and a substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance from legal
infirmity? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put,
arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
avoided.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if
the liberty involved were freedom of the
mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of
property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of
personal information, the maintenance of
establishments, and the “full rate of
payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal
laws with what they omit but there is no
canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean.”
CASE DIGEST : Ermita-Malate Hotel/Motel
vs. City of Manila
G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967 ERMITA-
MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU,
petitioners-appellees, vs. THE
HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA,
respondent-appellant. VICTOR ALABANZA,
intervenor-appellee.
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal
Board of Manila passed Ordinance No.
4760 with the following provisions
questioned for its violation of due process:
refraining from entertaining or accepting any
guest or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
prohibiting admission o less than 18 years
old;
usurious increase of license fee to P4,500
and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively
(tax issue also);
making unlawful lease or rent more than
twice every 24 hours; and
cancellation of license for subsequent
violation.
The lower court issued preliminary
injunction and petitioners raised the case to
SC on certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the
due process requirement of the
constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power to minimize certain practices hurtful
to public morals. There is no violation o
constitutional due process for being
reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality absent any
irregularity on its face. .As such a limitation
cannot be viewed as a transgression
against the command of due process. It is
neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the
opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate
use to which such premises could be, and,
according to the explanatory note, are being
devoted. Taxation may be made to
implement a police power and the amount,
object, and instance of taxation is
dependent upon the local legislative body.
Judgment of lower court reversed and
injunction lifted.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL
OPERATORS ASSOC., INC VS MAYOR
OF MANILA G.R. No. L-24693 Police Power
– Due Process Clause On 13 June 1963,
the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord
4760 and the same was approved by then
acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to
regulate hotels and motels. It classified
them into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd
class (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled
hotels/motels to get the demographics of
anyone who checks in to their rooms. It
compelled hotels/motels to have wide open
spaces so as not to conceal the identity of
their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the
validity of the law averring that such is
oppressive, arbitrary and against due
process. The lower court as well as the
appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-
Malate. ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is
against the due process clause. HELD: The
SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a
presumption that the laws enacted by
Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid.
W/o a showing or a strong foundation of
invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this
case, there was only a stipulation of facts
and such cannot prevail over the
presumption. Further, the ordinance is a
valid exercise of Police Power. There is no
question but that the challenged ordinance
was precisely enacted to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. This is to
minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes
not only discourages hotels/motels in doing
any business other than legal but also
increases the revenue of the lgu concerned.
And taxation is a valid exercise of police
power as well. The due process contention
is likewise untenable, due process has no
exact definition but has reason as a
standard. In this case, the precise reason
why the ordinance was enacted was to curb
down prostitution in the city which is reason
enough and cannot be defeated by mere
singling out of the provisions of the said
ordinance alleged to be vague. POLICE
POWER On the legislative organs of the
government, whether national of local,
primarily rest the exercise of the police
power, which, it cannot be too often
emphasized, is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. Police power is based
upon the concept of necessity of the State
and its corresponding right to protect itself
and its people.43 Police power has been
used as justification for numerous and
varied actions by the State. These range
from the regulation of dance halls,44 movie
theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47
The awesome scope of police power is best
demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred
or so years of presence in our nation’s legal
system, its use has rarely been denied. May
Courts Inquire Upon the Exercise of Police
Power? In view of the requirements of due
process, equal protection and other
applicable constitutional guaranties,
however, the exercise of such police power
insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or
property of any person is subject to judicial
inquiry. Where such exercise of police
power may be considered as either
capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable
constitutional guaranty may call for
correction by the courts. Two types of Due
Process Procedural Due Process:
Procedural due process refers to the
procedures that the government must follow
before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property.49 Procedural due process
concerns itself with government action
adhering
to the established process when it makes
an intrusion into the private sphere.
Examples range from the form of notice
given to the level of formality of a hearing.
Substantive Due Process: Substantive due
process completes the protection
envisioned by the due process clause. It
inquires whether the government has
sufficient justification for depriving a person
of life, liberty, or property.
ERMITA-MANILA HOTEL V. CITY OF
MANILA G.R. No.
L-24693 July 31, 1967
FACTS:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition
against Ordinance No. 4760 for being
violative of the due process clause,
contending that said ordinance is not only
arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but
also vague, indefinite and uncertain, and
likewise allege the invasion of the right to
privacy and the guaranty against self-
incrimination.
Ordinance No. 4760 has the following
provisions:
1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting
any guest or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
2. prohibiting admission of less than 18
years old;
3. imposition of P6,000.00 license fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500.00
for second class motels
4.It is unlawful for the owner to lease any
room or portion thereof more than twice
every 24 hours.
5. Automatic cancellation of license for
subsequent violation of the Ordinance.
The lower court ruled in favor of Ermita-
Manila Hotel. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power of the State.
WON the ordinace is against the due
process clause.
HELD:
1. YES. The ordinance was a regulatory
measure. It did not prohibit motels. It merely
regulated the mode in which it may conduct
business in order precisely to put an end to
practices which could encourage vice and
immorality. The ordinance is aim to
minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes
not only discourages hotels/motels in doing
any business other than legal but also
increases the revenue of the LGU
concerned.
2. NO. There is no violation of constitutional
due process for being reasonable and the
ordinance is enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality absent any irregularity on its
face.
Hence, judgment of the lower court is
reversed and the injunction issued lifted
forthwith.
Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA
849 (1967)
J. Fernando
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, and one of its members Hotel
del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of
Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be
applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was
beyond the powers of the Manila City Board
to regulate due to the fact that hotels were
not part of its regulatory powers. They also
asserted that Section 1 of the challenged
ordinance was unconstitutional and void for
being unreasonable and violative of due
process insofar because it would impose
P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first
class motels and P4,500.00 for second
class motels; there was also the
requirement that the guests would fill up a
form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the
premises and facilities of such hotels,
motels and lodging houses would be open
for inspection from city authorites. They
claimed this to be violative of due process
for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two
classes and required the maintenance of
certain minimum facilities in first class
motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The
petitioners also invoked the lack of due
process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease
any room or portion thereof more than twice
every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons
below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the
automatic cancellation of the license of the
hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of
Manila is violative of the due process
clause?
Held: No. Judgment reversed.
Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a
law.” However, the Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when
there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police
regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire
Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of
police power. As underlying questions of
fact may condition the constitutionality of
legislation of this character, the resumption
of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute." No
such factual foundation being laid in the
present case, the lower court deciding the
matter on the pleadings and the stipulation
of facts, the presumption of validity must
prevail and the judgment against the
ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged
ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals, particularly fornication and
prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the
licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating
for purpose other than legal" and at the
same time, to increase "the income of the
city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal
protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties, however, the
power must not be unreasonable or violative
of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition
of due process. It has a standard to which
the governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or
property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
What then is the standard of due process
which must exist both as a procedural and a
substantive requisite to free the challenged
ordinance from legal infirmity? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances," decisions
based on such a clause requiring a "close
and perceptive inquiry into fundamental
principles of our society." Questions of due
process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove
the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure
to meet the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful
occupations are also incidental to the police
power and the right to exact a fee may be
implied from the power to license and
regulate, but in fixing amount of the license
fees the municipal corporations are allowed
a much wider discretion in this class of
cases than in the former, and aside from
applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical,
courts have, as a general rule, declined to
interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of
liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to
supplement the state’s police power.
