3C 3D CIVPRO 2020 DIGESTS MODULE1

3C-3D CIVPRO 2020 CASE DIGESTS
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
Atty. Plaridel Bohol
Compiled Case Digests of 3C-3D 2020
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In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon Datumanong

G.R. No. 150274, August 4, 2006
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Topic: Preliminaries – Retroactive Application of the Rules of Court
Case Doctrine/s:
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a
general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal
rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
Facts:
The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)
an administrative complaint for dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, gross neglect
of duty, violation of office rules and regulations, and conduct prejudicial to the service against petitioner Tel-
Equen and several others, relative to the anomalous payment of the bailey bridge components owned by the
government.
The Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the OMB found petitioner guilty of dishonesty, falsification of public
documents, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and ordered their dismissal
from the service.
Petitioner appealed the administrative ruling with the CA, which affirmed the case. He then elevated the case
to the Supreme Court. While the appeal was still pending, DPWH Secretary Datumanong issued a
Memorandum Order (MO) dismissing petitioner from the service effective upon receipt of the MO.
Hence, the instant petition to cite Secretary Datumanong in contempt of court. Petitioner contends that in
issuing the MO despite knowledge of the pendency of the case, Secretary Datumanong thereby pre-empted
the Court’s sole right to make a decision.
During the pendency of this petition, the Rules of Procedure of the OMB was amended stating, “An appeal
shall not stop the [OMB’s] decision from being executory.”
Issue:
WON the amendment to the OMB’s Rules of Procedure may be applied retroactively
Ruling:
Yes.
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a
general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal
rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the OMB are clearly procedural and no vested right of the
petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in
the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive
by reason of the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or
even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.
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Sarmiento v. Zaratan
G.R. No. 167471, 5 February 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Topic: Power of the Supreme Court to suspend the Rules of Court
Case Doctrine/s:
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought
is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Facts:
Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against respondent Emerita Zaratan, in the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 36, docketed as Civil Case No. 29109. The MeTC rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner, finding that plaintiff has sufficiently established her causes against the
defendant and hereby order the defendant and all persons claiming rights under her: to pay plaintiff the
monthly rentals of P3,500.00 for the said premises from August 1, 2002 until defendant vacates the premises;
to pay plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 plus P1,500.00 per appearance of counsel in court, as and for attorney's
fees; and to pay the cost of suit.
Respondent filed her notice of appeal with the RTC. In the Notice of Appealed Case, 5 the RTC directed
respondent to submit her memorandum in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 (b) of Rule 40 of the
Rules of Court and petitioner to file a reply memorandum within 15 days from receipt. Respondent's counsel
received the notice on 19 May 2003, and he had until 3 June 2003 within which to file the requisite
memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time of five days due to his failure to
finish the draft of the said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the delay of filing his illness for one week,
lack of staff to do the work due to storm and fIood compounded by the grounding of the computers because
the wirings got wet.
On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. The RTC dismissed the appeal, stating
that required Memorandum was filed by defendant-appellant only on June 9, 2003 or six (6)
days beyond the expiration of the aforesaid fifteen-day period.
Respondent moved for the Reconsideration. Respondent adds that her appeal memorandum
was filed well within the period sought by her in her "Motion for Extension of Time to File
Memorandum" so that her appeal should not have been dismissed. Both motions were denied
by the RTC on 31 July 2003. This Court did not take cognizance of defendant-appellant's
"Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum," and rightly so, because it did not contain
a notice of hearing as required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, an omission
for which it could offer no explanation. Thus, defendant-appellant's appeal was properly
dismissed on account of her failure to file an appeal memorandum within the fifteen (15) day
period provided under Section 7 (b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which was granted. The
appellate court nullified and set aside the orders of the RTC and ordered the reinstatement of
respondent's appeal. respondent's appeal memorandum was admitted, and the case remanded
to the RTC for further proceedings. Petitioner assails the correctness and propriety of the
remedy resorted to by respondent by filing a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
According to petitioner, certiorari is not appropriate and unavailing as the proper remedy is an
appeal.
Issue/s:
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WoN the failure of respondent to include a Notice of Hearing in her Motion for Extension of Time to file
Memorandum on Appeal in the RTC is fatal, that the latter's motion is a worthless piece of paper with no legal
effect. - NO
Ruling/s:
It is not disputed that respondent perfected her appeal on 4 April 2003 with the filing of her Notice of Appeal
and payment of the required docket fees. However, before the expiration of time to file the Memorandum, she
filed a Motion for Extension of Time seeking an additional period of Ave days within which to file her
Memorandum, which motion lacked the Notice of Hearing required by Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules
of Court which provides:
SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion. — Except for motions which the court may act upon
without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set
for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall
be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three
(3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing
on shorter notice.
As may be gleaned above and as held time and again, the notice requirement in a motion is mandatory. As
a rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary
period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the
motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected without an opportunity to be
heard. The three-day notice required by law is intended not for the benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises
upon the adverse party and to give the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the motion. Principles
of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be
heard.
The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought
is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Elements or
circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the present case.
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect the substantive
rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. The required extension was
due to respondent's counsel's illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and fIood, compounded by the
grounding of the computers.
Further, it has been held that a "motion for extension of time . . . is not a litigated motion where notice to the
adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application, but an ex parte motion
made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties to the action, in the absence and usually without
the knowledge of the other party or parties."
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As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the
motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be
heard. It has been said that "ex parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in
situations and under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes
made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the motion."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
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Labao v. Flores
G.R. No. 187984, November 15, 2010
BRION, J.
Topic: Suspension of application of Rules of Court
Case Doctrine/s:
While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied,
indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business. The timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court
cannot trifle with. Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their
non-observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be
followed.
Facts:
The petitioner is the proprietor and general manager of the San Miguel Protective Security Agency (SMPSA),
a licensed security-service contractor. Respondents were SMPSA security guards assigned to the National
Power Corporation, Mindanao Regional Center (NPC-MRC), Ditucalan, Iligan City. On July 27, 2004, the
petitioner issued a memorandum requiring all security guards to submit their updated personal data files,
security guard professional license, and other pertinent documents by July 30, 2004 for reevaluation in
connection with the SMPSA’s new service contract with the NPC-MRC. When respondents failed to comply,
despite several notices to do so, the petitioner relieved them from NPC-MRC duty starting September and
October 2004, and ordered them to report to the Senior Operations Officer, Nemesio Sombilon, for new
assignments.
Sometime in March and April 2005, the respondents filed individual complaints with the NLRC for illegal
dismissal and money claims, claiming they were constructively dismissed when they were not given new
assignments for a period of over 6 months, despite repeated requests for NPC-MRC redeployment and for
new assignments. The petitioner and SMPSA denied the charge of constructive dismissal and countered that
the respondents’ relief from NPC-MRC duty was a valid exercise of its management prerogative. Furthermore,
they issued a notice directing the respondents to report to SMPSA’s main office for new assignments, but the
latter failed or refused to comply without any valid reasons.
Labor Arbiter Magbanua dismissed the consolidated complaints for lack of merit. He held that the respondents’
relief from NPC-MRC duty was due to their failure to comply with SMSPA’s requirement to submit updated
documents to meet NPC-MRC contract renewal requirements. According to the LA, this was a legitimate
exercise of NPC-MRC’s management prerogative. On appeal with the NLRC, it was ruled that respondents’
relief was in good faith, without grave abuse of discretion, and in the best interest of the business enterprise
since SMPSA merely exercised its management prerogative and discretion to protect its business interest. In
a September 29, 2006 resolution, the NLRC denied the respondents’ subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The respondents’ counsel, Atty. Plando, received the September 29, 2006 resolution on October 13, 2006.
88 days later, the respondents, through their new counsel, filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, alleging that they were informed of the September 29, 2006 resolution on December 6, 2006, while
respondent Bicoy received a copy of the resolution on November 6, 2006. Thus, the CA set aside the NLRC
resolution, finding that the respondents were constructively dismissed when they were not given new
assignments for more than 6 months. The petitioner and SMPSA moved for reconsideration, arguing that the
CA should have dismissed the petition outright for late filing, and that there was no compelling reason for the
reversal of the LA and the NLRC’s factual findings. In its resolution, the CA modified its decision by dismissing
Bicoy’s petition for having been filed out of time. However, it considered the respondents’ petition as timely
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filed. It also opined that disregarding any procedural lapses best served substantial justice. Hence, this
petition.
Issue/s:
Whether the CA erred in acting on the respondents’ petition despite its late filing, and in reversing the LA and
NLRC decisions.
Ruling/s:
Yes, the CA erred in acting on the respondents’ petition for certiorari despite its late filing. The NLRC resolution
was already final and executory, and the CA had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition, except to order its
dismissal. Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be instituted
within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day
period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to
a speedy disposition of their case. Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the
convenience of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency
of, our judicial system. While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods
are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat
that even this Court cannot trifle with. Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed
simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they are
required to be followed. It must be noted however, that there are recognized exceptions to their strict
observance. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable
or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. Nevertheless, the SC cannot sustain the
respondents’ argument that they cannot be bound their counsel’s negligence since it would enable every party-
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litigant to render inoperative any adverse order or decision of the courts or tribunals, through the simple
expedient of alleging his/her counsel’s gross negligence.
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Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC

G.R. No. 217158 March 12, 2019
JARDELEZA, J.
Case Doctrine/s:
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that, direct recourse to this Court is allowed only to resolve
questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or transcendental importance of the action. This
doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable the Court to
focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land.
Facts:
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and its attached agency, the Civil Aviation
Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), posted an Invitation to Pre-qualify and Bid (Invitation) on the airport
development, operations, and maintenance of the Bacolod-Silay, Davao, Iloilo, Laguindingan, New Bohol
(Panglao), and Puerto Princesa Airports (collectively, Projects). The total cost of the Projects is P116.23 Billion.
The Invitation stated that the Projects aim to improve services and enhance the airside and landside facilities
of the key regional airports through concession agreements with the private sector. The Projects will be
awarded through competitive bidding. Petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., represented by its Chairperson Gerardo
M. Malinao (petitioner), suing as a taxpayer and invoking the transcendental importance of the issue, filed the
present petition for prohibition. Petitioner alleges that it is a non-governmental organization composed of
subsistence farmers and fisherfolk from Samar, who are among the victims of Typhoon Yolanda relying on
government assistance for the rehabilitation of their industry and livelihood. It assails the constitutionality of
the bundling of the Projects and seeks to enjoin the DOTC and the CAAP from proceeding with the bidding of
the same.
For its part, the CAAP asserts that the petition violated the basic fundamental principle of hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner had not alleged any special and compelling reason to allow it to seek relief directly from the Court.
The case should have been filed with the trial court, because it raises factual issues which need to be threshed
out in a full-blown trial.
In its reply, the petitioner argues that it need not wait for the conduct of the bidding to file the suit because
doing so would render useless the very purpose for filing the petition for prohibition. As it is, five groups have
already been pre-qualified to bid in the Bundled Projects. Petitioner also submits that direct recourse to this
Court is justified as the "matter of prohibiting the bidding process of the illegally bundled projects are matters
of public interest and transcendental importance." It further insists that it has legal standing to file the suit
through Malinao, its duly authorized representative.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petitioner is allowed to seek relief directly from the court.
Ruling/s:
No. The 1987 Constitution and the Rules of Court promulgated, pursuant to its provisions, granted us original
jurisdiction over certain cases. In some instances, this jurisdiction is shared with Regional Trial Courts (RTCs)
and the Court of Appeals (CA). However, litigants do not have unfettered discretion to invoke the Court's
original jurisdiction.
This Court, however, is not a trier of fact. We cannot resolve these factual issues at the first instance. Petitioner
has not alleged ultimate facts to support its claim that bundling will create a monopoly, in violation of the
Constitution. By merely stating legal conclusions, petitioner did not present any sufficient allegation upon which
the Court could grant the relief petitioner prayed for.
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In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA in the issuance of
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (extraordinary writs), direct
recourse to this Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of law.
We are not equipped, either by structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance; these
are the primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory agencies. This is the raison d'être behind the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts. It operates as a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus
on the more fundamental tasks assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be
brushed aside by an invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of the issue or
cause raised.
When a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue indispensable to the resolution of
the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of the allegation or invocation of
compelling reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount importance of the case. Such question must
first be brought before the proper trial courts or the CA, both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve
factual questions.
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Spouses Gonzales v. Marmaine Realty Corp.

G.R. No. 214241, January 13, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Topic: General Principles - Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Case Doctrine/s:
In view of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the jurisprudence instructs that before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative
processes afforded him.
However, the doctrine is not absolute as it is subject to certain exceptions, one of which is when the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice.
Facts:
On October 30, 1997, Petitioners Spouses Gonzales filed a Complaint for Recognition as Tenant with
Damages and Temporary Restraining Order against respondent Marmaine Realty Corporation before
the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform AdjudicationvBoard (DARAB)
(Tenancy Case). After initially fling a Motion to Dismiss, Marmaine filed an Answer with Counterclaim. The trial
ensued.
On January 6, 1998, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of Spouses Gonzales. The Spouses filed a Notice of Lis Pendens before the
Register of Deeds of Batangas, which was then annotated on the certificates of title of Marmaine’s properties.
The PARAD dismissed the Spouses Gonzales’ complaint in the Tenancy case for lack of merit. The Spouses
moved for reconsideration which was denied. They appealed to DARAB but the latter affirmed the PARAD
ruling. The Spouses moved for reconsideration which was also denied. DARAB decision became final and
executory.
On January 31, 2012, Marmaine filed a Motion for Cancelation of Notice of Lis Pendens.
PARAD initially denied the motion but later directed the Register of Deeds of Batangas to cancel the notice of
lis pendens annotated on Marmaine's certificates of title. It pointed out that the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens only pertains to the Tenancy Case and does not involve Civil Case.
Spouses Gonzales moved for reconsideration which was denied. Petitioners went straight to the CA via a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The CA dismissed the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. It pointed out that
the proper remedy from a PARAD's denial of a motion for reconsideration is an appeal to the DARAB, and not
a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review before it due to petitioners' failure to
exhaust administrative remedies? (assignment topic)
2. Whether or not the PARAD correctly ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated
on the certicates of title of Marmaine's properties?
Ruling/s:
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1. The CA erred in dismissing Spouses Gonzales’ petition for review before it, considering that the matter
at issue — a question of law — falls within the known exceptions of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The
courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It entails lesser expenses
and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies.
In view of this doctrine, jurisprudence instructs that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention
of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy
must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort
to the court is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the
case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
However, the doctrine is not absolute as it is subject to certain exceptions, one of which is when the
question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice.
In the case at bar, Spouses Gonzales correctly pointed out that the issue they raised before the CA is
the propriety of the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens. The same falls within the aforesaid
exception as the same is a purely legal question, since the resolution of the same would not involve
an examination of the probative value presented by the litigants and must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances.
1. The PARAD properly ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens that Spouses Gonzales
caused to be annotated on Marmaine's certificates of title in view of the finality of the decision in the
Tenancy Case.
"Lis pendens," which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a
court acquires over a property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final
judgment. It is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation
is terminated; and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. The case
law likewise instructs that a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled in situation where judgment was
rendered against the party who caused such a notation.
The notice of lis pendens that Spouses Gonzales caused to be annotated on Marmaine's certificates
of title stemmed from the Tenancy Case. Since the Tenancy Case had already been decided against
Sps. Gonzales with finality, it is but proper that the PARAD order the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens.
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Teresita Tan v. Jovencio F. Cinco, et al.

G.R. No. 213054, June 15, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Topic: General Principles – Doctrine of judicial stability
Case Doctrine/s:
No court can interfere by injunction with judgements or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having
the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.
A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked anytime. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
Facts:
In 2001, the respondents extended a loan to Dante Tan, husband of the petitioner, amounting to
P50,000,000.00. Dante failed to pay the loan upon maturity and proposed that he settle it by selling the shares
he initially used as a security for the loan. However, Dante disappeared, leaving his obligations unpaid. Hence,
respondendts filed an action for sum of money against Dante before the RTC of Makati, Branch 146.
The Makati RTC rendered judgement on May 21, 2002 ordering Dante to pay respondents the sum of
P100,100,000.00. A Writ of Execution was issued on February 16, 2005.
To enforce the writ, Sheriff Ignacio levied on a property registered in Dante’s name, and an auction sale was
conducted. Dante sought the quashal of the writ by presenting an affidavit executed by his wife, Teresita Tan,
attesting to the conjugal nature of the subject property. The period to redeem the subject property lapsed,
hence a Final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of respondents.
Dante filed an Omnibus Motion alleging that the subject property was a family home and exempt from
execution. The Makati RTC denied the motion ruling that Dante belatedly raised the issues on the conjugal
nature of the property, and the disposition of the case became final.
On May 2, 2007, Teresita filed before the Parañaque RTC a complaint against respondents, along with Sheriff
Ignacio, for the nullification of the auction sale and the cancellation of the certificate of sale. The Parañaque
RTC dismissed the case on the ground of res judicata, ruling that the issues raised therein had already been
pass upon by the Makati RTC. However, upon Teresita’s motion for reconsideration, Parañaque RTC reversed
its initial disposition and nullified the auction sale, certificate of sale, and the Final Deed of Sale; ruling that
Teresita was considered a third party in the collection case before the Makati RTC, and that she did not waive
her right to institute a separate action to recover the subject property, thus leaving the nullification case not
barred by res judicata.
The respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals arguing that the Parañaque RTC
had no jurisdiction and power to review the proceedings of a co-equal court. The CA granted the petition.
Citing the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court,
it found that the affirmance of the Parañaque RTC’s assailed issuances would allow Teresita's husband,
Dante, to continue to evade his obligations which was already finally adjudicated by the Makati RTC, a co-
equal court and the first one to take cognizance of the controversy.
Issue/s:
Whether the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance of the
nullification case filed by Teresita and declared as null and void the auction sale, the certificate sale, and the
Final Deed of Sale in favor of respondents.
Ruling/s:
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Yes. The petition is devoid of merit.
The Court explained the doctrine of judicial stability as follows:

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal
court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with
the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief
sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that
acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to
the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control,
in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
The Court finds that the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance of
Teresita’s nullification case despite the fact that the collection case from which it emanated falls within the
jurisdiction of the Makati RTC. The Parañaque RTC is bereft of authority to nullify the levy and sale of the
subject property that was legitimately ordered by the Makati RTC, a coordinate and co-equal court. Teresita’s
nullification case filed before the Parañaque RTC was improper and in glaring violation of the doctrine of
judicial stability.
The determination of whether or not the levy and sale of a property in the execution of a judgement was valid
properly falls within the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the judgement and issued the writ of execution.
The power to open, modify, or vacate the said judgment or order is not only possessed but is restricted to the
court in which the judgment or order is rendered or issued.
The petition is denied. The order rendered by the Parañaque RTC are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
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Specified Contractors & Dev Inc v. Pobocan

G.R. No. 212014-15, 212427-28, 212694-95, 212794-95, December 6, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE,J.
Topic: General Principles - Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability
Case Doctrine/s:
Courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in determining probable cause unless there
are compelling reasons. The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, or lack of it, is entitled to great respect
absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Besides, to justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari on the
ground of abuse of discretion, the abuse must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as
to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.
Facts:
Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal pillaging of public
funds sourced from the PDAF of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010, in the total amount of
P517,000,000.00. The charges are contained in 2 complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder filed by the
NBI and (2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 301918 filed by the Field Investigation
Office of the Ombudsman.
In a Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014 (March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution), the Ombudsman found
probable cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one
(1) count of Plunder, and all the petitioners (along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
The Ombudsman found that the diversion and/or misuse of Sen. Revilla's PDAF was coursed through a
complex scheme involving various participants from Sen. Revilla's Office, the DBM, the IAs, and the JLN-
controlled NGOs. The Ombudsman then went on to conclude that through the said scheme, they were able to
siphon out government funds in the aggregate amount of P517,000,000.00, with at least
P224,512,500.00 received by Sen. Revilla.
Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and
Lim for Plunder, considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the time material to the charges; (b)
with the help of his co-accused, who are public officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed,
accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth through their intricate modus operandi as described above; and (c)
such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least P224,512,500.00, way more than the threshold amount of
P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of Plunder.
Aggrieved, all the petitioners separately moved for the reconsideration of the March 28, 2014 Joint resolution.
The Ombudsman then issued a Joint Order denying petitioners motions for reconsideration for ack of merit
and, thereby, affirming the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the findings of probable cause against all petitioners should be upheld?
Ruling/s:
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Yes. Time and again, this Court's consistent policy has been to maintain noninterference in the Ombudsman's
determination of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such
discretion. Case law states that "the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause does not touch on the issue of
guilt or innocence of the accused. It is not the function of the Office of the Ombudsman to rule on such issue.
All that the Office of the Ombudsman did was to weigh the evidence presented together with the counter-
allegations of the accused and determine if there was enough reason to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused are probably guilty thereof."
In this case, the Ombudsman did not err in finding probable cause against all the petitioners. Their findings
are fully supported by the evidence on record and no semblance of misapprehension taints the same.
Probable cause on Revilla

The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence on record. At the
forefront are the PDAF documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla himself
requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds to the identified JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as other
documents that made possible the processing of his PDAF, e.g., the MOAs executed by the legislator's office,
the IA, and the chosen NGO. All these documents - even those not actually signed by Sen. Revilla - directly
implicate him for the crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the authority of his Office as
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines.
Probable Cause against Cambe.

The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe in G.R. Nos. 212794-95 assailing the
Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him. is no dispute that Ca:mbe was Sen. Revilla's trusted
aide, being his Chief of Staff. By such authority, he also exercised operational control over the affairs of Sen.
Revilla's office, including the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe' s signatures explicitly appear on several
PDAF documents, such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF funds allocated for
certain projects to various JLN-controlled NGOs. Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to
have received PDAF money for himself and for Sen. Revilla.
Probable Cause against Napoles.

Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the illegal utilization,
diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF. In fact, she was tagged as the mastermind of the PDAF
scam.
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Cang v. CA
G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998
ROMERO, J:
Topic: Jurisdiction — Statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
Case Doctrine/s:
The established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the
jurisdiction of the court.
Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano begot three children during marriage, namely: Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony. When Anna Marie learned of her husband’s alleged extramarital affair with
Wilma Soco, she filed a petition for legal separation. The court rendered a decision approving the joint
manifestation of the Cang Spouses to live separately. Later on, petitioner left for the United States and sought
a divorce before a court, which was then granted.
Meanwhile, private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law
of Anna Marie, filed for the adoption of the three minor children before the RTC. The petition bears the
signature of then 14 year old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of
consent alleging that her husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children; that her brothers
and sisters including Ronald had been helping her in taking care of the children; and that because she would
be going to the United States to attend to a family business, leaving the children would be a problem and
would naturally haper her job-seeking venture abroad. Upon learning of the petition, petitioner returned to the
Philippines and filed an opposition thereto. The RTC issued a decree for adoption finding that petitioner was
morally unfit to be the father of his children on account of his being an “improvident father of his family” and
an “undisguised Lothario”. Before the CA, petitioner contended that the petition for adoption was fatally
defetive because he did not have a written consent to the adoption and that he never abandoned his children.
However, the CA affirmed the decree of adoption.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written consent as a natural
father as required by Article 31(2) of PD 603, the Child and Youth and Welfare Code and Art. 188(2) of the
Family Code?
Ruling/s:
No. The established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines
the jurisdiction of the court.
In 1986, then President Cory Aquino issued EO 91 amending Articles 27, 28, 29, 31, 33 and 35 of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code (CYWC). As such, when the petition for adoption was filed in 1987, the applicable
law was the CYWC, as amended by EO 91. During the pendency of the petition for adoption, the Family Code,
which amended the CYWC, took effect. Art. 256 of the Family Code provides for is retroactivity “insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
Notwithstanding the amendments to the law, however, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption
has remained a requisite for its validity. Such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child
or that such parent is “insane or hopelessly intemperate”. For the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case, it
is required that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance
therewith.
In this case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition. Nonetheless, the
petition sufficiently alleged the fact of abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural father. Hence,
even absent the written consent of petitioner, the allegations of abandonment sufficiently vested the lower
court with jurisdiction.
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Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC

G.R. No. 217158 March 12, 2019
JARDELEZA, J.
Case Doctrine/s:
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that, direct recourse to this Court is allowed only to resolve
questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or transcendental importance of the action. This
doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable the Court to
focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land.
FACTS:
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and its attached agency, the Civil Aviation
Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), posted an Invitation to Pre-qualify and Bid (Invitation) on the airport
development, operations, and maintenance of the Bacolod-Silay, Davao, Iloilo, Laguindingan, New Bohol
(Panglao), and Puerto Princesa Airports (collectively, Projects). The total cost of the Projects is P116.23 Billion.
The Invitation stated that the Projects aim to improve services and enhance the airside and landside facilities
of the key regional airports through concession agreements with the private sector. The Projects will be
awarded through competitive bidding. Petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., represented by its Chairperson Gerardo
M. Malinao (petitioner), suing as a taxpayer and invoking the transcendental importance of the issue, filed the
present petition for prohibition. Petitioner alleges that it is a non-governmental organization composed of
subsistence farmers and fisherfolk from Samar, who are among the victims of Typhoon Yolanda relying on
government assistance for the rehabilitation of their industry and livelihood. It assails the constitutionality of
the bundling of the Projects and seeks to enjoin the DOTC and the CAAP from proceeding with the bidding of
the same.
For its part, the CAAP asserts that the petition violated the basic fundamental principle of hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner had not alleged any special and compelling reason to allow it to seek relief directly from the Court.
The case should have been filed with the trial court, because it raises factual issues which need to be threshed
out in a full-blown trial.
In its reply, the petitioner argues that it need not wait for the conduct of the bidding to file the suit because
doing so would render useless the very purpose for filing the petition for prohibition. As it is, five groups have
already been pre-qualified to bid in the Bundled Projects. Petitioner also submits that direct recourse to this
Court is justified as the "matter of prohibiting the bidding process of the illegally bundled projects are matters
of public interest and transcendental importance." It further insists that it has legal standing to file the suit
through Malinao, its duly authorized representative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is allowed to seek relief directly from the court.
RULING:
No. The 1987 Constitution and the Rules of Court promulgated, pursuant to its provisions, granted us original
jurisdiction over certain cases. In some instances, this jurisdiction is shared with Regional Trial Courts (RTCs)
and the Court of Appeals (CA). However, litigants do not have unfettered discretion to invoke the Court's
original jurisdiction.
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This Court, however, is not a trier of fact. We cannot resolve these factual issues at the first instance. Petitioner
has not alleged ultimate facts to support its claim that bundling will create a monopoly, in violation of the
Constitution. By merely stating legal conclusions, petitioner did not present any sufficient allegation upon which
the Court could grant the relief petitioner prayed for.
In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA in the issuance of
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (extraordinary writs), direct
recourse to this Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of law.
We are not equipped, either by structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance; these
are the primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory agencies. This is the raison d'être behind the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts. It operates as a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus
on the more fundamental tasks assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be
brushed aside by an invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of the issue or
cause raised.
When a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue indispensable to the resolution of
the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of the allegation or invocation of
compelling reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount importance of the case. Such question must
first be brought before the proper trial courts or the CA, both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve
factual questions.
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Elizabeth M. Lansangan v. Antonio S. Caisip

G.R. No. 212987, August 6, 2018
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Topic: Katarungang Pambarangay
Case Doctrine/s:
The primordial objective of prior barangay conciliation is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent
the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of cases in courts.
Subject to certain exemptions, a party’s failure to comply with this requirement before filing a case in court
would render his complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to comply with the condition precedent,
pursuant to Section 1(j), Rule 16, of the ROC.
Facts:
Petitioner, a resident of Camanse Street, Purok 4, Rose Park Conception, Tarlac, alleged that respondent, a
resident of Barangay Sto. Nino, Concepcion, Tarlac, executed a promissory note in her favor in the amount of
€2,522.00 payable in three (3) installments. As respondent defaulted in his obligation under the promissory
note and refused to heed petitioner’s demands to comply therewith, the latter was constrained to file the said
complaint. Since respondent failed to file any responsive pleading, petitioner moved to declare him in default
and for the MCTC to render judgment, which was granted in an Order dated August 28, 2012. Accordingly,
the case was submitted for resolution.
MCTC motu proprio dismissed without prejudice the complaint for failure to comply with the provisions of RA
7160, otherwise known as “The Local Government Code of 1991,” which requires the prior referral of the
dispute between residents of the same barangay for conciliation proceedings before the filing of a case in
court. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied. MCTC opined that petitioner’s failure
to refer the matter for barangay conciliation proceedings rendered it without jurisdiction to rule on her
complaint. Aggrieved, she filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC. The RTC upheld the motu proprio
dismissal of petitioner’s complaint. It ruled that prior barangay conciliation proceedings before the filing of the
instant complaint is jurisdictional; thus, non-compliance therewith warrants its dismissal. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied. She appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held
that since the party-litigants are both residents of Concepcion, Tarlac, petitioner’s complaint should have
undergone the mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings before raising the matter before the courts.
Issue/s:
WON the CA erred in upholding the motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.
Ruling/s:
The Supreme Court held that the petition is meritorious.
Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the ROC provides for the grounds that may be raised in a motion to dismiss a complaint, to
wit:
Sec. 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
… (j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
As a general rule, the above-listed grounds must be invoked by the party-litigant at the earliest opportunity, as
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, such grounds are deemed waived. As an exception,
however, the courts may order motu proprio dismissal of a case on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription of action, pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 9 of the ROC.
In this case, the motu proprio dismissal of the complaint was anchored on petitioner’s failure to refer the matter
for barangay conciliation proceedings which in certain instances, is a condition precedent before filing a case
in court. As Section 412 (a) of RA 7160 provides, the conduct of barangay conciliation proceedings is a
precondition to the filing of a complaint involving any matter within the authority of the lupon. Under Sec. 409
(a) of RA 7160, disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable
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settlement before the lupon of said barangay. Lifted from PD No. 1508, otherwise known as the “Katarungang
Pambarangay Law,” the primordial objective of prior barangay conciliation is to reduce the number of court
litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate
filing of cases in courts. Subject to certain exemptions, a party’s failure to comply with this requirement before
filing a case in court would render his complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to comply with the condition
precedent, pursuant to Section 1(j), Rule 16, of the ROC.
The ground of non-compliance with the condition precedent, i.e., undergoing prior barangay conciliation
proceedings, was not invoked at the earliest opportunity, as in fact, respondent was declared in default for
failure to file a responsive pleading despite due notice. Therefore, it was grave error for the courts a quo to
order the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint on said ground. Hence, in order to rectify the situation, the Court
finds it proper that the case be reinstated and remanded to the MCTC, which is the court of origin, for is
resolution on the merits.
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Abagatnan vs Spouses Clarito

G.R. No. 211966; August 07, 2017
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Topic: Katarungang Pambarangay (Sec. 399-422, Local Government Code)
Case Doctrine/s:
1. Parties who do not actually reside in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays are not
required to submit their dispute to the lupon as a precondition to the filing of a complaint in court.
2. Parties are bound by the delimitation of issues that they agreed upon during the pre-trial proceedings.
Facts:
Sometime in September 1967, Wenceslao Abagatnan (Wenceslao) and his late wife, Lydia Capote (Lydia),
acquired a parcel of land designated as Lot 1472-B, with a total land area of 5,046 square meters
at Barangay Cogon, Roxas City from Mateo Ambrad and Soteraña Clarito by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale.
On October 4, 1999, Lydia died, leaving her children, who are co-petitioners in this case, to succeed into the
ownership of her conjugal share of said property.
Respondents approached Wenceslao and asked for permission to construct a residential house made of light
materials on the subject property. As one of the respondents was a distant relative, Wenceslao agreed, subject
to the condition that respondents will vacate the subject property should he need the same for his own use.
On 2006, Petitioners decided to sell portions of Lot 1472-B, including the subject property which was then still
being occupied by respondents. They offered to sell said portion to respondents, but the latter declined.
Despite demands to vacate the property, the respondents refused to vacate thus the petitioners resorted to
filing a case of unlawful detainer and damages to the MTCC.
MTCC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to remove the structures they
erected on the subject property and to vacate the same. It also directed respondents to pay petitioners the
amount of P500.00 per month as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the subject property
from the date of the filing of the action up to and until the structures on the property have been removed, as
well as the cost of suit. Aggrieved, respondents filed an appeal to the RTC.
RTC denied the petition stressing that evidence of ownership is preponderant on petitioners, the MTCC was
justified in ruling the case in the latter's favor and that held that the lack of barangay conciliation proceedings
cannot be brought on appeal because it was not made an issue in the Pre-Trial Order. Respondents then
appealed to the CA.
CA ruled in favor of the respondents and thus concluded that petitioners' Complaint had been prematurely
filed with the MTCC, as it should have been first brought before the Lupon for mandatory conciliation to accord
the parties the chance for amicable settlement.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint for failure to comply with the
prior barangay conciliation requirement under Section 412 of the LGC, despite the fact that not all real parties
in interest resided in the same city or municipality.
Ruling/s:
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No. The same ruling was reiterated in Banting v. Spouses Maglapuz, where the Court held that "the
requirement under Section 412 of the [LGC] that a case be referred for conciliation before the Lupon as a
precondition to its filing in court applies only to those cases where the real parties-in-interest actually reside in
the same city or municipality.
In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all the real parties in
interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City: Jimmy resided in Poblacion, Siniloan, Laguna, while Jenalyn
resided in Brgy. de La Paz, Pasig City. As such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior
referral of the case for barangay conciliation is not a precondition to its filing in court.
This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already authorized their sister and co-petitioner,
Josephine, to act as their attorney-in-fact in the ejectment proceedings before the MTCC. As previously
explained, the residence of the attorney-in-fact of a real party in interest is irrelevant in so far as the "actual
residence" requirement under the LGC for prior barangay conciliation is concerned.
Besides, as the RTC correctly pointed out, the lack of barangay conciliation proceedings cannot be brought
on appeal because it was not included in the Pre-Trial Order.
On this point, it is important to stress that the issues to be tried between parties in a case is limited to those
defined in the pre-trial order as well as those which may be implied from those written in the order
or inferred from those listed by necessary implication.
In this case, a cursory reading of the issues listed in the Pre-Trial Order easily shows that the parties never
agreed, whether expressly or impliedly, to include the lack of prior barangay conciliation proceedings in the
list of issues to be resolved before the MTCC.
In effect, the non-inclusion of this issue in the Pre-Trial Order barred its consideration during the trial. This is
but consistent with the rule that parties are bound by the delimitation of issues that they agreed upon during
the pre-trial proceedings.
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Chavez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 159411, March 18, 2005
PUNO, J.
Topic: Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law
Case Doctrine/s:
The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable
settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on
mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which remedy is judicial. However,
the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The
availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself which provides that the
amicable settlement "may" be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by
action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word "may" clearly makes
the procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or merely optional in nature.
Facts:
In October 1994, petitioner Teodoro Chavez and respondent Jacinto Trillana entered into a contract of lease
whereby the former leased to the latter his fishpond at Sitio Pariahan, Taliptip, Bulacan, for a term of six (6)
years. The contract provided that respondent shall undertake all construction and preservation of
improvements in the fishpond that may be destroyed during the period of the lease, at his expense, without
reimbursement from petitioner.
In August 1996, a powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject fishpond. Respondent did not
immediately undertake the necessary repairs as the water level was still high. Three (3) weeks later,
respondent was informed by a barangay councilor that major repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond
with the use of a crane. Respondent found out that the repairs were at the instance of petitioner who had
grown impatient with his delay in commencing the work.
With this, respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan.
He complained about the unauthorized repairs undertaken by petitioner, the ouster of his personnel from the
leased premises and its unlawful taking by petitioner despite their valid and subsisting lease contract. After
conciliation proceedings, an agreement was reached.
Alleging non-compliance by petitioner with their lease contract and the foregoing "Kasunduan," respondent
filed a complaint against petitioner before the RTC of Valenzuela City.
A decision was rendered in favor of respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which modified
the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the RTC of Valenzuela City had jurisdiction
over the action filed by respondent considering that the subject matter thereof, his alleged violation of the lease
contract with respondent, was already amicably settled before the Office of the Barangay Captain of Taliptip,
Bulacan. Petitioner argued that respondent should have followed the procedure for enforcement of the
amicable settlement as provided for in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the RTC of Valenzuela City has jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent despite the
subject matter thereof, petitioner’s alleged violation of the lease contract with respondent, having already
been amicably settled.
Ruling/s:
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Yes. Indeed, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides that an amicable settlement reached
after barangay conciliation proceedings has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court if not repudiated
or a petition to nullify the same is filed before the proper city or municipal court within ten (10) days from its
date. It further provides that the settlement may be enforced by execution by the lupong tagapamayapa within
six (6) months from its date, or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month
period. This special provision follows the general precept enunciated in Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz.:
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no
execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
Thus, we have held that a compromise agreement which is not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the law between the parties themselves. It has upon them
the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially approved, and cannot be lightly set aside or
disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery.
However, in Heirs of Zari, et al. v. Santos, the Court clarified that the broad precept enunciated in Art. 2037 is
qualified by Art. 2041 of the same Code, which provides:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.
In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring the suit
contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement,
without bringing an action for rescission. This is because he may regard the compromise as already rescinded
by the breach thereof of the other party.
In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of
enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial
and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular form, which
remedy is judicial. However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of rescission under Art. 2041
of the Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from the wording of Sec. 417 itself which
provides that the amicable settlement "may" be enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months from
its date or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word "may"
clearly makes the procedure provided in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or merely
optional in nature.
Thus, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the Barangay
Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner’s non-compliance paved the way for
the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the
procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard it as rescinded and insist upon
his original demand. Respondent chose the latter option when he instituted a civil case for recovery of
unrealized profits and reimbursement of advance rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Respondent was not limited to claiming ₱150,000.00 because although he agreed to the amount in the
"Kasunduan," it is axiomatic that a compromise settlement is not an admission of liability but merely a
recognition that there is a dispute and an impending litigation which the parties hope to prevent by making
reciprocal concessions, adjusting their respective positions in the hope of gaining balanced by the danger of
losing. Under the "Kasunduan," respondent was only required to execute a waiver of all possible claims arising
from the lease contract if petitioner fully complies with his obligations thereunder. It is undisputed that herein
petitioner did not.
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Anama v. Citibank
G.R. No. 192048, December 13, 2017
JARDELEZA, J.
Topic: B.P. 129 – Judicial Reorganization Act of 1980
Case Doctrine/s:
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129), otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and its
amendments, is the law which confers jurisdiction to the courts. Section 19 of BP 129, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691 (RA No. 7691), provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation
In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on
the amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such
are actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs.
Facts:
On November 10, 1972, Anama (petitioner) executed a promissory note amounting to Php 418,000 in favor of
Citibank (respondent) after obtaining a loan, and a chattel mortgage over several machineries and equipment.
Anama failed to pay monthly installments which led to Citibank’s filing of a complaint for sum of money and
replevin, which Anama countered that it was due to Citibank’s refusal to receive the checks he issued, and
that the chattel mortgage was defective and void.
RTC issued an Order of Replevin and Writ of Seizure over the machineries and equipment covered by the
chattel mortgage. On the other hand, Citibank filed a motion for issuance of alias writ of seizure, to seize the
properties and to dispose them. RTC granted the motion of Citibank. Anama filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied by the RTC.
Anama then filed for petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction before the CA on
the ground that the Resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion. The CA granted Anama’s petition
and nullified the RTC’s orders. Citibank was ordered to return the machineries and equipment. The writ of
preliminary injunction was made permanent. Hence, Citibank then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court assailing the decision of CA. SC dismissed the petition of Citibank for lack of merit and
affirming the decision of CA.
Meanwhile, the RTC issued an Order directing all pending incidents in the Civil Case be suspended until
Anama’s petition for reconstruction of record has been resolved. Anama then filed a petition for revival of
judgment with the CA, and that Citibank’s failure to file action for reconstitution of records in the RTC
constitutes abandonment of its action against Anama. Citibank filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground
that an action for revival of judgment is within the RTC’s jurisdiction. CA denied the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.
Anama filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied, hence argued in his petition that the revival of
judgment sought to be revived should be filed in the court that issued the judgment sought to be revived which
is the CA in this case.
Issue/s:
WON the CA has jurisdiction to hear the petition for revival of judgment.
Ruling/s:
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NO. Petition denied. The CA correctly held that it does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide Anama's action
for revival of judgment. As an action to revive judgment is a new action with a new cause of action, the rules
on instituting and commencing actions apply, including the rules on jurisdiction. Its jurisdictional requirements
are not dependent on the previous action and the petition does not necessarily have to be filed in the same
court which rendered judgment.
Section 19 of BP 129, as amended by RA No. 7691, provides:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation
In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on
the amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such
are actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs.
As an action to revive judgment raises issues of whether the petitioner has a right to have the final and
executory judgment revived and to have that judgment enforced and does not involve recovery of a sum of
money, we rule that jurisdiction over a petition to revive judgment is properly with the RTCs. Thus, the CA is
correct in holding that it does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide Anama's action for revival of judgment.
The CA's jurisdiction also shows that an action for revival of judgment is outside the scope of jurisdiction of
the CA. The CA also has concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for issuance of writ of amparo, writ of
habeas data, and writ of kalikasan. The present case, not being one of the enumerated proves that the CA is
without jurisdiction to hear and decide an action for revival of judgment.
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SPOUSES CLAUDIO and CARMENCITA TRAYVILLA , petitioners, vs.

BERNARDO SEJAS and JUVY PAGLINAWAN
G.R. No. 204970. February 1, 2016
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Topic: Jurisdictional Recognization Act of 1980
Case Doctrine/s:
The basis for determining jurisdiction and the amount of docket fees to be paid is the value of the subject
property as stated in the handwritten document sued upon and restated in the amended complaint.
Facts:
In 2005, petitioners Claudio and Carmencita Trayvilla instituted before the RTC against respondent Bernardo
Sejas (Sejas). In their Complaint for specific performance and damages, petitioners claimed among others
that Sejas was the registered owner of a 434-square meter parcel of land in Tukuran, Zamboanga del Sur
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title; that by virtue of a private handwritten document, Sejas sold said
parcel of land to them in 1982; that thereafter, they took possession of the land and constructed a house
thereon; that they resided in said house and continued to reside therein; that Sejas later reasserted his
ownership over said land and was thus guilty of fraud and deceit in so doing; and that they caused the
annotation of an adverse claim.
In an Amended Complaint, this time for specific performance, reconveyance, and damages, petitioners
impleaded respondent Juvy Paglinawan (Paglinawan) as additional defendant, claiming that Sejas
subsequently sold the subject property to her, after which she caused the cancellation of TCT and the issuance
of a new title in her name. Petitioners prayed that Sejas be ordered to execute a final deed of sale in their
favor and transfer the property to them; that Paglinawan's be canceled and the property be reconveyed to
them.
However, the additional docket fees for the moral damages prayed for in the Amended Complaint were not
paid. Likewise, for the additional causes of action, no docket fees were charged and paid. Respondents moved
for dismissal of the case, claiming lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and prescription. The RTC denied
the motion in a September 3, 2007 Order.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that petitioners' case was not for specific
performance but was in reality a real action or one involving title to and possession of real property, in which
case the value of the property should be alleged in the complaint in order that the proper filing fee may be
computed and paid; that since the value of the land was not alleged in the Amended Complaint, the proper
filing fee was not paid, and for this reason the case should be dismissed; and that petitioners' cause of action
is barred by prescription since the 10-year period to sue upon the handwritten contract — counted from their
purchase of the land in 1982 — had already lapsed when they filed the case in 2005. However, in a February
21, 2008 Order, the RTC denied the motion, stating among others that petitioners' case is not a real action but
indeed one for specific performance and thus one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Issue/s:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling/s:
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As correctly ruled by the CA, while petitioners' Amended Complaint was denominated as one mainly for
specific performance, they additionally prayed for reconveyance of the property, as well as the cancellation of
Paglinawan's. In other words, petitioners' aim in filing the civil case was to secure their claimed ownership and
title to the subject property, which qualifies their case as a real action. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an
interest therein.
Since the civil case is a real action made so by the Amended Complaint later filed, petitioners should have
observed the requirement relative to declaring the fair market value of the property as stated in the current tax
declaration or zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Since no such allegation was made in
the Amended Complaint, then the value of the subject property as stated in the handwritten document sued
upon and restated in the Amended Complaint should be the basis for determining jurisdiction and the amount
of docket fees to be paid.
The CA is correct in its general observation that in the absence of the required declaration of the fair market
value as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the property, it cannot be determined whether
the RTC or first level court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners' action, since the
jurisdiction of these courts is determined on the basis of the value of the property. Under applicable rules,
Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129, which reads:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction
over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.
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Heirs of Reterta v. Spouses Lopez

G.R. No. 159941, August 17, 2011
BERSAMIN, J.
Case Doctrine/s:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: xxx
xxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or
for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts;
xxx
Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on one’s title
involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over
such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not exceed ₱20,000.00
(in which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction).
Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the
assessed value of the property) and the principal relief thereby sought.
Facts:
On May 2, 2000, the petitioners Reterta commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance on the
RTC in Trece Martires City (Civil Case No. TM-983) averring that they were the true and real owners of the
parcel of land situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza Cavite, having inherited the land from their father who had died
on July 11, 1983. On August 1, 2000, the respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss insisting that
the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. TM-983 due to the land being friar land, and
that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence Civil Case No. TM-983.
On October 29, 2001, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, holding that it has no jurisdiction over the nature
of the action considering that the land subject of this case is a friar land and not land of the public domain.
Hence, the determination of whether or not fraud had been committed in the procurement of the sales
certificate rests to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands.
The petitioners then timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied their MR on February 21,
2002.
On May 15, 2002, the petitioners assailed the dismissal via petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed the
petition on April 25, 2003, holding that the remedy of Certiorari cannot be availed of by the petitioners as a
substitute for appeal.
On September 9, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue/s:
WON the petitioners’ action for reconveyance within the jurisdiction of the regular court
Ruling/s:
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YES. The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691, which provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx
xxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where
the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry
into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxx
such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not exceed ₱20,000.00 (in
which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative
of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the
property) and the principal relief thereby sought.
The respondents’ reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to sustain their position that the
Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) instead had exclusive jurisdiction was without basis. The authority of LMB
under Act No. 1120, being limited to the administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the
petitioners’ action for reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor
of a private person and title duly issues in the latter’s name. By ignoring the petitioners’ showing of its plain
error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by disregarding the allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted
whimsically and capriciously.
Given all the foregoing, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
term grave abuse of discretion connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
excess, or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
The dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-983, unless undone, would leave the petitioners bereft of any remedy to
protect their substantial rights or interests in the land. As such, they would suffer grave injustice and irreparable
damage. In that situation, the RTC’s dismissal should be annulled through certiorari, for the task of the remedy
was to do justice to the unjustly aggrieved.
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ESPERANZA SUPAPO et al vs. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE JESUS et al.

