The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror: The

(Re)Creation of Reality Immediately after 9/11

J. Maggio
University of Florida
This article examines six presidential speeches/statements ranging from
Bushs remarks on the night of the terrorist attacks to his (in)famous
State of the Union address declaring Iran, Iraq, and North Korea an
Axis of Evil. Using qualitative content analysis to investigate closely
the six speeches for their reality creating and persuasive rhetoric,
the study scrutinizes Bushs allegorical creation of the identity of the
enemy. David Zarefskys concept of the Power of Denition and Carl
Schmitts notion of the state of exception are applied to the shifting
rhetoric of Bushs speeches. The article concludes that Bush used
increasingly strong language after the September 11 attacks to create a
war-like aporia and that Bushs rhetoric set the limits of discursive
denition, and hence created the parameters of thought regarding the
issue of terrorism.
The president iswith the exception of the vice-presidential
running matethe only U.S. politician elected by the entire nation
(Crockett 2003; Tulis 1996). As such, the presidents rhetoric, even if
on a purely symbolic level, is extremely important to the polity.
Presidential statements are often the springboard for national debate,
solidarity, or outrage. Tulis (1996) argues in his classic The Rhetorical
Presidency that Woodrow Wilson transformed the presidency and the
government by advocating an executive that governed via persuasion
and an appeal to universal principles. By the same token, Crockett
(2003) views Wilson as a popular leader/interpreter who performs as
an agent of regular change (467). Some scholars have even suggested
that Wilson placed rhetorical leadership on such a privileged level that
he actually sacriced the power of executive action (Eden 1996).
Given the importance of presidential rhetoric, scholars have
attempted to measure and/or analyze its inuence in a variety of ways.
Many studies suggest that the president is the central gure in the
government and that he
1
has a decisive role in shaping the legislative
agenda (Kingdon 1995). Presidents rely on their inherent ability to
persuade both the Congress and the public (Kernell 1997; Neustadt
Politics & Policy, Volume 35, No. 4 (2007): 810-835. Published by Blackwell Publishing Inc.
The Policy Studies Organization. All rights reserved.
1990; Smith and Smith 1994). Of course, presidential rhetoric is a key
element of his persuasion, and many scholars have suggested that
strategic rhetoric can help the president get his agenda passed (Bond
and Fleisher 1990; Canes-Wrone 2001; Cohen 1995; Hart 1987; Kernell
1997; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987). Effective rhetoric can also
drive the overall agenda of the nation, as Grossman and Kumar (1979),
Sorenson (1994), and Covington (1987) show. By contrast, some writers
have suggested that the president cannot move opinion much, and even
where he can, it is more effective at the domestic level than when
directed toward events on the world stage (Edwards 2003; Edwards
and Wood 1999).
Notwithstanding the few perspectives that minimize the importance
of presidential rhetoric, some recent work has greatly illuminated the
role that such rhetoric has in the effective government of the nation.
Whitford and Yates (2003), for example, offer an excellent study
showing that the presidents rhetoric shifted the U.S. Attorneys
implementation of the war on drugs. Additionally, some have argued
convincingly that the president has a little appreciated role as
rhetorical leader of the economy (Wood, Owens, and Durham 2005).
In an exceedingly perceptive piece of scholarship, Thomas E. Nelson
(2004) argues that presidential framing is an excellent tool to drive the
policy debate. Hence, even if a persons core beliefs remain the same, a
president can shape the way citizens determine the outcome of a certain
policy issue (582). Framing issues can help shape the debate. However,
it is unclear whether framingor any rhetorical strategycan actually
change peoples minds (Edwards 2003). In fact, Nelsons argument
indicates that explicit attitudes are rarely changed, yet the perception of
the policy position is altered. In other words, attitudes are seldom
changed on the basis of a single message (Zarefsky 2004, 608).
David Zarefsky (2004) makes the fair point that while quite
rigorous, some of the scholarship regarding presidential rhetoric might
be taking a slightly simplistic view of how that language is used.
Presidential rhetoric, according to him, is not based on a strict sequence
of cause and then effect (608). Instead, Zarefsky suggests that a key
function of presidential rhetoric is to dene social reality (607)
[emphasis added]. Of course, it is difcult to measure the effect of this
denition of social reality. Yet on Zarefskys account, presidential
rhetoric literally closes hermeneutic doors.
Maggio The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror 811
Nowhere is this power of denition clearer than in President
George W. Bushs responses to the events of September 11, 2001. In
those responses Bush helped shape the social reality concerning the
tumultuous events. Applying Zarefskys concept of the presidential
power of denition to Bushs speeches immediately following the
terrorist attacks of 9/11 reveals an astonishing example of the shaping
of reality and the closing of hermeneutic doors. Analyzing six
presidential speeches/statements ranging from Bushs remarks on the
night of the terrorist attacks to his (in)famous State of the Union
address declaring Iran, Iraq, and North Korea an Axis of Evil, this
study traces the transformation of Bushs somewhat hesitant rhetoric
directly after the terrorist attacks to the fully developed war-time
language used in his Axis of Evil speech. In doing so, Bushs
rhetorical creation of the identity of the enemy will be scrutinized.
This article also uses qualitative content analysis to investigate closely
the six speeches for the reality-creating rhetoric Bush employed
during the aporia of the events of 9/11.