In one case- “much discretion is given to
municipal corporations in determining the
amount," here the license fee of the
operator of a massage clinic, even if it were
viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by
limiting duration of use to twice every 24
hours- It was not violative of due process.
'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is
not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.'
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the
good of the individual and for the greater
good of the peace and order of society and
the general well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in
his mind through education and personal
discipline, so that there may be established
the resultant equilibrium, which means
peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains
its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the
sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of
laissez faire has to some extent given way
to the assumption by the government of the
right of intervention even in contractual
relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if
the liberty involved were freedom of the
mind or the person, the standard for the
validity of governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of
property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of
personal information, the maintenance of
establishments, and the “full rate of
payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal
laws with what they omit but there is no
canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."
• City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122
SCRA 759 (1983)
Case Brief: City Govt of Quezon City v
Ericta
NOVEMBER 20, 2013JEFF REY
G.R. No. L-3491 June 24, 1983
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY
and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII;
HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC.,
respondents.
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64
provides that at least 6% of the total area
of the memorial park cemetery shall be
set aside for the charity burial of
deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for
at least 5 years prior to their death. As
such, the Quezon City engineer required
the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc,
to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in
Quezon City where the owners thereof
have failed to donate the required 6%
space intended for paupers burial.
The then Court of First Instance and its
judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the
respondent’s property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and
that the land is taken for a public use as
it is intended for the burial ground of
paupers. They further argued that the
Quezon City Council is authorized under
its charter, in the exercise of local police
power, ” to make such further
ordinances and resolutions not
repugnant to law as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred by this Act
and such as it shall deem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve
the morals, peace, good order, comfort
and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein.”
On the otherhand, respondent
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that
the taking or confiscation of property
was obvious because the questioned
ordinance permanently restricts the use
of the property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and
deprives the owner of all beneficial use
of his property.
Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question
a valid exercise of the police power?

Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a
valid exercise of the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of
rights is the provision which states that
‘no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process
of law’ (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1,
Constitution). On the other hand, there
are three inherent powers of government
by which the state interferes with the
property rights, namely-. (1) police
power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.
These are said to exist independently of
the Constitution as necessary attributes
of sovereignty.
An examination of the Charter of Quezon
City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal
any provision that would justify the
ordinance in question except the
provision granting police power to the
City. Section 9 cannot be justified under
the power granted to Quezon City to tax,
fix the license fee, and regulate such
other business, trades, and occupation
as may be established or practised in the
City. The power to regulate does not
include the power to prohibit or
confiscate. The ordinance in question
not only confiscates but also prohibits
the operation of a memorial park
cemetery.
Police power is defined by Freund as
‘the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property’. It is usually
exerted in order to merely regulate the
use and enjoyment of property of the
owner. If he is deprived of his property
outright, it is not taken for public use but
rather to destroy in order to promote the
general welfare. In police power, the
owner does not recover from the
government for injury sustained in
consequence thereof.
Under the provisions of municipal
charters which are known as the general
welfare clauses, a city, by virtue of its
police power, may adopt ordinances to
the peace, safety, health, morals and the
best and highest interests of the
municipality. It is a well-settled principle,
growing out of the nature of well-ordered
and society, that every holder of
property, however absolute and may be
his title, holds it under the implied
liability that his use of it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor
injurious to the rights of the community.
A property in the state is held subject to
its general regulations, which are
necessary to the common good and
general welfare. Rights of property, like
all other social and conventional rights,
are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall
prevent them from being injurious, and
to such reasonable restraints and
regulations, established by law, as the
legislature, under the governing and
controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and
expedient. The state, under the police
power, is possessed with plenary power
to deal with all matters relating to the
general health, morals, and safety of the
people, so long as it does not
contravene any positive inhibition of the
organic law and providing that such
power is not exercised in such a manner
as to justify the interference of the
courts to prevent positive wrong and
oppression.
However, in the case at hand, there is no
reasonable relation between the setting
aside of at least six (6) percent of the
total area of an private cemeteries for
charity burial grounds of deceased
paupers and the promotion of health,
morals, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation
of a portion of private cemeteries is not
covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act
537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to
prohibit the burial of the dead within the
center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place
subject to the provisions of general law
regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries. When the Local Government
Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides
in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang
panlungsod may “provide for the burial
of the dead in such place and in such
manner as prescribed by law or
ordinance” it simply authorizes the city
to provide its own city owned land or to
buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. This has
been the law and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation,
however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned
ordinance is different from laws and
regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas
for streets, parks, playgrounds, and
other public facilities from the land they
sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The
necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said
requirements which are intended to
insure the development of communities
with salubrious and wholesome
environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by
the subdivision developer when
individual lots are sold to home-owners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is
hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the
respondent court is affirmed.
ablishment, Maintenance and Operation of
Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial
Ground Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon
City and Providing Penalties for the
Violation thereof" provides that at least 6%
of the total area of the memorial park
cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial
of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at
least 5 years prior to their death, to be
determined by competent City Authorities,
and where the area so designated shall
immediately be developed and should be
open for operation not later than 6 months
from the date of approval of the application.
For several years, section 9 of the
Ordinance was not enforced by city
authorities but 7 years after the enactment
of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council
passed a resolution requesting the City
Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further
selling and/or transaction of memorial park
lots in Quezon City where the owners
thereof have failed to donate the required
6% space intended for paupers burial.
Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City
Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in
writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 would be enforced. Himlayang
Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Branch XVIII at
Quezon City), a petition for declaratory
relief, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding
Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the
Ordinance in question for being contrary to
the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter,
the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised
Administrative Code. There being no issue
of fact and the questions raised being purely
legal, both the City Government and
Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the rendition of
a judgment on the pleadings. The CFI
rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of
Ordinance 6118, S-64 null and void. A
motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the City Government and City
Council filed the petition or review with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of
the total area of all private cemeteries for
charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
is tantamount to taking of private property
without just compensation.
