Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24440 March 28, 1968
THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendants-
appellants.
Fortugaleza, Lood, Sarmiento, M. T. Yap & Associates for plaintiff-
appellee. Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.
BENGZON, J.P., J .:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of
Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga
Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was
approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga
City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that
Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon
upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and
paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the
Auditor General.
The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots
and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of
Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in
the name of Zamboanga Province. As far as can be gleaned from the
records,
1
said properties were being utilized as follows
No. of Lots Use
1 ................................................ Capitol Site
3 ................................................ School Site
3 ................................................ Hospital Site
3 ................................................ Leprosarium
1 ................................................ Curuan School
1 ................................................ Trade School
2 ................................................ Burleigh School
2 ................................................ High School Playground
9 ................................................ Burleighs
1 ................................................ Hydro-Electric Site (Magay)
1 ................................................ San Roque
23 ................................................ vacant
It appears that in 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province
was transferred to Dipolog.
2
Subsequently, or on June 16, 1948,
Republic Act 286 was approved creating the municipality of Molave
and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province.
On May 26, 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the
Auditor General, pursuant to Commonwealth Act 39, fixed the value
of the properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga
Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00.
3

On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the
province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and
Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations of the old
province were to be divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of
that law provided:
Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other
properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be
divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and
the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the
Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General.
Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11, 1955,
apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of
Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and
45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. Zamboanga del Norte therefore
became entitled to 54.39% of P1,294,244.00, the total value of the
lots and buildings in question, or P704,220.05 payable by
Zamboanga City.
On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the
President, issued a ruling
4
holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a
vested right as owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the
properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is
entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling
revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13, 1951 conveying
all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for
P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the provincial capital of the then
Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.
The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal to 25% of the regular
internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the quarter
ending March 31, 1960, then for the quarter ending June 30, 1960,
and again for the first quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961. The
deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46, was credited to the province
of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of the P764,220.05 due
it.
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved
amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that
All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former
province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga
are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of
Zamboanga. (Stressed for emphasis).
Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, on July 12, 1961,
ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop from effecting
further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to
Zamboanga City the sum of P57,373.46 taken from it out of the
internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City
admits that since the enactment of Republic Act 3039, P43,030.11 of
the P57,373.46 has already been returned to it.
This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte to file
on March 5, 1962, a complaint entitled "Declaratory Relief with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte against defendants-appellants Zamboanga
City, the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. It was prayed that: (a) Republic Act 3039 be declared
unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property without
due process and just compensation; (b) Plaintiff's rights and
obligations under said law be declared; (c) The Secretary of Finance
and the Internal Revenue Commissioner be enjoined from
reimbursing the sum of P57,373.46 to defendant City; and (d) The
latter be ordered to continue paying the balance of P704,220.05 in
quarterly installments of 25% of its internal revenue allotments.
On June 4, 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance of
preliminary injunction as prayed for. After defendants filed their
respective answers, trial was held. On August 12, 1963, judgment
was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Republic Act No. 3039 unconstitutional insofar as it deprives plaintiff
Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties, consisting of 50
parcels of land and the improvements thereon under certificates of
title (Exhibits "A" to "A-49") in the name of the defunct province of
Zamboanga; ordering defendant City of Zamboanga to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P704,220.05 payment thereof to be deducted
from its regular quarterly internal revenue allotment equivalent to
25% thereof every quarter until said amount shall have been fully
paid; ordering defendant Secretary of Finance to direct defendant
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct 25% from the regular
quarterly internal revenue allotment for defendant City of Zamboanga
and to remit the same to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte until said sum
of P704,220.05 shall have been fully paid; ordering plaintiff
Zamboanga del Norte to execute through its proper officials the
corresponding public instrument deeding to defendant City of
Zamboanga the 50 parcels of land and the improvements thereon
under the certificates of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-49") upon payment by
the latter of the aforesaid sum of P704,220.05 in full; dismissing the
counterclaim of defendant City of Zamboanga; and declaring
permanent the preliminary mandatory injunction issued on June 8,
1962, pursuant to the order of the Court dated June 4, 1962. No
costs are assessed against the defendants.
It is SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, but prior to the perfection of defendants' appeal,
plaintiff province filed a motion to reconsider praying that Zamboanga
City be ordered instead to pay the P704,220.05 in lump sum with 6%
interest per annum. Over defendants' opposition, the lower court
granted plaintiff province's motion.
The defendants then brought the case before Us on appeal.
Brushing aside the procedural point concerning the property of
declaratory relief filed in the lower court on the assertion that the law
had already been violated and that plaintiff sought to give it coercive
effect, since assuming the same to be true, the Rules anyway
authorize the conversion of the proceedings to an ordinary action,
5
We proceed to the more important and principal question of the
validity of Republic Act 3039.
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the
50 lots and buildings thereon in question. For, the matter involved
here is the extent of legislative control over the properties of a
municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself
is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning
municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the
property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if
the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality
cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just
compensation.
6

The capacity in which the property is held is, however,
dependent on the use to which it is intended and devoted. Now,
which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under
the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in classifying the
properties in question?
The Civil Code classification is embodied in its Arts. 423 and
424 which provide:1wph1.t
ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities
is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property.
ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal
streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and
public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or
municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall
be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of
special laws. (Stressed for emphasis).
Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question,
except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be
considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga
province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites,
and the school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not
for public use. They would fall under the phrase "public works for
public service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis
rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by
anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the first
paragraph of Art 424.
7
The playgrounds, however, would fit into this
category.
This was the norm applied by the lower court. And it cannot be
said that its actuation was without jurisprudential precedent for in
Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of Lands,
8
and in Municipality
of Tacloban v. Director of Lands,
9
it was held that the capitol site and
the school sites in municipalities constitute their patrimonial
properties. This result is understandable because, unlike in the
classification regarding State properties, properties for public service
in the municipalities are not classified as public. Assuming then the
Civil Code classification to be the chosen norm, the lower court must
be affirmed except with regard to the two (2) lots used as
playgrounds.
On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the
principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of
the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are
deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be
considered public, it is enough that the property be held and,
devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public
education, public health, etc.
10

