Contestatiom and Peace Building Between The State and Autonomous Islam

Contestations and Peace Building Between The State and Autonomous Islam
53
Part II
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54 Building Bridges, Crossing Boundaries
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Contestations and Peace Building Between The State and Autonomous Islam 55
Contestations and Peace Building Between

The State and Autonomous Islam
Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid
Introduction
It has been customary to view post-colonial Malaysian politics as
having been dominated by an ethnic-orientated communalism. Only in
the 1990s, with economic growth reaching unprecedented heights, have
voices calling for approaches transcending ethnic politics emerged, for
example, the Bangsa Malaysia discourse started by Prime Minister Dr.
Mahathir Mohamad’s Vision 2020 in February 1991 (Mahathir Mohamad
1991: 22). By the end of the decade, and despite the prevailing economic
uncertainty, analysts were projecting a ‘new politics in Malaysia’, which
saw, in 1999, electoral programmes of political parties coalescing around
universal issues such as justice, human rights, good governance, fight
against corruption and promotion of democratic values (Loh 2003). This
development was no doubt helped by the Reformasi outcry following the
unceremonious dismissal and inhumane treatment of Anwar Ibrahim, Dr.
Mahathir’s erstwhile deputy in both the government and the ruling United
Malays’ National Organisation (UMNO) party. The Anwar Ibrahim saga
gave birth to Parti Keadilan Nasional (National Justice Party) which,
while dominated by Malays sympathetic to Anwar, professed a multi-
racial platform and had prominent non-Malays among its leadership.
While the politics of ethnicity is viewed with concern by the official
corridors of power, as expressed in the incessant calls for national unity
in mainstream life, skeptics would argue that efforts in forging closer
55
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relationships among ethnic communities do not go so far as to significantly

bridge the communal gap. Regime maintenance in Malaysia rests on the
ethnic elites’ capacity to maintain grassroots communities’ faith in the
elites as their representatives in formal or informal negotiations for the
distribution of political power and economic clout. In other words, ethnic
political elites have a vested interest in maintaining ethnic politics.
Consociationalism prescribes overarching elite cooperation and stable
non-elite support for the elites as pre-requisites for success (Lijphart
1977: 53-54). Elite cooperation and non-elite support may diminish as
a result of a reduction of communal fear. Fear that the majority Malays,
who comprise the bulk of the native Bumiputera population, would be
overwhelmed by the country’s economically active non-Malays, had
always provided a rationale behind calls for Malay unity. Such fear
was constantly played out in the mainstream Malay media, and further
implanted in Malay students’ minds via orientation courses conducted by
the National Civics Bureau (BTN: Biro Tatanegara). The message given
to the Malay population was simple and direct: unite behind your UMNO
leaders who have maintained Malay hegemony in the face of non-Malay
challenges. To stray from this path was detrimental to long term interests
of Malays. Even if UMNO was seen as cooperating politically with non-
Malay partners, this was to pacify the non-Malays such that they demand
not more than what they deserve as stipulated by the Federal Constitution.
UMNO was seen as the sole path of salvation for Malays. Transgressors
of this injunction were shunned by the mainstream Malay political
establishment as evil perpetrators of disunity.
Malay Unity and Islamic Revivalism

Following the May 1969 racial riots, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was
enunciated with the twin purpose of eradicating poverty and restructuring
society so as to reduce the identification of race with economic function.
NEP-driven reconstruction was primarily designed to uplift the economic
status of the Malays. The NEP further boosted Islam via the state’s official
patronage of Islamic institutions and events, and its sponsorship of Malay
students to local and overseas tertiary institutions. At home, Islam became
an effective outlet to express grievances in the wake of the post-NEP gag
placed upon discussions of sensitive issues. Abroad, the students were

This was experienced by the present author himself when attending, in 1987, BTN
courses specially designed for state-sponsored Malay students on the eve of their
departure for higher education overseas.
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galvanised by the religious resurgence affecting their Muslim brethren

(Hussin Mutalib 1990: 53-67, Ahmad Fauzi 2002: 95-101).
It was not long before a competition for legitimacy among the Malay
masses evolved between official Islam as sponsored by the state and
autonomous Islam as propagated by the various independent Islamic
revival groups that emerged in the 1970s. It was important that the state
maintained an Islam-friendly image among the resurgent Malays. The
state had to shake off its secular nationalist image, hence the launching
of a conscious policy of Islamisation most readily identified with the
premiership of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003). Yet, seeking also
non-Malay electoral support, the state could not be seen to be excessively
promoting Islam per se. The state had to perennially maintain balance
between a self-defined religious zeal intended to win over the new
generation of Islamically-inclined Malays, and a conscious rejection
of religious extremism which was a real cause of worry for wary
non-Muslims.
Emerging from an obsessive desire of Malay ruling elites to ward
off any signs of Malay disunity in the wake of maintaining the delicate
political balance between Muslims and non-Muslims, the state developed
an Islamic administrative structure which overruled diversity between
Islamic traditions and organisations. As such, today, constitutional
freedom of religion applies only with respect to Islam vis-à-vis other
religions, but not among different interpretations of Islam. The Malaysian
state, as represented by its religious bureaucracy, considers its version of
religious orthodoxy as infallibly applicable upon the Malay population,
although legitimate evidence might indicate that contravening positions
had been tolerated within the framework of acceptable differences of
opinion in the Islamic intellectual tradition.
Since 1997, the voice of official Islam in Malaysia has been the
Department of Islamic Advancement of Malaysia (JAKIM: Jabatan
Kemajuan Islam Malaysia) - an enlarged version of the Islamic Centre
(Pusat Islam) which, since its founding in 1970, had been operating as a
division of the Prime Minister’s Department. Since the issuance of fatwa
(Islamic legal ruling) in Malaysia is constitutionally under the jurisdiction
of the different states forming the federation of Malaysia, JAKIM plays

Officially, the Islamic Centre was successively known as the National Committee of
Islamic Affairs (1970-74), Religious Division of the Prime Minister’s Department
(1974-85) and the Islamic Affairs Division of the Prime Minister’s Department
(1985-96). Each change of name was accompanied by a structural reorganisation
and an expansion of personnel and functions. For the history of JAKIM, see www.
islam.gov.my/sejarah.html (accessed on 16 Feb 2005).
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a coordinating role and streamlines administration at the national level.

It serves as a reference centre and sets up policy to guide the states.
JAKIM plans the future direction of Islam in Malaysia (www.islam.gov.
my/fungsi.html accessed 16 February 2005). It symbolises Muslim unity.
Under JAKIM, there is a research division which conducts studies of
deviant teachings (ajaran sesat). Those found guilty of subscribing to and
disseminating such heterodoxy would be sent to a special rehabilitation
centre in Jelebu, Negeri Sembilan, forming part of the activities of
JAKIM’s Dakwah Division (www.islam.gov.my/ppaj/profil.html accessed
16 February 2005).
In combating deviant teachings, JAKIM stresses that propagators
of deviant teachings threaten society and the nation. The propensity of
followers of deviant teachings to commit violence jeopardises security and
the sanctity of Islam (www.islam.gov.my/ppi/ajaransesat.html accessed 16
February 2005). Families break up as the brainwashed followers sacrifice
a considerable amount of time and money towards their false cause. Both
mainstream Muslims and non-Muslims are made to believe that peace
in the country could only prevail by taking punitive measures on those
allegedly deviant Islamic groups.
Prior to the Islamic revival, Malayness and Islamicity mutually
reinforced each other. In fact, Islam was manipulated for the purpose of
achieving the political unity of Malays. Even the so-called Islamic Party of
Malaysia (PAS: Parti Islam SeMalaysia) enjoyed strong Malay nationalist
credentials (Ahmad Fauzi 2003a: 80-81). Under the leadership of Dr.
Burhanuddin Al-Helmy (President 1956-69), PAS’s challenge was defined
by the twin creeds of Islam and Malay nationalism. Dr. Burhanuddin’s
own political principles incorporated nationalist-socialist elements insofar
as they conformed to the Islamic ideological framework (Safie Ibrahim
1981: chapters X-XI). He was portrayed as a Malay nationalist first and
an Islamic reformist second, and as a nationalist who converted to Islamic
reformism in the light of post-War political expediency, culminating in his
election as president of PAS in 1956 (cf. Funston 1980: 120; Means 1969:
278).
Nationalism in PAS survived the era of Mohamad Asri Muda’s
leadership (1969-82), during which Malay unity was conspicuously
demonstrated by the brief participation of PAS in the ruling National Front
(BN: Barisan Nasional) coalition government (1973-77) (Kamarul Zaman
Haji Yusoff 2004). Until 1982, both UMNO and PAS used Islam without
hesitation. They recognised that religion and royalty were the foremost
symbols of Malay unity (Kamarulnizam Abdullah 2003: 220-221). But for
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Islam to be a unifying factor, Malays had to be made to accept the state’s

version of Islam in vogue in Malaysia. The Islamic revival that swept
Malaysia in the 1970s transformed such a docile perception. Both UMNO
and PAS, willingly or unwillingly, had to accept revivalist Islam as a force
to be reckoned with in national politics. UMNO adopted a conscious
policy of Islamisation, while PAS, under a new breed of ulama (religious
scholars) leadership, repudiated all forms of nationalism, as emphasised
in Haji Yusof Rawa’s celebrated presidential address, ‘Menggempur
Pemikiran Assabiyah’ (Combating Tribalist Thought) at the 1984 PAS
General Assembly (Yusof Rawa and Fadzil Mohd. Noor 1995: 43-78).
Attacking the NEP as unjust and UMNO’s Islamisation as ‘cosmetic’,
PAS instead proclaimed an unflinching ideological commitment to a
juridical Islamic state ala-Iran. Such a drastic turnabout and offensive
approach would attract to it cohorts of young Malays in search of an
effective outlet to unleash their newly discovered Islamic energies and
aspirations (Ahmad Fauzi 2003a: 82).
In the post-Islamic revival era, the relationship between Malay as
a nation and Islam appeared as tenuous as ever. Becoming increasingly
Islamic was no more necessarily tantamount to being more Malay-centric.
Tensions and contradictions developed in the relationship between
Malayness and Islamicity (Hussin Mutalib 1990: 159). Malays who
embraced Islamic revivalism reformulated their conception of Islam into
one which was holistic and global, not circumscribed by its ethno-cultural
role as a Malay identity marker. As the terms of Islamic understanding
between revivalist Malay-Muslims and nationalist Malay-Muslims grew
wider, Islam exhibited a worrying potential of breaking up Malay unity
(Hussin Mutalib 1990: 158; Kamarulnizam Abdullah 2003: 230).
Malay disunity, in turn, threatened national security insofar as it
destabilised Malay communalism which had been the operating basis of
Malaysia’s multi-ethnic political configuration. In Malaysia, ‘national
security’ does not have a clear-cut definition which cuts across ethnic
boundaries. What is regarded as ‘national security’ might better be
regarded as ‘state security’ or ‘regime security’, wherein the objects in
danger are the government and ruling elites (Kamarulnizam Abdullah
2003: 224-225). While no direct and systemic link has emerged between
the notions of ‘Malay unity’ and ‘national security’ (Kamarulnizam
Abdullah 1999: 277, Kamarulnizam Abdullah 2003: 227), their
inseparability is carefully implanted in the minds of the Malay masses.
Malays being the definitive ethnic group in Malaysia, a threat to Malay
unity is simultaneously a threat to national security, and vice-versa.
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Threat to Malay Unity: The Kafir-Mengkafir Issue

