C.

Determinative Powers

1. Enabling power: to permit or allow something which the law undertakes

to regulate, e.g., grant or denial of licenses to engage in a particular business.

2. Directing power: illustrated by the power of assessment of the BIR or

the Bureau of Customs.

3. Dispensing power: to exempt from a general prohibition, or relieve an

individual or corporation from an affirmative duty, e.g., authority of zoning boards to vary
provisions of zoning ordinances, or the authority of the Acceptance Board of the
Philippine Army to relieve certain persons from military training.

4. Examining power: also called the investigatory power; consists in

requiring production of books, papers, etc., the attendance of witnesses and compelling
their testimony.

a. Power to compel attendance of witnesses not inherent in

administrative body; but an administrative officer authorized to take testimony or
evidence is deemed authorized to administer oath, summon witnesses, require
production of documents, etc..

b. Power to punish contempt must be expressly granted to the

administrative body; and when so granted, may be exercised only when administrative
body is actually performing quasi-judicial functions.

5. Summary power: power to apply compulsion or force against persons or

property to effectuate a legal purpose without a judicial warrant to authorize such action,
e.g., in the fields of health inspections, abatement of nuisances, etc.

D. Quasi-judicial or Adjudicatory Power.

1. Proceedings partake of the character of judicial proceedings.

Administrative body is normally granted the authority to promulgate its own rules of
procedure, provided they do not increase, diminish or modify substantive rights, and
subject to disapproval by the Supreme Court [Sec. 5(5), Art VIII, Constitution], The
requisites of procedural due process must be complied with.

2. Administrative due process:

a. The requisites of administrative due process, as enumerated in

Ang Tibay v. CIR, 40 O.G. 7th Supp. 129 are:

i. Right to a hearing;
ii. Tribunal must consider evidence presented;
iii. Decision must have something to support itself;
 iv. Evidence must be substantial;
v. Decision must be based on the evidence adduced at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties;
vi. The Board or its judges must act on its or their
independent consideration of the facts and the law of the case, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision; and,
vii. Decision must be rendered in such a manner that the
parties to the controversy can know the various issues involved and the reasons for the
decision rendered.

b. Cases:

i. In Ute Paterok v. Bureau of Customs, 193 SCRA 132, the

Supreme Court held that in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the allegedly
prohibited article is known, mere posting of the notice of hearing in the respondent’s
Bulletin Board does not constitute compliance with procedural due process.

ii. Due process demands that the person be duly informed of

the charges against him. He cannot be convicted of an offense with which he was not
charged. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental
procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings.
The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable in administrative
proceedings [Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, G.R. No. 127838, January 21, 1999],
The essence of due process is that a party be afforded reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense. In
administrative proceedings such as the one at bench, due process simply means the
opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of; a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times,
necessary [Padilla v. Sto. Tomas, 243 SCRA 155; M. Ramirez Industries v. Secretary of
Labor, 266 SCRA 483; Napolcom v. Bemabe, G.R. No. 129943, May 12, 2000].

iii. In Arboleda v. NLRC, G.R. No. 119509, February 11,

1999, the Supreme Court said that the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The requirement of notice and
hearing in termination cases does not connote full adversarial proceedings, as actual
adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when there is a need
to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. This is a
procedural right which the employee must ask for since it is not an inherent right, and
summary proceedings may be conducted thereon.

iv. In Lumiqued v. Exenea, G.R. No. 117565, November 18,

1997, it was held that administrative due process does not necessarily require the
assistance of counsel. But in Gonzales v. NLRC and Ateneo de Davao University, G.R.
No. 125735, August 26, 1999, the Supreme Court held that there was a violation of
administrative due process where the teacher was dismissed by the university without
having been given full opportunity to confront the “witnesses” against her.

v. However, administrative due process cannot be fully

equated to due process in the strict judicial sense [Ocampo v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 114683, January 18, 2000], The standard of due process that
must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element
of fairness is not ignored; even in the absence of previous notice, there is no denial of
due process as long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard [Adamson v.
Amores, 152 SCRA 237].

vi. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process

simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. “To be heard” does not mean only
verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard through pleadings. Where opportunity
to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process [Casimiro v. Tandog, G.R. No. 146137, June 8, 2005].

vii. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and

giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations
against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. As long as the party
was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due
process. Moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in
administrative proceedings; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due
process in its strict judicial sense [Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 161086, November 24, 2006].

