10.14 United States v.
Nixon Issue: Whether the separation of powers allow for the settlement of this
Facts: In June 1972, five men armed with cameras and bugging equipment
were arrested inside the Democratic National Committee’s offices in the
Watergate complex in Washington, D.C. Police soon discovered that the
burglars worked, directly or indirectly for the Committee to Re-elect the
President. President Nixon and leaders of his campaign denied any connection
with the incident. The five men were convicted of burglary, along with E.
Howard Hunt, Jr., a former Nixon aide, and G. Gordon Liddy, a lawyer for the
Committee to Re-elect the President. Shortly afterward, the presiding judge
received a letter from one of the convicted men. It spoke of payoffs to the
burglars in return for their silence; the men had perjured themselves to protect
others involved in the break-in. In 1973, a Senate select committee began an
investigation, and it became clear that top members of the Nixon
administration were involved in a cover-up of the break-in and several other
illegal actions. It was also discovered that Nixon had installed a taping system
that automatically recorded all of his conversations with his advisors. A
special prosecutor appointed to probe the Watergate scandal; subpoenaed the
tapes. Nixon refused to released them, claiming they were protected under
privilege. Nixon eventually released some of the tapes, but portions of them
had been erased. Finally, another special prosecutor asked the United States
Supreme Court to compel Nixon to release all of the tapes in their entirety.
dispute to be settled by the Judicial Branch.
Ruling: The Court ruled unanimously that President Richard Nixon had to
surrender the tapes. Chief Justice Warren Burger delivered the opinion of the
court. Burger wrote “The impediment that an absolute, unqualified executive
privilege would place in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the
Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict
with the function of the courts.
Main Point: The court has the authority to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia
Main Point: The law stands as it is, even though it may have been passed in
violation of the rules of procedure of the congress – because it was approved
by the assembly and the president. The court cannot touch on political
questions; it cannot declare an act of legislature void on account of non-
compliance with the rules made by itself.
Facts: An amendment to the National Internal Revenue Code was introduced
to the House of Representatives involving taxations on the manufacture and
sale of beer and cigarettes. This was later passed accordingly and brought to
the House of Senate. Upon the interpellation on the second reading, herein
petitioner moved for adjournment for lack of quorum which is constitutionally
needed to conduct business. Petitioner’s motion was defeated and was
railroaded. The bill was then signed into law by President Fidel Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not the law passed on violation on the constitutional
mandate.
Held: There is no rule of the House concerned that quorum shall be
determined by viva voce or nominal voting. The Constitution does not require
that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to
vote, except only on the following instances upon the last and the third
readings of the bill, at the request of 1/5 of the Members present and in
passing a bill over the veto of the President. Second, there is obviousness on
the part of the petitioner to delay the business of the House, thus eliminating
the alleged skullduggery on part of the accused. Third, the enrolled bill
doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself conclusive thus legally binding
provided it is in harmony with the constitution. Lastly, the court upheld
principle of separation of powers, which herein, is applicable for the
legislative branch for it has exercised its power without grave abuse of
discretion resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
10.17 Infotech Foundation v. COMELEC, GR No. 159139
Facts: COMELEC approved Resolution No. 6074 which awarded Phase II of
the Modernization Project of the Commission to “Mega Pacific Consortium”
(MPC,) an entity that had not participated in the bidding, for the automation of
the counting and canvassing of the ballots in the 2004 elections. Despite this
grant, the poll body signed the actual automation Contract with Mega Pacific
eSolutions, Inc., a company that joined the bidding but had not met the
eligibility requirements. The proferred computer hardware and software even
if, at the time of the award, they had undeniably failed to pass eight critical
requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of elections
Issue: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
Ruling: Yes. There is grave abuse of discretion (1) when an act is done
contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or (2) when it is
executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or
personal bias. In the present case, the Commission on Elections approved the
assailed Resolution and awarded the subject Contract not only in clear
violation of law and jurisprudence, but also in reckless disregard of its own
bidding rules and procedure.
*main points underscored
MATTEL, INC.
vs.