Kafir-mengkafir refers to the trading of accusations of one another’s
infidelity between different groups of Malay-Muslims. The issue had its
beginnings in PAS’s animosity towards UMNO’s cooperation with non-
Muslim BN partners, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and
the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). By forming a multi-religious
administration, UMNO was alleged to have committed the forbidden act
of appointing non-Muslim leaders to rule over Muslims. Such a stance
had arisen since the mid-1960s, but was temporarily suspended during
PAS’s brief stint in the ruling BN (1973-77) (Kamarulnizam Abdullah
1999: 268).
Kafir-mengkafir resurfaced with the emergence of the Middle
Eastern-influenced Young Turks in PAS – a development culminating
in the deposition of Mohamad Asri Muda as PAS leader in 1982. Kafir-
mengkafir was crystallised as a national issue by the controversial
speech delivered in April 1981 by Haji Abdul Hadi Awang (then PAS
State Commissioner for Terengganu and PAS President since September
2003), in Banggol Peradong, Terengganu. This speech, infamously called
Amanat Haji Hadi, outlined three major principles which governed PAS’s
fight against UMNO. First, PAS opposed UMNO because it had retained
the colonial or infidel constitution that they inherited. Second, since
the struggle, speeches and financial contribution of PAS members were
all jihad, their deaths in the course of fighting UMNO members were
as honourable martyrs. Third, one need not officially convert to other
religions to become a kafir, instead, one could be thrown into infidelity
by simply separating between religion and politics (Kamarul zaman Haji
Yusoff 2004: 385).
Amanat Haji Hadi seriously polarised Malay society into hostile PAS
and UMNO camps. In the rural Malay heartlands of Kelantan, Terengganu
and Kedah, families broke up, marriages were dissolved, religious feasts
were boycotted, annual zakat (almsgiving) were paid not through official
channels, and rival congregations offered the same prayers separately,
sometimes in different mosques (Kamarulnizam Abdullah 2003: 193-
94). Burgeoning audiences at PAS-organised lectures prompted
the government to step up security measures against it. In 1984, the
government issued a White Paper entitled The Threat to Muslim Unity

cf. ‘Fundamentalism on trial’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 May 1986; ‘Amanat
Haji Hadi bawa padah’, Mingguan Malaysia, 13 June 1999; ‘Prayers held in two
mosques’, New Straits Times, 8 December 2004.
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and National Security following the detentions of three PAS Youth

leaders under the Internal Security Act (ISA). This document implicated
PAS members in the subversive activities of extremist Islamic groups, and
created the spectre of the communists manipulating PAS-inspired rifts to
achieve their anti-democratic aims (Kamarulnizam Abdullah, 2003: 195-
196, Gunn, 1986: 40). A year later, in Memali village in Kedah, police
stormed a community of PAS villagers who were reportedly armed when
they resisted the arrest of their leader, Ibrahim Mahmood – popularly
known as Ibrahim Libya, who was accused of abusing Islam and inciting
rebellion against the state. In the ensuing showdown, four policemen
and fourteen villagers including Ibrahim lost their lives (Kamarulnizam
Abdullah 2003: 196-98).
There have been continuous polemic surrounding events of the
‘Memali tragedy’. The official explanation of the ‘Memali tragedy’
directly linked the violence with Amanat Haji Hadi’s advocacy of
militant jihad against UMNO members (Government of Malaysia 1986:
5, appendix B; JAKIM 2002: 7, 24-30). Physical confrontation against
the state was said to be passionately pursued by the PAS members, who
earnestly believed they were fighting an infidel government. Although
the resort towards violence in Memali was probably due to prevailing
conditions there, for example Ibrahim Libya’s personal instructions to the
villagers to resist, rather than a result of one or another party policy, its
relation to the kafir-mengkafir issue was more than accidental. Throughout
January to February 2002, the country’s premier television channel, Radio
Televisyen Malaysia (RTM), repeatedly played video clips of the Memali
tragedy in an attempt to convey to the public that PAS is supportive of
violence and terrorism. The taped confession of Muhamad Yusof Husin,
a PAS activist detained following the Memali violence, has been the
media’s favourite evidence. PAS, on the other hand, has been consistently
commemorating, to the government’s displeasure, the day of the Memali
tragedy as ‘Martyrdom Day’. It has also openly disagreed with the official
fatwa that Ibrahim Libya and his companions who perished in Memali
were not martyrs, but rather were treacherous rebels (bughah) (PAS
2002: viii, 41-45). PAS has also claimed that Muhamad Yusof Husin’s
confession following the Memali tragedy was extracted under torture
(PAS 2002: 18).

cf. ‘Siar ‘Amanat Haji Hadi’ elak umat Islam bermusuhan’, Utusan Malaysia, 27
March 2003.

For Muhamad Yusof’s statements to the authorities, see Government of Malaysia
(1986: 3, 5-6, 13-15, 17, 19), also quoted in Kamarulnizam Abdullah (2003: 197).
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PAS has not unequivocally retracted its diehard position on Amanat

Haji Hadi. Perhaps this intransigence is related to the influence of Middle
Eastern Islamist trends among the PAS leaders. Among others, those
influenced have developed strong tendencies to excommunicate fellow
Muslims who are willing to compromise with unIslamic rulership.
At any rate, PAS successfully capitalised on the Reformasi euphoria
engulfing the disgruntled Malays following the Anwar Ibrahim saga in
1998. Consequently, PAS registered massive gains in the November 1999
general elections. For the first time, it led the Opposition in Parliament.
At the state level, PAS retained Kelantan, captured Terengganu, and made
significant inroads into Kedah, Perlis, Pahang, Perak and Selangor.
With UMNO’s legitimacy questioned by the Malay electorate, while
PAS experiencd resurgence among upwardly mobile young Malays,
Malay unity again became the focal issue of national politics in 2000-
2001. PAS was put on the defensive for failing to disavow Amanat
Haji Hadi, which bore the blame for creating fissures within the Malay
community. While PAS claimed that there was never any clear-cut
promulgation of Amanat Haji Hadi’s deviation from Islamic teachings,
the UMNO-led state insisted otherwise. In response to doubts of PAS’s
sincerity in planning to open its door to non-Muslims for associate
membership and electoral candidacy, PAS’s Musryid al-‘Am (General
Guide)-cum-Chief Minister of Kelantan, Nik Aziz Nik Mat, retorted that
the PAS leadership had never adopted the practice of kafir-mengkafir;
instead, it had been instigated by extremist camps within the party.10 In
his defence, Haji Hadi Awang pleaded that Amanat Haji Hadi not be cited
in parts, and the sensitive parts duly taken out of context. When read as
a whole, Amanat Haji Hadi, he claimed, was a document outlining the
boundaries between faith and infidelity, without pin-pointing any group
or individuals as kafirs.11 Moreover, PAS argued that Amanat Haji Hadi

For an example of an attempt to establish such an intellectual linkage, see Astora
Jabat, ‘Pergolakan negara Arab jadi ilham: Pas tidak pernah sunyi daripada
mengkafirkan UMNO’, Mingguan Malaysia, 13 June 1999.

See the special report by Sangwon Suh and Santha Oorjitham, ‘Battle for Islam:
UMNO and PAS are locked in a struggle for the Malay soul. The outcome may
irrevocably change Malaysian society’, Asiaweek, 16 June 2000.

‘Saya tidak perlu bertaubat – Hadi’, Utusan Malaysia, .3 August 2000; ‘Majlis
Fatwa putuskan ‘Amanat Haji Hadi’ bercanggah – Hamid’, Utusan Malaysia,
5 August 2000; ‘Amanat Hadi diwartakan menyalahi ajaran Islam’, Mingguan
Malaysia, 22 April 2001.

‘PAS mahu letak calon bukan Islam’, Berita Harian, 31 May 1999.
10
‘Bukan gimik politik – Nik Aziz’, Utusan Malaysia, 3 June 1999.
11
See the interview with Haji Hadi Awang, ‘“Bukan saya kafirkan UMNO’’ - Hadi
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was Islamically justifiable and the party was not guilty of causing Malay
disunity. Public calls upon PAS leaders to repudiate Amanat Haji Hadi fell
on deaf ears.12 As in 1985, a planned muzakarah (discussion) to resolve
the UMNO-PAS dispute did not materialise, despite initial promising
efforts by moderating organisations.13
In the event, PAS suffered electoral reversals in the 2004 elections due
to a combination of two factors: internal weaknesses of the opposition
front and the BN’s astute capitalisation of Abdullah Badawi’s replacement
of Mahathir at the UMNO helm (Ahmad Fauzi 2006). A majority of
Malays were also attracted to Abdullah’s projection of Islam Hadhari.14
Although PAS had lost control of the Terengganu state government,
and its representation in the federal Parliament and other state legislatures
had been reduced, PAS continued to reject any Islamic conception or
notion introduced by the UMNO-led government. This included Islam
Hadhari.15 PAS’s uncompromising repudiation of Islam Hadhari is
best exemplified by Haji Abdul Hadi Awang himself, who, in his book
Hadharah Islamiyyah bukan Islam Hadhari (Islamic Civilisation, not
Awang jelaskan isu perpecahan akibat amanatnya’, Mingguan Malaysia, 13 August