3. Administrative determinations where notice and hearing are not

necessary for due process.

a. Grant of provisional authority for increased rates, or to engage in

a particular line of business [RCPI v. National Telecommunications Commission, 184
SCRA 517; PLDT v. National Telecommunications Commission, 190 SCRA 717].

b. Summary proceedings of distraint and levy upon the property of

a delinquent taxpayer.

c. Cancellation of a passport where no abuse of discretion is

committed by Secretary of Foreign Affairs [Suntay v. People, 101 Phil 770].

d. Summary abatementof a nuisance perse which affects the

immediate safety of persons or property [Art. 704, Civil Code of the Philippines].

e. Preventive suspension of a public officer or employee pending

investigation of administrative charges filed against him [Sec. 51, Book V, Title I,
Subtitle A, Administrative Code of 1987].
 4. Right against self-incrimination.

a. In Cabal v. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1064, it was held that since the

administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent therein may result
in the forfeiture of the property under R.A. 3019, the complainant cannot call the
respondent to the witness stand without encroaching on his right against self-
incrimination. In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 345, the same rule
was followed in administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner where the
proceedings could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice medicine.

b. This right may be invoked by the respondent at the time he is

called by the complainant as a witness; however, if he voluntarily takes the witness
stand, he can be cross-examined; but he may still invoke the right at the time the
question which calls for an answer which incriminates him of an offense other than that
which is charged is asked.

5. Power to punish contempt is inherently judicial; may be exercised only if

expressly conferred by law, and when administrative body is engaged in the
performance of its quasi-judicial powers (Dumarpa v. Dimaporo, 177 SCRA 478).

6. Administrative decisions not part of the legal system. Art. 8 of the Civil
Code recognizes judicial decisions applying or interpreting statutes as part of the legal
system of the country. But administrative decisions do not enjoy that level of
recognition. A memorandum-circular of a bureau head could not operate to vest a
taxpayer with a shield against judicial action. For there are no vested rights to speak of
respecting a wrong construction of the law by the administrative officials and such
wrong interpretation could not place the Government in estoppel to correct or overrule
the same [Philippine Bank of Communications v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 112024, January 28, 1999].

7. Administrative Appeal and Review.

a. Where provided by law, appeal from an administrative

determination may be made to a higher or superior administrative officer or body.

b. By virtue of the power of control which the President exercises

over all executive departments, the President — by himself — or through the Department
Secretaries (pursuant to the “alter ego” doctrine), may affirm, modify, alter, or reverse the
administrative decision of subordinate officials and employees (Araneta v. Gatmaitan,
101 Phil 328).
c. The appellate administrative agency may conduct additional
hearings in the appealed case, if deemed necessary [Reyes v. Zamora 90 SCRA 92].
 8. Doctrine of res judicata.

a. In Ysmael v. Deputy Executive Secretary, 190 SCRA 673, the

Supreme Court said that decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon
their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the
doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of
the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general
jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once
determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction.

b. In United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma, 288 SCRA

15, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that the doctrine of res judicata applies to
adversary administrative proceedings. Thus, because proceedings for certification
election are quasi-judicial in nature the decisions therein can attain finality.

c. However, the doctrine does not apply in administrative

adjudication relative to citizenship [Board of Commissioners, CID v. Judge de la Rosa,
197 SCRA 853], On questions of citizenship, the doctrine of res judicata can apply only
when the following conditions mentioned in Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra., obtain:

i. the question of citizenship is resolved by a court or an

administrative body as a material issue in the controversy after a full-blown hearing;

ii. with the active participation of the Solicitor General; and

iii. the finding made by the administrative body on the

citizenship issue is affirmed by the Supreme Court.