By analyzing this aporia, I intend to contribute to discussions of
the sovereign rhetorical moment that occurred after 9/11 using Carl
Schmitts concept of the political and the state of exception. In
1922, Schmitt (1985, 5) argued that the power to dene is key to a
government and wrote that the sovereign is he who decided on the
exception. I argue that Schmitts sovereign state of exception
enhances Zarefskys understanding of the power to dene and is
especially suitable to identifying the reality-shaping strategy underlying
Bushs post-9/11 rhetoric.
Zarefskys Theory of Presidential Rhetoric
Zarefskys (2004) argument that the president has the power of
denition should not be taken as the power to persuade in the
standard way this is understood. Rather, the power lies in setting the
limits of debate and/or reality. In fact, Zarefsky agrees with Edwards
(2003) that explicit votes or opinions are not often changed by
presidential rhetoric. Yet Zarefsky argues that presidential rhetoric has
an even more important role: the role to shape reality. On his account,
social reality is not a predetermined set of ideas; it is a contingent set of
812 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 4
social indicators. In this sense, all people participate in the creation of
reality and its political ramications. This reality creation is especially
true for the president.
Naming a situation provides the basis for understanding it and
determining the appropriate response. Because of his prominent
political position and his access to the means of communication,
the president, by dening a situation, might be able to shape the
context in which events or proposals are viewed by the public.
(Zarefsky 2004, 611)
Social reality is therefore not xedespecially social reality that is
mediated through news outlets and government spokesmen. Reality
is uid, and it is often shaped by presidential rhetoric (Miroff 2003,
278-80; Rubenstein 1989).
The presidents greatest power in shaping reality rests in the power
of denition. To dene something is to set the limits of cognition
regarding that concept. Zarefsky (2004, 612) articulates his theory of
denition in the following way.
To choose a denition is, in effect, to plead a cause, as if one were
advancing a claim and offering support for it. But no explicit
claim is offered and no support is provided. The presidential
denition is stipulated, offered as if it were natural and
uncontroversial rather than chosen and contestable.
Hence, to dene is to assert without argument that something is
true or real. It is to claim, in a Jeffersonian sense, that such
statements are self-evident. Of course, at the moment of denition
those terms often become the parameters of denition. It is through this
moment that the president creates a kind of intellectual sovereignty. As
both the chief executive and the national spokesperson, the president
occupies a unique position in which to create a moment of singular
denition.
Zarefsky (2004) offers four main strategies that illuminate how
presidents shape the denition of reality. The rst is association: the
linking of two concepts together. This is seen when the 9/11 attacks
were dened immediately as an act of war. Association is also used in
Maggio The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror 813
phrases such as the war on poverty or the war on drugs. The second
approach can be viewed as the opposite of association: dissociation.
This is when a president separates out two ideas once associated
together. Zarefsky (612) notes that a good example of dissociation is
Kennedys use of the term real peace in the context of his arms
control agreement (as opposed to, one might suppose, a false peace).
Other examples of dissociation are Reagans use of the term truly
needy to help him justify his cuts in welfare and Johnsons fairness of
outcomes to justify the beginnings of afrmative action (616-17). The
third strategy is condensation symbols, which designate no clear
referent but condense a host of different meanings into one phrase or
slogan (613). Good examples of condensation symbols are phrases like
Save Social Security First and Support Our Troops. Zarefskys
nal strategy is frame shifting. This is when a president shifts ex post
facto the context of a debate. A recent example of this is the Bush
Administrations justication of the Iraq war. The rationale for the
invasion of Iraq shifted (Bush 2002a; White House 2002) from weapons
of mass destruction to spreading democracy (Bush 2003; Sanger and
Shanker 2003).
Zarefsky (2004, 613) admits that these are not the only rhetorical
techniques employed by presidents, but they represent a useful
framework by which to analyze presidential denition making. In
developing his theory, Zarefsky addresses concerns that scholars of
presidential rhetoric sometimes make sloppy causation claims. To help
to counter this, Zarefsky asserts that a researcher should try to study
rhetoric using counterfactuals so that one can (to a certain extent) test
the degree of presidential denition-setting (618).
In this study I hope to show that Zarefskys method is especially
helpful in analyzing the shifting and evolving rhetoric of President
George W. Bush in the days immediately after September 11, 2001.
Within the framework provided by Zarefsky, I analyze six separate
presidential addresses: (1) the presidents initial remarks offered on the
night of September 11, 2001; (2) Bushs brief statement to the nation
on September 12th, 2001; (3) Bushs presidential radio address dated
September 15, 2001; (4) the presidents Islam Is Peace speech given on
September 17, 2001; (5) Bushs address to a Joint Session of Congress
and the American People on September 20, 2001; and (6) Bushs State of
Union /Axis of Evil speech delivered on January 29, 2002.
814 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 4
The rst ve speeches represent Bushs initial public responses to
9/11.
2
The last (Axis of Evil) speech portrays a more contemplated
and planned response to the attacks. This speech is particularly
interesting because it occurs after the fall of the Taliban, and it
represents, to a certain extent, the foreign policy under which the United
States still operates.
3
The analysis here focuses on the evolution of
three key themes: the link between security, safety, and solidarity; the
narrative of divine providence and destiny; and the struggle to locate an
enemy. An analysis of these themes shows the way President Bushs
rhetoric helped dene the reality of the events of September 11. Given
the shattering moment that was 9/11, I argue that Bushs rhetoric
represented a specic form of hermeneutic sovereignty, one that can
almost only be employed by a gure like the presidenta governmental
gure that signies a unied nation.