2000.
12
cf. ‘Pas perlu tolak Amanat Hadi -- Buat secara rasmi sebagai tanda ikhlas tidak
pernah kafirkan ahli UMNO – Najib’, Utusan Malaysia, 26 March 2001; ‘Pas
pertahan Amanat Hadi -- Fadzil: Buktikan kandungan ucapannya bercanggah ajaran
Islam’, Utusan Malaysia, 27 March 2001; ‘Hadi tidak mahu tarik balik’, Utusan
Malaysia, 28 March 2001; ‘Hadi akan terus ceramah amanatnya’, Utusan Malaysia,
16 April 2001.
13
‘Muzakarah `Amanat Haji Hadi’ dibatal’, Utusan Malaysia, 3 May 2001.
14
Officially translated as ‘civilisational Islam’, Islam Hadhari may be understood as
a progressive form of Islam which espouses a healthy balance between spiritual
and material development. In his inaugural presidential address at the 55th UMNO
General Assembly on 23 September 2004, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi outlined
ten fundamental principles of Islam Hadhari, viz. faith and piety in God, a just
and trustworthy government, free and independent people, a vigorous mastery
of knowledge, a balanced and comprehensive economic development, a good
quality of life, protection of the rights of minority groups and women, cultural and
moral integrity, conservation of the environment and strong defence capabilities.
See Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, ‘Menuju kecemerlangan’, Utusan Malaysia, 24
September 2004. The state’s official conception of Islam Hadhari has adopted key
points of Abdullah’s speech, see http://www.islam.gov.my/islamhadhari/bm/konsep.
html (accessed on 5 January 2005).
15
cf. Astora Jabat, ‘Hadi bersangka buruk kerana politik’, Mingguan Malaysia, 7
February 2005; Astora Jabat, ‘Istilah Islam Hadhari cerdik pandai Arab’, Mingguan
Malaysia, 13 February 2005; ‘Islam: Pas tolak apa saja usaha UMNO’, Mingguan
Malaysia, 13 February 2005; ‘Pas lupa sejarah, kesilapan masa lalu’, Berita Harian
editorial, 15 February 2005.
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Civilisational Islam), rebukes Islam Hadhari as a ‘hybrid religion’ which

allows the practice of a compartmentalised Islam alongside unIslamic
elements, and therefore a bid’ah (religious innovation) with deviationist
potential (Abdul Hadi Awang 2005: 24-34, 50, 90, 130, 196). Hadharah
Islamiyyah bukan Islam Hadhari has been put under scrutiny by JAKIM
for fear of its leading to public confusion over the Islam Hadhari
concept,16 but has as yet escaped a ban despite calls to that effect from
UMNO politicians. Kelantan chief minister Nik Aziz Nik Mat, on the
other hand, defends Hadharah Islamiyyah bukan Islam Hadhari as a more
authentic explication of Islam than the state’s official explanation of Islam
Hadhari.17
Such unqualified disavowal of state Islam, when the majority of
Malays seemed to be prepared to give the new Abdullah administration
the chance to prove itself, has merely reinforced the image of PAS
as dogmatic religious champions whose interpretation of Islam was,
however, deleterious towards Malay-Muslim unity. Peace building
between the state and PAS has been obstructed by the failure of both sides
to come to terms with their religious differences. Hence, Nik Aziz Nik
Mat’s plea in 2005, that UMNO and PAS engage in mutual dialogue in
an effort to unite Malays, was disdainfully rebuffed by UMNO leaders as
a chicanery.18 As far as the UMNO leaders are concerned, the recalcitrant
party is PAS; it has refused to withdraw the Amanat Haji Hadi and to
regret the kafir-mengkafir exchanges that it caused. In fact, official Islam
has continued to pronounce the Amanat Haji Hadi as contradictory to
Islamic faith and law (Wan Zahidi Wan Teh 2003: 36-54).
Threat to Islamic Orthodoxy: The Darul Arqam Issue

Meanwhile another conflict between Darul Arqam, an Islamic revivalist
movement founded in 1968 by Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad, and the
state developed beginning from the late 1970s, reaching a crescendo in
1994. Early criticisms of Darul Arqam focused on its attempts to revive
elementary Islamic practices in the segregated environment of self-
contained villages. Based initially in a settlement in Sungai Penchala in
16
‘JPM edar buku Islam Hadhari melalui JAKIM’, Berita Minggu, 13 March 2005.
17
‘Pandangan berbeza tentang Hadharah Islamiah’, Utusan Malaysia, 16 April 2005.
18
‘Pas-UMNO perlu bersemuka cari penyelesaian perpecahan’, Utusan Malaysia,
11 February 2005; ‘`Cadangan Nik Aziz Pas-UMNO bersemuka demi perpaduan
Melayu satu helah’’, Utusan Malaysia, 12 February 2005.
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the rural outskirts of Kuala Lumpur founded in 1973, Darul Arqam was
treated as fostering anti-progressive attitudes at a time when Malays
suffered material backwardness. In the 1980s, Darul Arqam’s missionary,
economic and educational projects began to make a significant impression
among Malays, who, apparently, regarded the ‘anti-development’
caricature of Darul Arqam as misleading. The expansion of Darul
Arqam’s influence, especially among the new Malay middle class, saw
the state’s treatment of Darul Arqam move from provisional toleration to
overt hostility.19
At the centre of the dispute were aspects of religious teachings,
embraced by Darul Arqam, which were considered to be theologically
‘deviant and deviationist’ (sesat lagi menyesatkan). Most seriously,
Darul Arqam was alleged to have subscribed to a tariqah (spiritual or sufi
order) called Aurad Muhammadiah whose genealogy was invalid as it
claimed its origins to a direct communication in a state of consciousness
(yaqazah) between the deceased Prophet Muhammad and its founder,
Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah Al-Suhaimi. Further, Darul Arqam was
accused of believing in the messianic return of Aurad Muhammadiah’s
progenitor from occultation despite evidence of his death and funeral,
of falsely making additions to the Islamic testament of faith, of adopting
the polytheistic practice of tawassul (invoking intermediaries when
making supplication to God), of wrongly interpreting the Quran, and of
encouraging a personality cult of Ustaz Ashaari. According to critics,
Ashaari’s followers had attributed to him divine powers, miraculous feats
and a Bani Tamim ancestry, supposedly indicating his ‘promised’ role
as a future leader commanding reins of power in Malaysia.20 Socially,
Darul Arqam was accused of creating widespread dissension within the
Malay community by purposely going against state Islamic enactments,
challenging the authority of the official ulama, exploiting child labour,
cajoling novices to leave their families and sacrificing their wealth for the
movement, unethically practising polygamous marriages and encouraging
family break-ups. Among the Malay community, a newly recruited Darul
Arqam member was portrayed as rebellious to his or her parents if he or
19
For information on Darul Arqam in its formative phase and successive stages of its
development, see Darul Arqam (1992a, 1992b, 1993a), Mohd. Rom Al Hodri (1992),
Muhammad Syukri Salleh (1992: chapter 4). On the state’s shifting treatment of
Darul Arqam, see Muhammad Syukri Salleh (1995).
20
For debates and competing perspectives on the heterodoxy allegedly practised by
Darul Arqam, see Ashaari Muhammad (1986, 1989), BAHEIS (1986, 1993), Ahmad
Fauzi (2005).
Everyday 1.indd 65 28-08-09 3:30:16 PM

she was unmarried, or neglectful of family life if he or she was married.21

Notwithstanding the pressure applied by the state on Darul Arqam
on theological and social grounds, it was only in the 1990s, after Darul
Arqam was seen to have crossed political boundaries, that the coup
de grace was delivered to it. There was concern that Darul Arqam’s
economic prowess, which had been built independently of the state, was
demonstrating an alarming political potential. Evidence indicated that
Darul Arqam had penetrated influentially into mainstream Malay socio-
political circles and was drawing crucial middle class support away from
UMNO. Darul Arqam itself openly claimed friendship with UMNO
stalwarts at both federal and state levels.22 Its publications in the 1990s
explored such politically explicit themes as Islamic internationalism,
the applicability of Islamic law, the Islamic concept of justice, and
the principles of government and administration in Islam. Included in
the discourses were assessments of the contemporary political scene,
critiques of the ruling establishment and direct responses to the alleged
social and security risks posed by Darul Arqam (cf. Abdul Halim
Abbas 1991, Ashaari Muhammad 1992, 1993b, 1993c, 1993d). Official
criticisms gradually increased in intensity and explicitness, goaded by
popular journalists who were provocatively lauding the achievements of
Darul Arqam and speculating prime ministerial material in Ustaz Ashaari
(Mohd. Sayuti Omar 1990: 156-62; Alattas 1992: chapter 8, 246-47; Nik
Mahadi Nik Hassan 1992).
Darul Arqam’s view of politics had hitherto been based strongly on
the notion that Malaysia’s transformation into an Islamic state would be
effected gradually by the missionary process of dakwah rather than via
electoral politics (Ashaari Muhammad 1990: 36-40, 101-02; Mohamad
Mahir Saidi 1992). Darul Arqam’s newly discovered boldness was
uncharacteristic, and pointed to a possibility that a shift in tactics and
methods was in the making in order to realise Darul Arqam’s Islamic
polity, as envisioned by its messianic interpretation of Islamic scriptures
(Darul Arqam 1992c, 1993b; Ashaari Muhammad 1993a). If this were
true, the authorities had justifiable cause to worry as the ruling elites
would almost certainly be out of place in such a political make-up. When
it arrived, the state’s clampdown on Darul Arqam was decisive. This
21
For examples of allegations that Darul Arqam had caused social unrest and broken
acceptable ethical norms, see Kedah Religious Affairs Department (1994: 12-15).
22
‘Radical Chic: Islamic fringe groups gain influence among the elite’, Far Eastern
Economic Review, 26 May 1994; ‘Mahathir opens high-risk crusade against Islamic
sect’, Financial Times, 6-7 August 1994; ‘A Ban Against The “Messiah”’, Time, 22
August 1994.
Everyday 1.indd 66 28-08-09 3:30:16 PM