Held: There is no reasonable relation
between the setting aside of at least 6% of
the total area of all private cemeteries for
charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from
a private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes
the burden to private cemeteries. The
expropriation without compensation of a
portion of private cemeteries is not covered
by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the
Revised Charter of Quezon City which
empowers the city council to prohibit the
burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and to provide for their
burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial
grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337
provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for
the burial of the dead in such place and in
such manner as prescribed by law or
ordinance" it simply authorises the city to
provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct
public cemeteries. This has been the law
and practice in the past and it continues to
the present. Expropriation, however,
requires payment of just compensation. The
questioned ordinance is different from laws
and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for
streets, parks, playgrounds, and other
public facilities from the land they sell to
buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities
of public safety, health, and convenience
are very clear from said requirements which
are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and
wholesome environments. The beneficiaries
of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by
the subdivision developer when individual
lots are sold to homeowners.
Facts:
Section 9 of ordinance No. 6118... entitled
"ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL
TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON
CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
THE VIOLATION THEREOF"... provides:
"Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total
area of the memorial park cemetery shall be
set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years
prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City
Authorities. The area so designated shall
immediately be developed and should be
open for operation not later than six months
from the date of approval of the
application."... the Quezon City Engineer
notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
that Section 9 of Ordinance... would be
enforced.
Respondent... reacted by filing with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal... a petition
for declaratory relief... seeking to annul
Section 9 of the ordinance... in question.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the
respondent's property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and
that the land is taken for a public use as it is
intended for the burial ground of paupers.
respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
contends that the taking or confiscation of
property is obvious because the questioned
ordinance permanently restricts the use of
the property such that it cannot be used for
any reasonable purpose and deprives the
owner... of all beneficial use of his property.
Issues:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a
valid exercise of the police power?
There is no reasonable relation between the
setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the
total area of all private cemeteries for
charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The... ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from
a private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes
the burden to private... cemeteries.
When the Local Government Code...
provides... that a sangguniang panlungsod
may "provide for the burial of the... dead in
such place and in such manner as
prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city
owned land or to buy or expropriate private
properties to construct public cemeteries.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of
just compensation.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely
solely on the general welfare clause or on
implied powers of the municipal corporation,
not on any express provision of law as
statutory basis of their exercise of power.
The clause has always received broad and
liberal interpretation... but we cannot stretch
it to cover this particular taking. Moreover,
the questioned ordinance was passed after
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated,
received necessary licenses and permits,
and commenced operating. The
sequestration of six percent of the cemetery
cannot even... be considered as having
been impliedly acknowledged by the private
respondent when it accepted the permits to
commence operations.
Ruling:
Principles:
CITY GOV’T OF QUEZON CITY v ERICTA
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
FACTS: The City government of Quezon
City enacted Ordinance No. 6118, S-64
entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL
TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON
CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
THE VIOLATION THEREOF". Sec. 9 of the
said ordinance provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total
area of the memorial park cemetery shall be
set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years
prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities. The area so
designated shall immediately be developed
and should be open for operation not later
than six months from the date of approval of
the application.
For several years, the aforequoted section
of the Ordinance was not enforced by city
authorities but seven years after the
enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon
City Council passed the following resolution:
RESOLVED by the council of Quezon
assembled, to request, as it does hereby
request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to
stop any further selling and/or transaction of
memorial park lots in Quezon City where
the owners thereof have failed to donate the
required 6% space intended for paupers
burial.
Pursuant to this, the Quezon City Engineer
notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc.
in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 would be enforced.
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by
filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal
Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a petition for
declaratory relief, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction
seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance
in question. The respondent alleged that the
same is contrary to the Constitution, the
Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy
Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
There being no issue of fact and the
questions raised being purely legal both
petitioners and respondent agreed to the
rendition of a judgment on the pleadings.
The respondent court, therefore, rendered
the decision declaring Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.
A motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the City Government and City
Council filed a petition for review which
seeks to the reversal of the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The City Government of Quezon City
argues that the taking of the property of
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc., is a valid an
reasonable exercise of police power and
that the land is taken for a public use as it is
intended for the burial grounds of paupers.
The City government further argues that the
Quezon City Council is authorized under its
charter, in the exercise of local police
power, " to make such further ordinances
and resolutions not repugnant to law as may
be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred
by this Act and such as it shall deem
necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein."
On the other hand, respondent Himlayang
Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or
confiscation of property is obvious because
the questioned ordinance permanently
restricts the use of the property such that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose
and deprives the owner of all beneficial use
of his property.
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. also stresses that
the general welfare clause is not available
as a source of power for the taking of the
property in this case because it refers to
"the power of promoting the public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property." The respondent points
out that if an owner is deprived of his
property outright under the State's police
power, the property is generally not taken
for public use but is urgently and summarily
destroyed in order to promote the general
welfare. The respondent cites the case of a
nuisance per se or the destruction of a
house to prevent the spread of a
conflagration.
ISSUE: WON Sec. 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 a valid exercise of police power.
RULING: NO. There is no reasonable
relation between the setting aside of at least
six (6) percent of the total area of an (sic)
private cemeteries for charity burial grounds
of deceased paupers and the promotion of
health, morals, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are
charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes
the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of
a portion of private cemeteries is not
covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act
537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit
the burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and to provide for their
burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial
grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for
the burial of the dead in such place and in
such manner as prescribed by law or
ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to
provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct
public cemeteries. This has been the law
and practise in the past. It continues to the
present. Expropriation, however, requires
payment of just compensation. The
questioned ordinance is different from laws
and regulations requiring owners of
subdivisions to set aside certain areas for
streets, parks, playgrounds, and other
public facilities from the land they sell to
buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities
of public safety, health, and convenience
are very clear from said requirements which
are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and
wholesome environments. The beneficiaries
of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by
the subdivision developer when individual
lots are sold to home-owners.
The police power of Quezon City is defined
in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537
which reads as follows:
(00) To make such further ordinance and
regulations not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge
the powers and duties conferred by this act
and such as it shall deem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote, the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the city and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property
therein; and enforce obedience thereto with
such lawful fines or penalties as the City
Council may prescribe under the provisions
of subsection (jj) of this section.
Police power is defined by Freund as 'the
power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty
and property' (Quoted in Political Law by
Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p. 50). It is
usually exerted in order to merely regulate
the use and enjoyment of property of the
owner. If he is deprived of his property
outright, it is not taken for public use but
rather to destroy in order to promote the
general welfare. In police power, the owner
does not recover from the government for
injury sustained in consequence thereof (12
C.J. 623). This power embraces the whole
system of public regulation (U.S. vs.
Linsuya Fan, 10 PhiL 104).
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities
that police power is usually exercised in the
form of mere regulation or restriction in the
use of liberty or property for the promotion
of the general welfare. It does not involve
the taking or confiscation of property with
the exception of a few cases where there is
a necessity to confiscate private property in
order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare as for
instance, the confiscation of an illegally
possessed article, such as opium and
firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of
Quezon City is not a mere police regulation
but an outright confiscation. It deprives a
person of his private property without due
process of law, nay, even without
compensation.