Security, Safety, and Solidarity
The presidents initial focus after 9/11 was on reassuring the nation
and making it feel safe. This feeling of safety is intimately connected to
notions of national security and solidarity. On the night of September
11, Bush (2001a) stated:
I want to reassure the American people that the full resources of
the federal government are working to assist local authorities to
save lives and to help the victims of these attacks . . . Ive been in
regular contact with the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense,
the national security team and my Cabinet. We have taken all
appropriate security precautions to protect the American people.
Our military at home and around the world is on high alert status,
and we have taken the necessary security precautions to continue
the functions of your government. We have been in touch with the
leaders of Congress and with world leaders to assure them that we
will do whatever is necessary to protect America and Americans.
4
These comments were essentially the rst public words Bush spoke after
the attacks on New York and Washington. Immediately after the
attacks, Bush felt the need to alert the nation that the government was
working properly and that he and his security team were in control. This
Maggio The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror 815
is especially interesting because despite calling the events an attack,
Bush does not rush into emergency procedures. He stresses that the
government is working. In this sense, Bush expressed his sovereignty by
declaring the standard functioning of the government.
Shifting rhetorical gears a bit, Bush (2001b) began his September 12
comments with the following statements:
I have just completed a meeting with my national security team,
and we have received the latest intelligence updates.
The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out
yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They
were acts of war. This will require our country to unite in steadfast
determination and resolve.
Bush continued,
[t]he federal government and all our agencies are conducting
business. But it is not business as usual. We are operating on a
heightened security alert. America is going forward, and as we do
so, we must remain keenly aware of the threats to our country.
Those in authority should take appropriate precautions to protect
our citizens.
But we will not allow this enemy to win the war by changing
our way of life or restricting our freedoms. This morning, I am
sending to Congress a request for emergency funding authority, so
that we are prepared to spend whatever it takes to rescue victims,
to help the citizens of New York City and Washington, D.C.
respond to this tragedy, and to protect our national security.
I want to thank the members of Congress for their unity and
support. America is united [emphasis added].
Here, Bush again asserts that the government is working to secure the
nation and to restore order to New York City and Washington, D.C.
Also, Bush shows the beginnings of associating security and safety with
a feeling of national solidarity. The country must unite and remain
steadfast if it wants to stay secure. Even at this early date, the rhetoric
of conformity is employed to create a narrative with a limited set of
truth-value options. Unity is made equivalent to safety; hence, to
be outside of that unity is to threaten the safety of the nation.
816 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 4
The fact that Bush, as the president, presented unity as strength
provides a prime example of Carl Schmitts determination of the
sovereign: the ability to dene the difference between friend and
enemy. For Schmitt, this distinction had real concrete meaning,
for, in his words, [t]he concepts friend, enemy, and battle have a real
meaning; they obtain and retain this meaning especially through their
reference to the real possibility of physical killing (Schmitt 1985, 4).
The underside of Bushs rhetoric of unity and strength is the real
possibility of bloodshed. Unity, safety, and strength are not
just empty political slogans; such rhetoricwhen connected to the
sovereign decision to dene the enemyis attached to actual
violence. This violence is the Schmittian impact of the use of such
sovereignty (Frye 1966, 820). All this begins to highlight the pertinence
of Schmitts theory for understanding post-9/11 rhetoric.
In addition to dening unity in a certain way, Bush also offers
a type of what Zarefsky calls frame shifting in this passage. The
frame shifting here is not, however, of the standard kind. Bush asserts
that the government is at heightened security, and it is not simply
business as usual. Yet he also says we must go forward and not
allow the attackers to restrict our freedoms or challenge our way
of life. This can be interpreted as a kind of exceptional state of
non-exceptionalness, a normal state of emergency. This is the exact
moment that Schmitts notion of the state of exception becomes
relevant and useful in eshing out Zarefskys ideas a little further.
Schmitt (1985) famously wrote that the [s]overeign is he who decides
the exception (5). This is a moment of lawful lawlessness where
the sovereign itself gets to dene the power of life and death, of legal
and illegal (Cooper 2004, 515). It is the instant that sovereignty
reveals itself. Bush denes, as the sovereign, that we are in both a
state of emergency and that such a state shall not challenge our
way of life. Of course, this rhetoric implies the questions who will
be affected by this emergency? and what is our way of life?
When applying the law, it is the sovereignin this case the executive
branch of the governmentthat decides when this rhetoric is
transformed into violence. Hence, this rhetorical sovereignty, as
declared by President Bush, is key to the almost total erosion of
the conceptual distinction between war and politics (Newman and
Levine 2006, 23).
Maggio The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror 817
Schmitts notion of the state of exception clearly inuenced
Giorgio Agambens work to the point where he titled one of his most
famous books after the concept.
5
Agamben is fascinated by the notion
that the state of exception is both outside of and contained in the
law. Like Derridas famous notion of a pharmakon, the state of
exception is both within and outside. Newman and Levine (2006, 24)
capture the basic point when saying that enshrined within the law is
the legal provision that enables the law itself to be suspended. This
illuminates Agambens (2005, 50) view of the state of exception, which
is not a dictatorship (whether constitutional or unconstitutional,
commissarial or sovereign) but a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie
in which all legal determinationsand above all the very distinction
between public and privateare deactivated. For both Agamben and
Schmitt, it is at this moment that one can see the inner workings of the
power of sovereignty. So, applying such analysis to Bushs statements,
the president himself claims the power of sovereignty by deciding that a
state of emergency exists and by dening this using presidential
rhetoric. For many, it appeared as if the United States had entered a
world of a permanent state of exception and/or emergency, where the
old divisions now exist in a through-the-looking glass universe. This
is the moment of hermeneutic sovereignty on the part of Bush. He
denes, or claims the right to dene, the state of emergency. It is at
this moment of decisionthe moment of exceptionthat one can
witness the rhetorical sovereignty of the president.