proscription of Darul Arqam went through three stages: in 1988, on its

publications said to contain its deviant sufi doctrines; in 1991, on its
activities involving government bodies; and in 1994 on the Darul Arqam
organisation itself (Ahmad Fauzi 1999b: 10-14). The threat to national
security, rather than theological deviationism and socio-religious discord,
became the immediate pretext to launch the state’s assault. Specifically,
Darul Arqam was charged with harbouring designs to seize political
power through magic and violence, and the evidence provided, although
ultimately unproven, was Darul Arqam’s alleged operation of a 313-
men suicide squad called the ‘Badr army’ in Bangkok.23 During June
to August 1994, there occurred constant barraging of Darul Arqam in
the mainstream media, to which Darul Arqam retaliated via statements
and interviews in the foreign media. So drastic did Darul Arqam come
out from its media aloofness that it dared challenge Prime Minister Dr.
Mahathir to a popularity referendum.24
Finally, on 5 August 1994, the National Fatwa Council (NFC)
declared a sweeping ban on Darul Arqam’s schools, businesses, activities,
teachings, settlements, literature, audio-visual materials and paraphernalia
bearing its symbols. State-incited persecution on a nationwide scale
followed, such as security raids on villages, mass arrests including
of women and children, confiscation of property, job and scholarship
suspension, social boycott and ban on overseas travel. On 2 September
1994, Ustaz Ashaari and a group of followers were apprehended by Thai
police in Lampang, northern Thailand. Their passports invalidated, they
were then repatriated to Malaysia. Eight Darul Arqam notables including
Ustaz Ashaari were consequently detained under the ISA. On 20 October
1994, in a closed but later televised dialogue session with members of the
NFC held at the National Mosque, the eight ISA detainees confessed to
their mistakes, repented and urged followers to return to the true path of
23
‘Al-Arqam tubuh pasukan bersenjata’, Utusan Malaysia, 13 June 1994; ‘Arqam
jadi gerakan militan – Hamid’, Utusan Malaysia, 14 June 1994; ‘Al-Arqam punyai
cita-cita politik ekstrem – Mohamed’, Utusan Malaysia, 14 June 1994; ‘PM: Arqam
ancam keselamatan negara’, Utusan Malaysia, 18 June 1994; ‘Interior denies report
of Muslim terrorist training’, Thailand Times, 26 June 1994; Surapong Posayanond,
‘Thailand’s stand on Al-Arqam movement’, letter to the editor of New Straits Times,
23 June 1994; ‘Pengakuan bekas anggota Tentera Badar’, Utusan Malaysia, 28
June 1994; Imtiaz Arif, ‘Mud-smearing campaign against Al Arqam’, letter to the
editor of Thailand Times, 5 July 1994; ‘Tentera Badar tidak dapat dikesan – Hamid’,
Utusan Malaysia, 7 July 1994; ‘IGP: No proof of Al Arqam suicide army’, The Star,
12 July 1994.
24
‘Al-Arqam leader hits out at ‘corrupt’ Kuala Lumpur’, The Nation, 2 July 1994;
‘Islamic leader wants to oppose Mahathir’, Thailand Times, 24 July 1994.
Everyday 1.indd 67 28-08-09 3:30:17 PM

Islam. On 28 October 1994, Ustaz Ashaari and five other ISA detainees
were conditionally released under the Restricted Residence Act.25 In
his subsequent tours to former Darul Arqam settlements throughout the
country, Ustaz Ashaari, in the constant company of police Special Branch
officers, asserted that Darul Arqam no longer existed and that he was no
longer its leader. Its former members were urged to rebuild new lives
according to true Islamic principles.26 Ustaz Ashaari himself eventually
settled down with his immediate family in Bandar Country Homes, a
Chinese-majority new township near Rawang, Selangor, until February
2002, when he was forcibly transported by the authorities to Labuan
island, a federal territory off the coast of Sabah in Borneo island.27
Ustaz Ashaari’s enforced removal to Labuan indicated the ruling
elite’s dissatisfaction of the Islamic bureaucracy’s efforts to rehabilitate
him and his hardcore followers. Throughout the period 1994-2002, the
state claimed to have detected and thwarted intermittent attempts to
revive Darul Arqam.28 This included having to resort to a second round
of ISA arrests from May to August 1996, involving the detention of
eighteen former Darul Arqam notables, including a wife, a son, a brother
and a son-in-law of Ustaz Ashaari (Ahmad Fauzi 2000: 52-3, 2001: 126-
27). Every time an alleged Darul Arqam revival was foiled, former Darul
Arqam spokesmen would deny that such an effort in revival ever existed;
instead, they claimed that their business remobilisation had been unfairly
misconstrued as mechanisms to veil prohibited religious practices.29
25
Under this Act, detainees were given a limited area, usually an assigned district
with well-recognised boundaries, in which they could move around. Presence
outside the area was an offence, except with express permission from the police, to
whom they were obliged to report weekly. They were also prohibited from leaving
their residence from 6 pm. until the next morning. Ustaz Ashaari was given the
Gombak and Selayang districts in the state of Selangor as his area of residence. See
‘Conditional release for Ashaari’, New Straits Times, 29 October 1994; ‘3 pemimpin
Al-Arqam dibuang daerah’, Utusan Malaysia, 7 February 1995.
26
‘Ashaari tells ex-followers he is no longer their leader’, New Sunday Times, 30
October 1994; ‘Al-Arqam dibubar’, Utusan Malaysia, 1 November 1994; ‘Asaari
ulangi seruan tinggalkan amalan bercanggah’, Mingguan Malaysia, 13 November
1994.
27
‘Asaari Muhammad dipindah ke Labuan’, Berita Harian 7 February 2002.
28
‘Usah cuba pulih Arqam: Rahim’, Berita Harian, 28 May 1996; ‘Cubaan pulih
Arqam’, Berita Minggu, 18 April 1999; ‘Al-Arqam kini ‘dihidupkan’ semula’,
Utusan Malaysia, 12 July 2000; ‘Bekas ahli Al-Arqam guna premis niaga’, Utusan
Malaysia, 29 August 2001; ‘Negeri mesti bertindak: Cubaan hidup semula Aurad
Muhammadiah’, Berita Harian, 18 February 2002.
29
‘‘No plans’ to revive Arqam’, Sunday Star, 9 June 1996; ‘JAKIM akan berunding
dengan Asaari’, Berita Harian, 18 May 1999; ‘Rufaqa’ nafi ada kaitan Al-Arqam’,
Everyday 1.indd 68 28-08-09 3:30:17 PM

While such swift action demonstrated the efficacy of the national security
apparatus, they also indicated the sluggishness and failure of the Islamic
bureaucracy in bringing the former Darul Arqam members in line with
mainstream Islam, as defined and enjoined by the state. The persistent
need of state monitoring of former Darul Arqam members contradicted
JAKIM’s recurrent proclamations of having successfully rehabilitated
them. At times, JAKIM was at pains to deny that the rehabilitation
programme of former Darul Arqam members had been to no avail.30
Rufaqa’: Darul Arqam Revisited and Reconfigured

Since April 1997, the most active remobilisation of former Darul Arqam
members had taken place under the aegis of Rufaqa’ Corporation, a
private limited company with Ustaz Ashaari as its executive chairman
and Bandar Country Homes, Rawang as its headquarters. Starting with
the manufacturing and distribution of herbal-based health products,
Rufaqa’, benefiting from Darul Arqam’s well-known enterprise spirit
and close-knit networks, quickly captured national and Southeast Asian
markets.31 Rufaqa’ townships, where juxtaposed business premises were
rented or bought en bloc and given a flavour of Rufaqa’ via conspicuous
signboards and continuous presence of company personnel, sprouted
throughout Malaysia in 2001-2002. The range of its businesses widened
to such diverse sectors as grocery stores, cafeterias and restaurants, food
catering, bakeries, polyclinics, computer training and cyber cafes, book
and magazine publication and printing, mechanical and vehicle repair
workshops, boutiques, laundry services, nurseries and kindergartens,
organisation of motivational courses and Islamic cultural events, and
tourism (Muhammad Syukri Salleh 2003: 156-57).32 Ustaz Ashaari’s
Berita Harian, 13 July 2000; ‘Rufaqa tidak terbabit cuba hidup Al-Arqam’, Berita
Harian, 25 February 2002.
30
‘Kes Arqam: KDN salahkan Pusat Islam’, Berita Harian, 3 June 1996; ‘Al Arqam
not a threat anymore, says Hamid’, The Star, 29 July 1996; ‘BAHEIS pulihkan 211
bekas ahli Arqam’, Berita Harian, 28 August 1996; ‘Kerajaan berjaya pulih akidah
bekas ahli al-Arqam’, Berita Harian, 4 February 1998; ‘JAKIM perlu berterus
terang’, Utusan Malaysia, 13 July 2000; ‘JAKIM nafi gagal pulih bekas anggota Al-
Arqam’, Berita Harian, 21 February 2002.
31
‘Zumala tinjau pasaran baru di Asia Barat’, Berita Harian, 4 February 2000;
‘Rufaqa’ terkenal di seberang laut’, Utusan Malaysia 8 February 2000; ‘Former Al-
Arqam redefines itself’, New Sunday Times, 30 April 2000; ‘Setelah abuya memilih
tobat’, Gatra, nos. 2-3, 6 December 2003.
32
See also the official website of Rufaqa’ Corporation at www.rufaqa.com and media
reports on the diversity of Rufaqa’’s business activities: ‘Business interest that
Everyday 1.indd 69 28-08-09 3:30:17 PM