G.R. No. 198356 April 20,2015
BRION, J.
Topic: RA 7691 – An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of MTC, MeTC, MCTC, amending BP 129
Case Doctrine/s:
Under BP 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or possession of real property is
plenary. However, R.A. No. 7691 granted the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC the exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear actions where the assessed value of the property does not exceed Php20,000 or Php50,000 if the
property is located in Metro Manila. Jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is
now determined by its assessed value. It is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment level.
Facts:
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus with the
MeTC of Caloocan City. The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in
Novaliches, Quezon City, and registered under petitioners’ name. The land has an assessed value of
Php39,980.00. Petitioners did not reside on the lot but made sure to visit at least twice a year.
During one of their visits, they saw two houses built on the lot without their knowledge and permission. They
learned that respondents occupied both houses. They demanded the surrender of the lot by bringing the
dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a certificate to file action for failure
of the parties to settle amicably.
The Spouses Supapo filed a criminal case against the respondents for violating PD No. 772 (Anti-Squatting
Law). The trial court convicted the respondents. On appeal, the CA dismissed the case because Congress
enacted R.A. No. 8368 repealing the Anti-Squatting Law. Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo
moved for the execution of the respondents’ civil liability, praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The
RTC granted the motion and issued the writ of execution. Respondents moved to quash it but the RTC denied
their motion. They filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. The CA granted it and ruled that with the repeal of
the Anti-Squatting Law, the criminal and civil liabilities of respondents were extinguished, but it also said that
recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession. Thus, the Spouses Supapo
filed the complaint for accion publiciana.
After filing their Answer, the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing and
argued that there is another action pending between the same parties, the complaint is barred by statute of
limitations, and the petitioners’ cause of action is barred by prior judgment.
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing. The RTC granted the
petition for certiorari of respondents because the action has prescribed and accion publiciana falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. It likewise denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the RTC decision; hence, this petition.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not the cause of action has prescribed.
3. Whether or not the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.
Ruling/s:
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1. YES. Under BP 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or possession of real
property is plenary. However, R.A. No. 7691 granted the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC the exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of the property does not exceed Php20,000 or
Php50,000 if the property is located in Metro Manila. Jurisdiction over actions involving title to or
possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value. It is its fair market value
multiplied by the assessment level.
Section 3. par. 3 or R.A. No 7691 provides: Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots."
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot located in Metro
Manila is Php39,980. Thus, the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
2. NO. Lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Even it be supposed
that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the other persons’ occupation of the property, regardless
of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any
time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated.
3. NO. Res judicata is not present in the case because:

a) First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint was prosecuted in the name of the People
of the Philippines. The accion publiciana was filed in the name of the Spouses Supapo.
b) There is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution of a crime under the
Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject
property.
c) There is no identity of causes of action. The People of the Philippines filed the case to protect
governmental interests, while the spouses filed the accion publiciana to protect their proprietary
interests.
PETITION GRANTED.
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Spouses Erorita v. Spouses Dumlao

G.R. No.195477, January 5, 2016
BRION, J.
Topic: Jurisdiction of RTC
Case Doctrine/s:
In discerning the jurisdiction of a court, it is the allegations in the complaint which is controlling. Nor is
jurisdiction based on the caption of the complaint. Although the caption of the complaint is “recovery of
possession”, its allegations contain facts for an unlawful detainer case.
Facts:
The spouses Dumlao were the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Oriental Mindoro. The San
Mariano Academy was built on the property. The same property was bought by the spouses Dumlao from an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale, due to the failure of the spouses Erorita to redeem it.
The Dumlao spouses allowed the plaintiffs to continue the operations of the academy in exchange for a
monthly rent of P20,000. Even after failure to pay their rent, the Dumlao spouses allowed the plaintiffs to
operate out of goodwill and friendship.
In 2002, the respondent spouses requested the plaintiffs to vacate the property, however, even if they wanted
to, they could not immediately shut down the school without clearance from the Department of Education.
Hence, the respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession. On tiral, the RTC declared the plaintiffs
in default due to their failure to appear. This led to a favorable decision to the Dumlao spouses.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over cases for unlawful detainer. The CA
ruled that under R.A. No. 7691, civil actions involving a real property's title or possession, jurisdiction depends
on the property’s assessed value and location. The assessed value of the property in question having
exceeded P20,000, the RTC had jurisdiction.
Issue/s:
WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the initial case?
Ruling/s:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the MTC had the jurisdiction over the case. It is a basic rule that jurisdiction
is determined by the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction does not depend on the complaint’s caption. Nor
is jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the answer.
Based on the complaint filed, although it bears the caption “recovery of possession”, its allegations contain
facts for an unlawful detainer case. An action for an unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive jurisdiction
regardless of the property’s assessed value. Therefore, the decision of the RTC is deemed void for lack of
jurisdiction. It must also be noted that the petitioners timely raised the issue of jurisdiction of the RTC. The
petition was granted.
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Rivera v. Catalo
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2422, July 20, 2015
MENDOZA, J.
Topic: Aspects of Jurisdiction - Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
Case Doctrine/s:
A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. it neither a source of any right nor the creator of
any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence,
it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
Facts:
Complainant Rivera filed a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of his Transfer Certificate
of Title and was raffled to Judge Catalo. The petition alleged that complainant was one of the heirs of Gilbuena;
that the original TCT was registered under the name of Gilbuena; and that the owner's duplicate copy of the
said title had remained missing despite their diligent efforts to locate the same. Judge Catalo granted the
petition of the complainant, which became final and executory. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds filed a
manifestation that the TCT subject of the court’s decision was already cancelled in 1924, and that an order
was issued to recall the approval of the Affidavit of Loss filed by complainant Rivera. Judge Catalo called the
parties for a hearing. However, complainant Rivera did not appear despite notice. Thus, Judge Catalo recalled
his previous decision.
Aggrieved, complainant Rivera filed an administrative complaint against Judge Catalo for gross ignorance of
the law for recalling a decision which has already become final and executory. As defense, Judge Catalo
invokes the inherent power of the court to amend and control its processes and orders to make them
conformable with the law and justice and explained that although a final judgment is immutable and
unalterable, such rule is not absolute as it admits exceptions such as those concerning void judgments.
Meanwhile, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) opined that Judge Catalo was administratively liable,
not for gross misconduct, but for gross ignorance of the law when he decided to motu proprio recall his own
final decision. The OCA also found that he overlooked the basic principle that a final judgment, order or
resolution could only be annulled under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
Issue/s:
Whether Judge Catalo was correct in recalling his decision despite it being final and executory.
Ruling/s:
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YES. Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect. However, there are
recognized exceptions to this general rule such as:
(1) The correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
(2) Void judgments; and
(3) Whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and
inequitable.
A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It neither is a source of any right nor the creator
of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence,
it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void.
With respect to unjust and inequitable judgments, under the law, the court may modify or alter a judgment
even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its execution unjust
and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration
transpired after the judgment has become final and executory.
In the case, Judge Catalo correctly recalled the judgment because it was void and the execution of such
judgment would definitely be unjust and inequitable as it would be sanctioning fraud and irregularity because
it would judicially permit the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a title which was no longer in
existence. Furthermore, the judgement was void for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter since a court
has no jurisdiction to order the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title when it is, in
fact, not lost. In the case, the original title was not lost but officially cancelled.
As for the remedies against a void judgment, the validity of a final judgment may be attacked on the ground
that the judgment or order is null and void, because the court had no power or authority to grant the relief or
no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both. The aggrieved party may attack the validity
of the final judgment by a direct action or proceeding in order to annul the same, as certiorari, which is not
incidental to, but is the main object of the proceeding. The validity of a final judgment may also be attacked
collaterally as when a party files a motion for the execution of the judgment and the adverse party resists the
motion by claiming that the court has no authority to pronounce the judgment and that the same is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties. In the case, the Register of Deeds filed
a manifestation moving for the recall of the final judgment. This manifestation should have been considered
as an opposition to the execution of judgment as she declined to implement the flawed court order.
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Heirs of Alfredo Bautista v. Lindo

G.R. No. 208232, 10 March 2014
VELASCO, JR., J.
Topic: (Jurisdiction over Subject Matter)
Case Doctrine/s:
The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought. In this regard, the Court, in Russell v. Vestil, wrote that “in determining
whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim.”
But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable
of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.
Facts:
● Alfredo R. Bautista, petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land located in Davao
Oriental.
● A few years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees, herein respondents, via a
notarized deed of absolute sale dated May 30, 1991.
● Two months later, OCT was canceled and Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in favor of the
vendees.
● Three years after the sale, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the
RTC, anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as
the “Public Land Act,” which reads: SECTION 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free
patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow,
or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
● Other respondents, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss , alleging that the complaint failed to state the
value of the property sought to be recovered.
● Moreover, they asserted that the total selling price of all the properties is only sixteen thousand five
hundred pesos (PhP 16,500), and the selling price or market value of a property is always higher than its
assessed value.
Since Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended, grants jurisdiction to the RTCs over civil actions involving
title to or possession of real property or interest therein where the assessed value is more than PhP 20,000,
then the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint in question since the property which Bautista seeks to
repurchase is below the PhP 20,000 jurisdictional ceiling.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Ruling/s:
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● The petition is meritorious.

● Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the Constitution and pertinent laws.
● Jurisdiction of RTCs, as may be relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129, which
reads: Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where
the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
● On the other hand, jurisdiction of first level courts is prescribed in Sec. 33 of BP 129, which provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
civil cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
xxxx
3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
● The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
● It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought. In this regard, the Court, in Russell v. Vestil, wrote that “in determining
whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court
has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the
claim.”
● But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by
RTCs.
Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation, viz:
1. Actions for specific performance;
2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil status;
3. The right to support of the plaintiff;
4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;
5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts;
6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.
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● The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance. His
action for specific performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.
● Respondents argue that Bautista’s action is one involving title to or possession of real property or any
interests therein and since the selling price is less than PhP 20,000, then jurisdiction is lodged with the
MTC. They rely on Sec. 33 of BP 129.
● Republic Act No. 7691 amended Sec. 33 of BP 129 and gave MeTC, MTC, and MCTC exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed twenty thousand pesos
(PhP 20,000) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed fifty
thousand pesos (PhP 50,000) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses and costs.
● At first blush, it appears that the action filed by Bautista involves title to or possession of the lots he sold
to respondents.
● Since the total selling price is less than PhP 20,000, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over the
case.
● This proposition is incorrect for the re-acquisition of the lots by Bautista or herein successors-in-interests,
the present petitioners, is but incidental to and an offshoot of the exercise of the right by the latter to
redeem said lots pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141.
● The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely dependent on the exercise of such right to
repurchase the lots in question and is not the principal or main relief or remedy sought.
Thus, the action of petitioners is, in reality, incapable of pecuniary estimation, and the reconveyance of the lot
is merely the outcome of the performance of the obligation to return the property conformably to the express
provision of CA 141.
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HEIRS OF JULAO v. DE JESUS

G.R. No. 176020, September 29, 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Topic: Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter
Case Doctrine/s:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint. Thus, it cannot be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties; nor can it be
cured by their silence, acquiescence, or even express consent.
The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
for the first time on appeal. In fact, the court may motu proprio dismiss a complaint at any time when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that lack of jurisdiction exists.
Facts:
Telesforo Julao filed before the DENR, Baguio City, two Townsite Sales Applications. Upon his death, his
applications were transferred to his heirs. Solito Julao executed a Deed of Transfer of Rights, transferring his
hereditary share in the property to respondent spouses De Jesus.
Petitioners filed before the RTC, Baguio City, a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Real Property against
respondent spouses. Petitioners alleged that they are the true and lawful owners the subject property; and
that petitioners sent a demand letter to respondent spouses asking them to return the subject property.
Respondent spouses filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription, which the RTC denied for lack
of merit. During the trial, petitioners disputed the validity of the Deed of Transfer of Rights executed by Solito.
After petitioners rested their case, respondent spouses filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File a Demurrer to
Evidence. The RTC, however, denied the Motion.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. The CA found
the Complaint dismissible on two grounds: (1) failure on the part of petitioners to identify the property sought
to be recovered; and (2) lack of jurisdiction. The CA likewise pointed out that the Complaint failed to establish
that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case as petitioners failed to allege the assessed value of the subject
property.
Issue/s:
W/N the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the complaint
Ruling/s:
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NO. Section 19 (2) and Section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,
provide:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases . — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that in an action for recovery of possession, the assessed value of the
property sought to be recovered determines the court's jurisdiction.
In this case, for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject property must exceed
P20,000.00. Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint the assessed value of the subject property,
the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint as petitioners failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over
it. In fact, since the assessed value of the property was not alleged, it cannot be determined which trial court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Furthermore, contrary to the claim of petitioners, the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised by respondents in
their Appellant's Brief. And the fact that it was raised for the first time on appeal is of no moment. Under Section
1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, defenses not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription, which must
be apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED.
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David v. Agbay
G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Topic: Jurisdiction over the Parties
Case Doctrine/s:
In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files
any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court
by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
Facts:
Petitioner used to be a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement, he and his wife purchased a 600-
square meter lot in Oriental Mindoro and constructed a residential house. However, in 2004, they came to
know that a portion of the lot is a public land and a part of the salvage zone. Petitioner thus filed a
Miscellaneous Lease Application over the subject land with DENR, and indicated there that he is a Filipino
citizen.
Private respondent Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner is disqualified to own land as
he is a Canadian citizen. A criminal complaint for falsification of public documents against the latter was also
filed.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to indict petitioner and recommended the filing
of an information in court. Petitioner contested resolution in a petition for review, but the DOJ denied it.
After the filing of the Information and before his arrest, petitioner filed a motion for re-determination of probable
cause in MTC. The lower court denied on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Issue/s:
Whether or not MTC properly denied petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
Ruling/s:
NO. Elementary is the rule that custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than the
application of bail. The Supreme Court, citing Miranda vs. Tuliao, ruled that jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he
invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.
In this case, petitioner, in filing his motion for re-determination of probable cause, was seeking an affirmative
relief. Hence, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived.
The Court distinguished custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law
is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a
motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody
after his trial has commenced.
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Miranda v Tuliao
G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Topic: Jurisdiction – Jurisdiction Over Parties
Case Doctrine/s:
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary
appearance, and the consequent submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case
of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a
special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; (2) in
criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest.
The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court
process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a
warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused
is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases
when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore,
in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though
there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed
to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Facts:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later
identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao
who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben
B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused
and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned
at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October
2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio,
a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and
Elizer Tuliao.
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Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe,
and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo
Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate,
and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and
issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed
the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint
Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant
of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio
in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for
reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied
in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
Issue/s:
W/N an accuse can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the court?
Ruling/s:
YES. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the
adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver
of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general
rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal
proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused
is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases
when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore,
in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though
there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed
to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this,
there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law.
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Palmiano-Salvador v. Angeles
G.R. No. 171219, September 3, 2012
PERALTA, J.
Topic: Jurisdiction over the Parties
Case Doctrine/s:
If a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff by one who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is
not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.
Facts:
Respondent-appellee ANGELES is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land in Sampaloc, Manila,
evidenced by TCT No. 150872. The subject parcel of land was occupied by GALIGA from 1979 up to 1993,
as a lessee with a lease contract. Subsequently, SALVADOR alleged that she bought on September 7,
1993 the subject parcel of land from Galiga who represented that he was the owner, being one in
possession. Petitioner-appellant Salvador remained in possession of said subject property from November
1993 up to the present.
On November 18, 1993, Angeles sent a letter to Salvador demanding that the latter vacate the subject
property, which was not heeded by the latter. Angeles, thru one Rosauro Diaz, Jr. (DIAZ), filed a complaint
for ejectment with MeTC Manila.
MeTC ruled in favor of Angeles.
On appeal to RTC, petitioner-appellant alleged that Diaz who filed the complaint for ejectment, had no
authority whatsoever from Angeles at the time of filing of the suit.
RTC denied the appeal.
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review, but it was dismissed for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.
Ruling/s:
NO. The basic issue which is – failure of Diaz to present proof of his authority to represent respondent (plaintiff
before the MeTC) in filing the complaint – has been ignored by the MeTC and the RTC, while the CA absolutely
failed to address it, despite petitioner's insistence on it from the very beginning, i.e., in her Answer filed with
the MeTC. This is quite unfortunate, because this threshold issue should have been resolved at the outset as
it is determinative of the court's jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.
Note that when Diaz filed the complaint before the MeTC alleging that he was the respondent’s attorney-in-
fact, there was no copy of any document attached to the complaint to prove his allegation regarding the
authority supposedly granted to him. Thus, prompting the petitioner to raise this issue. More than a year after
the complaint was filed, respondent attached to his reply to petitioner’s position an SPA, however, said SPA
was executed only on November 16, 1994, or more than a month after the complaint was filed.
In Tamondong v. CA, the Court stated that "[i]f a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who
is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any
legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the
complaint and the plaintiff." This ruling was reiterated in Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance
Company, where the Court went on to say that "[i]n order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case
on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party should first be
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subjected to the court's jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the [MeTC], the same
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent [plaintiff before the lower court]."
Therefore, the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over this case and all proceedings before it were null and
void. The courts could not have delved into the very merits of the case, because legally, there was no
complaint to speak of. The court's jurisdiction cannot be deemed to have been invoked at all.
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LUCIA BERNABE, ET AL. vs. DOMINGO VERGARA

