Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners,
vs.
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J .:
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of
and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard
for she sovereign acts, of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. Where no
provision of the Constitution or the laws or even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authori ty.
This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of
the law.
The Case
On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original petition for quo
warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of
the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents and the solicitor general "to file COMMENT
thereon within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice." On August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor
general submitted their respective Comments. In compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated September 1, 1998, petitioners
filed their Consolidated Reply on September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this Court gave due course to the petition and
deemed the controversy submitted for decision, without need of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction 1 to hear and decide petitions for quo
warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of
such petitions in the lower tribunals. 2 However, for special and important reasons or for exceptional and compelling
circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has allowed exceptions to this doctrine. 3 In fact, original petitions forcertiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the Senate President 4 and the Speaker of the
House 5 have been recognized as exceptions to this rule.
The Facts
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer, convened on July 27, 1998 for the first
regular session of the eleventh Congress. At the time, in terms of party affiliation, the composition of the Senate was as
follows: 6
10 members Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United
Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP)
1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member People's Reform Party (PRP)
1 member Gabay Bayan
2 members Independent

23 total number of senators 7 (The last six members are all classified by petitioners as
"independent".)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position of Senate President was
Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago.
By a vote of 20 to 2, 8 Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the
minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised
the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona
as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question
continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus,
but still failed to resolve the issue.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP senators, 9 stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President
formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main
that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position
that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues
From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as
the minority leader?
The Court's Ruling
After a close perusal of the pleadings 10 and a careful deliberation on the arguments, pro and con, the Court finds that no
constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition of and the assumption into office by
Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.
First Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 11 in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction to settle the issue of who is the
lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the definitions of "majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation of the
Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof, stating that "[t]he Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members."
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in common that the issue of who is the lawful
Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively to the domain of the legislature, over which the Court cannot
exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of separation of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as
the fundamental law does not provide for the office of a minority leader in the Senate. The legislature alone has the full di scretion
to provide for such office and, in that event, to determine the procedure of selecting its occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no question involving an interpretation or application
of the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of the Senate; neither are there "peculiar circumstances" impelling the Court to
assume jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor general adds that there is not even any legislative practice to support the
petitioners' theory that a senator who votes for the winning Senate President is precluded from becoming the minority leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on the various important cases involving this
very important and basic question, which it has ruled upon in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Court's power of judicial review; that is, questions involving
an interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of Congress.
Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in
nature, whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies." 12
In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, si nce it
was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration,
however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2)
because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to
hold a session 13 and therein elect a Senate President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: "[I] concur with the majority that this Court has jurisdiction over cases like the
present . . . so as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no
one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well." 14
Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:
Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of Congress, is highly
explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives. It has already involved the President of the
Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution
cannot be expected from any quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the
people for an effective settlement are pinned. 15
. . . This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or decide if this Court
should refuse to decide them. 16
. . . The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered. 17
In Taada v. Cueno, 18 this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that "it refers to 'those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not [the] legality, of a particular measure." 19
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political
question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was subject to
mandatory constitutional limitations. 20 Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia, 21 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote that the Court "had authority to and
should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ
[of habeas corpus]." This ruling was made in spite of the previous pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker 22 andMontenegro v.

Castaeda 23 that "the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege . . .) belongs to
the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other persons." But the Chief Justice
cautioned: "the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he
has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom
of his act."
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive Secretary: 24
The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character are justiciable,
not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called
political questions is the principle of separation of powers characteristic of the presidential system
of government the functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three
(3) categories, namely, 1) those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative
department; 2) those concerning mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions
applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those
dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or
prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice.
Within its own sphere but only within such sphere each department is supreme and
independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or
field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon the
advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other
departments provided that such acts, measures or decisions are within the area allocated thereto
by the Constitution.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected
is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested
act,not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations particularly those
prescribed by the Constitution would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such
issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of the courts of justice under the presidential
form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of
its basic predicates. As a consequence, we have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline
passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation made particularly more exacting
and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the
Constitution to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky. 589, 18 SW 522, 523], it
was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power," to determine whether another branch of the
government has "keptwithin constitutional limits."
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. The present
Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. 25
This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements of the Court. Daza v. Singson, 26Coseteng v.
Mitra, Jr. 27 and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales 28 similarly resolved issues assailing the acts of the leaders of both houses of
Congress in apportioning among political parties the seats to which each chamber was entitled in the Commission on
Appointments. The Court held that the issue was justiciable, "even if the question were political in nature," since it involved "the
legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of] the
Constitution."
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Taada v. Angara, 29 wherein the petitioners sought to nullify the Senate's
concurrence in the ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. The Court ruled: "Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute." The Court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning, an
act of the political departments of government, it will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it
down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.
Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 30 (HRET), the Court refused to reverse a decision of the
HRET, in the absence of a showing that said tribunal had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The Court ruled that full authority had been conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate as sole judges of all contests relating to the election, the returns, and the qualifications of their respective members.
Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive. 31 The Court may inquire into a decision or resolution of said tribunals only if such
"decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion" 32
Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia, 33 was asked to reexamine the enrolled bill doctrine and to look beyond the
certification of the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the bill, which was later enacted as Republic Act 8240, was
properly approved by the legislative body. Petitioners claimed that certain procedural rules of the House had been breached in
the passage of the bill. They averred further that a violation of the constitutionally mandated House rules was a violation of the
Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of concerned the internal procedures of the House,
with which the Court had no concern. It enucleated: 34
It would-be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either
to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own
rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial
forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been
invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative
skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of
discretion were it to do so. . . . In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its
rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
In the instant controversy, the petitioners one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known constitutionalist try to hew closely
to these jurisprudential parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the constitution, has not been observed in the
selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdiction over the petition. Well-settled is the
doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition,
regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. 35 In light of the aforesaid allegations of

petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discreti on in
the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue:
Violation of the Constitution
Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial question: In recognizing Respondent Guingona as
the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the
laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the constitutional provision requiring the election of
the Senate President "by majority vote of all members" carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of "majority" and
"minority," as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue that "majority" in the aforequoted constitutional provision
refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee chairmanships.
Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the
right to determine the minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate
minority leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted
committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the
Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
The term "majority" has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate,
it simply "means the number greater than half or more than half of any total." 36 The plain and unambiguous words of the subject
constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not
by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the "majority," much less the "minority," in the said body. And there is
no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than
one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shallipso facto constitute the
"minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shal l
automatically become the minority leader.
The Comment 37 of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were not contested in petitioners' Reply.
During the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen.
Jovito R Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. 38 During the
ninth regular session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was reached to
assign committee chairmanships to all senators, including those belonging to the minority. 39 This practice continued during the
tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was allowed to chair a committee. 40 History would also show that the "majority"
in either house of Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while the
"minority" normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with
the larger number of votes," 41 not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In
contrast, minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the
majority." 42 Betweentwo unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the
majority while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say
which is theminority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi -party system such
as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be
indentified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of
the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory
provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the
minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead sil ent
on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." 43 To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine the rules of its
proceedings." 44 Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal affairs. 45Pertinent to
the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:
Rule I
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
Sec 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a President Pro
Tempore, a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.
These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge of their duties.
Rule II
ELECTION OF OFFICER
Sec. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its Members. Should
there be more than one candidate for the same office, a nominal vote shall be taken; otherwise, the
elections shall be by viva voce or by resolution.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause
providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof, At any rate,
such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guideli nes or
specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On
grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the
legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. 46 Paraphrasing the words of Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then
the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the
courts may intervene. 47

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their
effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." 48 Being
merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by
the legislative body 49 at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it i s
certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has
no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is
bound to protect and uphold the very duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court
will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the Senate was violated, and while the
judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been lodged in the legislative department,
this Court may still inquire whether an act of Congress or its officials has been made with grave abuse of discretion. 50 This is
the plain implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly confers upon the judiciary the power and the
duty not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but likewise "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, said in part: 51
. . . the powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative,
the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy[, the] power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is
vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter
evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions, first, of Respondent Guingona and, second, of
Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue:
Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power 52 by one without color of title or who is
not entitled by law thereto. 53 A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the
contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. 54 The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a
public prosecutor 55 or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised
by another. 56 The action shall be brought against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding of
exercising such office. 57
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. 58 In this
case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed
position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested.
Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption
and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to
characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue:
Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" is restricted
only by the definition and confines of the term "grave abuse of discretion."
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility. 59
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as
such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and
a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the
laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista, Ramon Diokno and
Lorenzo M. Taada for respondent.
Teehankee, Fernando, Sunico & Rodrigo; Vera, Montesines & Navarro;
Felixberto M. Serrano and Vicente del Rosario as amici curiae.
R E S O L U T I O N
In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six
justices against four resolved to deny the petition.
Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is
now written briefly to explain the principal grounds for the denial.
The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M.
Taadare quested that his right to speak on the next session day,
February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then Senate
President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.
On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator
Taada and Senator Taada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with
the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating charges against the
then Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at
the Senate session hall at the appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the
petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed his
appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally
ascended the rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but
instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted
by Senators Taada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he
read slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and
conferred with his colleagues Senator Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner
finally called the meeting to order. Except Senator Sotto who was
confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United States,
all the Senator were present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the
roll call be dispensed with, but Senator Tirona opposed said motion,
obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner and his
partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Taada from
delivering his privilege speech. The roll was called.
Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with
the reading of the minutes, but this motion was likewise opposed by
Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-
mentioned conspiracy.
Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the
minutes, Senator Taada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver
his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding,
continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes,
Senator Taada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner
announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who would
speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the while,
tolerating the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was
continuously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the
latter would ask for recognition of Senator Taada.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery,
as if by pre-arrangement. At about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles
David, one of the petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and
he moved for adjournment of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of
the above-mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Taada.
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the
session and this opposition was seconded by herein respondent who

moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote. Another
commotion ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein
respondent also reiterated his opposition to the adjournment and again
moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair
hurriedly walked out of the session hall followed by Senator David,
Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the
senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate
President Pro-tempore, urged by those senators present took the Chair
and proceeded with the session.
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so
made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner,
made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the
remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to
paralyze the functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be
designated to preside over the session which suggestion was carried
unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the Chair.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was
appointedActing Secretary, because the Assistance Secretary, who was
then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter
abandoned the session.
Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally
able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read
aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his
motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair,
after the respondent had yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced
Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of
the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano
Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said
resolution was unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent
as acting president of the Philippines Senate.
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the
Court to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines senate and
oust respondent.
The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and
believes that these are the crucial points:
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino
vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the
power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered
with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of
the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators
were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should
abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect
only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose
their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must
imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to
preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme
Court.
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the
plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a
resolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the
temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And
we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action
inconsistent with the calm that should characterized judicial deliberations.
The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among other
reasons, the situation is not where two sets of senators have constituted
themselves into two senates actually functioning as such, (as in said
Werts case), there being no question that there is presently

one Philippines Senate only. To their credit be it recorded that petitioner
and his partisans have not erected themselves into another Senate. The
petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has not been duly elected in
his place in the same one Philippines Senate.
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief
Executive to the respondent makes it advisable, more than ever, to adopt
the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in matters of similar
nature.
The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the
session of the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the session validly
assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21,
1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor
and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these
questions once it is held, as they do, that the Court has no jurisdiction
over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on those four
on those sub-questions.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view
that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning
session and that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall,
prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with
their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the
resolution been approved only by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it
validly constituted? In other words, was there the majority required by the
Constitution for the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice
Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the
minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there
were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez,
and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator
Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of
twelve three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of
"each House" shall constitute aquorum, "the House: does not mean "all"
the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House".
(Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a
difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less
number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the
members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority
of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes
furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they
could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if
one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and
Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as
there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the
practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in
the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision,
twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will
side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the
latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially
one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators,
the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held
with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising
from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of
all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions
herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond
the shadow of a doubt.
As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to
dismiss the petition. Without costs.











Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,
vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M.
PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other
representative who may be appointed vice representative Juanita G.
Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for
petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.

GRIO-AQUIO, J .:p
This case involves a question of power. May the House of
Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein,
change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to
thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an
election contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and
annul that action of the House?
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago,
in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated to embark
upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the
Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it
could be considered by some as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of
the other two and to intermeddle with their prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch
of our Government, was all too willing to avoid a political confrontation
with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in the sands
of the "political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that
'where the matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in
their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or both the
legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond judicial
cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against
was either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that
matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA
183, 196.)
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality
and validity of legislative or executive action, especially when private
rights are affected came to be recognized. As we pointed out in the
celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for
the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a
justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not
usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be
done and how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the
responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate
branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The
question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to
assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs.
Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an
express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the
courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the
actions of the executive and legislative branches of the Government,
does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the
Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the
irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of
legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought

before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by
such action, as in this case. It is
a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in
courts to enable them to administer justice according to
law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power
to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly
before the court, to the determination of which must be
brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano
M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr.
Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates
for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of
Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the canvass made by
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes
Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes
Difference...................................... 3,300 votes
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due
time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short) which is composed of nine
(9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the
remaining six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member
Congressman
1st District
Benguet LDP
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member
Congressman
1st District Palawan
LDP
SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member
Congressman
2nd District Nueva Ecija
LDP
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member
Congressman
1st District Davao del Sur
LDP
JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member
Congressman
4th District Batangas

LDP
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member
Congressman
2nd District Zamboanga del Sur
(formerly GAD, now NP)
After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and
submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision
in July, 1989.
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won
over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP
members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the
ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4)
months the finalization of the decision in the case.
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted
in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman
Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman
Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on
March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief," Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP
Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that
he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self- respect,"
and to honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the
HRET that they would "abide by the result of the appreciation of the
contested ballot
1
Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a hornets'
nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to
neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.
On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision
on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the
notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6, 1991.
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision,
Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman Camasura by
letter
2
that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at
Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled him and
Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to
organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for
allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political
party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and
immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and
loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive
Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions.
3

At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP, and asked
the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it
'especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite.
4

At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal,
Mme. Justice Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the following letter dated
March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter
from the LDP, the House of Representatives, during its plenary session
on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the
election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral
Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:
13 March 1991
Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution
Hills Quezon City
Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal
of the decision of the House of Representatives during its
plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the
nomination and to rescind the election of the Honorable
Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral
Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is
self-explanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.
Thank you.

For the Secretary-General
(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations
Department (p. 10, Rollo.)
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice
and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in writing, of this
"distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their
assignments in the HRET because
By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of
the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral protest
entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25),
previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be
aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if
there were no legal impediment to its promulgation, the
decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be
confidently expected to be overturned on a motion for
reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have
been defeated.
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as
October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor of
protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the
Tribunal requested re-appreciation of some ballots, the
finalization of the decision had to be deferred by at least 4
months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now
with a margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc,
and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-
Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and
Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura and Antonio H.
Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with
Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de
Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan,
dissenting.
Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v.
Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience vote, for
which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the
loss of the confidence of the leader of his party.
Under the above circumstances an untenable situation
has come about. It is extremely difficult to continue with
membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to
preserve it. 8 integrity and credibility as a constitutional
body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the
unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is being
prevented at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should
not be hampered in the performance of its constitutional
function by factors which have nothing to do with the
merits of the cases before it.
In this connection, our own experience teaches that the
provision for proportional representation in the Tribunal
found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution,
should be amended to provide instead for a return to the
composition mandated in the 1935 Constitution, that is:
three (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes and three (3) of the party having the second largest
number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of
three (3) justices from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no
party or coalition of parties can dominate the legislative
component in the Tribunal.
In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could
perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives. Similarly, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole
judge of all such contests involving members of the
Senate. In this way, there should be lesser chances of
non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the
resolution of election contests.
We suggest that there should also be a provision in the
Constitution that upon designation to membership in the
Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest
themselves of affiliation with their respective political

parties, to insure their independence and objectivity as
they sit in Tribunal deliberations.
There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by
the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been promulgated
today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case
No. 21) is scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991
and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the
Holy Week recess.
But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of
the constitutionally mandated task of the Tribunal well
ahead of the completion of the present congressional
term.
Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to
be relieved from the chairmanship and membership in the
Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the
Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulgation of
the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:
In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at
9:45 tills morning from the House of Representatives that
at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had
voted to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election
of Congressman Camasura to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal
Resolved to cancel the promulgation of its Decision in
Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for
this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman
Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of
five members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of
the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly
promulgated.
The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of
the Supreme Court, being of the opinion that this
development undermines the independence of the
Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of electoral
cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of
even date, for their relief from membership in the
Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles
also manifested his intention to resign as a member of the
Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino,
Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also
manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief
of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, resolved to direct them to return
to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that:
... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the
Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all contests
relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of Congress, all members of these bodies
are appropriately guided only by purely legal
considerations in the decision of the cases before them
and that in the contemplation of the Constitution the
members-legislators, thereof, upon assumption of their
duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as
representatives of their respective political parties but as
impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to
further bolster the independence of the Tribunals, the
term of office of every member thereof should be
considered co-extensive with the corresponding
legislative term and may not be legally terminated except
only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or
removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the
request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be
relieved from their membership in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to
DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to
EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial
factors in the proceedings of the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs
functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion
of legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE the view
that the term of all the members of the Electoral
Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is co-
extensive with the corresponding legislative term and
cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause,
and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to
submit the issue to the said Tribunal in the first instance.
Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur,
but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be allowed
to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc,
otherwise a political and judicial travesty will take place.'
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against Representatives Marciano M.
Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or any other
representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanita G.
Camasura, Jr., and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of
March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to
rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G.
Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal;"
2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent
Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of
respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and
discharging functions as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent
Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his
functions as a member of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course,
required the respondents to comment
5
on the petition within ten days from
notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and allowing participation in
its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is
designated to replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal of the
nomination and rescission of the election of said Congressman Camasura as
member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this
Court, or until otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition
is centered on Congress' being the sole authority that nominates and
elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the political parties
therein, those who are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (and in the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it
allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in
the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is
materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion
from the political party;
6
that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-
extensive with his legislative term,
7
for if a member of the Tribunal who
changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the
constitutional provision mandating representation based on political affiliation
would be completely nullified;
8
and that the expulsion of Congressman
Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP
9
and the
decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the
sole prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is
a purely political question beyond the reach of judicial review.
10

In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged
that the petitioner has no cause of action against him because he has not
yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the
HRET.
11
Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of
Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the
HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's membership
in the HRET.
12

The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar
vein; that the inclusion of the HETH as a party respondent is erroneous
because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The
petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of
his rights. What he assails is the act of the House of Representatives of

withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman
Juanita nito Camasura as a member of the HRET.
13

Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued
that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with the assailed
decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decision
by cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his
(Bondoc's) prejudice.
14
Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an
indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to assure that
complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal
would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme
Court's decision as to whether the relief of respondent Congressman
Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid."
15

In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained
that Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents in
this case because after the House of Representatives had announced
the termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in the HETH
several newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of
Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman Palacol to take
Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal.
16

Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to
do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the
House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of "reorganizing" the
representation in the tribunal of the majority party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that
question. It provides:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of their respective
members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution,
except the provision on the representation of the main political parties in
the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all
the political parties, instead of equal representation of three members
from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the
Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provision reads as follows:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the
party having the largest number of votes and three of the
party having the second largest member of votes therein.
The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it
was impossible for any political party to control the voting in the tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the
Batasang Pambansa.
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores
the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990).
The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-
thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of
politicians. What this Court had earlier said about the Electoral
Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and
House of Representatives:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the
Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and
impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to
transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge
contests relating to the election and qualification of
members of the National Assembly is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the
legislature.
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House
were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be
the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns
and qualifications of members of the legislative houses,
and, as such, are independent bodies which must be
permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise
and control them, without any legislative interference.
(Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil.
818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal
must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional
election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the
Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from
and independent of the legislature and though not a
power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all
intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its
authority, an independent organ; while composed of a
majority of members of the legislature it is a body
separate from and independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created
for the specific purpose of determining contests relating to
election returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly may not be interfered with by the
judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to
the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to
the election and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil. 139.)
The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished
in the 1987 Constitution as the following exchanges on the subject
between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986
Constitutional Commission, attest:
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
My questions will be very basic so we can
go as fast as we can. In the case of the
electoral tribunal, either of the House or of
the Senate, is it correct to say that these
tribunals are constitutional creations? I will
distinguish these with the case of the
Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan
which are created by mandate of the
Constitution but they are not constitutional
creations. Is that a good distinction?
MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent
statement.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore,
say that either the Senate Electoral
Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is
a constitutional body.?
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional
body, is it then subject to constitutional
restrictions?

MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to
constitutional restrictions intended for that
body.
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find
out if the ruling in the case of Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be
applicable to the present bodies we are
creating since it ruled that the electoral
tribunals are not separate departments of
the government. Would that ruling still be
valid?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate
departments because the separate
departments are the legislative, the
executive and the judiciary; but they are
constitutional bodies.
MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not
separate departments of government, I
would like to know again if the ruling
in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53
Phil. 139, would still be applicable to the
present bodies we are deciding on, when
the Supreme court said that these
electoral tribunals are independent from
Congress, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration and, therefore, Congress
has no power to regulate proceedings of
these electoral tribunals.
MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They
are independent although they are not a
separate branch of government.
MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement
that in all parliaments of the world, the
invariable rule is to leave unto themselves
the determination of controversies with
respect to the election and qualifications
of their members, and precisely they have
this Committee on Privileges which takes
care of this particular controversy.
Would the Gentleman say that the
creation of electoral tribunals is an
exception to this rule because apparently
we have an independent electoral
tribunal?
MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the
electoral tribunals are independent, but
the Gentleman will notice that the
wordings say: 'The Senate and the House
of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral
Tribunal. So, technically, it is the tribunal
of the House and tribunal of the Senate
although they are independent.
MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as
we have agreed on, are independent from
both bodies?
MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line
of my question. How can we say that
these bodies are independent when we
still have six politicians sitting in both
tribunals?
MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be
independent, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President,
when we discussed a portion of this in the
Committee on the Executive, there was a
comment by Chief Justice Concepcion-
Commissioner Concepcion-that there
seems to be some incongruity in these
electoral tribunals, considering that

politicians still sit in the tribunals in spite of
the fact that in the ruling in the case
of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate
Electoral tribunal Case No. 1, they are
supposed to act in accordance with law
and justice with complete detachment
from an political considerations. That is
why I am asking now for the record how
we could achieve such detachment when
there are six politicians sitting there.
MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the
Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the
opposition, has, with sterling competence,
shown independence in the proceedings
of this Commission. I think we can also
trust that the members of the tribunals will
be independent. (pp. 111-112, Journal,
Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis
supplied.)
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of
the HRET.
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded
by the framers of our Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its
proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party
therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from
the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of
the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman
Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP,
because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate,
Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the
House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest
between Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the
work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere
tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three
justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be
powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all
hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in
the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must
discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and
independence even independence from the political party to which they
belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are
not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In
expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a
conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes
by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse
of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution
of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of
tenure.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura's right to
security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of
congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as
members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution
(Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House
Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such
as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in
the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for
other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally
affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to
show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of
another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET
was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of
the House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to security of tenure
because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal
were changed before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief

Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief
Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter,
who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he
(J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale
University. It should be stressed, however, that those changes in the
judicial composition to the HRET had no political implications at all unlike
the present attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No coercion
was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on
Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own
free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert design to derail the
disposition of a pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from,
and by, the LDP to punish him for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed
to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case.
The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify
his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be
promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for the LDP to
nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal.
That stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly
aimed to substitute Congressman Camasura's vote and, in effect, to
change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the
protection of his rights against the strong arm of the majority party in the
House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief,
nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted
with grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from
the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the
Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to
protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The
Court must perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the
violator be the highest official of the land or the Government itself"
(Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59
SCRA 183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral
Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid
cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the
Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's
decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly
violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole
judge" of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We,
therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March 13, 1991 of
the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura as a member of the
House Electoral Tribunal. The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled
to the reliefs he prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is
granted. The decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanita G.
Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby
declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and
Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his
position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the
promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc
vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the
unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the
prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby
declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon
service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the
Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.






[G.R. No. 130240.February 5, 2002]
DE VENECIA, JR., et al., vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (1
st
DIV.)
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated FEB
5 2002.
G.R. No. 130240(Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House
of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General
of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuao, Cashier, House of
Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of
Representatives, petitioners, vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division),
respondent.)
The principal issue in this petitioner for certiorari
[1]
cralaw is whether of not the
Sandiganbayan may cite in contempt of court the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for refusing to implement the preventive suspension order it
issued in a criminal case against a member of the House.
Petitioners seek the annulment of:
(1) the Order dated August 18, 1997 of the Sandiganbayan (First
Division),
[2]
cralaw directing Speaker Jose de Venecia of the House of
Representatives, to implement the preventive suspension of then Congressman
Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., in connection with Criminal Case No. 18857 entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. and Gregorio S.
Branzuela"; and
(2) the Resolution dated August 29, 1997,
[3]
cralaw also of the Sandiganbayan,
declaring Speaker de Venecia in contempt of court for refusing to implement
the preventive suspension order.
The facts are as follows:
On March 12, 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case No. 18857)
was filed with the Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman
Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended).
After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a "Motion To
Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite."
In its Resolution dated June 6, 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the
motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused.But the Speaker did
not comply.Thus, on August 12, 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
requiring him to appear before it, on August 18, 1997 at 8:00 o'clock in the
morning, to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.
Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for reconsideration,
invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can only act as
may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution No. 116
adopted on August 13, 1997.
On August 29, 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered the now assailed
Resolution
[4]
cralaw declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court
and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice.
Hence, the instant recourse.
The issue before us had long been settled by this Court in Ceferino S. Paredes,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan in G.R. No. 118354 (August 8, 1995).We ruled that the
suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law ismandatory and is of different
nature and purpose.It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a
precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of a valid Information.Its
purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution
by influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence and from
committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.It is thus an incident to
the criminal proceedings before the court.On the other hand, the suspension or
expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed sanction
against its members.It is, therefore, apenalty for disorderly behavior to
enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its
honor and integrity.
Just recently, in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., this
Court en banc, through Justice Jose C. Vitug, held that the doctrine of
separation of powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the
mandate of R.A. 3019, thus:
"The order of suspension prescribed by
Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. x x x.
"The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an
erring member. x x x.

"The doctrine of separation of powers by
itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded
members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019
nor from its sanctions.The maxim simply recognizes
that each of the three co-equal and independent,
albeit coordinate, branches of the government - the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary -
has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its
own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one
branch from unduly intruding into the internal
affairs of either branch."(Emphasis ours)
We note that the term of then Congressman Ceferino Paredes, Jr. expired on
June 30, 1988.This rendered moot and academic the instant case.
WHEREFORE, for being moot, this case is deemed CLOSED and
TERMINATED.(Quisumbing, J., no part.Quisumbing and Carpio, JJ., abroad on
official business)
Very truly yours,
LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court
(Sgd.) MA.
LUISA D.
VILLARAMA
Asst. Clerk of
Court






























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150605 December 10, 2002
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official
capacities as Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J .:
In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he who has been rejected
by the people cannot represent the people. Respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin
lost to petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903 votes in the May 14, 2001
elections as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. The most
sophisticated legal alchemy cannot justify her insistence that she should continue
governing the people of Leyte against their will. The enforcement of the
sovereign will of the people is not subject to the discretion of any official of the
land.
This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto directed against respondents
Speaker Jose De Venecia and Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the
House of Representatives to compel them to implement the decision of the
Commission on Elections en banc by (a) administering the oath of office to
petitioner as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte, and (b) registering the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives, and against respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin for
usurping, intruding into, and unlawfully holding and exercising the said public
office on the basis of a void proclamation.
The facts are uncontroverted. Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates
for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte during the
May 14, 2001 elections. At that time, petitioner was the Mayor of Ormoc City
while respondent Locsin was the sitting Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of
Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with the COMELEC main office a Petition for
Disqualification
1
against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the
registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a)
of the Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that the petitioner used the
equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract,
haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob,
Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
Attached to the petition are the (a) Affidavits of Basilio Bates,
2
Danilo D.
Maglasang,
3
Cesar A. Laurente;
4
(b) Joint Affidavit of Agripino C. Alferez and
Rogelio T. Salvera;
5
(c) Extract Records from the Police Blotter executed by
Police Superintendent Elson G. Pecho;
6
and (d) Photographs showing
government dump trucks, haulers and surfacers and portions of public roads
allegedly filled-in and surfaced through the intercession of the respondent.
7
The
case was docketed as SPA No. 01-208 and assigned to the COMELEC's Second
Division.
On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order delegating
the hearing and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of
the Regional Director of Region VIII.
8
On May 11, 2001, the COMELEC Second
Division sent a telegram informing the petitioner that a disqualification case was
filed against him and that the petition was remanded to the Regional Election
Director for investigation.
9

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director
had yet to hear the disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was
included in the list of candidates for district representative and was voted for. The
initial results showed that petitioner was the winning candidate.
On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished, respondent Locsin
joined as intervenor in SPA No. 128 and filed a "Most Urgent Motion to
Suspend Proclamation of Respondent [herein petitioner]" with the COMELEC
Second Division.
10
Respondent Locsin alleged that "the evidence on record
against respondent is very strong and unless rebutted remains." She urged the
Commission to set the hearing of the disqualification case and prayed for the
suspension of the proclamation of the respondent "so as not to render the
present disqualification case moot and academic." A copy of the Motion was
allegedly served on petitioner by registered mail but no registry receipt was
attached thereto.
11

On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a "Second Most Urgent Motion to
Suspend Proclamation of Respondent" stating "there is clear and convincing
evidence showing that the respondent is undoubtedly guilty of the charges
against him and this remains unrebutted by the respondent." A copy of the
Motion was sent to the petitioner and the corresponding registry receipt was
attached to the pleading.
12
The records, however, do not show the date the
petitioner received the motion.

On the same day, May 18, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-
Parte Order
13
directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend
the proclamation of petitioner in case he obtains the highest number of votes by
reason of "the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for
disqualification."
14
It also directed the Regional Election Director to speed up the
reception of evidence and to forward immediately the complete records together
with its recommendation to the Office of the Clerk of the Commission.
15
As a
result, petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even though the final election
results showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin's
53,447 votes.
16

At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its Order suspending his
proclamation, the petitioner has yet to be summoned to answer the petition for
disqualification. Neither has said petition been set for hearing. It was only on May
24, 2001 that petitioner was able to file an Answer to the petition for his
disqualification with the Regional Election Director, alleging that: (a) he has not
received the summons together with the copy of the petition; (b) he became
aware of the matter only by virtue of the telegram sent by the COMELEC Second
Division informing him that a petition was filed against him and that the Regional
Election Director was directed to investigate and receive evidence therewith; and
(c) he obtained a copy of the petition from the COMELEC Regional Office No. 8
at his own instance.
17
Petitioner further alleged that the maintenance, repair and
rehabilitation of barangay roads in the municipalities of Matag-ob and Kananga
were undertaken without his authority, participation or directive as City Mayor of
Ormoc. He attached in his Answer the following: (a) Affidavit of Alex B.
Borinaga;
18
(b) Copy of the Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular Session of
Barangay Monterico;
19
(c) Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel;
20
(d) Supplemental
Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel;
21
and (e) Affidavit of Arnel Y. Padayao.
22

On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of
Suspension,
23
alleging that (a) he did not receive a copy of the Motion to
Suspend his Proclamation and hence, was denied the right to rebut and refute
the allegations in the Motion; (b) that he did not receive a copy of the summons
on the petition for disqualification and after personally obtaining a copy of the
petition, filed the requisite answer only on May 24, 2001; and (c) that he received
the telegraph Order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his
proclamation only on May 22, 2001. He attached documentary evidence in
support of his Motion to Lift the Suspension of his proclamation, and requested
the setting of a hearing on his Motion.
24

On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on the petitioner's Motion
and the parties were ordered to submit their respective memoranda.
25
On June 4,
2001, petitioner submitted his Memorandum
26
in support of his Motion assailing
the suspension of his proclamation on the grounds that: (a) he was not afforded
due process; (b) the order has no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of his
guilt is patently inexistent for the purpose of suspending his proclamation. He
prayed that his proclamation as winning congressional candidate be expediently
made, even while the disqualification case against him continue upon due notice
and hearing. He attached the following additional evidence in his Memorandum:
(a) Copy of certification issued by PNP Senior Inspector Benjamin T. Gorre;
27
(b)
Certification issued by Elena S. Aviles, City Budget Officer;
28
(c) Copy of
certification issued by Wilfredo A. Fiel, City Engineer of Ormoc;
29
(d) Joint
Affidavit of Antonio Patenio and Pepito Restituto;
30
and (e) Affidavits of Demetrio
Brion,
31
Igmedio Rita
32
and Gerardo Monteza.
33
Respondent Locsin's
memorandum also contained additional affidavits of his witnesses.
34

Petitioner's Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, however, was not
resolved. Instead, on June 14, 2001, theCOMELEC Second Division
promulgated its Resolution
35
in SPA No. 01-208 which found the petitioner
guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. It directed
the "immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest
number of votes xxx." A copy of said Resolution was sent by fax to the
counsel of petitioner in Cebu City in the afternoon of the following day.
36

By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350,
were declared stray even before said Resolution could gain finality. On
June 15, 2001, respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte. It issued a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and
Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Member of the House of
Representatives stating that "MA. VICTORIA LARRAZABAL LOCSIN obtained a
total of FIFTY THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN (53,447)
votes representing the highest number of votes legally cast in the legislative
district for said office."
37
Respondent Locsin took her oath of office on June
18, 2001 and assumed office on June 30, 2001.
On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC en banc a
Motion for Reconsideration
38
from the June 14, 2001 Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division which ordered his disqualification, as well as an
Addendum to the Motion for Reconsideration.
39
Petitioner alleged in his Motion
for Reconsideration that the COMELEC Second Division erred: (1) in
disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the
witnesses for respondent Locsin; (2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the
witnesses for respondent Locsin; and (3) in promulgating the resolution in
violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing therein the immediate
proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter.' Respondent Locsin and her co-
petitioner in SPA No. 01-208 filed a joint Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration.
40

On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Proclamation,
41
docketed as SPC No. 01-324,
assailing the validity of the proclamation of respondent Locsin who garnered only
the second highest number of votes. Respondent Locsin filed her Answer
alleging that: (1) the Commission lost jurisdiction to hear and decide the case

because of the proclamation of Locsin and that any question on the "election,
returns, and qualification" of Locsin can only be taken cognizance of by the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); (2) the case should be filed
and heard in the first instance by a Division of the Commission and not directly
by the Commission en banc; and (3) the proclamation of Locsin was valid
because she received the highest number of valid votes cast, the votes of Codilla
being stray.
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation
42
stating that he was
deprived of a fair hearing on the disqualification case because while the
documentary evidence adduced in his Memorandum was in support of his
Motion for the lifting of the suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC
Second Division instead ruled on the main disqualification case. In
consonance with his prayer that a full-dress hearing be conducted on the
disqualification case, he submitted Affidavits of additional witnesses
43
which he
claims would refute and substantially belie the allegations of
petitioner's/intervenor's witnesses. A Reply,
44
Rejoinder
45
and Sur-
Rejoinder
46
were respectively filed by the parties. Consequently, the motion for
reconsideration in SPA No. 01-208 and the petition for declaration of nullity in
SPC No. 01-324 were submitted for resolution.
From the records, it appears that initially, a "Resolution" penned by
Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier, dated July 24, 2001, was submitted to the
Office of the Chairman, dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity for lack of
jurisdiction and denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Codilla.
47
Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Resurreccion Z. Borra
submitted their respective dissenting opinions
48
to the Javier resolution. It bears
emphasis that Commissioner Tuason, Jr. was the ponente of the Resolution of
the COMELEC Second Division which ordered the disqualification of petitioner
but after considering the additional evidence presented by the latter, he
concluded that the totality of the evidence was clearly in petitioner's favor.
Equally worth mentioning is the fact that Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, who
was the Presiding Commissioner of the Second Division, also dissented and
voted to grant Codilla's motion for reconsideration on the ground that "[T]he
people of Leyte have spoken and I respect the electorate's will. x x x."
49

On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a
"Vote and Opinion and Summary of Votes" reversing the resolution of the
Second Division and declaring the proclamation of respondent Locsin as
null and void. The dispositive portion reads:
"JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, I concur with
Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra, Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.
and Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, in SPA No. 01-208, to GRANT the motion
for reconsideration and to REVERSE the resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) promulgated on June 1, 2001, disqualifying Codilla; and subsequently,
in SPC No. 01-324, to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and
declare as null and void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin.
Accordingly:
1. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the disqualification resolution
against Codilla, promulgated by the Commission (Second Division) on
June 14, 2001 (SPA No. 01-208), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent-
movant Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and to REVERSE the
Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated
on June 14, 2001, for insufficiency of evidence;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner
Codilla, issued by the Commission (Second Division) on May
18, 2001, having been issued without hearing and without any
finding that the evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong
and, thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the
Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001,
for "(t)he immediate proclamation of the candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes, to the exclusion of
respondent" and the concurrent order for "the Provincial Board
of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene and
thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes counting out the Respondent" the
same being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence,
and resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the
Commission (Second Division) promulgated o June 14, 2001,
that the votes of respondent Codilla are "considered stray and
invalid" said ruling being issued on the basis of an inapplicable
decision, and contrary to established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon
the finality of this resolution, to reconvene and proclaim
petitioner Codilla as the winning candidate for Representative of
the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte to comply with its
ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes in the elections for that position; and

(f) to order intervenor-oppositor Locsin, upon the finality of this
resolution, to vacate the office of Representative of the House
of Representatives representing the Fourth legislative district of
Leyte and, for this purpose, to inform the House of
Representatives through the Honorable Speaker of this
resolution for its attention and guidance; and
2. On the petition for Declaration of Nullity of proclamation of respondent Ma.
Victoria L. Locsin (SPC No. 01-324), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as
null and void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin, the
proclamation being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence,
and resolutions of the Commission on Elections;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla,
issued by the Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, in SPA
No. 01-208, having been issued without hearing and without any finding
that the evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null and
void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208,
for "(t)he immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes, to the exclusion of respondent" and the
concurrent order for "the provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to
immediately reconvene and thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes counting out the Respondent"
the same being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and
resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208,
that the votes of respondent Codilla are "considered stray and invalid"
said ruling being issued on the basis of an inapplicable decision, and
contrary to established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality
of this resolution, to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the
winning candidate for Representative of the Fourth legislative district of
Leyte he (sic) having garnered the highest number of votes in the
elections for the position; and
(f) to order respondent Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to
vacate the office of Representative of the House of Representatives
representing the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte and, for this purpose,
to inform the House of Representatives through the Honorable Speaker
of this resolution for its attention and guidance.
Summary of Votes
Considering the FOUR (4) VOTES of the Chairman and Commissioners
Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., and Ralph C. Lantion, to grant
the Motion for Reconsideration of Codilla and reverse the disqualification
Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-208,
promulgated on June 14, 2001, and as an inevitable consequence, in voting to
grant the petition for declaration of nullity of the proclamation of Ma. Victoria L.
Locsin in SPC No. 01-324, the verdict/opinion of the Chairman and the three (3)
Commissioners taken together now stands, as it is, the MAJORITY DECISION of
the Commission En Banc in both cases; and the "Resolution" submitted by three
(3) Commissioners, namely, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier, Commissioner
Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, is considered,
as it is, the MINORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both cases.
The MAJORTIY DECISION was arrived at after proper consultation with those
who joined the majority. The Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners
comprising the majority decided that no one will be assigned to write a Majority
Decision. Instead, each one will write his own separate opinion. Commissioners
Borra, Tuason, Jr. and the undersigned Chairman submitted separate opinions.
Commissioner Lantion wrote an explanation on his vote."
50

The aforequoted judgment was adopted in a "Vote of Adoption" signed by
Commissioners Ralph C. Lantion, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A.
Tuason, Jr.
51

Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision annulling her
proclamation. Instead, she filed a "Comment and Manifestation"
52
with the
COMELEC en banc questioning the procedure and the manner by which the
decision was issued. In addition, respondent Locsin requested and was issued
an opinion by House of Representatives Executive Director and Chief Legal
Counsel Leonardo B. Palicte III declaring that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction
to nullify the proclamation of respondent Locsin after she had taken her oath and
assumed office since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of election, returns
and qualifications of Members of the House.
53
Relying on this opinion, respondent
Locsin submitted a written privileged speech to the House during its regular
session on September 4, 2001, where she declared that she will not only
disregard but will openly defy and disobey the COMELEC en banc resolution
ordering her to vacate her position.
54

On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order
55
constituting
the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to implement the
aforesaid decision. It likewise ordered the Board to reconvene and "proclaim the

candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the district, as the duly-
elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte, and accordingly
issue a Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for
Member of the House of Representatives x x x, based on the city/municipal
certificates of canvass submitted beforehand to the previous Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte x x x."
On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte, having obtained a total of 71,350 votes
representing the highest number of votes cast in the district.
56
On the same day,
petitioner took his oath of office before Executive Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of
the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City.
57

On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru
respondent Speaker De Venecia, informing the House of the August 29, 2001
COMELEC en banc resolution annulling the proclamation of respondent Locsin,
and proclaiming him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte.
58
Petitioner also served notice that "I am assuming the duties
and responsibilities as Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte to
which position I have been lawfully elected and proclaimed. On behalf of my
constituents, I therefore expect that all rights and privileges intended for the
position of Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte be accorded to
me, including all physical facilities and staff support." On the basis of this letter, a
Memorandum
59
dated October 8, 2001 was issued by Legal Affairs Deputy
Secretary-General Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr., for Speaker De Venecia, stating
that "there is no legal obstacle to complying with the duly promulgated and now
final and executory COMELEC Decision of August 29, 2001 x x x."
These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House of Representatives of a
copy of the COMELEC en banc resolution on September 20, 2001,
60
no action
was taken by the House on the letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence, petitioner
sought the assistance of his party, LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, which sent a
letter
61
addressed to respondent Speaker De Venecia, dated October 25, 2001,
and signed by Party President Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Secretary-General
Heherson T. Alvarez, and Region VIII Party Chairman Sergio Antonio F. Apostol,
requesting the House of Representatives to act decisively on the matter in order
that petitioner "can avail of whatever remedy is available should their action
remain unfavorable or otherwise undecisive."
In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter
62
dated October 30, 2001, stating
that:
"We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we are inclined to
sustain it. However, Rep. Locsin has officially notified the HOUSE in her privilege
speech, inserted in the HOUSE Journal dated September 4, 2001, that she shall
'openly defy and disobey' the COMELEC ruling. This ultimately means that
implementing the decision would result in the spectacle of having two (2)
legislators occupying the same congressional seat, a legal situation, the only
consideration, that effectively deters the HOUSE's liberty to take action.
In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the implementation of the
COMELEC decision is a matter that can be best, and with finality,
adjudicated by the Supreme Court, which, hopefully, shall act on it most
expeditiously." (emphases supplied)
Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo warranto.
Petitioner submits that by virtue of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc
which has become final and executory for failure of respondent Locsin to appeal
therefrom, it has become the ministerial duty: (1) of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as its Administrative Head and Presiding Officer, to implement
the said resolution of the COMELEC en banc by installing him as the duly-
elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte; and (2) of the
Secretary-General, as official custodian of the records of the House, to formally
register his name in the Roll of Members of the House and delete the name of
respondent Locsin therefrom. Petitioner further contends that respondent Locsin
has been usurping and unlawfully holding the public office of Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte considering that her premature proclamation
has been declared null and void by the COMELEC en banc. He alleges that the
action or inaction of public respondents has deprived him of his lawful right to
assume the office of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
In his Comment,
63
public respondent Speaker De Venecia alleged that
mandamus will not lie to compel the implementation of the COMELEC decision
which is not merely a ministerial duty but one which requires the exercise of
discretion by the Speaker of the House considering that: (1) it affects the
membership of the House; and (2) there is nothing in the Rules of the House of
Representatives which imposes a duty on the House Speaker to implement a
COMELEC decision that unseats an incumbent House member.
In his Comment,
64
public respondent Secretary-General Nazareno alleged that in
reading the name of respondent Locsin during the roll call, and in allowing her to
take her oath before the Speaker-elect and sit as Member of the House during
the Joint Session of Congress, he was merely performing official acts in
compliance with the opinions
65
rendered by House of Representatives Chief
Counsel and Executive Director Leonardo C. Palicte III stating that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to declare the proclamation of respondent Locsin
as null and void since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all election,
returns and qualifications of Members of the House. He also contends that the
determination of who will sit as Member of the House of Representatives is not a
ministerial function and cannot, thus, be compelled by mandamus.