enforced removal to Labuan, rather than slowing down Rufaqa’’s business

wings, actually broadened its markets. It also enhanced Ustaz Ashaari’s
influence. So successful was his post-Darul Arqam business ventures
that Ustaz Ashaari was touted to have reached millionaire status, while
his close followers among family members and company directors and
executives were rumoured to be leading luxurious lifestyles.33
It is ironical that the earliest problem that Ustaz Ashaari encountered
with the state back in the 1970s revolved around Darul Arqam’s alleged
anti-progressive and isolationist attitude. Despite Ustaz Ashaari having
now developed into a self-styled corporate magnate, the state was
neither prepared to cede moral ground to him, nor to compliment his
achievements in engineering Malay-Muslim advancement, which was
in line with NEP goals. During Ustaz Ashaari’s stay in Labuan, JAKIM
continually insisted that behind Rufaqa’, there somehow existed a plot to
revive Darul Arqam.34 JAKIM’s expose was conventionally accompanied
by warnings issued by the police, and followed by the usual denials by
Rufaqa’.35 Statements by ruling politicians would rely on evidence and
arguments provided by JAKIM and security officials.36 Yet, the public
had for eight years been fed with similar accusations of revival plots
and ensuing denials. The more frequent JAKIM raised the matter, the
greater was the chance that JAKIM would be seen to be ineffective in
its Darul Arqam rehabilitation programme. Already there were calls for
span five industries’, New Sunday Times, 30 April 2000; ‘Asaari pengasas Rufaqa
Corporation’, Utusan Malaysia, 13 July 2000; ‘Banned Al-Arqam cult thriving
under business umbrella’, Straits Times (Singapore), 9 Feb 2002.
33
‘Kini Asaa’ri digelar jutawan: setelah 7 tahun pengharaman Al-Arqam’, Buletin
Utama, 29 April-5 May 2001; Tarmizi Mohd. Jam and Ann Wan Seng, ‘Ashaari
dan Rufaqa’ Corporation: Taikun Baru Selepas 7 Tahun Arqam Diharam’, Geletek,
June 2001; ‘Ashari Kembang Pengaruh di Labuan’, Buletin Utama, 21-24 April
2002; ‘Penduduk rayu penempatan Asa’ari dikaji semula’, Berita Harian, 5
September 2002; ‘Gaya hidup pengikut al-Arqam perlu dipantau’, Berita Harian, 28
November 2002; ‘Apa ruginya Asyaari kaya?’, http://www.harakahdaily.net/print.
php?sid=3510 (accessed on 14 December 2002).
34
‘Cubaan Al-Arqam hidupkan semula ajaran dikesan’, Berita Harian, 10 August
2002; ‘Al-Arqam cuba dihidup kembali’, Harian Metro, 23 April 2003; ‘Kerajaan
pantau rapi pergerakan Asaari’, Utusan Malaysia, 7 May 2003; Al-Arqam dipantau
lebih kerap’, Berita Harian, 10 May 2003.
35
‘Amaran keras kepada bekas ahli Arqam’, Mingguan Malaysia, 25 August 2002;
‘Kalimah Syahadah Ustaz Ashaari: Nafi Rufaqa’ tiru Al-Arqam’, Bacaria, 28
December 2002.
36
For example, Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s statement; see
‘Tindakan tegas jika cuba hidupkan semula Aurad Muhammadiyah’, Utusan
Malaysia, 13 March 2002.
Everyday 1.indd 70 28-08-09 3:30:17 PM

JAKIM to review its approach in handling Darul Arqam and to appreciate

Darul Arqam’s positive contributions to the Malay-Muslim economy
and culture.37 By prolonging the Darul Arqam issue, the state was
inadvertently questioning its own credibility.
One reason for the state’s continual dissatisfaction of the former Darul
Arqam members’ rehabilitation appears to be their adamancy in schooling
their children in a separate educational system. To Rufaqa’ Corporation
(2003: 1), education forms the pulse of a nation. After five years of the
closure of Darul Arqam schools, in July 1999, Rufaqa’ sponsored the
establishment of At-Tahalli secondary school in Bandar Country Homes,
Rawang. Operating on a temporary permit from the Selangor Islamic
Affairs Department (JAIS: Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor), the school
targeted students among offsprings of former Darul Arqam parents, who
hitherto had to send their children to state schools against their own
will. As an incentive, At-Tahalli offered free education for children of
Rufaqa’ employees and the poor.38 It was not long before the school got
into trouble with the authorities for allegedly being a vehicle to inculcate
Darul Arqam teachings among its students, thus planting seeds for a
future revival.39 Such an impression was evident from the emergence
of nasyeed (Islamic song) groups whose membership composed of at-
Tahalli students.40 The chief nasyeed group, Qathrunnada, quickly gained
popularity by producing albums and performing in major Islamic concerts
around Malaysia, bringing back memories of stylish Darul Arqam
cultural performances a decade earlier.41 Denials by the At-Tahalli school
37
‘Gempur benih ajaran sesat’, editorial, Utusan Malaysia, 26 August 2002; Ramli
Mohd. Yunus, ‘Lihat Al-Arqam dari aspek positif: Dato’ Abdul Hamid tak perlu
melatah’, Buletin Demokrasi, 30 August – 5 September 2002.
38
‘Rufaqa’ tawar pendidikan percuma kepada pelajar miskin’, Mangga, bil. 62, May
2000.
39
‘Pemilik Sekolah At Tahalli nafi terbabit pertubuhan haram’, Utusan Malaysia, 13
July 2000.
40
There is wide acceptance that Darul Arqam, via its main nasyeed groups Nada
Murni and The Zikr, was chiefly responsible for popularising nasyeed as a modern
musical genre in Malaysia since the mid-1980s. Darul Arqam cultural performances
were distinctive for integrating contemporary musical elements, such as the use of
percussion and modern instruments, with the classical nasyeed melody as inherited
from its sufi origins. All three most popular nasyeed groups in contemporary
Malaysia, viz. Raihan, Rabbani and Hijjaz, trace their origins to Darul Arqam’s
multiple cultural troupes. See for example, ‘Kumpulan nasyid perlu elak lirik galak
maksiat’, Berita Harian, 8 January 2004.
41
‘Qathrunnada dilarang baca surat cinta’, Pancaindera (Mingguan Malaysia), 14
May 2000; ‘4 anak Ustaz As’aari jadi penyanyi’, Mangga, bil. 62, May 2000; ‘MAS
Everyday 1.indd 71 28-08-09 3:30:17 PM

management of any association with Darul Arqam were inadequate to

persuade JAIS to keep it open, and from December 2000, the temporary
operational licence was revoked and police help was sought to make sure
the school closed down.42 With the closing down of At-Tahalli, Rufaqa’
officially bowed to the authorities’ demands to operate all of its activities
legally. Following Ustaz Ashaari’s banishment to Labuan in February
2002, remaining attempts by former Darul Arqam members to educate
their children outside the mainstream educational system were beaten
off.43 Such attempts involved taking over private religious schools by
former Darul Arqam teachers who may or may not be linked to Rufaqa’.44
The state’s decision to withdraw grants to independent People’s Religious
Schools (SAR: Sekolah Agama Rakyat) in 2002 further tightened its
stranglehold over private religious education, which had attracted many
rural Malay parents disenchanted with state education.
However, such regulatory measures were not regarded as impediments
to Rufaqa’’s educational initiatives. Observations throughout the various
Rufaqa’’s townships, for instance in Bandar Country Homes, Rawang, and
Bandar Baru PERDA, Bukit Mertajam, Penang,45 show that Rufaqa’ has
devised its own independent hostel system to regulate their offspring who
have now re-entered the state educational system. As related to the present
author by Sholehuddin Abdullah, Penang’s director of Rufaqa’,46 a Rufaqa’
township will typically have four hostels to house their children: male
secondary, male primary, female secondary, female primary. After classes
in state schools, the students are trained, according to their levels, in fard
‘ain (personal religious obligations) and spiritual sciences to make up
for the weaknesses of the state system. The spiritual sciences, composed
of novel interpretations of tawhid (theology), fiqh (jurisprudence) and
tasawwuf (sufism) were made relevant to contemporary undertakings
and integrated into the formal education system from the primary to
sambut Maal Hijrah membawa mesej ‘Cinta Agung’, Buletin Utama, 8-14 May
2000; ‘Lebih 5000 penonton menitis airmata semasa konsert teater muzikal Islam di
UKM’, Buletin Utama, 4-10 September 2000.
42
‘JAIS buat aduan terhadap sekolah At-Tahalli’, Utusan Malaysia, 15 February 2001.
43
‘Negeri mesti bertindak’, Berita Harian, 18 February 2002; ‘Tutup sekolah agama
hidupkan fahaman bertentangan Islam’, Utusan Malaysia, 18 February 2002;
‘Semua negeri pantau Aurad Muhammadiah’, Berita Harian, 19 February 2002.
44
‘Johor arah sekolah agama Al-Ruhama ditutup’, Berita Harian, 21 February 2002;
‘JAJ halang usaha bekas ahli Al-Arqam’, Berita Harian, 16 March 2002.
45
Fieldwork October 2004 – March 2005.
46
Information from Sholehuddin was gathered from a series of meetings with him
(December 2004 – March 2005).
Everyday 1.indd 72 28-08-09 3:30:17 PM

tertiary levels. The mainstream educational system, by relegating fard

‘ain knowledge to the level of personal domain and leaving the masses
to seek it themselves, in fact reversed the ways of the Messengers,
whose main mission was to bring the ummah to God. As part of their
co-curricular activity, Muslim students are given practical training in
Rufaqa’’s economic projects. In this way, they develop company loyalty,
camaraderie, independent survival spirit and the capacity to relate Islamic
knowledge with real life experience in the entrepreneurial world. Such
training – a practical realisation of fard kifayah (congregational religious
obligations), are conducted in a manner which arouses God-consciousness
in the hearts and minds of both students and teachers. Rufaqa’ was not
the least worried that it could be misunderstood for creating a sub-system
within the formal educational system, for they were not breaking any law.
Indeed, in spite of Rufaqa’’s independent hostels having received negative
media attention,47 none has been ordered to shut down.
Rufaqa’ and Non-Muslims: A New Paradigm of Relationship

A stumbling block against the convergence of Islamic visions of the
state and of Darul Arqam was the concern that Darul Arqam’s teachings
promoted an exclusively Muslim polity, as reflected in the administration
of and lifestyle in its settlements. This arguably went against the state’s
philosophy of harmonious power-sharing between the various communal
groups in the country.48 Although there was indication that the Darul
Arqam leadership appreciated Malaysia’s multi-ethnic character,
meaningful interaction between Darul Arqam members and non-Muslim
communities, was thin (cf. Muhammad Syukri Salleh 1992: 254-55).
On the likely implementation of hudud (Islamic criminal punishments)
in an Islamic state, Darul Arqam pleaded to non-Muslims not to harbour
misconceptions about hudud and to give Islamic law a chance to prove its
utility in restoring justice and morality in Malaysia, just as they had given
the chance to Western laws, which were similarly not invented by them
(Ashaari Muhammad 1992: 152-58).
In Rufaqa’, greater avenues exist for a better working relationship with
non-Muslims. The philosophy underpinning the establishment of Rufaqa’
is love of God – a perennial sufi theme. This love runs concurrently
with fear of God, forming feelings of Godliness (rasa berTuhan) and
47
‘JAIP kesan asrama persendirian cuba hidupkan Al-Arqam’, Berita Harian (utara),
7 April 2004.
48
‘Arqam’s teachings ‘against power sharing’’, The Star, 24 June 1996.
Everyday 1.indd 73 28-08-09 3:30:17 PM

servility (rasa kehambaan), which together form the essence of taqwa.