G.R. No. 48652, 16 September 1942
MORAN, J.
Topic: Jurisdiction over the Issues
Case Doctrine/s:
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court sets forth the principles generally governing the venue of actions, whether real or
personal, or involving persons who neither reside nor are found in the Philippines or otherwise. Agreements
on venue are explicitly allowed. "By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed
or transferred from one province to another." Sec. 3, Rule 4, Rules of Court. Parties may by stipulation waive
the legal venue and such waiver is valid and effective being merely a personal privilege, which is not contrary
to public policy or prejudicial to the third persons. It is a general principle that a person may renounce any right
which the law gives unless such renunciation would be against public policy.
Facts:
On October 8, 1988 Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. and Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. entered
into a “Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services” of the former’s product in Samar and Leyte Provinces.
The contract contained, among others:
1. a stipulation reading: “...All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with / in the proper Courts
of Quezon City,” and
2. a provision binding UNIMASTERS to obtain a credit line with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.-
Tacloban Branch in the amount of P2,000,000.00 to answer for its obligations to KUBOTA.
Five years later, UNIMASTERS filed an action on the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban against KUBOTA,
Reynaldo Go, and Metrobank for damages for breach of contract, and injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order. On the same day the RTC issued a restraining order and set the application for preliminary
injunction for hearing. KUBOTA then filed-two motions, one prayed for dismissal of the case on the ground of
improper venue, and the other for the transfer of the date of the injunction hearing due to the unavailability of
respondent’s counsel on the date first agreed upon. Notwithstanding KUBOTA’s claim that its motion to
transfer hearing has been granted, the RTC went ahead with the hearing on the injunction incident. On January
13, 1994, the RTC handed down an Order authorizing the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for,
upon a bond of P2,000,000.00. And on February 3, 1994, the same Court promulgated an Order denying
KUBOTA's motion to dismiss. Both orders were challenged as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion by KUBOTA in a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition led with the Court of Appeals.
The Appellate Court agreed with KUBOTA. After its motion for reconsideration was turned down by the C,
UNIMASTERS appealed to this Court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the stipulation regarding the venue had the effect of effectively eliminating the latter as an
optional venue and limiting litigation between Unimasters and KUBOTA only and exclusively to Quezon City.
Ruling/s:
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No. Absent additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and
intention that actions between them should be ventilated only at the place selected by them, Quezon City or
other contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and intention the stipulation should be construed,
not as confining suits between the parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in
Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff. The invariable construction placed on venue
stipulations is that they do not negate but merely complement or add to the codal standards of Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court. In other words, unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical and suitably
limiting language, that they wish the venue of actions between them to be laid only and exclusively at a definite
place, and to disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory
or restrictive, but merely permissive, or complementary of said rule. The fact that in their agreement the parties
specify only one of the venues mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a place for their actions different from those specified
by said rule, does not, without more, suffice to characterize the agreement as a restrictive one.
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CHESTER DE JOYA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE PLACIDO MARQUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch 40, Manila-RTC, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 162416, January 32, 2006
AZCUNA, J.
Topic: Jurisdiction - Jurisdiction over the Res
Case Doctrine/s:
Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the ︎ling of the complaint, petition or
initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or submission
by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by
the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the parties,
cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the pleadings ︎led in the
case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied
consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as
provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation). This is acquired by
the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in
attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the
property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits involving
civil status or real property in the Philippines of a non-resident defendant.
Facts:
De Joya filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest
issued by the respondent judge against petitioner, and asserts that the latter erred in finding the
existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance thereof against him. The documentarvidence found
in the records and examined by the respondent judge shows that therein private complainant was enticed
to invest a large sum of money in State Resources Development Management Corporation; that he issued
several checks amounting to P114,286,086.14 in favor of the corporation; that the corporation, in turn,
issued several checks to private complainant, purportedly representing the return of his investments; that
said checks were later dishonored for insu︎cient funds and closed account; that petitioner and his co-
accused, being incorporators and directors of the corporation, had knowledge of its activities and
transactions.
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However, even up to the time the matter was raised to the Court on certiorari, the petitioner had continuously
refused to surrender and submit to the court’s jurisdiction.
Issue/s:
Whether petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for. -- NO.
Ruling/s:
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The Court held that the documents were all that was needed to establish probable cause for the purpose
of issuing a warrant of arrest. It need not be shown that the accused are indeed guilty of the crime
charged. That matter should be left to the trial. It should be emphasized that before issuing warrants of
arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused.
Hence, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just
personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor ︎nding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence.
In addition, it may not be amiss to note that petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from this Court nor from the
trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The requisites for the
exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction are:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the ︎ling of the complaint, petition or
initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or submission
by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the
service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the parties, cannot
be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the pleadings ︎led in the
case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied
consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as
provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10. AcTHCE
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation). This is acquired by
the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in
attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the
property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits involving
civil status or real property in the Philippines of a non-resident defendant.
There is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief from the courts without submitting
to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued refusal to submit to the court's jurisdiction should give this
Court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place
the accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive stance
shows an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal process. It should be remembered that he
who invokes the court's jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.
The petition was DISMISSED.
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Gomez v. CA
G.R. No. 127692, March 10, 2004
AUSTRIA MARTINEZ, J:
Topic: Jurisdiction over the Res
Case Doctrine/s:
Jurisdiction over the res refers to the court’s jurisdiction over the thing or the property under litigation.
In action in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the
court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res, although summons must be served upon the
defendant in order to satisfy the due process requirements. Thus, if the court acquires jurisdiction over the res
in an action in rem even without jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the court’s judgment is valid.
Facts:
Petitioners spouses Fortunato and Aurora Gomez filed an action for specific performance and/or rescission
against heirs of Jesus Trocino, Sr., and their mother Caridad Trocino, herein respondents. Spouses Trocino
allegedly mortgaged two parcels of land to Fr. Yujuico which was subsequently foreclosed and sold to public
auction. But before the expiry of the redemption period, spouses Trocino sold the property to petitioners.
However, upon redemption from Dr. Yujuico, spouses Trocino refused to convey ownership of the properties
to petitioners, thus the complaint.
RTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs, but upon appeal of the respondents before the CA for the
annulment of the RTC’s decision, the CA decided in favor of the respondents and granted the appeal. The
CA’s decision is based on the respondents’, heirs of Jesus Trocino Sr., contention that the lower court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons since they were not validly served with the copy of the summons and
the complaint. According to them, at the time summons was served on them, Adolfo Trocino was already in
Ohio, U.S.A., and has been residing there for 25 years, while Mariano Trocino was in Talibon, Bohol, and has
been residing there since 1986.
Petitioners, therefore, filed the present petition contending that the CA erred in declaring the need for personal
and/or extraterritorial service of summons despite the nature if the action being one in rem.
Issue/s:
WON there is a need for the lower court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondents for its
judgment to be valid against them.
Ruling/s:
Yes. It is indeed correct, that according to Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in actions in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res, although the summons must be served upon the defendant in order to satisfy due
process.
However, in contrast with the petitioners’ contention that the action they have filed against respondents is one
in rem, the court finds that it is an action in personam. While petitioners’ complaint is a real action since it
affects title or possession of two parcels of land it does not automatically follow that the action is in rem. This
is because the action instituted by petitioners, that is action for specific performance and/or rescission, affects
the parties alone, not the whole world, hence it is an action in personam. Hence, a real action may at the same
time be an action in personam and not necessarily an action in rem.
With the action brought by the petitioners identified by the Court to be one in personam, jurisdiction over the
person of the respondents is necessary for the judgment of the RTC to be valid against them.
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Therefore, the decision of the CA is affirmed, that is, the decision of the RTC is valid and binding only to
Caridad Trocino in proportion to her share in the properties, since it was only her that was shown in the
records who has received the summons, which gives the RTC jurisdiction over her person.
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
G.R. No. L-21450
DIZON, J:
Topic: Estoppel Jurisdiction
Case Doctrine/s:
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Facts:
Spouses Tijam filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against spouses Sibonghanoy to recover the sum of
P1,980. A writ of attachment was issued by the court against the defendants although this was countered by a
counter-bond of the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. being the Surety of the Sibonghanoys. As the trial ensued,
the CFI ruled in favor of the Tijams. Subsequently, a writ of execution was issued by the CFI but an affirmative
relief by the Surety company was made. This was likewise denied by the CFI which prompted the Surety to
appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein the latter affirmed the decision of the CFI. Quickly thereafter, the Surety
filed a motion to dismiss to the CA on the ground of lack of jurisdiction alleging that the Tijams filing to the CFI
on July 19, 1948 was not proper. Since one month before the filing to the CFI, the Judiciary Act of 1948 was
passed into law wherein it stated that Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts (MTC) all civil actions where the value of the subject- matter or the amount of the demand does
not exceed P2,000.00.
Issue/s:
W/N the case may be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction?
Ruling/s:
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NO, the case may not be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction since laches was already set in. The Supreme
Court ruled that laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. In the case at bar, the Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its
active participation. As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on
July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety led its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963
raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. Furthermore, the Surety became a quasi-party
therein since July 31, 1948 when it led a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by
the court of origin. Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific obligations in connection with
the pending case. It could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the
law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at
several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction
of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only
after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction. Were We to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment
creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Sps. Trayvilla vs. Sejas

G.R. No. 204970, February 1, 2016
DEL CASTILLO, J.
B.P. 129- Judicial Reorganization Act of 1980
Case Doctrine/s:
Sec. 33 of BP 129, provides:
civil cases.―Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
Facts:
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In 2005, Petitioners Claudio and Carmencita Trayvilla instituted before the RTC Civil Case for specific
performance ad damages against respondent Bernardo Sejas (Sejas). Petitioners claimed among others that
Sejas was the registered owner of parcel of land in Tukuran, Zamboanga del Sur and that by virtue of a private
handwritten document, Sejas sold said parcel of land to them and that thereafter, they took possession of the
land and constructed a house where they resided. Sejas then later reasserted his ownership over said land
and was thus guilty of fraud and deceit so they prayed that Sejas be ordered to execute a final deed of sale
over the property and transfer the same to them. In an Amended Complaint, this time for specific performance,
reconveyance, and damages, petitioners impleaded respondent Juvy Paglinawan (Paglinawan) as additional
defendant, claiming that Sejas subsequently sold the subject property to her, after which she caused the
cancellation and the issuance of a new title in her name. Petitioners prayed that Sejas be ordered to execute
a final deed of sale in their favor and transfer the property to them; that Paglinawan’s TCT T-6,627 be canceled
and the property be reconveyed to them.
However, the additional docket fees for the moral damages prayed for in the Amended Complaint were not
paid. Likewise, for the additional causes of action, no docket fees were charged and paid Respondents moved
for dismissal of the case, claiming lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and prescription. The RTC denied
the motion.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that petitioners’ case was not for specific
performance but was in reality a real action or one involving title to and possession of real property, in which
case the value of the property should be alleged in the complaint in order that the proper filing fee may be
computed and paid and that since the value of the land was not alleged in the Amended Complaint, the proper
filing fee was not paid, and for this reason the case should be dismissed.
The CA issued the assailed Decision, which held that the petition is meritorious. As can be gleaned from the
records, the Amended Complaint was styled as one for ‘Specific Performance and Damages,’ whereby private
respondents sought to compel petitioner Sejas to execute the deed of sale over the subject land in their favor
on the premise that they bought the said land from petitioner Sejas through a private document. While it may
appear that the suit filed is one for specific performance, hence an action incapable of pecuniary estimation,
a closer look at the allegations and reliefs prayed for in the Complaint, however, shows that private
respondents were not merely seeking the execution of the deed of sale in their favor. They were also asking
the lower court earnestly to cancel TCT No. T-46,627 which was allegedly issued to petitioner Paglinawan
through fraudulent means and have the same reconveyed to them as the owners of the subject land. Under
these circumstances, the suit before the RTC is a real action, affecting as it did title to the real property sought
to be reconveyed. A real action is one in which the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property; or, as indicated
in what is now Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of
possession of real property. Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, prior to its amendment by A.M. No. 04-
2-04-SC, had a specific paragraph governing the assessment of the docket fees for real action, to wit: In a
real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged
by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees. But it is important to note that, with the
amendments introduced by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which became effective on 16 August 2004, the paragraph
in Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, pertaining specifically to the basis for the computation of docket
fees for real actions was deleted. Instead, Section 7(1) of Rule 141, as amended, provides that ‘in cases
involving real property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT
TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
WHICH IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION’
shall be the basis for the computation of the docket fees. Unfortunately, private respondents never alleged in
their Amended Complaint, much less in the prayer portion thereof, the fair market value of the subject res as
stated in the Tax Declaration or current zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which [sic] is higher,
or if there is none, the stated value thereof, to serve as basis for the receiving clerk in computing and arriving
at the proper amount of filing fee due thereon. In the absence of such allegation, it cannot be determined
whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners’ action. There is
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therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action of
the private respondents. Hence, the RTC erred in taking cognizance of the case despite private respondents’
non-payment of the correct docket fees which must be computed in accordance with Section 7(1), Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, as amended. The consistent rule is that ‘a case is deemed filed only upon payment of
the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court,’ and that jurisdiction over any case is acquired
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Hence, it held
that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 4633-2K5, hence, its act of taking cognizance of
the subject Complaint was tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in its assailed November 19, 2012
Resolution. Hence, the present Petition.
Issue/s:
Did the Court of Appeals ruled correctly when it dismissed the complaint by reason of Petitioner-Appellants’
alleged non-payment of the correct dockets fees due to its failure to allege the fair market value or the stated
value of the subject property in the amended complaint?
Ruling/s:
The petition was denied.
As correctly ruled by the CA, while petitioners’ Amended Complaint was denominated as one mainly for
specific performance, they additionally prayed for reconveyance of the property, as well as the cancellation of
Paglinawan’s TCT T-46,627. In other words, petitioners’ aim in filing Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 was to secure
their claimed ownership and title to the subject property, which qualifies their case as a real action. Pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a real action is one that affects title to or possession
of real property, or an interest therein.Since Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 is a real action made so by the Amended
Complaint later filed, petitioners should have observed the requirement under A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC relative to
declaring the fair market value of the property as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Since no such allegation was made in the Amended Complaint, then the
value of the subject property as stated in the handwritten document sued upon and restated in the Amended
Complaint should be the basis for determining jurisdiction and the amount of docket fees to be paid.
The CA is correct in its general observation that in the absence of the required declaration of the fair market
value as stated in the current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the property, it cannot be determined whether
the RTC or first level court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners’ action, since the
jurisdiction of these courts is determined on the basis of the value of the property.
On the other hand, jurisdiction of first level courts is prescribed in Sec. 33 of BP 129, which provides:
civil cases.―Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
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interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
However, the CA failed to consider that in determining jurisdiction, it could rely on the declaration made in the
Amended Complaint that the property is valued at P6,000,00. The handwritten document sued upon and the
pleadings indicate that the property was purchased by petitioners for the price of P6,000.00.For purposes of
filing the civil case against respondents, this amount should be the stated value of the property in the absence
of a current tax declaration or zonal valuation of the BIR. Since the value of the subject property as stated in
the Amended Complaint is just P6,000.00, then the RTC did not have jurisdiction over petitioners' case in the
first instance; it should have dismissed Civil Case No. 4633-2K5. But it did not. In continuing to take cognizance
of the case, the trial court clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
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Heirs of Reterta v. Spouses Lopez

G.R. No. 159941, August 17, 2011
BERSAMIN, J.
Case Doctrine/s:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: xxx
xxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or
for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts;
xxx
such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not exceed ₱20,000.00
(in which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction).
Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the
assessed value of the property) and the principal relief thereby sought.
Facts:
On May 2, 2000, the petitioners Reterta commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance on the
RTC in Trece Martires City (Civil Case No. TM-983) averring that they were the true and real owners of the
parcel of land situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza Cavite, having inherited the land from their father who had died
on July 11, 1983. On August 1, 2000, the respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss insisting that
the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case No. TM-983 due to the land being friar land, and
that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence Civil Case No. TM-983.
On October 29, 2001, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, holding that it has no jurisdiction over the nature
of the action considering that the land subject of this case is a friar land and not land of the public domain.
Hence, the determination of whether or not fraud had been committed in the procurement of the sales
certificate rests to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands.
The petitioners then timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied their MR on February 21,
2002.
On May 15, 2002, the petitioners assailed the dismissal via petition for certiorari, but the CA dismissed the
petition on April 25, 2003, holding that the remedy of Certiorari cannot be availed of by the petitioners as a
substitute for appeal.
On September 9, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue/s:
WON the petitioners’ action for reconveyance within the jurisdiction of the regular court
Ruling/s:
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YES. The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691, which provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx
xxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where
the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxx
such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not exceed ₱20,000.00 (in
which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative
of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the
property) and the principal relief thereby sought.
The respondents’ reliance on Section 12 and Section 18 of Act No. 1120 to sustain their position that the
Bureau of Public Lands (now LMB) instead had exclusive jurisdiction was without basis. The authority of LMB
under Act No. 1120, being limited to the administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the
petitioners’ action for reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor
of a private person and title duly issues in the latter’s name. By ignoring the petitioners’ showing of its plain
error in dismissing Civil Case No. TM-983, and by disregarding the allegations of the complaint, the RTC acted
whimsically and capriciously.
Given all the foregoing, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
term grave abuse of discretion connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
excess, or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
The dismissal of Civil Case No. TM-983, unless undone, would leave the petitioners bereft of any remedy to
protect their substantial rights or interests in the land. As such, they would suffer grave injustice and irreparable
damage. In that situation, the RTC’s dismissal should be annulled through certiorari, for the task of the remedy
was to do justice to the unjustly aggrieved.
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Heirs of Tomas Dolleton v. Fil-Estate Management, Inc.

G.R. No. 170750, 7 April 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Topic: Rule 2 – Cause of Action
Case Doctrine/s:
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a
party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as follows: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff, for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
Facts:
In October 1997, petitioners (1) Heirs of Tomas Dolleton, (2) Heraclio Orcullo, (3) Remedios San Pedro, et al.,
(4) Heirs of Bernardo Millama, et al., (5) Heirs of Agapito Villanueva, et al., (6) Heirs of Hilarion Garcia, et al.,
(7) Serafina SP Argana, et al., and (8) Heirs of Mariano Villanueva, et al. filed before the RTC separate
Complaints for Quieting of Title and/or Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Preliminary
Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against respondents Fil-Estate Management Inc., Spouses Arturo
E. Dy and Susan Dy, Megatop Realty Development, Inc., and the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas.
The eight Complaints were similarly worded and contained substantially identical allegations. Petitioners
claimed in their Complaints that they had been in continuous, open, and exclusive possession of the afore-
described parcels of land (subject properties) for more than 90 years until they were forcibly ousted by armed
men hired by respondents in 1991. They had cultivated the subject properties and religiously paid the real
estate taxes for the same. Respondents cannot rely on Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 9176, No.
9177, No. 9178, No. 9179, No. 9180, No. 9181 and No. 9182, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas
in their names, to support their claim over the subject properties since, petitioners averred, the subject
properties were not covered by said certificates.
Respondents filed before the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They moved for the dismissal of the eight Complaints on the
grounds of (1) prescription; (2) laches; (3) lack of cause of action; and (4) res judicata.
Respondents claimed that the Complaints should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Even
assuming that petitioners were able to prove their allegations of longtime possession and payment of realty
taxes on the subject properties, and to submit a sketch plan of the same, these cannot defeat a claim of
ownership over the parcels of land, which were already registered under the Torrens system in the name of
respondents and the other consortium members.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petitioners has a cause of action.
Ruling/s:
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Yes. The petitioners has a cause of action. Respondents mistakenly construe the allegations in petitioners'
Complaints. What petitioners alleged in their Complaints was that while the subject properties were not
covered by respondents' certificates of title, nevertheless, respondents forcibly evicted petitioners therefrom.
Hence, it is not simply a question of whether petitioners' possession can defeat respondents' title to registered
land. Instead, an initial determination has to be made on whether the subject properties were in fact covered
by respondents' certificates of title.
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true
would justify the relief demanded. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.
If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be
dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendant.
The Court is convinced that each of the Complaints filed by petitioners sufficiently stated a cause of action.
The Complaints alleged that petitioners are the owners of the subject properties by acquisitive prescription.
As owners thereof, they have the right to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived
thereof, they may recover the same. Section 428 of the Civil Code provides that:
Article 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those
established by law. The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order
to recover it.
Petitioners averred that respondents had violated their rights as owner of the subject properties by evicting
the former therefrom by means of force and intimidation. Respondents allegedly retained possession of the
subject properties by invoking certificates of title covering other parcels of land. Resultantly, petitioners filed
the cases before the RTC in order to recover possession of the subject properties, to prevent respondents
from using their TCTs to defeat petitioners' rights of ownership and possession over said subject properties,
and to claim damages and other reliefs that the court may deem just and equitable.
The Court notes that petitioners' prayer for the cancellation of respondents' certificates of title are inconsistent
with their allegations. Petitioners prayed for in their Complaints that, among other reliefs, judgment be rendered
so that "Transfer Certificate of Title Numbers 9176, 9177, 9178, 9179, 9180, 9181, and 9182 be cancelled by
the Register of Deeds for Las Piñas, Metro Manila, insofar as they are or may be utilized to deprive plaintiffs
of possession and ownership of said lot." Yet, petitioners also made it plain that the subject properties, of
which respondents unlawfully deprived them, were not covered by respondents' certificates of title. It is
apparent that the main concern of petitioners is to prevent respondents from using or invoking their certificates
of title to deprive petitioners of their ownership and possession over the subject properties; and not to assert
a superior right to the land covered by respondents' certificates of title. Admittedly, while petitioners can seek
the recovery of the subject properties, they cannot ask for the cancellation of respondents' TCTs since
petitioners failed to allege any interest in the land covered thereby. Still, the other reliefs sought by petitioners,
i.e., recovery of the possession of the subject properties and compensation for the damages resulting from
respondents' forcible
taking of their property, are still proper.
Petitioners' Complaints should not have been dismissed despite the seeming error made by petitioners in their
prayer. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for
relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain.
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Multi-Realty Development Corp. v. The Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp.

G.R. No. 146726, June 16, 2006
CALLEJO, SR., J.
Topic: Rule 2 – Cause of Actions
Case Doctrine/s:
One has a right of action to file a complaint/petition for reformation of an instrument when his legal right is
denied, challenged or refused by another; or when there is an antagonistic assertion of his legal right and the
denial thereof by another concerning a real question or issue; when there is a real, definitive and substantive
controversy between the parties touching on their legal relations having adverse legal interests.
Facts:
Petitioner Multi-Realty is a domestic corporation engaged in real estate, and in development and construction
of condominiums. In 1970s, it built the 26-storey Makati Tuscany Condominium which consisted of 160 units,
4 of which are penthouse units in the top floor. 270 parking slots were also built, 164 of which are allotted to
its unit owners, with each unit being allotted 1 slot each, and each penthouse unit with 2 slots. 8 of the parking
slots were designated for guests, while 98 were retained for sale to unit owners who want to have additional
slots. Pursuant to the Condominium Act (RA 4726), Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp. (MATUSCO) was
created to manage the condominium units. A Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions (Master Deed) was
executed between Multi-Realty and MATUSCO, and was filed with the Register of Deeds in 1977. Secs. 5 and
7 thereof provides:
Sec. 5 – Accessories to Units. – To be considered as part of each unit and reserved for the exclusive
use of its owner are the balconies adjacent thereto and the parking lot or lots which are to be assigned
to each unit.
Sec. 7 – The Common Areas. – The common elements or areas of the Makati Tuscany shall comprise
of all the parts of the project other than the units, including without limitation the ff.:
(d) All driveways, playgrounds, garden areas and PARKING AREAS OTHER THAN THOSE
ASSIGNED TO EACH UNIT UNDER SEC. 5 ABOVE.
Multi-Realty then executed a Deed of Transfer to MATUSCO over the common areas. Subsequently, Multi-
Realty sold 26 of the 98 parking slots from 1977 to 1986 to which, MATUSCO did not object. In 1979,
MATUSCO’s President, Jovencio Cinco, informed the Board members of Multi-Realty’s proposal to sell all of
the unassigned slots at a price of P15,000 per lot against its prevailing price at that time of P33,000 each. In
the meantime, the fair market value of each slot is P250,000 each. In 1989, Multi-Realty requested that 2 of
its executives be allowed to park in two of the remaining 72 slots, but MATUSCO denied the request, asserting,
for the first time, their ownership over the common areas. While MATUSCO later on offered the requested
slots, Multi-Realty rejected it.
Multi-Realty then sued for Damages and/or Reformation of Instrument with prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, asserting that the ownership of the 98 unassigned slots remained with
them. MATUSCO alleged that Multi-Realty had no cause of action against it for reformation since Multi-Realty,
by its own admission, sold parking slots to third parties despite knowledge that such slots, other than those
mentioned in Sec. 5 of the Master Deed, belonged to MATUSCO. On appeal, Multi-Realty stood its ground
that it was not its intent to designate the 98 unassigned slots as common areas, and this was known to
MATUSCO, and this is shown by MATUSCO’s failure to object during the sale of some of the slots, and its
failure to assert ownership thereon for 11 years. MATUSCO argued that the Master Deed unconditionally
transferred to them the ownership of the parking lots in question, and that Multi-Realty sold the 26 slots in bad
faith, and that MATUSCO had no knowledge of such sale; hence; Multi-Realty is not entitled to any reformation
of the instrument. In August 21, 2000, the CA dismissed Multi-Realty’s appeal on the ground of prescription,
and said that it could review errors not assigned on appeal, but Multi-Realty asserted that the CA misapplied
Sec. 8, Rule 51 because 1964 Rules of Court was still in effect. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue/s:
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W/N Multi-Realty had a cause of action against MATUSCO since its action for reformation had not yet
prescribed
Ruling/s:
YES, the Court held that one has a right of action to file a petition for reformation of an instrument when his
legal right is denied, challenged or refused by another; or when there is an antagonistic assertion of his legal
right and the denial thereof by another concerning a real question or issue; when there is a real, definitive and
substantive controversy between the parties touching on their legal relations having adverse legal interests. A
cause of action consists of 2 elements: (1) plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s corresponding primary
duty, whatever may be the subject to which they relate—person, character, property or contract; and (2) the
delict of wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. To
determine when the fact constitute a cause of action for reformation, second paragraph of Sec. 1, Rule 63
must be considered because petition under such Rule is a special civil action determinative of the rights of the
parties to the case. It is permitted so that courts should be allowed to act, not only when hard is actually done
and rights jeopardized by physical wrongs or attack upon existing legal relations, but also when challenge,
refusal, dispute or denial thereof is made amounting to a live controversy.
The statute of limitations then does not begin to run against an equitable cause of action for the reformation
of an instrument because of mistake until the mistake has been discovered or ought to have been discovered.
In this case, petitioner only became of aware of respondent’s denial of its right under their true contract after
MATUSCO’s denial of its request; hence, Multi-Realty’s cause of action only arose during this time. For a
petition for declaratory relief to prosper, the following conditions sine qua non must concur: (1) there must be
a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must
be ripe for judicial determination. The judicial controversy in this case did not arise until the doubt of the plaintiff
gets translated into a claim of right which is actually contested.
Applying Art. 1144 of the New Civil Code providing a ten-year prescriptive period for written contracts, the
prescriptive period for reformation had not yet lapsed when Multi-Realty filed the complaint in 1990. Hence; it
was also incorrect for CA to dismiss the case on the basis of prescription, instead of resolving it on the merits
when prescription was not a ground raised by the parties.
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Consular Area Residents Association, INC vs Casanova

G.R. No. 202618,
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Topic: Rule 2- Cause of Action
Case Doctrine/s:
1. It is a fundamental rule of procedural law that it is not the caption of the pleading that determines the
nature of the complaint but rather its allegations.
2. in order for a writ of injunction to issue, the petitioner should be able to establish: (a) a right in esse or
a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent
and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Facts:
RA 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 created the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority (BCDA) in order to “accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative
productive uses of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their extensions,” and to “raise funds by the
sale of portions of Metro Manila camps.” In relation to this, Executive Order 40 was issued identifying Fort
Bonifacio as one of the military camps earmarked for development and disposition to raise funds for the BCDA
project. Located in Fort Bonifacio are the subjects of this case: the Joint US Military Army Group (JUSMAG),
a 34.5 hectare area where military officers and their respective families, had occupied housing units and
facility; and the Diplomatic and Consular Areas, a declared alienable and disposable land.
Respondent Casanova, as President and Chief Executive officer of the BCDA, sent a letter informing petitioner
Consular Area Residents Association Inc, an association composed of residents of the Diplomatic and
Consular Area, regarding the demolition of structures within the JUSMAG Area. However, petitioner claims
that they are within the Diplomatic and Consular Area, and not the JUSMAG area. Furthermore, petitioner
claims that Casanova had no authority to act for and in behalf of the BCDA considering his “highly anomalous
and irregular” appointment as president thereof.
On the other hand, respondents maintained that the clearing operations undertaken by the BCDA includes
petitioner’s structures which are covered by the JUSMAG area. Aside from this, respondents Local Housing
Board of Taguig City and the City Government of Taguig, contended that the instant petition should have been
filed before the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area, instead of the Supreme Court.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the case should have been filed before the RTC, instead of the Supreme Court
2. Whether the or not the demolition should be enjoined
Ruling/s:
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1. No. Respondents cited Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provision applies to, among other,
petitions for prohibition. While the instant petition is denominated as one for prohibition, a careful perusal of
the same reveals that it is actually a petition for injunction as it ultimately seeks that a writ of injunction be
issued to permanently stop "respondents, or any other person acting under their orders or authority, from
carrying out, or causing to carry out, the demolition of petitioner's properties." More significantly, respondents
(with the exception of Casanova) are not asked to be prevented from exercising any judicial or ministerial
function on account of any lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion, which allegation is key
in an action for prohibition. Case law dictates that "for a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must
establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising functions, judicial[, quasi-judicial] or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with brave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
It is a fundamental rule of procedural law that it is not the caption of the pleading that determines the nature
of the complaint but rather its allegations. Hence, considering the above-discussed allegations, the petition,
albeit denominated as one for prohibition, is essentially an action for injunction, which means that Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court would not apply. Instead, it is Section 21 of RA 7227, which solely authorizes
the Supreme Court to issue injunctions to restrain or enjoin "the implementation of the projects for the
conversion into alternative productive uses of the military reservations," that would govern.
2. No. Jurisprudence teaches that in order for a writ of injunction to issue, the petitioner should be able to
establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) a violation of that right; and
(c) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In
the absence of a clear legal right, the writ must not issue. A restraining order or an injunction is a preservative
remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights and interests, and it is not designed to protect contingent or
future rights. Verily, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of adequate existing rights is not a
ground for injunction.
The Court finds that petitioner has failed to prove that the structures for which they seek protection against
demolition fall within the Diplomatic and Consular Area. Its supposition is anchored on two (2) documents,
namely: (a) a printed copy of BCDA's declaration in its website that the Diplomatic and Consular Area is a
non-BCDA property; and (b) a map of the South Bonifacio Properties showing the metes and bounds of the
properties of the BCDA as well as the properties contiguous to them. However, none of these documents
substantiate petitioner's claim: the website posting is a mere statement that the Diplomatic Consular Area is
supposedly a non-BCDA property, whereas the map only depicts the metes and bounds of the BCDA's
properties.
For another, petitioner argues against the legality of the intended demolition, insisting that there should be a
court order authorizing the demolition pursuant to Article 536 of the Civil Code and Section 28 of RA 7279,
and not a mere Certificate of Compliance on Demolition. However, the Court has already settled, in the case
of Kalipunan ng Damay ang Mahihirap, Inc. v. Robredo, that demolitions and evictions may be validly
carried out even without a judicial order when, among others, government infrastructure projects with
available funding are about to be implemented pursuant to Section 28 (b) of RA 7279. Records show that
the demolition of the properties is the precursory step to the conversion of the JUSMAG area into a
residential and mixed-use development As such, it falls within the ambit of Section 28 (b) of RA 7279, which
authorizes eviction or demolition without the need of a court order.
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Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. vs. Virgilio S. David

G.R. No. 129928; August 25, 2005
Tinga, J.
Topic: Rule 2: Cause of Action
Case Doctrine/s:
The sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint in order to sustain a
dismissal on this ground. No extraneous matter may be considered nor facts not alleged, which would
require evidence and therefore must be raised as defenses and await the trial. In other words, to
determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no other
should be considered.
Facts:
Respondent David filed a case for specific performance and damages against MOELCI II. The case was
predicated on a document attached as Annex “A” to the Amended Complaint that according to David is the
contract pursuant to which he sold to MOELCI II one unit of 10 MVA Transformer.
MOELCI II filed its answer which pleaded, among others, affirmative defenses which also constitute rounds for
dismissal of the complaint which were lack of cause of action, there being allegedly no enforceable contract
between David and MOELCI II. In essence, it argued that the document attached as Annex “A” was only a
quotation letter and not a contract and as such, David’s complaint is dismissible for failure to state a cause of
action.
In his opposition, David contended that because a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action is required to be based only on the allegations of the complaint, the “quotation letter”, being merely an
attachment to the complaint and not part of its allegations, cannot be inquired into.
RTC denied the MOELCI II’s motion and the latter elevated this case to the CA by way of a special civil action
for certiorari which the CA dismissed.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari
Ruling/s:
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No.
To determine the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may be properly
considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of the external facts or hold preliminary hearings
to determine their existence. If the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may
be averred by the defendants.
It has been hypothetically admitted that the parties had entered into a contract sale where David bound
himself to supply MOELCI II transformer with accessories; that despite written and verbal demands,
MOELCI II has failed to pay the price thereof plus the custom duties and incidental expenses; and that
apart from the previously stated contract of sale, David regularly delivered various electrical hardware
to MOELCI II which, despite demands, has an outstanding balance. The court believes that all the
foregoing sufficiently lay out a cause of action.
Contrary to MOELCI II's assertion, Annex "A" is not an "undisguised quotation letter." While Annex "A"
is captioned as such, the presence of the signatures of both the General Manager and the Chairman of
the Committee of Management immediately below the word "CONFORME" appearing on the
document's last page lends credulity to David's contention that there was, or might have been, a
meeting of minds on the terms embodied therein.
The ambiguity of the import and nature of Annex "A" which necessitates a resort to its proper
interpretation, fortifies the propriety of the trial court's denial of MOELCI II's Motion. The interpretation
of a document requires introduction of evidence which is precisely disallowed in determining whether
or not a complaint states a cause of action. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly dismissed MOELCI
II's petition and upheld the trial court's ruling.
Moreover, preliminary hearing undeniably is subject to the discretion of the trial court. Absent any
showing that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or with such grave abuse
of discretion as would amount to lack of jurisdiction, as in the present case, the trial court's order
granting or dispensing with the need for a preliminary hearing may not be corrected by certiorari.
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NORLINDA S. MARILAG. vs. MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ

G.R. No. 201892, 22 July 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Topic: Splitting of a single cause of action and its effects
Case Doctrine/s:
To be sure, splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where the round of dismissal is litis
pendentia for res judicata, as the case may be.
Facts:
On July 30, 1992, Rafael Martinez, respondent's father, obtained a loan from the petitioner secured by a real
estate mortgage. Rafael failed to settle his obligation upon maturity despite repeated demands, prompting
petitioner to file a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before the RTC of Imus, Cavite,
Branch 90.
Rafael failed to file his answer and, upon petitioner's motion, was declared in default. After an ex
parte presentation of petitioner's evidence, the RTC-Imus ruled in favor of the petitioner. Accordingly, it
ordered Rafael to pay petitioner the amount of P229,200.00. Records did not show that this Decision had
already attained finality.
Prior to knowledge of the above decision, the respondent bound himself with the petitioner to pay for the debt
of his father. After paying P400,000.00, apparently due to calculation of interests incurred, he promised to pay
the remaining P229,000.00 with a promissory note. Upon learning of the decision, the respondent refused to
pay, which then prompted the petitioner to file suit for collection of sum of money from the promissory note.
Respondent averred that the petitioner had no cause of action against him and that he actually overpaid.
Initially, the court a quo ruled in favor of the respondent by claiming that the extinguishment of the debt of his
father to the petitioner was to his favor. But the same court reversed its decision following the motion for
reconsideration of the petitioner, declaring that the foreclosure suit was distinct and separate from the
collection suit. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the court a quo, and later denied the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent. It held that the doctrine of res judicata finds application in the instant
case, considering that both the judicial foreclosure and collection cases were filed as a consequence of the
non-payment of Rafael's loan, which was the principal obligation secured by the real estate mortgage and the
primary consideration for the execution of the subject promissory note.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the prosecution of a collection case was barred by the decision upon a judicial foreclosure.
Ruling/s:
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NO. Res judicata is inapplicable in this case, but litis pedentia applies.
For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at
least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is
such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount
to res judicata in the other. The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed
to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action.
In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause
of action against the debtor mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for
collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.
The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself.
In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial
foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on Rafael's debt. In
light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing of
a personal action for collection of the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis pendentia, considering
that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained finality.
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Yap v. FIRST e-BANK CORPORATION

G.R. No. 169889, September 29, 2009
CORONA, J.
Topic: Rule 2 – Splitting of a single cause of action and its effects
Case Doctrine/s:
1. Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
2. Prior to the effectivity of Circular 57-97, the alternative remedies of foreclosure of mortgage and
collection suit were not barred even if a suit for BP 22 had been filed earlier, unless a judgment of
conviction had already been rendered in the BP 22 case finding the accused debtor criminally liable
and ordering him to pay the amount of the check(s).
Facts:
Sammy Yap obtained a ₱2 million loan from PDCP Development Bank, Inc. (PDCP), now known as First e-
bank Corporation. Sammy’s parents, petitioners Simon Yap and Milagros Guevarra, executed a third-party
mortgage on their land and warehouse standing on it as a security. The mortgage agreement allowed PDCP
to extrajudicially foreclose in case of default. In addition, Sammy issued a promissory note and six postdated
checks as securities.
When Sammy defaulted, PDCP presented the checks but were dishonored. Due to the events, PDCP filed a
complaint for six counts of violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law). After which, PDCP filed an application
for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage on the property.
Upon Sammy’s motion and without objection from the public prosecutor and PDCP, the complaint was
provisionally dismissed. However, pursuant to the petition of PDCP to extrajudicially foreclose the property,
and extrajudicial sale was set.
Petitioners Sps. Yap filed in RTC of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, a complaint for injunction, damages and
accounting of payments against PDCP. The complaint sought to stop the sale on the ground that PDCP waived
its right to foreclose the mortgage on their property when it filed BP 22 cases against Sammy.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Sps. Yap and held that PDCP waived its right to foreclose when it elected to
sue Sammy. According to RTC, PDCP had 3 options when Sammy defaulted: enforcement of promissory note
in collection cases, enforcement of check under Negotiable Instruments Law or BP 22, or foreclosure of
mortgage. These remedies are alternative.
PDCP appealed to CA and CA ruled in favor of PDCP. It said that PDCP was not barred from exercising the
right to foreclose because the purpose of BP 22 was to punish the act of issuing worthless check.
Sps. Yap appealed the decision and said that when Sammy was sued for 6 counts of violation of BP 22, PDCO
should have been deemed to have simultaneously filed for collection of the amount of the represented checks.
The civil aspect of such action was the collection of Sammy’s obligation, and PDCP elected that remedy, so
PDCP should no longer be allowed to foreclose the mortgage.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Sps. Yap was correct that filing a complaint for violation of BP 22 barred PDCP from foreclosing
the mortgaged property.
Ruling/s:
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No, Sps. Yap were not correct. Their position was based on Supreme Court Circular 57-97, which provides
for the rules and guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases under BP 22. Pertinent portions of
Circular 57-97 provide:
1. The criminal action for violation of [BP] 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding
civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.
2. Xxx
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced,
it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If
the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with the pertinent
procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the actions as thus
consolidated. (emphasis supplied)
Here, Circular 57-97 was not yet in force when PDCP sued Sammy for violation of BP 22 and when it filed for
extrajudicial foreclosure on the mortgaged property of Sps. Yap. Thus, prior to the effectivity of Circular
57-97, the alternative remedies of foreclosure of mortgage and collection suit were not barred even if
a suit for BP 22 had been filed earlier, unless a judgment of conviction had already been rendered in
the BP 22 case finding the accused debtor criminally liable and ordering him to pay the amount of the
check(s).
In this case, no judgment of conviction (which could have declared the criminal and civil liability of Sammy)
was rendered because Sammy moved for the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, PDCP could have still
foreclosed on the mortgage or filed a collection suit.
However, records show that Sammy has already paid a portion of the loan. So to prevent unjust enrichment
on the part of the creditor, any foreclosure by PDCP should only be for the unpaid balance.
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Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corporation

G.R. No. 167246, July 20, 2011
BRION, J.
Topic: Rule 2 – Cause of Action
Case Doctrine/s:
Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present:
1. identity of the parties in the two actions;
2. substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties;
3. and the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in
one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action, such as whether
the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action (also known as the
"same evidence" test), or whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the
other. Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action in the second case
existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.
Facts:
Umale entered into a two-year contract of lease with respondent corporation. Before the expiration of the
lease, respondent corporation filed an unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the MTC docketed as
Civil Case No. 8084. The respondent used as a ground for ejectment the petitioner's violation of stipulations
in the lease contract regarding the use of the property. Under this contract, the petitioner shall use the leased
lot as a parking space for light vehicles and as a site for a small drivers' canteen, and may not utilize the
subject premises for other purposes without the respondent's prior written consent. The petitioner, however,
constructed restaurant buildings and other commercial establishments on the lot, without first securing the
required written consent from the respondent, and the necessary permits from the Association and the Ortigas
& Co. Ltd. Partnership. The petitioner also subleased the property to various merchants-tenants in violation of
the lease contract.
MTC decided in favor of the respondent. RTC reversed the decision of MTC. Respondent filed a petition for
review with the CA.
While the case was pending with the CA, respondent again filed another case for unlawful detainer on the
ground that the lease contract has already expired. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9210. MTC
decided in favor of the respondent. RTC reversed the decision on Civil Case. 9210 on the ground of litis
pendentia. CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled that there was no litis pendentia; thus the petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not litis pendentia exist between Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210.
Ruling/s:
No. We disagree with the petitioner and find that there is no litis pendentia.
As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and
vexatious.
Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present:

1. identity of the parties in the two actions;
1. substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties;
1. and the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in
one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
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Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action. (S3 R2 of ROC) If two or more suits are
instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the ling of one or a judgment on the merits in any one is
ground for the dismissal of the others. (S4 R2 of ROC)
Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action, such as whether
the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action (also known as the
"same evidence" test), or whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the
other. Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action in the second case
existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.
Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the cause of
action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint — and to which we
answer in the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the
petitioner's violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the
expiration of the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint on October 10,
2000, the lease contract between the parties was still in effect. It was only at the expiration of the lease contract
that the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the respondent as
a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in the second case was not yet in existence at
the time of filing of the first ejectment case.
In response to the petitioner's contention that the similarity of Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 rests on
the reiteration in the second case of the cause of action in the first case, we rule that the restatement
does not result in substantial identity between the two cases. Even if the respondent alleged violations
of the lease contract as a ground for ejectment in the second complaint, the main basis for ejecting the
petitioner in the second case was the expiration of the lease contract. If not for this subsequent
development, the respondent could no longer file a second complaint for unlawful detainer because an
ejectment complaint may only be filed within one year after the accrual of the cause of action, which, in the
second case, was the expiration of the lease contract.
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CATALINA B. CHU, THEANLYN B. CHU, THEAN CHING LEE B. CHU,

THEAN LEEWN B. CHU, and MARTIN LAWRENCE B. CHU , petitioners,
vs. SPOUSES FERNANDO C. CUNANAN and TRINIDAD N. CUNANAN,
BENELDA ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and SPOUSES
G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011.
BERSAMIN, J.
Topic: Splitting of Cause of Action and its Effects
Case Doctrine/s
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon
the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Facts
Spouses Manuel and Catalina Chu (Chus) executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage involving
their five parcels of land. In favor of Trinidad N. Cunanan (Cunanan) for the consideration of
P5,161,090.00.
They also executed a so-called side agreement, whereby they clarified that Cunanan had paid only
P1,000,000.00 to the Chus despite the Chus, as vendors, having acknowledged receiving P5,161,090.00; that
the amount of P1,600,000.00 was to be paid directly to Benito Co and to Security Bank and Trust Company
(SBTC) in whose favor the five lots had been mortgaged; and that Cunanan would pay the balance of
P2,561.90.00 within three months, with a grace period of one month subject to 3%/month interest on any
remaining unpaid amount.
The parties further stipulated that the ownership of the lots would remain with the Chus as the vendors and
would be transferred to Cunanan only upon complete payment of the total consideration and compliance with
the terms of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage.
Thereafter, the Chus executed a special power of attorney authorizing Cunanan to borrow P5,161,090.00 from
any banking institution and to mortgage the five lots as security, and then to deliver the proceeds to the Chus
net of the balance of the mortgage obligation and the downpayment. Cunanan later transferred two of the lots
to spouses Amado and Gloria Carlos (Carloses) on July 29, 1987.
Subsequently, Cunanan was able to transfer the titles on her name without the knowledge of the Chus, and
acquire a loan from the bank with the lots as a security without paying the purchase price to the Chus. This
caused the annotation of the unpaid vendor’s lien on the three lots by the Chus. Nonetheless, Cunanan still
assigned the remaining three lots to Cool Town Realty on May 25, 1989 despite the annotation.
Thereafter, the Chus commenced a civil action against the Cunanans to recover the unpaid balance, and was
later on amended to seek the annulment of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. The Chus have
also impleaded Cool Town Realty as additional defendants.
Considering that the Carloses have already sold the two lots to Benelda Estate, the Chus further amended
their complaint impleading the latter. In its response Benelda Estate filed its answer and motion to dismiss
alleging that the Chus had no cause of action because the former acted in good faith and with all diligence in
ascertaining any encumbrance over the lots. The RTC denied Benelda Estate’s motion, but was reversed
when it was brought in the CA.
Subsequently, the Chus, the Cunanans, and Cool, Town Realty have entered into a compromise agreement
which was later on approved by the RTC.
Thereafter petitioner brought another suit against the Carloses and Benelda Estate seeking the cancellation
of title over the two lots in the latter’s possession. Petitioner amended the complaint and impleaded the
Cunanans once again. The Cunanans moved to dismiss the amended complaint based on two grounds,
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namely: (a) bar by prior judgment, and (b) the claim or demand had been paid, waived, and abandoned.
Benelda Estate likewise moved to dismiss the amended complaint, citing as grounds: (a) forum shopping; (b)
bar by prior judgment, and (c) failure to state a cause of action. On their part, the Carloses raised aCrmative
defenses in their answer, namely: (a) the failure to state a cause of action; (b) res judicata or bar by prior
judgment; and (c) bar by statute of limitations.
On April 25, 2002, the RTC denied both motions to dismiss, holding that the amended complaint stated a
cause of action against all the defendants; that the action was not barred by res judicata because there was
no identity of parties. The Cunanans sought for reconsideration but was denied.
On November 19, 2002, the CA promulgated its decision, 17 granting the petition for certiorari and nullifying
the challenged orders of the RTC. The CA ruled that the compromise agreement had ended the legal
controversy between the parties with respect to the cause of action arising from the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage covering all the 5ve parcels of land; that Civil Case No. G-1936 and Civil Case No.
12251 involved the violation by the Cunanans of the same legal right under the deed of sale with assumption
of mortgage; and that the 5ling of Civil Case No. 12251 contravened the rule against splitting of a cause of
action, and rendered Civil Case No. 12251 subject of a motion to dismiss based on bar by res judicata.
ISSUE/S
Was Civil Case No. 12251 barred by res judicata although the compromise agreement did not expressly
include Benelda Estate as a party and although the compromise agreement made no reference to the lots
now registered in Benelda Estate’s name?
RULING
Yes.
In the construction or interpretation of a compromise agreement, the intention of the parties is to be

ascertained from the agreement itself, and effect should be given to that intention. Thus, the compromise
agreement must be read as a whole. The following pertinent portions of the compromise agreement indicate
that the parties intended to thereby settle all their claims against each other. The intent of the parties to
settle all their claims against each other is expressed in the phrase any and all their respective claims
against each other as alleged in the pleadings they respectively filed in connection with this case, which was
broad enough to cover whatever claims the petitioners might assert based on the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage.
Apparently, the petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce or rescind the deed
of sale with assumption of mortgage. Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or
indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions upon
them. A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided in order to be
made the subject of two or more different actions.
The petitioners were not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage and to prosecute piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a
special relief was sought under the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, and then to leave the rest to
be presented in another suit; otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. Their splitting violated the
policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective was to avoid unduly burdening the
dockets of the courts. Their contravention of the policy merited the dismissal of Civil Case No. 12251
on the ground of bar by res judicata.
Yet, in order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: — (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d)
there must be between the first and second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of the subject
matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
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The first requisite was attendant. Civil Case No. G-1936 was already terminated under the compromise
agreement, for the judgment, being upon a compromise, was immediately final and unappealable. As to the
second requisite, the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action in Civil Case No. G-1936 for the
enforcement or rescission of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, which was an action whose
subject matter was not capable of pecuniary estimation. That the compromise agreement explicitly settled
the entirety of Civil Case No. G-1936 by resolving all the claims of theparties against each other indicated
that the third requisite was also satisfied.
In fine, the rights and obligations of the parties vis-Ã -vis the five lots were all defined and governed by the
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, the only contract between them. That contract was single and
indivisible, as far as they were concerned. Consequently, the Chus could not properly proceed against the
respondents in Civil Case No. 12251, despite the silence of the compromise agreement as to the Carloses
and Benelda Estate, because there can only be one action where the
contract is entire, and the breach total, and the petitioners must therein recover all their claims and
damages.The Chus could not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make that single cause of
action the basis of several suits.
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RIVIERA GOLF CLUB, INC., vs. CCA HOLDINGS, B.V.

G.R. No. 173783, June 17, 2015
BRION, J.
Topic: Splitting of a single cause of action and its effects
Case Doctrine/s:
A cause of action may give rise to several reliefs, but only one action can be filed. A single cause of action or
entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided into two or more different actions. The test of identity of
causes of action rests on whether the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present
causes of action.
Facts:
Riviera Golf, is the owner of Riviera Golf Club (Club), a 36-hole golf course and recreational facility in Silang,
Cavite. On October 11, 1996, Riviera Golf entered into a Management Agreement with CCA Holdings, B.V.
(CCA Holdings), a foreign corporation, for the management and operation of the Club for a period of 5 years.
Under this agreement, Rivera Golf would pay CCA Holdings a monthly Base Management Fee plus an
incentive Management Fee of 10%.
The parties also entered into a co-terminous Royalty Agreement that would allow Riviera Golf and the Club's
CCA Holdings’ name and facilities where Rivera Golf and AFP-RSBS will pay CCA Holdings a gross licensing
fee.
Riviera Golf defaulted in its payment of the licensing fees and the reimbursement claims and likewise failed to
pay the monthly management and incentive fees prompting CCA Holdings to demand the amounts due under
both agreements. Riviera Golf sent CCA Holdings a letter informing the latter that it was pre-terminating the
Management Agreement purportedly to alleviate the financial crisis and the Royalty Agreement was also
deemed pre-terminated. CCA Holdings protested and demanded that Rivera Golf settle its unpaid
management and royalty fees to which the latter refused.
CCA Holdings filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money with damages and during the pendency of
the case, the parties tried to extrajudicially settle and executed a compromise agreement par 4 of which reads
“xxx shall not be construed as a waiver of or with prejudice to plaintiff's rights/cause of action, if any, arising
from or relative to the pre-termination of the parties' Management and Royalty Agreements xxx ” which the
RTC approved.
Subsequently, CCA Holdings again sent a letter to Riviera Golf, this time, demanding the sum of
US$390,768.00 representing the expected business profits it was supposed to derive for the unexpired two-
year term of the Management Agreement. As its demands went unheeded, CCA Holdings filed another
complaint for sum of money. Rivera Golf filed a Motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and violation
of the rule against splitting of causes of action. CCA holdings opposed the motion contending that there is no
splitting of causes of action since the two cases are entirely independent of each other.
RTC granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the first and second complaints have identical causes of action
and subject matter. CA set aside the order granting the motion to dismiss and held that res judicata and
splitting of a single cause of action were not committed.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not CCA Holdings violated the prohibitions against splitting a single cause of action when
it filed the claim for damages for unrealized profits
2. Whether or not the par 4 of the compromise agreement is valid
Ruling/s:
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YES. The Court is convinced that there is identity of causes of action between the first and the second
complaints. A cause of action may give rise to several reliefs, but only one action can be filed. A single cause
of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided into two or more different actions.
In both Civil Cases, CCA Holdings imputed the same wrongful act — the alleged violations of the terms and
conditions of the Management and Royalty Agreements. In Civil Case No. 01-611, CCA Holdings' cause of
action rests on Riviera Golf's failure to pay the licensing fees, reimbursement claims, and monthly
management and incentive fees. In Civil Case No. 03-399 on the other hand, CCA Holdings' cause of action
hinges on the damages it allegedly incurred as a result of Riviera Golf's premature termination of the
Management and Royalty Agreements. Although differing in form, these two cases are ultimately anchored on
Riviera Golf's breach of the Management and Royalty Agreements. Thus, we conclude that they have identical
causes of action.
The test of identity of causes of action rests on whether the same evidence would support and establish the
former and the present causes of action. Under the same evidence test, when the same evidence support and
establish both the present and the former causes of action, there is likely an identity of causes of action.
The pleadings and record of the present case show that there is a glaring similarity in the documentary
evidence submitted to prove the claims under the two complaints. The pieces of evidence both in the collection
of unpaid management and royalty fees, and the recovery of damages for the expected business profits aim
at establishing the breach of the Management and Royalty Agreements. Based on the allegations in the two
complaints, the facts that are necessary to support the second complaint would have been sufficient to allow
CCA Holdings to recover in the first complaint. The similarity in the pieces of evidence in these two cases
therefore strongly suggests the identity of their causes of action.
2.) A reading of paragraph 4 of the Compromise Agreement shows that it allows the filing of complaints based
on the same cause of action. Since paragraph 4 allows the splitting of causes of action and res judicata, this
provision of the Compromise Agreement should be invalidated for being repugnant to our public policy.
Because it is contrary to our policy against multiplicity of suits, we cannot uphold paragraph 4 of the
Compromise Agreement to be valid, for we would then render legitimate the splitting of causes of action and
negate the prohibition against res judicata.
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Perez v. Hermano
G.R. No. 147417, July 8, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Topic: Rule 2 – Joinder of Causes of Action
Case Doctrine/s:
The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions
which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded
in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant
idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between
them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should
nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject
always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not
authorized.
Facts:
Petitioner spouses and Aviso filed three causes of action based on the following allegations. Sometime in
November 1997, the spouses Perez and Aviso entered into a Contract to Sell with Zecson Land Inc. as the
buyer through its president Zenie Sales-Contreras. The subject properties were five parcels of land valued at
P19, 104, 000. In the agreement entered into by the parties, Zecson Land Inc. shall pay a down payment to
the spouses and Aviso, another portion of the purchase price will be given as cash advance upon the execution
of the contract, while the rest shall be used by Zecson as payment for loans earlier contracted by the three
from the company. This is the first cause of action.
In the second cause of action, the spouses Perez and Aviso contend that they were tricked to sign other
documents simultaneous with the execution of the Contract to Sell. Two of the said documents were mortgage
deeds over the same 5 properties in favour of respondent Hermano, whom they have never met. Sales-
Contreras allegedly explained to them that “the mortgage contracts would merely serve to facilitate the
payment of the price agreed upon in their Contract to Sell.” However, the spouses and Aviso assert that it
was never their intention to mortgage their properties to Hermano and that they have never received a single
centavo from mortgaging their properties to him. They now then seek a TRO against Hermano who informed
them that he would be foreclosing the subject properties.
In their third cause of action, the spouses and Aviso pray for damages against Zecson Land, Inc. and/or Zenie
Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and Antonio Hermano. They claim that they are entitled to damages
from the aforementioned defendants for Zecson and Contreras’ failure to comply with their obligations under
their Contract to Sell and in misleading and misrepresenting them into mortgaging their properties to Hermano,
who in turn, had not paid them the proceeds thereof.
Thus, the first cause of action was for enforcement of contract to sell entered into between the spouses and
Aviso and Zecson, the second was for annulment or rescission of two contracts of mortgage entered into
between the spouses and Aviso and Hermano, while the last one was for damages against all the mentioned
defendants. A joinder was made on these causes of action and a civil case for Enforcement of Contract and
Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction
against Zescon Land, Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and against
respondent herein Antonio Hermano was filed before the RTC.
Hermano denied the spouses and Aviso’s allegations through his Answer with Counterclaim. Hermano also
filed a “Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for Separate Trial" which was granted
by the trial court on the ground that there was a misjoinder in the causes of action. As a consequence,
Hermano was dropped from the civil case. The spouses Perez and Aviso moved for reconsideration but was
also denied by the trial court. So, they filed an original action for certiorari before the CA.
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The CA dismissed the petition "for having been filed beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 4,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended." The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed
by the petitioners was also denied. Hence this petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the trial court erred in dropping Hermano in the civil action and ruling that there was a
misjoinder in the causes of action.
Ruling/s:
YES. The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions
which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded
in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant
idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between
them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should
nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject
always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not
authorized.
What the SC gathered from the trial court’s Orders was that the trial court ruled that there was a misjoinder in
the civil case filed because it did not comply with the conditions on joinder of parties. It is well to remember
that the joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties or different parties. If the joinder involves
different parties, as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law common to both parties joined,
arising out of the same transaction or series of transaction.
It can be deduced from the averments made in the complaint that there are questions of fact and law common
to both Zecson Land, Inc. and Hermano arising from a series of transaction over the same properties.
There is the question of fact, for example, of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc., indeed misled petitioners to
sign the mortgage deeds in favor of respondent Hermano. There is also the question of which of the four
contracts were validly entered into by the parties. Note that under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, for a mortgage
to be valid, it is imperative that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. Thus, respondent
Hermano will definitely be affected if it is subsequently declared that what was entered into by petitioners and
Zescon Land, Inc., was a Contract of Sale (as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by them)
because this would mean that the contracts of mortgage were void as petitioners were no longer the absolute
owners of the properties mortgaged. Finally, there is also the question of whether or not Zescon Land, Inc.,
as represented by Sales-Contreras, and respondent Hermano committed fraud against petitioners as to make
them liable for damages.
Thus, the petition was granted, the Orders of the RTC were annulled and set aside, and the RTC was ordered
to add respondent Antonio Hermano as one of the defendants in Civil Case filed by spouses Perez and Aviso.
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Sps. Danilo and Cristina Decena v. Sps. Pedro and Valeria Piquero
G.R. No. 155736, March 31, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.
Topic: Joinder and Misjoinder of Causes of Action
Case Doctrine/s:
A cause of action may be single although the plaintiff seeks a variety of remedies. The mere fac that the
plaintiff prays for multiple reliefs does not indicate that he has stated more than one cause of action. The
prayer may aid in interpreting the petition and in determining whether or not more than one cause of action is
alleged even though other matters are incidentally involved and although different acts, methods, elements of
injury, items of claims, or theories of recovery are set forth.
Facts:
Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena (Petitioners) owned a house and lot in Paranaque City covered by TCT
No. 134391. On September 7, 1997, the Decena spouses executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with
Spouses Pedro and Valeria Piquero (Respondents) in which they sold the property to Respondents for the
price of P940,250.00 payable in 6 installments via postdated checks. Respondents thereafter took possession
of the property.
On May 17, 1999, Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession, and
damages against Respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan because the first 2
checks drawn were dishonored by the drawee bank, and when they demanded payment from Respondents,
Respondents refused to replace the checks with cash. Respondents, in fine, filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over the property subject matter of the action. Petitioners
insisted that their action for damages and attorney’s fees is a personal action and can therefore be filed in the
RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, where they currently reside. Petitioners explained that, although the property which
is the subject matter of the case is located elsewhere, the action for recovery of possession thereof may be
joined with their other action. The trial court ruled in favor of Petitioners and denied Respondents’ motion,
basing its denial on Rule 2, Section 5(c).
● Section 5(c) of Rule 2 provides that “a party may, in one pleading, assert, in the alternative or otherwise,
as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following
conditions… (c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to different
venues or jurisdiction, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC, provided one of the causes of action
falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein…”
Issue/s:
Does Rule 2, Section 5(c) apply in this case?
Ruling/s:
Rule 2, Section 5(c) does not apply in this case. Petitioners have only one cause of action against
Respondents, which is the breach of the MOA upon Respondents’ refusal to pay the first 2 installments. The
claim for damages for reasonable compensation for Respondents’ use and occupation of the property, as well
as moral and exemplary damages suffered by Petitioners on account of such breach of the MOA, are merely
incidental to the main cause of action and are not independent or separate causes of action. Since the only
cause of action is a real action pertaining to the house and lot in Paranaque, the complaint shall be filed in the
RTC of Paranaque and not the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
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Flores v. Mallare-Phillipps
G.R. No. L-66620, September 24, 1986
FERIA, J.
Topic: Rule 2 – Joinder of Parties
Case Doctrine/s:
Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate
causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has
separate causes of action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the causes
of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the
same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as provided
in Section 6 of Rule 3.
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the
total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or
being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in
each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
Facts:
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Heilia S. Mallare- Phillipps of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province which dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner
did not attach to his petition a copy of his complaint in the erroneous belief that the entire original record of the
case shall be transmitted to this Court pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 39 of BP 129. This
provision applies only to ordinary appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals (Section 20 of
the Interim Rules). Appeals to this Court by petition for review on certiorari are governed by Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court (Section 25 of the Interim Rules).
The order appealed from states that the first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against respondent
Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which he
purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions from August to October, 1981; and the second cause
of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00
representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on several occasions from March,
1981 to January, 1982.prcd
On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal fled a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section
19(8) of BP 129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand
is more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that although another
person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was
separate and distinct from that of the other respondent. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule
introduced in Section 33(1) of BP 129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
Issue/s:
Whether or not application of the totality rule under Section 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11
of the Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule
3.
Ruling/s:
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Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate
causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has
separate causes of action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the causes
of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the
same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as provided
in Section 6 of Rule 3.
If the separate claims against the several defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there is a common question of law or fact, they would now be under the jurisdiction of the
regional trial court.
In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section
6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead
of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount
demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of
parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful
scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against
respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.
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Verzosa v. Fernandez
G.R. No. 25254; November 22, 1926
STREET, J.
Topic: Natural and Juridical Persons, Entities Authorized by Law
Case Doctrine/s:
A Roman Catholic Bishop having the right of supervision and inspection over religious brotherhoods
established in his bishopric may maintain a civil action to compel the persons comprising the directorate of
such a fund in their custody, it being alleged that they are using it in contravention of the spirit and purposes
of the trust.
Facts:
Monseñor Alfredo Verzosa (as Roman Catholic Apostolic Bishop for the diocese of Lipa, constituted as a
unipersonal religious corporation) instituted a case to compel defendants (Zosimo Fernandez, Salvador
Unson, Tomas Cabreza, Ramon Fabella, Pedro F. Caballes, and Pedro Lavadia) and to account for a fund
held by them as trustees pertaining to the Brotherhood of the Most Holy Sacrament of the town of Pagsanjan
and for other purposes. The defendants demurred to the amended complaint because of the following reasons:
1. The plaintiff has no right to maintain an action; 2. The facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a
cause of action; 3. The court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Upon hearing the cause, the trial court
sustained the demurrer and upon election of the plaintiff not to amend further, the court dismissed the action.
The plaintiff appealed. Hence, this petition.
● As can be gleaned from its history, on February 20, 1807, a number of individuals constituting or
representing the guild of sangley mestizos of the pueblo of Pagsanjan, in the Province of Laguna united
themselves into a religious association or brotherhood for the purpose of raising and supplying, from
year to year, the means necessary to meet the expenses of the annual fiestas in honor of the Most
Holy Sacrament and of their patroness the Virgen Lady of Guadalupe, as well as for the purpose of
procuring the celebration of an annual requiem mass for the repose of the souls of the deceased
members. It was approved by their superior, the Archbishop of Manila, who was at the time upon a
pastoral visit in Pagsanjan, and the brotherhood was formally organized under the name of La
Archicofradia del Santisimo Sacramento. Under the law as it then existed, royal approval was essential
to the legality of an association of this character; and it was not until July 23, 1819, that a royal cedula
was issued by the king of Spain, placing the brotherhood upon a lawful basis and defining the manner
in which it should be organized and conducted. Meanwhile, however, under the approval of the
Archbishop, the association had begun exercising its functions and had maintained a de facto
existence from the time of its first organization.
● TLDR: In other words, the religious association or brotherhood was constituted to meet the expenses
of the annual fiestas. It was later on approved by the Archbishop of Manila. Royal approval/royal cedula
was issued by the King of Spain placing the brotherhood with a lawful basis of existence. However, in
the complaint, it was shown that the defendants were circumventing and used the funds in their custody
in contravention of the spirit and purposes of the trust.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the court has jurisdiction over the case?
2. Whether Bishop Verzosa has the personality to maintain his action in enforcing the trust/compelling
the defendants to account for the funds held by them?
Ruling/s:
1. Yes. In the exercise of their equitable powers our courts have undoubted jurisdiction to compel a trustee
properly to perform his trust and, if necessary, to remove him from office.
2. Yes. As ecclesiastical superior of the parish priest (who is ex officio Rector of the Brotherhood), the Bishop
necessarily has an interest in the enforcement of the trust, even apart from the duty imposed upon his
predecessor, the Archbishop of Manila in the closing paragraph of the royal cedula, to enforce exact and
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punctual performance of the trust. As stated in the opening paragraph of this opinion, the demurrer to the
amended complaint is of a general character, being directed to the questions of the jurisdiction of the court,
the right of the plaintiff to maintain the action, and the sufficiency of the facts stated to constitute a ground of
action. None of the points presented in the demurrer are as well founded.
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NEMENCIO EVANGELISTA v. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO

G.R. No. 157447, April 29, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Topic: Parties to Civil Actions- Real parties in interest
Case Doctrine:
An action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real
property which is the subject matter of the action
Facts:
Petitioners Nemencio Evangelista et al. alleged that they occupied and possessed parcels of land located in
Barangay San Rafael, Province of Rizal by virtue of several Deeds of Assignment executed by one Ismael
Favila Rodrguez. According to the Deeds of Assignment, the subject property was part of a vast tract of land
awarded to Dom Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain evidenced by a Spanish title and that Ismael Favila claims
to be one of the heirs of Don Rodriguez. Ismale Favila then assigned portions of the subject property to the
petitioners in exchange for their labor and work.
Petitioners learned that respondent Carmelino Santiago was planning to evict them from the subject property.
Respondent claims that it was his mother, Isabel Santiago that executed a deed of donation transferring the
property to him. Petitioners filed with the trial court an action for declaration of nullity of respondents certificates
of title on the basis that it was fake and spurious.
Respondent filed his affirmative defense claiming that petitioners had no legal capacity to file the complaint
and this, the complaint stated no cause of action. Since his OCT No. 670 was genuine and authentic on its
face, then all of respondents' titles are incontrovertible and indefeasible. He further argued that P.D No. 892,
required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration of their lands within six months from
effectivity of the decree. After the given period, Spanish titles could no longer be used as evidence of land
ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens System.
The RTC held a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses as prayed for by respondent after which, it
dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioners ruling that were not the lawful owners of the land subject of
this case, for they did not comply with PD 892, the said plaintiffs do not have the legal standing to bring before
this Court the instant complaint.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are real parties in interest.
Ruling:
The Court believes that the trial court rightfully dismissed petitioners’ Complaint, but for reasons different from
those relied upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
In their Complaint, petitioners asserted title over the Subject Property. Petitioners further averred that rather
than an action for nullity of respondent’s certificates of title, theirs was more appropriately an action to remove
a cloud on or to quiet their title over the Subject Property. However, Petitioners failed to establish in their
Complaint that they had any legal or equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to
justify their right to file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title. In their Complaint, petitioners claimed
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title to the Subject Property by virtue of their actual and continuous possession of the same since time
immemorial. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in their favor, attached to and an integral
part of their Complaint, revealed that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest based their right to the Subject
Property on the Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
Petitioners failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their Complaint aside from possession of the Subject
Property from time immemorial, which this Court has already controverted; and the Spanish title, which is
already ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject Property. Therefore, without legal or equitable title to
the Subject Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting
of, title and their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of action.
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V-Gent, Inc. vs. Morning Star Travel and Tours

G.R. No. 186305, July 22, 2015
BRION, J.
Topic: Rule 3 – Parties to Civil Actions
Case Doctrine/s:
An agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name and without joining the principal when the following
elements concur: (1) the agent acted in his own name during the transaction; (2) the agent acted for the benefit
of an undisclosed principal; and (3) the transaction did not involve the property of the principal.
Facts:
In 1998, VGent bought 26 two-way plane tickets (Manila-Europe-Manila) from Morning Star Travel and Tours,
Inc. Later, V-Gent returned 15 unused tickets worth $8,747.50 out of which, Morning Star only refunded 6
tickets worth $3,445.62. In 2000, V-Gent filed a money claim against Morning Star for payment of the
unrefunded $5,301.88 plus attorney's fees.
Morning Star countered that tickets were bought on the airline company's "buy one, take one" promo. It alleged
that there were only 14 unused tickets and only 7 of these were refundable; considering that it had already
refunded 6, there was nothing else to refund. It also questioned V-Gent's personality to file the suit. It asserted
that the passengers, in whose names the tickets were issued, are the real parties-in-interest.
Citing Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, 3 the MeTC declared that, as agent of the passengers who paid
for the tickets, V-Gent stood as the real party-in-interest. However, the case was still dismissed for failure of
Vgent to prove its money claim by preponderance of evidence. The issue on legal standing was not raised
before RTC but the latter reversed the ruling of MeTC on money claims on the basis of preponderance of
evidence. Upon appeal, the issue on legal standing was revived and CA held that V-Gent is not a real party-
in-interest because it merely acted as an agent of the passengers who bought the tickets from Morning Star
with their own money.
Issue/s:
1. WON VGent is the real party-in-interest and has a legal standing.
2. WON by making a partial refund to VGent, Morning Star is estopped from refusing to make a full refund
on the ground that VGent is not the real party-in-interest.
3. WON the ruling of MeTC that VGent is the real party-in-interest had become final and executory upon
failure of Morning Star to raise this issue on appeal to RTC, and therefore, cannot be reviewed by CA.
Ruling/s:
1. NO. V-Gent admits that it purchased the plane tickets on behalf of the passengers as the latter's
agent. The tickets were issued in the name of the passengers and paid for with the passengers'
money; hence, the passengers are the real party-in-interest.
Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest — the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. In suits where an agent represents a party,
the principal is the real party-in-interest; an agent cannot file a suit in his own name on behalf of the
principal subject to certain exceptions.
Under Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court an agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name and
without joining the principal when the following elements concur: (1) the agent acted in his own name
during the transaction; (2) the agent acted for the benefit of an undisclosed principal; and (3) the
transaction did not involve the property of the principal.
When these elements are present, the agent becomes bound as if the transaction were its own. This
rule is consistent with Article 1883 of the Civil Code which says: Art. 1883. If an agent acts in his own
name, the principal has no right of action against the persons with whom the agent has contracted;
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neither have such persons against the principal. In such case, the agent is the one directly bound in
favor of the person with whom he has contracted, as if the transaction were his own, except when the
contract involves things belonging to the principal. The provisions of this article shall be understood to
be without prejudice to the actions between the principal and agent.
In the present case, only the first element is present; the purchase order and the receipt were in the
name of V-Gent. However, the remaining elements are absent because: (1) V-Gent disclosed the
names of the passengers to Morning Star — in fact the tickets were in their names; and (2) the
transaction was paid using the passengers' money. Therefore, Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
cannot apply.
1. NO. The power to collect and receive payments on behalf of the principal is an ordinary act of
administration covered by the general powers of an agent. On the other hand, the filing of suits is an act of
strict dominion.
Under Article 1878 (15) of the Civil Code, a duly appointed agent has no power to exercise any act of
strict dominion on behalf of the principal unless authorized by a special power of attorney. An agent's
authority to file suit cannot be inferred from his authority to collect or receive payments; the grant of
special powers cannot be presumed from the grant of general powers. Moreover, the authority to
exercise special powers must be duly established by evidence, even though it need not be in writing.
By granting the initial refund, Morning Star recognized V-Gent's authority to buy the tickets and collect
refunds on behalf of the passengers. However, Morning Star's recognition of V-Gent's authority to
collect a refund for the passengers is not equivalent to recognition of V-Gent's authority to initiate a
suit on behalf of the passengers. Morning Star therefore, is not estopped from questioning V-Gent's
legal standing to initiate the suit.
1. No. The MeTC dismissed V-Gent's complaint against Morning Star for failure to prove its claim. This
dismissal meant that the plaintiff did not prove a violation of its right for which the defendant should be held
liable. This ruling was plainly a judgment in Morning Star's favor and one that it had no cause to question.
Indeed, it would be legally illogical for Morning Star to file an appeal to question a ruling of dismissal in its
favor.
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Oposa v. Factoran
G.R. No. 101083 July 30,1993
DAVIDE, JR., J.
Topic: Rule 3- Parties to Civil Actions- Representatives as parties
Case Doctrine/s:
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation
of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations
Facts:
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded
as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of
our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this
petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion
by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are
all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves
and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn.
They prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint
shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
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On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the
said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and
that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and
ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
Issue/s:
WON the petitioners, as representatives of minors has the right to bring action to the judicial power of the
Court
Ruling/s:
YES. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
future generations.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf
of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
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Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait v. Sec. Angelo Reyes
G.R. No. 180771. April 21, 2015
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Topic: Parties to Civil Actions – Representative as parties
Case Doctrine/s:
Any Filipino Citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action
to enforce rights or obligations under environment laws. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases filed
enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle
that humans are stewards of nature.
Facts:
The “resident marine mammals” in the petition are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, which inhibit the waters in and around the Tanon Strait. They are represented by Ramos and Eisma-
Osorio (Stewards) as their legal guardians and as friends. The Government of the Philippines, acting through
the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration. This contract involved geological and
geophysical studies of the Tanon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and
reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. Japex, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite
surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tanon Strait. DOE and JAPEX formally converted the Contract for
exploration into a contract for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block
covering approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tanon Strait. JAPEX committed to drill one
exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was part of Tanon Strait which was
declared a protected seascape, JAPEX agreed tom comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment
requirements. JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province
which made the petitioners apply to the court for redress. Petitioners protest the adverse ecological impact of
JAPEX’s oil exploration activities showing that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. The
respondents contend that Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file the present
petition.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petition?
Ruling/s:
Yes, it had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only natural and juridical
persons should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by
themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in representation of these animals or inanimate
objects. Locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. The court has
passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases which allow for “citizen suit” which
permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws. This
liberalizes standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on
personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature.
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In the Matter of the Heirship of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez

G.R. No. 182645, December 15, 2010
PERALTA, J.
Topic: Rule 3 – Indispensable Parties
Case Doctrine/s:
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and
who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The
presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear
and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a
suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.
Facts:
Henry, Certeza and Rosalina's claim to the intestate estate of the late Hermogenes Rodriguez, a former
gobernadorcillo, is based on the following lineage: that Antonio and Hermogenes were brothers and the latter
died in 1910 without issue, leaving Antonio as his sole heir, as their grandfather.
At the initial hearing of the petition on 14 November 1989, nobody opposed the petition. Having no oppositors
to the petition, the RTC entered a general default against the whole world, except the Republic of the
Philippines. After presentation of proof of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, the RTC allowed Henry,
Certeza and Rosalina to submit evidence before a commissioner in support of the petition. After evaluating
the evidence presented, the commissioner found that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the grandchildren in
the direct line of Antonio and required them to present additional evidence to establish the alleged fraternal
relationship between Antonio and Hermogenes. Taking its cue from the report of the commissioner, the RTC
rendered a Partial Judgment declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs in the direct descending line of
the late Antonio, Macario and Delfin and appointing Henry as regular administrator of the estate of the
decedents Delfin, Macario and Antonio, and as special administrator to the estate of Hermogenes.
Henry filed the bond and took his oath of office as administrator of the subject estates. Subsequently, six
groups of oppositors entered their appearances either as a group or individually, namely: (1) The group of
Judith Rodriguez; (2) The group of Carola Favila-Santos; (3) Jaime Robles; (4) Florencia Rodriguez; (5)
Victoria Rodriguez; and (6) Bienvenido Rodriguez
Only the group of Judith Rodriguez had an opposing claim to the estate of Antonio, while the rest filed opposing
claims to the estate of Hermogenes. In his opposition, Jamie Robles likewise prayed that he be appointed
regular administrator to the estates of Antonio and Hermogenes and be allowed to sell a certain portion of land
included in the estate of Hermogenes.
After hearing on Jamie Robles' application for appointment as regular administrator, the RTC issued an Order
declaring him to be an heir and next of kin of decedent Hermogenes and thus qualified to be the administrator.
Accordingly, the said order appointed Jaime Robles as regular administrator of the entire estate of
Hermogenes and allowed him to sell the property covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio Manggahan,
Pasig Rizal.
The RTC rendered a decision declaring Carola Favila-Santos and her co-heirs as heirs in the direct
descending line of Hermogenes and reiterated its ruling in the partial judgment declaring Henry, Certeza and
Rosalina as heirs of Antonio. The decision dismissed the oppositions of Jamie Robles, Victoria Rodriguez,
Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez, for their failure to substantiate their respective claims of
heirship to the late Hermogenes.
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On 13 August 1999, the RTC issued an Amended Decision reversing its earlier finding as to Carola Favila-
Santos. This time, the RTC found Carola Favila-Santos and company not related to the decedent
Hermogenes. The RTC further decreed that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the heirs of Hermogenes. The
RTC also re-affirmed its earlier verdict dismissing the oppositions of Jaime Robles, Victoria Rodriguez,
Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez. Robles then appealed the August 13, 1999 Decision of the
RTC by filing a Notice of Appeal, but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order for Robles' failure to
file a record on appeal. Robles questioned the denial of his appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari
with this Court.
In a Resolution, this Court referred the petition to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits on
the ground that the said court has jurisdiction concurrent with this Court and that no special and important
reason was cited for this Court to take cognizance of the said case in the first instance. The CA rendered
judgment annulling the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC.
Henry Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and his group moved for the reconsideration of the CA decision, but the same
was denied in a Resolution. Rodriguez and his co-respondents did not appeal the Decision and Resolution of
the CA. On the other hand, Robles filed an appeal with this Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision. This
Court issued a Resolution denying the petition of Robles and, thereafter, the said Resolution became final and
executory. Thus, the instant petition was filed.
The basic contention of Robles in the instant Motion is that he is a party-in-interest who stands to be adversely
affected or injured or benefited by the judgment in the instant case. He also argues that the failure of service
upon him of a copy of the instant petition as well as petitioner's memorandum, and the fact that he was not
required or given the opportunity to file his comment or answer to the said petition nor served with any order,
resolution or any other process issued by this Court in the instant petition, is a clear denial of his right to due
process.
In his Comment and Opposition, petitioner contends that Robles has no legal standing to participate in the
instant petition. Petitioner argues that in an original action for certiorari, the parties are the aggrieved party
against the lower court and the prevailing party. Petitioner claims, however, that Robles was never impleaded,
because he was not the prevailing party in the assailed Decision of the CA as well as the questioned Order of
the RTC. Petitioner further avers that the inclusion of Robles' name as respondent in the caption of the instant
petition was a result of a clerical error which was probably brought about by numerous cases filed with this
Court involving Robles and the subject estate.
Issue/s:
Whether or not Robles is an indispensable party.
Ruling/s:
Yes, Robles is an indispensable party. He stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome of the petition.
He has an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect his rights, such that the
courts cannot proceed without his presence. Robles is interested in sustaining the assailed CA Decision,
considering that he would benefit from such judgment. As such, his non-inclusion would render the petition
for certiorari defective. Petitioner, thus, committed a mistake in failing to implead Robles as respondent.
The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the
court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just.
If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss
the complaint/petition for the plaintiff’s/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.
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Cerezo v. Tuazon
G.R. No.141538 , March 23, 2004
CARPIO, J.
Topic: Indispensable Party
Case Doctrine/s:
An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom
no final resolution of the case is possible. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-
delict is solidary. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the
other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either.
Facts:
Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger bus with plate number NYA 241 collided
with a tricycle bearing plate number TC RV 126 along Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines, Mabalacat,
Pampanga. On 1 October 1993, tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as
owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo (Atty. Cerezo), and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda
(Foronda) alleging that his negligence, carelessness and imprudence resulted to severe damage to the tricycle
and serious physical injuries to plaintiff thus making him unable to walk and becoming disabled, with his thumb
and middle finger on the left hand being cut.
On 1 October 1993, Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a pauper. Subsequently, the trial court issued summons
against the Cerezo spouses after many attempts, the alias summons and a copy of the complaint were finally
served on 20 April 1994 at the office of Atty. Cerezo, who was then working as Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor.
Atty. Valera appeared on behalf of the Cerezo spouses. Atty. Valera filed an urgent ex-parte motion praying
for the resolution of Tuazons motion to litigate as a pauper and for the issuance of new summons on the
Cerezo spouses to satisfy proper service in accordance with the Rules of Court. The Court denies the prayer
in the Appearance and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion requiring new summons to be served to the defendants.
On 30 August 1994, the trial court issued an order resolving Tuazons motion to litigate as a pauper and the
Cerezo spouses urgent ex-parte motion. The Court is satisfied from the unrebutted testimony of the plaintiff
that he is entitled to prosecute his complaint in this case as a pauper under existing rules. The trial court issued
an order directing the Cerezo spouses to file their answer within fifteen days from receipt of the order. The
Cerezo spouses did not file an answer. Tuazon filed a motion to declare the Cerezo spouses in default.
On 30 May 1995, after considering Tuazons testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court ruled in
Tuazons favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on Forondas liability because there was no service of
summons on him.
Mrs. Cerezo received a copy of the decision on 25 June 1995. On 10 July 1995, Mrs. Cerezo filed before the
trial court a petition for relief from judgment on the grounds of fraud, mistake or excusable
negligence.Testifying before the trial court, both Mrs. Cerezo and Atty. Valera denied receipt of notices of
hearings and of orders of the court. The trial court issued an order denying the petition for relief from judgment.
The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Section 1 of
Rule 65. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48132.[14The petition questioned whether the trial
court acquired jurisdiction over the case considering there was no service of summons on Foronda, whom the
Cerezo spouses claimed was an indispensable party.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the CA committed an error in ignoring the allegation that defendant-driver Danilo A. Foronda
whose negligence is the main issue is an indispensable party whose presence is compulsory but [whom] the
lower court did not summon.
Ruling/s:
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NO.
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos' assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. An indispensable party
is one whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of
the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezos liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only
solidary, it is also primary and direct.Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazons
action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary
obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each
debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only
mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable,
and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either.
Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo
alone.
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Foster-Gallego vs. Spouses Galang

G.R. No. 130228. July 27, 2004
CARPIO, J.
Topic: Rule 3 – Parties to Civil Actions: Indispensable Parties
Case Doctrine/s:
An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. A person is not an
indispensable party if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other
parties, so that he will not necessarily be injuriously affected by a decree that does complete justice between
the other parties. He is also not indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief between
him and those already parties to the action or will simply avoid multiple litigations.
Facts:
Vive Realty Corporation (VRC) acquired several properties at a public auction held by the Municipal Treasurer
of Paranaque (Treasurer) on October 1982. Among these properties was a parcel of land (Property) located
in Barrio Kaybiga, Paranaque, Metro Manila. The sale was perfected and ordered the Register of Deeds to
cancel the transfer certificates of title and to issue new titles in the name of VRC.
On June 1984, the Spouses Galang purchased the Property from VRC. The Spouses Galang took possession
of the Property and had it declared in their name for taxation purposes. They diligently paid the corresponding
real property taxes.
In April 1989, Romeo Galang came home from Saudi Arabia and discovered a hollow block fence along the
perimeter of the Property. Gallego built the fence in March 1989. Although the Spouses Galang brought the
matter to the Barangay Lupon for possible settlement, Gallego failed to appear at the barangay hall and instead
sent his lawyer. On May 1989, the Spouses Galang filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, Gallego alleged that his brother, Bernabe Foster-Gallego, owned the
Property. Gallego denied that his brother was delinquent in the payment of real property taxes. Gallego
asserted that his brother had never received a notice of delinquency or a notice of the public auction of the
Property
Gallego failed to appear at the pre -trial conference and was declared in default and allowing the Spouses
Galang to present their evidence ex parte. On 10 March 1990, Gallego filed a motion to lift the order of default
and to admit his pre-trial brief while Bernabe Foster-Gallego (petitioner) filed a motion for intervention with an
attached answer-in-intervention. RTC denied Gallegos motion but granted the petitioners motion. Petitioner
then filed on August 1990 a motion to admit third-party complaint, to include third-party defendant VRC, as
well on the Municipality (now City), Treasurer, and Register of Deeds of Paranaque.
The RTC favored the Spouses Galang which led Gallego and petitioner to jointly file a Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals praying to annul the order. The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. Gallego and petitioner then elevated the matter to this Court, which denied their petition and subsequent
motion for reconsideration for lack of reversible error.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners appeal from the trial courts orders
disallowing petitioner’s intervention
2. Whether petitioner is an indispensable party to the action for quieting of title.
Ruling/s:
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1. NO. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing petitioner’s appeal. It is true that an order denying a
motion for intervention is appealable. Where the lower courts denial of a motion for intervention amounts to a
final order, an appeal is the proper remedy, as when the denial leaves the intervenor without further remedy
or resort to judicial relief.
However, the issue of whether petitioner correctly appealed the assailed orders of the trial court to the Court
of Appeals is beside the point since petitioner did not interpose his own appeal. Petitioner merely joined
Gallegos appeal from the trial court’s decision.
A prospective intervenor’s right to appeal applies only to the denial of his intervention. Not being a party to the
case, a person whose intervention the court denied has no standing to question the decision of the court.
Petitioner thus had no legal personality to join Gallego in assailing the decision of the trial court. Petitioner
could question only the trial courts orders denying his intervention and striking off from the records his answer-
in-intervention, not the decision itself.
Moreover, petitioner filed his notice of appeal out of time. Petitioner lost his right to appeal when he exceeded
the fifteen-day period granted by law. Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration on the thirteenth day of his
fifteen-day period to appeal. The filing of a motion for reconsideration merely suspends the running of the
period to appeal. Once the court denies the motion, the aggrieved party has only the remaining period from
receipt of the order of denial to file his appeal. Petitioner thus had only two days from his receipt on 23 January
1995 of the trial courts order denying the reconsideration, or up to 25 January 1995, to perfect his appeal to
the Court of Appeals. Petitioners failure to interpose his appeal on time rendered the assailed orders of the
trial court final.
Petitioner argues that his tardiness of one day is excusable, and cannot defeat his property rights. Petitioner
does not, however, offer any valid justification for the late filing of his appeal. The trial court had a valid reason
to deny petitioners intervention. An intervention is ordinarily not permitted if the prospective intervenors rights
can be fully protected in a separate proceeding. In this case, even if the trial court allowed it, petitioners
intervention in the action for quieting of title would have been futile.
2. NO. The petitioner is not an indispensable party to the action of quieting of title. An indispensable party is a
party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made,
in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. A person is not an indispensable party if his interest
in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that he will not
necessarily be injuriously affected by a decree that does complete justice between the other parties.
Petitioner, whose title was cancelled, is not an indispensable party to the action for quieting of title. The
assailed decision quieting title in favor of the Spouses Galang has no appreciable effect on petitioner’s title.
Petitioner’s title could still be cancelled with or without the trial courts declaration that the Spouses Galang are
the owners of the Property at this time.
Further, the assailed decision does not bind petitioner. The rules on quieting of title expressly provide that any
declaration in a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice persons who are not parties to the action. Given that the
trial court denied petitioners intervention and struck it off from the records, petitioner is not a party to the instant
case. Suits to quiet title are actions quasi in rem, and the judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only
between the parties to the action.
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Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar

G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016
LEONEN, J.
Topic: Necessary Parties
Case Doctrine/s:
To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he [or she]
must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced.
Facts:
Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane of Sampaguita Street, United
Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City. A Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number PKM 19512 was
travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes. To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left
and hit Reyes. Alex Espinosa (Espinosa), a witness to the accident, went to her aid and loaded her in the back
of the van. Espinosa told the driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to bring Reyes to the hospital.
Instead of doing so, Bautista appeared to have left the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still
in the van. Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital.
Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van was Caravan. Caravan is a corporation
engaged in the business of organizing travels and tours. Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned to drive
the van as its service driver.
Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes. Despite medical attendance, Reyes died two (2)
days after the accident.
Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and the person who raised her since she was
nine (9) years old, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a Complaint for damages against Bautista
and Caravan. In her Complaint, Abejar alleged that Bautista was an employee of Caravan and that Caravan
is the registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.
Caravan's Motion for Reconsideration was denied through the October 20, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial
Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Regional Trial Court's July 31, 2003 Decision and
October 20, 2003 Order.
Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring this suit because she is not a real party in interest.
According to Caravan, Abejar does not exercise legal or substitute parental authority. She is also not the
judicially appointed guardian or the only living relative of the deceased. She is also not "the executor or
administrator of the estate of the deceased." According to Caravan, only the victim herself or her heirs can
enforce an action based on culpa aquiliana such as Abejar's action for damages.
Issue/s:
Whether respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar is a real party in interest who may bring an action for damages
against petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. on account of Jesmariane R. Reyes' death.
Ruling/s:
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YES. Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss and is, thus, a real party
in interest in this case. In her Complaint, respondent made allegations that would sustain her action for
damages: that she exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes; that Reyes' death was caused by the
negligence of petitioner and its driver; and that Reyes' death caused her damage. Respondent properly filed
an action based on quasi-delict. She is a real party in interest.
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a real party in interest: “A real party in interest
is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest.” Respondent's capacity to file a complaint against petitioner stems
from her having exercised substitute parental authority over Reyes.
Article 233 of the Family Code provides for the extent of authority of persons exercising substitute parental
authority, that is, the same as those of actual parents.
Both of Reyes' parents are already deceased. Reyes' paternal grandparents are also both deceased. The
whereabouts of Reyes' maternal grandparents are unknown. There is also no record that Reyes has brothers
or sisters. It was under these circumstances that respondent took custody of Reyes when she was a child,
assumed the role of Reyes' parents, and thus, exercised substitute parental authority over her. As Reyes'
custodian, respondent exercised the full extent of the statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent.
Consistent with Article 220 of the Family Code, respondent supported Reyes' education and provided for her
personal needs. To echo respondent's words in her Complaint, she treated Reyes as if she were her own
daughter.
Respondent's right to proceed against petitioner, therefore, is based on two grounds.
First, respondent suffered actual personal loss. With her affinity for Reyes, it stands to reason that when Reyes
died, respondent suffered the same anguish that a natural parent would have felt upon the loss of one's child.
It is for this injury — as authentic and personal as that of a natural parent — that respondent seeks to be
indemnified.
Second, respondent is capacitated to do what Reyes' actual parents would have been capacitated to do.
We note that Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. Having reached the age of majority, she was
already emancipated upon her death. While parental authority is terminated upon emancipation, respondent
continued to support and care for Reyes even after she turned 18. Except for the legal technicality of Reyes'
emancipation, her relationship with respondent remained the same. The anguish and damage caused to
respondent by Reyes' death was no different because of Reyes' emancipation.
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SPOUSES ANTONIO F. ALGURA and LORENCITA S.J. ALGURA vs. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT
OF THE CITY OF NAGA, ATTY. MANUEL TEOXON, ENGR. LEON PALMIANO, NATHAN SERGIO and
BENJAMIN NAVARRO, SR.
G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006
VELASCO, JR., J.
Topic: Rule 3 – Parties to Civil Actions
Case Doctrine/s:
Section 21 of Rule 3 provides that the adverse party may still contest the grant of the authority later,
at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. This challenge may be based on newly
discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court determines after
hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the
proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment
is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment of prescribed fees
shall be made, without prejudice to other sanctions the court may impose.
Facts:
On September 1, 1999, Spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S. J. Algura filed a Verified
Complaint for damages against the Naga City government and its officers. They alleged that the
defendants had caused the illegal demolition of their residence, thus depriving them of income in the
form of monthly rentals amounting to P7,000 paid by their boarders. Accompanying the Complaint
was petitioners’ ex parte Motion to institute action as indigent litigants. To this Motion was appended
Antonio Algura’s pay slip showing a gross monthly income of P10,474.00 and a net pay of P3,616.99
for the month of July 1999. Also attached was a certification by the Office of the City Assessor of Naga
City, stating that petitioners had no property declared in their names for taxation purposes. The city
government filed a Motion to Disqualify the spouses for nonpayment of filing fees. Respondents had
asserted that in addition to the net income of Antonio, who was a member of the Philippine National
Police, Lorencita had a ministore and a computer shop on the ground floor of their residence.
Allegedly, petitioners were not indigent litigants, as they also derived additional income from several
boarders who paid them rentals, according to respondents. On April 14, 2000, the Naga City RTC
issued an Order disqualifying petitioners from being recognized as indigent litigants. They had
allegedly failed to substantiate their claim for exemption from payment of legal fees and from
compliance with the third paragraph of Section 18 of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, directing
them to pay the requisite filing fees. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
On May 5, 2000, the trial court issued an Order giving them the opportunity to comply with Section 18
of Rule 141, which had laid down the requisites for qualifying as an indigent litigant. Petitioners
subsequently submitted their Compliance, to which was attached the Affidavits of Petitioner Lorencita
Algura and one Erlinda Bangate. In her Affidavit, Lorencita claimed that the demolition of their small
dwelling deprived them of a monthly income amounting to P7,000. This situation forced them,
including their six minor children, to rely mainly on her husband’s P3,500 monthly salary as a
policeman. She said that the family’s basic necessities could not be covered sufficiently by this salary,
the meager income from her small sari-sari store, and the rentals from some boarders. Furthermore,
they did not own any real property, as certified by the Naga City assessor’s office. On the other hand,
Erlinda Bangate attested under oath that she personally knew the Algura spouses, who were her
neighbors. She corroborated Lorencita’s statements. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the Naga City RTC. The lower court held that the gross income or total earnings of the
Alguras amounted to P10,474, which was over and above the amount of P3,000 a month set under
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Rule 141, Section 18, for pauper litigants residing outside Metro Manila. Nowhere in her Affidavit did
Lorencita deny that she and her immediate family earned a gross income of P3,000.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the Alguras should be considered indigent litigants qualified for exemption from the payment
of filing fees.
Ruling/s:
Tracing the history of the Rules of Court on suits in forma pauperis (pauper litigant), the High
Court, through Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr.,[1] clarified the pertinent rules as follows: 1. When an
application to litigate as an indigent party is filed, the court shall scrutinize the affidavits and supporting
documents submitted, in order to determine if the income and property standards prescribed in the
present Section 19 of Rule 141 have been met. The court must determine if: (1) the applicant’s gross
income and that of the immediate family do not exceed an amount double the monthly minimum wage
of an employee; and (2) the applicant does not own real property with a fair market value of more than
P300,000. If the trial court finds that these income and property requirements have been met, it
automatically grants the applicant the authority to litigate as an indigent litigant, and the grant is a
matter of right. 2. If the trial court finds that one or both requirements have not been met, it shall set a
hearing to enable the presentation of proof that the applicant has “no money or property sufficient and
available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.” In that hearing, the adverse
party may adduce countervailing evidence to disprove the evidence presented by the applicant.
Afterwards, the trial court will rule on the application, depending on these presentations.
Section 21 of Rule 3 also provides that the adverse party may still contest the grant of the
authority later, at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. This challenge may be based
on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the application was heard. If the court
determines after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income
or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of
court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment
of prescribed fees shall be made, without prejudice to other sanctions the court may impose.
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Divinagracia v. Parilla
G.R. No. 196750, 11 March 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Topic: Parties to Civil Actions- Misjoinder and Joinder of Parties
Case Doctrine/s:
All the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action
for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable
Facts:
Conrado Nobleza, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) owned a 313-square meter parcel of land located at Cor. Fuentes-
Delgado Streets, Iloilo City. During his lifetime, he contracted two marriages: (a) the first was with Lolita
Palermo with whom he had two (2) children, namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.; and (b) the second was with
Eusela Niangar with whom he had seven (7) children, namely, Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial,
Celedonio, Ceruleo,7 and Cebeleo, Sr. Conrado, Sr. also begot three (3) illegitimate children, namely,
Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. Mateo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and was survived by his children
Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord. Cebeleo, Sr. also pre-deceased his father
and was survived by his wife, Maude, and children Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.
According to Santiago, upon Conrado, Sr.’s death, Cresencio, Conrado, Jr., Felcon (in representation of his
father, Mateo, Sr., and his siblings), Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia, Rogelio, Eduardo, and Ricardo sold their
respective interests over the subject land to Santiago for a consideration of P447,695.66, as embodied in a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale dated November 22, 1989 which was,
however, not signed by the other heirs who did not sell their respective shares, namely, Ceruleo, Celedonio,
and Maude (in representation of his husband, Cebeleo, Sr., and their children). On December 22, 1989, the
same parties executed a Supplemental Contract whereby the vendors-heirs and Santiago agreed that out of
the aforesaid consideration, only P109,807.93 will be paid up front, and that Santiago will only pay the
remaining balance of P337,887.73 upon the partition of the subject land. However, Santiago was not able to
have TCT cancelled and the subject document registered because of Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s refusal
to surrender the said title. This fact, coupled with Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude’s failure to partition the
subject land, prompted Santiago to file a Complaint dated January 3, 1990 for judicial partition and for
receivership.
For their part, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude maintained that Santiago had no legal right to file an action for
judicial partition nor compel them to surrender the TCT because, inter alia: (a) Santiago did not pay the full
purchase price of the shares sold to him; and (b) the subject land is a conjugal asset of Conrado Sr. and
Eusela Niangar and, thus, only their legitimate issues may validly inherit the same.
The RTC ordered, among others, the partition of the subject land between Santiago on the one hand, and
Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo, Sr. (i.e., Felcon, et al.) on the other hand and,
consequently, the cancellation of TCT No. T-12255 and the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate certificate in
favor of Santiago and the group of Ceruleo, Celedonio, Maude, and the heirs of Mateo, Sr. The RTC found
that through the subject document, Santiago became a co-owner of the subject land and, as such, has the
right to demand the partition of the same.
However, the CA set aside the RTC Rulings and consequently, dismissed Santiago’s complaint for judicial
partition It held that Felcon’s siblings, as well as Maude’s children, are indispensable parties to the judicial
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partition of the subject land and, thus, their non-inclusion as defendants in Santiago’s complaint would
necessarily result in its dismissal.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that Felcon’s siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children are
indispensable parties to Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition and further dismissed Santiago’s complaint
for his failure to implead said omitted heirs.
Ruling/s:
Yes. Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in the property shall be joined
as defendants, viz.:
SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. – A person having the right to compel the partition of
real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title
and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all
other persons interested in the property.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an
action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr. has the following heirs, legitimate and illegitimate, who
are entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the subject land, namely: Conrado, Jr., Cresencio, Mateo, Sr.,
Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo. However,
both Mateo, Sr. and Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and, thus, pursuant to the rules on representation
under the Civil Code, their respective interests shall be represented by their children, namely: (a) for Mateo,
Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo, Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr.
and Neobel.
The aforementioned heirs – whether in their own capacity or in representation of their direct ascendant – have
vested rights over the subject land and, as such, should be impleaded as indispensable parties in an action
for partition thereof. However, a reading of Santiago’s complaint shows that as regards Mateo, Sr.’s interest,
only Felcon was impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and co-representatives. Similarly, with regard to
Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when pursuant to
Article 97235 of the Civil Code, the proper representatives to his interest should have been his children,
Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. Verily, Santiago’s omission of the aforesaid heirs renders his complaint for partition
defective.
In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable parties in the instant complaint for judicial partition
renders all subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties, but even as to those present.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
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Sps. Dela Cruz vs Joaquin

G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005
Panganiban, J.
Topic: Effect of death of party litigant
Case Doctrine/s:
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished,the Rules of Court require a substitution of
the deceased under Section 16 of Rule 3. Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground
to nullify a trial court’s decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.
Facts:
Pedro Joaquin filed a Complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership, the cancellation of title, and damages
against Sps. Dela Cruz in the Regional Trial Court of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. Respondent alleged that
he had obtained a loan from them in the amount of ₱9,000 on June 29, 1974, payable after five (5) years; that is, on
June 29, 1979. To secure the payment of the obligation, he supposedly executed a Deed of Sale in favor of
petitioners. The Deed was for a parcel of land in Pinagpanaan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, covered by TCT No. T-
111802. The parties also executed another document entitled "Kasunduan." Respondent claimed that the
Kasunduan showed the Deed of Sale to be actually an equitable mortgage. Spouses De la Cruz contended that this
document was merely an accommodation to allow the repurchase of the property until June 29, 1979, a right that he
failed to exercise.
On April 23, 1990, the RTC issued a Decision in his favor. The trial court declared that the parties had entered into
a sale with a right of repurchase. Sustaining the trial court, the CA noted that petitioners had given respondent the
right to repurchase the property within five (5) years from the date of the sale or until June 29, 1979. In the March 9,
2004 Resolution, the CA denied reconsideration and ordered a substitution by legal representatives, in view of
respondent’s death on December 24, 1988.
Petitioners assert that the RTC’s Decision was invalid for lack of jurisdiction. They claim that the respondent died
during the pendency of the case. There being no substitution by the heirs, the trial court allegedly lacked jurisdiction
over the litigation.
Issue/s:
Whether the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Pedro Joaquin on December 24, 1988
Ruling/s:
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NO. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished,the Rules of Court require a substitution
of the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3, which reads thus:
Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel. –Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is
not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after
such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of
an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice. If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if
the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a
specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased, and the
latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
The records of this case contain a "Motion for Substitution of Party Plaintiff" dated February 15, 2002, filed before
the CA. Evidently, the heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntarily appeared and participated in the case. We stress that the
appellate court had ordered his legal representatives to appear and substitute for him. The substitution even on
appeal had been ordered correctly.
Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process.
Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected,
noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.
Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The
alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.
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Gaffney v. Butler
G.R. No. 219408, November 8, 2017
CAGUIOA, J.
Topic: Rule 3, Sec 1 – Parties to a Civil Action; Deceased person or his estate as a party
Case Doctrine/s:
A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a case.
Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court unequivocally states that "only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action."
Facts:
On September 21, 2011, Donald Francis Gaffney ("private respondent") filed a Complaint against Gina V.
Butler ("petitioner") for sum of money. Private respondent alleged that sometime between the years 2006 to
2007, petitioner and her husband Anthony Richard Butler approached and invited private respondent to invest
in ActiveFun Corporation ("ActiveFun"), an entity engaged in the construction, operation and management of
children's play and party facilities. Petitioner was the President of ActiveFun while her husband was its
Treasurer and Chief Executive Officer.
Private respondent advanced the approximate amount of PhP12,500,000.00 representing his initial investment
in ActiveFun. However, petitioner's husband passed away sometime in December 2009. Consequently, the
proposed investment agreement did not materialize. Private respondent then demanded the return of his
investments from petitioner. However, However, despite the lapse of a considerable period of time, petitioner
was only able to pay private respondent on October 15, 2010 an initial amount of PhP1,000,000.00, receipt of
which was duly acknowledged in writing by private respondent. Several demands through phone calls and e-
mails were made to petitioner for her to comply with her undertaking but to no avail.
On July 13, 2011, a letter was sent to petitioner through registered mail demanding her to pay private
respondent and Richard McDonnell (another party who infused funds into ActiveFun) within ten (10) days from
receipt of the said letter the aggregate amount of PhP25,000,000.00 plus accrued interests. payment.
Petitioner in a letter dated August 2, 2011, denied having knowledge of the investments and having offered to
buy private respondent's share in ActiveFun. Private respondent was thus constrained to institute a legal action
for the enforcement of his claim against petitioner.
In her Answer filed on April 23, 2012, petitioner averred, among others, that she had no knowledge of private
respondent's investment in ActiveFun. She, however, admitted that she paid private respondent the amount
of PhP1,000,000.00 with the qualification that the same was an undue payment, having been misled and
intimidated by the latter into believing that she has an obligation to return said investment, when no such
obligation exists. Moreover, petitioner denied the signature in the Acknowledgment Receipt as hers and
claimed that it is a forgery.
Richard Butler under the original Complaint, private respondent filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended
Complaint for the purpose of impleading the estate or the heirs 6 of the late Anthony Richard Butler, as
additional party-defendant, allegedly represented by petitioner as his surviving spouse. He alleged that
petitioner required him, as a pre-condition for the payment of the balance, to execute a separate handwritten
acknowledgment of the said payment. Petitioner opposed the motion primarily on the ground that "only natural
or juridical persons may be parties in an ordinary civil action."
Issue/s:
Whether or not a deceased or his estate may be named as defendant in an ordinary civil action.
Ruling/s:
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No. A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant in a case.
Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court unequivocally states that "only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action."
Applying this legal provision, the Court, in Ventura v. Militante, declared that neither a deceased person nor
his estate has capacity to be sued, explaining thus:
xxx
Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does not
have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and
should be denied by the court. An action begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by
a legal person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend the party
plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to amend. Considering that capacity to be
sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be
sued and may not be named a party defendant in a court action.
Hence, there can be no doubt that a deceased person or his estate may not be impleaded as defendant in a
civil action as they lack legal personality. Thus, when Anthony died, his legal personality ceased and he could
no longer be impleaded as respondent in the present ordinary civil suit for collection. As such, the complaint
against him should be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action
or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because a
complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil action.
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San Juan v. Cruz

G.R. No. 167321, July 31, 2006
CALLEJO, SR., J.
Topic: Rule 3 – Parties to Civil Actions; Effect of death of party litigant
Case Doctrine/s:
Rule 3 Section 16 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rule that the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for
the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the
specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within a
specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for
the estate of the deceased.
Facts:
Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the devisees
therein. Upon Loreto's death on October 25, 1988, Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino Fled a petition for the probate of
the will in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. While the petition was pending, Oscar Casa died
intestate on May 24, 1999. The firm of Aquino, Galang, Lucas, Espinoza, Miranda & Associates entered their
appearance as counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who claimed to be one of the heirs of Oscar Casa and their
representative.
In 2002, the probate court issued an Order denying the entry of appearance of said law firm, considering that
Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor or administrator of the estate of the devisee, hence, cannot be
substituted for the deceased as his representative as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. On
November 22, 2002, the court issued an order directing Aquino to secure the appointment of an administrator
or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa in order that the appointee be substituted in lieu of the said deceased.
On February 26, 2003, Aquino Fled a pleading entitled "Appointment of Administrator" signed by Candelaria,
Jesus, Arlyn, Nestor, Edna, Benhur, Federico, Rafael and Ma. Eden, all surnamed Casa, on February 24,
2003, praying that one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as administrator of the estate of the
deceased and that he be substituted for the deceased. In compliance with the order of the court, Epifanio San
Juan Fled a "Motion to Declare Appointment of Administrator As Inadequate or insufficient." 4 He maintained
that the heirs should present an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa as the representative of the estate
in the case.
On December 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of San Juan. Contrary to its Order, the
court held that there was, after all, no need for the appointment of an administrator or executor as substitute
for the deceased devisee. It is enough, the court declared, that a representative be appointed as provided in
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. A 1st MR and a 2nd MR were filed but were both denied by the RTC.
San Juan filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on November 22, 2004 for the nullification of the orders
issued by the probate which the CA dismissed on the ground that it was filed beyond the 60-day period counted
from the notice to the petitioner of the trial court’s Feb. 27, 2004 order.
Issue/s:
Whether or not it is necessary for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa
Ruling/s:
NO.
The second paragraph of the Rule 3 Section 6 is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be substituted
for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the
specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within a
specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for
the estate of the deceased. The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals (relied upon by
petitioner), that priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and
that it is only in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases
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where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of
allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no longer true.
The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an administrator of his
estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as
devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executor
of the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as
representatives of the estate. Said heirs may designate one or some of them as their representative before
the trial court.
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ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., petitioners, vs. LUCIO TAN
G.R. No. 145022. September 23, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Topic: Rule 4 - Venue
Case Doctrine/s:
It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.
Facts:
On September 27, 1998, Lucio Tan led a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali,
ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-2288, seeking
moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news
article.
INQUIRER and NOCUM led their joint answer, ALPAP and UMALI likewise led their joint answer, and alleged
therein among others that venue was improperly laid.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an Order dated February 10, 1999, dismissing the complaint
without prejudice on the ground of improper venue.
respondent Lucio Tan led an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the
amended complaint. it is alleged that "This article was printed and rst published in the City of Makati" The
lower court, after having the case dismissed for improper venue, admitted the amended complaint and deemed
set aside the previous order of dismissal.
Dissatisfied, petitioners, together with defendants Capt. Florendo Umali and the Airline Pilots Association of
the Philippines, Inc. (ALPAP), appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
rendered its decision and denied the petition.
Issue/s:
Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil case upon the filing of the original complaint for damages?
Ruling/s:
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Yes. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter
comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. In the case at
bar, after examining the original complaint, we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the
case was led before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent's cause of action is for damages arising from
libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it is
a Court of First Instance that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction
with venue.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature were
printed and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction.
These additional allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent's failure to
include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondent's
failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that venue was not properly laid.
Petitioners' argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege
the place where the libelous articles were printed and rst published would have been tenable if the case led
were a criminal case. The failure of the original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because
this fact involves the issue of venue which goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be
because the case before us is a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional.
The cases cited by petitioners are not applicable here. These cases involve amendments on complaints that
confer jurisdiction on courts over which they originally had none. This is not true in the case at bar. As
discussed above, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter upon the ling of the original complaint.
It did not lose jurisdiction over the same when it dismissed it on the ground of improper venue. The amendment
merely laid down the proper venue of the case.
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Ley Construction and Development Corp. v. Sedano

G.R. No. 222711, 23 August 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Topic: Rule 4 – Venue – When the rules on venue does not apply
Case Doctrine/s:
The venue for personal actions shall - as a general rule - lie with the court which has jurisdiction where the
plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, parties may, through a written
instrument, restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.
Facts:
On March 13, 2012, Ley Construction and Development Corp (LCDC) filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum
of Money and Damages for P8,828,025.46 against Marvin Sedano, operating under the name “Lola Taha Lalo
Pata Palengke at Paluto sa Seaside” before the Valenzuela-RTC. In the complaint, LCDC alleged that it
leased a parcel of land located in Financial Center Area, Pasay City, from PNCC in 2005 and subleased the
lot to Sedano in 2006. Sedano allegedly failed to pay rent from August to December 2011 despite demand,
which led to the complaint.
In Sedano’s Answer, he countered that he has religiously paid his rent to LCDC until PNCC’s demand that he
pay directly to PNCC, pursuant to LCDC’s ejection from the property by court order. Due to such demand,
Sedano paid directly to PNCC.
Sedano also pointed out Section 21 of the lease contract with LCDC, which states:
21. Should any of the party (sic) renege or violate any terms and conditions of this lease contract, it shall be
liable for damages. All actions or case[s] filed in connection with this lease shall be filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all others.
Hence, calling for the dismissal of the case due to improper venue. The Valenzuela-RTC dismissed the case,
granting Sedano’s motion, but held that the stipulation in Section 21 of the lease contract is void insofar as it
limits the filing of cases to the RTC of Pasay City, even when the subject matter jurisdiction is with the
Metropolitan Trial Courts.
Issue/s:
Was the RTC – Valenzuela’s decision to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue erroneous?
Ruling/s:
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NO.
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place
agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but
also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the
intention of the parties respecting the matter.
After a thorough study of the case, the Court is convinced that all these elements are present and that the
questioned stipulation in the lease contract, i.e., Section 21 thereof, is a valid venue stipulation that limits the
venue of the cases to the courts of Pasay City. It states:
21. Should any of the party renege or violate any terms and conditions of this lease contract, it shall be liable
for damages. All actions or case[s] filed in connection with this lease shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City, exclusive of all others.
The above provision clearly shows the parties' intention to limit the place where actions or cases arising from
a violation of the terms and conditions of the contract of lease may be instituted. This is evident from the use
of the phrase "exclusive of all others" and the specification of the locality of Pasay City as the place where
such cases may be filed.
Since the lease contract already provided that all actions or cases involving the breach thereof should be filed
with the RTC of Pasay City, and that petitioner’s complaint purporting the said breach fell within the RTC's
exclusive original jurisdiction, the latter should have then followed the contractual stipulation and filed its
complaint before the RTC of Pasay City. However, it is undeniable that petitioner filed its complaint with the
Valenzuela-RTC; hence, the same is clearly dismissible on the ground of improper venue, without prejudice,
however, to its refiling in the proper court.
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Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and KUBOTA Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 119657, 7 February 1997
NARVASA, C.J.
Topic: Jurisdiction over the Issues
Case Doctrine/s:
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court sets forth the principles generally governing the venue of actions, whether real or
personal, or involving persons who neither reside nor are found in the Philippines or otherwise. Agreements
on venue are explicitly allowed. "By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be changed
or transferred from one province to another." Sec. 3, Rule 4, Rules of Court. Parties may by stipulation waive
the legal venue and such waiver is valid and effective being merely a personal privilege, which is not contrary
to public policy or prejudicial to the third persons. It is a general principle that a person may renounce any right
which the law gives unless such renunciation would be against public policy.
Facts:
On October 8, 1988 Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. and Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. entered
into a “Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services” of the former’s product in Samar and Leyte Provinces.
The contract contained, among others:
1. a stipulation reading: “...All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with / in the proper Courts
of Quezon City,” and
2. a provision binding UNIMASTERS to obtain a credit line with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.-
Tacloban Branch in the amount of P2,000,000.00 to answer for its obligations to KUBOTA.
Five years later, UNIMASTERS filed an action on the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban against KUBOTA,
Reynaldo Go, and Metrobank for damages for breach of contract, and injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order. On the same day the RTC issued a restraining order and set the application for preliminary
injunction for hearing. KUBOTA then filed-two motions, one prayed for dismissal of the case on the ground of
improper venue, and the other for the transfer of the date of the injunction hearing due to the unavailability of
respondent’s counsel on the date first agreed upon. Notwithstanding KUBOTA’s claim that its motion to
transfer hearing has been granted, the RTC went ahead with the hearing on the injunction incident. On January
13, 1994, the RTC handed down an Order authorizing the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for,
upon a bond of P2,000,000.00. And on February 3, 1994, the same Court promulgated an Order denying
KUBOTA's motion to dismiss. Both orders were challenged as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion by KUBOTA in a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition led with the Court of Appeals.
The Appellate Court agreed with KUBOTA. After its motion for reconsideration was turned down by the C,
UNIMASTERS appealed to this Court.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the stipulation regarding the venue had the effect of effectively eliminating the latter as an
optional venue and limiting litigation between Unimasters and KUBOTA only and exclusively to Quezon City.
Ruling/s:
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No. Absent additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and
intention that actions between them should be ventilated only at the place selected by them, Quezon City or
other contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and intention the stipulation should be construed,
not as confining suits between the parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in
Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff. The invariable construction placed on venue
stipulations is that they do not negate but merely complement or add to the codal standards of Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court. In other words, unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical and suitably
limiting language, that they wish the venue of actions between them to be laid only and exclusively at a definite
place, and to disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory
or restrictive, but merely permissive, or complementary of said rule. The fact that in their agreement the parties
specify only one of the venues mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a place for their actions different from those specified
by said rule, does not, without more, suffice to characterize the agreement as a restrictive one.
117

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3C-3D CIVPRO 2020 CASE DIGESTS

Atty. Plaridel Bohol

Compiled Case Digests of 3C-3D 2020

In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon Datumanong

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC

Spouses Gonzales v. Marmaine Realty Corp.

Teresita Tan v. Jovencio F. Cinco, et al.

Yes. The petition is devoid of merit.

The Court explained the doctrine of judicial stability as follows:

Specified Contractors & Dev Inc v. Pobocan

Probable cause on Revilla

Probable Cause against Cambe.

Probable Cause against Napoles.

Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC

Elizabeth M. Lansangan v. Antonio S. Caisip

Abagatnan vs Spouses Clarito

Chavez v. Court of Appeals

Section 19 of BP 129, as amended by RA No. 7691, provides:

SPOUSES CLAUDIO and CARMENCITA TRAYVILLA , petitioners, vs.

Heirs of Reterta v. Spouses Lopez

On September 9, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this appeal.

ESPERANZA SUPAPO et al vs. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND SUSAN DE JESUS et al.

3. NO. Res judicata is not present in the case because:

Spouses Erorita v. Spouses Dumlao

Heirs of Alfredo Bautista v. Lindo

● The petition is meritorious.

HEIRS OF JULAO v. DE JESUS

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED.

LUCIA BERNABE, ET AL. vs. DOMINGO VERGARA

The petition was DISMISSED.

Sps. Trayvilla vs. Sejas

Heirs of Reterta v. Spouses Lopez

On September 9, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this appeal.

Heirs of Tomas Dolleton v. Fil-Estate Management, Inc.

Multi-Realty Development Corp. v. The Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp.

Consular Area Residents Association, INC vs Casanova

Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. vs. Virgilio S. David

NORLINDA S. MARILAG. vs. MARCELINO B. MARTINEZ

Yap v. FIRST e-BANK CORPORATION

Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corporation

Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present:

CATALINA B. CHU, THEANLYN B. CHU, THEAN CHING LEE B. CHU,

In the construction or interpretation of a compromise agreement, the intention of the parties is to be

RIVIERA GOLF CLUB, INC., vs. CCA HOLDINGS, B.V.

NEMENCIO EVANGELISTA v. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Whether or not petitioners are real parties in interest.

V-Gent, Inc. vs. Morning Star Travel and Tours

They prayed for that judgment be rendered:

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

In the Matter of the Heirship of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez

Foster-Gallego vs. Spouses Galang

Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar

Respondent's right to proceed against petitioner, therefore, is based on two grounds.

Sps. Dela Cruz vs Joaquin

San Juan v. Cruz