Facts: BPEA (respondents) filed a complaint by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against

petitioners BOP (secretary of Department of General Services and Director of BOP). The complaint
alleged that both the secretary of DOG and the director of BOP have been engaging in unfair labor
practices. Answering the complaint, the petitioners (BOP), denied the charges of unfair labor practices
attributed to them and alleged that the BPEA complainants were suspended pending result of
administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations; that the BOP is
not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but of the republic performing governmental
functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But later on January
27, 1959, the trial judge of Industrial Court sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the
functions of the BOP are exclusively proprietary in nature, since they receives outside jobs and that
many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and holidays, therefore
consequently denied the prayed for dismissal, which brought the petitioners (BOP) to present petition for
certiorari and prohibition.

Issue: Whether or not the BOP can be sued.

Held: As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the BOP cannot be
sued (Sec.1, Rule 33, Rules of court).
It is true that BOP receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on
regular working days and holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are
exclusively proprietary in nature. Overtime work in the BOP is done only when the interest of the service
so requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such
payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it
cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character.
Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or
proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued
without its consent, much less over its jurisdiction.
Disposition: The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and
the complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents
other than the respondent court.








Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993

Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for
security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their
arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA.
Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay,
uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages
against the DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency
for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did
not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of
execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency.
Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case

Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that the State may not be sued without its
consent reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express
affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the
very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any
circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The States consent may be given expressly or impliedly.
Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other
hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or
when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level
of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.

But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction
must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another
which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental
entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act
proprietary in character.

But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Act
No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising
from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD
1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.


















Sanders v. Veridiano GR L-46930 (June10, 1988)
FACTS:

Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was the
commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with
permanent residence in the Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as
game room attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA.
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted
from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and
regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of
their permanent full-time status.
However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report.
The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and
supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be
difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the
case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could
hear."
Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval
Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status. So, private respondent
filed for damages alleging that the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the
grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.
However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their
official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state
immunity. However, the motion was denied on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any
evidence that their acts were official in nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?

RULING:
Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision
over its personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of the letters, the
petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government because they have acted on
behalf of that government and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that government and not the
petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his
personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if
appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character
will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort
committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the
officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a
foreign state, as in the present case.
Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of
damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the
United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages
awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent.
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign states, the rule is
derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem
non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations."
Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we
reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.


















Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program. There was a
marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a
result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of
conducting an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the heirs of
the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based on such
recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the Republic and
the military/police officers involved in the incident.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages
Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the petitioners. The
recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does
not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of
the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a
cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the
Commission does not in any way bind the State.
The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were responsible for
the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled
rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were
responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority,
hence, the acts cannot be considered official.










US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487
Facts:

The usa had a naval base in subic, zambales. The base was one of those provided in the military bases
agreement between phils. and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US
for the constrcution of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another group. For this reason, a
suit for specific preformance was filed by him against the US.
Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be
able to invoke state immunity.
Held:
The traditional role of the state immunity excempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state
without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of independence and
equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and
evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them
between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietary acts. the result is that
state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be
sued. Only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relates the
exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both US and phils., indisputably, a function of the government of highest order,
they are not utilized for , nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.












Facts

An expropriation proceeding was filed by the Municipality of Makati, herein petitioner, against the private
property of Arceli Jo. In compliance to PD 42, the petitioner opened an account under its name at PNB
depositing an amount of P417,510.00. The court fixed the appraised value of the expropriated property at
P5,291,666.00 and an advanced payment was made in the amount of P338,160 leaving a balance of
P4,953,506. After the decision becomes final and executory, the private respondent moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution. A notice of garnishment was thereafter issued by the court to the PNB
account. A manifestation was filed by the petitioner informing the court that the private respondent was no
longer the true owner of the expropriated property. The court consolidated the ownership of the property
to PSB as a mortgagee/purchaser. The private respondent and PSB agreed to divide the compensation
due from the expropriation proceeding. The judge ordered PNB to immediately release to them the sum
of P4,953.506 corresponding to the balance of the appraised value of the expropriated property. The PNB
bank manager refused as he is waiting for the approval of their head office. The Municipality of Makati
contends that its fund with DBP could neither be be garnished or levied upon execution for to do so would
result to the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law. The
lower court denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner ruling that the account with DBP of the
petitioner was an account specifically opened for the expropriation proceeding. Petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the lower courts decision. A petition for review with a
prayer for preliminary injunction was filed to the S.C. A temporary restraining order was issued by the
S.C.
Issue
Whether or not the PNB funds may be levied in the expropriation proceeding ?
Held
The petitioner belatedly informed the court that there are two existing accounts with PNB. Account A was
the one intended for the expropriation proceeding and account B is primarily intended for financing
governmental functions and activities. Because account A has a fund that is insufficient to meet the
remaining amount of its balance for the expropriation proceeding, it is unlawful to get the remaining
balance from Account B without an ordinance appropriating said funds for expropriation purpose. Thus
the court ruled that account A maybe levied but not account B. The respondents are without recourse
however should the petitioner refuse to pay its remaining obligation. Where a municipality refuses without
justifiable reason to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail
the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation
ordinance and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds for such purpose.




SPOUSES FONTANILLA VS HON. MALIAMAN, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
GR # 55963 and 61045, Feb. 27, 1991 (Constitutional Law Government Agency, Proprietary Functions)

FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency, was held liable for damages
resulting to the death of the son of herein petitioner spouses caused by the fault and/or negligence of the
driver of the said agency. NIA maintains that it is not liable for the act of its driver because the former
does not perform primarily proprietorship functions but governmental functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its driver.

HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the
government, because its community services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is
irrigation of lands, thus, making it an agency with proprietary functions governed by Corporation Law and
is liable for actions of their employees.

North cotabato vs. GRP gr no. 183591
FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about by the
Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an
aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The
agreement mentions "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction
over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all
natural resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act
for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation
and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-
AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional

HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to
information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is
contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof.

REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both national and local
levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation of peoples
participation in the peace process.

Article III (Bill of Rights)

Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access to official records
and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

Article II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

LGC (1991), require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations. No project or
program be implemented unless such consultations are complied with and approval mus be obtained.

Article VII (Executive Department)

Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Article X. (Local Government)

Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the province, cities,
municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordillera as hereinafter provided.


Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics within
the framework of this constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.

Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that
laws are faithfully executed.


Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes
cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities
and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people
of the region.

The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.

ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.

Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.


MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present constitution and
laws shall come into force upon signing of a comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework. The presidents authority is limited to proposing constitutional
amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be
put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.
- See more at: http://studentsofsocrates.blogspot.com/2010/05/north-cotabato-vs-grp-gr-no-
183591.html#sthash.ce6m8PKT.dpuf