Taqwa refers primarily to one’s strength and conviction in one’s spiritual
relationship with God, but the attainment of taqwa does not necessarily
deny the improvement of one’s mental and physical faculties.49 On the
contrary, spiritual nourishment leads not only to mental agility, but
also towards the fulfillment of one’s material necessities of life. The
company profile of Rufaqa’ states that, “Rufaqa’ Corporation Sdn. Bhd.
is established with its unique goal of making business enterprises as
an access of gaining intimacy with God. Worldly profit is not the main
concern.” (Rufaqa’ Corporation Sdn. Bhd. n.d.). Rufaqa’ Corporation’s
motto: ‘serene and reassuring’ balances the need of a devout spirituality
with service to humanity, regardless of ethnicity and religion. As the
profile explains, serenity and calmness of the soul are achieved “when
the feeling of being with God and humbleness are deeply instilled in
the heart,” while reassuring results are accomplished “when the Rules
(shariah) of God are implemented in life.” The motto captures Rufaqa’’s
“belief and conviction in promoting all the services and products offered”
(Rufaqa’ Corporation Sdn. Bhd. n.d.) The fulfillment of one’s soul in his
relationship with God is balanced by one’s burning desire to fulfill social
obligations. Such fulfillment invites divine intervention in one’s individual
and family undertakings, such that a cooperative civilisation based on a
universal love of God and care for fellow humans takes effect.
In Rufaqa’, sufism is blended with integral aspects of life. Sufism
neither leads to one leading the life of a recluse, nor does it divest
one from legal and social responsibilities. Sufism here refers not to
ritualistic incantations or specific spiritual exercises, as was the case
with Aurad Muhammadiah as practised by Darul Arqam, but rather to a
holistic process of human development (pembangunan insan), which
necessitates a close adherence to physical requirements of the religion
(Shuib Sulaiman 2004). Sufism’s emphasis on love of God also leads to
prosperity, care of fellow Muslims and a harmonious accommodation with
and tolerance of non-Muslims so that they find it a privilege to live under
Muslim rule. Thus, Rufaqa’s sufism goes hand in hand with a harmonious
relationship with non-Muslims in the context of Malaysia’s plural society.
By promoting a universal love of God and preferring the Malay term
Tuhan (God) instead of the Arabic Allah in its public pronouncements (cf.
49
On Ustaz Ashaari’s taqwa-based model of development and references to taqwa
in his pre-Rufaqa’ writings, see Ahmad Fauzi (2003b). Ustaz Ashaari’s variegated
thoughts and views on taqwa have been recently systematised by a member of
Rufaqa’’s board of directors, Major (Retired) Abu Dzar in his Taqwa Menurut Ustaz
Hj Asaari Mohamad (2005).
Everyday 1.indd 74 28-08-09 3:30:18 PM

Abu Dzar 2005a: 170-171), Rufaqa’ avoids alienating non-Muslims, many

of whom have been sceptical of enforced Islamisation in the country.
Rufaqa’’s theme nasyeed, as always sung by its performing artists in
Rufaqa’’s programmes, is entitled ‘Tuhan Cinta Agung’ (God the Supreme
Love).
At the practical level, active interaction between Rufaqa’ and non-
Muslims has been promoted via business and proximity of residence.
Bandar Country Homes, where Ustaz Ashaari was banished in 1994-2002,
is populated by a majority (sixty percent) of non-Muslims, mainly of
Chinese ethnicity (Muhammad Syukri Salleh 2003: 175). What may have
started off as accidental interaction in the marketplace and neighbourhood
developed into a cordial relationship between Rufaqa’ and non-Muslims,
as acknowledged by Lim Kwee Eng, former President of Bandar Country
Homes’ Residents’ Association:
Islamic-oriented business here has attracted many visitors who wish
to know further about it. It is not an exaggeration to say that Bandar
Country Homes has achieved fame via Ashaari’s businesses. In terms of
human relations, Rufaqa’ employees can be made an example by the local
community because they exhibit highly regarded morals and respect for
others. They also give assistance and cooperation in ensuring that the local
community’s plans are successful. The products they sell are undeniably
cheaper than other goods sold here. They also have a clinic and a maternity
hospital which are not too particular about prices in order to perform social
obligations. Malays in Country Homes should be proud in having an
entrepreneur who has successfully raised Islamic economic development
in tune with the sophistication of the times. Generally, all residents of
Country Homes are fond of Ashaari and his employees. He is said to be
generous and helpful to the surrounding community. (Buletin Utama 29
April – 5 May 2001, author’s translation).
The present author, during his fieldwork, had the opportunity of meeting
with two Chinese friends of Rufaqa’, viz. Lee Yau Hui and Chee Kim
Meng.50 Both former businessmen were hopeful that Rufaqa’ and Ustaz
Ashaari would one day be given a significant role in national affairs,
as his brand of Islamic development offered solutions to Malaysia’s
problems such as corruption and extravagance. In Labuan, where Ustaz
Ashaari served his remaining term of restricted residence (2002-04),
Rufaqa’ operated a range of business enterprises and restaurant chains,
using the licences of local Chinese businessmen willing to cooperate as
50
The meeting took place in Lee’s residence in Kelana Jaya, Selangor, in November
2004.
Everyday 1.indd 75 28-08-09 3:30:18 PM

Rufaqa’’s business partners (Ahmad Fauzi 2003b: 148). In the Chinese-

majority state of Penang, at the north of Peninsular Malaysia, Rufaqa’ has
established one of its most successful economic bases since expanding
its wings here in 2001 (Ahmad Fauzi 2004, Rufaqa’ Pulau Pinang 2003).
Rufaqa’’s efforts in galvanising the Malay-Muslim economy, in a state
where the Malays are economically backward,51 has been acknowledged
by the state’s UMNO leaders.52 In order to express appreciation of its
non-Muslim suppliers, customers and business partners, Rufaqa’’s Penang
branch organised a dinner function attended by almost one-hundred non-
Muslim friends, and officiated by P.K. Subbaiyah, a non-Muslim Indian
state assemblyman and Penang state executive councilor for the portfolio
of health, welfare and caring society.53
Rufaqa’’s conformity to a state-defined Islam was pivotal towards
peace building between the state and former Darul Arqam leaders still
bound by the Restricted Residence Act. Such an Islam had to conform to
acceptable religio-nationalist visions of a Malaysian identity, which Darul
Arqam was accused of subverting by proposing their own messianic
polity (cf. Ahmad Fauzi 1999a). For the remaining tenure of Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad’s Premiership, the state was contented to keep close tabs
on Rufaqa’ such that it did not transgress the limits of being a purely
business entity. Such a reminder was delivered in person to Ustaz Ashaari
when he was summoned to the Prime Minster’s office for a brief meeting
in June 2001. Ustaz Ashaari was reportedly offered the option of joining
51
The economic marginalisation of Penang Malays has long been a subject of concern
among Malay politicians and academics, see for instance Amir H. Baharuddin
(1982), the more recent interview with Professor Amir Hussin Baharuddin, ‘Nasib
Melayu bila jadi minoriti - Orang Melayu Pulau Pinang sudah macam bangsa
Palestin’, Mingguan Malaysia, 1 September 2002; the report by Associate Professor
Aminah Ayob, ‘Nasib Melayu bila malas belajar - Isu dominasi bidang profesional
di Pulau Pinang menyedihkan’, Mingguan Malaysia, 15 September 2002; and the
headline news, ‘Melayu P. Pinang terpinggir - Nasib seperti Melayu Singapura jika
kerajaan negeri amal sikap tidak peduli’, Utusan Malaysia, 26 August 2002; and
‘Melayu P. Pinang perlu nilai diri semula – PM’, Utusan Malaysia, 27 August 2002.
52
For instance, Dr. Hilmy Yahaya had an audience with Rufaqa’’s state leaders at
his Deputy Chief Minister’s office in Kompleks Tun Abdul Razak (KOMTAR),
Penang, on 20 March 2003. Photographs of the meeting were shown to the author
by Penang’s Rufaqa’ executive committee member, Ismail Mohd. Noor. In the
2004 general elections, Dr. Hilmy moved from the state seat of Telok Bahang to
the federal seat of Balik Pulau. Upon winning the seat, he was appointed as the
parliamentary secretary of the Finance Ministry, which is headed by the Prime
Minister.
53
See report of the function, ‘Bumiputera perlu berurus niaga dengan bangsa lain’,
Berita Harian (utara), 30 July 2004.
Everyday 1.indd 76 28-08-09 3:30:18 PM

UMNO in an effort to counterweight PAS in the next elections, but Ustaz

Ashaari declined and chose instead to remain in the corporate world.54 His
snubbing of Dr. Mahathir’s offer very possibly prolonged his detention,
not to mention past grudges going back to 1994, when Ustaz Ashaari
openly confronted Dr. Mahathir in the foreign media and a Darul Arqam
senior leader, Shuib Sulaiman, provocatively predicted Dr. Mahathir’s
downfall at the hands of Ustaz Ashaari (Shuib Sulaiman 1994). It was
important that Rufaqa’ maintained a high business profile, in order to
convince the authorities that not only was Ustaz Ashaari uninterested
to meddle in political affairs, but he also no longer harboured religio-
political ideals whose vision ran contrary to that of the state.
Rufaqa’ and Peace Building with the Post-Mahathir State

The resignation of Dr. Mahathir on 31 October 2003, followed by
an orderly transfer of power to his deputy, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi,
paved the way for Ustaz Ashaari’s freedom. This became reality on 25
October 2004.55 Heated speculation had been spreading for around two
months prior to the release,56 especially since the momentous decision
by the Federal Court to quash the conviction on former Deputy Prime
Minister Anwar Ibrahim for sodomy, thereby granting him freedom after
six years of incarceration. Despite the government’s insistence that the
judiciary had come to its decision independently, the Malaysian public
widely saw the executive’s liberal hands in influencing the court.57 Both
historic decisions raised the credibility of Prime Minister Abdullah
Ahmad Badawi, who, since assuming power, had made a gallant effort to
establish ‘good governance’ and a ‘people-friendly image’ as hallmarks of
his administration (Khoo 2004: 8-10).
Since obtaining freedom, Ustaz Ashaari has refrained from making
public statements. His health deteriorated sharply under detention and
54
The meeting managed to escape media attention, and was reported only by an
obscure tabloid, Semasa, bil. 26, 21-31 July 2001 under the headline ‘Hj. Ashaari
dimintai sertai UMNO’.
55
‘Ex-leader of Al Arqam can now move freely’, New Straits Times, 27 October 2004;
‘Former leader of Islamic sect freed’, Straits Times (Singapore), 28 October 2004.
56
‘Pengikut yakin Ashaari akan dibebaskan’, Kosmo 8 September 2004; ‘’Abu Ya’
Ashaari bebas!’, Buletin Demokrasi, 28 September 2004; ‘Jakim serah kepada KDN
tempoh tahanan terhad Asaari’, Utusan Malaysia, 12 December 2004.
57
‘Was there a deal?’, Straits Times (Singapore), 4 September 2004; ‘Time for
Healing: In a stunning decision, Malaysia’s highest court allows Anwar Ibrahim to
go free. Can he be a political force again?’ Time, 13 September 2004.
Everyday 1.indd 77 28-08-09 3:30:18 PM

he now suffers from lockjaw – a disease which has severely affected

his speech. Since his release and return to Peninsular Malaysia from
Labuan, he has been busy visiting Rufaqa’’s projects around the country,
but fighting failing health, spends most of his time in his sumptuous
bungalow in Pinggiran Taman Tun Dr. Ismail, Kuala Lumpur.58 He has
steered Rufaqa’ into the direction of cooperative ventures with the state,
especially in promoting Islam Hadhari and combating social ills (gejala
sosial) – a prime concern of Malay community leaders in recent years.59
In a book containing collection of poems directed at former Darul
Arqam leaders who have disavowed and castigated him, Ustaz Ashaari
expresses pride and gratitude in being able to help the government in
such causes (Asaari Mohamad 2005: 60, 68, 76, 111, 125, 144). During
the launching and discussion session of a book outlining Ustaz Ashaari’s
thoughts and ideas on Islam Hadhari,60 Rufaqa’ spokespersons declared
his concurrence with Islam Hadhari, whose realisation was his ambition.
In appreciation of Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s open regime
policy, they quoted his calls for the acceptance of creative ideas from all
parties and for the building of towering Malay personalities.61 Denying
any hidden agenda of reviving Darul Arqam, they were grateful that with
Islam Hadhari, they could at last see eye to eye with the state.62
58
cf. ‘Former Al Arqam leader back from the cold’, New Straits Times, 28 January
2005. Upon Ustaz Ashaari’s visit to Rufaqa’’s projects in northern Malaysia, late
October to early November 2004, Rufaqa’ officials arranged meetings between
the present author and him at the Holiday Villa Hotel in Alor Star, Kedah, and the
Equatorial Hotel in Bukit Jambul, Penang. However, due to his unclear speech,
communication with him had to use the medium of an interpreter – his wife,
Khatijah Aam. Glimpses of his early movements upon release were caught by the
media, see for instance, ’Ashaari pulang ke kampung isteri pertama di Kodiang’,
Utusan Malaysia, 29 October 2004. He has, however, until today, declined to be
officially interviewed.
59
Such concerns have been expressed openly; see for instance ‘Pembabitan remaja
Melayu paling ketara’, Utusan Malaysia, 21 January 2002, and ‘Remaja Melayu
terbabit gejala sosial meningkat’, Utusan Malaysia, 23 August 2004.
60
The book by Major (Retired) Abu Dzar, Islam Hadhari Menurut Ust. Hj Ashaari
Muhammad (2005), was given a sympathetic pre-launch review in the mainstream
press; see ‘Perincian Islam Hadhari’, Berita Harian, 27 January 2005.
61
See for instance the report ‘Ailing Ashaari gives book launch a miss’, The Malay
Mail, 29 January 2005, and FakhrulRazi Hj. Ashaari’s introduction in Rufaqa’
Corporation Sdn Bhd. (2005): the souvenir programme booklet accompanying the
book discussion session at the Putra World Trade Centre on 20 February 2005.
For the exact statements of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, see the headline reports:
‘Pelanggan bukan bola – PM’, Utusan Malaysia, 21 January 2005, and ‘Bina
Melayu unggul – PM’, Mingguan Malaysia, 6 February 2005.
62
‘Nafi hidupkan semula Al-Arqam’, Berita Harian, 29 January 2005.
Everyday 1.indd 78 28-08-09 3:30:18 PM

Observers who had in the past written negatively on Darul Arqam

commended the changes that had taken place among its former
members under Rufaqa’, proving their commitment to contribute to
mainstream Islam within prescribed limits.63 Among other things,
Rufaqa’ demonstrated a more liberal view of women by discarding the
face covering veil and dark clothing which had been so characteristic
of Darul Arqam women. Rufaqa’’s programmes are now glittered with
cultural performances by an all-female nasyeed group, Mawaddah, who
have produced albums featuring popular theme songs on Islam Hadhari
and on the Asian tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004 as ‘a message
from God’.64 In the wake of the tsunami catastrophe, Ustaz Ashaari also
authored a book which praised the government’s disaster relief efforts
in Aceh as evidence of Islam Hadhari in practice, thus confirming
Malaysia’s reputation as a model Islamic state. He further congratulated
Abdullah Badawi for replacing New Year entertainment events with
religious programmes as a mark of respect for tsunami victims (Asaari
Mohamad and Khatijah Aam 2005: 20, 103-06).
In terms of combating social ills, Rufaqa’ had published and
distributed books to that effect even before Ustaz Ashaari’s release (cf.
Murshidah Mustaffa and Maryam Shafie 2002, Abu Dzar 2004). Rufaqa’
was one of the organisations invited by the Internal Security Ministry to
jointly participate in its mobile Enam Jahanam (Six Damned Ones) street
carnival, which was meant to be a war against drug addiction and abuse.65
63
cf Astora Jabat, ‘Islam Hadhari versi Rufaqa’’, Mingguan Malaysia, 30 January
2005.
64
For a high-profile report on Mawaddah, see ‘All-girl nasyid group spreading its
wings’, New Straits Times, 6 November 2004. Their widely distributed albums,
the most recent of which are entitled Islam Hadhari and Tsunami Pembawa Mesej
dari Tuhan, have reached such enormous popularity that Mawaddah has been
invited to perform on national television and in many state functions; see the
profile, Mawaddah (2004) and website at www.mawaddah.com.my. Mawaddah
has, however, encountered problems in penetrating Kelantan, whose PAS-run
government retains the conservative view of female entertainment performances as
publicly prohibited, except to an all-female audience; see ‘Kenapa Haram Nasyid
Kami?, Warta Seni, 32, 1-31 May 2004.
65
Seventy NGOs were summoned to the Internal Security Ministry on 17 February
2005 to discuss ways of combating the drug menace and to seek their contribution
to the Ministry’s Enam Jahanam street carnival. Rufaqa’ was represented in the
meeting by Ustaz Ashaari’s wife, Ustazah Khatijah Aam. For topical discussions on
the government’s participatory strategy in its latest war on drugs, see for example
‘Polis, artis jayakan kempen dadah `6 Jahanam’, Utusan Malaysia, 21 February
2005; ‘Kerajaan ajak rakyat perangi dadah’, Berita Harian, 1 March 2005, and
‘Memarangi dadah hingga ke akar umbi’, Berita Harian, 6 March 2005.
Everyday 1.indd 79 28-08-09 3:30:18 PM

In the inaugural event along Jalan Masjid India, Kuala Lumpur, from
23 to 27 February 2005, Rufaqa’ was given the opportunity to present
motivational talks on giving up drug addiction the Islamic way, and
to set up stalls promoting anti-drugs paraphernalia as well as its Kelab
Remaja Hadhari Bebas Dadah (Drug-free Youth Club). As one of the
enlisted carnival artists, Mawaddah was allowed to perform on the open
stage show every day and night, including during the opening ceremony
officiated by the Prime Minister. At the end of the carnival, Rufaqa’’s and
Mawaddah’s contributions were personally acknowledged in the form of
souvenirs presented by Noh Omar, Deputy Internal Security Minister.66
Conclusion
This chapter has chronicled two cases of intra-Malay conflict involving
contestations between the Malaysian state on the one hand and
autonomous Islam as represented by PAS, and Darul Arqam and Rufaqa’
on the other. Politically conditioned by the expediency to maintain a
picture of Malay unity, and thereby preserve communal harmony between
the different ethnic groups, the state has utilised JAKIM as its arm to
ensure no non-conformist trends emerge in the religious practice of
Malay-Muslims. JAKIM has been given the authority, based supposedly
on its scholarly research, to pronounce on whether a particular religious
belief and practice of Muslims in Malaysia has strayed from orthodox
Islam or not. Its decisions have conventionally been accepted by other
components of the state establishment as equivalent to a religious edict.
Whether the ruling elite and the security apparatus will or will not act
upon a Muslim group perceived to have deviated from orthodox Islam
depend on JAKIM’s rulings and recommendations.
Admittedly, the ruling elite may have ulterior motives in suppressing
a movement, for example in its persecution of Darul Arqam in order to
neutralise its influence that had drawn a rising number of Malay-Muslims
away from UMNO. But in defeating such a challenge, it officially still
waited for the religious bureaucracy’s decree. By acting in such a formal
manner, any punitive measure applied on Malay-Muslim groups can
easily be classified as ‘religious’, regardless of the state’s actual reasons.
In Malaysia, therefore, any peace building effort to reconcile the state
and autonomous Islam will have to take account of the views of JAKIM,
66
Personal observations during fieldwork at the Enam Jahanam street carnival in
Kuala Lumpur (23–27 February 2005).
Everyday 1.indd 80 28-08-09 3:30:18 PM