Of course, Schmitt was also concerned with the inner workings of
the decision to implement the exception on the material world: in
other words, the moment when the exception becomes violence. This is
also an interest of Agamben (1998, 168-9), who argues that the camp
has become the physical manifestation of the state of exception. That
said, in the context of the United States the physical manifestation
of the state of exceptionthe wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
detainee campshave been implemented by many people; the
conceptual world in which such things can exist is dened in Bushs state
of emergency. In other words, the state of exception is more than a
purely theoretical complaint or puzzle. This state has physical
manifestations in, among other things, the Guantanamo Bay detainee
camp and the Abu Ghraib prisons. Bushs rhetorichis power of
denitionhelped create a reality where the disturbing pictures of the
818 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 4
mistreatment at Abu Graihb can coexist alongside the persistent belief
that the United States still has moral responsibilities and duties in the
world. The actions at Abu Graihb and the corresponding images are the
fruits sown from the seeds of Bushs post-9/11 rhetoric.
Nevertheless, in a world dened by a state of exception, the
government must still stress security. Hence, when Bush (2001c) spoke
to the public two days later, on September 15, he began by stating,
[g]ood morning. This weekend I am engaged in extensive sessions with
members of my National Security Council, as we plan a comprehensive
assault on terrorism. Here, the president has associated the attackers
with terrorism and has explained that the National Security Team is
planning a comprehensive assault on terrorism. Again, security is the
primary issue, and it is the rst topic of the speech.
Later in the same speech Bush (2001c) opines that [i]n Washington,
D.C., the political parties and both houses of Congress have shown a
remarkable unity, and Im deeply grateful. A terrorist attack designed
to tear us apart has instead bound us together as a nation. Again, unity
is a key to the nation being safe from terrorists. There is a strong
association between unity and security. In fact the point may be pushed
further; Bush now associates disunity with the goal of the terrorist
attack. Hence, to not be unied is to play into the terrorists hands.
Once more, we see Schmitts notions of sovereignty come into play, this
time with a combination of the power to dene an us and a them as
well as the power to declare a state of exception. According to Bushs
rhetoric, the attacks will fail because we have clearly dened who the
us is, andin this state of emergencywe will remain united against
the them.
Even in Bushs (2001d) gallant Islam Is Peace speech, he
employed the rhetoric of unityand hence the concept of sovereignty
as theorized by Schmittwhen stressing the sameness of Muslim
Americans.
America counts millions of Muslims amongst our citizens, and
Muslims make an incredibly valuable contribution to our country.
Muslims are doctors, lawyers, law professors, members of the
military, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, moms and dads . . . This is a
great country. Its a great country because we share the same
values of respect and dignity and human worth. And it is my
Maggio The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror 819
honor to be meeting with leaders who feel just the same way I do.
Theyre outraged, theyre sad. They love America just as much as
I do.
Bush admirably attempted to quash the torment of Muslims by casting
them as ordinary Americans. In fact, he stated, they love America just
as much as I do. Hence, he used association to blend Muslim-
Americans into the fold of normal Americans like himself. Also, Bush
disassociated the terrorists versions of Islam from the real Islam: the
real version of Islam teaches peace, not violence. Bush again claims a
kind of hermeneutic sovereignty in this moment by claiming to know
the real Islam.
During Bushs (2001e) September 20 speech in front of both houses
of Congress, he again emphasizes the importance of unity.
We have seen the state of our Union in the endurance of rescuers,
working past exhaustion. We have seen the unfurling of ags, the
lighting of candles, the giving of blood, the saying of prayersin
English, Hebrew, and Arabic. We have seen the decency of a
loving and giving people who have made the grief of strangers
their own. My fellow citizens, for the last nine days, the entire
world has seen for itself the state of our Unionand it is strong.
The Union (standing in for the Nation) is strong, and presumably
safe and secure, because of the unity of all Americans. The unity of the
nation also led to an action that directly helped secure the country:
namely funding for the military.
I thank the Congress for its leadership at such an important time.
All of America was touched on the evening of the tragedy to see
Republicans and Democrats joined together on the steps of
this Capitol, singing God Bless America. And you did more
than sing; you acted, by delivering $40 billion to rebuild our
communities and meet the needs of our military. (Bush 2001e)
Hence, the unity of Republicans and Democrats leads directly to
rebuilding our communities and meeting the needs of our military.
This unity is the basis of strength and of safety. It is as if, echoing
Lincoln, any fragmentation would be half a nation and that such a
nation could not stand.
820 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 4
During Bushs (2002b) Axis of Evil speech, he once again
associated security and safety with unity and steadfastness.