EMMA FRANCISCO
Petitioner alleged that private respondent Uy's "Barbie" trademark as the latter
was confusingly similar to its trademark on dolls, doll clothes and doll
accessories, toys and other similar commercial products. Mattel argues that its
products are items related to Uy's products; hence, identical trademarks should
not be used where the possibility of confusion as to source or origin of the
product is certain. It also contends that that the Director General of the IPO
has the power to act on a pending trademark application considered as
"withdrawn" for failure to file the DAU, and that by adopting an exactly
identical mark, in spelling and style, Uy should be presumed to have intended
to cash in or ride on the goodwill and widespread recognition enjoyed by
Mattel's mark. On the other hand, Uy submits that the case has become moot
and academic since the records of the IPO will show that no Declaration of
Actual Use (DAU) was filed on or before December 1, 2001; thus,
he is deemed to have abandoned his trademark application for failure to
comply with the mandatory filing of the DAU.
Whether or not the judiciary resolve moot cases.
RULING: A moot case is one that ceases to present justiciable controversy by the virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally the courts decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss it on the ground of
mootness.
MAIN POINT: The courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if first, there
has been a grave violation of the Constitution. Second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved. Third, when the constitutional issue
raised requires formulation principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public. Fourth, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
VINUYA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
MAINPOINT:
The Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether
to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.
FACTS:
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing
aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during
the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive
Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a
claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. But
officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and
took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for
compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the
Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not
espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive
Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners’ claims against Japan.
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
Garcia v. BOI
Facts: The Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, a foreign corporation, was
attracted to situate its petrochemical plant in Bataan by “initial inducements
and other circumstances” Subsequently, however, it asked the Board of
Investments to be allowed to move to Batangas on the ground that it has the
right of final choice of plant site. On that basis, the BOI yielded. The
capitulation of the BOI is challenged as abuse of discretion.
Issue: whether or not BOI committed grave abuse of discretion when it yield
to the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding.
Ruling: Yes. In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant’s
remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to
Batangas except a near absolute discretion given by the BOI to investors not
only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for
reasons which remain murky to say the least.
The BOI capitulation is adverse to Philippine interest contrary to the thrust of
the Constitution.
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner, 
vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent
Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of
the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached
on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
The crime of raping his ten-year old either daughter or step daughter having
been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in
effect, petitioner was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite
the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered that by
granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is
an executive function.
HELD: No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the
source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to
control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
Main Point: The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential
aspect of jurisdiction. The powers of the Executive, the legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude for the simple
reason that there is no higher right than the right of life. To contend that only
the Executive can protect the right of life of an accused after his final
conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of
three branches of our government. (Bernas)
10.24 Liban v. Gordon, 639 SCRA 709
FACTS: Respondent filed a motion for partial recommendation on a decision
which ruled that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
did not disqualify him from being a Senator, and that the charter creating
PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private corporation and the
Congress is precluded by the Constitution to create such. The Court then
ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the SEC as a private corporation.
Respondent takes exception to the second part of the ruling, which addressed
the constitutionality of the statute which was R.A. 95 creating the PNRC as a
private corporation. Respondent avers that the issue of constitutionality was
only touched upon in the issue of locus standi. It is a rule that the
constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is not the lis mota of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the Court to have ruled on the
constitutionality of the PNRC statute.
HELD: Yes, it has been consistently held in Jurisprudence that the Court
should exercise judicial restraint when it comes to issues of constitutionality
where it is not the lis mota of the case. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 95, as
amended, the charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, was not raised by
the parties as an issue and should not have been passed upon by this Court.
The structure of the PNRC is sui generis being neither strictly private nor
public in nature. R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety.
Bayan Muna vs. Romulo
641 SCRA 244
Facts: The International Criminal Court (ICC) under the Rome Statute was
established with "the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes of international concern and shall be complementary to
the national criminal jurisdictions”. On May 9, 2003, the Philippines entered
into a Non-Surrender Agreement with United States of America (USA) which
aims to protect what it refers to and defines as "persons" of the RP and US
from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.
Issue: WON there is jurisdictional conflict between the Philippines, as party to
the non-surrender agreement, and the International Criminal Court.
Ruling:
Contrary to petitioner’s pretense, the Agreement does not contravene
or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going
against each other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the
principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the International
Criminal Court. As aptly pointed out by respondents and admitted by
petitioners, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is to "be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states]."
Furthermore, under the premise of complementarity, the primary jurisdiction
for any case lies first with the state’s national judicial systems. A state is given
a chance to exercise complementarity by informing the International Criminal
Court of its choice to investigate and prosecute its own nationals through its
own domestic courts. Thus, the State has the primary jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute its own nationals in its custody who may have
committed the grave international crimes specified in the Rome Statute.