and the school of thought which dominates JAKIM officials’ Islamic

orientation at one particular time. The Malay mark of respect to Islam
has been practically translated as deference to state Islam as interpreted
by its religious bureaucracy. This bureaucracy, in turn, may possibly
act according to their political master’s interests. The understanding of
such interests, however, will have to come via informal or unpublicised
channels, as evidence of formal communication will damage the integrity
of both the ruling elite and the religious bureaucracy.
The two cases of intra-Malay conflict discussed in this paper represent
two poles in the opposite direction. On the one hand, efforts at peace
building between PAS and the Malaysian state have failed because neither
party wishes to accommodate the views of the other. The conflict has been
significantly represented since the early 1980s by the divergent treatment
of Amanat Haji Hadi. PAS regards the Amanat as Islamically valid, while
the state rejects it as a heresy. PAS is reluctant to disown Amanat Haji
Hadi, while the state regards the Amanat’s circulation as blatant resistance
to official fatwa, and thereby, to orthodox Islam. When the state comes up
with a new approach to Islam in Islam Hadhari, PAS pours scorn on it as
an innovation and effectively a new religion. One has the impression that
anything offered by the state with respect to Islam will be looked down
upon by PAS, regardless of scholarly justifications backing the state’s
version of Islam. The ‘UMNO versus PAS’ political rivalry has dominated
contestations between state Islam and PAS’s Islam. The dominance of
the ‘government versus opposition’ mentality in such contestations has
impeded the room for rational discussion.67
On the other hand, having experienced being at the receiving end of the
might of the state juggernaut, Darul Arqam members opted to tone down
their perceived rigidity which had previously obstructed peace building
between Darul Arqam and the state. They have tried their best to retain
principles of their struggle while abandoning elements that might invite
unwelcome suspicion from the peering eyes of JAKIM. Ustaz Ashaari has
insisted that his loyal followers continue to pursue together their Islamic
67
In its 33rd General Assembly in 1987, then PAS President, Haji Yusof Rawa, put
forward a programme of Tajdid Hadhari (civilisational reformation) towards
realising a Hadharah Islamiah (Islamic civilisation) – the term PAS today proposes
in lieu of Islam Hadhari; see Yusof Rawa and Fadzil Mohd Noor (1995: 161-91).
If PAS had once accepted the term Tajdid Hadhari, one wonders of the credibility
of PAS’s arguments in flatly opposing the term Islam Hadhari. Even if the state
changed the name of its new vision of Islam to Hadharah Islamiah instead of
Islam Hadhari to accommodate PAS, there is strong likelihood that PAS would still
oppose it, by virtue of it being ‘state-manufactured’.
Everyday 1.indd 81 28-08-09 3:30:19 PM

ambitions within the prescribed rules and regulations as outlined by the

state.68 Hence, for instance, whereas Darul Arqam was never registered,
Rufaqa’ is a legally registered business corporation. While Darul Arqam’s
villagisation strategy lent it the hostile tag of being isolationist and
embracing a ‘siege mentality’ of over-suspicion of outsiders (cf. Nagata
1984: 105, Hussin Mutalib 1990: viii, 87-88), Rufaqa’ reaches out to the
wider society by operating its businesses in urban areas. Although the
juxtaposed positions of its business premises give the whole area an air
of a self-styled ‘Rufaqa’ township’, the Rufaqa’ community maintains
good relations with the neighbourhood via participation in community
programmes and services. Unlike Darul Arqam, Rufaqa’ employees
agree to educate their children in state schools after their endeavour for
a separate educational system incurred the displeasure of the authorities.
They insist, however, on maintaining separate hostels where their children
are given additional religious knowledge and business training.
In contrast with Darul Arqam’s reputation of being ethnocentric (cf.
Nagata 1984: 112, Hussin Mutalib 1990: 89), Rufaqa’ interacts with
non-Muslims, to the extent of forming business linkages with them and
organising multi-ethnic social gatherings. Rufaqa’’s new communal-
friendly emphasis has been spelt out intellectually in two of Ustaz
Ashaari’s lengthy poems, outlining the consistency of Islam Hadhari with
a plural society, and the need for communal integration based on multi-
faith love and fear of God (Abu Dzar 2005a: 156-61, 167-71). To the
delight of critics of Darul Arqam’s social etiquette, Rufaqa’ has adopted
a more liberal approach with respect to dressing and female participation
in public affairs. A Rufaqa’ township has the environment of a thriving
modern Malay business community, rather than the closed and sombre
Arabic-like surrounding of a Darul Arqam settlement. To the Rufaqa’
leadership, the changes above are on technical matters, which are liable to
alterations, in order to safeguard fundamental tenets of the struggle.
Peace between the state and Rufaqa’ will be maintained so long as the
state accepts in good faith that Rufaqa’ has disowned aspects of Darul
Arqam’s teaching and lifestyle that are abhorrent to the state, for whatever
reason the state thinks. The state has to be convinced that Rufaqa’ is not
entering mainstream life as part of a calculated strategy to hoodwink the
authorities and to penetrate the masses, simultaneously harbouring and
disseminating missions and visions similar to the ones which had made
Darul Arqam an abomination. At least for the moment, the room for
manoeuvre given by the state to Rufaqa’ to conduct their activities, leaves
68
See his poetic advice to his friends in Asaari Mohamad (2005: 56).
Everyday 1.indd 82 28-08-09 3:30:19 PM

one with the outward impression that the state and Rufaqa’ have struck a
new modus vivendi – one based on conditional trust and understanding.
Only the Rufaqa’ leadership probably realises the extent to which their
conformity to the state is genuine, or merely a temporary sacrifice until
such a time comes when it feels comfortable enough to assert its truly
autonomous vision and programme.
The newly found equilibrium in the state – Rufaqa relationship was
apparently threatened when Rufaqa’’s representatives were summoned
to JAKIM’s office on 21 March 2005.69 As related to the author, JAKIM
demanded explanations for traces of messianism that it had allegedly
detected in the recent publications of Rufaqa’ (cf. Abu Dzar 2005a: 75,
Asaari Mohamad and Khatijah Aam 2005: 58, 81, chapter 9). JAKIM
also expressed discomfort that despite the general concurrence of Ustaz
Ashaari and Rufaqa’ with Islam Hadhari, there allegedly existed veiled
criticisms of the present political order and establishment in the book
Islam Hadhari Menurut Ust. Hj Ashaari Muhammad. Among the
disputed matters were the book’s conception that an Islamic ruler was
God’s representative and not the people’s representative, and a statement
that laws which authorise detention without trial such as the ISA had no
foundation in Islam (cf. Abu Dzar 2005a: 74, 149). Prior to the JAKIM
- Rufaqa’ meeting, the Minister at the Prime Minister’s Department,
Abdullah Md. Zin, revealed that the book Islam Hadhari Menurut Ust.
Hj Ashaari Muhammad was being monitored, for fear that the public
would confuse its debatable conceptions with the state’s version of
Islam Hadhari.70 But when the issue of the book was asked directly to
Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi after the JAKIM - Rufaqa’
meeting, rather than censuring the book and Rufaqa’, he merely replied
that JAKIM and he himself would look closely into the book, lest Darul
Arqam teachings were resurrected.71
Until the time of writing, it seems that the state is as yet willing to
tolerate Rufaqa’’s belief that Malaysia is destined to lead Islamic
resurgence in the early fifteenth Islamic century, as long as the personality
of the leader and the timing of the messianic triumph, as portrayed by
Rufaqa’, are denied specific characteristics and qualities. Needless to say,
69
Amazingly, Rufaqa’ was represented in the meeting by two women, viz. Ustazah
Khatijah Aam - Ustaz Ashaari’s wife, and Murshidah Mustaffa – Ustaz Ashaari’s
daughter-in-law (personal communication during fieldwork, October 2004 – March
2005). This is further testament to the definitive role of women in Rufaqa’ – a
significant change from the male-dominated Darul Arqam.
70
‘JPM edar buku Islam Hadhari melalui JAKIM’, Berita Minggu, 13 March 2005.
71
‘Penjelasan konsep Islam Hadhari diteruskan’, Utusan Malaysia, 23 March 2005.
Everyday 1.indd 83 28-08-09 3:30:19 PM

if such a general vision were embraced by the Malay-Muslim masses,

the ruling elite would benefit handsomely as it could claim to deserve the
mantle of ‘true Islamic leader’. As admitted to the author, Ustaz Ashaari
is himself very satisfied with the unprecedented level of cooperation
Rufaqa’ has struck with the state, such that he has termed the present
state of affairs as ‘extremely comfortable’ in his more than thirty years of
involvement with the Islamic struggle.72
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Contestatiom and Peace Building Between The State and Autonomous Islam

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Contestatiom and Peace Building Between The State and Autonomous Islam

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Contestations and Peace Building Between The State and Autonomous Islam

Everyday 1.indd 53 28-08-09 3:30:15 PM

Everyday 1.indd 54 28-08-09 3:30:15 PM

Contestations and Peace Building Between

Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid

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relationships among ethnic communities do not go so far as to significantly

Malay Unity and Islamic Revivalism

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galvanised by the religious resurgence affecting their Muslim brethren

Everyday 1.indd 57 28-08-09 3:30:15 PM

a coordinating role and streamlines administration at the national level.

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Islam to be a unifying factor, Malays had to be made to accept the state’s

Everyday 1.indd 59 28-08-09 3:30:15 PM

Threat to Malay Unity: The Kafir-Mengkafir Issue

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and National Security following the detentions of three PAS Youth

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PAS has not unequivocally retracted its diehard position on Amanat

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Awang jelaskan isu perpecahan akibat amanatnya’, Mingguan Malaysia, 13 August

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Civilisational Islam), rebukes Islam Hadhari as a ‘hybrid religion’ which

Threat to Islamic Orthodoxy: The Darul Arqam Issue

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she was unmarried, or neglectful of family life if he or she was married.21

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proscription of Darul Arqam went through three stages: in 1988, on its

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Rufaqa’: Darul Arqam Revisited and Reconfigured

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enforced removal to Labuan, rather than slowing down Rufaqa’’s business

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JAKIM to review its approach in handling Darul Arqam and to appreciate

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management of any association with Darul Arqam were inadequate to

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tertiary levels. The mainstream educational system, by relegating fard

Rufaqa’ and Non-Muslims: A New Paradigm of Relationship

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servility (rasa kehambaan), which together form the essence of taqwa.

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Abu Dzar 2005a: 170-171), Rufaqa’ avoids alienating non-Muslims, many

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Rufaqa’’s business partners (Ahmad Fauzi 2003b: 148). In the Chinese-

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UMNO in an effort to counterweight PAS in the next elections, but Ustaz

Rufaqa’ and Peace Building with the Post-Mahathir State

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he now suffers from lockjaw – a disease which has severely affected

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Observers who had in the past written negatively on Darul Arqam

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and the school of thought which dominates JAKIM officials’ Islamic

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ambitions within the prescribed rules and regulations as outlined by the

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