Our war on terror is well begun, but it is only begun. This campaign
may not be nished on our watchyet it must be and it will be
waged on our watch. We cant stop short. If we stop nowleaving
terror camps intact and terror states uncheckedour sense of
security would be false and temporary. History has called America
and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our
privilege to ght freedoms ght. Our rst priority must always be
the security of our nation, and that will be reected in the budget
I send to Congress. My budget supports three great goals for
America: we will win this war; well protect our homeland; and we
will revive our economy. September the 11thbrought out the best in
America, and the best in this Congress. And I join the American
people in applauding your unity and resolve. Now Americans
deserve to have this same spirit directed toward addressing
problems here at home. Im a proud member of my partyyet as
we act to win the war, protect our people, and create jobs in
America, we must act, rst and foremost, not as Republicans, not
as Democrats, but as Americans.
Bush denes the response to 9/11 as one that requires solidarity, a
fundamental unity. Inthis unity rests the security of the nation. Hence, to
the extent that people act outside of the consensus, they are acting against
the national unity. In the moment of the state of exception, Bush
attempted to dene unity as a key to democracy. Of course, this misses an
essential element of democracy: disagreement and conict. If the United
States is essentially a democratic nation, then unity cannot be the only
basis of our strength; diversity of ideas and commitment to democratic
principles themselves are the underlying factors of American political
life. Nevertheless, in a moment of rhetorical savvy and sovereignty, the
aftermath of 9/11 saw Bush associating unity with both security and
safety and offering fragmentation as the road to an unstable society.
The United States as the Hero of History: Destiny and Providence
There was a grand irony to George W. Bush facing possibly the
greatest challenge of any president since Franklin Roosevelt: Bush
Maggio The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror 821
was the rst president in over a century whose opponent received
more popular votes than the elected president. Additionally, it was
conventional wisdom that [Bush was] not a gifted rhetorician
(Crockett 2003). Yet after September 11, Bush often spoke as if God
had willed the electoral map, and it was divine intervention that placed
him in charge of the country. In fact, immediately after 9/11, Bush
employed strong themes of historical destiny and providence. On the
night of the terrorist attacks, Bush (2001a) ended his brief statement
with the sweeping claim, make no mistake: we will show the world that
we will pass this test. Similarly, in his September 15, 2001 radio
address, Bush ended the speech with the declaration of Americas
freedom, ending with this is why we shall prevail. It was as if God
spoke to Bush and alerted him of the divine providence of his cause.
There was more than a mere rallying call to Bushs statements; there was
a sense of destiny personied.
Soon this theme of freedom being linked to Gods providence
became a mantra of the Bush Administration. In Bushs (2001e) speech
before both houses of Congress on September 20, he equated his
self-described war on terror as part of the history of the battle for
freedom.
Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we see
right here in this chambera democratically elected government.
Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedomsour
freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote
and assemble and disagree with each other . . . These terrorists kill
not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With
every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating
from the world and forsaking our friends. They stand against us,
because we stand in their way . . . We are not deceived by their
pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the
heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By
sacricing human life to serve their radical visionsby
abandoning every value except the will to powerthey follow in
the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they
will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in historys
unmarked grave of discarded lies.
Bush skillfully associates the terrorists with oppressive regimes of the
past (Hyde 2005, 12). Islamic fundamentalists are the heirs of fascism,
822 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 4
totalitarianism, and Nazism. Hence, in this association, Bush places the
United States at the forefront of a historical battle for freedom (this
battle is somewhat ironic given the non-secular orientation of Bushs
ideology). Additionally, he rhetorically frames the demise of Islamic
fundamentalism as inevitable yet still a struggle that will take much
American work and sacrice. Nevertheless, because the United States is
on the side of freedom, and thus of divine providence, the terrorists
will eventually be placed in historys unmarked grave of discarded
lies.
Later in the same speech, Bush (2001e) opines that
[s]ome speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead,
and dangers to face. But this country will dene our times, not be
dened by them. As long as the United States of America is
determined and strong, this will not be an age of terror; this will be
an age of liberty, here and across the world . . . The course of this
conict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and
fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know
that God is not neutral between them.
God, freedom, justice, and destiny are all associated with the United
States struggle, and fear, terror, and cruelty are associated with Islamic
fundamentalism. The room for debate is closedthe good has been
dened. In another moment of rhetorical sovereignty, Bush assumes,
rather hubristically, that the God of Abrahamthe God of Jews,
Christians, and Muslimsfavors liberal-style freedoms. How can
one argue with God?
In Bushs (2002b) state of the union address, he echoed many of the
same themes.
When I called our troops into action, I did so with complete
condence in their courage and skill. And tonight, thanks to them,
we are winning the war on terror. The man and women of our
Armed Forces have delivered a message now clear to every enemy
of the United States: Even 7,000 miles away, across oceans and
continents, on mountaintops and in cavesyou will not escape
the justice of this nation . . . So long as training camps operate, so
long as nations harbor terrorists, freedom is at risk. And America
and our allies must not, and will not, allow it . . . But some
Maggio The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror 823
governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no
mistake about it: If they do not act, America will . . . [The
terrorists] embrace tyranny and death as a cause and a creed. We
stand for a different choice, made long ago, on the day of our
founding. We afrm it again today. We choose freedom and the
dignity of every life. Steadfast in our purpose, we now press on.
We have known freedoms price. We have shown freedoms
power. And in this great conict, my fellow Americans, we will see
freedoms victory.
In this language, Bush associates the founding of the United States, our
virginal birth, with the continued war on terror. In the frame of Bushs
rhetoric, the United States is the superhero in the grand narrative of
the divine crusade for freedom. Once again the truth-value options are
limited because the players in the drama, the United States and the
terrorists, have been dened by the rhetorical ourishes of Bushs
speech.
One could imagine another possible frame for the attacks of 9/11:
they could be seen as isolated events of madmen or as a systemic
problem of the inequities of the world. Yet those frames are not
comforting to the public. An isolated event seems too random, too
arbitrary. It would render the suffering of 9/11 meaningless. Plus, there
did appear to be a pattern of events: the bombing of embassies, the
Cole, and so on. However, even this pattern did not dictate the
rhetorical choices of the Bush Administration. For example, there was
an alleged pattern of gun-violence and anti-federal acts in the
1990s, and yet President Clinton did not choose to frame the Oklahoma
City bombing in the context of a larger threat from, for instance,
militia fundamentalists.
The moment that Bush framed the attacks in his peculiar way is the
key moment of sovereignty. The theoretical work by Schmitt (1985) and
Agamben (2005) is seen in action at this instant. As the exception is
dened, Bushs sovereignty is expressed. Schmitt (1985, 5) writes that
this
denition of sovereignty must therefore be associated with a
borderline case and not with routine. It will soon become clear
that the exception is understood to refer to the general concept in
the theory of the state, and not merely to the construct applied to
any emergency decree or state of siege.
824 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 4
The power of the state is revealed when Bush employs his rhetorical
narrative about the 9/11 bombings. It is at that moment that sovereignty
is used in a complete way.
One can speculate on the self-interested motivations of the Bush
Administration in its response to 9/11. Then again, the public did not
respond well to the a diagnosis of the 9/11 attacks that placed even some
blame on the overall global system of late-capitalism as well as on the
Wests support for Israel. When some leadersin the United States and
abroadsuggested that although the attacks were despicable, one
should look at them in the context of the United States overall foreign
policy; the leaders were derided and ridiculed. Many claimed that these
freedom-haters where engaging in a game of blame the victim
(Hollander 2001, 22; Ponnuru 2001, 30).
6
This is still seen years after the
event; Republican/Libertarian Ron Paul has been blasted for suggesting
that the United States had some culpability in 9/11 (Roberts 2007). To
many, Pauls words seemed absurd, precisely because the parameters of
the debate had already been set: the United States was the victim, the
martyr for the struggle of freedom.
7
And this struggle, although
supremely difcult, will ultimately end with freedom and with the
United States prevailing.
Like the state of emergency/state of normalcy dichotomy implied
by Bushs comments regarding the security of the nation, here, Bush
attempts to make the seemingly contradictory argument that we must
struggle for freedom, yet God is on freedoms side. This argument
is made using techniques of association-denition as outlined by
Zarefsky: freedom, the United States, and divine destiny are associated
against the backdrop of the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. The
example is especially interesting because Zarefskys techniques are used
by Bush at the precise moment that he denes the state of exception. In
other words, the rhetorical techniques used by Bush help establish the
foundation for a moment of sovereignty, understood in a Schmittian
sense: a moment of sovereignty that rested in the state of exception.
Finding Our Enemy
The attacks of September 11 were devastating for many reasons, yet
one of the scariest facets of the attacks was the lack of a denitive
enemy. The ambiguous statements by President Bush (2001a) on the
Maggio The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror 825
evening of the attacks evidence this lack of a clear enemy. The United
States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly
acts. The president did not specify a particular enemy, although this is
not especially strange given it was the day of the attack. That said, Bush
was clear that those responsible will be punished. Yet he does not
identify how they will be punished, whether in a military or a criminal
context.
Four days later, Bush (2001c) is more candid about the nature of the
enemy that attacked the United States. For example, he states that
[t]his is a conict without battleelds or beachheads, a conict
with opponents who believe they are invisible. Yet, they are
mistaken. They will be exposed, and they will discover what others
in the past have learned: Those who make war against the United
States have chosen their own destruction. Victory against
terrorism will not take place in a single battle, but in a series of
decisive actions against terrorist organizations and those who
harbor and support them.
In this passage, Bush tries to disassociate traditional war from the
new war against terrorism. However, in the same words he is
associating the attacks with an act of war against the United States. This
association with war is possibly the most powerful of all rhetorical
associations. David Zarefsky (2004, 616-17) writes that
simply put, a crisis (such as war) rearranges the rhetorical ground.
The urgency of the situation requires quick response and
establishes a presumption in favor of action. There is no time to
consider carefully all the arguments and objections that might
arise during peacetime. So debate is truncated . . .
The nal example returns to the metaphor of war, as it is
deployed in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. President Bush instantly and instinctively reacted to the
news of the attack by saying simply, We are at war.
Hence, at the same moment Bush is associating the 9/11 attacks with
warfareand hence silencing an aspect of debate about themhe is
also disassociating the new war from the old-style wars. This is a
double act of rhetorical and hermeneutic sovereignty. Bush is again
826 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 4
employing rhetorical techniques to dene reality in a new way. Not only
does this new reality conform to Bushs policy decisions, but it renders
other denitions of reality automatically in opposition or at the
periphery.
During Bushs September 17 Islam Is Peace speech, the president
attempts another association/disassociation rhetorical move. This time
the rhetoric dealt with the true nature of Islam and, in contrast, the
evil of the terrorists. Bush (2001d) stated, [t]he face of terror is not the
true faith of Islam. Thats not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace.
These terrorists dont represent peace. They represent evil and war.
In this passage Bush disassociates the true faith of Islam from the
faux-Islam of the fundamentalist terrorists. Additionally, he associates
the terrorists with evil and war. Like all effective associations/
disassociations, Bush does not offer any actual denition or argument
for his interpretation.
8
The terrorists are again treated as an amorphous
group, almost like a primordial force of evil. In fact, terrorists almost
act as an empty signiera symbol that can be used and employed as a
placeholder for evil or enemy. In this creation of a kind of blank
signier enemy, Bush rests in himself the Schmittian ability to dene
us and them.
Of course, the military loathes ghting empty signiers or
primordial forces, and it is difcult for the United States populace to
embrace such an amorphous enemy. Therefore, and interestingly,
Bushs rhetoric changed a bit during his September 20 address to the
houses of Congress. In that speech, Bush (2001e) sought to link specic
nations with the threat of terrorism. His telling language is worth
quoting at length.
On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of
war against our country. Americans have known warsbut for
the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for
one Sunday in 1941.
The leadership of al Qaeda has great inuence in Afghanistan
and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that
country. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaedas vision for the world.
Afghanistans people have been brutalizedmany are starving
and many have ed. Women are not allowed to attend school.
You can be jailed for owning a television. Religion can be
practiced only as their leaders dictate. A man can be jailed in
Maggio The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror 827
Afghanistan if his beard is not long enough. The United States
respects the people of Afghanistanafter all, we are currently its
largest source of humanitarian aidbut we condemn the Taliban
regime. It is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening
people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying
terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is
committing murder.
The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand
over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate. I also want to
speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We
respect your faith. Its practiced freely by many millions of
Americans, and by millions more in countries that America counts
as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who
commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah.
The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to
hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim
friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical
network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.
Bush employs several rhetorical moves in the previously cited passage.
The most obvious move is to call the attacks explicitly an act of war.
This allows the United States a frame of reference for the violence
committed on 9/11. Yet Bush also attempts to associate the enemies
with both the actors (the terrorists) and the states that harbor them (in
this case, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan). Of course, Bush must also
separate unelected and nondemocratic states from the United States.
9
This mirrors Wilsons rhetoric concerning Germans during World War
I, where the transformation of the American self was part of a wider
rhetorical restructuring of Americas image of the war and was
inextricably connected to the transformation of the other into the
enemy of liberty (Flanagan 2004, 116).
Although Bush associates the Taliban with the terrorists, he also
attempts to disassociate the people of Afghanistan from the Taliban.
The people of Afghanistan are innocent, yet the regime is evil. Similarly,
Bush is once again disassociating the real or good Muslims around
the world from those who commit evil in the name of Allah. Hence,
the enemy exists in the regime of the Taliban and the terrorists
themselves. The harboring of terrorists is associated, via denitional
rhetoric, with being a terrorist.
828 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 4
During Bushs (2002b) Axis of Evil speech, he went even further
in locating the enemy in various regimes around the world.
[W]e must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical,
biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States
and the world.
Our second goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror
from threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons
of mass destruction. Some of these regimes have been pretty quiet
since September the 11th. But we know their true nature. North
Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass
destruction, while starving its citizens. Iran aggressively pursues
these weapons and exports terror, while an un-elected few repress
the Iranian peoples hope for freedom. Iraq continues to aunt its
hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime
has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear
weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used
poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizensleaving the
bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a
regime that agreed to international inspectionsthen kicked out
the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from
the civilized world. States like these, and their terrorist allies,
constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the
world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes
pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms
to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They
could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States.
In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be
catastrophic [emphasis added].
After the fall of the Taliban, Bush deliberately associated regimes and
states ruled by the unelected few with terrorists. In a certain sense,
he actually frame shifted the blame for (or risk related to) 9/11 to the
regimes that could potentially ally with terrorist organizations. So the
threat of terrorism is now rhetorically rooted in the governments of
Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and other similar regimes.
This rhetoric is another example of Schmitts (1985) notion of
sovereignty explicitly at work. Here, Bush denes in very certain terms
who the enemy is. He isolates three states and declares them the enemy.
At that moment Bush is beginning his action as the sovereign. It is
Maggio The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror 829
telling that these enemies are somewhat arbitrary, at least by Bushs
own standards. For example, Pakistan has a nondemocratically elected
leader and a populace that is somewhat supportive of Al Qaeda and
nuclear power. Yet Pakistan was not dened by Bush as an enemy.
China, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait are all countries with abusive and
nondemocratic oligarchies. Yet these countries have explicitly been
dened as friends in various contexts. In other words, it is in this
power, the sovereign power to dene, that rests much of the ofcial
power of the president. And, as Schmitt (1985) repeatedly points out,
these denitions have concrete effects. One need only look to Iraq to
see the effects of Bushs hermeneutic sovereignty.
Additionally, Bushs term Axis of Evil itself employs unique
rhetoric. First, it creates what Zarefsky calls a condensation symbol
for the complex web of anti-American governments and networks.
Hence, one does not need to analyze the complex structures or
causalities of separate nations and/or groupsthey can be reduced to
the signier the Axis of Evil. Second, it associates these regimes and
groups with one of the United States greatest enemies, the Axis Powers
of World War II. Hence, the Axis of Evil countries begin to exude
characteristics of fascism in mid-century Germany and Italy, as well as
the imperialist notions of Japan. This association has been continued in
latter days with the term Islamic Fascism that has been adopted by
many right-wing politicians and pundits. The association functions the
same as the use of the term axis; it evokes the United States great
moral victory in World War II. And third, by equating these
countries with the Axisas well as the biblical notion of evil
Bush denes the regimes as inherently our enemies. It is this powerthe
sovereign power of denitionthat rests at the core of the political and
the sovereign.
Conclusion: The Rhetoric of Today . . . and Tomorrow?
Writing over ve years after the attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, I am amazed that the presidential rhetoric has not
changedmuchfromBushs (2002b) State of the UnionAddress. Bushhas
not strayed from his positions vis--vis safety, providence, and our
enemies. It is possible that Bush was simply correct about the nature of
the threatbut that would imply that it is possible to be correct by a
830 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 4
meta-standard.
10
The rhetorical consistency could also be attributed to
Bushs notorious intellectual obstinacy or his refusal to listen to contrary
voices. Despite the 2006 elections, the GOP presidential eldwith the
exception of gady Ron Paul and possibly Newt Gingrichhave all
roughly embraced the rhetorical ourishes of the Bush Administration.
Also, the center-left candidates in the Democratic Party have at least
partially endorsed Bushs denitional categories that stem from the
sovereign moments after 9/11. Consequently, one can concludein
accordance with David Zarefskys theorythat Bushs rhetoric set the
limits of discursive denition and hence created the parameters of
thought regarding the issue of terrorism.
This denitional sovereignty marks the moment that Schmitts
notion of the political can be fruitfully blended with Zarefskys
theories of presidential rhetoric. Given the current state of affairs, some
thinkers on the left have claimed that Bushs rhetoric regarding terror
has placed us in a perpetual state of emergency (Hardt and Negri
2004, 7; Neocleous 2006, 193; Panitch 2002, 42). These thinkers have
gestured toward Walter Benjamins (2003, 392) initial claims about the
state of emergency becoming permanent. Other thinkers have argued
that the state of exception is simply part of modern liberal democracy
(Neocleous 2006; Scheuerman 1996; Zizek 2002). The general argument
here is that although liberal legalism is hostile to dictatorship, even
liberals outt state authorities with far-reaching powers during an
emergency (Scheuerman 1996, 307) to a certain extent. As both Zizek
and Neocleous argue, liberalism needs the state of emergency to deal
with situations that cannot be labeled by standard liberal norms and the
rule of law. Thus, the state of exception keeps liberalism alive by being
a legal way to produce nonlegal results. The material results of the
nonlegal legality have been seen at Guantanamo Bay and Abu
Ghraib. Yet according to this line of thought, liberal-democracy needs
Gitmo; [e]mergency, in this sense, is what emerges from the rule of law
when violence needs to be exercised and the limits of the rule of law
overcome (Neocleous 2006, 207).
Whether liberalism has an innate state of emergency is beyond the
scope of this article. That said, the sheer capacity of Bush to dene both
the state of exception and our concept of friends and enemies is
a testament to how powerful the moment of hermeneutic sovereignty is.
It is also important to note how commanding the combination of
Maggio The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror 831
Schmittian sovereignty and Zarefskys rhetoric is in shaping the current
reality. In fact, to the extent that these parameters of thought are
useful to the administration or the country, they will likely be
retained. However, when too many anomalies begin to form on the
margins of his denitions, then the pragmatic value of Bushs rhetoric
is likely to wane. The 2006 mid-term elections might be an indication
that a counter-reality is beginning to take hold. Yet even that counter-
reality must be employed within or against the reality created by
Bushs rhetoric concerning terrorism during the time directly after 9/11.
Notes
I would like to thank Richard Conley, Marissa Silber, Beth Rosenson, Dustin Fridkin, Leslie
Thiele, Daniel ONeill, Richard Yon, Michael Heaney, Naomi Nelson, Thomas Biebricher, and the
anonymous reviewers at Politics and Policy for their feedback, support, and/or encouragement.
1
I use the term he in the context of the presidency merely for pragmatic reasons. I understand
that the word contains a normative judgment, despite the fact that the United States has not yet
elected a female president.
2
Since they are of differing signicance, I do not comment on all the speeches equally.
3
As of this writing, the Democrats control of Congress after the 2006 elections has not changed the
United States overall policy. The Democrats margin in Congress is thin and, of course, Bush is
still the president with all appropriate constitutional powers.
4
All quotations to Bushs speeches will be identied in the text. They are all archived at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases. The exact citations are included in the references list.
5
It should be noted that Walter Benjamin, another famous thinker who discussed the state of
exception, also inuences Agambens work.
6
Among the left-wingers who were attacked were Norman Mailer, Susan Sontag, and Edward
Said.
7
This frame was particularly strong in the years immediately after the attacks.
8
Bush does quote a single line from the Koran. Yet this is hardly an argument or a rigorous
examination of the nature of Islam or the motives of the terrorists.
9
Given the circumstances of the 2000 election, the irony of these statements was not lost on
commentators.
10
Such a contention would violate one of the assumptions of Zarefskys theory.
About the Author
J. Maggio is a Ph.D. candidate working in political theory at the
University of Floridas Political Science Department. He is interested in
832 Politics & Policy Vol. 35 No. 4
the intersection of aesthetics, rhetoric, and politics. His dissertation
tracks the effect of the form of art on politics and political thought. In
addition to working on his doctorate, J. Maggio is also a graduate of the
University of Floridas College of Law.
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