As a matter of fact, the City government of
Quezon City rely solely on the general
welfare clause or on implied powers of the
municipal corporation, not on any express
provision of law as statutory basis of their
exercise of power. The clause has always
received broad and liberal interpretation but
the Court cannot stretch it to cover this
particular taking.
Therefore, the petition is denied.
QC vs. Judge Ericta (GR No. L-34915; June
24, 1983)
2016-02-16administrator
Facts:
An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon
city which approved the regulation of
establishment of private cemeteries in the
said city where it states that 6% of the total
area of the private memorial park shall be
set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City. Himlayang
Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends
that the taking or confiscation of property
restricts the use of property such that it
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose
and deprives the owner of all beneficial use
of his property. It also contends that the
taking is not a valid exercise of police
power, since the properties taken in the
exercise of police power are destroyed and
not for the benefit of the public.
Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance made by
Quezon City is a valid taking of private
property
Ruling:
No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is
not a valid way of taking private property.
The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are
charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemeteries. State’s exercise of the power of
expropriation requires payment of just
compensation. Passing the ordinance
without benefiting the owner of the property
with just compensation or due process,
would amount to unjust taking of a real
property. Since the property that is needed
to be taken will be used for the public’s
benefit, then the power of the state to
expropriate will come forward and not the
police power of the state.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY
and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY
versus HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA
G.R. No. L-34915 (June 24, 2983) FACTS:
Section 9 of City Ordinance No. 6118, S-64
entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL
TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON
CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides: "At
least six (6) percent of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside
for charity burial of deceased persons who
are paupers and have been residents of
Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their
death, to be determined by competent City
Authorities. The area so designated shall
immediately be developed and should be
open for operation not later than six months
from the date of approval of the application."
For seven years, this provision has not been
enforced until the Quezon City Council
passed the resolution requesting the City
Engineer of Quezon City to stop and further
selling and/or transaction of memorial park
lots in QC where the owners thereof failed
to donate the required 6% for pauper burial.
Pursuant to such resolution, the City
Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino Inc in
writing that Sec 9 of Ordinance 6118 would
be enforced. Because of this, Himlayang
Pilipino filed the CFI at QC a petition for
declaratory relief, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction
seeking to annul Section 9 of the ordinance
for being contrary to the Constitution, the
QC Charter, Local Autonomy Act and
Revised Administrative Code. The lower
court declared said provision null and void,
thus the City Council of QC filed the petition
for review before the SC. The QC Council
argue that the taking of the respondent's
property is a valid and reasonable exercise
of police power and that the land is taken for
a public use as it is intended for the burial
ground of paupers. They further argue that
the Quezon City Council is authorized under
its charter, in the exercise of local police
power, " to make such further ordinances
and resolutions not repugnant to law as may
be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred
by this Act and such as it shall deem
necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein." On the other hand,
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the
taking or confiscation of property is obvious
because the questioned ordinance
permanently restricts the use of the property
such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner
of all beneficial use of his property. The
respondent also
stresses that the general welfare clause is
not available as a source of power for the
taking of the property in this case because it
refers to "the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property." The respondent
points out that if an owner is deprived of his
property outright under the State's police
power, the property is generally not taken
for public use but is urgently and summarily
destroyed in order to promote the general
welfare. ISSUES: 1. Does QC council have
the authority to issue create the provision in
question? 2. Is Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 is a valid exercise of police
power? HELD: 1. NO. There is nothing in
the Charter of Question City that would
justify provision in question. It cannot be
justified under the power granted to Quezon
City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate
such other business, trades, and occupation
as may be established or practiced in the
City because the power to regulate does not
include the power to prohibit. Neither is the
provision justified under R.A. 537
authorizing the city council to 'prohibit the
burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and provide for their
burial in such proper place and in such
manner as the council may determine,
subject to the provisions of the general law
regulating burial grounds and cemeteries
and governing funerals and disposal of the
dead' because such provision does not
authorize confiscation of property to serve
as burial grounds. 2. NO. The police power
of Quezon City provides: "To make such
further ordinance and regulations not
repugnant to law as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred by this act and such as
it shall deem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote,
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort and convenience of the
city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein; and enforce
obedience thereto with such lawful fines or
penalties as the City Council may prescribe
under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this
section." In a long line of cases, police
power is usually exercised in the form of
mere regulation or restriction in the use of
liberty or property for the promotion of the
general welfare. It does not involve the
taking or confiscation of property with the
exception of a few cases where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property in
order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare as for
instance, the confiscation of an illegally
possessed article, such as opium and
firearms. The provision in question is not
merely regulation but an outright
confiscation. It deprives a person of its
property without compensation.
The provision can neither be sustained on
the ground of presumption of validity of a
duly enacted legislation. There is no
reasonable relation between the setting
aside of at least six (6) percent of the total
area of an private cemeteries for charity
burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order,
safety, or the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are
charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public
cemetery for this purpose, the city passes
the burden to private cemeteries. Similarly,
when the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177
(q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may
"provide for the burial of the dead in such
place and in such manner as prescribed by
law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the
city to provide its own city owned land or to
buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. The questioned
ordinance is different from laws and
regulations requiring owners of subdivisions
to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from
the land they sell to buyers of subdivision
lots. The necessities of public safety, health,
and convenience are very clear from said
requirements which are intended to insure
the development of communities with
conducive and wholesome environments
and the beneficiaries of the regulation, in
turn, are made to pay by the subdivision
developer when individual lots are sold to
home-owners.
• Napocor v. San Pedro, G.R. No. 170945,
September 26, 2006
Napocor v. San Pedro G.R. No. 170945,
September 26, 2006
Facts: Petitioner for the construction of its
Transmission Line and Tower negotiated
with respondent for an easement of right of
way over her property. respondent executed
a Right of Way Grant in favor of NPC. The
payment voucher for the residential portion
of the lot valued was then processed.
However, the NPC Board of Directors
approved Board Resolution stating that it
would pay only for easement over
agricultural lands, adopt median or average
if there are several amounts involved. NPC
filed a complaint for eminent domain in the
RTC against Maria and other landowners.
According to NPC, in order to construct and
maintain its Northwestern Luzon
Transmission Line Project it was necessary
to acquire several lots for an easement of
right of way. The RTC rendered judgment,
declaring as well-grounded, fair and
reasonable the compensation for the
property. NPC appealed the amended
decision to the CA, asserting that the lower
court gravely erred in fixing the just
compensation for Respondents. the CA
rendered judgment dismissing the appeal,
NPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which the CA denied, Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether the Right of way easement
resulting to the deprivation of use of the
property is considered a taking.
Held: Yes, The right-of-way easement
resulting in a restriction or limitation on
property rights over the land traversed by
transmission lines, as in the present case,
also falls within the ambit of the term
“expropriation.” While it is true that petitioner
only after a right-of-way easement, it
nevertheless perpetually deprives
defendants of their proprietary rights as
manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff
upon defendants that below said
transmission lines. Normally, of course, the
power of eminent domain results in the
taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property;
but no cogent reason appears why said
power may not be availed of to impose only
a burden upon the owner of condemned
property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real
property may, through expropriation, be
subjected to an easement of right-of-way.”
CASE 2011-0149: NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION VS. YUNITA TUAZON,
ROSAURO TUAZON AND MARIA TERESA
TUAZON (G.R. NO. 193023, 22 JUNE
2011, BRION, J.) SUBJECT:
DETERMINATION OF JUST
COMPENSATION. (BRIEF TITLE:
NAPOCOR VS. TUAZON)
============================
SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST
DIGEST:
NAPOCOR’S TRANSMISSION LINE
TRAVERSED ON RESPONDENT’S
PROPERTY. RESPONDENTS DEMANDS
THAT THEY BE PAID FULL VALUE OF
THEIR LAND AS JUST COMPENSATION.
NAPOCOR ARGUES THAT IT SHALL
ONLY PAY EASEMENT FEE PURSUANT
TO SECTION 3-A(B) ITS CHARTER, R.A.
6395, WHICH PRESCRIBES A FORMULA
FOR EASEMENT FEE. IS NAPOCOR
CORRECT?
NO. THE DETERMINATION OF JUST
COMPENSATION IS A JUDICIAL
FUNCTION. THE FORMULA PROVIDED
IN NAPOCOR’S CHARTER IS NOT
BINDING ON THE COURT. IT IS ONLY A
GUIDE.
NAPOCOR’s protest against the relevancy
of Gutierrez, heavily relying as it does on
the supposed conclusiveness of Section 3-
A(b) of R.A. 6395 on just compensation due
for properties traversed by transmission
lines, has no merit. We have held in
numerous cases that Section 3-A(b) is not
conclusive upon the courts.[1][33] In
National Power Corporation v. Maria Bagui,
et al.,[2][34] we categorically held:
Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No.
6395, as amended, is not binding on the
Court. It has been repeatedly emphasized
that the determination of just compensation
in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function and that any valuation for just
compensation laid down in the statutes may
serve only as a guiding principle or one of
the factors in determining just compensation
but it may not substitute the court’s own
judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
(Citations omitted.)
The determination of just compensation in
expropriation cases is a function addressed
to the discretion of the courts, and may not
be usurped by any other branch or official of
the government.[3][35] This judicial function
has constitutional raison d’être; Article III of
the 1987 Constitution mandates that no
private property shall be taken for public use
without payment of just compensation. In
National Power Corporation v. Santa Loro
Vda. de Capin, et al.,[4][36] we noted with
approval the disquisition of the CA in this
matter:
The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists
that its Charter [Section 3A (b) of R.A. 6395]
obliges it to pay only a maximum of 10% of
the market value declared by the owner or
administrator or anyone having legal
interest in the property, or such market
value as determined by the assessor,
whichever is lower. To uphold such a
contention would not only interfere with a
judicial function but would also render as
useless the protection guaranteed by our
Constitution in Section 9, Article III of our
Constitution that no private property shall be
taken for public use without payment of just
compensation.
SUBJECT: NAPOCOR ARGUES THAT
RESPONDENTS MAY BE DEEMED TO
HAVE WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO SUCH
VALUATION OF JUST COMPENSATION
BECAUSE THEY DID NOT OPPOSE THE
INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSMISSION
LINE ON THEIR PROPERTY. IS
NAPOCOR’S CONTENTION CORRECT?
NO. HIS PRESUMED WAIVER IS A BAR
TO HIS ACTION TO DISPOSSESS THE
COMPANY, HE IS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS
ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR THE
VALUE OF THE LAND, OR FOR INJURIES
DONE HIM.
That the respondents’ predecessor-in-
interest did not oppose the installation of
transmission lines on their land is irrelevant.
In the present petition, NAPOCOR
insinuates that Mr. Tuazon’s failure to
oppose the instillation now estops the
respondents from their present claim.[5][38]
This insinuation has no legal basis. Mr.
Tuazon’s failure to oppose cannot have the
effect of thwarting the respondents’ right to
just compensation. In Rafael C. de
Ynchausti v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light
Co., et al.,[6][39] we ruled:
“The owner of land, who stands by,
without objection, and sees a public railroad
constructed over it, can not, after the road is
completed, or large expenditures have been
made thereon upon the faith of his apparent
acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its
use by the railroad company. In such case
there can only remain to the owner a right of
compensation.” (Goodin v. Cin. And
Whitewater Canal Co.,18 Ohio St., 169.)
“One who permits a railroad company to
occupy and use his land and construct its
road thereon without remonstrance or
complaint, cannot afterwards reclaim it free
from the servitude he has permitted to be
imposed upon it. His acquiescence in the
company’s taking possession and
constructing its works under circumstances
which made imperative his resistance, if he
ever intended to set up illegality, will be
considered a waiver. But while this
presumed waiver is a bar to his action to
dispossess the company, he is not deprived
of his action for damages for the value of
the land, or for injuries done him by the
construction or operation of the road.” (St.
Julien v. Morgan etc., Railroad Co.,
35La.Ann., 924.)
Napocor v. San Pedro, G.R. 170945,
September 26, 2006
FACTS OF THE CASE:
For the construction of its San Manuel-San
Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and Tower
No. SMJ-389, NPC negotiated with Maria
Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by
her son, Vicente, for an easement of right of
way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The
property, which was partly agricultural and
partly residential land, was located in
Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 00386.
The payment voucher for the residential
portion of the lot valued at P6,000,000.00
(at P600.00 per square meter) was then
processed.7 However, the NPC Board of
Directors approved Board Resolution No.
97-2468 stating that it would pay only
P230.00 per sq m for the residential portion
and P89.00 per sq m for the agricultural
portion, on the following premises:
· The proposed land valuations were
evaluated and analyzed using the joint
appraisal report on fair market value of
lands by Cuervo Appraisal, Inc.,
Development Bank of the Philippines, and
the Land Bank of the Philippines and the fair
market values established by the respective
Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of
Zambales, Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija,
Pampanga and Bulacan as well as the City
Appraisal Committee (CAC) of San Carlos
and Cabanatuan.
· For lot acquisition, adopt PAC or
CUERVO Appraisal, whichever is lower; if
there is a problem of acceptance, refer
same to the Board;
· For easement over agricultural lands,
adopt median or average if there are
several amounts involved; and
· Always oppose any proposals for
conversion of agricultural lands.
On January 15, 1998, the NPC filed a
complaint for eminent domain in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan
against Maria and other landowners.
Maria San Pedro filed her Answer on
February 2, 1998, alleging that there had
already been an agreement as to the just
compensation for her property. She prayed,
among others, that she should be paid the
consideration stated in the Right of Way
Grant, P600.00 per sq m for the residential
portion of the land as agreed upon by her
and NPC, and to base the values from
Resolution No. 97-00512 of the Provincial
Appraisal Committee.
During the pre-trial on January 25, 1999, the
parties agreed that the only issue for
resolution was the just compensation for the
property. The court appointed a committee
of commissioners to ascertain and
recommend to the trial court the just
compensation for the properties.
On June 6, 2001, the trial court issued an
Order granting the motion of the heirs and
denied that of NPC. The RTC declared that
the just compensation for the residential
portion of the property should be the same
as that of the spouses Lagula's property,
which was P499.00 per sq m. On the claim
of NPC in its motion for reconsideration that
it should be made to pay only an easement
fee, the trial court ruled that Lot No. 2076
should be treated the same way as NPC
treated the properties of the spouses
Lagula. It was pointed out that in the
compromise agreements executed by
plaintiff and spouses Lagula, plaintiff paid
P499.00 per sq m on the basis of a straight
sale of their agricultural land, and not
merely an easement fee for a right of way
thereon.
NPC appealed to the CA asserting that the
lower court erred in its decision and prayed
for modification.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner paid
just compensation?
RULING:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
The constitutional limitation of "just
compensation" is considered to be the sum
equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described to be the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition or the fair value of the
property as between one who receives, and
one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time
of the actual taking by the government.39
To determine the just compensation to be
paid to the landowner, the nature and
character of the land at the time of its taking
is the principal criterion.40
In the July 12, 1999 Majority Report, the
commissioners found that the property was
located in a highly-developed area and was
accessible through an all-weather road. The
fact that the property had potential for full
development as shown by the existence of
building projects in the vicinity, and the long-
term effect of the expropriation on the lives,
comfort and financial condition of petitioners
was likewise considered. The report also
took into account the ocular inspection
conducted by the commissioners on May
11, 1999. The tax declaration of the subject
property,41 the NPC sketch plan,42 the
location plan,43 the zoning certificates,44
the zonal valuation of the BIR,45 and the
opinion values46 were also considered.
As had been amply explained by this Court
in Export Processing Zone Authority v.
Dulay:
Various factors can come into play in the
valuation of specific properties singled out
for expropriation. The values given by
provincial assessors are usually uniform for
very wide areas covering several barrios or
even an entire town with the exception of
the poblacion. Individual differences are
never taken into account. The value of land
is based on such generalities as its possible
cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other
crops. Very often land described as
"cogonal" has been cultivated for
generations. Buildings are described in
terms of only two or three classes of
building materials and estimates of areas
are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax
values can serve as guides but cannot be
absolute substitutes for just compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped to
question the valuations made by assessors
since they had the opportunity to protest is
illusory. The overwhelming mass of land
owners accept unquestioningly what is
found in the tax declarations prepared by
local assessors or municipal clerks for them.
They do not even look at, much less
analyze, the statements. The idea of
expropriation simply never occurs until a
demand is made or a case filed by an
agency authorized to do so.
It is violative of due process to deny to the
owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or
wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts
of justice and fairness to allow the
haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or
clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment
of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the
property, after evidence and arguments pro
and con have been presented, and after all
factors and considerations essential to a fair
and just determination have been
judiciously evaluated.
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-
way is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain. Considering the nature
and effect of the installation of the 230 KV
Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the
limitation imposed by NPC against the use
of the land for an indefinite period deprives
private respondents of its ordinary use.
• CIR vs. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 9 (1988)
CIR v. ALGUE, GR No. L-28896, 1988-02-
17
Facts:
the private respondent, a domestic
corporation engaged in engineering,
construction and other allied activities,
received a letter from the petitioner
assessing it in the total amount of
P83,183.85 as delinquency income taxes
for the... years 1958 and 1959
Algue filed a letter of protest or request for
reconsideration... the BIR was not taking
any action on the protest and it was only
then that he accepted the warrant... of
distraint and levy earlier sought to be
served.
Algue filed a petition for review of the
decision of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue with the Court of Tax Appeals
The petitioner contends that the claimed
deduction of P75,000.00 was properly
disallowed because it was not an ordinary,
reasonable or necessary business expense.
The Court of Tax Appeals had seen it
differently. Agreeing with Algue, it held that
the said amount had been... legitimately
paid by the private respondent for actual
services rendered. The payment was in the
form of promotional fees. These were
collected by the payees for their work in the
creation of the Vegetable Oil Investment
Corporation of the Philippines and its
subsequent purchase... of the properties of
the Philippine Sugar Estate Development
Company.
The petitioner contends that the claimed
deduction of P75,000.00 was properly
disallowed because it was not an ordinary,
reasonable or necessary business expense.
the amount was earned through the joint
efforts of the persons among whom it was
distributed.
Alberto Guevara, Jr., Eduardo Guevara,
Isabel Guevara, Edith O' Farell, and Pablo
Sanchez worked for the formation of the
Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation,
inducing other persons to invest in it.[14]
Ultimately, after its incorporation largely
through the promotion of the said persons,
this new corporation purchased the PSEDC
properties.[15] For this sale, Algue received
as agent a commission of P125,000.00, and
it was from this... commission that the
P75,000.00 promotional fees were paid to
the aforenamed individuals.
the payees duly reported their respective
shares of the fees in their income tax
returns and paid the corresponding taxes
thereon.
no distribution of... dividends was involved.
Issues:

whether or not the Collector of Internal
Revenue correctly disallowed the
P75,000.00 deduction claimed by private
respondent Algue as legitimate business
expenses in its income tax returns.
Ruling:
It is true that as a rule the warrant of
distraint and levy... is "proof of the finality of
the assessment"[8] and "renders hopeless a
request for reconsideration,"[9] being
"tantamount to an outright denial thereof
and makes the said request deemed
rejected."[10] But there... is a special
circumstance in the case at bar that
prevents application of this accepted
doctrine.
four days after the private respondent
received the petitioner's notice of
assessment, it filed its letter of protest.
apparently not taken into account before the
warrant of distraint and levy was issued
During the intervening period, the warrant
was premature and could therefore not be
served.
the protest filed by private respondent was
not pro forma and was based on strong
legal considerations.
had the effect of suspending on January 18,
1965, when it was filed, the reglementary...
period which started on the date the
assessment was received... period started
running again only on April 7, 1965, when
the private respondent was definitely
informed of the implied rejection of the said
protest and the warrant was finally served
on... it.
We agree with the respondent court that the
amount of the promotional fees was not
excessive. The total commission paid by the
Philippine Sugar Estate Development Co. to
the private respondent was P125,000.00.
[21] After deducting the said fees, Algue
still... had a balance of P50,000.00 as clear
profit from the transaction. The amount of
P75,000.00 was 60% of the total
commission. This was a reasonable
proportion, considering that it was the
payees who did practically everything, from
the formation of the Vegetable Oil
Investment
Corporation to the actual purchase by it of
the Sugar Estate properties.
the burden is on the taxpayer to prove the
validity of the claimed deduction. In the
present case, however, we find that the
onus has been discharged satisfactorily.