Respondent Locsin, in her Comment,
66
alleged that the Supreme Court has no
original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a member of the
House of Representatives for under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution it is
the HRET which is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. She likewise
asserts that this Court cannot issue the writ of mandamus against a co-equal
legislative department without grossly violating the principle of separation of
powers. She contends that the act of recognizing who should be seated as a
bona fide member of the House of Representatives is not a ministerial function
but a legislative prerogative, the performance of which cannot be compelled by
mandamus. Moreover, the prayer for a writ of mandamus cannot be directed
against the Speaker and Secretary-General because they do not have the
authority to enforce and implement the resolution of the COMELEC.
Additionally, respondent Locsin urges that the resolution of the COMELEC en
banc is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. First, it should have dismissed the
case pending before it after her proclamation and after she had taken her oath of
office. Jurisdiction then was vested in the HRET to unseat and remove a Member
of the House of Representatives. Second, the petition for declaration of nullity is
clearly a pre-proclamation controversy and the COMELEC en banc has no
original jurisdiction to hear and decide a pre-proclamation controversy. It must
first be heard by a COMELEC Division. Third, the questioned decision is actually
a "hodge-podge" decision because of the peculiar manner in which the
COMELEC disposed of the case.
Finally, respondent Locsin asserts that the matter of her qualification and
eligibility has been categorically affirmed by the HRET when it dismissed the quo
warranto case filed against her, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-043, entitled
"Paciano Travero vs. Ma. Victoria Locsin," on the ground that "the allegations
stated therein are not proper grounds for a petition for quo warranto against a
Member of the House of Representatives under section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, and that the petition was filed
late."
67

In his Reply,
68
petitioner asserts that the remedy of respondent Locsin from the
COMELEC decision was to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court,
not to seek an opinion from the Chief Legal Counsel of the House of
Representatives; that the HRET has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaration
of nullity of proclamation which is based not on ineligibility or disloyalty, but by
reason that the candidate proclaimed as winner did not obtain the highest
number of votes; that the petition for annulment of proclamation is a pre-
proclamation controversy and, hence, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMELEC pursuant to section 242 of B.P. Blg. 881
69
and section 3, Article IX (C)
of the Constitution; that respondent Speaker De Venecia himself recognizes the
finality of the COMELEC decision but has decided to refer the matter to the
Supreme Court for adjudication; that the enforcement and implementation of a
final decision of the COMELEC involves a ministerial act and does not encroach
on the legislative power of Congress; and that the power to determine who will sit
as Member of the House does not involve an exercise of legislative power but is
vested in the sovereign will of the electorate.
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether the proclamation of respondent
Locsin by the COMELEC Second Division is valid; (b) whether said proclamation
divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity; and (c)
assuming the invalidity of said proclamation, whether it is the ministerial duty of
the public respondents to recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
I
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.
After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we find that the proclamation of
respondent Locsin is null and void for the following reasons:
First. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings
leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin.
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 3402
70
sets the procedure for disqualification cases
pursuant to section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
"C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF
THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK
OF QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SAME GROUNDS FOR
DISQUALIFICATION
(1) The verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code and the verified petition to disqualify a
candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing same grounds for
disqualification, may be filed any day after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
(2) The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code shall be filed in ten (10) legible copies by any
citizen of voting age, or duly registered political party, organization or
coalition of political parties against any candidate who in an action or
protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent
court guilty of, or found by the Commission of:
2.a having given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions;

2.b having committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy;
2.c having spent in his election campaign an amount in excess
of that allowed by the Omnibus Election Code;
2.d having solicited, received or made any contribution
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the
Omnibus Election Code;
2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.
x x x x x x x x x
(4) Upon payment of the filing fee of P1,000.00 and legal research fee of
P20.00, the offices concerned shall docket the petition and assign to it a
docket number which must be consecutive, according to the order of
receipt and must bear the year and prefixed as SPA with the
corresponding initial of the name of the office, i.e. SPA (RED) No. C01-
001; SPA (PES) No. C01-001;
(5) Within three (3) days from filing of the petitions, the offices concerned
shall issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy
of the petition and its enclosures, if any;
(6) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of
summons within which to file his verified answer (not a motion to
dismiss) to the petition in ten (10) legible copies, serving a copy thereof
upon the petitioner. Grounds for Motion to Dismiss may be raised as an
affirmative defense;
(7) The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the
testimonies, the parties shall submit their affidavits or counter-affidavits
and other documentary evidences including their position paper;
(8) The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of
the filing of the answer. The hearing officer concerned shall submit to the
Clerk of the Commission through the fastest means of communication,
his findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the
completion of the hearing and reception of evidence together with the
complete records of the case;
(9) Upon receipt of the records of the case of the findings, reports and
recommendation of the hearing officer concerned, the Clerk of the
Commission shall immediately docket the case consecutively and
calendar the same for raffle to a division;
(10) The division to whom the case is raffled, shall after consultation,
assign the same to a member who shall pen the decision, within five (5)
days from the date of consultation."
Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional
Election Director, to issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a
copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days from the filing
of the petition for disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent
candidate the opportunity to answer the allegations in the petition and hear his
side. To ensure compliance with this requirement, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure requires the return of the summons together with the proof of service
to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when service has been completed, viz:
"Rule 14. Summons
x x x x x x x x x
Section 5. Return.- When the service has been completed by personal service,
the server shall give notice thereof, by registered mail, to the protestant or his
counsel and shall return the summons to the Clerk of Court concerned who
issued it, accompanied with the proof of service.
Section 6. Proof of Service.- Proof of service of summons shall be made in the
manner provided for in the Rules of Court in the Philippines."
Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10) days from the filing of the
Answer, must be conducted. The hearing officer is required to submit to the Clerk
of the Commission his findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days
from the completion of the hearing and reception of evidence together with the
complete records of the case.
(a) Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through
the service of summons nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation.
The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the petitioner.
They do not contain a copy of the summons allegedly served on the petitioner
and its corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private respondent never
rebutted petitioner's repeated assertion that he was not properly notified of the
petition for his disqualification because he never received summons.
71
Petitioner
claims that prior to receiving a telegraphed Order from the COMELEC Second

Division on May 22, 2001, directing the District Board of Canvassers to suspend
his proclamation, he was never summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition
for his disqualification. He was able to obtain a copy of the petition and the May
22 Order of the COMELEC Second Division by personally going to the
COMELEC Regional Office on May 23, 2001. Thus, he was able to file his
Answer to the disqualification case only on May 24, 2001.
More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in gross violation of
section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
"Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.- The Commission and the
courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this
Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven
days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless,
if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the
preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to
office." (emphases supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by final judgment when
the elections were conducted on May 14, 2001. The Regional Election Director
has yet to conduct hearing on the petition for his disqualification. After the
elections, petitioner was voted in office by a wide margin of 17,903. On May 16,
2001, however, respondent Locsin filed a Most Urgent Motion for the suspension
of petitioner's proclamation. The Most Urgent Motion contained a statement to
the effect that a copy was served to the petitioner through registered mail. The
records reveal that no registry receipt was attached to prove such service.
72
This
violates COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring notice and service of the
motion to all parties, viz:
"Section 4. Notice.- Notice of a motion shall be served by the movant to all
parties concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together
with a copy of the motion. For good cause shown, the motion may be heard on
shorter notice, especially on matters which the Commission or the Division may
dispose of on its own motion.
The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and
place of the hearing of the motion.
Section 5. Proof of Service.- No motion shall be acted upon by the Commission
without proof of service of notice thereof, except when the Commission or a
Division is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not
affected."
Respondent's Most Urgent Motion does not fall under the exceptions to notice
and service of motions. First, the suspension of proclamation of a winning
candidate is not a matter which the COMELEC Second Division can dispose of
motu proprio. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646
73
requires that the suspension must be
"upon motion by the complainant or any intervenor", viz:
"Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.- Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared
by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with the trial or hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong." (emphases supplied)
Second, the right of an adverse party, in this case, the petitioner, is clearly
affected. Given the lack of service of the Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner,
said Motion is a mere scrap of paper.
74
It cannot be acted upon by the
COMELEC Second Division.
On May 18, 2001 at exactly 5:00 p.m.,
75
respondent Locsin filed a Second Most
Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioner's proclamation. Petitioner was
served a copy of the Second Motion again by registered mail. A registry
receipt
76
was attached evidencing service of the Second Most Urgent Motion to
the petitioner but it does not appear when the petitioner received a copy thereof.
That same day, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order suspending the
proclamation of petitioner. Clearly, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to
contest the allegations contained in the petition for disqualification. The Order
was issued on the very same day the Second Most Urgent Motion was filed. The
petitioner could not have received the Second Most Urgent Motion, let alone
answer the same on time as he was served a copy thereof by registered mail.
Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only
when evidence of the winning candidate's guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the
COMELEC Second Division did not make any specific finding that evidence
of petitioner's guilt is strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of
the petitioner is the "seriousness of the allegations" in the petition for
disqualification. Pertinent portion of the Order reads:
"Without giving due course to the petition xxx the Commission (2
nd
Division),
pursuant to Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6,

Republic Act No. 6646 xxx and considering the serious allegations in the
petition, hereby directs the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to
suspend the proclamation of respondent, if winning, until further
orders."
77
(emphases supplied)
We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is
strong, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its power when it
suspended his proclamation.
(b) The COMELEC Second Division did not give ample opportunity to the
petitioner to adduce evidence in support of his defense in the petition for
his disqualification.
All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted on the petition for
disqualification in gross violation of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which specifically
enjoins the COMELEC to "continue with the trial or hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest." This is also in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3402
requiring the Regional Election Director to complete the hearing and reception
of evidence within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer, and to submit his
findings, reports, and recommendations within the five (5) days from completion
of the hearing and the reception of evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension of his proclamation on
May 25, 2001. Although an oral argument on this Motion was held, and the
parties were allowed to file their respective memoranda, the Motion was not
acted upon. Instead, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution on the
petition for disqualification against the petitioner. It was based on the following
evidence: (a) the affidavits attached to the Petition for Disqualification; (b) the
affidavits attached to the Answer; and (c) the respective memoranda of the
parties.
On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension cannot be substituted for the hearing in the disqualification case.
Although intrinsically linked, it is not to be supposed that the evidence of the
parties in the main disqualification case are the same as those in the Motion to
Lift the Order of Suspension. The parties may have other evidence which they
may deem proper to present only on the hearing for the disqualification case.
Also, there may be evidence which are unavailable during the hearing for the
Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension but which may be available during the
hearing for the disqualification case.
In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that he submitted his Memorandum merely
to support his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. It was not intended to
answer and refute the disqualification case against him. This submission was
sustained by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, the members of the COMELEC en
banc concluded, upon consideration of the additional affidavits attached in his
Urgent Manifestation, that the evidence to disqualify the petitioner was
insufficient. More specifically, the ponente of the challenged Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division held:
"Indeed, I find from the records that the May 30, 2001 hearing of the COMELEC
(Second Division) concerns only the incident relating to the Motion to Lift Order of
Suspension of Proclamation. It also appears that the order for the submission of
the parties' respective memoranda was in lieu of the parties' oral argument on
the motion. This would explain the fact that Codilla's Memorandum refers mainly
to the validity of the issuance of the order of suspension of proclamation. There
is, however, no record of any hearing on the urgent motion for the suspension of
proclamation. Indeed, it was only upon the filing of the Urgent Manifestation
by Codilla that the Members of the Commission (Second Division) and
other Members of the Commission en banc had the opportunity to consider
Codilla's affidavits. This time, Codilla was able to present his side, thus,
completing the presentation of evidentiary documents from both
sides."
78
(emphases supplied)
Indeed, careful reading of the petitioner's Memorandum shows that he confined
his arguments in support of his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. In said
Memorandum, petitioner raised the following issues: (a) he was utterly deprived
of procedural due process, and consequently, the order suspending his
proclamation is null and void; (b) the said order of suspension of proclamation
has no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of guilt on his part is patently
inexistent for the purpose of directing the suspension of his proclamation.
79
He
urged the COMELEC Second Division to conduct a full dress hearing on the
main disqualification case should the suspension be lifted.
80

(c) the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the
petitioner is not based on substantial evidence.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be considered to be
based on substantial evidence. It relied merely on affidavits of witnesses
attached to the petition for disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC Second
Division gave credence to the affidavits without hearing the affiants. In reversing
said Resolution, the COMELEC en banc correctly observed:
"Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division) made its
decisions based mainly on the allegation of the petitioner and the supporting
affidavits. With this lopsided evidence at hand, the result was predictable. The
Commission (Second Division) had no choice. Codilla was disqualified."
81

Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the
evidence coming from the petitioner, failed to prove the gravamen of the offense
for which he was charged.
82


Petitioner allegedly violated section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code which
reads:
"Section 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or protest in which
he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found
by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing official
functions, xxx shall be disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding office"
To be disqualified under the above-quoted provision, the following elements must
be proved: (a) the candidate, personally or through his instructions, must have
given money or other material consideration; and (b) the act of giving money or
other material consideration must be for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or
corrupting the voters or public officials performing electoral functions.
In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged that (a) petitioner
ordered the extraction, hauling and distribution of gravel and sand, and (b) his
purpose was to induce and influence the voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte
to vote for him. Pertinent portion of the petition reads:
"[T]he respondent [herein petitioner], within the election period, took advantage of
his current elective position as City Mayor of Ormoc City by illegally and
unlawfully using during the prohibited period, public equipments and vehicles
belonging to and owned by the City Government of Ormoc City in extracting,
hauling and distributing gravel and sand to the residents and voters of the
Municipalities of Kananga and Matag-ob Leyte, well within the territorial limits of
the 4th Congressional District of Leyte, which acts were executed without period,
and clearly for the illicit purpose of unduly inducing or directly corrupting various
voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, within the 4th legislative district of Leyte, for
the precise purpose of inducing and influencing the voters/beneficiaries of
Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to cast their votes for said respondent."
83

The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second Division failed to prove
these allegations. For instance, Cesar A. Laurente merely stated that he saw
three (3) ten-wheeler dump trucks and a Hyundai Payloader with the markings
"Ormoc City Government" extracting and hauling sand and gravel from the
riverbed adjacent to the property owned by the Codilla family.
84

Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Sulvera in their Joint Affidavit merely stated
that they saw white trucks owned by the City Government of Ormoc dumping
gravel and sand on the road of Purok 6, San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte. A
payloader then scattered the sand and gravel unloaded by the white trucks.
85

On the other hand, Danilo D. Maglasang, a temporary employee of the City
Government of Ormoc assigned to check and record the delivery of sand and
gravel for the different barangays in Ormoc, stated as follows:
"3. That on April 20, 2001, I was ordered by Engr. Arnel Padayo, an employee of
the City Engineering Office, Ormoc City to go to Tagaytay, Kangga (sic), Leyte as
that will be the source of the sand and gravel. I inquired why we had to go to
Kananga but Engr. Padayao said that it's not a problem as it was Mayor
Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. who ordered this and the property is owned by the
family of Mayor Codilla. We were to deliver sand and gravel to whoever requests
from Mayor Codilla."
86

Similarly, the Affidavit of Basilio Bates cannot prove the offense charged against
the petitioner. He alleged that on April 18, 2001, a white truck with the marking
"City Government of Ormoc" came to his lot at Montebello, Kananga, Leyte and
unloaded mixed sand and that the driver of the truck told him to "vote for Codilla
as a (sic) congressman during election."
87
His statement is hearsay. He has no
personal knowledge of the supposed order of the petitioner to distribute gravel
and sand for the purpose of inducing the voters to vote for him. The same could
be said about the affidavits of Randy T. Merin,
88
Alfredo C. De la Pea,
89
Miguel
P. Pandac,
90
Paquito Bregeldo, Cristeta Alferez , Glicerio Rios,
91
Romulo Alkuino,
Sr.,
92
Abner Casas,
93
Rita Trangia,
94
and Judith Erispe
95
attached to respondent
Locsin's Memorandum on the Motion to Lift the Suspension of Proclamation.
Also valueless are the affidavits of other witnesses
96
of respondent Locsin, all
similarly worded, which alleged that the petitioner ordered the repair of the road
in Purok 6, Barangay San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte and the flattening of the area
where the cockfights were to be held. These allegations are extraneous to the
charge in the petition for disqualification. More importantly, these allegations do
not constitute a ground to disqualify the petitioner based on section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed other election offenses
against the petitioner, particularly section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
"Section 261. Prohibited Acts.- The following shall be guilty of an election
offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.- (1) Any person who gives, offers or
promises money or anything of value, gives or promises any office or
employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or make or offers to
make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to
be made to any person, association, corporation, entity or community in
order to induce anyone or the public in general, to vote for or against any
candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against

any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention
or similar selection process of a political party.
x x x x x x x x x
(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities
owned or controlled by the government for an election campaign.- Any
person who uses under any guise whatsoever directly or indirectly, xxx
(3) any equipment, vehicle, facility, apparatus, or paraphernalia owned
by the government or by its political subdivisions, agencies including
government-owned or controlled corporations, or by the Armed Forces
of the Philippines for any election campaign or for any partisan political
activity x x x."
However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is
limited to those enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC
jurisdiction.
97
They are criminal and not administrative in nature.
Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of
prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of
justice, viz:
"Section 265. Prosecution.- The Commission shall, through its duly
authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this
Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any
complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the
complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for
proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
x x x x x x x x x
Section 268. Jurisdiction.- The regional trial court shall have the exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for
violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or
failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal
trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal
cases."
The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it decided the
disqualification case based on section 261 (a) and (o), and not on section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
(d) Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of
respondent Locsin was done with undue haste.
The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor
of the petitioner, and the proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording
the petitioner the opportunity to challenge the same. In the morning of June 15,
2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers convened, and on the strength of the
said Resolution excluding the votes received by the petitioner, certified that
respondent Locsin received the highest number of votes. On this basis,
respondent Locsin was proclaimed.
Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division only through his counsel via a facsimile message in
the afternoon of June 15, 2001
98
when everything was already fait accompli.
Undoubtedly, he was not able to contest the issuance of the Certificate of
Canvass and the proclamation of respondent Locsin. This is plain and simple
denial of due process.
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is
deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his
rights is void.
Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered
"stray" and respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 01-208 contains
two dispositions: (1) it ruled that the petitioner was disqualified as a candidate for
the position of Congressman of the Fourth District of Leyte; and (2) it ordered the
immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of
votes, to the exclusion of the respondent [herein petitioner].
As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being
violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming,
however, that the petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the
COMELEC Second Division to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for
the petitioner as stray, and on this basis, proclaim the respondent as having
garnered the next highest number of votes.
(a) The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in
favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray."
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require
a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to
be considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified
by final judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in

his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising
the electorate in whom sovereignty resides.
99
For in voting for a candidate who
has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people
voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in
the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom
they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.
100

This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that
the petitioner has not been declared by final judgment to be disqualified not
only before but even after the elections. The Resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and hence,
could not be executed, because of the timely filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration. Section 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on
Finality of Decisions and Resolutions reads:
"Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions.- (a) In ordinary actions, special
proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of
the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days
from its promulgation.
(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the
Commission en banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days in
Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other
proceedings, following their promulgation.
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or
resolution of a Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of
five (5) days in Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15)
days in all other actions or proceedings, following its promulgation."
(emphasis supplied)
In this wise, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116,
101
issued in relation to the finality of
resolutions or decisions in disqualification cases, provides:
"This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en
banc or division, particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).
Special Action cases refer to the following:
(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of
decisions or resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the
Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on
disqualification cases shall become final and executory after five (5)
days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court;
(2) the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall
become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a
motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed;
(3) where the ground for disqualification case is by reason of non-
residence, citizenship, violation of election laws and other analogous
cases and on the day of the election the resolution has not become final
and executory the BEI shall tally and count the votes for such
disqualified candidate;
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates,
particularly whether the nuisance candidate has the same name as the
bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate,
particularly where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the
bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of
five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In
which case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be
counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or
repealed."
Considering the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC
Second Division gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate
disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his
favor. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is very clear that
a timely Motion for Reconsideration shall suspend the execution or
implementation of the resolution, viz:
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days
from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the

execution or implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling."
(emphases supplied)
(b) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed.
More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled
doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may
not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.
102
In
every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their
expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and
elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in
the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his
place.
103
In Domino v. COMELEC,
104
this Court ruled, viz:
"It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the second placer
would have received that (sic) other votes would be to substitute our judgment for
the mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among the qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed.
x x x x x x x x x
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that
the election fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the
disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only
authorizes a declaration in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of
votes, and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to make a
choice and the election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated
candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate
is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to
undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people's right to
elect officials of their choice."
105

Respondent Locsin proffers a distinction between a disqualification based on
personal circumstances such as age, residence or citizenship and disqualification
based on election offenses. She contends that the election of candidates later
disqualified based on election offenses like those enumerated in section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code should be invalidated because they violate the very
essence of suffrage and as such, the votes cast in his favor should not be
considered.
106

This contention is without merit. In the recent case of Trinidad v.
COMELEC,
107
this Court ruled that the effect of a judgment disqualifying a
candidate, after winning the election, based on personal circumstances or
section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is the same: the second placer could
not take the place of the disqualified winner.
II
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested the COMELEC en
banc of jurisdiction to review its validity.
Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to
annul her proclamation. She maintains that the COMELEC en banc was been
divested of jurisdiction to review the validity of her proclamation because she has
become a member of the House of Representatives. Thus, she contends that the
proper forum to question her membership to the House of Representatives is the
House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
We find no merit in these contentions.
First. The validity of the respondent's proclamation was a core issue in the
Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
In his timely Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc, petitioner
argued that the COMELEC Second Division erred thus:
"(1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious
declaration of the witnesses for respondent Locsin;
(2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent
Locsin; and
(3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of
procedure and in directing therein the immediate proclamation of
the second highest 'vote getter.'" (emphases supplied)
In support of his third assignment of error, petitioner argued that "the Second
Division's directive for the immediate proclamation of the second highest vote-
getter is premature considering that the Resolution has yet to become final and
executory."
108
Clearly, the validity of respondent Locsin's proclamation was made
a central issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the
petitioner. Without doubt, the COMELEC en banc has the jurisdiction to rule on
the issue.