Main point: Under the premise of complementarity, the primary jurisdiction
for any case lies first with the state’s national judicial systems.
Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Margarito Teves, et al., G.R. No.
176579, June 28, 2011
I. THE FACTS
This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of Philippine
Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the government of
the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency Privatization
Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of
First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based investment
management and holding company and a shareholder of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).
The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also involved an
indirect sale of 12 million shares (or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding
common shares) of PLDT owned by PTIC to First Pacific. With the this sale,
First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to
37 percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners
in PLDT to about 81.47%. This, according to the petitioner, violates Section
11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign
ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%.
II. THE ISSUE
Does the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to
the total common shares only, or to the total outstanding capital stock
(combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a
public utility?
III. THE RULING
the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in
the election of directors, then the term “capital” shall include such preferred
shares because the right to participate in the control or management of the
corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors.
In short, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.
Mantruste Systems v CA
FACTS: Mantruste System, Inc. (MSI) entered into an interim lease
agreement with the Development Bank of the Philippines — owner of the
Bayview Plaza Hotel — wherein the former would operate the hotel for “a
minimum of three months or until such time that the said properties are sold to
MSI or other third parties by DBP.              
On October 28, Salgado, speaking for MSI, wrote APT informing the
latter of the alleged “legal lien” over the hotel to the amount of P10,000,000
(should be P12,000,000). Moreover, he demanded that the Trust consider MSI
a “very preferred” bidder. Nevertheless, on November 4, 1987 herein private
respondent allegedly prepared to submit its bid to the APT for P95,000,000.00
in cash or P120,000,000 in installment terms. On the same occasion, however,
MSI asked the Trust for clarification on the following points: (1) whether APT
had a clean title over the property; (2) whether the Trust knew the hotel had
back taxes; (3) who should pay the tax arrears; and (4) whether MSI’S
advances made in behalf of DBP would be treated as part of the bid offer.
On November 13, 1981, herein private respondent filed a complaint
with respondent lower court — docketed as Civil Case No. 18319 — praying
among others for: (1) the issuance of a restraining order enjoining APT from
approving the winning bid and awarding the Bayview property to private
petitioners, and from ejecting MSI from the property or from terminating the
contract of lease; (2) the award of the Bayview property in favor of MSI as the
highest bidder. On December 15, 1937, the lower court, as already said,
granted the writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: WON Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A is unconstitutional as it
impinges upon judicial power in violation of Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the
Constitution
RULING: No. Said provision does not infringe any provision of the
Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of courts “to settle actual
controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government” (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under
the system of separation of powers set up in the Constitution, the power of the
courts over the other branches and instrumentalities of the Government is
limited only to the determination of “whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion (by them) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” in
the exercise of their authority and in the performance of their assigned tasks
(Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Courts may not substitute their
judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its
functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the
acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.
11.4 Malaga vs. Penachos, GR No. 86995
FACT: The petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against
the officers of PBAC of The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) for
their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion
in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They submitted their required documents
on December 2 ,1988 the last day set for the submission and was even
published in the Western Visayas Daily the deadline. However, their
submission was still considered late. The RTC issued a restraining order
prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the project. The
defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the
court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under
Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject
to the provisions of PD 1818?
HELD: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government
instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by
P.D. 1818.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is
covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present
surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to
the bidding and the award of the project. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered: a) upholding the restraining order dated December 12, 1988, as not
covered by the prohibition in P.D. 1818; b) ordering the chairman and the
members of the PBAC board of trustees, to each pay separately to petitioners
nominal damages of P10,000.00 each; and c) removing the said chairman and
members from the PBAC board of trustees, or whoever among them is still
incumbent therein, for their malfeasance in office. Costs against PBAC.
11.5 Lupangco v. CA, 160 SCRA 848 (1988)
Facts: Oct 6, 1986, (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 "Additional Instructions
to Examines," to all who will take the licensure examinations in accountancy.
“No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like
conducted by, or shall receive any
hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or
any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or
employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the
three days immediately proceeding every examination day including
examination day.”
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions
prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.
“Oct 16, 196, petitioners et al, filed an injuction suit against PRC, in the RTC.
RTC Held: that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent
commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it
found to be unconstitutional. PRC to CA– Appeal
CA HELD
: RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement
of the Resolution No.105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the
Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Courtare co-
equal bodies. “That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at
least a co-equal body with the Regional Trial Court is beyond question, and
co-equal bodies have no power to control each other or interfere with each
other's acts. 3”
Issue: Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional
Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the
administrative acts of the latter.