Supporting jurisprudence are found in the following cases: (1)
HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
11
where it was stated
that "... where the municipality has occupied lands distinctly for public
purposes, such as for the municipal court house, the public school,
the public market, or other necessary municipal building, we will, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, presume a grant from the
States in favor of the municipality; but, as indicated by the wording,
that rule may be invoked only as to property which is used distinctly
for public purposes...." (2) VIUDA DE TANTOCO V. MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL OF ILOILO
12
held that municipal properties necessary for
governmental purposes are public in nature. Thus, the auto trucks
used by the municipality for street sprinkling, the police patrol
automobile, police stations and concrete structures with the
corresponding lots used as markets were declared exempt from
execution and attachment since they were not patrimonial properties.
(3) MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS VS. CANTOS
13
held squarely
that a municipal lot which had always been devoted to school
purposes is one dedicated to public use and is not patrimonial
property of a municipality.
Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar
as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds,
hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites
a total of 24 lots since these were held by the former
Zamboanga province in its governmental capacity and therefore are
subject to the absolute control of Congress. Said lots considered as
public property are the following:
TCT Number Lot Number U s e
2200 ...................................... 4-B ...................................... Capitol Site
2816 ...................................... 149 ...................................... School Site
3281 ...................................... 1224 ...................................... Hospital Site
3282 ...................................... 1226 ...................................... Hospital Site
3283 ...................................... 1225 ...................................... Hospital Site
3748 ...................................... 434-A-1 ...................................... School Site
5406 ...................................... 171 ...................................... School Site
5564 ...................................... 168 ...................................... High School Play-ground
5567 ...................................... 157 & 158 ...................................... Trade School
5583 ...................................... 167 ...................................... High School Play-ground
6181 ...................................... (O.C.T.) ...................................... Curuan School
1194
2
...................................... 926 ...................................... Leprosarium
1194
3
...................................... 927 ...................................... Leprosarium
1194
4
...................................... 925 ...................................... Leprosarium
5557 ...................................... 170 ...................................... Burleigh School
5562 ...................................... 180 ...................................... Burleigh School
5565 ...................................... 172-B ...................................... Burleigh
5570 ...................................... 171-A ...................................... Burleigh
5571 ...................................... 172-C ...................................... Burleigh
5572 ...................................... 174 ...................................... Burleigh
5573 ...................................... 178 ...................................... Burleigh
5585 ...................................... 171-B ...................................... Burleigh
5586 ...................................... 173 ...................................... Burleigh
5587 ...................................... 172-A ...................................... Burleigh
We noticed that the eight Burleigh lots above described are
adjoining each other and in turn are between the two lots wherein the
Burleigh schools are built, as per records appearing herein and in the
Bureau of Lands. Hence, there is sufficient basis for holding that said
eight lots constitute the appurtenant grounds of the Burleigh schools,
and partake of the nature of the same.
Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-
mentioned, the records do not disclose whether they were
constructed at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga.
Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been
erected even before 1936 when Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted
and the further fact that provinces then had no power to authorize
construction of buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own
expense,
14
it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by
the National Government, using national funds. Hence, Congress
could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it
did with the lots in question.
But even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the
buildings constitute mere accessories to the lands, which are public
in nature, and so, they follow the nature of said lands, i.e., public.
Moreover, said buildings, though located in the city, will not be for the
exclusive use and benefit of city residents for they could be availed
of also by the provincial residents. The province then and its
successors-in-interest are not really deprived of the benefits
thereof.
But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive
Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the value of the rest of the 26
remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not
being utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes. Said lots are:
TCT Number Lot Number U s e
5577 ...................................... 177 ...................................... Mydro, Magay
13198 ...................................... 127-0 ...................................... San Roque
5569 ...................................... 169 ...................................... Burleigh
15

5558 ...................................... 175 ...................................... Vacant
5559 ...................................... 188 ...................................... "
5560 ...................................... 183 ...................................... "
5561 ...................................... 186 ...................................... "
5563 ...................................... 191 ...................................... "
5566 ...................................... 176 ...................................... "
5568 ...................................... 179 ...................................... "
5574 ...................................... 196 ...................................... "
5575 ...................................... 181-A ...................................... "
5576 ...................................... 181-B ...................................... "
5578 ...................................... 182 ...................................... "
5579 ...................................... 197 ...................................... "
5580 ...................................... 195 ...................................... "
5581 ...................................... 159-B ...................................... "
5582 ...................................... 194 ...................................... "
5584 ...................................... 190 ...................................... "
5588 ...................................... 184 ...................................... "
5589 ...................................... 187 ...................................... "
5590 ...................................... 189 ...................................... "
5591 ...................................... 192 ...................................... "
5592 ...................................... 193 ...................................... "
5593 ...................................... 185 ...................................... "
7379 ...................................... 4147 ...................................... "
Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots are registered
strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature. On
the other hand, that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are
also registered is of no significance since registration cannot convert
public property to private.
16