The private respondent has proved that the
payment of the fees... was necessary and
reasonable in the light of the efforts exerted
by the payees in inducing investors and
prominent businessmen to venture in an
experimental enterprise and involve
themselves in a new business requiring
millions of pesos. This was no mean feat
and should be, as... it was, sufficiently
recompensed.
it is a requirement in all democratic regimes
that it be exercised reasonably and in
accordance with the prescribed procedure.
We hold that the appeal of the private
respondent from the decision of the
petitioner was filed on time with the
respondent court in accordance with Rep.
Act No. 1125... the claimed deduction by the
private respondent was permitted under the
Internal Revenue
Code and should therefore not have been
disallowed by the petitioner.
Principles:
CIR vs. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 9 (1988)
G.R. No. L-28896 February 17, 1988
Fact: The petitioner contends that the
claimed deduction of P75,000.00 was
properly disallowed because it was not an
ordinary reasonable or necessary business
expense. The Court of Tax Appeals had
seen it differently. Agreeing with Algue, it
held that the said amount had been
legitimately paid by the private respondent
for actual services rendered. The payment
was in the form of promotional fees. These
were collected by the Payees for their work
in the creation of the Vegetable Oil
Investment Corporation of the Philippines
and its subsequent purchase of the
properties of the Philippine Sugar Estate
Development Company. The petitioner had
Originally claimed these promotional fees to
be personal holding company income but
later conformed to the decision of the
respondent court rejecting this assertion. In
fact, as the said court found, the amount
was earned through the joint efforts of the
persons among whom it was distributed It
has been established that the Philippine
Sugar Estate Development Company had
earlier appointed Algue as its agent,
authorizing it to sell its land, factories and oil
manufacturing process. Pursuant to such
authority, Alberto Guevara, Jr., Eduardo
Guevara, Isabel Guevara, Edith, O’Farell,
and Pablo Sanchez, worked for the
formation of the Vegetable Oil Investment
Corporation, inducing other persons to
invest in it.14 Ultimately, after its
incorporation largely through the promotion
of the said persons, this new corporation
purchased the PSEDC properties.15 For
this sale, Algue received as agent a
commission of P126,000.00, and it was
from this commission that the P75,000.00
promotional fees were paid to the
aforenamed individuals. The petitioner
claims that these payments are fictitious
because most of the payees are members
of the same family in control of Algue. It is
argued that no indication was made as to
how such payments were made, whether by
check or in cash, and there is not enough
substantiation of such payments. In short,
the petitioner suggests a tax dodge, an
attempt to evade a legitimate assessment
by involving an imaginary deduction.
Issue: Whether the Promotional Expense
Disallowed by the CIR Valid?
Held: No, the court agreed that the
respondent promotional fee was a valid
deductable. The total commission paid by
the Philippine Sugar Estate Development
Co. according to the Tax Code, Expenses In
general are All the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business, including a reasonable allowance
for salaries or other compensation for
personal services actually rendered. The
amount of P75,000.00 was 60% of the total
commission. This was a reasonable
proportion, considering that it was the
payees who did practically everything, from
the formation of the Vegetable Oil
Investment Corporation to the actual
purchase by it of the Sugar Estate
properties. That the private respondent has
proved that the payment of the fees was
necessary and reasonable in the light of the
efforts exerted by the payees in inducing
investors and prominent businessmen to
venture in an experimental enterprise and
involve themselves in a new business
requiring millions of pesos. This was no
mean feat and should be, as it was,
sufficiently recompensed.
CASE DIGEST: Commissioner of lnternal
Revenue (CIR) vs. Algue, Inc. (158 SCRA
9), G.R. No. L-28896, February 17, 1988
JUNE 28, 2021
Fair Labor Standards Act ( FLSA )
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COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE vs. ALGUE and THE COURT
OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. L-28896 February 17, 1988

Ezoic
FACTS:
The Philippine Sugar Estate Development
Company had earlier appointed Algue as its
agent, authorizing it to sell its land, factories
and oil manufacturing process. Pursuant to
such authority, Alberto Guevara, Jr.,
Eduardo Guevara, Isabel Guevara, Edith,
O’Farell, and Pablo Sanchez, worked for the
formation of the Vegetable Oil Investment
Corporation, inducing other persons to
invest in it. Ultimately, after its incorporation
largely through the promotion of the said
persons, this new corporation purchased
the PSEDC properties.
Ezoic
For this sale, Algue received as agent a
commission of P126,000.00, and it was
from this commission that the P75,000.00
promotional fees were paid to the
aforenamed individuals.
The petitioner contends that the claimed
deduction of P75,000.00 was properly
disallowed because it was not an ordinary
reasonable or necessary business expense.
The Court of Tax Appeals had seen it
differently. Agreeing with Algue, it held that
the said amount had been legitimately paid
by the private respondent for actual services
rendered. The payment was in the form of
promotional fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Collector of
Internal Revenue correctly disallowed the
P75,000.00 deduction claimed by private
respondent Algue as legitimate business
expenses in its income tax returns.
RULING:
Ezoic
The Supreme Court agrees with the
respondent court that the amount of the
promotional fees was not excessive. The
amount of P75,000.00 was 60% of the total
commission. This was a reasonable
proportion, considering that it was the
payees who did practically everything, from
the formation of the Vegetable Oil
Investment Corporation to the actual
purchase by it of the Sugar Estate
properties.
It is said that taxes are what we pay for
civilization society. Without taxes, the
government would be paralyzed for lack of
the motive power to activate and operate it.
Hence, despite the natural reluctance to
surrender part of one’s hard-earned income
to the taxing authorities, every person who
is able to must contribute his share in the
running of the government.
Ezoic
Ezoic
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES:
1. As a rule, the collection of taxes should
be made in accordance with law.
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government
and so should be collected without
unnecessary hindrance. On the other hand,
such collection should be made in
accordance with law as any arbitrariness
will negate the very reason for government
itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile
the apparently conflicting interests of the
authorities and the taxpayers so that the
real purpose of taxation, which is the
promotion of the common good, may be
achieved.
Ezoic
2. An appeal from a decision of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue with the
Court of Tax Appeals is 30 days from
receipt thereof.
The chronology as shown in the case
indicates that the petition was filed
seasonably. According to Rep. Act No.
1125, the appeal may be made within thirty
days after receipt of the decision or ruling
challenged.
Ezoic
3. As a general rule, the warrant of
distraint and levy is proof of the finality of
the assessment. An exception to this rule,
however, is where there is a letter of protest
after receipt of notice of assessment.
It is true that as a rule the warrant of
distraint and levy is “proof of the finality of
the assessment” and “renders hopeless a
request for reconsideration,” being
“tantamount to an outright denial thereof
and makes the said request deemed
rejected.” But there is a special
circumstance in the case at bar that
prevents application of this accepted
doctrine.
Ezoic
The proven fact is that four days after the
private respondent received the petitioner’s
notice of assessment, it filed its letter of
protest. This was apparently not taken into
account before the warrant of distraint and
levy was issued; indeed, such protest could
not be located in the office of the petitioner.
It was only after Atty. Guevara gave the BIR
a copy of the protest that it was, if at all,
considered by the tax authorities. During the
intervening period, the warrant was
premature and could therefore not be
served.
4. As the Court of Tax Appeals correctly
noted, the protest filed by private
respondent was not pro forma and was
based on strong legal considerations.
Ezoic
It thus had the effect of suspending on
January 18, 1965, when it was filed, the
reglementary period which started on the
date the assessment was received, viz.,
January 14, 1965. The period started
running again only on April 7, 1965, when
the private respondent was definitely
informed of the implied rejection of the said
protest and the warrant was finally served
on it. Hence, when the appeal was filed on
April 23, 1965, only 20 days of the
reglementary period had been consumed.
5. The burden rests on the taxpayer to
prove validity of the claimed deduction
successfully discharged.
Ezoic
In the present case, however, we find that
the onus has been discharged satisfactorily.
The private respondent has proved that the
payment of the fees was necessary and
reasonable in the light of the efforts exerted
by the payees in inducing investors and
prominent businessmen to venture in an
experimental enterprise and involve
themselves in a new business requiring
millions of pesos. This was no mean feat
and should be, as it was, sufficiently
recompensed.
6. What is the purpose or rationale of
taxation?
It is said that taxes are what we pay for
civilized society. Without taxes, the
government would be paralyzed for lack of
the motive power to activate and operate it.
Hence, despite the natural reluctance to
surrender part of one’s hard-earned income
to the taxing authorities, every person who
is able to must contribute his share in the
running of the government.
The government, for its part, is expected to
respond in the form of tangible and
intangible benefits intended to improve the
lives of the people and enhance their moral
and material values, This symbiotic
relationship is the rationale of taxation and
should dispel the erroneous notion that it is
an arbitrary method of exaction by those in
the seat of power.
CIR VS. ALGUE INC. | G.R. No. L-28896
February 17, 1988
G.R. No. L-28896 February 17, 1988
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
ALGUE, INC., and THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
Algue Inc., a domestic corporation engaged
in engineering, construction and other allied
activities, received a letter from the BIR
(Commissioner of Internal Revenue)
assessing it with delinquency income taxes
totalling P83,183.85 as for the years 1958
and 1959. Algue filed a request for
reconsideration.
On March 12, 1965, a warrant of distraint
and levy was presented to Algue Inc.,
through its counsel, Atty. Alberto Guevara,
Jr., who refused to receive it on the ground
of the pending protest.
However, when Atty. Guevara was finally
informed that the BIR was not taking any
action on the protest, he accepted the
warrant of distraint and levy earlier sought
to be served.
Algue, then, sought to claim a P75,000
deduction, but was denied by the CIR. The
CTA, however, ruled in favor of Algue and
allowed the deduction, stating that the said
amount had been legitimately paid by
Algue, Inc. as promotional fees for the work
in the formation of Vegetable Oil Investment
Corporation of the Philippines and its
subsequent purchase of the properties of
the Philippine Sugar Estate Development
Corporation.
Issue:
Whether the CTA was correct in allowing
the P75,000 deduction claimed by Algue
Inc.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling
of the Court of Tax Appeals and allowed the
deduction claimed by Algue Inc.
It has been established that the Philippine
Sugar Estate Development Company had
earlier appointed Algue as its agent,
authorizing it to sell its land, factories and oil
manufacturing process. In addition to this,
testimonies of witness has shown that the
said amount was not made in one lump sum
but periodically and in different amounts as
each payee's need arose. It should be
remembered that this was a family
corporation where strict business
procedures were not applied and immediate
issuance of receipts was not required. Even
so, at the end of the year, when the books
were to be closed, each payee made an
accounting of all of the fees received by him
or her, to make up the total of P75,000.00.
Admittedly, everything seemed to be
informal. This arrangement was
understandable, however, in view of the
close relationship among the persons in the
family corporation.
Moreover, the SC agreed with the CTA that
the amount of the promotional fees was not
excessive. The total commission paid by the
Philippine Sugar Estate Development Co. to
the private respondent was P125,000.00.
After deducting the said fees, Algue still had
a balance of P50,000.00 as clear profit from
the transaction. The amount of P75,000.00
was 60% of the total commission. This was
a reasonable proportion, considering that it
was the payees who did practically
everything, from the formation of the
Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation to the
actual purchase by it of the Sugar Estate
properties.
As correctly stated by the Solicitor General,
the taxpayer has the burden to prove the
validity of the claimed deduction. And in the
present case, the onus has been
discharged satisfactorily. Algue has proved
that the payment of the fees was necessary
and reasonable in the light of the efforts
exerted by the payees in inducing investors
and prominent businessmen to venture in
an experimental enterprise and involve
themselves in a new business requiring
millions of pesos. This was no mean feat
and should be, as it was, sufficiently
recompensed.
But even as we concede the inevitability
and indispensability of taxation, it is a
requirement in all democratic regimes that it
be exercised reasonably and in accordance
with the prescribed procedure. If it is not,
then the taxpayer has a right to complain
and the courts will then come to his succor.
For all the awesome power of the tax
collector, he may still be stopped in his
tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate, as it
has here, that the law has not been
observed.

Further, there is no dispute that the payees
duly reported their respective shares of the
fees in their income tax returns and paid the
corresponding taxes thereon. The Court of
Tax Appeals also found, after examining the
evidence, that no distribution of dividends
was involved.
Algue Inc. has proved that the payment of
the fees was necessary and reasonable in
the light of the efforts exerted by the payees
in inducing investors and prominent
businessmen to venture in an experimental
enterprise and involve themselves in a new
business requiring millions of pesos. This
was no mean feat and should be, as it was,
sufficiently recompensed.
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government
and so should be collected without
unnecessary hindrance. However, such
collection should be made in accordance
with law as any arbitrariness will negate the
very reason for government itself. It is
therefore necessary to reconcile the
apparently conflicting interests of the
authorities and the taxpayers so that the
real purpose of taxation, which is the
promotion of the common good, may be
achieved.

Taxation Defined
It is said that taxes are what we pay for
civilization society. Without taxes, the
government would be paralyzed for lack of
the motive power to activate and operate it.
Hence, despite the natural reluctance to
surrender part of one's hard earned income
to the taxing authorities, every person who
is able to must contribute his share in the
running of the government. The government
for its part, is expected to respond in the
form of tangible and intangible benefits
intended to improve the lives of the people
and enhance their moral and material
values. This symbiotic relationship is the
rationale of taxation and should dispel the
erroneous notion that it is an arbitrary
method of exaction by those in the seat of
power.