Ruling: The SC ruled that RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No.
86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution. This is
because from Presidential Decree No. 223, the Professional Regulation
Commission is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and
coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the
Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now
the Regional Trial Court).
Main Point: Whether or not courts of general jurisdiction have authority over
administrative agencies depend on the statutes governing the subject. Where
the statutes designates the court having jurisdiction other than courts of
general jurisdiction, then courts of general jurisdiction do not have authority.
But where there is silence, the general rule applies.
11.6 Radiowealth vs Agregado
Facts: A Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker were bought and
installed in the second and third floor of the Malacanang Annex which houses
the Supreme Court.
The Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee (appointed by the
President) disapproved of the purchase and its installation invoking EO 302
which discontinues open market purchases. Petitioners also contend that
judicial functions do not include purchase of property. Radio wealth, Inc.
(vendor) is now requesting that the payment be approved however, the
Auditor of the SC refused to countersign the warrant for payment
Issue: Whether or not the Auditor General, as part of the Executive
Department, was correct in his decision to deny the payment of the equipment
that the Supreme Court bought from Radiowealth.
Ruling: No, the Auditor General made a mistake in his decision. According to
Section 3 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Judiciary shall enjoy
fiscal autonomy which means that the appropriations for the Judiciary may not
be reduced and shall be automatically and regularly released. The said fiscal
autonomy is grated to the Supreme Court in order to strengthen its
independence.
In the absence of express and valid legislation, the Auditor General may not
question the court’s expenditures except when they are irregular, unnecessary,
excessive and extravagant. Outside of these exemptions his duty to approve
the payments is mandatory; and even when the objection is that the
expenditures are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant, his
decisions are not final.
Main point: Judiciary has the power to maintain its existence and do whatever
is necessary to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and ensure
effectiveness in the administration of justice.
Bengzon v. Drilon
FACTS: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the
Supreme Court and the Lower Court’s General Appropriations were vetoed by
the President because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations
for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase
of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of
Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional Commission.
ISSUES: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the
General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
RULING: The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to
dictating to the Judiciary of its funds should be utilized, which is clearly
repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the
Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in
the appropriations law. The petition is granted and the questioned veto is
illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid and subsisting.
MAIN POINT:
Fiscal autonomy is granted to the Supreme Court to strengthen its
independence. Thus, any appropriations for Judiciary may not be reduced by
the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year, and after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
FORTICH vs. CORONA | GR 131457 | ART. III, Sec. 4, par. 3
FACTS: In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and
intervenors pray that this case be referred to the Supreme Court en banc. They
contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration were
resolved by a vote of two-two, but the required number to carry a decision is
three votes which was not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to
and be decided by the Supreme Court en banc, relying on the following
constitutional provision.
RULING: With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only
cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required
number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as
in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the provision
speaks only of case and not matter. The reason is simple. The Article VIII,
Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie
in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is
to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been
decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration,
the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting
does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand
in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary
vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the
motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered
and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in
the Resolution of November 17, 1998.
11.10 People v. Ebio, GR 147750, Sept. 29, 2004
FACTS: Gerry Ebio was a convicted rapist who abused his own
daughter, Dory Ebio. On April 2000, Dory Ebio was preparing to sleep in the
“sala”, then Gerry who was at that time drunk, approached her and told her to
transfer to the bedroom because they were already crowded in the “sala”.
Armed with a six inch blade-like instrument, Gerry ordered her to undress and
threatened to kill her if she would not comply. Afraid of the threat, she took
off her shorts and panty. Gerry also took off his shorts, mounted her and had
carnal knowledge of her. She felt pain and cried the whole time. The private
complainant was silent during the sexual assault because of the threat to her
life. After the assault she put on her panty and shorts lay down and continued
crying inside the room.
On 14 October 2002, Gerry Ebio was convicted by the
Supreme Court of qualified rape and sentenced him to suffer death penalty.
The PAO moved for reconsideration on the ground that the Court lacked
quorum when the case was deliberated as it appears that the decision was only
decided between seven justices. In a Resolution on September 7, 2004, the
Supreme Court granted the motion for reconsideration, ruling that there is no
question that the Court’s decision in the case was concurred in majority of the
members and the punishment was in fact unanimously decided upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the seven concurring justices constituted a
quorum of a 14-member court?