We are more inclined to uphold this latter view. The
controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal
Corporations State vs. Province than along that of Civil Law.
Moreover, this Court is not inclined to hold that municipal property
held and devoted to public service is in the same category as
ordinary private property. The consequences are dire. As ordinary
private properties, they can be levied upon and attached. They can
even be acquired thru adverse possession all these to the
detriment of the local community. Lastly, the classification of
properties other than those for public use in the municipalities as
patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code is "... without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws." For purpose of this
article, the principles, obtaining under the Law of Municipal
Corporations can be considered as "special laws". Hence, the
classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly
governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code
classification in this particular case.
Defendants' claim that plaintiff and its predecessor-in-interest
are "guilty of laches is without merit. Under Commonwealth Act 39,
Sec. 50, the cause of action in favor of the defunct Zamboanga
Province arose only in 1949 after the Auditor General fixed the value
of the properties in question. While in 1951, the Cabinet resolved
transfer said properties practically for free to Zamboanga City, a
reconsideration thereof was seasonably sought. In 1952, the old
province was dissolved. As successor-in-interest to more than half of
the properties involved, Zamboanga del Norte was able to get a
reconsideration of the Cabinet Resolution in 1959. In fact, partial
payments were effected subsequently and it was only after the
passage of Republic Act 3039 in 1961 that the present controversy
arose. Plaintiff brought suit in 1962. All the foregoing, negative
laches.
It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to
collect from the City of Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share in the
26 properties which are patrimonial in nature, said share to
computed on the basis of the valuation of said 26 properties as
contained in Resolution No. 7, dated March 26, 1949, of the
Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General.
Plaintiff's share, however, cannot be paid in lump sum, except
as to the P43,030.11 already returned to defendant City. The return
of said amount to defendant was without legal basis. Republic Act
3039 took effect only on June 17, 1961 after a partial payment of
P57,373.46 had already been made. Since the law did not provide
for retroactivity, it could not have validly affected a completed act.
Hence, the amount of P43,030.11 should be immediately returned by
defendant City to plaintiff province. The remaining balance, if any, in
the amount of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots should then be
paid by defendant City in the same manner originally adopted by the
Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
and not in lump sum. Plaintiff's prayer, particularly pars. 5 and 6,
read together with pars. 10 and 11 of the first cause of action recited
in the complaint
17
clearly shows that the relief sought was merely the
continuance of the quarterly payments from the internal revenue
allotments of defendant City. Art. 1169 of the Civil Code on reciprocal
obligations invoked by plaintiff to justify lump sum payment is
inapplicable since there has been so far in legal contemplation no
complete delivery of the lots in question. The titles to the registered
lots are not yet in the name of defendant Zamboanga City.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside
and another judgment is hereby entered as follows:.
(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to
plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the amount of P43,030.11
which the former took back from the latter out of the sum of
P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter; and
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor
of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of plaintiff's 54.39% share in
the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom the sum of
P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949
of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of
quarterly payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the
manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur. Concepcion, C.J., is on
leave.

































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29788 August 30, 1972
RAFAEL S. SALAS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary;
CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, in his capacity as Governor of the
Land Authority; and LORENZO GELLA, in his capacity as
Register of Deeds of Manila, petitioners-appellants, vs. HON.
HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch XXIII,
Court of First Instance of Manila; ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his
capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila; and the CITY OF
MANILA, respondents-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor-
General Antonio A. Torres, Solicitor Raul I. Goco and Magno B.
Pablo & Cipriano A. Tan, Legal Staff, Land Authority for petitioners-
appellants.
Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents-appellees.

ESGUERRA, J .:p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, in Civil Case No. 67946, dated
September 23, 1968, the dispositive portion of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment declaring Republic Act
No. 4118 unconstitutional and invalid in that it deprived the City of
Manila of its property without due process and payment of just
compensation. Respondent Executive Secretary and Governor of the
Land Authority are hereby restrained and enjoined from
implementing the provisions of said law. Respondent Register of
Deeds of the City of Manila is ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 80876 which he had issued in the name of the Land
Tenure Administration and reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No.
22547 in the name of the City of Manila which he cancelled, if that is
feasible, or issue a new certificate of title for the same parcel of land
in the name of the City of Manila.
1

The facts necessary for a clear understanding of this case are as
follows:
On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, acting as a land registration court, rendered judgment in
Case No. 18, G.L.R.O. Record No. 111, declaring the City of Manila
the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1, Block
557 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Mani1a, containing an area
of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less. Pursuant to said judgment
the Register of Deeds of Manila on August 21, 1920, issued in favor
of the City of Manila, Original Certificate of Title No. 4329 covering
the aforementioned parcel of land. On various dates in 1924, the City
of Manila sold portions of the aforementioned parcel of land in favor
of Pura Villanueva. As a consequence of the transactions Original
Certificate of Title No. 4329 was cancelled and transfer certificates of
title were issued in favor of Pura Villanueva for the portions
purchased by her. When the last sale to Pura Villanueva was
effected on August 22, 1924, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21974
in the name of the City of Manila was cancelled and in lieu thereof
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22547 covering the residue
thereof known as Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557, with an area of 7,490.10
square meters, was issued in the name of the City of Manila.
On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila, presided by
then Vice-Mayor Antono J. Villegas, adopted a resolution requesting
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines to consider the
feasibility of declaring the City property bounded by Florida, San
Andres, and Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 25545 and 22547, containing a total area of 7,450 square
meters as a patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose
of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof.
2

The said resolution of the Municipil Board of the City of Manila was
officially transmitted to the President of the Philippines by then Vice-
Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on September 21, 1960, with the
information that the same resolution was, on the same date,
transmitted to the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Congress of the Philippines.
3

During the First Session of the Fifth Congress of the Philippines,
House Bill No. 191 was filed in the House of Representatives by then
Congressman Bartolome Cabangbang seeking to declare the
property in question as patrimonial property of the City of Manila, and
for other purposes. The explanatory note of the Bill gave the grounds
for its enactment, to wit:
In the particular case of the property subject of this bill, the City of
Manila does not seem to have use thereof as a public communal
property. As a matter of fact, a resolution was adopted by the
Municipal Board of Manila at its regular session held on September
21, 1960, to request the feasibility of declaring the city property
bounded by Florida, San Andres and Nebraska Streets as a
patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling
these lots to the actual occupants thereof. Therefore, it will be to the
best interest of society that the said property be used in one way or
another. Since this property has been occupied for a long time by the
present occupants thereof and since said occupants have expressed
their willingness to buy the said property, it is but proper that the
same be sold to them.
4