The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the
COMELEC en banc is of no moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELEC
en banc could still rule on the nullity of respondent's proclamation because it was
properly raised in the Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en
banc to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided
by a division, viz:
"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decision shall be decided by the Commission en banc."
Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides:
"Rule 19. Motions for Reconsideration.-
Section 1. Grounds for Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion for
reconsideration may be filed on the grounds that the evidence is
insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling, or that the said
decision, order or ruling is contrary to law.
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be
filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if
not pro forma, suspends the execution or implementation of the
decision, resolution, order or ruling."
Section 3. Form and Contents of Motion for Reconsideration.- The
motion shall be verified and shall point out specifically the findings or
conclusions of the decision, resolution, order or ruling which are not
supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express
reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the
provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or resolutions.
Section 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal.- A
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling when not pro
forma, suspends the running of the period to elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court.
Section 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of.- Upon the filing
of a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a
Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24)
hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The
latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the
Commission en banc.
Section 6. Duty of the Clerk of Court of the Commission to set Motion for
Hearing.- The Clerk of Court concerned shall calendar the motion for
reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within ten
(10) days from the certification thereof." (emphases supplied)
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the
COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the
said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was
yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for
the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which
has no jurisdiction in the instant case.
Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and having taken oath as
representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, any question relative to her
election and eligibility should be brought before the HRET pursuant to section 17
of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
109

We reject respondent's contention.
(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity
of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged
by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET
cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua,
110
even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a
proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this
Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the
House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due
to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements
themselves." This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions
or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.

(b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of
respondent Locsin.
Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a
petition for quo warranto with the HRET.
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
111
In the case at bar, neither the
eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if
she won, to assume office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been
duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but
whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that
respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the
HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation
was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of
absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner,
to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
III
Whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to
recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may
file a verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."
112
For a petition for mandamus to prosper,
it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is
a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board,
officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right
to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public
officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment.
113

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner
in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th
legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the
public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered
71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the
May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the
proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the
COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the
proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not
been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has
become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the
constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that
its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to
the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise
register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This decision shall be
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., no part.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19721 May 10, 1962
CARLOS CUNANAN, petitioner,
vs.
JORGE TAN, JR., respondents.
PER CURIAM:
Gentlemen:
For your information and guidance, the resolution of this Court on even
date is quoted below:
In Civil Case G.R. No. L-19721 "Carlos Cunanan vs. Jorge Tan,
Jr." the
facts are:
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan who claims to be a career
employee, with more than thirty (30) years in the government
service was, on June 6 or 8, 1961, appointed by the President
of the Philippines as acting Deputy Administrator of the
Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. Thereupon, he qualified and assumed the
duties and functions of said office. On November 6, 1961, the
President extended to him an ad interim appointment as Deputy
Administrator of the Reforestation Administration, Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. On April 3, 1962, six (6)
Senators and seven (7) members of the House of
Representatives, purporting to act as the Commission on
Appointments, rejected said ad interim appointment. On April 11,
1962, respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was designated by the President
as Acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation
Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
and performed the function of said office, without the consent of
petitioner herein. Hence, soon thereafter, or on April 27, 1962,
petitioner commenced the present quo warranto proceeding
against respondent, contending that the latter's designation is
invalid, the office of Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation
Administration, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
not being vacant when he was designated thereto, because the
aforesaid rejection of petitioner's ad interim appointment is invalid
for several reasons.
When the first session of the Fifth Congress of the Philippines
opened on January 22, 1962, the members of the Senate were
evenly divided into two (2) groups: there were twelve (12)
Senators affiliated with the Liberal Party, on the one hand, and on
the other were twelve (12) Senators affiliated with the
Nacionalista Party and Nationalist-Citizens' Party. Hence, the
Senate has been unable to elect a new Senate President, and
Senator Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., who was President of the Senate
during the immediately preceding Congress, continued to hold
said office in an acting capacity. The House of Representatives,
consisting of seventy-two (72) members affiliated with the
Nacionalista Party, twenty-nine (29) affiliated with the Liberal
Party and one (1) not affiliated with any political party, elected
Congressman Daniel F. Romualdez as Speaker of said chamber.
In due course, the Commission on Appointments was constituted
pursuant to the Constitution, on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties in each House of Congress,
as follows:
On the Part of the Senate
Nacionalista Party Liberal Party
Hon. Alejandro Almendras Hon. Eulogio Balao
Hon. Fernando Lopez Hon. Mariano J. Cuenco
Hon. Genaro Magsaysay Hon. Ferdinand Marcos
Hon. Cipriano Primicias Hon. Camilo Osias
Hon. Jose Roy
Hon. Francisco (Soc)
Rodrigo
Hon. Gil J. Puyat Hon. Rogelio de la Rosa

On the Part of the House of Representatives
Nacionalista Party Liberal Party
Hon. Jose M. Aldeguer Hon. Eladio T. Balite
Hon. Wenceslao R. Lagumbay Hon. Manuel T. Cases
Hon. Felix A. Fuentebella Hon. Floro Crisologo
Hon. Rodolfo Ganzon Hon. Gerardo M. Roxas
Hon. Agustin Gatuslao

Hon. Rasid Lucman

Hon. Apolonio V. Marasigan

Hon. Maximo Noel

On March 21, 1962, by the vote of twenty-nine (29) Congressmen
affiliated with the Liberal Party and twenty-five (25) Congressmen
affiliated with the Nacionalista Party, forming what is commonly known as
the "Allied Majority," declared vacant the seats of the twelve (12)
members of the House of Representatives in the Commission of
Appointments and re-elected, as members thereof for said Chamber, its
former representatives in said Commission, except Congressmen
Ganzon, Lucman and Lagumbay, in lieu of whom said "Allied Majority"
elected Congressmen Jose Alberto, Reynaldo Honrado and Jose
Cojuangco, Jr. although still affiliated with the Nacionalista Party, these
three (3) Congressmen form part of the "Allied Majority". The members of
Congress who took part in the alleged session of the Commission on
Appointments on April 3, 1962, and rejected the ad interim appointment
of petitioner herein were:
(a) Six (6) Senators affiliated with the Liberal Party, namely: Hon.
Eulogio Balao, Hon. Mariano J. Cuenco, Hon. Ferdinand Marcos,
Hon. Camilo Osias, Hon. Francisco (Soc) Rodrigo, Hon. Rogelio
de la Rosa;
(b) Four (4) Congressmen affiliated with the same party, to wit:
Hon. Eladio T. Balite, Hon. Manuel T. Cases, Hon. Floro
Crisologo, and Hon. Gerardo M. Roxas; and
(c) Three (3) Congressmen affiliated with the Nacionalista Party,
but identified with the 'Allied Majority': Hon. Jose Alberto, Hon.
Reynaldo Honrado and Hon. Jose Cojuangco Jr.
Was the rejection of petitioner's ad interim appointment by the
aforementioned thirteen (13) members of Congress, purporting to act as
the Commission on Appointments, valid or not? The determination of this
issue depends upon: (1) the legality of the resolution of the House of
Representatives of March 21, 1962, declaring the seats of its twelve (12)
members in the Commission on Appointments vacant; and (2) the legality
of the action of the House of Representatives in reconstituting the
membership of the Commission on Appointments for said House. In view
of the conclusion we have reached with respect to the first question, we
deem it unnecessary to pass upon the second question.
With respect to the first question, we hold that the same should be
resolved in the negative. The Commission on Appointments is it creature
of the Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members of
Congress, said Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of
the Commission do not come from Congress, but emanate directly from
the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the
functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature. In order
that the members of the Commission could properly discharge their
duties as such, it is essential that their tenure therein be provided with a
certain measure of stability to insure the necessary freedom of action.1wph 1. t
Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there
shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12)
Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives
elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional
REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN",
necessarily connotes the authority of each House of Congress to see to it
that this requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it may
take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the
Commission, but, also, subsequently thereto. If by reason of successful
election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion from
the political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with
another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political
parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with
authority to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the
Commission on Appointments held by members of said House belonging
to the political party adversely affected by the change and then fill said
vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.

One thing, however, is to take these measures owing to changes of
permanent character in the representation of the political parties in the
House, and another thing for some members thereof affiliated with a
political party to make common cause in certain matters with members of
the House belonging to another political party. In other words, a shifting
of votes at a given time, even if due to arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-
called "Allied Majority", does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of
the membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise, the
Commission on Appointments may have to be reorganized as often as
votes shift from one side to another in the House. The framers of our
Constitution could not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ,
like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of
Congress.
We are aware of the statements made on the floor of our Constitutional
Convention indicating the opinion of some officers thereof or delegates
thereto that members of the Commission on Appointments were to serve
at the pleasure of the legislature. It should be noted, however, that said
statements were made with reference to the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly, the unicameral legislature under
our original Constitution. The statements did not refer and do not
necessarily apply to the Commission on Appointments under the present
Constitution, as amended, for we now have a bicameral Congress, both
Houses of which are represented in the Commission on Appointments. If
a House of Congress were free, at any time, to declare vacant the
position of its members in the Commission on Appointments, such House
could, in effect, paralyze the entire Commission, without the consent of
the other House. Such possibility could not have been countenanced by
the Constitutional Convention.
In his amended petition petitioner alleges that on April 27, 1962, his ad
interim appointment was confirmed by the "legitimate" Commission on
Appointments, in a meeting said to have been presided over by its
chairman ex oficio, Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., and attended by six (6)
Senators namely. Senators Almendras, Lopez, Magsaysay, Primicias,
Roy and Puyat and eight (8) Congressmen namely, Congressmen
Aldeguer, Lagumbay, Fuentebella, Ganzon, Gatuslao, Lucman,
Marasigan and Noel. Respondent has denied such allegation, but this
cannot affect our foregoing view.
Without prejudice to an extended decision later on, the Court holds,
therefore, that the resolution of the House of Representatives of March
21, 1962, declining vacant the seats of the twelve (12) members of the
House of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and
appointing others in lieu of some of them, as well as the rejection of
the ad interim appointment of petitioner by thirteen (13) alleged members
of the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized, and the
designation of respondent Jorge Tan, Jr., as Acting Deputy Administrator
of the Reforestation Administration, Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, on April 16, 1962, when said office was not vacant,
are null and void; that petitioner is entitled to hold said office; and that
respondent should vacate the same and turn it over to petitioner, with
costs against said respondent.
Mr. Justice Padilla voted to dismiss the petition, upon the ground that the
effectivity of petitioner's ad interim appointment expired on December 30,
1961, for the reasons given in his concurring opinion inAytona vs.
Castillo, G.R. No. L-18313 (January 19, 1962).
Yours truly,
(SGD.) PAULINO S. MARQUEZ
Clerk of Court












Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L.
GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN
DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL
TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented
by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his
capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT
and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former
Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO
BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PERLAS-BERNABE, J .:
"Experience is the oracle of truth."
1

-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions
2
taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the
complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the systems
conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional
challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.
3
Historically, its
usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed
with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished
bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming
from the generosity of their well-fed master.
4
This practice was later
compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to direct federal
budgets in favor of their districts.
5
While the advent of refrigeration has made
the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that
"bring home the bacon" to a legislators district and constituents.
6
In a more
technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government
spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring
money to a representative's district.
7
Some scholars on the subject further
use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.
8

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-
sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,
9
although, as will be
later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the
Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,
10
or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered
11
as the
earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since
the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to
post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund
release, Section 3
12
provides that the sums appropriated for certain
public works projects
13
"shall be distributed x x x subject to the
approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House
of Representatives. "The committee from each House may also
authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made by
the Secretary of Commerce and Communications."
14
Also, in the
area of fund realignment, the same section provides that the said
secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the
authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of said

distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of
appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented
15
that post-enactment legislator
participation broadened from the areas of fund release and
realignment to the area of project identification. During that year,
the mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent
that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For
the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members
of Congress, they being the representatives of the people, either
on their own account or by consultation with local officials or civil
leaders."
16
During this period, the pork barrel process commenced
with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals
appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that
were accommodated formed part of a legislators allocation, and
the amount each legislator would eventually get is determined in a
caucus convened by the majority. The amount was then integrated
into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public
Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House
of Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until it was
signed into law by the President the Public Works Act.
17
In the
1960s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view
of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the
Senate.
18

B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently
discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when
"one man controlled the legislature,"
19
the reprieve was only
temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already
introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA)
called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under
the article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on
reports,
20
it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-
sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each
assemblyman receiving P500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen
would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of
Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said ministry
would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local
Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or
municipal treasurers in the assemblymans locality. It has been
further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the
SLDP also began to cover not only public works projects, or so-
called "hard projects", but also "soft projects",
21
or non-public works
projects such as those which would fall under the categories of,
among others, education, health and livelihood.
22

C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the
restoration of Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork Barrel"
was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and
the "Visayas Development Fund" which were created with lump-
sum appropriations of P480 Million and P240 Million, respectively,
for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao and
Visayas areas in 1989. It has been documented
23
that the clamor
raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar
funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide Development
Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA
24
with an
initial funding ofP2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and
other priority community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,
25
CDF funds were,
with the approval of the President, to be released directly to the
implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of the
required list of projects and activities."Although the GAAs from
1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of allocations of the
individual legislators, as well as their participation in the
identification of projects, it has been reported
26
that by 1992,
Representatives were receivingP12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
while Senators were receiving P18 Million each, without any
limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any kind of
project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges,
and buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and
scholarships.
27

D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,
28
the GAA explicitly stated that the
release of CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of the
list of projects and activities identified by, among others, individual
legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an
allocation for the Vice-President.
29
As such, Representatives were
allocated P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, P18 Million
each, and the Vice-President, P20 Million.
In 1994,
30
1995,
31
and 1996,
32
the GAAs contained the same
provisions on project identification and fund release as found in the
1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the
Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.
33


Under the 1997
34
CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-
President, in consultation with the implementing agency concerned,
were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be
funded from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly
endorsed by (a) the Senate President and the Chairman of the
Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b) the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the
Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the House of
Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be
submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also
stated that the project list, which would be published by the
DBM,
35
"shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that "no
funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not
included in the list herein required."
The following year, or in 1998,
36
the foregoing provisions regarding
the required lists and endorsements were reproduced, except that
the publication of the project list was no longer required as the list
itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork
Barrel" at that time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork Barrel"
were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called
"Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad
ministrations political agenda.
37
It has been articulated that since
CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive
departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus harder
to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the
finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well
as the DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.
38
Examples of
these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd) School
Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public
Works Fund, the El Nio Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation
Fund.
39
The allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly,
shall be made upon prior consultation with the representative of
the legislative district concerned.
40
Similarly, the legislators had the
power to direct how, where and when these appropriations were to
be spent.
41

E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,
42
the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three
(3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security Program
Fund,"
43
the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"
44
and the
"Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"
45
all of
which contained a special provision requiring "prior consultation"
with the Member s of Congress for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 2000
46
that the "Priority Development Assistance
Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement of "prior
consultation with the respective Representative of the District"
before PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing
agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article.
Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was
expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be
used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits.
47
The
succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the re-
enactment
48
of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 2002
49
PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely
contained a single special provision ordering the release of the
funds directly to the implementing agency or local government unit
concerned, without further qualifications. The following year,
2003,
50
the same single provision was present, with simply an
expansion of purpose and express authority to realign.
Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department
of Public Works and Highways
51
(DPWH) and the DepEd
52
required
prior consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects of
implementation delegation and project list submission, respectively.
In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.
53

In 2005,
54
the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used
"to fund priority programs and projects under the ten point agenda
of the national government and shall be released directly to the
implementing agencies." It also introduced the program menu
concept,
55
which is essentially a list of general programs and
implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may
be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA
was re-enacted
56
in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases.
In similar regard, the program menu concept was consistently
integrated into the 2007,
57
2008,
58
2009,
59
and 2010
60
GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with
respect to the specific amounts allocated for the individual
legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and
identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the
PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd School
Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its
predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the
concerned Member of Congress
61
anent certain aspects of project
implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed
formal participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO) in
the implementation of government projects were introduced. In the

Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for
school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate.
For such purpose, the law stated that "the amount of at least P250
Million of the P500 Million allotted for the construction and
completion of school buildings shall be made available to NGOs
including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of
Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School"
program, with capability and proven track records in the
construction of public school buildings x x x."
62
The same allocation
was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under
the DepEd Budget.
63
Also, it was in 2007 that the Government
Procurement Policy Board
64
(GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-
2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending
the implementing rules and regulations
65
of RA 9184,
66
the
Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of
negotiated procurement,
67
the procedure whereby the Procuring
Entity
68
(the implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum
of agreement with an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or
ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to
NGOs."
69

G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF
Articles, the 2011
70
PDAF Article included an express statement on
lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-
President: Representatives were given P70 Million each, broken
down into P40 Million for "hard projects" and P30 Million for "soft
projects"; while P200 Million was given to each Senator as well as
the Vice-President, with a P100 Million allocation each for "hard"
and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds
was included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed only
once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of
Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior and
Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy,
and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the
further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same
implementing unit and same project category as the original project,
for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been
obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for
realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
71

In the 2012
72
and 2013
73
PDAF Articles, it is stated that the
"identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall
conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each
implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as
practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would
choose and identify the project from the said priority list.
74

Provisions on legislator allocations
75
as well as fund
realignment
76
were included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles;
but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at P200
Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013
PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing
agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the
projects.
77
Legislators were also allowed to identify
programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and
scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he
secures the written concurrence of the legislator of the intended
outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House.
78
Finally,
any realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project
identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all
required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case
may be.
79

III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and the
recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the terms
usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund
under Section 8
80
of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,
81
issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the
said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help
intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the
exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources
vital to economic growth.
82
Due to the energy-related activities of the
government in the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the
"Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",
83
the special fund created
under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section
12, Title IV
84
of PD 1869,
85
or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos
on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and
accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985,
86
amending Section
12
87
of the former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been
described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct
assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular
budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate
gross earnings of PAGCOR.
88

IV. Controversies in the Philippines.

Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased
tremendously,
89
owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly
used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.
90
It was in
1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted.
Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an
anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government money
that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of
kickbacks."
91
He said that "the kickbacks were SOP (standard operating
procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52
percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging,
rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school
buildings."
92
"Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were public
funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the
money trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of
August 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig."
93
"The
publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative
allocations of certain lawmakers, including P3.6 Billion for a Congressman,
sparked public outrage."
94

Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of
the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of
unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.
95

Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the government has been
defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using
funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies
for scores of ghost projects."
96
The investigation was spawned by sworn
affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation
"JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) had swindled billions of
pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20
dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the
ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the
money was diverted into Napoles private accounts.
97
Thus, after its
investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for
Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to
be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
98

On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of
a three-year audit investigation
99
covering the use of legislators' PDAF from
2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration.
The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds
under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects
(VILP)
100
by the DBM, the application of these funds and the implementation
of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several
government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).
101
The total
releases covered by the audit amounted to P8.374 Billion in PDAF
and P32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the
total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made
nationwide during the audit period.
102
Accordingly, the Co As findings
contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including
Local Projects (VILP)," were made public, the highlights of which are as
follows:
103

Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable
number of legislators significantly exceeded their respective
allocations.
Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts
of sponsoring members of the Lower House.
Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount
appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without
these having been turned over to the government.
Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies
without the latters endorsement and without considering their
mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to
implement projects.
Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by
the implementing agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed by
the proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.
The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence
of any appropriation law or ordinance.
Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and
regulations.
Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven
hundred seventy two (772) projects amount to P6.156 Billion were
either found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious
documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization
of the Funds.

Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing
agencies, of goods and services reportedly used in the projects
were not compliant with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at
least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO."
104
According to incumbent CoA Chairperson
Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in
the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the Malampaya
Funds.
105

V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the
Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before the Court
similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional.
To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as
follows:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the
Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining
respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective
capacities as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of
Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds
for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be
called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto.
106
The Alcantara
Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L.
Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose
M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With
Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently
embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF,
and the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds
and the Presidential Social Fund,
107
be declared unconstitutional and null and void for
being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue
a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary
Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent
Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any
expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the
foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete
schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years
2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient
entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the
Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013,
specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto."
108
Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations
with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds including,
but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR."
109
The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.
110

Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno),
filed a Petition dated August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF
be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining
President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from
releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to
fund priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in
consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of
Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and
Communication and the National Economic Development Authority.
111
The
Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.
112

On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating
all cases; (b) requiring public respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions;
(c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer,
the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from
releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA
of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not
for the purpose of "financing energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government under the same provision; and (d) setting the
consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even date before the Court, seeking the lifting,
or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and medical
assistance purposes, of the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.
113

On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing
petitioners to reply to the Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the
Comment: (a) on September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated
September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a
Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013,
Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be
observed by the parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In

view of the technicality of the issues material to the present cases, incumbent
Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with
him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who
would be able to competently and completely answer questions related to, among
others, the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson
was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court
during the Oral Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the
Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within a period of
seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are
the main issues for the Courts resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual
and justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are
matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to
sue; and (d) the Courts Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105,
113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez"
114
(Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987,
entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and
Management"
115
(LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the
"Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of
legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties;
and (f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910,
116
relating to the Malampaya
Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social
Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative
power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In
addition, the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by the
present cases.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by
the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry,
117
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing
to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
118
Of these requisites, case law
states that the first two are the most important
119
and, therefore, shall be discussed
forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy.
120
This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one
which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.
121
In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights
that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence."
122
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional
scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the
act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It
is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged
action."
123
"Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through
advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions."
124

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the

questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged
funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the
PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for
the Presidential Social Fund are currently existing and operational; hence, there
exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the
unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had
been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A
case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or
no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.
125
Differing from this
description, the Court observes that respondents proposed line-item budgeting
scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its
resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013
PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and
existing. Neither will the Presidents declaration that he had already "abolished the
PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of
government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By
constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by
Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a
declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following exchange
between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor
General during the Oral Arguments:
126

Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the
law,
127
correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General
Appropriations Act, correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for
example of the PDAF, the President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of
the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure that I will continue
the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not
that (interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project,
he has the power to stop the releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is
Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code
128
x x x. So at
most the President can suspend, now if the President believes that the PDAF is
unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific
case of the PDAF because of the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities
and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA Report, you
have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the
duty .
x x x x
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. Youve seen the CoA Report, there are
anomalies, you stop and investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that
mean that PDAF has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
x x x x
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases.
Congress passes a law to repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases
supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the
moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot,
if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character
of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
129

The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of
petitioners they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect
to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative
power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the
interests involved
the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public
funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a
situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest.
The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the systems flaws
have never before been magnified. To the Courts mind, the coalescence of the CoA
Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the governments own
recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF"
130
demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the
importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners
claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight
accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-
mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,
131
a recent case

wherein the Court upheld the CoAs disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF
funds, it was emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the
proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of
its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the
check and balance system inherent in our form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative
authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only
on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative
agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order
are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this
Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be
sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical
need for a definitive ruling on the systems constitutionality. As disclosed during the
Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of
disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the
CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice
Leonen) pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the
courts.
132
Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles
relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases,
but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds
should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the
preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an
affair of annual occurrence.
133
The relevance of the issues before the Court does not
cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014."
134
The evolution of the
"Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history,
lends a semblance of truth to petitioners claim that "the same dog will just resurface
wearing a different collar."
135
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,
136
the government
had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the
"capable of repetition but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar
questions from re- emerging."
137
The situation similarly holds true to these cases.
Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are
spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and
hence, must not evade judicial review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies
carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the
other branches of government."
138
Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a
restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of
Baker v. Carr,
139
applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial
discretion." Cast against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches
are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them
in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the
Court not to impose a solution at this stage."
140

The Court must deny respondents submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but
legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to
"those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."
141
The
intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon
the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of
the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of
government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial
power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary
the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed
therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,
142
the expanded concept of judicial power under
the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question doctrine was explained as
follows:
143

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political
question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt
not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new
provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do
to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not
just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the
executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution."
144
To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms
undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force
that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Courts avowed
intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede
the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of
change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of
the people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes
its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society.
For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents plea for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."
145

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-
taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the
National Treasury."
146
Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to
question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they
pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as
taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the
Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law,
147
as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given
that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."
148
The CoA Chairpersons statement during the Oral Arguments that the
present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete
breakdown of controls"
149
amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the
seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon
the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
150
All told, petitioners
have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et
movere (or simply, stare decisis which means "follow past precedents and do not
disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law principles which both deal
with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For
the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to
its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on
the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind
a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
151
This required identity is not,
however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved
constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article,
whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork
Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a
procedural technicality and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits in that
petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed,
there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend
them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to
demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has become a
common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court up
held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004
PDAF Article, and saw "no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in
the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as
the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The
principle, entrenched under Article 8
152
of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that,
for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus,
where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent
court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.
153

Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel
provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly
understand its context, petitioners posturing was that "the power given to the
Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by
the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power
in an appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and
identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution."
154
In
deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main
conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of
the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the
power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it
can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals

and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At
once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a
separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-
enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the
present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the
CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork
Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained
within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of
project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The
complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be,
therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale
application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with
inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort
to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of the case,
Philconsas fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose and
identify of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of
the power of appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From
this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects
is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative
power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should
exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be
exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be
exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as
embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely
recommendatory. Justice Vitugs Concurring Opinion in the same case sums up the
Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by
law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that
authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am
afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits
from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA Report, the
Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the
post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the
same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional
inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism
is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent
case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima
155
(Abakada) has effectively overturned
Philconsas allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the
separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada
rule will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural
technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current
application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not
apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must
first define the terms "Pork Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and
"Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the
Legislative and Executive branches of government to accumulate lump-sum public
funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its distribution
as political largesse."
156
They assert that the following elements make up the Pork
Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations process
to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining
how the funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use
the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d)
projects funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of
the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing official by yielding rich
patronage benefits.
157
They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of
two (2) kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative)
Pork Barrel, currently known as the PDAF;
158
and, second, the Presidential (or
Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the
Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.
159

Considering petitioners submission and in reference to its local concept and legal
history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and
practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily
intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the
Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork
Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of
lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively
organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the funds
utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular,
petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional
Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual
legislators to wield a collective power;
160
and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of
lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of
its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,
161
the Court shall delimit the use of such
term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive
issues of these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.

a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the
three fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in
Angara v. Electoral Commission,
162
it means that the "Constitution has blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government."
163
To the legislative branch of
government, through Congress,
164
belongs the power to make laws; to the executive
branch of government, through the President,
165
belongs the power to enforce laws;
and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court,
166
belongs the power to
interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design,
ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere."
167
Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the
executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no
power to make or execute the law."
168
The principle of separation of powers and its
concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of
government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one
branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power
over the other branches or the citizenry.
169
To achieve this purpose, the divided
power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable
of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence
would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-
interest assertions of another or others.
170

Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one
branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme
Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in
two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the others
performance of its constitutionally assigned function";
171
and "alternatively, the
doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is
entrusted to another."
172
In other words, there is a violation of the principle when there
is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another departments
functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is
indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the
Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague
173
(Guingona, Jr.),
the Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the various
operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work
and financial plans for individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as
well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution cycle.
174
This
is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.
175
Thus, unless the Constitution
provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles
and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided
under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its
members, should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since,
as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in
Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates
or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the
exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely
following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money
may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by
law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress law -making role necessarily
comes to an end and from there the Executives role of implementing the national
budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them,
Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the
Executive."
176

The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the
Court held that "from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional."
177
It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only
pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may
still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that
the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress role must be
confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator
participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence,
tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.
As the Court ruled in Abakada:
178

Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation.1wphi1 In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the
following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the
budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any
matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to
the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed
by the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel among others,
the 2013 PDAF Article "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the
political branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way
past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is

passed."
179
They state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report
provide "an illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield
over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional principle of
separation of powers."
180
Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case
only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that individual legislators limited their
role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their implementation.
181

For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not
been violated since the President maintains "ultimate authority to control the
execution of the GAA and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the legislators
proposals.
182
They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality
of the power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as
such proposal and identification are recommendatory."
183
As such, they claim that
"everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa
framework, and hence, remains constitutional."
184

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the
post-enactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators may it be through project lists,
185
prior consultations
186
or
program menus
187
have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to
identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork
Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators
to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions
1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special
Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced from past PDAF
Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the
identified project falls under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly,
Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days
from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or
design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator
may make his choice. The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify
PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the representative of the district
concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF
projects refer to "projects to be identified by legislators"
188
and thereunder provides
the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally,
paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the
project identification "shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations
and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be." From the foregoing special provisions, it
cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment
authority to identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-
enactment authority in the areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013
PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to participate in the area of fund
release through congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which
explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the
documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by
House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the
case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund
realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4
189
which explicitly
state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be ; and,
second , paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of
Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and
Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and
Trade and Industry
190
x x x to approve realignment from one project/scope to another
within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request
is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the
foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in
as Guingona, Jr. puts it "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including
"the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation
and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The
fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated
from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.
191
That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in
nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court
must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of
legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as
such, respondents reliance on the same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to
substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of
recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents through the statements of
the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments have admitted that the identification
of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped
as a funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the
entire budget execution process:
192

Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislators identification of the project,
can the PDAF of the legislator be utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the
individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
x x x x
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and
then there is no identification.
x x x x
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was
implemented without the identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no
specific examples. I would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement,
there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are triggered
by an identification from the legislator.
x x x x
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were
replying to a question, "How can a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF
Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that sense, Your Honor.
Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district
would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases
supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article
as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form
of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget,
unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle
and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which
legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must
be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such
informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the
years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these
cases:
193

Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses
of Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent
of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress frontally
faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the
budget process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the
DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all
of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF
provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that had been done
since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that they are all now in the
PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether
through formal measures written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in
government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the
Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,
194
legislative power shall be
exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same.
In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
195
Based on this provision, it is clear that only
Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other.
This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the
only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local
governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local
matters;
196
and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the
President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency,
197
or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
198

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to
delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of
either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making)
or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-
making).
199
The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were
explained in the case of People v. Maceren
200
as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the
principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of

legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to
promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law."
x x x x
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that
subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it
confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the
principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is
lodged in Congress.
201
That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states
that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation,
the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor
202
(Bengzon), held
that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum
from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF
Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are
able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the
2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly,
said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution
does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all
other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate
and distinct does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government.
203

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the Presidents
power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to
him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill presentment." The
Presidents item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
x x x x
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he
may exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the
Constitution.
204
As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the
"submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as
law after the required publication."
205

Elaborating on the Presidents item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the
legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained that:
206

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the
Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill,
commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented
to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature
must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the
government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The
Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the
negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the
Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the
Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict
construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will
indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner
as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the
Legislature. (Emphases supplied)
The justification for the Presidents item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals
such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,
207
impose fiscal restrictions on the
legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branchs role in the budgetary
process.
208
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme
Court characterized the Presidents item-power as "a salutary check upon the
legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions,
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to

influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the
chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste,
inadvertence, or design."
209

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there
exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the
field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary
of Justice of the Philippine Islands,
210
the US Supreme Court characterized an item of
appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put
into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the
President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific
appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for
parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item
characterized by singular correspondence meaning an allocation of a specified
singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-
item."
211
This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as
a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may
discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity
Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a
specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item"
appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed
that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or
values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its
own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-
item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may
even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice
considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating
expenses), in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific
for the exercise of the Presidents item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and
discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-
veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein
discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify
the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding
revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2
5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed
only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely
provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for
multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further
determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of
the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the
law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific
appropriation of money and hence, without a proper line-item which the President
may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the
predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes
wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder
some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such
arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing
authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended
and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations
constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority
would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of
non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a
lump-sum appropriation, the legislators identification of the projects after the passage
of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on."
212
Accordingly,
they submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations
bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless."
213

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a
process which is intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as
such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address situations which
are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the
Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and
textually-grounded.
214

The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a
collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among
individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and
could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their
own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only
after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the
actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-
sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of
a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment
and consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly
point out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a)

accepting the entire P24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific
projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national
agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.
215

Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013
PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a
prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the
lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source
allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions,
assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads,
flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore,
does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents
power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the
CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and
information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said
Funds."
216
Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or
amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."
217

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article,
as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be
unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of
flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the
Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that
unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends.
218

c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel operate defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of
checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional
Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy
passing of the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-
interested partners."
219
They also claim that the system has an effect on re- election
as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that
the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite
useful, to well, accelerate the decisions of senators."
220

The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states
that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every
instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in
accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of
the peoples trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability,
221
hence, the
various mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact accountability
from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of
public funds may be checked is the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned
in Abakada,
222
congressional oversight may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny
based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear
before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation;
223
or (b) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation.
224

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on
congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment
roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight
would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority,
would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it
must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs
afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally
appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly,
be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during
his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation a matter before another office of government renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority
and/or the individual legislators control of his PDAF per se would allow him to
perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a
legislators use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for
re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts
and on a case-to-case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity
between legislators and the Executive department, through the formers post-
enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely

borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel
Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial
assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and
violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public
accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of
similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who
are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in
power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
225
which
states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service,
and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-
executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect,
said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional
right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action.
226
Therefore,
since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political
dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely
speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System
would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The States policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and
Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,
227
otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had been
more specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful
local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national
goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the National Government to the local government units.
x x x x
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to
conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units,
nongovernmental and peoples organizations, and other concerned sectors of the
community before any project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the
State to empower local government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become
self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national economy. As explained by
the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:
228

This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to
the policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and
encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant
communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small
republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local
governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more
important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as
members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue interference by
the national government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials
and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only
to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the
Constitution.
229
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes
against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows district
representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing
public funds for local development.
230
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and
that "it is also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the
President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about
the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each
project."
231
Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its
existence by stating that "the relatively small projects implemented under the
Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national development goals to
the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are overlooked
by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-projects.
232
Similarly, in his
August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President
Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a
worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for
communities that the LGU concerned cannot afford.
233

Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in
the system which actually belies the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal."
In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division
is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests
and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the
allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality,
wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a
result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount
of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be
relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives and in some years,
even the Vice-President who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the
Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the
Congressional Pork Barrels original intent which is "to make equal the unequal."
Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control
of each legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and
PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs)
which are already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting
the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development
efforts within its territorial jurisdiction."
234
Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities
whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,
235
their
programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by
individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy caused
by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by
petitioners in the following wise:
236

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and
initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this
type of personality-driven project identification has not only contributed little to the
overall development of the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening
infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local
matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well
as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns
to the substantive issues involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now,
amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the
"primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the
National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation
law since the "primary and specific purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy
Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental
thereto.
237
In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a
valid appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely
incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment
of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.
238
In view of the foregoing, petitioners
suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper
appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."
239

The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or
determinable
240
amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public
purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the
very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or
apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate
that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide
or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization
or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be made by law," an
appropriation law may according to Philconsa be "detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from
the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:
241


There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular
form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the
authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other
words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past
but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by
enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made
in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be
embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special
provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for
specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure
is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language
employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the
present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:
242

To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the
designated purpose. The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply
to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means
the setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public purpose. No particular form
of words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly
manifested. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the
appropriation must be the "primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid
appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate or
determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular public
purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence,
already sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under
contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including
receipts from service contracts and agreements such as application and processing
fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected from
concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the
Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties,
rentals, production share on service contracts and similar payments on the
exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a
Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. After deducting five (5%) percent as
Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate
gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross
earnings be less than P150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the
General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
(Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis--vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be
concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of
"all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all
sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified public
purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly
sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%)
percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or
60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00" (also a
determinable amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and
x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a
specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly
deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely
because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively
create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations
are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by
individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the
Court observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not
the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment
determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences
outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an
"appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual
legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-
discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President "unbridled
discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be used."
243
Respondents, on
the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same
section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."
244


The Court agrees with petitioners submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public
purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must
contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making
authority to the Executive
245
either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the
law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining
facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-
making.
246
There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative
guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the
"completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other
hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that
a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.
247
To be sufficient, the standard must specify
the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented.
248

In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8
of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not
lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents
authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya
Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may
be confined only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the
general word or phrase is to be construed to include or be restricted to things akin
to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned,
249
is
belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a singular and general
class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from
which the general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said
phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs
of the government;
250
and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the
Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby
contradicting respondents own position that it is limited only to "energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."
251
Thus,
while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy of
energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of
law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it
must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the
Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government," remains legally effective and subsisting.
Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an
assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used as it should be used only in
accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the
parties submissions on the same.
252
Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision
may be readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court
proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the
Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure
development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose
adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social
Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated
purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not
supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves
the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of
a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term
could pertain to any kind of facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic
definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a system, especially public services
and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems)
needed to support commerce as well as economic and residential development."
253
In
fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must be
stricken down as unconstitutional since similar to the above-assailed provision
under Section 8 of PD 910 it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section
12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional as
the Court did so in the context of its pronouncements made in this Decision
petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to
release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who
have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use
of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);
254
and (b) "the use of the
Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013,
specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto"
255
(Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners prayer is
grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which read as follows:

ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a
petition for mandamus. As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission:
256

While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be
discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made
contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the
constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency
discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be
compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public
right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth
in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this
case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the
constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.
257
(Valmonte), it has been clarified
that the right to information does not include the right to compel the preparation of
"lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is
essential that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the
thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required." Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a
particular request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder
quoted:
258

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are
entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to
compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the
like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the
applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and
that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The
corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and
specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203;
Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the
part of respondent to prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of
mandamus actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-
defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive Secretary
and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork
Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which
would form the bases of the latters duty to furnish them with the documents
requested. While petitioners pray that said information be equally released to the
CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these
cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed access to or to
compel the release of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit
investigations. While the Court recognizes that the information requested is a matter
of significant public concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of
disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the equally important
interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners prayer on this score,
without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may
choose to pursue through a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Courts denial herein should only cover petitioners plea
to be furnished with such schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or
the general public, access to official documents which are already existing and of
public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any valid statutory
prohibition, access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte,
while the Court denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the
list requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the documents
sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodians reasonable
regulations,viz.:
259

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted
by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating
to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the
records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of
the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect
the records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538,

quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the second and third
alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners,
i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the
then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations
with the Congress of all presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including
but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund, remittances from the
PAGCOR and the PCSO or the Executives Social Funds."
260

Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter
which is generally left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.
Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their prayer on this score.
3. Respondents Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to
the concept of released funds. In response to the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO
that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM
issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8)
which pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special
Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has
been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may
continually be implemented and disbursements thereto effected by the agencies
concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation
and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and,
second, that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency concerned
prior to the issuance of the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the
SARO does not yet involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only
triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]."
261
As such, PDAF
disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased
and unobligated allotments." They explain that once a SARO has been issued and
obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the
same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they cannot be considered
as remaining PDAF." They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the
TRO by the DBM.
262

The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Courts
September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present
Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the
consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one.
Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF
funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined.
The propriety of the DBMs interpretation of the concept of "release" must,
nevertheless, be resolved as it has a practical impact on the execution of the current
Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether or not PDAF funds
covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be
disbursed following the DBMs interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners posturing for the fundamental reason
that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal
contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific
authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given
amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures
the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is
subject to separate approval or clearance by competent authority."
263

Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of
an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not
have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the
disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain
circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the
actual release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA,
264
which is
subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the statements
of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments:
265

Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
x x x x
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the
agencies to obligate or to enter into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already
the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the amounts
obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal

for the MDS for the authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the
payees depending on the projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the
SAROs issued are withdrawn by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds
which have been "released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013
PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any
corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decisions promulgation, be
enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general
fund. Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the
funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already
obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an
unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds
which have been obligated but not released meaning, those merely covered by a
SARO under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the
Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these
funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead,
respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to
be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as
unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Courts pronouncement anent the
unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all
other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1)
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be
treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary,
in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act,
such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and
should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,
266
the doctrine
merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental
organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is
valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial
review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its
quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired
prior to such adjudication."
267
"In the language of an American Supreme Court
decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of
unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored."
268

For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the
chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork
Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within
which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying
gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget
execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it
has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are
not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of
presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ;
insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving
legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which
they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to
intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local
institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it
has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for
energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other
public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development
projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious
unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should
never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form, by any
semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a
system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the
people and its co-stewards in government to look forward with the optimism of
change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous
public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not
purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation
to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its

cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Courts bounden duty and no
others.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional
violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of
past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and
CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators
whether individually or collectively organized into committees to intervene, assume
or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution,
such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision
of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power
of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional
Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various
Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to
legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves
determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court
similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both
failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power.
Accordingly, the Courts temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby
declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF
funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds
sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase
"to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which
are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash
Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether
obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this
permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the
unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for their
respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the
Court hereby DENIES petitioners prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or
the Department of Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the
Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the
availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners access to
official documents already available and of public record which are related to these
funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodians
reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is
without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit
may choose to pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject
of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left
to the prerogative of the political branches of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to,
within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all
government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to
the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the
Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice













Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO
PARAYNO, JR., Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 168207
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY E.
ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL,
AND SERGIO R. OSMEA III, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, CESAR V. PURISIMA,
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., COMMISSIONER OF
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 168461
ASSOCIATION OF PILIPINAS SHELL DEALERS, INC. represented by its President,
ROSARIO ANTONIO; PETRON DEALERS ASSOCIATION represented by its
President, RUTH E. BARBIBI; ASSOCIATION OF CALTEX DEALERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES represented by its President, MERCEDITAS A. GARCIA; ROSARIO
ANTONIO doing business under the name and style of "ANB NORTH SHELL
SERVICE STATION"; LOURDES MARTINEZ doing business under the name and
style of "SHELL GATE N. DOMINGO"; BETHZAIDA TAN doing business under the
name and style of "ADVANCE SHELL STATION"; REYNALDO P. MONTOYA doing
business under the name and style of "NEW LAMUAN SHELL SERVICE STATION";
EFREN SOTTO doing business under the name and style of "RED FIELD SHELL
SERVICE STATION"; DONICA CORPORATION represented by its President, DESI
TOMACRUZ; RUTH E. MARBIBI doing business under the name and style of "R&R
PETRON STATION"; PETER M. UNGSON doing business under the name and style
of "CLASSIC STAR GASOLINE SERVICE STATION"; MARIAN SHEILA A. LEE
doing business under the name and style of "NTE GASOLINE & SERVICE
STATION"; JULIAN CESAR P. POSADAS doing business under the name and style
of "STARCARGA ENTERPRISES"; ADORACION MAEBO doing business under
the name and style of "CMA MOTORISTS CENTER"; SUSAN M. ENTRATA doing
business under the name and style of "LEONAS GASOLINE STATION and
SERVICE CENTER"; CARMELITA BALDONADO doing business under the name
and style of "FIRST CHOICE SERVICE CENTER"; MERCEDITAS A. GARCIA doing
business under the name and style of "LORPED SERVICE CENTER"; RHEAMAR A.
RAMOS doing business under the name and style of "RJRAM PTT GAS STATION";
MA. ISABEL VIOLAGO doing business under the name and style of "VIOLAGO-PTT
SERVICE CENTER"; MOTORISTS HEART CORPORATION represented by its
Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; MOTORISTS
HARVARD CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for Operations,
JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; MOTORISTS HERITAGE CORPORATION represented
by its Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; PHILIPPINE
STANDARD OIL CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for Operations,
JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; ROMEO MANUEL doing business under the name and
style of "ROMMAN GASOLINE STATION"; ANTHONY ALBERT CRUZ III doing
business under the name and style of "TRUE SERVICE STATION", Petitioners,
vs.
CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance
and GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 168463
FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, EMMANUEL JOEL J.
VILLANUEVA, RODOLFO G. PLAZA, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, OSCAR
G. MALAPITAN, BENJAMIN C. AGARAO, JR. JUAN EDGARDO M. ANGARA,
JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, MUJIV S. HATAMAN,
RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III,
RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ, RODOLFO Q. AGBAYANI and TEODORO A. CASIO,
Petitioners,
vs.
CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, GUILLERMO L.
PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 168730
BATAAN GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR. Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary; HON.
MARGARITO TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; HON. JOSE MARIO
BUNAG, in his capacity as the OIC Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

and HON. ALEXANDER AREVALO, in his capacity as the OIC Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
The expenses of government, having for their object the interest of all, should be
borne by everyone, and the more man enjoys the advantages of society, the more he
ought to hold himself honored in contributing to those expenses.
-Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781)
French statesman and economist
Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for
education, increased emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full
value-added tax benefits these are the reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A.
No. 9337)
1
was enacted. Reasons, the wisdom of which, the Court even with its
extensive constitutional power of review, cannot probe. The petitioners in these
cases, however, question not only the wisdom of the law, but also perceived
constitutional infirmities in its passage.
Every law enjoys in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Their arguments
notwithstanding, petitioners failed to justify their call for the invalidity of the law.
Hence, R.A. No. 9337 is not unconstitutional.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555
and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950.
House Bill No. 3555
2
was introduced on first reading on January 7, 2005. The House
Committee on Ways and Means approved the bill, in substitution of House Bill No.
1468, which Representative (Rep.) Eric D. Singson introduced on August 8, 2004.
The President certified the bill on January 7, 2005 for immediate enactment. On
January 27, 2005, the House of Representatives approved the bill on second and
third reading.
House Bill No. 3705
3
on the other hand, substituted House Bill No. 3105 introduced
by Rep. Salacnib F. Baterina, and House Bill No. 3381 introduced by Rep. Jacinto V.
Paras. Its "mother bill" is House Bill No. 3555. The House Committee on Ways and
Means approved the bill on February 2, 2005. The President also certified it as urgent
on February 8, 2005. The House of Representatives approved the bill on second and
third reading on February 28, 2005.
Meanwhile, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means approved Senate Bill No.
1950
4
on March 7, 2005, "in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 1337, 1838 and 1873,
taking into consideration House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705." Senator Ralph G. Recto
sponsored Senate Bill No. 1337, while Senate Bill Nos. 1838 and 1873 were both
sponsored by Sens. Franklin M. Drilon, Juan M. Flavier and Francis N. Pangilinan.
The President certified the bill on March 11, 2005, and was approved by the Senate
on second and third reading on April 13, 2005.
On the same date, April 13, 2005, the Senate agreed to the request of the House of
Representatives for a committee conference on the disagreeing provisions of the
proposed bills.
Before long, the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill
No. 3555, House Bill No. 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950, "after having met and
discussed in full free and conference," recommended the approval of its report, which
the Senate did on May 10, 2005, and with the House of Representatives agreeing
thereto the next day, May 11, 2005.
On May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate version
was transmitted to the President, who signed the same into law on May 24, 2005.
Thus, came R.A. No. 9337.
July 1, 2005 is the effectivity date of R.A. No. 9337.
5
When said date came, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders, enjoining respondents from enforcing and implementing the law.
Oral arguments were held on July 14, 2005. Significantly, during the hearing, the
Court speaking through Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, voiced the rationale for
its issuance of the temporary restraining order on July 1, 2005, to wit:
J. PANGANIBAN : . . . But before I go into the details of your presentation, let me just
tell you a little background. You know when the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the
Court issued a TRO at about 5 oclock in the afternoon. But before that, there was a
lot of complaints aired on television and on radio. Some people in a gas station were
complaining that the gas prices went up by 10%. Some people were complaining that
their electric bill will go up by 10%. Other times people riding in domestic air carrier
were complaining that the prices that theyll have to pay would have to go up by 10%.
While all that was being aired, per your presentation and per our own understanding
of the law, thats not true. Its not true that the e-vat law necessarily increased prices
by 10% uniformly isnt it?
ATTY. BANIQUED : No, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : It is not?
ATTY. BANIQUED : Its not, because, Your Honor, there is an Executive Order that
granted the Petroleum companies some subsidy . . . interrupted

J. PANGANIBAN : Thats correct . . .
ATTY. BANIQUED : . . . and therefore that was meant to temper the impact . . .
interrupted
J. PANGANIBAN : . . . mitigating measures . . .
ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : As a matter of fact a part of the mitigating measures would be the
elimination of the Excise Tax and the import duties. That is why, it is not correct to say
that the VAT as to petroleum dealers increased prices by 10%.
ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : And therefore, there is no justification for increasing the retail price
by 10% to cover the E-Vat tax. If you consider the excise tax and the import duties,
the Net Tax would probably be in the neighborhood of 7%? We are not going into
exact figures I am just trying to deliver a point that different industries, different
products, different services are hit differently. So its not correct to say that all prices
must go up by 10%.
ATTY. BANIQUED : Youre right, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : Now. For instance, Domestic Airline companies, Mr. Counsel, are
at present imposed a Sales Tax of 3%. When this E-Vat law took effect the Sales Tax
was also removed as a mitigating measure. So, therefore, there is no justification to
increase the fares by 10% at best 7%, correct?
ATTY. BANIQUED : I guess so, Your Honor, yes.
J. PANGANIBAN : There are other products that the people were complaining on that
first day, were being increased arbitrarily by 10%. And thats one reason among many
others this Court had to issue TRO because of the confusion in the implementation.
Thats why we added as an issue in this case, even if its tangentially taken up by the
pleadings of the parties, the confusion in the implementation of the E-vat. Our people
were subjected to the mercy of that confusion of an across the board increase of
10%, which you yourself now admit and I think even the Government will admit is
incorrect. In some cases, it should be 3% only, in some cases it should be 6%
depending on these mitigating measures and the location and situation of each
product, of each service, of each company, isnt it?
ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor.
J. PANGANIBAN : Alright. So thats one reason why we had to issue a TRO pending
the clarification of all these and we wish the government will take time to clarify all
these by means of a more detailed implementing rules, in case the law is upheld by
this Court. . . .
6

The Court also directed the parties to file their respective Memoranda.
G.R. No. 168056
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed
a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a
10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on
importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use
or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a
uniform provisoauthorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the
following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%),
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
one and one-half percent (1 %).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by
Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section
28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
G.R. No. 168207
On June 9, 2005, Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al., filed a petition
for certiorari likewise assailing the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No.
9337.
Aside from questioning the so-called stand-by authority of the President to increase
the VAT rate to 12%, on the ground that it amounts to an undue delegation of
legislative power, petitioners also contend that the increase in the VAT rate to 12%
contingent on any of the two conditions being satisfied violates the due process
clause embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as it imposes an unfair
and additional tax burden on the people, in that: (1) the 12% increase is ambiguous
because it does not state if the rate would be returned to the original 10% if the
conditions are no longer satisfied; (2) the rate is unfair and unreasonable, as the
people are unsure of the applicable VAT rate from year to year; and (3) the increase

in the VAT rate, which is supposed to be an incentive to the President to raise the
VAT collection to at least 2
4
/5 of the GDP of the previous year, should only be based
on fiscal adequacy.
Petitioners further claim that the inclusion of a stand-by authority granted to the
President by the Bicameral Conference Committee is a violation of the "no-
amendment rule" upon last reading of a bill laid down in Article VI, Section 26(2) of
the Constitution.
G.R. No. 168461
Thereafter, a petition for prohibition was filed on June 29, 2005, by the Association
of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al., assailing the following provisions of R.A. No.
9337:
1) Section 8, amending Section 110 (A)(2) of the NIRC, requiring that the input tax on
depreciable goods shall be amortized over a 60-month period, if the acquisition,
excluding the VAT components, exceeds One Million Pesos (P1, 000,000.00);
2) Section 8, amending Section 110 (B) of the NIRC, imposing a 70% limit on the
amount of input tax to be credited against the output tax; and
3) Section 12, amending Section 114 (c) of the NIRC, authorizing the Government or
any of its political subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including GOCCs, to
deduct a 5% final withholding tax on gross payments of goods and services, which
are subject to 10% VAT under Sections 106 (sale of goods and properties) and 108
(sale of services and use or lease of properties) of the NIRC.
Petitioners contend that these provisions are unconstitutional for being arbitrary,
oppressive, excessive, and confiscatory.
Petitioners argument is premised on the constitutional right of non-deprivation of life,
liberty or property without due process of law under Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution. According to petitioners, the contested sections impose limitations on
the amount of input tax that may be claimed. Petitioners also argue that the input tax
partakes the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited
without due process of law. Petitioners further contend that like any other property or
property right, the input tax credit may be transferred or disposed of, and that by
limiting the same, the government gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there is
no profit or value-added.
Petitioners also believe that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as the
limitation on the creditable input tax if: (1) the entity has a high ratio of input tax; or (2)
invests in capital equipment; or (3) has several transactions with the government, is
not based on real and substantial differences to meet a valid classification.
Lastly, petitioners contend that the 70% limit is anything but progressive, violative of
Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution, and that it is the smaller businesses with
higher input tax to output tax ratio that will suffer the consequences thereof for it
wipes out whatever meager margins the petitioners make.
G.R. No. 168463
Several members of the House of Representatives led by Rep. Francis Joseph G.
Escudero filed this petition forcertiorari on June 30, 2005. They question the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 on the following grounds:
1) Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an undue delegation of legislative
power, in violation of Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution;
2) The Bicameral Conference Committee acted without jurisdiction in deleting the no
pass on provisions present in Senate Bill No. 1950 and House Bill No. 3705; and
3) Insertion by the Bicameral Conference Committee of Sections 27, 28, 34, 116, 117,
119, 121, 125,
7
148, 151, 236, 237 and 288, which were present in Senate Bill No.
1950, violates Article VI, Section 24(1) of the Constitution, which provides that all
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives
G.R. No. 168730
On the eleventh hour, Governor Enrique T. Garcia filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition on July 20, 2005, alleging unconstitutionality of the law on the ground that
the limitation on the creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-registered
establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, thus violating the principle
that tax collection and revenue should be solely allocated for public purposes and
expenditures. Petitioner Garcia further claims that allowing these establishments to
pass on the tax to the consumers is inequitable, in violation of Article VI, Section
28(1) of the Constitution.
RESPONDENTS COMMENT
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of respondents.
Preliminarily, respondents contend that R.A. No. 9337 enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality and petitioners failed to cast doubt on its validity.
Relying on the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA
630 (1994), respondents argue that the procedural issues raised by petitioners, i.e.,
legality of the bicameral proceedings, exclusive origination of revenue measures and
the power of the Senate concomitant thereto, have already been settled. With regard
to the issue of undue delegation of legislative power to the President, respondents

contend that the law is complete and leaves no discretion to the President but to
increase the rate to 12% once any of the two conditions provided therein arise.
Respondents also refute petitioners argument that the increase to 12%, as well as
the 70% limitation on the creditable input tax, the 60-month amortization on the
purchase or importation of capital goods exceedingP1,000,000.00, and the 5% final
withholding tax by government agencies, is arbitrary, oppressive, and confiscatory,
and that it violates the constitutional principle on progressive taxation, among others.
Finally, respondents manifest that R.A. No. 9337 is the anchor of the governments
fiscal reform agenda. A reform in the value-added system of taxation is the core
revenue measure that will tilt the balance towards a sustainable macroeconomic
environment necessary for economic growth.
ISSUES
The Court defined the issues, as follows:
PROCEDURAL ISSUE
Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 24, and
b. Article VI, Section 26(2)
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
1. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and
108 of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article VI, Section 28(2)
2. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of
the NIRC; and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC,
violate the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article III, Section 1
RULING OF THE COURT
As a prelude, the Court deems it apt to restate the general principles and concepts of
value-added tax (VAT), as the confusion and inevitably, litigation, breeds from a
fallacious notion of its nature.
The VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter,
exchange or lease of goods or properties and services.
8
Being an indirect tax on
expenditure, the seller of goods or services may pass on the amount of tax paid to the
buyer,
9
with the seller acting merely as a tax collector.
10
The burden of VAT is
intended to fall on the immediate buyers and ultimately, the end-consumers.
In contrast, a direct tax is a tax for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the
transaction or business it engages in, without transferring the burden to someone
else.
11
Examples are individual and corporate income taxes, transfer taxes, and
residence taxes.
12

In the Philippines, the value-added system of sales taxation has long been in
existence, albeit in a different mode. Prior to 1978, the system was a single-stage tax
computed under the "cost deduction method" and was payable only by the original
sellers. The single-stage system was subsequently modified, and a mixture of the
"cost deduction method" and "tax credit method" was used to determine the value-
added tax payable.
13
Under the "tax credit method," an entity can credit against or
subtract from the VAT charged on its sales or outputs the VAT paid on its purchases,
inputs and imports.
14

It was only in 1987, when President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No.
273, that the VAT system was rationalized by imposing a multi-stage tax rate of 0% or
10% on all sales using the "tax credit method."
15

E.O. No. 273 was followed by R.A. No. 7716 or the Expanded VAT Law,
16
R.A. No.
8241 or the Improved VAT Law,
17
R.A. No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of
1997,
18
and finally, the presently beleaguered R.A. No. 9337, also referred to by
respondents as the VAT Reform Act.
The Court will now discuss the issues in logical sequence.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE
I.
Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 24, and
b. Article VI, Section 26(2)
A. The Bicameral Conference Committee

Petitioners Escudero, et al., and Pimentel, et al., allege that the Bicameral
Conference Committee exceeded its authority by:
1) Inserting the stand-by authority in favor of the President in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of
R.A. No. 9337;
2) Deleting entirely the no pass-on provisions found in both the House and Senate
bills;
3) Inserting the provision imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be
credited against the output tax; and
4) Including the amendments introduced only by Senate Bill No. 1950 regarding other
kinds of taxes in addition to the value-added tax.
Petitioners now beseech the Court to define the powers of the Bicameral Conference
Committee.
It should be borne in mind that the power of internal regulation and discipline are
intrinsic in any legislative body for, as unerringly elucidated by Justice Story, "[i]f the
power did not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of
the nation, either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and order."
19
Thus,
Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the Constitution provides that "each House may determine
the rules of its proceedings." Pursuant to this inherent constitutional power to
promulgate and implement its own rules of procedure, the respective rules of each
house of Congress provided for the creation of a Bicameral Conference Committee.
Thus, Rule XIV, Sections 88 and 89 of the Rules of House of Representatives
provides as follows:
Sec. 88. Conference Committee. In the event that the House does not agree with
the Senate on the amendment to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be
settled by the conference committees of both chambers.
In resolving the differences with the Senate, the House panel shall, as much as
possible, adhere to and support the House Bill. If the differences with the Senate are
so substantial that they materially impair the House Bill, the panel shall report such
fact to the House for the latters appropriate action.
Sec. 89. Conference Committee Reports. . . . Each report shall contain a detailed,
sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject
measure.
. . .
The Chairman of the House panel may be interpellated on the Conference Committee
Report prior to the voting thereon. The House shall vote on the Conference
Committee Report in the same manner and procedure as it votes on a bill on third
and final reading.
Rule XII, Section 35 of the Rules of the Senate states:
Sec. 35. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of
Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be
settled by a conference committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten (10)
days after their composition. The President shall designate the members of the
Senate Panel in the conference committee with the approval of the Senate.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit
statement of the changes in, or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be
signed by a majority of the members of each House panel, voting separately.
A comparative presentation of the conflicting House and Senate provisions and a
reconciled version thereof with the explanatory statement of the conference
committee shall be attached to the report.
. . .
The creation of such conference committee was apparently in response to a problem,
not addressed by any constitutional provision, where the two houses of Congress find
themselves in disagreement over changes or amendments introduced by the other
house in a legislative bill. Given that one of the most basic powers of the legislative
branch is to formulate and implement its own rules of proceedings and to discipline its
members, may the Court then delve into the details of how Congress complies with its
internal rules or how it conducts its business of passing legislation? Note that in the
present petitions, the issue is not whether provisions of the rules of both houses
creating the bicameral conference committee are unconstitutional, but whether the
bicameral conference committee has strictly complied with the rules of both
houses, thereby remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by
Congress.
In the recent case of Farias vs. The Executive Secretary,
20
the Court En
Banc, unanimously reiterated and emphasized its adherence to the "enrolled bill
doctrine," thus, declining therein petitioners plea for the Court to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. Assailed in said case was Congresss creation of two sets of
bicameral conference committees, the lack of records of said committees
proceedings, the alleged violation of said committees of the rules of both houses, and
the disappearance or deletion of one of the provisions in the compromise bill
submitted by the bicameral conference committee. It was argued that such
irregularities in the passage of the law nullified R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act.
Striking down such argument, the Court held thus:

Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House
and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases
reveals the Courts consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to
deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the
petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the
2nd or 3
rd
Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether
House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their
observance the courts have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to
the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor.The Court
reiterates its ruling in Arroyo vs. De Venecia, viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to
the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House
of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that
there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared
that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification
or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that
"Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the
courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number
of members have agreed to a particular measure."
21
(Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing declaration is exactly in point with the present cases, where petitioners
allege irregularities committed by the conference committee in introducing changes or
deleting provisions in the House and Senate bills. Akin to theFarias case,
22
the
present petitions also raise an issue regarding the actions taken by the conference
committee on matters regarding Congress compliance with its own internal rules. As
stated earlier, one of the most basic and inherent power of the legislature is the power
to formulate rules for its proceedings and the discipline of its members. Congress is
the best judge of how it should conduct its own business expeditiously and in the
most orderly manner. It is also the sole
concern of Congress to instill discipline among the members of its conference
committee if it believes that said members violated any of its rules of proceedings.
Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court cannot apply to questions regarding only
the internal operation of Congress, thus, the Court is wont to deny a review of the
internal proceedings of a co-equal branch of government.
Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in the case of Tolentino
vs. Secretary of Finance,
23
the Court already made the pronouncement that "[i]f a
change is desired in the practice [of the Bicameral Conference Committee] it
must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any
constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house."
24
To date,
Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court. It
seems, therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference
committee to be very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action.
Nevertheless, just to put minds at ease that no blatant irregularities tainted the
proceedings of the bicameral conference committees, the Court deems it necessary
to dwell on the issue. The Court observes that there was a necessity for a conference
committee because a comparison of the provisions of House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705
on one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, reveals that there were indeed
disagreements. As pointed out in the petitions, said disagreements were as follows:
House Bill No. 3555 House Bill No.3705 Senate Bill No. 1950
With regard to "Stand-By Authority" in favor of President
Provides for 12% VAT
on every sale of goods
or properties (amending
Sec. 106 of NIRC); 12%
VAT on importation of
goods (amending Sec.
107 of NIRC); and 12%
VAT on sale of services
and use or lease of
properties (amending
Sec. 108 of NIRC)
Provides for 12% VAT in
general on sales of goods
or properties and reduced
rates for sale of certain
locally manufactured goods
and petroleum products
and raw materials to be
used in the manufacture
thereof (amending Sec. 106
of NIRC); 12% VAT on
importation of goods and
reduced rates for certain
imported products including
petroleum products
(amending Sec. 107 of
NIRC); and 12% VAT on
sale of services and use or
lease of properties and a
reduced rate for certain
services including power
generation (amending Sec.
108 of NIRC)
Provides for a single rate
of 10% VAT on sale of
goods or properties
(amending Sec. 106 of
NIRC), 10% VAT on sale
of services including sale
of electricity by
generation companies,
transmission and
distribution companies,
and use or lease of
properties (amending
Sec. 108 of NIRC)
With regard to the "no pass-on" provision
No similar provision Provides that the VAT
imposed on power
generation and on the sale
of petroleum products shall
be absorbed by generation
companies or sellers,
respectively, and shall not
be passed on to consumers
Provides that the VAT
imposed on sales of
electricity by generation
companies and services
of transmission
companies and
distribution companies,
as well as those of
franchise grantees of
electric utilities shall not
apply to residential
end-users. VAT shall be
absorbed by generation,

transmission, and
distribution companies.
With regard to 70% limit on input tax credit
Provides that the input
tax credit for capital
goods on which a VAT
has been paid shall be
equally distributed over
5 years or the
depreciable life of such
capital goods; the input
tax credit for goods and
services other than
capital goods shall not
exceed 5% of the total
amount of such goods
and services; and for
persons engaged in
retail trading of goods,
the allowable input tax
credit shall not exceed
11% of the total amount
of goods purchased.
No similar provision Provides that the input
tax credit for capital
goods on which a VAT
has been paid shall be
equally distributed over 5
years or the depreciable
life of such capital goods;
the input tax credit for
goods and services other
than capital goods shall
not exceed 90% of the
output VAT.
With regard to amendments to be made to NIRC provisions regarding income and excise taxes
No similar provision No similar provision Provided for amendments to
several NIRC provisions regarding
corporate income, percentage,
franchise and excise taxes
The disagreements between the provisions in the House bills and the Senate bill were
with regard to (1) what rate of VAT is to be imposed; (2) whether only the VAT
imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies should not
be passed on to consumers, as proposed in the Senate bill, or both the VAT imposed
on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies and the VAT
imposed on sale of petroleum products should not be passed on to consumers, as
proposed in the House bill; (3) in what manner input tax credits should be limited; (4)
and whether the NIRC provisions on corporate income taxes, percentage, franchise
and excise taxes should be amended.
There being differences and/or disagreements on the foregoing provisions of the
House and Senate bills, the Bicameral Conference Committee was mandated by the
rules of both houses of Congress to act on the same by settling said differences
and/or disagreements. The Bicameral Conference Committee acted on the
disagreeing provisions by making the following changes:
1. With regard to the disagreement on the rate of VAT to be imposed, it would appear
from the Conference Committee Report that the Bicameral Conference Committee
tried to bridge the gap in the difference between the 10% VAT rate proposed by the
Senate, and the various rates with 12% as the highest VAT rate proposed by the
House, by striking a compromise whereby the present 10% VAT rate would be
retained until certain conditions arise,i.e., the value-added tax collection as a
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5%, or
National Government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
1%, when the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance shall
raise the rate of VAT to 12% effective January 1, 2006.
2. With regard to the disagreement on whether only the VAT imposed on electricity
generation, transmission and distribution companies should not be passed on to
consumers or whether both the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission
and distribution companies and the VAT imposed on sale of petroleum products may
be passed on to consumers, the Bicameral Conference Committee chose to settle
such disagreement by altogether deleting from its Report any no pass-on provision.
3. With regard to the disagreement on whether input tax credits should be limited or
not, the Bicameral Conference Committee decided to adopt the position of the House
by putting a limitation on the amount of input tax that may be credited against the
output tax, although it crafted its own language as to the amount of the limitation on
input tax credits and the manner of computing the same by providing thus:
(A) Creditable Input Tax. . . .
. . .
Provided, The input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for use
in trade or business for which deduction for depreciation is allowed under this Code,
shall be spread evenly over the month of acquisition and the fifty-nine (59)
succeeding months if the aggregate acquisition cost for such goods, excluding the
VAT component thereof, exceeds one million Pesos (P1,000,000.00): PROVIDED,
however, that if the estimated useful life of the capital good is less than five (5) years,
as used for depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be spread over such
shorter period: . . .
(B) Excess Output or Input Tax. If at the end of any taxable quarter the output tax
exceeds the input tax, the excess shall be paid by the VAT-registered person. If the
input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding
quarter or quarters: PROVIDED that the input tax inclusive of input VAT carried over
from the previous quarter that may be credited in every quarter shall not exceed
seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT any input
tax attributable to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option be
refunded or credited against other internal revenue taxes, . . .
4. With regard to the amendments to other provisions of the NIRC on corporate
income tax, franchise, percentage and excise taxes, the conference committee
decided to include such amendments and basically adopted the provisions found in
Senate Bill No. 1950, with some changes as to the rate of the tax to be imposed.

Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of Representatives and Senate
Rules, the Bicameral Conference Committee is mandated to settle the differences
between the disagreeing provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill. The term
"settle" is synonymous to "reconcile" and "harmonize."
25
To reconcile or harmonize
disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference Committee may then (a) adopt the
specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b) decide that neither
provisions in the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would
be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise
between the disagreeing provisions.
In the present case, the changes introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee
on disagreeing provisions were meant only to reconcile and harmonize the
disagreeing provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly foreign to
the subject embraced by the original provisions.
The so-called stand-by authority in favor of the President, whereby the rate of 10%
VAT wanted by the Senate is retained until such time that certain conditions arise
when the 12% VAT wanted by the House shall be imposed, appears to be a
compromise to try to bridge the difference in the rate of VAT proposed by the two
houses of Congress. Nevertheless, such compromise is still totally within the subject
of what rate of VAT should be imposed on taxpayers.
The no pass-on provision was deleted altogether. In the transcripts of the
proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee held on May 10, 2005, Sen.
Ralph Recto, Chairman of the Senate Panel, explained the reason for deleting the no
pass-on provision in this wise:
. . . the thinking was just to keep the VAT law or the VAT bill simple. And we were
thinking that no sector should be a beneficiary of legislative grace, neither should any
sector be discriminated on. The VAT is an indirect tax. It is a pass on-tax. And lets
keep it plain and simple. Lets not confuse the bill and put a no pass-on provision.
Two-thirds of the world have a VAT system and in this two-thirds of the globe, I have
yet to see a VAT with a no pass-though provision. So, the thinking of the Senate is
basically simple, lets keep the VAT simple.
26
(Emphasis supplied)
Rep. Teodoro Locsin further made the manifestation that the no pass-on provision
"never really enjoyed the support of either House."
27

With regard to the amount of input tax to be credited against output tax, the Bicameral
Conference Committee came to a compromise on the percentage rate of the
limitation or cap on such input tax credit, but again, the change introduced by the
Bicameral Conference Committee was totally within the intent of both houses to put a
cap on input tax that may be
credited against the output tax. From the inception of the subject revenue bill in the
House of Representatives, one of the major objectives was to "plug a glaring loophole
in the tax policy and administration by creating vital restrictions on the claiming of
input VAT tax credits . . ." and "[b]y introducing limitations on the claiming of tax
credit, we are capping a major leakage that has placed our collection efforts at an
apparent disadvantage."
28

As to the amendments to NIRC provisions on taxes other than the value-added tax
proposed in Senate Bill No. 1950, since said provisions were among those referred to
it, the conference committee had to act on the same and it basically adopted the
version of the Senate.
Thus, all the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee
were germane to subjects of the provisions referred
to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court does not see any grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral
Conference Committee. In the earlier cases of Philippine Judges Association vs.
Prado
29
and Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,
30
the Court recognized the long-
standing legislative practice of giving said conference committee ample latitude for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House. Thus, in
the Tolentino case, it was held that:
. . . it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely
new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the
committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is
no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an
"amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to
the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but
needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the
legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee
acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.
31
(Emphasis
supplied)
B. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution on the
"No-Amendment Rule"
Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution, states:
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
Petitioners argument that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is
allowed to add or delete provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these
had passed three readings is in effect a circumvention of the "no amendment rule"

(Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution), fails to convince the Court to deviate
from its ruling in the Tolentino case that:
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committees Report in these cases must
have undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there
would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modification of the
compromise bill. . . .
Art. VI. 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills
introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference
committee report.
32
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court reiterates here that the "no-amendment rule" refers only to the
procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills
initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the
other house for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision
in a way as to proscribe any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it
would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the other house of Congress would
be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill.
Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the
introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and
modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both
houses of Congress is prohibited.
C. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution on
Exclusive Origination of Revenue Bills
Coming to the issue of the validity of the amendments made regarding the NIRC
provisions on corporate income taxes and percentage, excise taxes. Petitioners refer
to the following provisions, to wit:
Section 27 Rates of Income Tax on Domestic Corporation
28(A)(1) Tax on Resident Foreign Corporation
28(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends
34(B)(1) Inter-corporate Dividends
116 Tax on Persons Exempt from VAT
117 Percentage Tax on domestic carriers and keepers of Garage
119 Tax on franchises
121 Tax on banks and Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries
148 Excise Tax on manufactured oils and other fuels
151 Excise Tax on mineral products
236 Registration requirements
237 Issuance of receipts or sales or commercial invoices
288 Disposition of Incremental Revenue
Petitioners claim that the amendments to these provisions of the NIRC did not at all
originate from the House. They aver that House Bill No. 3555 proposed amendments
only regarding Sections 106, 107, 108, 110 and 114 of the NIRC, while House Bill No.
3705 proposed amendments only to Sections 106, 107,108, 109, 110 and 111 of the
NIRC; thus, the other sections of the NIRC which the Senate amended but which
amendments were not found in the House bills are not intended to be amended by
the House of Representatives. Hence, they argue that since the proposed
amendments did not originate from the House, such amendments are a violation of
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
The argument does not hold water.
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and
3705 that initiated the move for amending provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with
the value-added tax. Upon transmittal of said House bills to the Senate, the Senate
came out with Senate Bill No. 1950 proposing amendments not only to NIRC
provisions on the value-added tax but also amendments to NIRC provisions on other
kinds of taxes. Is the introduction by the Senate of provisions not dealing directly with
the value- added tax, which is the only kind of tax being amended in the House bills,
still within the purview of the constitutional provision authorizing the Senate to
propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the House?
The foregoing question had been squarely answered in the Tolentino case, wherein
the Court held, thus:
. . . To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important
to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . .
At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a
distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the
bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the
law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senates power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose
amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two
houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can
propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the
Constitution to originate in the House.

. . .
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills
of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected
to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the
senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear
on the enactment of such laws.
33
(Emphasis supplied)
Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included
provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage,
excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not
contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be
introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
Furthermore, the amendments introduced by the Senate to the NIRC provisions that
had not been touched in the House bills are still in furtherance of the intent of the
House in initiating the subject revenue bills. The Explanatory Note of House Bill No.
1468, the very first House bill introduced on the floor, which was later substituted by
House Bill No. 3555, stated:
One of the challenges faced by the present administration is the urgent and daunting
task of solving the countrys serious financial problems. To do this, government
expenditures must be strictly monitored and controlled and revenues must be
significantly increased. This may be easier said than done, but our fiscal authorities
are still optimistic the government will be operating on a balanced budget by the year
2009. In fact, several measures that will result to significant expenditure savings have
been identified by the administration. It is supported with a credible package of
revenue measures that include measures to improve tax administration and
control the leakages in revenues from income taxes and the value-added tax
(VAT). (Emphasis supplied)
Rep. Eric D. Singson, in his sponsorship speech for House Bill No. 3555, declared
that:
In the budget message of our President in the year 2005, she reiterated that we all
acknowledged that on top of our agenda must be the restoration of the health of our
fiscal system.
In order to considerably lower the consolidated public sector deficit and eventually
achieve a balanced budget by the year 2009, we need to seize windows of
opportunities which might seem poignant in the beginning, but in the long run
prove effective and beneficial to the overall status of our economy. One such
opportunity is a review of existing tax rates, evaluating the relevance given our
present conditions.
34
(Emphasis supplied)
Notably therefore, the main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of
Representatives is to bring in sizeable revenues for the government
to supplement our countrys serious financial problems, and improve tax
administration and control of the leakages in revenues from income taxes and value-
added taxes. As these house bills were transmitted to the Senate, the latter,
approaching the measures from the point of national perspective, can introduce
amendments within the purposes of those bills. It can provide for ways that would
soften the impact of the VAT measure on the consumer,i.e., by distributing the burden
across all sectors instead of putting it entirely on the shoulders of the consumers. The
sponsorship speech of Sen. Ralph Recto on why the provisions on income tax on
corporation were included is worth quoting:
All in all, the proposal of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means will raise P64.3
billion in additional revenues annually even while by mitigating prices of power,
services and petroleum products.
However, not all of this will be wrung out of VAT. In fact, only P48.7 billion amount is
from the VAT on twelve goods and services. The rest of the tab P10.5 billion- will be
picked by corporations.
What we therefore prescribe is a burden sharing between corporate Philippines and
the consumer. Why should the latter bear all the pain? Why should the fiscal salvation
be only on the burden of the consumer?
The corporate worlds equity is in form of the increase in the corporate income tax
from 32 to 35 percent, but up to 2008 only. This will raise P10.5 billion a year. After
that, the rate will slide back, not to its old rate of 32 percent, but two notches lower, to
30 percent.
Clearly, we are telling those with the capacity to pay, corporations, to bear with this
emergency provision that will be in effect for 1,200 days, while we put our fiscal house
in order. This fiscal medicine will have an expiry date.
For their assistance, a reward of tax reduction awaits them. We intend to keep the
length of their sacrifice brief. We would like to assure them that not because there is a
light at the end of the tunnel, this government will keep on making the tunnel long.
The responsibility will not rest solely on the weary shoulders of the small man. Big
business will be there to share the burden.
35

As the Court has said, the Senate can propose amendments and in fact, the
amendments made on provisions in the tax on income of corporations are germane to
the purpose of the house bills which is to raise revenues for the government.

Likewise, the Court finds the sections referring to other percentage and excise taxes
germane to the reforms to the VAT system, as these sections would cushion the
effects of VAT on consumers. Considering that certain goods and services which
were subject to percentage tax and excise tax would no longer be VAT-exempt, the
consumer would be burdened more as they would be paying the VAT in addition to
these taxes. Thus, there is a need to amend these sections to soften the impact of
VAT. Again, in his sponsorship speech, Sen. Recto said:
However, for power plants that run on oil, we will reduce to zero the present excise
tax on bunker fuel, to lessen the effect of a VAT on this product.
For electric utilities like Meralco, we will wipe out the franchise tax in exchange for a
VAT.
And in the case of petroleum, while we will levy the VAT on oil products, so as not to
destroy the VAT chain, we will however bring down the excise tax on socially
sensitive products such as diesel, bunker, fuel and kerosene.
. . .
What do all these exercises point to? These are not contortions of giving to the left
hand what was taken from the right. Rather, these sprang from our concern of
softening the impact of VAT, so that the people can cushion the blow of higher prices
they will have to pay as a result of VAT.
36

The other sections amended by the Senate pertained to matters of tax administration
which are necessary for the implementation of the changes in the VAT system.
To reiterate, the sections introduced by the Senate are germane to the subject matter
and purposes of the house bills, which is to supplement our countrys fiscal deficit,
among others. Thus, the Senate acted within its power to propose those
amendments.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
I.
Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108
of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article VI, Section 28(2)
A. No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., Pimentel, Jr., et al., and Escudero, et
al. contend in common that Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections
106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC giving the President the stand-by
authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when a certain condition is met,
constitutes undue delegation of the legislative power to tax.
The assailed provisions read as follows:
SEC. 4. Sec. 106 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
SEC. 106. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties.
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every
sale, barter or exchange of goods or properties, a value-added tax equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the gross selling price or gross value in money of the goods or
properties sold, bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid by the seller or
transferor:provided, that the President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-
added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has
been satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or
(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %).
SEC. 5. Section 107 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
SEC. 107. Value-Added Tax on Importation of Goods.
(A) In General. There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every importation
of goods a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) based on the total value
used by the Bureau of Customs in determining tariff and customs duties, plus
customs duties, excise taxes, if any, and other charges, such tax to be paid by the
importer prior to the release of such goods from customs custody: Provided, That
where the customs duties are determined on the basis of the quantity or volume of
the goods, the value-added tax shall be based on the landed cost plus excise taxes, if
any: provided, further, that the President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-
added tax to twelve percent (12%) after any of the following conditions has
been satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or

(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %).
SEC. 6. Section 108 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
SEC. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-
added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or
exchange of services: provided, that the President, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-
added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has
been satisfied.
(i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or
(ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %). (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the President to increase
the VAT rate is a virtual abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because
such delegation is not within the purview of Section 28 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of
the government.
They argue that the VAT is a tax levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services, which cannot be included
within the purview of tariffs under the exempted delegation as the latter refers to
customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and
usually imposed on goods or merchandise imported or exported.
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., further contend that delegating to the
President the legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism. They insist that
accountability, responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions of Congress
and they should not pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also
argue that the law also effectively nullified the Presidents power of control, which
includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the
Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance.
Petitioners Pimentel, et al. aver that the President has ample powers to cause,
influence or create the conditions provided by the law to bring about either or both the
conditions precedent.
On the other hand, petitioners Escudero, et al. find bizarre and revolting the situation
that the imposition of the 12% rate would be subject to the whim of the Secretary of
Finance, an unelected bureaucrat, contrary to the principle of no taxation without
representation. They submit that the Secretary of Finance is not mandated to give a
favorable recommendation and he may not even give his recommendation. Moreover,
they allege that no guiding standards are provided in the law on what basis and as to
how he will make his recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the
President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is
the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
A brief discourse on the principle of non-delegation of powers is instructive.
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its
own constitutionally allocated sphere.
37
A logical
corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of
powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegata non
delegari potest which means "what has been delegated, cannot be delegated."
38
This
doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such as delegated power constitutes not
only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of
his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.
39

With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that
"the Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." The powers which Congress is
prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively,
legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been
described as the authority to make a complete law complete as to the time
when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable and to
determine the expediency of its enactment.
40
Thus, the rule is that in order that a
court may be justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of
legislative power, it must appear that the power involved is purely legislative in nature
that is, one appertaining exclusively to the legislative department. It is the nature of
the power, and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise, which
determines the validity of its delegation.
Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the
following recognized limitations or exceptions:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article
VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation
itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
41
and (b) fixes a
standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
42
A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected.
43
Both tests are intended to
prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed
to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
44

In People vs. Vera,
45
the Court, through eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded
on the concept and extent of delegation of power in this wise:
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or
not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the
judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
. . .
The true distinction, says Judge Ranney, is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no
valid objection can be made.
. . .
It is contended, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after
it leaves the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on
certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the
people of a particular community. In Wayman vs. Southard, the Supreme Court of the
United States ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it
may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which
may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the
existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law.
That is a mental process common to all branches of the
government. Notwithstanding the apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule
prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from
social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial age, the orthodox
pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds
restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States in
the following language speaking of declaration of legislative power to
administrative agencies: The principle which permits the legislature to provide
that the administrative agent may determine when the circumstances are such
as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time
this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the
legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words, the legislature,
as it is its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances, certain
executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other
circumstances, different or no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to
the administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public
policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case
require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed.
The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course,
come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the
Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate. The
legislature, then, may provide that a law shall take effect upon the happening of
future specified contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power
to determine when the specified contingency has arisen. (Emphasis supplied).
46

In Edu vs. Ericta,
47
the Court reiterated:
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to
alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not
there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the
scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislative does not abdicate
its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what
is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may be the only way in
which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been
made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be
done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be
made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the
necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. (Emphasis supplied).
48

Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to
determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the
operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature must
prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority.
49
While the
power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the
enforcement and administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them,
including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation
depends.
50


The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the
enactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillary to
legislation. Thus, the duty of correlating information and making recommendations is
the kind of subsidiary activity which the legislature may perform through its members,
or which it may delegate to others to perform. Intelligent legislation on the
complicated problems of modern society is impossible in the absence of accurate
information on the part of the legislators, and any reasonable method of securing
such information is proper.
51
The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of
government does not require that Congress find for itself
every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself
detailed determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to application of
legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself
properly to investigate.
52

In the present case, the challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the
common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6 which reads as follows:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%),
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
one and one-half percent (1 %).
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a
delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of
the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation
of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or
condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual
matters outside of the control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of
discretion is the fact that the wordshall is used in the common proviso. The use of the
word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
53
Where the law is clear and
unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no
choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.
54

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate
upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty
which cannot be evaded by the President. Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the
word shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does not come into play. It is a
clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a
certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions
by a person or body other than the legislature itself.
The Court finds no merit to the contention of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List,
et al. that the law effectively nullified the Presidents power of control over the
Secretary of Finance by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance. The Court cannot also subscribe to the
position of petitioners
Pimentel, et al. that the word shall should be interpreted to mean may in view of the
phrase "upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance." Neither does the
Court find persuasive the submission of petitioners Escudero, et al. that any
recommendation by the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the
President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter.
When one speaks of the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President, it
simply means that as head of the Department of Finance he is the assistant and
agent of the Chief Executive. The multifarious executive and administrative functions
of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and
the acts of the secretaries of such departments, such as the Department of Finance,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. The Secretary of Finance, as such, occupies a political position and holds
office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be
of the President's bosom confidence" and, in the language of Attorney-General
Cushing, is "subject to the direction of the President."
55

In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence
of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego
of the President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the
power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed
will is to take effect.
56
The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which
legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all
the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to
properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other
pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is
present. His personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of
Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President
cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Congress simply granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the
existence of a fact, namely, whether by December 31, 2005, the value-added tax
collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2
4
/5%) or the national government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%). If
either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative
mandate, must submit such information to the President. Then the 12% VAT rate

must be imposed by the President effective January 1, 2006. There is no undue
delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of
a law. This is constitutionally permissible.
57
Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who
must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is
frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
58

As to the argument of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that delegating to
the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to the principle of republicanism,
the same deserves scant consideration. Congress did not delegate the power to tax
but the mere implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate
to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the
legislative policy. That Congress chose to do so in such a manner is not within the
province of the Court to inquire into, its task being to interpret the law.
59

The insinuation by petitioners Pimentel, et al. that the President has ample powers to
cause, influence or create the conditions to bring about either or both the conditions
precedent does not deserve any merit as this argument is highly speculative. The
Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not
exist at all. The Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances.
When the Court acts on appearances instead of realities, justice and law will be short-
lived.
B. The 12% Increase VAT Rate Does Not Impose an Unfair and Unnecessary
Additional Tax Burden
Petitioners Pimentel, et al. argue that the 12% increase in the VAT rate imposes an
unfair and additional tax burden on the people. Petitioners also argue that the 12%
increase, dependent on any of the 2 conditions set forth in the contested provisions,
is ambiguous because it does not state if the VAT rate would be returned to the
original 10% if the rates are no longer satisfied. Petitioners also argue that such rate
is unfair and unreasonable, as the people are unsure of the applicable VAT rate from
year to year.
Under the common provisos of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, if any of the two
conditions set forth therein are satisfied, the President shall increase the VAT rate to
12%. The provisions of the law are clear. It does not provide for a return to the 10%
rate nor does it empower the President to so revert if, after the rate is increased to
12%, the VAT collection goes below the 2
4
/5 of the GDP of the previous year or that
the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year does not
exceed 1%.
Therefore, no statutory construction or interpretation is needed. Neither can
conditions or limitations be introduced where none is provided for. Rewriting the law is
a forbidden ground that only Congress may tread upon.
60

Thus, in the absence of any provision providing for a return to the 10% rate, which in
this case the Court finds none, petitioners argument is, at best, purely speculative.
There is no basis for petitioners fear of a fluctuating VAT rate because the law itself
does not provide that the rate should go back to 10% if the conditions provided in
Sections 4, 5 and 6 are no longer present. The rule is that where the provision of the
law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court's seeking the
legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
subtraction.
61

Petitioners also contend that the increase in the VAT rate, which was allegedly an
incentive to the President to raise the VAT collection to at least 2
4
/5 of the GDP of the
previous year, should be based on fiscal adequacy.
Petitioners obviously overlooked that increase in VAT collection is not
the only condition. There is another condition,i.e., the national government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 %).
Respondents explained the philosophy behind these alternative conditions:
1. VAT/GDP Ratio > 2.8%
The condition set for increasing VAT rate to 12% have economic or fiscal meaning. If
VAT/GDP is less than 2.8%, it means that government has weak or no capability of
implementing the VAT or that VAT is not effective in the function of the tax collection.
Therefore, there is no value to increase it to 12% because such action will also be
ineffectual.
2. Natl Govt Deficit/GDP >1.5%
The condition set for increasing VAT when deficit/GDP is 1.5% or less means the
fiscal condition of government has reached a relatively sound position or is towards
the direction of a balanced budget position. Therefore, there is no need to increase
the VAT rate since the fiscal house is in a relatively healthy position. Otherwise
stated, if the ratio is more than 1.5%, there is indeed a need to increase the VAT
rate.
62