RULING: Yes. (The constitution does not expressly state the number of
justices required to present to constitute a quorum of the court en banc) BUT
in case of doubt in a criminal case, especially where the punishment imposed
is death penalty, THE DOUBT SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF
THE ACCUSED. The case should be readmitted for deliberation of the Court
en banc.
MAIN POINT:Since it was a capital criminal case, the court ruled that there
should be eight justices (not 7 or merely half of the 14 justices).
Firestone Ceramic V. CA
FACTS: The cases at bar involve a vast tract of land with an area of around
ninety-nine (99) hectares presumptively belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, which land had been adjudicated to private individuals by a court
alleged to be without jurisdiction. Since the validity of the said decision and
the original certificate of title as well as transfer certificates of title issued
pursuant thereto hinges on the classification of subject area at the time it was
so adjudicated, determination of the validity of the disposition of the court is
in order.
ISSUE: Whether the Court En Banc acted without merit on its decision.
HELD: The Court En Banc entertains a case for its resolution and disposition,
it does so without implying that the Division of origin is incapable of
rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court simply means that
the nature of the cases calls for en banc attention and consideration. Neither
can it be concluded that the Court has taken undue advantage of sheer voting
strength. It was merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable
opinion of the majority of its actual membership - that, indeed, subject cases
are of sufficient importance meriting the action and decision of the whole
Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil that all the members of this highest Court
of the land are always embued with the noblest of intentions in interpreting
and applying the germane provisions of law, jurisprudence, rules and
Resolutions of the Court to the end that public interest be duly safeguarded
and rule of law be observed.
Mainpoint: The Court En Banc Decisions or resolutions of a division of the
court, when concurred in by majority of its members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon is a decision or
resolution of the Supreme Court. (Firestone Ceramics v. CA, 2000)
Tano vs. Socrates 278 SCRA 154 (1997)
Facts: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City enacted
Ordinance No. 15-92 banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside
Puerto Princesa City effective for five years. To implement the ordinance, the
City Mayor of Puerto Princesa City issued Office Order No. 23 dated January
23, 1993, ordering inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster
being shipped out from air and sea. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Provincial Government of Palawan, enacted Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance
No. 2, series of 1993, prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying,
selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a
period of five years. Petitioners challenged the aforementioned ordinances and
office order on the ground that it deprived them of due process of law, their
livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade. There
are two sets of petitioners. The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is
to prevent the prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until
the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall
have been resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim that being
fishermen or marine merchants, they would be adversely affected by the
ordinances. As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously
one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a declaration that the Ordinances
in question are a "nullity for being unconstitutional."
Issue: Whether Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to entertain a petition
for declaratory relief.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court does not possess original jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved. The
Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ruled that
the challenged ordinances do not suffer any infirmity, both under the
Constitution and applicable laws, including the Local Government Code.
There is no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or
marginal fisherman.
11.14 Angara v. Electoral Commission
Facts: Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor
were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly
for the 1st District of Tayabas province. On October 17, 1935, the provincial
board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National
Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of
office on November 15. On Dec 3 rd, National Assembly passed the Resolution
No. 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On December 8,
Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the
election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the National
Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day
of the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly. On December, Angara motion to
dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed
period. The Electoral Commission denied Angara’s petition. Angara prayed
for the issuance prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and
prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua’s
protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon
the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to
the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to
hear the case.
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy.
Ruling: In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity
of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between
two agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for
the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as “the sole judge of all
contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly.”
Main Point: It is the power of the Supreme Court that exercise original
jurisdiction over Petition for Certiorari Prohibition.
Tan v. Macapagal
Main point: The first requisite for the exercise of judicial review is that there
must be before the court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial
power. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication.
Facts: Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino
people. The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating
Constitutional Convention was "without power, under Section 1, Article XV
of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt
proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption
of a form of a government other than the form now outlined in the
present Constitution [the Convention being]merely empowered to
propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general
plan laid down therein.
Issues: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case
Held: No. At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any
resolution that would radically alter the1935 constitution therefore not yet ripe
for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con has actually
does something already. Then the court may actually inquire into the
jurisdiction of the body. Separation of power departments should be left alone
to do duties as they see fit. The Executive and the Legislature are not bound to
ask for advice in carrying out their duties; judiciary may not interfere so that it
may fulfill its duties well. The court may not interfere until the proper time
comes “ripeness”