Subsequently, a revised version of the Bill was introduced in the
House of Representatives by Congressmen Manuel Cases, Antonio
Raquiza and Nicanor Yiguez as House Bill No. 1453, with the
following explanatory note:
The accompanying bill seeks to convert one (1) parcel of land in the
district of Malate, which is reserved as communal property into a
disposable or alienable property of the State and to provide its
subdivision and sale to bona fide occupants or tenants.
This parcel of land in question was originally an aggregate part of a
piece of land with an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less. ...
On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila in its regular
session unanimously adopted a resolution requesting the President
of the Philippines and Congress of the Philippines the feasibility of
declaring this property into disposable or alienable property of the
State. There is therefore a precedent that this parcel of land could be
subdivided and sold to bona fide occupants. This parcel of land will
not serve any useful public project because it is bounded on all sides
by private properties which were formerly parts of this lot in question.
Approval of this bill will implement the policy of the Administration of
land for the landless and the Fifth Declaration of Principles of the
Constitution, which states that the promotion of Social Justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all people should be
the concern of the State. We are ready and willing to enact
legislation promoting the social and economic well-being of the
people whenever an opportunity for enacting such kind of legislation
arises.
In view of the foregoing consideration and to insure fairness and
justice to the present bona fide occupants thereof, approval of this
Bill is strongly urged.
5

The Bill having been passed by the House of Representatives, the
same was thereafter sent to the Senate where it was thoroughly
discussed, as evidenced by the Congressional Records for May 20,
1964, pertinent portion of which is as follows:
SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr. President, it will be re called that when
the late Mayor Lacson was still alive, we approved a similar bill. But
afterwards, the late Mayor Lacson came here and protested against
the approval, and the approval was reconsidered. May I know
whether the defect in the bill which we approved, has already been
eliminated in this present bill?
SENATOR TOLENTINO: I understand Mr. President, that that has
already been eliminated and that is why the City of Manila has no
more objection to this bill.
SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr. President, in view of that manifestation
and considering that Mayor Villegas and Congressman Albert of the
Fourth District of Manila are in favor of the bill. I would not want to
pretend to know more what is good for the City of Manila.
SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there being no objection, I
move that we approve this bill on second reading.
PRESIDENT PRO-TEMPORE: The biII is approved on second
reading after several Senetors said aye and nobody said nay.
The bill was passed by the Senate, approved by the President on
June 20, 1964, and became Republic Act No. 4118. It reads as
follows:
Lot I-B-2-B of Block 557 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila,
situated in the District of Malate, City of Manila, which is reserved as
communal property, is hereby converted into disposal or alienable
land of the State, to be placed under the disposal of the Land Tenure
Administration. The Land Tenure Administration shall subdivide the
property into small lots, none of which shall exceed one hundred and
twenty square meters in area and sell the same on installment basis
to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof and to individuals, in
the order mentioned: Provided, That no down payment shall be
required of tenants or bona fide occupants who cannot afford to pay
such down payment: Provided, further, That no person can purchase
more than one lot: Provided, furthermore, That if the tenant or bona
fide occupant of any given lot is not able to purchase the same, he
shall be given a lease from month to month until such time that he is
able to purchase the lot: Provided, still further, That in the event of
lease the rentals which may be charged shall not exceed eight per
cent per annum of the assessed value of the property leased: And
provided, finally, That in fixing the price of each lot, which shall not
exceed twenty pesos per square meter, the cost of subdivision and
survey shall not be included.
Sec. 2. Upon approval of this Act no ejectment proceedings against
any tenant or bona fide occupant of the above lots shall be instituted
and any ejectment proceedings pending in court against any such
tenant or bona fide occupant shall be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant: Provided, That any demolition order directed against any
tenant or bona fide occupant shall be lifted.
Sec. 3. Upon approval of this Act, if the tenant or bona fide occupant
is in arrears in the payment of any rentals, the amount legally due
shall be liquidated and shall be payable in twenty-four equal monthly
installments from the date of liquidation.
Sec. 4. No property acquired by virtue of this Act shall be transferred,
sold, mortgaged, or otherwise disposed of within a period of five
years from the date full ownership thereof has been vested in the
purchaser without the consent of the Land Tenure Administration.
Sec. 5. In the event of the death of the purchaser prior to the
complete payment of the price of the lot purchased by him, his widow
and children shall succeed in all his rights and obligations with
respect to his lot.
Sec. 6. The Chairman of the Land Tenure Administration shall
implement and issue such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.
Sec. 7. The sum of one hundred fifty thousand pesos is appropriated
out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated,
to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 8. All laws or parts of laws inconsistent with this Act are
repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 20, 1964.
To implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, and pursuant
to the request of the occupants of the property involved, then Deputy
Governor Jose V. Yap of the Land Authority (which succeeded the
Land Tenure Administration) addressed a letter, dated February 18,
1965, to Mayor Antonio Villegas, furnishing him with a copy of the
proposed subdivision plan of said lot as prepared for the Republic of
the Philippines for resale of the subdivision lots by the Land Authority
to bona fide applicants.
6

On March 2, 1965, the City Mayor of Manila, through his Executive
and Technical Adviser, acknowledged receipt of the proposed
subdivision plan of the property in question and informed the Land
Authority that his office would interpose no objection to the
implementation of said law, provided that its provisions be strictly
complied with.
7

With the above-mentioned written conformity of the City of Manila for
the implementation of Republic Act No. 4118, the Land Authority,
thru then Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap, requested the City
Treasurer of Manila, thru the City Mayor, for the surrender and
delivery to the former of the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 22547 in order to obtain title thereto in the name of the
Land Authority. The request was duly granted with the knowledge
and consent of the Office of the City Mayor.
8

With the presentation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547, which
had been yielded as above stated by the, City authorities to the Land
Authority, Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T. No. 22547) was
cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Manila and in lieu thereof
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80876 was issued in the name of the
Land Tenure Administration (now Land Authority) pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 4118.
9

But due to reasons which do not appear in the record, the City of
Manila made a complete turn-about, for on December 20, 1966,
Antonio J. Villegas, in his capacity as the City Mayor of Manila and
the City of Manila as a duly organized public corporation, brought an
action for injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction to
restrain, prohibit and enjoin the herein appellants, particularly the
Governor of the Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of Manila,
from further implementing Republic Act No. 4118, and praying for the
declaration of Republic Act No. 4118 as unconstitutional.
With the foregoing antecedent facts, which are all contained in the
partial stipulation of facts submitted to the trial court and approved by
respondent Judge, the parties waived the presentation of further
evidence and submitted the case for decision. On September 23,
1968, judgment was rendered by the trial court declaring Republic
Act No. 4118 unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that it
deprived the City of Manila of its property without due process of law
and payment of just compensation. The respondents were ordered to
undo all that had been done to carry out the provisions of said Act
and were restrained from further implementing the same.
Two issues are presented for determination, on the resolution of
which the decision in this case hinges, to wit:
I. Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of
Manila?
II. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the
Constitution?
I.
As regards the first issue, appellants maintain that the land involved
is a communal land or "legua comunal" which is a portion of the
public domain owned by the State; that it came into existence as
such when the City of Manila, or any pueblo or town in the
Philippines for that matter, was founded under the laws of Spain, the
former sovereign; that upon the establishment of a pueblo, the
administrative authority was required to allot and set aside portions
of the public domain for a public plaza, a church site, a site for public
buildings, lands to serve as common pastures and for streets and
roads; that in assigning these lands some lots were earmarked for
strictly public purposes, and ownership of these lots (for public
purposes) immediately passed to the new municipality; that in the
case of common lands or "legua comunal", there was no such
immediate acquisition of ownership by the pueblo, and the land
though administered thereby, did not automatically become its
property in the absence of an express grant from the Central
Government, and that the reason for this arrangement is that this
class of land was not absolutely needed for the discharge of the
municipality's governmental functions.
It is argued that the parcel of land involved herein has not been used
by the City of Manila for any public purpose and had not been
officially earmarked as a site for the erection of some public
buildings; that this circumstance confirms the fact that it was
originally "communal" land alloted to the City of Manila by the Central
Government not because it was needed in connection with its
organization as a municipality but simply for the common use of its
inhabitants; that the present City of Manila as successor of the
Ayuntamiento de Manila under the former Spanish sovereign merely
enjoys the usufruct over said land, and its exercise of acts of
ownership by selling parts thereof did not necessarily convert the
land into a patrimonial property of the City of Manila nor divest the
State of its paramount title.
Appellants further argue that a municipal corporation, like a city is a
governmental agent of the State with authority to govern a limited
portion of its territory or to administer purely local affairs in a given
political subdivision, and the extent of its authority is strictly delimited
by the grant of power conferred by the State; that Congress has the
exclusive power to create, change or destroy municipal corporations;
that even if We admit that legislative control over municipal
corporations is not absolute and even if it is true that the City of
Manila has a registered title over the property in question, the mere
transfer of such land by an act of the legislature from one class of
public land to another, without compensation, does not invade the
vested rights of the City.
Appellants finally argue that Republic Act No. 4118 has treated the
land involved as one reserved for communal use, and this
classification is conclusive upon the courts; that if the City of Manila
feels that this is wrong and its interests have been thereby
prejudiced, the matter should be brought to the attention of Congress
for correction; and that since Congress, in the exercise of its wide
discretionary powers has seen fit to classify the land in question as
communal, the Courts certainly owe it to a coordinate branch of the
Government to respect such determination and should not interfere
with the enforcement of the law.
Upon the other hand, appellees argue by simply quoting portions of
the appealed decision of the trial court, which read thus:
The respondents (petitioners-appellants herein) contend, among
other defenses, that the property in question is communal property.
This contention is, however, disproved by Original Certificate of Title
No. 4329 issued on August 21, 1920 in favor of the City of Manila
after the land in question was registered in the City's favor. The
Torrens Title expressly states that the City of Manila was the owner
in 'fee simple' of the said land. Under Sec. 38 of the Land
Registration Act, as amended, the decree of confirmation and
registration in favor of the City of Manila ... shall be conclusive upon
and against all persons including the Insular Government and all the
branches there ... There is nothing in the said certificate of title
indicating that the land was 'communal' land as contended by the
respondents. The erroneous assumption by the Municipal Board of
Manila that the land in question was communal land did not make it
so. The Municipal Board had no authority to do that.
The respondents, however, contend that Congress had the power
and authority to declare that the land in question was 'communal'
land and the courts have no power or authority to make a contrary
finding. This contention is not entirely correct or accurate. Congress
has the power to classify 'land of the public domain', transfer them
from one classification to another and declare them disposable or
not. Such power does not, however, extend to properties which are
owned by cities, provinces and municipalities in their 'patrimonial'
capacity.
Art. 324 of the Civil Code provides that properties of provinces, cities
and municipalities are divided into properties for public use and
patrimonial property. Art. 424 of the same code provides that
properties for public use consist of provincial roads, city streets,
municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades
and public works for public service paid for by said province, cities or
municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is
patrimonial. Tested by this criterion the Court finds and holds that the
land in question is patrimonial property of the City of Manila.
Respondents contend that Congress has declared the land in
question to be 'communal' and, therefore, such designation is
conclusive upon the courts. The Courts holds otherwise. When a
statute is assailed as unconstitutional the Courts have the power and
authority to inquire into the question and pass upon it. This has long
ago been settled in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60, when the
United States Supreme Court speaking thru Chief Justice Marshall
held:
... If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void,
does it, notwithstanding its validity, bind the courts, and oblige them
to give effect? It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is ... So if a law be in opposition to
the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a
particular case, so that the court must either decide that case
conformable to the constitution, disregarding the law, the court must
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is
of the very essence of unconstitutional judicial duty.
Appellees finally concluded that when the courts declare a law
unconstitutional it does not mean that the judicial power is superior to
the legislative power. It simply means that the power of the people is
superior to both and that when the will of the legislature, declared in
statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the
Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the Constitution
rather than by the statutes.
There is one outstanding factor that should be borne in mind in
resolving the character of the land involved, and it is that the City of
Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee
simple, has not shown by any shred of evidence in what manner it
acquired said land as its private or patrimonial property. It is true that
the City of Manila as well as its predecessor, the Ayuntamiento de
Manila, could validly acquire property in its corporate or private
capacity, following the accepted doctrine on the dual character
public and private of a municipal corporation. And when it
acquires property in its private capacity, it acts like an ordinary
person capable of entering into contracts or making transactions for
the transmission of title or other real rights. When it comes to
acquisition of land, it must have done so under any of the modes
established by law for the acquisition of ownership and other real
rights. In the absence of a title deed to any land claimed by the City
of Manila as its own, showing that it was acquired with its private or
corporate funds, the presumption is that such land came from the
State upon the creation of the municipality (Unson vs. Lacson, et al.,
100 Phil. 695). Originally the municipality owned no patrimonial
property except those that were granted by the State not for its public
but for private use. Other properties it owns are acquired in the
course of the exercise of its corporate powers as a juridical entity to
which category a municipal corporation pertains.
Communal lands or "legua comunal" came into existence when a
town or pueblo was established in this country under the laws of
Spain (Law VII, Title III, Book VI, Recopilacion de las Leyes de
Indios). The municipalities of the Philippines were not entitled, as a
matter of right, to any part of the public domain for use as communal
lands. The Spanish law provided that the usufruct of a portion of the
public domain adjoining municipal territory might be granted by the
Government for communal purposes, upon proper petition, but, until
granted, no rights therein passed to the municipalities, and, in any
event, the ultimate title remained in the sovereign (City of Manila vs.
Insular Government, 10 Phil. 327).
For the establishment, then, of new pueblos the administrative
authority of the province, in representation of the Governor General,
designated the territory for their location and extension and the
metes and bounds of the same; and before alloting the lands among
the new settlers, a special demarcation was made of the places
which were to serve as the public square of the pueblo, for the
erection of the church, and as sites for the public buildings, among
others, the municipal building or the casa real, as well as of the lands
whick were to constitute the common pastures, and propios of the
municipality and the streets and roads which were to intersect the
new town were laid out, ... . (Municipality of Catbalogan vs. Director
of Lands, 17 Phil. 216, 220) (Emphasis supplied)
It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that regardless of
the source or classification of land in the possession of a
municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its
private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the
State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental
or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to the paramount
power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its
creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public
work, the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality
thereof for purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legal
situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts
it to a different use (2 McQuilin,Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., p.
197, citing Monagham vs. Armatage, 218 Minn. 27, 15 N. W. 2nd
241).
True it is that the legislative control over a municipal corporation is
not absolute even when it comes to its property devoted to public
use, for such control must not be exercised to the extent of depriving
persons of their property or rights without due process of law, or in a
manner impairing the obligations of contracts. Nevertheless, when it
comes to property of the municipality which it did not acquire in its
private or corporate capacity with its own funds, the legislature can
transfer its administration and disposition to an agency of the
National Government to be disposed of according to its discretion.
Here it did so in obedience to the constitutional mandate of
promoting social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of the people.
It has been held that a statute authorizing the transfer of a Municipal
airport to an Airport Commission created by the legislature, even
without compensation to the city, was not violative of the due process
clause of the American Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of
Minnessota in Monagham vs. Armatage, supra, said:
... The case is controlled by the further rule that the legislature,
having plenary control of the local municipality, of its creation and of
all its affairs, has the right to authorize or direct the expenditures of
money in its treasury, though raised, for a particular purpose, for any
legitimate municipal purpose, or to order and direct a distribution
thereof upon a division of the territory into separate municipalities ... .
The local municipality has no such vested right in or to its public
funds, like that which the Constitution protects in the individual as
precludes legislative interferences. People vs. Power, 25 Ill. 187;
State Board (of Education) vs. City, 56 Miss. 518. As remarked by
the supreme court of Maryland in Mayor vs. Sehner, 37 Md. 180: "It
is of the essence of such a corporation, that the government has the
sole right as trustee of the public interest, at its own good will and
pleasure, to inspect, regulate, control, and direct the corporation, its
funds, and franchises."
We therefore hold that c.500, in authorizing the transfer of the use
and possession of the municipal airport to the commission without
compensation to the city or to the park board, does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The Congress has dealt with the land involved as one reserved for
communal use (terreno comunal). The act of classifying State
property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power
and it should not be interfered with by the courts.
This brings Us to the second question as regards the validity of
Republic Act No. 4118, viewed in the light of Article III, Sections 1,
subsection (1) and (2) of the Constitution which ordain that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law and that
no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
II .
The trial court declared Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional for
allegedly depriving the City of Manila of its property without due
process of law and without payment of just compensation. It is now
well established that the presumption is always in favor of the
constitutionality of a law (U S. vs. Ten Yu, 24 Phil. 1; Go Ching, et al.
vs. Dinglasan, et al., 45 O.G. No. 2, pp. 703, 705). To declare a law
unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution must
be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the attainment
of some public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is
allowed. To strike down a law there must be a clear showing that
what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it
to be done (Morfe vs. Mutuc, et al., G.R. No. L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968;
22 SCRA 424). That situation does not obtain in this case as the law
assailed does not in any manner trench upon the constitution as will
hereafter be shown. Republic Act No. 4118 was intended to
implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the
Government program of "Land for the Landless". The explanatory
note of House Bill No. 1453 which became Republic Act No. 4118,
reads in part as follows:
Approval of this bill will implement the policy of the administration of
"land for the landless" and the Fifth Declaration of Principles of the
Constitution which states that "the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all people should be
the concern of the State." We are ready and willing to enact
legislation promoting the social and economic well-being of the
people whenever an opportunity for enacting such kind of legislation
arises.
The respondent Court held that Republic Act No. 4118, "by
converting the land in question which is the patrimonial property of
the City of Manila into disposable alienable land of the State and
placing it under the disposal of the Land Tenure Administration
violates the provisions of Article III (Secs. 1 and 2) of the Constitution
which ordain that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation, and that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law". In support thereof
reliance is placed on the ruling in Province of Zamboanga del Norte
vs. City of Zamboanga, G.R. No. 2440, March 28, 1968; 22 SCRA
1334, which holds that Congress cannot deprive a municipality of its
private or patrimonial property without due process of law and
without payment of just compensation since it has no absolute
control thereof. There is no quarrel over this rule if it is undisputed
that the property sought to be taken is in reality a private or
patrimonial property of the municipality or city. But it would be simply
begging the question to classify the land in question as such. The
property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the
City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity.
That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title
should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land
covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted
by the sovereign upon its creation. That the National Government,
through the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General,
in the cadastral proceedings did not contest the claim of the City of
Manila that the land is its property, does not detract from its
character as State property and in no way divests the legislature of
its power to deal with it as such, the state not being bound by the
mistakes and/or negligence of its officers.
One decisive fact that should be noted is that the City of Manila
expressly recognized the paramount title of the State over said land
when by its resolution of September 20, 1960, the Municipal Board,
presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio Villegas, requested "His
Excellency the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility
of declaring the city property bounded by Florida, San Andres and
Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and
25547, containing an area of 7,450 square meters, as patrimonial
property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to
the actual occupants thereof." (See Annex E, Partial Stipulation of
Facts, Civil Case No. 67945, CFI, Manila, p. 121, Record of the
Case) [Emphasis Supplied]
The alleged patrimonial character of the land under the ownership of
the City of Manila is totally belied by the City's own official act, which
is fatal to its claim since the Congress did not do as bidden. If it were
its patrimonial property why should the City of Manila be requesting
the President to make representation to the legislature to declare it
as such so it can be disposed of in favor of the actual occupants?
There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land
belongs to the State and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of
Manila for municipal purposes. But since the City did not actually use
said land for any recognized public purpose and allowed it to remain
idle and unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by squatters,
no presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of the City of
Manila may be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own
private or patrimonial property (Municipality of Tigbauan vs. Director
of Lands, 35 Phil. 798; City of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10
Phil. 327; Municipality of Luzuriaga vs. Director of Lands, 24 Phil.
193). The conclusion of the respondent court that Republic Act No.
4118 converted a patrimonial property of the City of Manila into a
parcel of disposable land of the State and took it away from the City
without compensation is, therefore, unfounded. In the last analysis
the land in question pertains to the State and the City of Manila
merely acted as trustee for the benefit of the people therein for whom
the State can legislate in the exercise of its legitimate powers.
Republic Act No. 4118 was never intended to expropriate the
property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal
land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the
National Government: And this was done at the instance or upon the
request of the City of Manila itself. The subdivision of the land and
conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by
Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the
power of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of
Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, but simply as
a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property.
It should be emphasized that the law assailed was enacted upon
formal written petition of the Municipal Board of Manila in the form of
a legally approved resolution. The certificate of title over the property
in the name of the City of Manila was accordingly cancelled and
another issued to the Land Tenure Administration after the voluntary
surrender of the City's duplicate certificate of title by the City
Treasurer with the knowledge and consent of the City Mayor. To
implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, the then Deputy
Governor of the Land Authority sent a letter, dated February 18,
1965, to the City Mayor furnishing him with a copy of the "proposed
subdivision plan of the said lot as prepared for the Republic of the
Philippines for subdivision and resale by the Land Authority to bona
fide applicants." On March 2, 1965, the Mayor of Manila, through his
Executive and Technical Adviser, acknowledged receipt of the
subdivision plan and informed the Land Authority that his Office "will
interpose no objection to the implementation of said law provided
that its provisions are strictly complied with." The foregoing sequence
of events, clearly indicate a pattern of regularity and observance of
due process in the reversion of the property to the National
Government. All such acts were done in recognition by the City of
Manila of the right and power of the Congress to dispose of the land
involved.
Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it
owns, either under the due process clause or under the eminent
domain provisions of the Constitution. If it failed to get from the
Congress the concession it sought of having the land involved given
to it as its patrimonial property, the Courts possess no power to grant
that relief. Republic Act No. 4118 does not, therefore, suffer from any
constitutional infirmity.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and
petitioners shall proceed with the free and untrammeled
implementation of Republic Act No. 4118 without any obstacle from
the respondents. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee and Antonio, JJ., concur.
Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.



























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L40474 August 29, 1975
CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HON.
PASCUAL A. BERCILLES Presiding Judge, Branch XV, 14th
Judicial District, and JOSE L. ESPELETA, Assistant Provincial
Fiscal, Province of Cebu, representing the Solicitor General's
Office and the Bureau of Lands, respondents.
Jose Antonio R Conde for petitioner.
Office of the Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,
Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Trial Attorney
David R. Hilario for respondents. .

CONCEPCION, Jr., J .:
This is a petition for the review of the order of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu dismissing petitioner's application for registration of
title over a parcel of land situated in the City of Cebu.
The parcel of land sought to be registered was only a portion of M.
Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. On September 23, 1968, the City
Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, approved on October
3, 1968, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in
the City Development Plan.
1
Subsequently, on December 19, 1968,
the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing
the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding.
2

Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being
the highest bidder and on March 3, 1969, the City of Cebu, through
the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein
petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00.
3
By virtue of the
aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application
with the Court of First instance of Cebu to have its title to the land
registered.
4

On June 26, 1974, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a
motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property
sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is
considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the
commerce of man. Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration
by any private individual.
5

After hearing the parties, on October 11, 1974 the trial court issued
an order dismissing the petitioner's application for registration of title.

6
Hence, the instant petition for review.
For the resolution of this case, the petitioner poses the following
questions:
(1) Does the City Charter of Cebu City (Republic Act No. 3857) under
Section 31, paragraph 34, give the City of Cebu the valid right to
declare a road as abandoned? and
(2) Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the
patrimonial property of the City of Cebu which may be the object of a
common contract?
(1) The pertinent portions of the Revised Charter of Cebu City
provides:
Section 31. Legislative Powers. Any provision of law and executive
order to the contrary notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the
following legislative powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(34) ...; to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue,
park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may
be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.
From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is
empowered to close a city road or street. In the case of Favis vs. City
of Baguio,
7
where the power of the city Council of Baguio City to
close city streets and to vacate or withdraw the same from public use
was similarly assailed, this court said:
5. So it is, that appellant may not challenge the city council's act of
withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead end from public
use and converting the remainder thereof into an alley. These are
acts well within the ambit of the power to close a city street. The city
council, it would seem to us, is the authority competent to determine
whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use.
Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the
discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the
courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion.
Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that
some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate
the vacation ordinance.
(2) Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's
application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it
follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property
which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of
public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted,
in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that: "Property thus
withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be
lawfully used or conveyed."
Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public
use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the
petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.
WHEREFORE, the order dated October 11, 1974, rendered by the
respondent court in Land Reg. Case No. N-948, LRC Rec. No. N-
44531 is hereby set aside, and the respondent court is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of the petitioner's application for
registration of title.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J, Fernando, Barredo and Aquino, JJ., concur.



























Province of Zamboanga Del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al
GR No. L-24440, March 28, 1968


FACTS:

After Zamboanga Province was divided into two (Zamboanga Del
Norte and Zamboanga Del Sur), Republic Act 3039 was passed
providing that--

"All buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the former
province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga
are hereby transferred free of charge in favor of the City of
Zamboanga."

Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just compensation
was unconstitutional because it deprived the province of property
without due process. Included in the properties were the capital site
and capitol building, certain school sites, hospital and leprosarium
sites, and high school playgrounds.

ISSUES:


1. Are the properties mentioned, properties for public use or
patrimonial property?
2. Should the city pay for said properties?

HELD:

1. If we follow the Civil Code classification, only the high
school playgrounds are for public use since it is the only one
that is available to the general public, and all the rest are
patrimonial property since they are not devoted to public use
but to public service. But if we follow the law on Municipal
Corporations, as long as the purpose is for a public service,
the property should be considered for PUBLIC USE.

2. If the Civil Code classification is used, since almost all the
properties involved are patrimonial, the law would be
unconstitutional since the province would be deprived of its
own property without just compensation.

If the law on Municipal Corporations would be followed, the
properties would be of public dominion, and therefore NO
COMPENSATION would be required. It is the law on
Municipal Corporations that should be followed. Firstly, while
the Civil Code may classify them as patrimonial, they should
not be regarded as ordinary private property. They should
fall under the control of the State, otherwise certain
governmental activities would be impaired. Secondly, Art.
424, 2nd paragraph itself says "without prejudice to the
provisions of special laws."

Salas V Jarencio (1972)
Ponente: Esguerra, J.

Legal Doctrine: Regardless of the source or classification of
land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those
acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate
capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the
benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or
proprietary purposes

Facts:
February 24, 1919the 4th Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, acting as a land registration court,
rendered judgment in Case No. 18, G.L.R.O. Record No.
111, declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a
parcel of land known as Lot No. 1, Block 557 of the
Cadastral Survey of the City of Mani1a, containing an area of
9,689.8 square meters, more or less.
August 21, 1920 Title No. 4329 issued on in favor of the
City of Manila after the land in question was registered in the
City's favor. The Torrens Title expressly states that the City
of Manila was the owner in 'fee simple' of the said land
September 20, 1960the Municipal Board, presided by
then Vice-Mayor Antonio Villegas, requested "His Excellency
the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of
declaring the city property bounded by Florida, San Andres
and Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 25545 and 25547, containing an area of 7,450 square
meters, as patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the
purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants
thereof
The said resolution of the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila was officially transmitted to the President of the
Philippines the following day, to which a copy was furnished
to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Congress
of the Philippines.
June 20, 1964RA 4118 was passed by the Senate and
approved by the President pursuant to the request. Such bill
was enacted for social justice purposes, that they be sold to
their currently landless occupants.
But due to reasons which do not appear in the record, the
City of Manila made a complete turn-about, for on December
20, 1966, Antonio J. Villegas, in his capacity as the City
Mayor of Manila and the City of Manila as a duly organized
public corporation, brought an action for injunction and/or
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit and
enjoin the herein appellants, particularly the Governor of the
Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of Manila, from
further implementing Republic Act No. 4118, and praying for
the declaration of Republic Act No. 4118 as unconstitutional.

Issues and Decisions:
1. Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the
City of Manila? NO, it is the property of the State.
2. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the
Constitution? YES, it is valid.

Ratio:

1. Is the property involved private or patrimonial property
of the City of Manila? NO, it is the property of the State.

The rule is that when it comes to property of the municipality
which it did not acquire in its private or corporate capacity
with its own funds, the legislature can transfer its
administration and disposition to an agency of the National
Government to be disposed of according to its discretion.

The possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired
with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such
property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its
inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary
purposes.
The City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court
as owner in fee simple, has not shown by any shred of
evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its private
or patrimonial property. The presumption is that such land
came from the State upon the creation of the municipality.

That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but
this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State as
the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City
of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation

Therefore, the land in question pertains to the State and the
City of Manila merely acted as trustee for the benefit of the
people therein for whom the State can legislate in the
exercise of its legitimate powers.

2. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the
Constitution? YES, it is valid.

Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of
anything it owns, either under the due process clause or
under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. If it
failed to get from the Congress the concession it sought of
having the land involved given to it as its patrimonial
property, the Courts possess no power to grant that relief.
Republic Act No. 4118 does not, therefore, suffer from any
constitutional infirmity.





Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles
GR No. L-40474, August 29, 1975


FACTS: The City Council of Cebu, in 1968, considered as an
abandoned road, the terminal portion of one of its streets.
Later it authorized the sale through public bidding of the
property. The Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. was able to
purchase the same. It then petitioned the RTC of Cebu for
the registration of the land. The petition was opposed by the
Provincial Fiscal (Prosecutor) who argued that the lot is still
part of the public domain, and cannot therefore be
registered.


ISSUE: May the lot be registered in the name of the buyer?


HELD: Yes, the land can be registered in the name of the
buyer, because the street in question has already been
withdrawn from public use, and accordingly has become
patrimonial property. The sale of the lot was therefore valid.


CHAVEZ VS PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND AMARI
CORPORATION

Facts:

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing
agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide.
It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR
insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore
lands are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of
the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands.
PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged
areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD:

No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public
domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will
sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are
alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA
seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership
of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer
to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged
areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary
to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.