That the first condition amounts to an incentive to the President to increase the VAT
collection does not render it unconstitutional so long as there is a public purpose for
which the law was passed, which in this case, is mainly to raise revenue. In fact, fiscal
adequacy dictated the need for a raise in revenue.
The principle of fiscal adequacy as a characteristic of a sound tax system was
originally stated by Adam Smith in hisCanons of Taxation (1776), as:
IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the
pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public
treasury of the state.
63


It simply means that sources of revenues must be adequate to meet government
expenditures and their variations.
64

The dire need for revenue cannot be ignored. Our country is in a quagmire of financial
woe. During the Bicameral Conference Committee hearing, then Finance Secretary
Purisima bluntly depicted the countrys gloomy state of economic affairs, thus:
First, let me explain the position that the Philippines finds itself in right now. We are in
a position where 90 percent of our revenue is used for debt service. So, for every
peso of revenue that we currently raise, 90 goes to debt service. Thats interest plus
amortization of our debt. So clearly, this is not a sustainable situation. Thats the first
fact.
The second fact is that our debt to GDP level is way out of line compared to other
peer countries that borrow money from that international financial markets. Our debt
to GDP is approximately equal to our GDP. Again, that shows you that this is not a
sustainable situation.
The third thing that Id like to point out is the environment that we are presently
operating in is not as benign as what it used to be the past five years.
What do I mean by that?
In the past five years, weve been lucky because we were operating in a period of
basically global growth and low interest rates. The past few months, we have seen an
inching up, in fact, a rapid increase in the interest rates in the leading economies of
the world. And, therefore, our ability to borrow at reasonable prices is going to be
challenged. In fact, ultimately, the question is our ability to access the financial
markets.
When the President made her speech in July last year, the environment was not as
bad as it is now, at least based on the forecast of most financial institutions. So, we
were assuming that raising 80 billion would put us in a position where we can then
convince them to improve our ability to borrow at lower rates. But conditions have
changed on us because the interest rates have gone up. In fact, just within this room,
we tried to access the market for a billion dollars because for this year alone, the
Philippines will have to borrow 4 billion dollars. Of that amount, we have borrowed 1.5
billion. We issued last January a 25-year bond at 9.7 percent cost. We were trying to
access last week and the market was not as favorable and up to now we have not
accessed and we might pull back because the conditions are not very good.
So given this situation, we at the Department of Finance believe that we really need
to front-end our deficit reduction. Because it is deficit that is causing the increase of
the debt and we are in what we call a debt spiral. The more debt you have, the more
deficit you have because interest and debt service eats and eats more of your
revenue. We need to get out of this debt spiral. And the only way, I think, we can get
out of this debt spiral is really have a front-end adjustment in our revenue base.
65

The image portrayed is chilling. Congress passed the law hoping for rescue from an
inevitable catastrophe. Whether the law is indeed sufficient to answer the states
economic dilemma is not for the Court to judge. In the Farias case, the Court
refused to consider the various arguments raised therein that dwelt on the wisdom of
Section 14 of R.A. No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), pronouncing that:
. . . policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the
exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court
to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an
enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether
it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative
discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are
matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does
not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.
66

In the same vein, the Court in this case will not dawdle on the purpose of Congress or
the executive policy, given that it is not for the judiciary to "pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation."
67

II.
Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the
NIRC; and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC,
violate the following provisions of the Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and
b. Article III, Section 1
A. Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. argue that Section 8 of
R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110 (A)(2), 110 (B), and Section 12 of R.A. No.
9337, amending Section 114 (C) of the NIRC are arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and
confiscatory. Their argument is premised on the constitutional right against
deprivation of life, liberty of property without due process of law, as embodied in
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
Petitioners also contend that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the law.
The doctrine is that where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked,
considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need
for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent
such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail.
68


Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 110(B) of the NIRC imposes a
limitation on the amount of input tax that may be credited against the output tax. It
states, in part: "[P]rovided, that the input tax inclusive of the input VAT carried over
from the previous quarter that may be credited in every quarter shall not exceed
seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: "
Input Tax is defined under Section 110(A) of the NIRC, as amended, as the value-
added tax due from or paid by a VAT-registered person on the importation of goods
or local purchase of good and services, including lease or use of property, in the
course of trade or business, from a VAT-registered person, and Output Tax is the
value-added taxdue on the sale or lease of taxable goods or properties or services by
any person registered or required to register under the law.
Petitioners claim that the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input
tax that may be claimed. In effect, a portion of the input tax that has already been
paid cannot now be credited against the output tax.
Petitioners argument is not absolute. It assumes that the input tax exceeds 70% of
the output tax, and therefore, the input tax in excess of 70% remains uncredited.
However, to the extent that the input tax is less than 70% of the output tax, then
100% of such input tax is still creditable.
More importantly, the excess input tax, if any, is retained in a businesss books of
accounts and remains creditable in the succeeding quarter/s. This is explicitly allowed
by Section 110(B), which provides that "if the input tax exceeds the output tax, the
excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters." In addition,
Section 112(B) allows a VAT-registered person to apply for the issuance of a tax
credit certificate or refund for any unused input taxes, to the extent that such input
taxes have not been applied against the output taxes. Such unused input tax may be
used in payment of his other internal revenue taxes.
The non-application of the unutilized input tax in a given quarter is not ad infinitum, as
petitioners exaggeratedly contend. Their analysis of the effect of the 70% limitation is
incomplete and one-sided. It ends at the net effect that there will be
unapplied/unutilized inputs VAT for a given quarter. It does not proceed further to the
fact that such unapplied/unutilized input tax may be credited in the subsequent
periods as allowed by the carry-over provision of Section 110(B) or that it may later
on be refunded through a tax credit certificate under Section 112(B).
Therefore, petitioners argument must be rejected.
On the other hand, it appears that petitioner Garcia failed to comprehend the
operation of the 70% limitation on the input tax. According to petitioner, the limitation
on the creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-registered establishments to retain a
portion of the taxes they collect, which violates the principle that tax collection and
revenue should be for public purposes and expenditures
As earlier stated, the input tax is the tax paid by a person, passed on to him by the
seller, when he buys goods. Output tax meanwhile is the tax due to the person when
he sells goods. In computing the VAT payable, three possible scenarios may arise:
First, if at the end of a taxable quarter the output taxes charged by the seller are
equal to the input taxes that he paid and passed on by the suppliers, then no payment
is required;
Second, when the output taxes exceed the input taxes, the person shall be liable for
the excess, which has to be paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);
69
and
Third, if the input taxes exceed the output taxes, the excess shall be carried over to
the succeeding quarter or quarters. Should the input taxes result from zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated transactions, any excess over the output taxes shall instead be
refunded to the taxpayer or credited against other internal revenue taxes, at the
taxpayers option.
70

Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337 however, imposed a 70% limitation on the input tax. Thus,
a person can credit his input tax only up to the extent of 70% of the output tax. In
laymans term, the value-added taxes that a person/taxpayer paid and passed on to
him by a seller can only be credited up to 70% of the value-added taxes that is due to
him on a taxable transaction. There is no retention of any tax collection because the
person/taxpayer has already previously paid the input tax to a seller, and the seller
will subsequently remit such input tax to the BIR. The party directly liable for the
payment of the tax is the seller.
71
What only needs to be done is for the
person/taxpayer to apply or credit these input taxes, as evidenced by receipts,
against his output taxes.
Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. also argue that the input
tax partakes the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or
limited without due process of law.
The input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of
the due process clause. A VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input
tax is a mere statutory privilege.
The distinction between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind
for persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The state may change or
take away rights, which were created by the law of the state, although it may not take
away property, which was vested by virtue of such rights.
72

Under the previous system of single-stage taxation, taxes paid at every level of
distribution are not recoverable from the taxes payable, although it becomes part of
the cost, which is deductible from the gross revenue. When Pres. Aquino issued E.O.
No. 273 imposing a 10% multi-stage tax on all sales, it was then that the crediting of
the input tax paid on purchase or importation of goods and services by VAT-
registered persons against the output tax was introduced.
73
This was adopted by the
Expanded VAT Law (R.A. No. 7716),
74
and The Tax Reform Act of 1997 (R.A. No.

8424).
75
The right to credit input tax as against the output tax is clearly a privilege
created by law, a privilege that also the law can remove, or in this case, limit.
Petitioners also contest as arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and confiscatory, Section
8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 110(A) of the NIRC, which provides:
SEC. 110. Tax Credits.
(A) Creditable Input Tax.
Provided, That the input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for
use in trade or business for which deduction for depreciation is allowed under this
Code, shall be spread evenly over the month of acquisition and the fifty-nine (59)
succeeding months if the aggregate acquisition cost for such goods, excluding the
VAT component thereof, exceeds One million pesos (P1,000,000.00): Provided,
however, That if the estimated useful life of the capital goods is less than five (5)
years, as used for depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be spread over
such a shorter period: Provided, finally, That in the case of purchase of services,
lease or use of properties, the input tax shall be creditable to the purchaser, lessee or
license upon payment of the compensation, rental, royalty or fee.
The foregoing section imposes a 60-month period within which to amortize the
creditable input tax on purchase or importation of capital goods with acquisition cost
of P1 Million pesos, exclusive of the VAT component. Such spread out only poses a
delay in the crediting of the input tax. Petitioners argument is without basis because
the taxpayer is not permanently deprived of his privilege to credit the input tax.
It is worth mentioning that Congress admitted that the spread-out of the creditable
input tax in this case amounts to a 4-year interest-free loan to the government.
76
In
the same breath, Congress also justified its move by saying that the provision was
designed to raise an annual revenue of 22.6 billion.
77
The legislature also dispelled
the fear that the provision will fend off foreign investments, saying that foreign
investors have other tax incentives provided by law, and citing the case of China,
where despite a 17.5% non-creditable VAT, foreign investments were not
deterred.
78
Again, for whatever is the purpose of the 60-month amortization, this
involves executive economic policy and legislative wisdom in which the Court cannot
intervene.
With regard to the 5% creditable withholding tax imposed on payments made by the
government for taxable transactions, Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended
Section 114 of the NIRC, reads:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax.
(C) Withholding of Value-added Tax. The Government or any of its political
subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations (GOCCs) shall, before making payment on account of each purchase of
goods and services which are subject to the value-added tax imposed in Sections 106
and 108 of this Code, deduct and withhold a final value-added tax at the rate of five
percent (5%) of the gross payment thereof: Provided, That the payment for lease or
use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners shall be subject to ten
percent (10%) withholding tax at the time of payment. For purposes of this Section,
the payor or person in control of the payment shall be considered as the withholding
agent.
The value-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10) days
following the end of the month the withholding was made.
Section 114(C) merely provides a method of collection, or as stated by respondents,
a more simplified VAT withholding system. The government in this case is constituted
as a withholding agent with respect to their payments for goods and services.
Prior to its amendment, Section 114(C) provided for different rates of value-added
taxes to be withheld -- 3% on gross payments for purchases of goods; 6% on gross
payments for services supplied by contractors other than by public works contractors;
8.5% on gross payments for services supplied by public work contractors; or 10% on
payment for the lease or use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners.
Under the present Section 114(C), these different rates, except for the 10% on lease
or property rights payment to nonresidents, were deleted, and a uniform rate of 5% is
applied.
The Court observes, however, that the law the used the word final. In tax
usage, final, as opposed to creditable, means full. Thus, it is provided in Section
114(C): "final value-added tax at the rate of five percent (5%)."
In Revenue Regulations No. 02-98, implementing R.A. No. 8424 (The Tax Reform Act
of 1997), the concept of final withholding tax on income was explained, to wit:
SECTION 2.57. Withholding of Tax at Source
(A) Final Withholding Tax. Under the final withholding tax system the amount of
income tax withheld by the withholding agent is constituted as full and final
payment of the income tax due from the payee on the said income. The liability for
payment of the tax rests primarily on the payor as a withholding agent. Thus, in case
of his failure to withhold the tax or in case of underwithholding, the deficiency tax shall
be collected from the payor/withholding agent.
(B) Creditable Withholding Tax. Under the creditable withholding tax system, taxes
withheld on certain income payments are intended to equal or at least approximate
the tax due of the payee on said income. Taxes withheld on income payments
covered by the expanded withholding tax (referred to in Sec. 2.57.2 of these
regulations) and compensation income (referred to in Sec. 2.78 also of these
regulations) are creditable in nature.

As applied to value-added tax, this means that taxable transactions with the
government are subject to a 5% rate, which constitutes as full payment of the tax
payable on the transaction. This represents the net VAT payable of the seller. The
other 5% effectively accounts for the standard input VAT (deemed input VAT), in lieu
of the actual input VAT directly or attributable to the taxable transaction.
79

The Court need not explore the rationale behind the provision. It is clear that
Congress intended to treat differently taxable transactions with the
government.
80
This is supported by the fact that under the old provision, the 5% tax
withheld by the government remains creditable against the tax liability of the seller or
contractor, to wit:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax.
(C) Withholding of Creditable Value-added Tax. The Government or any of its
political subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned or
controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall, before making payment on account of each
purchase of goods from sellers and services rendered by contractors which are
subject to the value-added tax imposed in Sections 106 and 108 of this Code, deduct
and withhold the value-added tax due at the rate of three percent (3%) of the gross
payment for the purchase of goods and six percent (6%) on gross receipts for
services rendered by contractors on every sale or installment payment which shall
be creditable against the value-added tax liability of the seller or contractor:
Provided, however, That in the case of government public works contractors, the
withholding rate shall be eight and one-half percent (8.5%): Provided, further, That
the payment for lease or use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners
shall be subject to ten percent (10%) withholding tax at the time of payment. For this
purpose, the payor or person in control of the payment shall be considered as the
withholding agent.
The valued-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10)
days following the end of the month the withholding was made. (Emphasis supplied)
As amended, the use of the word final and the deletion of the word creditable exhibits
Congresss intention to treat transactions with the government differently. Since it has
not been shown that the class subject to the 5% final withholding tax has been
unreasonably narrowed, there is no reason to invalidate the provision. Petitioners, as
petroleum dealers, are not the only ones subjected to the 5% final withholding tax. It
applies to all those who deal with the government.
Moreover, the actual input tax is not totally lost or uncreditable, as petitioners believe.
Revenue Regulations No. 14-2005 or the Consolidated Value-Added Tax Regulations
2005 issued by the BIR, provides that should the actual input tax exceed 5% of gross
payments, the excess may form part of the cost. Equally, should the actual input tax
be less than 5%, the difference is treated as income.
81

Petitioners also argue that by imposing a limitation on the creditable input tax, the
government gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there is no profit or value-
added.
Petitioners stance is purely hypothetical, argumentative, and again, one-sided. The
Court will not engage in a legal joust where premises are what ifs, arguments,
theoretical and facts, uncertain. Any disquisition by the Court on this point will only be,
as Shakespeare describes life in Macbeth,
82
"full of sound and fury, signifying
nothing."
Whats more, petitioners contention assumes the proposition that there is no profit or
value-added. It need not take an astute businessman to know that it is a matter of
exception that a business will sell goods or services without profit or value-added. It
cannot be overstressed that a business is created precisely for profit.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that "no person or class of
persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances."
83

The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the
purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of
taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the
methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the States power is entitled to
presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power
absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
84

Petitioners point out that the limitation on the creditable input tax if the entity has a
high ratio of input tax, or invests in capital equipment, or has several transactions with
the government, is not based on real and substantial differences to meet a valid
classification.
The argument is pedantic, if not outright baseless. The law does not make any
classification in the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied or
the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection.
Petitioners alleged distinctions are based on variables that bear different
consequences. While the implementation of the law may yield varying end results
depending on ones profit margin and value-added, the Court cannot go beyond what
the legislature has laid down and interfere with the affairs of business.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on
all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons
or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in
these same particulars.
85

Petitioners brought to the Courts attention the introduction of Senate Bill No. 2038 by
Sens. S.R. Osmea III and Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal on June 6, 2005, and

House Bill No. 4493 by Rep. Eric D. Singson. The proposed legislation seeks to
amend the 70% limitation by increasing the same to 90%. This, according to
petitioners, supports their stance that the 70% limitation is arbitrary and confiscatory.
On this score, suffice it to say that these are still proposed legislations. Until Congress
amends the law, and absent any unequivocal basis for its unconstitutionality, the 70%
limitation stays.
B. Uniformity and Equitability of Taxation
Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution reads:
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same
class shall be taxed at the same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different
amounts provided that the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere with all
people at all times.
86

In this case, the tax law is uniform as it provides a standard rate of 0% or 10% (or
12%) on all goods and services. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending
Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC, provide for a rate of 10% (or
12%) on sale of goods and properties, importation of goods, and sale of services and
use or lease of properties. These same sections also provide for a 0% rate on certain
sales and transaction.
Neither does the law make any distinction as to the type of industry or trade that will
bear the 70% limitation on the creditable input tax, 5-year amortization of input tax
paid on purchase of capital goods or the 5% final withholding tax by the government.
It must be stressed that the rule of uniform taxation does not deprive Congress of the
power to classify subjects of taxation, and only demands uniformity within the
particular class.
87

R.A. No. 9337 is also equitable. The law is equipped with a threshold margin. The
VAT rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) does not apply to sales of goods or services with
gross annual sales or receipts not exceeding P1,500,000.00.
88
Also, basic marine and
agricultural food products in their original state are still not subject to the tax,
89
thus
ensuring that prices at the grassroots level will remain accessible. As was stated
in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan:
90

The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or
services by persons engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sales
exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from
its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine products,
so that the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as they are from the
incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the
general public.
It is admitted that R.A. No. 9337 puts a premium on businesses with low profit
margins, and unduly favors those with high profit margins. Congress was not
oblivious to this. Thus, to equalize the weighty burden the law entails, the law, under
Section 116, imposed a 3% percentage tax on VAT-exempt persons under Section
109(v), i.e., transactions with gross annual sales and/or receipts not exceeding P1.5
Million. This acts as a equalizer because in effect, bigger businesses that qualify for
VAT coverage and VAT-exempt taxpayers stand on equal-footing.
Moreover, Congress provided mitigating measures to cushion the impact of the
imposition of the tax on those previously exempt. Excise taxes on petroleum
products
91
and natural gas
92
were reduced. Percentage tax on domestic carriers was
removed.
93
Power producers are now exempt from paying franchise tax.
94

Aside from these, Congress also increased the income tax rates of corporations, in
order to distribute the burden of taxation. Domestic, foreign, and non-resident
corporations are now subject to a 35% income tax rate, from a previous
32%.
95
Intercorporate dividends of non-resident foreign corporations are still subject
to 15% final withholding tax but the tax credit allowed on the corporations domicile
was increased to 20%.
96
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) is not exempt from income taxes anymore.
97
Even the sale by an artist of
his works or services performed for the production of such works was not spared.
All these were designed to ease, as well as spread out, the burden of taxation, which
would otherwise rest largely on the consumers. It cannot therefore be gainsaid that
R.A. No. 9337 is equitable.
C. Progressivity of Taxation
Lastly, petitioners contend that the limitation on the creditable input tax is anything but
regressive. It is the smaller business with higher input tax-output tax ratio that will
suffer the consequences.
Progressive taxation is built on the principle of the taxpayers ability to pay. This
principle was also lifted from Adam Smiths Canons of Taxation, and it states:
I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in
proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the
state.
Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up depending on the resources of the
person affected.
98

The VAT is an antithesis of progressive taxation. By its very nature, it is regressive.
The principle of progressive taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch
as the VAT paid by the consumer or business for every goods bought or services
enjoyed is the same regardless of income. In

other words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an income, whether big or small.
The disparity lies in the income earned by a person or profit margin marked by a
business, such that the higher the income or profit margin, the smaller the portion of
the income or profit that is eaten by VAT. A converso, the lower the income or profit
margin, the bigger the part that the VAT eats away. At the end of the day, it is really
the lower income group or businesses with low-profit margins that is always hardest
hit.
Nevertheless, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes,
like the VAT. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive
system of taxation." The Court stated in the Tolentino case, thus:
The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the
VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation. The constitutional provision has been interpreted to
mean simply that direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible,
indirect taxes should be minimized. (E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. 1977)) Indeed, the mandate to Congress is not to
prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales taxes, which
perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have been prohibited with the
proclamation of Art. VIII, 17 (1) of the 1973 Constitution from which the present Art.
VI, 28 (1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive.
Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is
difficult, if not impossible, to avoid them by imposing such taxes according to the
taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case of the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive
effects of this imposition by providing for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. No.
7716, 3, amending 102 (b) of the NIRC), while granting exemptions to other
transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, 4 amending 103 of the NIRC)
99

CONCLUSION
It has been said that taxes are the lifeblood of the government. In this case, it is just
an enema, a first-aid measure to resuscitate an economy in distress. The Court is
neither blind nor is it turning a deaf ear on the plight of the masses. But it does not
have the panacea for the malady that the law seeks to remedy. As in other cases, the
Court cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional simply because of its yokes.
Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong there is a remedy,
and that the judiciary should stand ready to afford relief. There are undoubtedly many
wrongs the judicature may not correct, for instance, those involving political
questions. . . .
Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the repository
of remedies for all political or social ills; We should not forget that the Constitution has
judiciously allocated the powers of government to three distinct and separate
compartments; and that judicial interpretation has tended to the preservation of the
independence of the three, and a zealous regard of the prerogatives of each, knowing
full well that one is not the guardian of the others and that, for official wrong-doing,
each may be brought to account, either by impeachment, trial or by the ballot box.
100

The words of the Court in Vera vs. Avelino
101
holds true then, as it still holds true now.
All things considered, there is no raison d'tre for the unconstitutionality of R.A. No.
9337.
WHEREFORE, Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the petitions in G.R.
Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463, and 168730, are hereby DISMISSED.
There being no constitutional impediment to the full enforcement and implementation
of R.A. No. 9337, the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 1, 2005
is LIFTED upon finality of herein decision.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice