SOLIVEN #103

Carpio v. Doroja, 180 SCRA 1 (1989)

Distinguished from subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code

F: October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney owned
and operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as a
consequence of which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the medico-legal
certificate and sustained injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3) three months .
was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries under an amended
information punishable under Article 365 of the RPC. A writ of execution was duly served upon the
accused but was returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused as shown by the sheriff's
return. Thus, the complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary liability of
the owner-operator of the vehicle. The same was denied by the trial court on two grounds, namely, the
decision of the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo Toribio, and the
nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not "culpa-contractual." A motion for
reconsideration of the said order was disallowed for the reason that complainant having failed to raise
the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said court rendered its decision which has
become final and executory, and the trial court has no power to alter or modify such decision.

I: Whether the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same criminal
proceeding against the driver where the award was given.

R: YES. A separate and independent action is unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of
the heirs of the victim.

The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the RPC. The
subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from the primary liability of employers, which is
quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability
emanated from a delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-aquiliana.
The present case is neither an action for culpa-contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an
action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the RPC Article 100. Civil
liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.. In
no case can this be regarded as a civil action for the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of
the New Civil Code.

Article 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. - Every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable.

In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the
criminal action, it should be shown
(1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry,
(2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and
(3) that he is insolvent.
The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the
criminal action. All these requisites present, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon
the employee's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar
satisfies all these requirements.

Article 365. Imprudence and negligence. -Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any
act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a
less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if
it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be
imposed.

Article 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. - The subsidiary liability established in
the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the matter of
subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like manner, the appellate court's decision made no
mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of a separate
complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his liability is
clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case, it is not indispensable for the question
of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court.

Art. 2180 of the Civil Code Art. 103 of the RPC

Subsidiary Liability
Action is founded on
Quasi-delictual Delictual
Culpa-aquiliana The present case is neither an action
for culpa contractual nor for culpa-
aquiliana. This is basically an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from
crime under Art. 100 of the RPC.

Requisites for application a) Employees and household a) Employer is engaged in any

In order that an employer
b)
may be held subsidiarily
liable for the employee‘s
civil liability in the
criminal action, it should
be shown:
helpers act within the scope of
their assigned tasks; and
Employers may not be engaged
in any business or industry.
d)
kind of industry;
b) Employee committed the
offense in the discharge of his
duties; and
c) Employee is insolvent.
the subsidiary iability of the
employer, however, arises
only after conviction of the
employee in the criminal
action.

All these requisites present, the Toribio

becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the
Ramirez‘s conviction and upon proof of the
latter‘s insolvency (unsatisfied writ of
execution).

AS TO THE NECESSITY TO FILE A SEPARATE CASE

Toribio has not been deprived of his day in court, because the case is NOT one wherein the operator
is sued for a primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability
incident to and dependent upon his employee‘s criminal negligence is sought to be enforced.
Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in
effect a party to the criminal case. So, the employer‘s subsidiary liability may be determined and
enforced in the criminal case as part of the execution proceedings against the employee. The filing
of a separate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary
since his liability is clear from the decision against the accused. Such subsidiary liability is already
implied from the appellate court‘s decision.

AS TO SUBSIDIARY WRIT OF EXECUTION NOT AN AMENDMENT OF DECISION

Compelling Toribio to pay on the basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment
of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the RPC, once all the requisites are met, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the
case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this
does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a
motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon
conviction of the employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the employee‘s
insolvency.
TAGAYAN #104

Distinguished from subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code

BANTOTO v. BOBIS

FACTS: Crispin Vallejo was the registered owner of a "jeepney" named "Jovil 11", with
plate TPU-20948, that was operated by him in Bacolod City through driver Salvador Bobis.
On 24 October 1948, through the driver's negligence, the "jeepney" struck a 3-year old girl,
Damiana Bantoto, a daughter of appellees, inflicting serious injuries that led to her death a
few days later. The City Fiscal of Bacolod filed an information charging Bobis with homicide
through reckless imprudence, to which Bobis pleaded guilty. He was, accordingly,
sentenced to 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor and to indemnify the deceased girl's heirs
(appellees herein) in the sum of P3,000.00.

Appellees Vicente Bantoto and Florita Lanceta, for themselves and their other children,
instituted the present action against Salvador Bobis, Juan Maceda (later absolved) and
Crispin Vallejo in the court of first instance, pleading the foregoing facts and seeking to have
the three defendants declared solidarily responsible for damages, consisting of the civil
indemnity required of the driver Bobis in the judgment of conviction, plus moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys' fees and costs.

Vallejo moved to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action against him,
for the reason that the amended complaint did not aver that the driver, Bobis was
insolvent.

ISSUE: Whether Vallejo can be held subsidiarily liable?

RULING: Yes. The master's liability, under the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes committed
by his servants and employees in the discharge of their duties, is not predicated upon the
insolvency of the latter. Article 103 of the Penal Code prescribes that:

"Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall also apply to employees, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties."

The insolvency of the servant or employee is nowhere mentioned in said article as a

condition precedent. In truth, such insolvency is required only: when the liability of the
master is being made effective by execution levy, but not for the rendition of judgment
against the master.

LEMON:

IMPORTANT: Is insolvency a requirement for the subsidiary liability of an employer to attach?

✓ NO, Bantoto case provides that insolvency is NOT a requirement for the attachment of liability
of an employer but it is a requirement to enforce the liability against the employer.

The subsidiary character of the employer's responsibility merely imports that the latter's property
is not to be seized without first exhausting that of the servant. And by analogy to a regular
guarantor, the master may not demand prior exhaustion of the servant's properties if he can not
"point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within Philippine territory, sufficient to
cover the amount of the debt" (Cf. Civil Code, Article 1060). This rule is logical, for as between
the offended party (as creditor) and the culprit's master or employer, it is the latter who is in a
better position to determine the resources and solvency of the servant or employee.

IMPORTANT: Is insolvency a requirement for the subsidiary liability of an employer to attach?

✓ _NO, Bantoto case provides that insolvency is NOT a requirement for the attachment of liability of an
employer but it is a requirement to enforce the liability against the employer.

If a writ of execution is returned unsatisfied, that means that?

✓ _That means that there is no sufficient property by the employee to pay for the execution

INSOLVENCY is a requirement for the ENFORCING the civil liability.

Once it is established, that the employee is convicted by a final conviction, if the employer is engaged in a
business or an industry, and if the employee committed a crime while he was in the employer of the employer
and in the discharge of his functions, automatically EMPLOYER would be held subsidiarily liable?
✓ _It must be proven that the employee must be in default by the fact of the writ of execution being returned
unsatisfied.
Tinae
Case No. 105
Distinguished from subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code
Baza Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao Security and Investigation Service, Inc., G.R. No. L-
32383, September 30, 1982

Plaintiff- Baza Corp., Lessee of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines

Defendant- Bolinao Security

Facts:
· Bolinao Security & Investigation Service, Inc. entered into a contract with the
Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines whereby it agreed to furnish security
guards to the latter for the purpose of guarding and protecting its properties and
installations.

· Plaintiff (Baza) has had no contract with the defendant (Bolinao) for security
services of its office equipment and supplies and therefore its office equipment,
supplies and other properties were never accounted for and placed under the
control of the defendant or any of its security guards.

· Jose Silvestre was thus guarding the building, properties and installations
of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, conspired and confederated with an
outsider, 16 year-old Ernesto Secreto, allowed Secreto to gain entrance to the office
of the plaintiff by passing thru a hole of the building left so when an air conditioner
placed therein was taken out to be repaired, and once inside, stole and carried away
therefrom, office equipment of the plaintiff all valued at P5,440.00.

· Plaintiff demands in writing on defendant for it to pay the amount of P5,440.00.

· The security guard, Jose Silvestre, had been convicted by the CFI.
· The Court further orders both defendants to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
Baza Marketing Corporation in the sum of P5,440.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
the event of insolvency not to exceed one-third (1/3) of their respective principal
penalties, and to pay the costs pro-rata.
· The security guard is insolvent and cannot satisfy the civil liability imposed in
the judgment of conviction.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in holding that defendant’s employee was not in the
discharge of his duty when he committed the crime and therefore the defendant employer could
not be held subsidiarily liable.

Ruling: No. The clear import of the trial court’s ruling is that the subsidiary liability under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may only arise if the employee commits the crime
of which he was found guilty in line or in pursuance of the discharge of his assigned
duties.

Defendant-appellee would admit that if the properties which were stolen belonged to the
Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, defendant-appellee would be liable inasmuch as the
unlawful taking occurred in the performance discharge of the duties of the security guard.

Plaintiff-appellant, on the other hand, maintains that the subsidiary liability of the employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code does not require that the employee commit
the crime within the scope of his assigned tasks. Instead, it is enough if the employee
committed the act while he was doing his assigned task as such employee, or on the
occasion then it being immaterial whether the act or crime committed is a part of the employee’s
duty or assigned task.

The law makes the employer subsidiarily liable for the civil liability arising from a crime
committed by an employee "in the discharge of his duties." (Article 103, Revised Penal
Code.) This subsidiary liability does not arise from any and all offenses that the employee
may commit, but limited to those which he shall be found guilty of in the discharge of his
duties. The law does not say, as urged by plaintiff-appellant, that the crime of the employee
must be the one committed "while in the discharge of his duties." It could not be contemplated
that an employer will be held responsible for any misdeed that his employee could have done
while performing his assigned task. Thus, it is neither just nor logical that, if a security guard
committed robbery in a neighboring establishment near the one he is assigned to guard, or
raped a woman passerby in the course of his tour of duty, his employer should be made
subsidiarily liable for his said misdeed. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the crime
was committed by the employee "in the discharge of his duties."

This conclusion is supported by the ruling in Marquez vs. Castillo, 68 Phil. 568, wherein it was
held that the subsidiary liability of the employer does not arise where the owner of the car which
figured in an accident causing the death of one and injuries to another, the said accident not
having occurred in the course of the performance of the duties for which the driver had been
hired, it appearing therein that the driver took the car without the employer's knowledge and
used it as if it were his own.

In the case at bar, the security guard was assigned to guard the building, properties and
installations of the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines. (Paragraph 6, Stipulations of
Facts.) The contract for security was between defendant-appellee and the Chamber of
Commerce of the Philippines. (Paragraph 3, Ibid.) No contract was ever entered by the
plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee for security services of its office equipments
and supplies which were never accounted for and placed under the control of defendant-
appellee or any of the security guards assigned in the premises of the Chamber of
Commerce of the Philippines. (Paragraph 5, Ibid.) In conniving with another to steal or rob
the office equipments of plaintiff-appellant, the security guard in question may not be
said to have acted in the discharge of his duties as security guard. The circumstance that
the office of plaintiff-appellant is in the same building for which defendant-appellee had a
contract for security service does not materially change the legal implication of the said act. For
all legal intents and purposes, the robbery could have been committed in a neighboring building
or establishment, in which case, it may hardly be argued that the employer of the security guard
should be made responsible for the consequences of such malefaction.

The act contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code is necessarily a crime
from which civil liability had arisen but which could not be satisfied by the accused
employee. The statutory limitation that the crime of the employee must have been
committed "in the discharge of his duties" is clearly intended to exclude crimes not
related to the performance of duties assigned to him by his employer.

TINGKAHAN
CASE 106
Yonaha v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 397 (1996)

FACTS: Elmer Ouano was charged with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide"
in an information which averred — "That on April 14, 1990 at or about 11:45 A.M.. in Basak, Lapulapu
City Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, while driving a
Toyota Tamaraw sporting Plate No. GCX-237 duly registered in the name of Raul Cabahug and
owned by EK SEA Products, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously maneuver and operate it in
a negligent and reckless manner; without taking the necessary precaution to avoid injuries to
person and damage to property, as a result thereof the motor vehicle he was then driving bumped
and hit Hector Cañete, which caused the latter’s instantaneous death due to the multiple severe
traumatic injuries at different parts of his body." When arraigned, the accused pleaded "guilty" and,
on 09 March 1992, the trial court pronounced its judgment —

"Finding therefore the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged against him and
taking into account the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty which the
prosecuting fiscal readily accepted. On 27 April 1992, a writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of
the monetary award. In his Return of Service, dated 07 May 1992. the MTCC Deputy City Sheriff stated
that he had served the writ on accused Elmer Ouano but that the latter had manifested his inability
to pay the money obligation.

Forthwith, private respondents presented a "motion for subsidiary execution" with neither a notice of
hearing nor notice to petitioner. Acting on the motion, nevertheless, the trial court issued an order, dated
29 May 1992, directing the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution. The sheriff went to petitioner’s
residence to enforce the writ, and it was then, allegedly for the first time, that petitioner was
informed of Ouano’s conviction. Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to recall the subsidiary writ of
execution principally anchored on the lack of prior notice to her and on the fact that the employer’s
liability had yet to be established. Private respondents opposed the motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s writ of subsidiary execution is valid

RULING: YES The statutory basis for an employer’s subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. This Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in
the same criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty, on the thesis that it
really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the execution process of the judgment.

But, execution against the employer must not issue as just a matter of course, and it behooves
the court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a
hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of the employer’s liability.

The requirement is mandatory even when it appears prima facie that execution against the
convicted employee cannot be satisfied. The court must convince itself that the convicted
employee is in truth in the employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged in an industry of
some kind; that the employee has committed the crime to which civil liability attaches while in the
performance of his duties as such; and that execution against the employee is unsuccessful by
reason of insolvency. The assumption that, since petitioner in this case did not aver any exculpatory
facts in her "motion to stay and recall," as well as in her motion for reconsideration, which could save her
from liability, a heating would be a futile and a sheer rigmarole is unacceptable. The employer must be
given his full day in court.

The subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code requires (a) the
existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b) that the employer is engaged in some kind of
industry; (c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed
the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the
discharge of such duties); and (d) that said employee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction of the
employee, of course, concludes the employer and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the same
criminal case, but to afford the employer due process, the court should hear and decide that liability on
the basis of the conditions required therefor by law.

LEMON LAW:

IMPORTANT: How may the employer be held liable subsidiarily liable? What are the requirements in order
to hold the employer subsidiarily liable for the damages or for liability to attach?
1. Employee must have been convicted by final conviction
2. Employer must be engaged in a business or industry.
3. Employee must have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties.
4. There must be absence of any collusion between the employee and the injured party

True or False. The conviction of an employee for a crime committed by him while in the discharge of his
duties is conclusive as to the subsidiary liability of the employer under the RPC.
✓ _FALSE. There must be absence of any collusion between the employee and the injured party

VERY IMPORTANT: If the employee is convicted by a final conviction, if the employer is engaged in a
business or an industry, and if the employee committed a crime while he was in the discharge of his functions,
is the employer already ipso facto subsidiarily liable for the damages arising from the RPC?
✓ _NO. There must be no collusion between the employee and the injured party

IMPORTANT: Is insolvency a requirement for the subsidiary liability of an employer to attach?

✓ _NO, Bantoto case provides that insolvency is NOT a requirement for the attachment of liability of an
employer but it is a requirement to enforce the liability against the employer.

If a writ of execution is returned unsatisfied, that means that?

✓ _That means that there is no sufficient property by the employee to pay for the execution

INSOLVENCY is a requirement for the ENFORCING the civil liability.

Once it is established, that the employee is convicted by a final conviction, if the employer is engaged in a
business or an industry, and if the employee committed a crime while he was in the employer of the employer
and in the discharge of his functions, automatically EMPLOYER would be held subsidiarily liable?
✓ _It must be proven that the employee must be in default by the fact of the writ of execution being returned
unsatisfied.

If you are a winning party what would you file if the writ of execution is returned unsatisfied, in order to
enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer?
✓ _Motion

According to your rules of court, there are 2 kinds of motions. You have the litigated motion and non-
litigated motion. If it is a litigated motion, it must be set for hearing and the adverse party must be adequately
heard. Is the motion to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer, a litigated or a non-litiaged?
✓ _It is a litigated motion. Therefore, the employer has the right to be heard.

IMPORTANT: Why does the employer have the right to be heard? Because the employer may question the
decision finding the employee guilty? So it operates as another layer of appealing the
decision of finding the employee guilty?
NO, the employers have the right to be heard at this stage NOT BECAUSE HE CAN QUESTION THE CONVICTION OF
THE EMPLOYEE but because he may raise certain defenses:
1. Employer is not engaged in a business or industry.
2. No EER.
3. Employee committed the offense NOT in the discharge of his duties.
4. There is collusion between the employee and the injured party
5. Employee is NOT insolvent.

Is article 2180 respondeat superior?

✓ NO

What is respondeat superior?

✓ _The fault or negligence of the servant or employee is CONCLUSIVELY the fault or negligence of the
employer, and the employer is held liable because of the fault or the negligence of the servant or employee and not
because of his own negligence in the selection and supervision of employees.
 _VERY IMPORTANT: If your position is vicarious liability under 2180 is NOT respondeat superior, is
respondeat superior recognized in any other way under Philippine Law?
✓ _Under the subsidiary liability of the employer under the RPC, the guilt of the employee is conclusively the
liability of the employer such that no matter what happens, the employer cannot question the guilt of the employee
and the employer can raise very limited grounds to escape liability. Hence, some authors opine that RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR is recognized under Philippine law, not under 2180 but because of the subsidiary liability of
employers for the crimes committed by their employees.

Abisana 107
Distinguished from Subsidiary liability under the RPC
Solidum v. People GR 192123
F:
· Gerald was born with an imperforate anus (no anal opening). When he was 3
years old, he was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation (an
operation for anal opening)
· The surgical team consisted of 4 doctors while the anesthesiologists consisted of 3
doctors including herein petitioner, Dr. Fernando Solidum.
· During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma
which lasted for 2 weeks but he only gained consciousness after a month. From
then on he could no longer see, hear, or move.
· Gerald’s mother, Luz, lodged a complaint with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila
against the physicians.
· The Prosecutor found probable cause and filed an information but solely against
Dr. Solidum alleging that he fail and neglect to use the care and diligence as the
best of his judgment would dictate under said circumstance, by failing to monitor and
regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered sing 100% halothane and
other anesthetic medications; thus, Gerald suffered a cardiac arrest and
consequently a defect resulting to insufficient oxygen supply in the brain rendering
Gerald incapable of moving his body.
· Both the RTC and CA convicted Dr. Solidum of reckless imprudence resulting to
serious physical injuries
- Basis of the courts for convicting Dr. Solidum?
1. Prior to the evaluation, the child was evaluated and found fit to undergo a
major operation
2. The tests and other procedures failed to reveal that he was suffering from
any known ailment or disability that could turn into a significant risk
3. not a hint that the nature of the operation itself was a causative factor in
the events that finally led to hypoxia.
I: Can Ospital ng Maynila be held civilly liable jointly and severally with Solidum? (MAIN
ISSUE RELATED SA TOPIC)
R: No.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted
with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. It is puzzling,
therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and
severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng
Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum.
Q: When can Ospital ng Maynila be held civilly liable?
 only when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions
for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with:
1. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila
must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry."
- What is meant by industry?
A: The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or
business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in
industry.
However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in
industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian
work.
2. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit,
Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the
discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not
such employee but a consultant of the hospital.
3. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as
an employee (which did not happen here), the execution against him was
unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
(In case iask ni atty: Was the CA correct in convicting Solidum? NO)
RTC basis for conviction: failure to monitor and properly regulate the level of anesthetic
agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane
CA’s basis for affirming conviction: Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround. He affirmed the
findings and conclusions in his report except for an observation which, to all intents and
purposes, has become the storm center of this dispute. He wanted to correct one piece of
information regarding the dosage of the anesthetic agent administered to the child. He
declared that he made a mistake in reporting a 100% halothane and said that based on
the records it should have been 100% oxygen. (Meaning: walang overdose)
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the ‘injury
for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a
right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.’"
An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or administrative – calls for the
plaintiff to prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the
duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act
in accordance with the specific norms or standards established by his profession; (b) the breach
of the duty by the physician’s failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of care;
(3) the causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the
negligent act or omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient.
Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical qualifications in anesthesia
to provide guidance to the trial court on what standard of care was applicable. It would
consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the first three elements of
a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an anesthesiologist himself who
served as the Chairman of the Committee on Ethics and Malpractice of the Philippine Society of
Anesthesiologists that investigated the complaint against Dr. Solidum, his testimony mainly
focused on how his Committee had conducted the investigation.39 Even then, the report of his
Committee was favorable to Dr. Solidum,
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of
anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other
anesthetic medications."However, the foregoing circumstances, taken together, did not prove
beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the
anesthetic agent to Gerald.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from civil
liability. But we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances that
have been established here do not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His
acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent
showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of
administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia
that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum
civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for
civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.

Baute
Case no. 108

Vestil v. Intermediate Appellate Court

179 SCRA 47 (1989)

Primary Liability and Special Torts; Possessors/users of animals

Facts: Theness Tan Uy, 3 year old, was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child
of the Vestils in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos
Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated
for multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead and administered an anti-rabies vaccine
by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after 9 days but was re-admitted one week
later due to vomiting of saliva. The following day, the child died. The cause of death was
certified as broncho-pneumonia.

Seven (7) months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to
them as the possessors of “Andoy,” the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The
Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente
Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bit Theness.
Additionally, she had died of broncho-pneumonia, which had no correlation to dog bites.

After trial, the CFI of Cebu sustained the Vestils and dismissed the complaint. The IAC
reversed and found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so
should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the
dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes
independent thereof as submitted by the appellees. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Vestils are liable for damages for the death of Theness Uy.

Ruling: Yes. The cause of Theness’ death was the dog bites. She developed hydrophobia, a
symptom of rabies, and had died due to broncho-pneumonia, a complication of rabies.

The Vestils are the possessors of the property and Purita is the only heir residing in Cebu City.
They use it as a second home and visited weekly - renting it out to the boarders, paying for
utilities and hiring the maid who cleaned and cooked for the house occupants. An occupant of
the household (Marcial Lao) testified that they maintain the house for business purposes and
that he is one of the boarder of said property. Liability is due to the possession of the dog,
regardless of the ownership of the dog or property.

The Vestils‘ contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is
not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 holds the possessor liable even if the animal should
escape or be lost and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that,
as the Vestils also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into
biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as
long as they cause injury; liability still attaches because one who possesses an animal
for utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which the animal may had
caused. As for the alleged provocation, Theness was only 3 years old at the time she was
attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.

Article 2183 reads, “The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.” According to Manresa, the
obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the
presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is
based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such
animals may cause.

It is the possession and not only the ownership that is determinative of who may be held
liable for the injury caused by the animal. (“It is the possession of the dog that admittedly was
staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.”)

In this case, the defendants are said to be the possessor of the dog for the following reasons:

1. They went to the house regularly where the dog was staying and used it virtually as a second
house;

2. They paid for the water bills of the house where the dog was staying;

3. The dog remained in the house even after the death of the child who was bitten by the dog,
etc.

What’s a strict liability tort? ✓ Liability is imposed even without fault or negligence

What is the first bite rule?

• A common law principle

• It is only after the first bite (i.e. when the animal attacks someone else for the first time) that
the owner/possessor of the animal realizes that his animal is a vicious animal.

• It is only upon the second and subsequent bites that the owner/possessor may be held liable
for the injuries caused by the animal because it is only after the first bite that the owner realizes
that the animal is vicious. The first bite is a “free pass”

• The only time that the owner/possessor of an animal will be held liable for the injury that the
animal caused is if the owner/possessor fails to take the necessary precautions to prevent the
animal from hurting someone. It applies to vicious animals only. Therefore, negligence is an
element.

• But this rule is not applicable in the Philippines because Article 2183 (1) does not
distinguish between vicious and domesticated animals, (2) it does not distinguish
between the first and subsequent bites, and (3) it is not predicated upon negligence but
based on natural equity
Briones #109
Manufacturers and Processors
Coca-Cola Bottlers v. CA

Facts: Complainant Lydria Geronimo owned a school canteen which had to close down as a
consequence of the big drop in its sales of soft drinks triggered by the discovery of foreign
substances in certain beverages sold by it. Several parents complain about the presence of fiber -like
matter on the soft-drinks. She submitted the drinks to DOH for testing and found out that they
were adulterated products. This prompted Lydria to file a complaint and demanded payment for
actual, compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages. Respondent Coca-Cola prayed for the
dismissal of the case based on their pleading, their complaint is not based on quasi-delict as it does
not ascribe any tortious or wrongful conduct on Coca-Cola, but it is based on Art. 1561-1562
breach of seller's warranty on law on Sales. And since there is a contractual relation, cause of action
prescribed within 6 months from the delivery of goods. Lydria argued that the action was based on
Article 2176 because Coke had recklessly and negligently sold to her adulterated products. An
action for a quasi-delict prescribed in 4 years and therefore her action had not yet been prescribed. The
CA ruled against the petitioner.

Issue: Whether CA erred in ruling that Article 2176 is applicable in this case

Ruling: NO. The court held that CA was correct when it held Coca-Cola was liable for recklessly
and negligently selling to complainant adulterated products hence cause of action is one for
quasi-delict is proper and has not yet been prescribed. In Singson vs. BPI, liability for quasi-delict
may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations. In Air France vs. Carrascoso, the act
that breaks the contract may also be tort. Existence of a contract between the parties does not bar
the commission of a tort and the recovery of damages. Thus, liability for quasi-delict may still
exist despite the presence of contractual relations.

Alternative remedies of the buyer to enforce warranty Art. 1567.

Under this article, the vendee has the option either:
(1) to with- draw from the contract (accion redhibitoria), or
(2) demand a proportionate reduction of the price (accion quanti minoris), with a right to damages
in either case.
The remedies are alternative as they are incompatible with each other. The complainant must
elect.

Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods
shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although
no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.

Elements of Article 2187

1. The defendant is the manufacturer or the processor;

2. The products involved are foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods;

3. Noxious or harmful substances were used;

4. Death or injury results to plaintiff because of the use of noxious or harmful substances;
and

5. The plaintiff is a consumer, user, or purchaser of the goods.

LEMON NOTES:
Legal bases for holding manufacturer or seller of injury causing products liable are:
UNDER AMERICAN LAW UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW
(1) Negligence (1) Quasi-Delict under Article 2176 or Delict under 365 for
reckless imprudence resulting to physical injuries or homicide
(2) Breach of Warranty (2) Article 1567. In the cases of articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565
and 1566, the vendee may elect between withdrawing from the
contract and demanding a proportionate reduction of the price,
with damages in either case.
(3) Tort (take note that QD is different (3) Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs,
from tort because tort under the drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death
common law includes not only or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used,
negligence, but also intentional criminal although no contractual relation exists between them and the
acts) consumers.

Other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or (4) Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
misrepresentation injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

(5) The Consumer Act of the Philippines (limited only to

consumer goods-goods or goods which are intended for
personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes).

A grocery store sold food past the expiry date. In this case, the food is not covered by Article 2187
because no noxious or harmful substances were used in their production. Through the negligence
on the part of the grocery store, the expired item was not taken off the shelf. Can the grocery
owner be sued under Article 2187?
✓ NO, since in Article 2187, the defendant must be the manufacturer or processor. Your
legal recourse is quasi delict despite the presence of the contract of sale because the
action which breached the contract is tort.

Also, under the law on sales, the injured party in the breach of warranty has 2 remedies:
1. Injured party can withdraw from the contract with claim for damages (accion reinvintoria); or
2. Proportionate reduction in price with claim for damages (accion quanti minoris)

Can the negligence of the manufacturer of consumer products give rise to a delict?
✓ Yes, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, Reckless Imprudence

How about manufacturers of defective wheels or brakes on cars. Will that fall under Article 2187?
Will they fall under the Consumer Act?
✓ No, because 2187 covers only foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods while
The Consumer Act covers only consumer goods.

What then are the possible legal remedies against car manufacturers under Philippine law?
✓ Quasi-delict, delict, Article 1547, and Article 33
Chatty
Case No. 110
Manufacturers and Processors
Pascual v. Ford Motor Company Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 220667
January 27, 2016

Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar
goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances
used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.
TN: The strict liability in torts is not applicable in this case.

FACTS:
 In November 2006, petitioner Olivia Pascual bought a second-hand Ford E-
150. Sometime in April 2008, Pascual’s driver was driving the vehicle at
moderate speed along the National Highway in Nueva Vizcaya when the right
rear wheel suddenly detached, causing Pascual and other passengers to
suffer physical injuries and to be rushed to the hospital.

 Pascual filed complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against

respondents Ford Motor Company Philippines (FMCI), a Ford manufacturer
and Ford Group Philippines, Inc. (FGPI), a Ford distributor in the Philippines,
claiming that both are liable for the defective vehicle.

 Respondents FMCI and FGPI denied their liability averring that Pascual cannot
claim the manufacturer’s warranty against hidden defects because the
vehicle was bought second hand and the warranty has already expired
after two years from the day it was bought from a Ford dealer on November
2000. They presented evidence that the vehicle was repaired and altered by non-
Ford authorized dealers to enable it to carry a load beyond its capacity; and the
heavy load stress caused the wheel to detach.
 RTC: liable due to the factory defect of the vehicle; it was purchased from them
and they failed to protect Pascual as the end-user.
 CA: reversed the RTC ruling, vehicle already undergone unauthorized
alterations at the time of the incident, and even if respondents were negligent,
the doctrine of proximate cause applies. The alteration is an efficient intervening
cause that would release respondents from liability. Pascual was negligent by
failing to check the vehicle before purchasing it; thus, it is her negligence that is
the proximate cause of the accident.

ISSUES: Whether FMCI and FGPI are liable to Pascual for quasi-delict

RULING: NO. Jurisprudence provides that in order to sustain a claim based on quasi-
delict, the following requisites must concur:
(1) damage to plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts
he must respond was guilty; and
(3) connection of cause and effect between such negligence and damage.

The CA correctly held that Pascual cannot attribute negligence to the FMCI and the
FGPI. The testimony of their expert witness was corroborated by other
documentary evidence, such as the technical report and photographs of the
vehicle, to prove that the vehicle had undergone alterations which affected its
performance, including the safety to passengers. The expert witness explained
that the non-authorized Ford technicians' alteration of the rear axle to carry a
heavier load exceeded the vehicle's maximum capacity and the heavy load
caused the axle to break. Pascual, on the other hand, did not refute the expert
witness' testimony on the alterations made.

Pascual cannot also claim that Ford repaired her vehicle since she stated that the
vehicle was brought to Ford for change oil and brake lining jobs only and not for
the purpose of repair. Pascual's claim that the FMCI and the FGPI are presumed
negligent has no basis in law or in jurisprudence. It is Pascual who has the burden to
prove the FMCI's and the FGPI's negligence.

The case of Nutrimix Feeds Corporation v. CA provides that the following must be
present before a manufacturer or seller may be held liable for any damage caused
by the product:
1. proof that the product in question was defective;
2. the defect must be present upon the delivery or manufacture of the
product; or when the product left the seller's or manufacturer's control; or
when the product was sold to the purchaser; and
3. the product must have reached the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition it was sold.

Pascual did not present proof that the vehicle was defective upon its
manufacture. The alteration in the vehicle's rear axle after the vehicle was sold is
a substantial change in the vehicle's condition. Hence, the FMCI, as manufacturer,
and the FGPI, as seller/distributor, cannot be held liable for any damage caused by the
vehicle's defect. The strict liability in torts is not applicable.

We also find that the strict liability in torts is not applicable against the FMCI and
the FGPI. Pascual cites the California Supreme Court Case of Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc. to support her claim on the applicability of strict liability in
torts. According to Greenman:

A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the

market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to
have a defect that causes injury to a human being. The purpose of such liability is
to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by
the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the
injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves. Implicit in the
machine's presence on the market, however, was a representation that it would
safely do the jobs for which it was built.

Jurisprudence provides that foreign decisions, such as the Greenman case, are not
controlling in this jurisdiction but are, at best, only persuasive. The Greenman case,
however, is not even persuasive for purposes of the present case because its
facts are different and cannot apply squarely to the present case.

Greenman involved a purchaser who bought a defective power tool first hand from a
retailer. On the other hand, the present case involves a second-hand vehicle which was
bought from an unidentified person. Even assuming that the Greenman case is
applicable, the FMCI and the FGPI are not liable because their representation as to the
vehicle's weight capacity is limited. The vehicle will safely do the job for which it was
built subject to the vehicle's weight capacity. The alteration of the vehicle's rear axle to
carry more weight beyond the vehicle's capacity is outside the FMCI's and the FGPI's
representation of its product.

ECHEM
Case No. 111

LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

City of Manila v. Teotico, 22 SCRA 267

FACTS:

· On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old
Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a
jeepney to take him downtown.
· After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop.
As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an
uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole.
· Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and
causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing
his vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of
them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after
which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid,
Teotico suffered contusions and abrasions.
· These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him
in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor
P1,400.00.
· Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint — which was,
subsequently, amended — for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city
health officer, city treasurer and chief of police.
· CFI- dismissed the amended complaint.
· On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except
insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the
aggregate sum of P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.
· Manila maintains that the Section 4 of RA 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) provision
should prevail over Article 2189 of the Civil Code, because Republic Act 409, is a special law,
intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable
to the entire Philippines.

ISSUE:

1. whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the
City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor,
the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance,
or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.

RULING:

Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article
2189 is decisive thereon.

The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly.
 RA No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) Article 2189 of the Civil Code

Territorial Application

Special law General legislation

As to Subject Matter

Establishes a general rule regulating the constitutes a particular prescription making

liability of the City of Manila for: “damages or
injury to persons or property arising from the
failure of” city officers "to enforce the
provisions of" said Act "or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence" of the city
"Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions."
"provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable
for damages for the death of, or injury
suffered by any person by reason" —
specifically — "of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other-public works under their control or
supervision."

What governs liability

section 4 refers to liability arising from Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective
negligence, in general, regardless of the streets," in particular.
object thereof

It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the
accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has
not been negligent in connection therewith.

As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the
answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended
complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is "under the
supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn,
alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition
and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant
City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance
of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in
effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.

At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province,
city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P.
Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily
detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409.

Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or
supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with
the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is
one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review. WHEREFORE,
the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of
Manila. It is so ordered.
 JALALUDDIN
CASE 112

Local Government Units

City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero, G.R. Nos. 140743 & 140745, September 17, 2009

FACTS: Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner of two (2)
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-98163 and T-98174 of the Registry of
Deeds of Tagaytay City. TTTDC incurred real estate tax liabilities on the said properties for the tax
years 1976 to 1983 (7 years).

On November 28, 1983, for failure of TTTDC to settle its delinquent real estate tax obligations, the City
Government of Tagaytay (City of Tagaytay) offered the properties for sale at public auction . Being the
only bidder, a certificate of sale was executed in favor of the City of Tagaytay and was correspondingly
inscribed on the titles of the properties on November 20, 1984.

The City of Tagaytay filed an unnumbered petition for entry of new certificates of title in its favor
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite. RTC granted the petition. The TTTDC appealed to the CA.
The subject properties were later purchased by Amuerfina Melencio-Herrera and Emiliana Melencio-
Fernando (Melencios) for the amount equivalent to the taxes and penalties due to the same.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case before the CA, TTTDC filed a petition for nullification of the
public auction involving the disputed properties on the ground that the properties were not within the
jurisdiction of the City of Tagaytay and thus, beyond its taxing authority. On the other hand, the City of
Tagaytay averred that based on its Charter, said properties are within its territorial jurisdiction. The RTC
denied this motion.

ISSUE: Whether the City of Tagaytay is liable for damages when it levied real estate taxes on the
subject properties

RULING: YES. It is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain property for sale due to tax
delinquency, the subject property should be under its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the failure of the city
officials in this case to verify if the property is within its jurisdiction before levying taxes on the same
constitutes gross negligence

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the principal is liable for the negligence of its agents acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks. The City of Tagaytay is liable for all the necessary and natural
consequences of the negligent acts of its city officials. It is liable for the tortious acts committed by its
agents who sold the subject lots to the Melencios despite the clear mandate of R.A. No. 1418,
separating Barrio Birinayan from its jurisdiction and transferring the same to the Province of
Batangas. The negligence of the officers of the City of Tagaytay in the performance of their official
functions gives rise to an action ex contractu and quasi ex-delictu. However, the Melencios cannot
recover twice for the same act or omission of the City of Tagaytay.

SECTION 24. Liability for Damages. – Local government units and their officials are not
exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property.

The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, we reiterate our finding that the City of Tagaytay acted in
bad faith when it levied real estate taxes on the subject properties, and should be held accountable for
all the consequences thereof, including the void sale of the properties to the Melencios.The City of
Tagaytay is accountable for erroneously assessing taxes on properties outside its territorial jurisdiction.
As of the passage of R.A. No. 1418 in 1956, the City of Tagaytay is presumed to know that Barrio
Birinayan, in which the subject properties are situated, is no longer within its territorial jurisdiction
and beyond its taxing powers. (Under Batangas na sya)
TAKE NOTE: LGUs can be held liable not only on the basis of Article 2189. LGUs can be held liable
under Art. 2189 CC, Art. 2176 CC, Sec. 24 LGC, City of Gov’t of Tagaytay case. Hence, LGUs are not
immune from suit for damages. Nonetheless, under Art. 2189, LGUs do not need to own the road, etc.
to be held liable, they only need to exercise control or supervision over said road, etc.

ARTICLE 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or supervision. (CIVIL CODE)

SECTION 24. Liability for Damages. – Local government units and their officials are not exempt from
liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property. (LGC)

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relations between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.

In this case, it is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain property for sale due to tax
delinquency, the subject property should be under its territorial jurisdiction. The city officials are
expected to know such basic principle of law. The failure of the city officials of Tagaytay to verify if the
property is within its jurisdiction before levying taxes on the same constitutes gross negligence.

Accordingly, the City of Tagaytay is liable to return the full amount paid by the Melencios during the
auction sale of the subject properties by way of actual damages. The amount paid at the auction sale
shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of the finality of the RTC
decision in Civil Case No. TG-1196, when the claim was judicially demanded. Thereafter, interest at the
rate of twelve percent (12%), in lieu of the 6%, shall be imposed on such amount upon finality of this
decision until full payment thereof.

The gross negligence of the City of Tagaytay in levying taxes and auctioning properties to answer for
real property tax deficiencies outside its territorial jurisdiction amounts to bad faith that calls for the
award of moral damages. Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused. Although incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the amount must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering
inflicted.
ECHEM

Case No. 111

LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

City of Manila v. Teotico, 22 SCRA 267

FACTS:

· On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old
Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a
jeepney to take him downtown.

· After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop.
As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an
uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole.

· Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing
broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision,
several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought
Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was
taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered
contusions and abrasions.

· These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him
in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor
P1,400.00.

· Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint — which was,
subsequently, amended — for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city
health officer, city treasurer and chief of police.

· CFI- dismissed the amended complaint.

· On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except
insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the
aggregate sum of P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.

· Manila maintains that the Section 4 of RA 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) provision
should prevail over Article 2189 of the Civil Code, because Republic Act 409, is a special law,
intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable
to the entire Philippines.

ISSUE:

1. whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the
City of Manila) reading:

The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor,
the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance,
or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions.

or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:

Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.

RULING:

Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article
2189 is decisive thereon.

The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly.

RA No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) Article 2189 of the Civil Code

Territorial Application

Special law General legislation

As to Subject Matter

Establishes a general rule regulating the constitutes a particular prescription making

liability of the City of Manila for: “damages or
injury to persons or property arising from the
failure of” city officers "to enforce the
provisions of" said Act "or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence" of the city
"Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions."
"provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable
for damages for the death of, or injury
suffered by any person by reason" —
specifically — "of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other-public works under their control or
supervision."

What governs liability

section 4 refers to liability arising from Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective
negligence, in general, regardless of the streets," in particular.
object thereof

It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the
accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has
not been negligent in connection therewith.

As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the
answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended
complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is "under the
supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn,
alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition
and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant
City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance
of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in
effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.

At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province,
city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P.
Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily
detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409.

Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or
supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with
the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is
one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review. WHEREFORE,
the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of
Manila. It is so ordered.
Shufen Cutie #113
E. Building Proprietors
De Roy v. CA

FACTS: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents Luis Bernal et. al., resulting in
injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, the daughter. Private
respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do so.

RTC found petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarded damages to the private
respondents. CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding the petitioners liable under Art. 2190 of the Civil Code?

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the
Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the
damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioner’s argument that private respondents had the "last
clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop
and, therefore, petitioners’ prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last
clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case. Thus,
De Roy and Ramos are liable for damages.

LEMON NOTES: The liability in Article 2190 attaches only because of lack of necessary
repairs that indicate that there must be some form of negligence.
NAPII #114
Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47851, October 3, 1986, and
April 15, 1988
Engineers/Architects/Contractors
October 3, 1986

Facts: These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA in modifying
the decision of the CFI Manila. The CA in modifying the decision of the lower court
included an award of an additional amount of P200,000.00 to the Philippine Bar
Association to be paid jointly and severally by the defendant United Construction Co.
and by the third-party defendants Juan F. Nakpil and Sons and Juan F. Nakpil.

Philippine Bar Association, a civic-non-profit association, incorporated under the

Corporation Law, decided to construct an office building on its 840 sqm located at the
comer of Aduana and Arzobispo Streets, Intramuros, Manila.
The construction was undertaken by the United Construction, Inc. on an "administration"
basis, on the suggestion of Juan J. Carlos, the president and general manager of
United. The plans and specifications for the building were prepared by the other third-
party defendants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons. The building was completed in June, 1966.
On August 2, 1968 an earthquake hit Manila and the building in question sustained
major damage. The front columns of the building buckled, causing the building to tilt
forward dangerously. As a temporary remedial measure, the building was shored
(support with beams) up by United Construction, Inc.

On November 29, 1968, PBA commenced this action for the recovery of damages
arising from the partial collapse of the building against United Construction, Inc. and its
President and General Manager Juan J. Carlos as defendants.

Plaintiff alleged that the collapse of the building was due to defects in the construction,
the failure of the contractors to follow plans and specifications and violations by the
defendants of the terms of the contract.
Defendants in turn filed a third-party complaint against the architects who prepared the
plans and specifications, alleging in essence that the collapse of the building was due to
the defects in the said plans and specifications.

ISSUE: Whether the Engineer, Architect and Contractors should be deemed negligent?

RULING: Yes. One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape
liability for the natural and probable consequences thereof, although the act of a third
person, or an act of God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the
loss.

The evidence sufficiently supports a conclusion that the negligence and fault of both
United and Nakpil and Sons, not an act of God, were responsible for the damages.
 there were deficiencies or defects in the design, plans and specifications of the PBA
building which involved appreciable risks with respect to the accidental forces which
may result from earthquake shocks.

DEVIATIONS:
1. Columns where the spacings were greater than that called for in the specifications
2. Hollow column evidence of poor construction
3. The omission or lack of spirals and ties at the bottom and/or at the top of some of the
ground floor columns contributed greatly to the collapse of the PBA building since it is at
these points where the greater part of the failure occurred.

The "deviations made by the defendants from the plans and specifications caused
indirectly the damage sustained and that those deviations not only added but also
aggravated the damage caused by the defects in the plans and specifications prepared
by third-party defendants”
Article 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building
is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should
collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the
ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the
same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality
furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect
supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action
by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The action must be brought
within ten years following the collapse of the building

DECISION
Defendant and the third-party defendants, solidary, indemnity in favor of the PBA of 5
MILLION for damages and additional P100,000 Pesos for attorney's fees

April 15, 1988 MR

FACTS/ISSUE: Motion for Reconsideration for 1986 Ruling and arguing that:

1. THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSIONER, AS ADOPTED BY THE TRIAL COURT,

AND AFFIRMED BOTH BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THIS HONORABLE
COURT NEGATE THE PREMISE THAT, THE SUBJECT BUILDING COLLAPSED;
HENCE, ARTICLE 1723 DOES NOT APPLY.

2. THE LEGAL DUTY OF PBA TO PROVIDE FULLTIME AND ACTIVE SUPERVISION IN

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SUBJECT BUILDING IS IMPOSED BY PUBLIC
INTEREST, USAGE AND CUSTOM; FAILING IN THAT DUTY, PBA MUST BEAR
AND/OR SHARE IN ANY LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES IN THE PREMISES.

3. LIABILITY, IF ANY, FOR THE DAMAGE OF THE SUBJECT BUILDING MUST BE

BORNE BY ALL THE PARTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMMISSIONER’S
FINDINGS AND WITH DUE REGARD TO THE CONDITION OF THE BUILDING
PRIOR TO PBA’S DEMOLITION THEREOF.

4. THE FINDING OF BAD FAITH IS NOT WARRANTED IN FACT AND IS WITHOUT

BASIS IN LAW.

5. THE AWARD OF DAMAGES COUCHED IN GENERAL TERMS IS DEFECTIVE;

MOREOVER, IT IS UNWARRANTED BY THE FACTS AND THE LAW.

RULING:
1. After the April 2, 1968 earthquake the building in question was not totally lost, the
collapse was only partial and the building could still be restored at the expense of
P900,000.00. But after the subsequent earthquake on April 7, 9, and 12, 1970 there
was no question that further damage was caused to the property resulting in an
eventual and unavoidable collapse or demolition (complete collapse). In fact, on April
30, 1970 the building was authorized by the trial court to be demolished at the expense
of the plaintiff. Note that a needed demolition is in fact a form of "collapse."

2. UNITED insists on the inherent legal duty of the owner, reinforced by practice, usage
and custom, to exercise such supervision. Apart from the fact that UNITED seems to
have completely contradicted its own view that this construction involves highly
technical matters and therefore beyond the ambit of ordinary understanding and
experience, the contrary appears to be more in accord with ordinary practice, which is to
avail oneself of the services of architects and engineers whose training and expertise
make them more qualified to provide effective supervision of the construction.

3. On the contrary, on the basis of such finding, it was held that such wanton negligence of
both the defendant and the third-party defendants in effecting the plans, designs,
specifications, and construction of the PBA building is equivalent to bad faith in the
performance of their respective tasks

4. & 5.

It will be recalled that the estimate of the Commissioner was limited to P1,100,000.00
for costs of repairs after the partial collapse of the building on April 2, 1968 but not after
its total collapse resulting from the subsequent earthquakes. It is therefore evident that
the actual cost of total reconstruction of the building in question was not considered by
the commissioner in the computation. Considering further the present cost of
reconstruction, the new amount (arrived at almost 20 years later) is far from being
excessive. It is indeed a very conservative estimate.
OMAR #115
Abuse of Rights and acts contra bonos mores
St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc. v. LWV Construction Corp.
G.R. No. 217426
Facts: Respondent is engaged in the business of recruiting Filipino workers for deployment to
Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, petitioner is an accredited member of the Gulf Cooperative
Council Approved Medical Centers Association (GAMCA) and as such, authorized to conduct
medical examinations of prospective applicants for overseas employment. On January 10,
2008, respondent referred prospective applicant Jonathan Raguindin to petitioner for a pre-
deployment medical examination in accordance with the instructions from GAMCA. After
undergoing the required examinations, petitioner cleared Raguindin and found him "fit for
employment," as evidenced by a Medical Report dated January 11, 2008. Unfortunately, when
Raguindin underwent another medical examination with the General Care Dispensary of Saudi
Arabia, he purportedly tested positive for hepatitis C virus. The Ministry of Health of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia required a re-examination of Raguindin, which the General Care
Dispensary conducted on April 28, 2008 which gave the same results thereby leading to
Raguindin's repatriation to the Philippines.
Petitioner's Contention: In its Answer with compulsory counterclaim, petitioner denied liability
and claimed that respondent was not a proper party in interest for lack of privity of contract
between them and the Medical Report issued by petitioner had already expired on April 11,
2008, or three (3) months after its issuance on January 11, 2008.
Respondent's Contention: It is claiming that petitioner was reckless in issuing its Medical
Report stating that Raguindin is "fit for employment" when a subsequent finding in Saudi Arabia
revealed that he was positive for HCV, respondent filed a Complaint for sum of money and
damages against petitioner before the MeTC.

The lower courts ruled in favor of the respondent and based their decisions in the provisions of
Articles 19, 20, and 21 on human relations instead of Article 2176 of the Civil Code

Issue: Whether Petitioner was negligent in issuing the Medical Report and should be held liable
for damages

Ruling: NO. the courts a quo erroneously anchored their respective rulings on the
provisions of Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. This is because respondent did not
proffer (nor have these courts mentioned) any law as basis for which damages may be
recovered due to petitioner's alleged negligent act. In its amended complaint, respondent
mainly avers that had petitioner not issue a "fit for employment" Medical Report to
Raguindin, respondent would not have processed his documents, deployed him to Saudi
Arabia, and later on - in view of the subsequent findings that Raguindin was positive for
HCV and hence, unfit to work - suffered actual damages in the amount of P84,373.41.
In the Alano case, Justice Leonen aptly elaborated on the distinctive applications of Articles 19,
20 and 21, vis-a-vis Article 2176, which particularly governs quasi-delicts:

Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct of human relations. By itself, it
is not the basis of an actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care required so
that an actionable tort may arise when it is alleged together with Article 20 or Article 21.
Article 20 concerns violations of existing law as a basis for an injury. It allows recovery
should the act have been willful or negligent. Article 21, on the other hand, concerns
injuries that may be caused by acts which are not necessarily proscribed by law. This
article requires that the act be willful, that is, that there was an intention to do the act and
a desire to achieve the outcome.

In cases under Article 21, the legal issues revolve around whether such outcome should
be considered a legal injury on the part of the plaintiff or whether the commission of the
 act was done in violation of the standards of care required in Article 19. Article 2176
covers situations where an injury happens through an act or omission of the defendant.
When it involves a positive act, the intention to commit the outcome is irrelevant. The act
itself must not be a breach of an existing law or a pre-existing contractual obligation.
What will be considered is whether there is "fault or negligence” attending the
commission of the act which necessarily leads to the outcome considered as injurious
by the plaintiff. The required degree of diligence will then be assessed in relation to the
circumstances of each and every case. Thus, with respect to negligent acts or
omissions, it should therefore be discerned that Article 20 of the Civil Code concerns
"violations of existing law as basis for an injury", whereas Article 2176 applies when the
negligent act causing damage to another does not constitute "a breach of an existing
law or a pre-existing contractual obligation.

Thus, as the claimed negligent act of petitioner was not premised on the breach of any
law, and not to mention the incontestable fact that no pre-existing
contractual relation was averred to exist between the parties, Article 2176 - instead of
Articles 19, 20 and 21 - of the Civil Code should govern. In this regard, it was therefore
incumbent upon respondent to show that there was already negligence at the time the
Medical Report was issued, may it be through evidence that show that standard medical
procedures were not carefully observed or that there were already palpable signs that
exhibited Raguindin's unfitness for deployment at that time. All told, there being no
negligence proven by respondent through credible and admissible evidence, petitioner
cannot be held liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

LEMON NOTES:
Did the TC and CA award damages? How did TC and CA characterize the cause of
action?
✓ Yes, both courts awarded damages (TC – actual; CA – temperate) on the basis of Arts.
19, 20, and 21.
But what did the SC say?
✓ That the TC and CA were wrong to base their decisions on these Articles. Why?
✓ The SC delineated each Article and compared it to Article 2176. Article 19 sets the
standard for the exercise of one’s rights and performance of one’s duties. However, Article 19 is
not a basis for damages. Rather, Arts. 20 and 21 are proper. Article 20 refer to willful and
negligent acts that are done contrary to law, while Article 21 applies only to willful acts done
contra bonos mores.
✓ Moreover, SC held that when an action is filed on the basis of Arts. 20, a law must have been
violated, whereas Article 2176 applies when the negligent act causing damage to another does
not constitute “a breach of an existing law or a pre-existing contractual
obligation.”
Justice Bernabe cited another Justice, right?
✓ Justice Leonen in his concurring opinion in Alano v. Magud-Logmao.
IMPORTANT: So, according to Justice Bernabe citing Justice Leonen, Articles 19-21 are
supposed to cover those acts or omissions which also amount to a violation of the law, whereas
Article 2176 is the proper law to apply if the act or omission which results in damage does not
involve a violation of the law.
Question: If that is the distinction, then where do we lump or in which basket do we place those
actions for the recovery of civil liability arising from crimes? Should we place them in the basket
of Arts. 19-21? Or do we place them in the basket of Article 2176? Do you understand the
dilemma?
✓ We’ve established based on Barredo and Elcano that a negligent or intentional act or
omission which amounts to a crime, if it involves a private offended party or gives rise to a
pecuniary damage, will give rise to 2 kinds of liability: civil liability ex-delicto and civil liability
based on the same act or omission considered or characterized as a quasi-delict.
With respect to the second category of civil liability, do we place it under Arts. 19-21 or under
Article 2176 in light of the discussion in St. Martin?
✓ This case cannot be considered as conclusive basis for saying that actions for the
recovery of civil liability arising from criminal actions must be based on Arts. 19-21.
✓ Two points:
✓ (1) All the cases that we’ve taken up, and all the cases that we will take up in connection
the recovery of civil liability arising from acts or omissions that also constitute a crime have all
been prosecuted under either of 2 provisions: Article 2176 and 33 of the Civil Code; and
✓ (2) The SC in this case did not say that actions for the recovery of civil liability arising from
crimes that also involve violations of the law must be prosecuted on the basis of Arts. 19-21.
How did the Court explain here that there was no law that was violated which is why they
applied Article 2176, and not Arts. 19-21?
Because there’s no law or statute that requires that a clinic to guarantee a patient’s medical
status from the time of examination up until the date of expiration of medical
report issued.

SOLIVEN #116

Cebu Country Club, Inc., (CCCI) v. Elizagaque

G.R. No. 160273, January 18, 2008

F: CCCI is a non-stock non-profit private membership club in Banilad, Cebu. Co-petitioners Dapat,
Almendras, Neri, Luym, Libi, Garcia, and Sala are members of CCCI‘s Board of Directors (BOARD).
In 1987, San Mig Corp (SMC), a special company proprietary member of CCCI designated Ricardo
Elizagaque as a special non-proprietary member. Elizagaque was SMC‘s SVP and Operations Manager for
VisMin. This designation was approved by the BOARD.

In 1996, Elizagaque applied for a proprietary membership. The application was endorsed by 2 other
proprietary members of CCCI. Elizagaque was able to purchase the proprietary share of a certain Dr.
Butalid for only 3M (the current price of the share was 5M, so nakatipid siya). Thereafter, CCCI issued a
Proprietary Ownership Certificate in his favor on Sept 6, 1996.

The BOARD met on Apr 4 and May 30 1997 wherein the action on the application of Elizagaque was
deferred. In July, his application was voted upon. Then in Aug, Elizagaque received a letter from CCCI‘s
corporate secretary (Neri) informing him that his application for proprietary membership was
disapproved.

A letter for reconsideration was sent in the same month but CCCI did not reply. Subsequent letters for
reconsideration were sent to CCCI in Oct and November but CCCI never replied to any of Elizagaque‘s
requests.

Elizagaque filed a complaint for damages against CCCI and its abovementioned Board. RTC Pasic ruled
for Elizagaque and ordered CCCI and BOARD to jointly and severally pay compensatory, moral,
exemplary damages each in the millions as well as litigation expenses. On appeal, CA affirmed but
removed compensatory damages. MR denied. Hence, we are here.

CCCI & BOARD contend that CA erred in making them liable because no evidence was presented
showing they acted in bad faith and in disregarding damnum absque injuria as a defense.

I: Whether in disapproving Elizagaque‘s application for proprietary membership, CCCI is liable to the
former for damages.

R: YES. LIABLE. CCCI‘s Articles of Incorporation provide that:

The CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right to approve or disapprove
an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be exercised arbitrarily and must
always be in accordance with Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In GF Equity v. Valenzona, it was held that a right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted
by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

In rejecting Elizagaque‘s application for proprietary membership, we find that CCCI violated the rules
governing human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between
human beings and for the stability of social order. The trial court and the CA aptly held that CCCI
committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving the applications. This is contrary to morals, good
custom or public policy.

It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) requiring the unanimous vote of the directors
present at a special or regular meeting was NOT PRINTED on the application form Elizagaque filled and
submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original provision of Section 3(c) which was silent
on the required number of votes needed for admission of an applicant as a proprietary member.

The original provision stated that:

After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30) days, if no objections have been filed or if there are, the
Board considers the objections unmeritorious, the candidate shall be qualified for inclusion in the
“Eligible-for-Membership List.”

CCCI explained that the amendment was not printed on the application form due to economic reasons.
We find this excuse flimsy and unconvincing. Such an amendment, aside from being extremely
significant, was introduced way back in 1978 or almost 20 years before the filing of the application. We
cannot fathom why such a prestigious and exclusive golf country club, like the CCCI, whose members are
all affluent, did not have enough money to cause the printing of an updated application form.

It is thus clear that Elizagaque was left groping in the dark wondering why his application was
disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was required.
When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an objection to his
application, CCCI apparently ignored him. Certainly, he did not deserve this kind of treatment. Having
been designated by San Miguel Corporation as a special non-proprietary member of CCCI, he should
have been treated by CCCI with courtesy and civility. At the very least, they should have informed him
why his application was disapproved.

The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm.
When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Such is the case here.

Damnum Absque Injuria not applicable

In Amonoy v. Gutierrez, we held that this principle does not apply when there is an abuse of a person‘s
right, as in this case.

Joint and Several Liability

CCCI‘s argument that they could not be held jointly and severally liable for damages because only 1
voted for the disapproval of respondent‘s application lacks merit pursuant to § 31 of the Corporation
Code which provides that —
SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers.—Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly
vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or
bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in
conflict with their duty as such directors, or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages
resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons.
TAGAYAN #117
Abuse of Rights and acts contra bonus mores

Metroheights Subdivision Homeowners Association, Inc. v. CMS Construction and

Development Corp.
G.R. No. 209359, October 17, 2018
Article 19

FACTS: On June 29, 1992, Metroheights Subdivision Homeowners Association, Inc. filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a complaint for damages with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against CMS Construction and Development Corporation (CMS
Construction), Tomasito Cruz, Tita Cruz, Simonette Cruz, Angel Cruz, Ernesto Cruz
(theCruzes), and Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS).

Metroheights alleged, among others, that it sought the assistance of MWSS to address
the insufficient supply of water in its subdivision to which the latter advised the
improvement and upgrading of its private internal water distribution lines, foremost of
which was the transfer or change in the location of its tapping source and the change in size of
its water service line from the old line tapped at Sanville Subdivision to a new tapping source on
Visayas Avenue, Quezon City; that on November 16, 1990, Metroheights entered into a
contract with MWSS for the new water service connection, and MWSS awarded the
project to a contractor which implemented the same, the cost of which was solely
shouldered by contribution from Metroheights’ members amounting toP190,000.00,
inclusive of labor, materials, and MWSS' fees and charges; and that since then, there was
already sufficient and strong water pressure twenty-four (24) hours a day in the
Metroheights’subdivision.

However, sometime in April 1992, CMS Construction made diggings and excavations, and
started to lay water pipes along Fisheries Street and Morning Star Drive in Sanville
Subdivision, Quezon City, Metroheights’ neighboring subdivision; that in the process, CMS
Construction, with the knowledge and consent of MWSS but without Metroheights’
knowledge and consent, unilaterally cut-off and disconnected the latter's new and
separate water service connection on Visayas Avenue; that on May 28, 1992, Metroheights’
members were waterless, which lasted for three (3) days, and that Metroheights’ polyvinyl
chloride (PVC) pipes and radius elbow, valued at around P30,000.00, were stolen by CMS
Construction's workers; that when Metroheights’ officers discovered the illegal cutting of the
water connection on May 30, 1992, they immediately complained to the respondents and
demanded for the restoration of their water line; that CMS Construction only made a temporary
reconnection with the use of a 2-inch rubber hose to the new water line it constructed at Sanville
Subdivision; and that despite Metroheights’ verbal and written demands, respondents have
failed to restore Metroheights’ water line connection in its original state and to return the
missing PVC pipes and radius elbow.

RTC held respondents liable for damages. CA reversed, holding there was no abuse of
rights since the project was not undertaken without notice to Metroheights.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are liable for damages.

RULING: YES, except for the Cruzes. The CA failed to consider that Tomasito Cruz testified
during his cross-examination that there was no notice to Metroheights coming from their
company.

The alleged meetings, claimed by Tomasito Cruz to have taken place to show that
Metroheights had already been notified of the rehabilitation project, were not substantiated at
all. Even Engr. Cariaga's assertion that it is an operating procedure to give letters to the
homeowners, as well as the barangays affected, regarding the objective of the project and
calling for meetings was not also established by any documentary evidence. It is, therefore,
established that there was no notice, not even a generalized notice, given by
respondents to Metroheights regarding the rehabilitation project.

In fact, it was only after Metroheights’ officer investigated the reason behind the loss of water
supply in their subdivision that it was learned that their existing line was cut-off and transferred
by respondents. Also, it was only when Metroheights’ officer went to the office of CMS
Construction and complained about the loss of water supply in their subdivision that
Metroheights’ homeowners' water line was temporarily reconnected with a 2-inch rubber hose.
The testimony of CMS Construction's President revealed this matter on cross-examination.

In MWSS v. Act Theater, Inc., we held that Metroheights’ act of cutting off respondents'
water service connection without prior notice was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to
the latter, justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of the New Civil Code.

"Article 19 [of the New Civil Code] was intended to expand the concept of torts by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to provide[,] specifically in statutory law. If mere fault or
negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more
reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. The absence of good faith is essential to
abuse of right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of the law,
together with an absence of all information or belief of fact which would render the transaction
unconscientious. In business relations, it means good faith as understood by men of affairs." 11

Considering that respondents would disconnect and change petitioner's existing water line
tapped from Visayas Avenue to another tapping source, good faith and prudence dictate that
petitioner should be informed or notified of such actions, as respondents admitted that
prior notice to affected areas is a standard operating procedure. More so, petitioner's
members had spent their own money to pay for their existing water connection on Visayas
Avenue to address the perennial problem of the lack of water supply in their area.

We do not agree with the CA's finding that respondents' actions were merely consequential to
the exercise of their rights and obligations to manage and maintain the water supply
system. "Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be
exercised." Article 19 of the New Civil Code sets the standard in the exercise of one's rights and
in the performance of one's duties, i.e., he must act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. "The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears,
and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a
right without the spirit of justice which gives it life is repugnant to the modern concept of social
law." Here it was established, as shown by the above discussions, that respondents indeed
abused their right.

As to liability of the Cruzes:

We find that respondents MWSS and CMS Construction should be held liable for damages to
Metroheights but not the Cruzes who are the directors and stockholders of CMS Construction.
Section 31 of the Corporation Code is the governing law on personal liability of officers for the
debts of the corporation, to wit:

Sec. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. - Directors or trustees who willfully and
knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal
or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be liable jointly
and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or
members and other persons.

We find that Metroheights failed to show that the Cruzes committed any of those above-quoted
acts to make them personally liable.
Tinae
Case No. 118
Abuse of Rights and acts contra bonus mores
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, August 25,
1989

Petitioners- Globe Mackay, Herbert Hendry

Private Respondent- Restituto Tobias
Summary: Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias, he was charged with
estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Five other criminal complaints were filed
against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial document
while the fifth was for of Article 290 of the RPC (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
Correspondence).

Tobias was dismissed from his employment. When he sought employment at RETELCO.
Petitioner Hendry wrote RETELCO a letter stating that Tobias was dismissed from GLOBE
MACKAT due to dishonesty.

Tobias filed a civil case for damages. GLOBE MACKAY is liable for damages under Article 19 in
relation to Article 20 and 21. The filing of the 6 criminal complaints constituted malicious
prosecution.

Facts:
· Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe
Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a
purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager.
· GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos which were reported by Tobias
to his immediate superior and to petitioner Herbert Hendry, Executive VP and General
Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
· Hendry told Tobias he was the number one suspect and ordered him to take a
one week forced leave.
· Tobias was asked to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit
specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police
investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. He was cleared by the police
investigators on this first police report.
· Petitioners also hired a private investigator finding Tobias guilty.
· Tobias was suspended from work.
· He was also cleared on the second police report.
· Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies
and the fact that the report of the private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet
complete, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through
falsification of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa.
· Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of
which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial document while the fifth was
for of Article 290 of the RPC (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence).
· Two of these complaints were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office
(of the AFP), which however, remanded them to the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal
 complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's
resolutions dismissing the criminal complaints with the Secretary of Justice, who,
however, affirmed their dismissal.
· Petitioners terminated Tobias’ employment.
· Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA and Secretary of Labor
dismissed. Tobias appealed with the Office of the President. Petitioners and private
respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter's
complaint for illegal dismissal.
· Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO).
However, Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by
GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
· Tobias filed a civil case for damages because of petitioners' abusive manner in
dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them.
· Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful
exercise of their right to dismiss private respondent.

Issue: Whether petitioners are liable for damage to private respondent.

Ruling: Yes.

Article 19, 20, and 21

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order." The Old Code merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to
draw out its spirit. Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which
provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also
in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to
give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore,
recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. However, Article 19 does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper.

Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:

Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since
they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not,
however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides
that:

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid
test which can be applied. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights
has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable
provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.

An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be
justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the
employee to go on a leave. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was
certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private
respondent returned to work on November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon
reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said, "Tobby, you are the crook and
swindler in this company." Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was
submitted only on December 10, 1972 the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless.

The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of
Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The
Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be
confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the
dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee.

Letter of GLOBE MACKAY to RETELCO

The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO, stating
that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter,
Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. Petitioners must likewise be held liable
for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

6 criminal complaints against Tobias

While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to
the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights, the right to institute criminal
prosecutions cannot be exercised maliciously and in bad faith.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately
by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless. The filing of a suit
by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution. The mere dismissal by the
fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious
prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad
faith.

In the instant case, dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the Ministry of Justice, but
appeal was dismissed. Two of these cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's
Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in the
military stockade, but this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases
involving civilians to the civil courts.

Notwithstanding the two police reports clearing Tobias in the fraudulent transactions complained
of, defendants hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila. There can
be no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to
harass, oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff.

The Court finds it significant that the criminal complaints were filed during the pendency of the
illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against petitioners. The fact that they were filed during the
pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry (that they
will file 100 more cases against Tobias), the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the
two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against
GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no
other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal
complaints against Tobias.

As to the damages awarded

Petitioners: Only actual damages from his loss of employment

Damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or
amount to a legal wrong is not actionable not applicable.

Even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive
manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must
now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with
the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-
delictual acts committed by petitioners.

Moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code.

If gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its
imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith.

LEMON Notes
At the end of preliminary investigation, the fiscal will determine whether or not there is probable
cause. If there is none, the fiscal will dismiss the case. Will that be enough to charge for malicious
prosecution?
 Court acquittal is not necessary and dismissal of the case by the investigating fiscal will be
sufficient to file a case for malicious prosecution. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal
complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no
competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith.

Private complainant files complaint with DOJ to vex and humiliate person. Prosecutor finds
probable cause and files information. In public crimes, control is passed over to public
prosecutor. Can the private complainant be said to be the prosecutor in that case to satisfy the
first element that the defendant was himself the prosecutor?
 No answer.

IMPORTANT: Summary of Malicious Prosecution

(1) Malice + Probable cause = No malicious prosecution
(2) No malice + Probable cause = No malicious prosecution
(3) No malice + No probable cause = No malicious prosecution
(4) Malice + No probable cause = Malicious prosecution There must always be malice, concurrently, with
the absence of probable cause for there to be malicious prosecution.

TINGKAHAN
CASE NO 119

FACTS: Marsman- now Metro Drug, Inc. - is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
distributing pharmaceutical products. Petitioner Iledan was Marsman's Warehouse Manager during the
time material to this case. Respondent Ligo was then Marsman's Warehouse Supervisor and was
primarily responsible for the destruction of bad order and expired drugs. Bad order drugs are those that
are retrieved from the market for being unfit for human consumption, while expired drugs are those which
have reached their expiry date.

Iledan supposedly received a telephone call informing him that some of Marsman's bad order and expired
drugs that were intended for destruction were not actually destroyed but were sold at the back of the Sto.
Nino Church in Parañaque. The following day, Iledan asked respondent to accompany him to the NBI
office. They proceeded to the NBI headquarters in Manila, where respondent was arrested and placed in
a detention cell.10 Thereafter, respondent and other individuals were presented to the media during a live
conference as the suspects in the distribution and sale of bad order and expired medicines. Their
photographs were taken, and later published, Respondent was detained at the NBI headquarters for at
least 10 days, after which he was provisionally released after posting bond. He was criminally charged
with violation of Republic Act No. 372013 as amended by Executive Order No. 17514 (RA 3720) which
prohibits the sale, dispensing or delivery of expired or rejected pharmaceutical products. However, he
was thereafter acquitted.

Ligo was likewise charged with serious misconduct, breach of trust, and commission of a crime against
Marsman. After several hearings, was terminated from employment. Ligo filed a Complaint for damages
against Marsman and Iledan. Respondent alleged that petitioners maliciously conspired to frame him and
fabricate a criminal charge against him.

RTC and CA: ruled in favor of Ligo

ISSUE: Whether or not the requisites of malicious prosecution where setablished

RULING: They argue that three of the four elements required for a malicious prosecution suit to
prosper are lacking, namely:

1) that the defendant in the malicious prosecution case is himself the prosecutor in the criminal,
civil or other legal proceeding or case, or that he instigated its commencement;

2) that in bringing the action, the defendant acted without probable cause; and

3) that the defendant was impelled by legal malice -- an improper or sinister motive.

In connection with the first requisite, petitioners contend that they did not act as prosecutors, nor did they
commence the criminal case against respondent; that it was the NBI that investigated and caused the
filing of Criminal Case No. 9070, and their role was limited to requesting the NBI's assistance in
investigating the respondent's alleged pilferage of bad medicines; that they did not seek NBI assistance to
prosecute respondent, but merely to investigate him; and that it was the NBI alone which determined what
crime respondent should be charged with.

Relative to the second element, petitioners insist that they acted with probable cause in seeking the
investigation of respondent and his colleagues, based on the tip provided by Miguel that bad medicines
were being sold in Para�aque; that probable cause was established through the surveillance
operations of the NBI and the State Prosecutor's recommendation to file Criminal Case No. 9070; that
acquittal does not disprove the existence of probable cause,29 and so it was erroneous for the CA to
declare that respondent's acquittal implies lack of probable cause, as his acquittal was based on failure to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt - not lack of probable cause.

On the third element, or the issue of legal malice, petitioners argue that since there was probable cause
to charge respondent, then this is tantamount to absence of malice; stated otherwise, the absence of
probable cause and malice must concur in an action for malicious prosecution.30 Moreover, good faith is
presumed in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of malice.

Therefore, for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1)
the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its
commencement; (2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action,
the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal
malice � an improper or a sinister motive.

The CA is correct in declaring that all the elements of malicious prosecution exist in this case.

First of all, there is no question that the investigation of respondent for alleged participation in a
purported syndicate that sells Marsman's bad medicines was prompted by a supposed telephone
call tip from Miguel, which resulted in Pilapil's March 15, 1993 request to then NBI Director
Velasco for an investigation of the matter.

Secondly, respondent was acquitted in the resulting criminal case - Criminal Case No. 9070 - for
lack of evidence and lack of jurisdiction, through an October 12, 1994 Order of the Taguig City
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 74.

There is no doubt that Marsman instigated the investigation and prosecution of respondent and
his colleagues.

Petitioners cannot claim that they merely sought to investigate - and not prosecute -respondent;
certainly, prosecution follows as a necessary consequence if the NBI believes that a crime has
been committed, and petitioners cannot prevent the filing of charges, even if they wanted to.

As correctly observed by the appellate court, if indeed petitioners simply sought to investigate and not
prosecute respondent, they should have first conducted their own internal investigation of the matter
instead of immediately referring the case to the NBI; the option to prosecute may be exercised later. In
fact, this should have been the case; nothing prevented them from fielding confidential personnel to pose
as buyers of these bad medicines they believe were being sold in Para�aque. Their so-called informant
Miguel - if he actually existed - could have produced more than a simple telephone report.

On the question of probable cause, it must be said that against the respondent, no probable cause
existed to warrant his prosecution for violation of the provisions of RA 3720. There is no legal
ground to suppose that respondent was involved in a syndicate which sold Marsman's bad
medicines in Para�aque; the supposed tipster Miguel was not presented in court to identify the
alleged perpetrators of the illegal act - hence, the basis for the accusation is lacking. Although
informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and maintain their
valuable service to the police, this rule cannot apply in Miguel's case because he was not a confidential
informant; his identity was precisely divulged.
Abisana 120
Tan v. Valeriano, G.R. No. 185559, August 2, 2017

F:
Valeriano, president of Holy Name Society—a religious organization, delivered a welcome
address during the multi-sectoral consultative conference. Allegedly, he lambasted certain
officials—specifically certain Councilors petitioners, Gilana and Vice Mayor Gonzales.
Thus, herein petitioners filed before the CSC an administrative complaint against Valeriano
(resident auditor of COA). They charged Valeriano with acts of electioneering and engaging in
partisan politics as petitioners believed that the purpose of the conference was to choose
candidates who will be endorsed by Holy Name Society for the 2001 elections.
This was dismissed by the CSC, without prejudiced to refiling, as the complaint-affidavit was not
notarized.
Subsequently, petitioners re-filed a complaint-affidavit on March but later on withdrew the same
by June.
But sometime before the withdrawal, petitionrs filed another administrative complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman for violation of R.A. No. 6713 in relation to Sec 55 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987. This was later on dismissed on June for lack of evidence.
Valeriano filed before the RTC for damages. The RTC ruled in respondents favor stating that
petitioners act of filing numerous cases against Valeriano was attended by malice and bad faith.
R TC held that the act of filing numerous cases before the CSC, COA, and the Ombudsman,
which cases were subsequently found to be unsubstantiated, is reflective of ill will or the desire
for revenge.
The CA reversed the trial court’s ruling insofar as Gonzales and Gilana were concerned. CA
held that petitioners' act of refiling their complaint with the CSC in April 2001, notwithstanding
the pendency of the administrative case with the Ombudsman, shows bad faith.20 The CA
further held that petitioners' intent to prejudice and injure Valeriano was revealed when they did
not inform their lawyer of the pending case with the Ombudsman.

I:
Whether petitioners acted with malice or bad faith in filing the administrative complaints against
Valeriano.

R: No.
Article 19 of the Civil Code contains what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights which requires that everyone must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. The law recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
it is recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
The elements of abuse of rights are the following:
(a) the existence of a legal right or duty;
(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and,
(c) with the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

The existence of malice or bad faith is the fundamental element in abuse of right. In an action to
recover damages based on malicious prosecution, it must be established that the prosecution
was impelled by legal malice.28 There is necessity of proof that the suit was patently malicious
as to warrant the award of damages under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code or that the suit was
grounded on malice or bad faith.29 There is malice when the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.30 The award of damages
arising from malicious prosecution is justified if and only if it is proved that there was a misuse or
abuse of judicial processes.31 Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities
for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.

In this case, what prompted petitioners to initiate the complaint against Valeriano was his vital
participation in the multi-sectoral conference that was held wherein certain local officials were
the subject of criticisms.

(Just In Case)
During the consultative conference held by the Holy Name Society, speakers were allowed to
criticize certain incumbent local officials. The conference was held at a time so close to the
holding of the 2001 elections. Valeriano, an employee of the COA, was, incidentally, the
president of said religious organization. Given the law's prohibition on public officers and
employees, such as Valeriano, from engaging in certain forms of political activities, it could
reasonably be said that those who had filed the complaints against Valeriano before the CSC
and the Office of the Ombudsman had done so as they had reason to believe that Valeriano
was violating the prohibition. Given the circumstances of the conference, it can reasonably be
said that the complaints were filed out of a belief in a viable cause of action against Valeriano.
Put in another way, it cannot be said, for certain, that the complaints against Valeriano were
filed simply out of malice.

Indeed, the CA, in absolving Gonzales and Gilana, found no malice or bad faith in the first
complaint with the CSC, to wit:

Defendants-appellants miserably failed to show that plaintiff-appellee Valeriano probably

engaged in partisan political activity when the latter urged the participants in his welcome
address "to join hands together to build and offer our constituents a good governance as
alternative of which, I will leave it to your noble hands." Witness for defendants-appellants
Asotes did not even see and hear plaintiff-appellee Valeriano deliver his welcome address.
However, there is no showing that defendants-appellants Gonzales and Gilana acted with
malice or sinister design to vex or humiliate plaintiff-appellee Valeriano by the mere act of
initiating an administrative case for electioneering against the latter with the CSC and with the
Office of the Ombudsman after the dismissal without prejudice of the complaint by the CSC.

This Court, however, disagrees with the CA that the mere re-filing of the complaint with the CSC
is reason to hold petitioners liable for damages.1âwphi1 It must be remembered that the same
complaint had earlier been dismissed on a technicality,35 and that the CSC directed that the
dismissal was without prejudice, i.e., the complaint may be re-filed after compliance with the
technical rules. Following the discussion of the CA as quoted above, we can say that this same
complaint was likewise not filed out of malice. It was borne out of a reasonable belief on the
illegality of Valeriano’s acts. Parenthetically, whether Valeriano’s acts do amount to illegalities is
another question altogether, one that is not within the purview of the present review.

It is a doctrine well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution, of and by itself, does not make one liable for malicious prosecution,
for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.36
Valeriano failed to prove that the subject complaints against him were motivated purely by a
sinister design. It is an elementary rule that good faith is presumed and that the burden of
proving bad faith rests upon a party alleging the same. Absent such, petitioners cannot be held
liable for damages.
Baute
Case no. 121

Wassmer v. Velez

G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964

Abuse of Rights and acts contra bonus mores

Facts: Defendant Francisco Velez and plaintiff Beatriz Wassmer decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day. 2 days before the set day, Velez left a note which states that:
“Dear Bet —Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. I am leaving on the
Convair today. Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only
create a scandal.” The next day, Velez sent a telegram stating therein that: “NOTHING
CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE.”
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Sued by Beatriz for damages,
Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Judgment was rendered ordering defendant
to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs. Chances for an amicable settlement were given by
the lower courts but Velez failed to appear therein. Hence, the present petition.

In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment
is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing"
an action for breach of promise to marry.

Issue: Whether there is a provision of law which authorizes an action for breach of promise to
marry?

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that it must not be overlooked, however, that the extent
to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21
of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for September 4,
1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-
to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased.
Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with
accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then, with but two
days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old: simply left a note for plaintiff
stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home
city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing
changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise
to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Is the breach of a promise to marry actionable under Philippine law? No. (The provisions which
provides for an action against a breach of promise to marry was deleted by the legislative
because no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in
the so-called Balm suit in many of the American States.) Simply stated, it is prone to abuse that
is why it was deleted by the legislative.

Why were moral damages awarded in Wassmer? Moral damages were awarded NOT because
of breach of promise to marry but because the conduct of defendant was contrary to Article 21.
It was because the breach of Article 21 that warranted the award of moral damages To formally
set a wedding and go through all the preparation only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable
in damages in accordance with Article 2

Briones #122
Abuse of Rights and acts contra bonus mores
Petrophil Corp. v. CA
G.R. No. 122796 (2001)
Facts: Petrophil Corporation (Petrophil) entered into contract with private respondent Dr. Amanda
Ternida-Cruz, allowing the latter to haul and transport any and all packages and/or bulk products of
Petrophil. The contract provided among others, that Petrophil could terminate the contract for breach,
negligence, discourtesy, improper and/or inadequate performance, or abandonment. In a letter dated May
21, 1987, Petrophil, through its operations Manager, advised Dr. Cruz that it was terminating her hauling
contract. Dr. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court, seeking the nullity of the termination of the contract,
and declaring its suspension as unjustified and contrary to its terms and conditions. She claimed that the
termination of her hauling contract was a retaliation against her for allegedly sympathizing with the then
striking Petrophil employees.

Before Petrophil terminated the contract on May 25, 1987, there was a strike of its employees at the
Pandacan terminal. Dr. Cruz and her husband were seen at the picket line and were reported to have
instructed their truck drivers not to load petroleum products. At the resumption of the operation in
Pandacan terminal, Dr. Cruz’s contract was suspended for one week and eventually terminated.

Issue: Whether petitioner was guilty of arbitrary termination of the contract, which would entitle Dr. Cruz
to damages

Ruling: YES. In terminating the hauling contract of Dr. Cruz without hearing her side on the
factual context above described, petitioner opened itself to a charge of bad faith. While Petrophil
had the right to terminate the contract, petitioner could not act purposely to injure private
respondents. It was found to be a retaliation against Dr. Cruz for allegedly sympathizing with
striking employees. Moreover, Petrophil terminated the contract without giving Dr. Cruz an
opportunity to explain her actions, which constituted bad faith and abuse of a right under Article
19 of the Civil Code.

There is an abuse of right under Article 19 if the following elements are present:
1) There is a legal right or duty;
2) It is exercised in bad faith;
3) For the sole purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. All these 3 elements are
present in the case at the bar.

LEMON NOTES:
So termination without due process equals abuse of right? No.
Why was their bad faith in this case? Because the contract was terminated without hearing the side of
Dr. Cruz.

The court here had something to say about Article 20. What was that?
Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the damage done. Petitioner might not have deliberately
intended to injure the respondent-drivers. But as a consequence of its willful act directed against Dr. Cruz,
respondent-drivers lost their jobs and consequently suffered loss of income. Note that under Article 20,
there is no requirement that the act must be directed at a specific person, but it suffices that a person
suffers damage as a consequence of a wrongful act of another in order that indemnity could be
demanded from the wrongdoer.

Chatty

Case No. 123

Abuse of Rights and acts contra bonus mores
Navarro-Banaria v. Banaria, G.R. No. 217806, July 28, 2020

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

FACTS:
 Respondents are siblings, children, and grandchildren of Pascasio, while petitioner is the
legal wife of Pascasio and stepmother of the Banaria siblings. Respondents filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner.
 Pascasio, the family patriarch, at the time of the filing of the complaint, was already frail
and suffering from physical and mental infirmity incapacitating him to fully functioning on
his own without any assistance.
 The complaint stemmed from the alleged bad faith, malice, and deliberate failure of
Adelaida to keep her word and honor her promise to bring Pascasio to his 90th birthday
celebration held on February 22, 2004. It was prepared by the respondents and the non-
appearance of Pascasio during the event allegedly caused loss and injury to the
respondents.
 Respondents alleged that the planning of the event started as early as February 2003 or
a year before. Respondents were in continuous contact with Adelaida to remind her of
the upcoming event. Adelaida confirmed Pascasio's attendance during the event
although it coincides with the death anniversary of Adelaida's mother.
 Much to the dismay of the Banaria siblings as well as their guests, Pascasio was
nowhere to be found in his 90th birthday celebration.
 Respondents continuously called Adelaida but they were not able to contact her. Almost
200 guests were at the venue waiting for Pascasio to come. The siblings deemed it
proper to continue the celebration even without the birthday celebrant himself.
 Respondents reported Pascasio as a missing person in the police station.
 Respondents even called and went to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
where Adelaida works but they failed to see her there.
  Afterwards, respondent Paulina was able to talk to one of Adelaida's maids named Kit.
Kit told Paulina that she went to Tarlac with Pascasio and Adelaida in the morning of
February 21, 2004 but went their separate ways upon reaching said province.
 Respondents have been informed that they were in Alpha Village, Quezon City. They
went there and asked why Pascasio was not able to attend the birthday celebration.
Adelaida reasoned that Pascasio did not want to go to the party. When asked why
Adelaida broke her commitment to bring Pascasio to the party, Adelaida uttered the
words, "I am the wife."
 Thus, the Complaint for Damages filed by respondents against Adelaida.
 In response, Adelaida rebutted the allegations of the respondents by saying that she
was not privy to the respondents' planned birthday celebration for Pascasio. She also
said that she deemed it wise to spare Pascasio of the embarrassment and humiliation of
defecating and urinating without regard to the people around him brought about by his
advanced age.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner violated Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, thus, respondents
are entitled to damages.

RULING: YES. Petitioner contends that she did not commit any violation under Article 19 of the
Civil Code by alleging that the testimonies of the respondents were pure surmises and
conjectures. Aside from that, petitioner avers that respondents failed to prove bad faith, malice
and ill motive on her part. Because of this, petitioner posits that there can be no award of actual,
moral and exemplary damages under the principle of damnum absque injuria or damage without
injury since her legal right was not exercised in bad faith and with no intention to injure another.
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith. The principle embodied in this provision is more commonly
known as the "abuse of right principle." The legal consequence should anyone violate
this fundamental provision is found in Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code. The correlation
between the two provisions are showed in the case of GF EQUITY, Inc. v. Valenzona, to wit:

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of

abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise
of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good
faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right,
though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and
for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.

When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Article 20 and 21 of the New
Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law. There is no question
that as legal wife and guardian of Pascasio, Adelaida has the principal and overriding
decision when it comes to the affairs of her husband. However, it must be noted
Adelaida's right cannot be exercised without limitation. It must conform to the exacting
standards of conduct enunciated in Article 19. Adelaida was clearly remiss in this aspect.
Even though Adelaida alleges that she was not privy to any birthday celebration for Pascasio,
the fact remains that she was continuously informed and reminded about the scheduled event.
She even contributed P5,000.00 for the costs. Following Adelaida's testimony that Pascasio had
already decided not to attend his birthday celebration a day before such event, she should have
contacted the respondents immediately for the respondents to be able to take appropriate
action. Adelaida knew fully well that the respondents already spent a considerable amount of
money and earnest efforts were already made to ensure the success of the event. The least that
Adelaida could have done was to inform the respondents immediately of any unforeseen
circumstance that would hinder its success and to avert any further damage or injury to the
respondents. Adelaida neglected to contact the respondents immediately after their return to
Manila on February 23, 2004. If she was sincere in bringing Pascasio to his birthday celebration,
then she would have immediately called the respondents upon returning to Manila to inform
them of their whereabouts and to state the reason for Pascasio non-attendance.
Respondents have sufficiently established that it was an annual tradition for the family to
celebrate the birthday of their father Pascasio. Besides, the allegation that Pascasio refused to
attend his birthday celebration because of an alleged misunderstanding with his two sons was
not duly proven.

All in all, the foregoing shows that Adelaida intentionally failed to bring Pascasio to the
birthday celebration prepared by the respondents thus violating Article 19 of the Civil
Code on the principle of abuse of right. Her failure to observe good faith in the exercise
of her right as the wife of Pascasio caused loss and injury on the part of the
respondents, for which they must be compensated by way of damages pursuant to
Article 21 of the Civil Code.

ECHEM

CASE NO. 124

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Almario v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 170928, September 11, 2007

FACTS:

· On October 21, 1988, petitioner, Vicente S. Almario (Almario), was hired by respondent,
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), as a Boeing 747 Systems Engineer.

· In 1995, he successfully bid for a higher position of Airbus 200 First Officer that requires
additional training, he underwent, at PAL’s expense, more than five months of training
consisting of ground schooling in Manila and flight simulation in Melbourne, Australia.

· After completing the training course, Almario served as A-300 First Officer of PAL, but after
eight months of service as such or on September 16, 1996, he resigned, for "personal reasons,"
effective October 15, 1996.

· PAL’s Vice President for Flight Operations sent Almario a letter, the pertinent portions of
which read:

“… As you are aware the Company invested heavily on your professional training in the
estimated amount of PHP786,713.00 on the basis that you continue to serve the Company for a
definite period of time which is approximately three (3) years or thirty-six (36) months. In view of
the foregoing, we urge you to reconsider your proposed resignation otherwise you will be
required to reimburse the Company an amount equivalent to the cost of your professional
training and the damaged [sic] caused to the Company.”

· Despite receipt of the letter, Almario pushed through with his resignation.

· Almario said that he did not sign anything regarding any reimbursement. However, PAL did
not reply. Almario sent two letters following up PAL’s reply as well as the release of his
clearances which he needed to avail benefits.
· PAL filed a Complaint against Almario before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC), for
reimbursement of ₱851,107 worth of training costs, attorney’s fees equivalent to 20% of the said
amount, and costs of litigation. PAL invoked the existence of an innominate contract of do ut
facias (I give that you may do) with Almario in that by spending for his training, he would render
service to it until the costs of training were recovered in at least three (3) years. Almario having
resigned before the 3-year period, PAL prayed that he should be ordered to reimburse the costs
for his training.

· Almario denied the existence of any agreement with PAL that he would have to render
service to it for three years after his training failing which he would reimburse the training costs.
He pointed out that the 1991-1994 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and
the Airline Pilot’s Association of the Philippines (ALPAP), of which he was a member, carried no
such agreement.

· RTC: The trial court denied Almario’s claim for moral damages, however. It denied too
Almario’s claim for the monetary equivalent of his family trip pass benefits (worth US$49,824), it
holding that the same had been forfeited as he did not avail of them within one year from the
date of his separation.

· CA: reversed the trial court’s decision. It found Almario liable under the CBA between PAL
and ALPAP and, in any event, under Article 22 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner can refuse to reimburse the costs of training without violating the
principle of unjust enrichment.

RULING: NO. It is not disputed that the petitioner merely entered a bid for a higher position, and
that when he was accepted based on seniority and qualification, the position was awarded to
him. It is also not disputed that petitioner [had] not asked, requested, or demanded for the
training. It came when his bid was accepted by PAL;

The pertinent provision of the CBA and its rationale aside, contrary to Almario’s claim, Article
22 of the Civil Code which reads:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just
or legal ground, shall return the same to him, applies.

This provision on unjust enrichment recognizes the principle that one may not enrich
himself at the expense of another. An authority on Civil Law writes on the subject, viz:

Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage,

so long as it is appreciable in money. It may consist of some positive pecuniary value
incorporated into the patrimony of the defendant, such as: (1) the enjoyment of a thing
belonging to the plaintiff; (2) the benefits from service rendered by the plaintiff to the
defendant; (3) the acquisition of a right, whether real or personal; (4) the increase of
value of property of the defendant; (5) the improvement of a right of the defendant, such
as the acquisition of a right of preference; (6) the recognition of the existence of a right in
the defendant; and (7) the improvement of the conditions of life of the defendant.

The enrichment of the defendant must have a correlative prejudice, disadvantage, or

injury to the plaintiff. This prejudice may consist, not only of the loss of property or the
deprivation of its enjoyment, but also of non-payment of compensation for a prestation or
service rendered to the defendant without intent to donate on the part of the plaintiff, or the
failure to acquire something which the latter would have obtained. The injury to the plaintiff,
however, need not be the cause of the enrichment of the defendant. It is enough that there be
some relation between them, that the enrichment of the defendant would not have been
produced had it not been for the fact from which the injury to the plaintiff is derived.
(Underscoring supplied)

Admittedly, PAL invested for the training of Almario to enable him to acquire a higher level of
skill, proficiency, or technical competence so that he could efficiently discharge the position of
A-300 First Officer. Given that, PAL expected to recover the training costs by availing of
Almario’s services for at least three years. The expectation of PAL was not fully realized,
however, due to Almario’s resignation after only eight months of service following the
completion of his training course. He cannot, therefore, refuse to reimburse the costs of training
without violating the principle of unjust enrichment.
Almario must pay PAL the sum of ₱559,739.90, to bear the legal interest rate of 6% per annum
from the filing of PAL’s complaint on February 11, 1997 until the finality of this decision.

JALALUDDIN
CASE 125

Unjust Enrichment
Grandteq Industrial Steel Products, Inc., v. Margallo, G.R. No. 181393, July 28, 2009

MP: Margallo was a Sales Engineer of Grandteq and she availed the company car loan. She received
letter from Granteq accusing her of working for another company, and she was asked to just resign but
she never got the sales commission nor reimbursement for the car loan payments. SC held that Grandteq
was unjustly enriched by the car loan provisions.

FACTS: Grandteq is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of selling welding electrodes, alloy
steels, aluminum and copper alloys. Gonzales is the President/Owner of Grandteq. Grandteq employed
Margallo as Sales Engineer beginning 3 August 1999. Margallo claimed that on an unstated date, she
availed herself of the car loan program offered to her by Grandteq as a reward for being "Salesman of
the Year." She paid the down payment on a brand new Toyota Corolla, amounting to ₱201,000.00, out
of her own pocket. The monthly amortization for the car was ₱10,302.00, of which ₱5,302.00 was to be
her share and ₱5,000.00 was to be the share of Grandteq.

On December 2003, Margallo received a letter signed by Gonzales and Rolando de Leon (De Leon), Vice-
President for Administration of Grandteq, that she violated moonlighting, sabotage, and breach of
trust and confidence. After explaining her side, Margallo then averred that in January 2004, De Leon
asked her to just resign, promising that if she did, she would still be paid her commissions and other
benefits, as well as be reimbursed her car loan payments. Relying on De Leon’s promise, Margallo
tendered on 13 January 2004, her irrevocable resignation, effective immediately.

Margallo, however, alleged that she was never paid her money claims. Grandteq failed to pay her
commissions in the sum of ₱87,508.00, equivalent to 5% of the total sales that she collected as of
January 2004, which amounted to ₱1,750,148.84. Grandteq likewise failed to refund the "sales
accommodations" or advances she gave her customers. In addition, after Margallo’s resignation,
Grandteq sold her car to Annaliza Estrella, another employee, for ₱550,000.00. These events prompted
her to file before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint against Grandteq and Gonzales, for recovery of sales
commission, cash incentive and car loan payment, damages and attorney fees, which was docketed as
NLRC Case No. 0009-108-03-04.Grandteq and Gonzales opposed Margallo’s claims. They maintained
that Margallo was not entitled to sales commissions because the computation thereof, according to
company policy, should be based on actual collections within 180 days from invoice date.

ISSUE: Whether Margallo had a right to be reimbursed her car loan payments?

RULING: Yes. The principle that no person may unjustly enrich oneself at the expense of another
(Nemo cum alteris detrimento locupletari potest) is embodied in Article 22 of the New Civil Code.
There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at
the expense of or with damages to another. The principle against unjust enrichment obliges Grandteq
and Gonzales to refund to Margallo the car loan payments she had made, since she has not actually
acquired the car. The Constitution and the Labor Code mandate the protection of labor.

As to sales commission, in cases involving money claims of employees, the employer has the burden of
proving that the employees did receive their wages and benefits and that the same were paid in
accordance with law. Grandteq and Gonzales have failed to provide the burden of proof to show, by
substantial evidence, their claim that Margallo was not entitled to sales commissions because the sales
made by the latter remained outstanding and unpaid, rendering these sales as bad debts and thus
nullifying Margallo’s right to this monetary benefit.

***The questionable provision in the car loan agreement between Grandteq and Margallo provides: “In
case of resignation, of the personnel from the company, all payments made by the personnel shall be
forfeited in favor of the company.” Connected thereto is the provision in the same car loan agreement,
which reads:

a. The COMPANY shall have the right to regain the possession of the car before the expiration of the
term of the loan in the event of any of the following:
b. The PERSONNEL resigns from the COMPANY during the effectivity of this agreement.

Said provisions plainly are contrary to the fundamental principles of justice and fairness. It must be
remembered that Margallo herself paid for the down payment and her share in the monthly
amortization of the car. However, she did not get to leave with the car when she resigned from
Grandteq. In effect, Margallo parted with her hard-earned money for nothing, being left, as she is, with
an empty bag. The inequitableness in the conduct of Grandteq and Gonzales is heightened by the fact
that after they regained possession of the car, they resold the same to another employee under a similar
contract bearing the same terms and conditions signed by Margallo

The principle that no person may unjustly enrich oneself at the expense of another (Nemo cum alteris
detrimento locupletari potest) is embodied in Article 22 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him.

The above-quoted article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of
which were formulated as "basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of the social order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience; [are] guides for human conduct that should run as golden threads through
society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of
justice." There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or
when a person retains the money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience.

The principle against unjust enrichment obliges Grandteq and Gonzales to refund to Margallo the car
loan payments she had made, since she has not actually acquired the car. To relieve Grandteq and
Gonzales of their obligation to reimburse Margallo would, indeed, be to sanction unjust enrichment in
favor of the first two and cause unjust poverty to the latter.
LABOR ARBITER DECISION: LA found that Margallo had no right to the reimbursement of her car loan
payments under her car loan agreement with Grandteq. And as regards of (sic) the car loan, the same
should be governed by the undisputed terms and conditions of the Agreement between complainant
and respondent company (Annex "A" of respondents’ position paper). And page 2 of said Agreement
clearly stipulates that in case of resignation, all payments made by the personnel shall be forfeited in
favor of the company. Thus, the claim for refund of the car loan should likewise be denied.

SC UPHELD NLRC AND CA DECISION: In ordering that Grandteq and Gonzales reimburse the car loan
payments made by Margallo, the NLRC reasoned:

It is unlikely for an employee who has invested his time and industry in a particular job to simply give it
up after being accused of violating company rules and regulations. It is more likely that he did so upon
the expectation that she would derive a certain benefit from it. Thus, the claim that the [herein
respondent Margalllo] resigned because she was promised that she would be paid her money claims if
she did, is more credible than the contention that she did so without any prodding from the [herein
petitioners Grandteq and Gonzales]. It would therefore appear that the provision, in the agreement
(records, pp. 32-340) executed by the parties, that "in case of resignation of the PERSONNEL from the
COMPANY, all payments made by the PERSONNEL shall be forfeited in favor of the COMPANY" has been
superseded by the above-mentioned subsequent agreement between the parties.

Besides, it is uncontroverted that the car loan program was offered to the complainant as a reward for
being the "Salesman of the Year." Moreover, nowhere in their pleadings did the [petitioners Grandteq
and Gonzales] controvert the claim that the [respondent Margallo] paid the down payment, entire first
amortization, insurance, and her share in the monthly amortizations for seventeen months, or the total
amount of ₱214,395.90 for the car. It is also uncontroverted that after the [respondent Margallo]’s
negotiated resignation, her car was resold to another employee for the original price. Under the
circumstances, the above-quoted contractual provision is null and void for being contrary to morals,
good customs, and public policy. The law overrides contracts which are prepared by employers to
circumvent the rights of their employees (Baguio Country Club vs. NLRC, 206 SCRA 643). Thus, the
above-quoted contractual provision does not bar the [respondent Margallo] from recovering her car
loan payments from the [petitioners Grandteq and Gonzales].

Like the NLRC, the Court of Appeals found that Margallo had a right to be reimbursed her car loan
payments, and the terms of the car loan agreement between Margallo and Grandteq should not be
applied for being highly prejudicial to the employee’s interest. Truly, the contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they want, and their agreement would have
the force of law between them. However, those terms and conditions agreed upon must not be contrary
to law, morals, customs, public policy or public order. Precisely, the law overrides such conditions which
are prejudicial to the interest of the worker. The law affords protection to an employee, and it will not
countenance any attempt to subvert its spirit and intent. The sheer inequality that characterizes
employer-employee relations, where the scales generally tip against the employee, often scarcely
provides him real and better options. Moreover, in controversies between a laborer and his master,
doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should
be resolved in the former’s favor.

ShufenCutiepie #126
Disrespect of Persons
Manaloto v. Veloso

FACTS: This case is an off-shoot of an unlawful detainer case filed by Ermelinda Manaloto et
al., who are the lessors of a residential house, which was leased to respondent Ismael Veloso III
at the rate of Php17,000 per month. The action for unlawful detainer was instituted because of
Veloso’s failure to pay the monthly rent from May 23, 1997 to December 22, 1998 despite the
petitioner’s repeated demands. Veloso, however, denied the nonpayment of rentals, alleging
that he made advance payments when he spent Php825,000 for the repairs done on the leased
property.
While the case was still on appeal, the petitioner lessors published the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, who ruled in favor of the lessors. Copies of the decision were
distributed to the homeowners of Horseshoe Village, which caused Veloso to be the talk of the
town and his good name to be greatly damaged. On appeal to the (RTC) MeTC decision was
reversed. [Respondent] was ordered to pay arrearages from May 23, 1997 up to the date of the
decision but he was also given an option to choose between staying in the leased property or
vacating the same, subject to the reimbursement by [petitioners] of one-half of the value of the
improvements which it found to be in the amount of ₱120,000.00. [Respondent] was also given
the right to remove said improvements pursuant to Article 1678 of the Civil Code, should
[petitioners] refuse to pay ₱60,000.00.
While judgment in the unlawful detainer case was pending before the RTC respondent filed a
Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages. The first cause of action was for damages
because the respondent supposedly suffered embarrassment and humiliation when petitioners
distributed copies of the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case to the homeowners of
Horseshoe Village while respondent's appeal was still pending. The second cause of action was
for breach of contract since petitioners, as lessors, failed to make continuing repairs on the
subject property to preserve and keep it tenantable.
CA- found that petitioners were indeed liable to respondent for damages. Hence, the instant
Petition for Review
ISSUE: Were the petitioners correct in publishing the MeTC’s decision while the case was still
on appeal?
HELD: No. The petitioners are obliged to respect the respondent’s good name even though
they are opposing parties in a detainer case. Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. A violation of such principle
constitutes an abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct. Petitioners are also expected to respect
Veloso’s dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of mind under Article 26 of the Civil Code.
JUST IN CASE U KNOW NA: A cause of action (for damages) exists if the following elements
are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right
of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. We find that all three elements exist in
the case at bar.

First, respondent filed the complaint to protect his good character, name, and reputation. Every
man has a right to build, keep, and be favored with a good name.

Second, petitioners are obliged to respect respondent's good name even though they are
opposing parties in the unlawful detainer case. As Article 19 of the Civil Code requires, "[e]very
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." The elements of an abuse of rights
under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

Petitioners are also expected to respect respondent's "dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind" under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of
birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the RTC should not have dismissed Veloso's
complaint for damages on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.

 The Court found that Veloso's complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action for
damages, as it stated a right in favor of Veloso (protection of his good name and
reputation), an obligation on the part of the lessors to respect his right, and an act or
omission by the lessors that violated his right.
 The Court, however, disagreed with the Court of Appeals' award of moral and exemplary
damages without the parties having the chance to present evidence.
 The Court emphasized that the burden of proof lies with the party claiming affirmative
relief, and mere allegations in the complaint are not equivalent to proof.
 The Court deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages and remanded the case
to the RTC for further proceedings on the first cause of action (damages).
NAPII #127
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc., v. Verchez, G.R. No. 164349,
January 31, 2006
Disrespect of Persons

FACTS: On January 21, 1991, Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the Sorsogon
Provincial Hospital for diabetes. On the same date, her daughter Grace Verchez-Infante (Grace)
immediately went to the Sorsogon Branch of the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI) whose services she engaged to send a telegram to her sister Zenaida Verchez-Catibog
(Zenaida) who was residing at Quezon City reading: "Send check money Mommy hospital."

As 3 days after RCPI was engaged to send the telegram to Zenaida, no response was received
from her, Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, this time thru JRS Delivery Service, reprimanding her
for not sending any financial aid.
Immediately after she received Grace’s letter, Zenaida, left on January 26, 1991 for Sorsogon.
On her arrival at Sorsogon, she disclaimed having received any telegram.

In the meantime, Zenaida and her husband, together with her mother Editha left for Quezon City
on January 28, 1991 and brought Editha to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City
where she was confined.
The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later or on February 15, 1991.
On inquiry from RCPI why it took that long to deliver it, a messenger of RCPI replied that he had
nothing to do with the delivery thereof as it was another messenger who previously was
assigned to deliver the same but the address could not be located, hence, the telegram was
resent on February 2, 1991, and the second messenger finally found the address on February
15, 1991.

On April 17, 1992, Editha died. Editha’s husband Alfonso Verchez, along with his daughters
Grace and Zenaida and their respective spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI before the
RTC Sorsogon for damages. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the delay in
delivering the telegram contributed to the early demise of the late Editha.

RCPI argues that the clause in the Telegram Transmission Form signed by Grace absolved it
from liability for any damage arising from the transmission other than the refund of telegram
tolls;
RTC ordered RCPI to pay 100,000 for moral damages and 20,000 for Atty’s Fees
CA AFFIRMED
RCPI

ISSUE: Whether RCPI should be held liable under Article 26 (2) of the NCC

RULING: YES. Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another.
RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the peace of
mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the appellate court, it
disrupted the "filial tranquility" among them as they blamed each other for failing to respond
swiftly to an emergency that involved the life of the late Mrs. Verchez, who suffered from
diabetes.

The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in this case are, therefore, analogous to acts
mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasi-delict
when courts may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
RCPI insists that the limited liability clause in the "Telegram Transmission Form" is not a
contract of adhesion since the stipulations were located in a particular space where they can
easily be seen, is sufficient notice to any sender where she could manifest her disapproval and
avail of the services of the other telegram operators.

A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of the parties imposes a ready-made form
of contract, which the other party may accept or reject, but which the latter cannot modify.

OMAR #128
Disrespect of Persons
St. Louis Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-46061 (November 14, 1984)
Facts: Petitioner St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S.
Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday Times of December
15, 1968, an advertisement with the heading “WHERE THE HEART IS." Doctor Aramil a
neuropsychiatrist and a member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial
Hospital, noticed the mistake. In a letter, Dr. Aramil expressed that the house depicted in the
subject advertisement belonged to him, and the said advertisement made it look like the house
belonged to another person. There was no authority from him for the use of his house as part of
a publicity stunt. That, the unauthorized use of his house for promotional gain was a
transgression to private property and is also damaging to his prestige as a medical professional.
The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of
advertising. He stopped publication of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil and
offered his apologies. However, no rectification or apology was published. Aramil's counsel
demanded from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of P110,000. In its
answer, St. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so desired,
rectification would be published in the Manila Times. It was published in the issue of the Manila
Times of March 18, 1969, a new advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real house. But
it did not publish any apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the error. Dr. Aramil filed
for a complaint for damages. RTC ruled in favor of Aramil. CA affirmed RTC ruling. Hence, the
present appeal.

Issue: Whether Petitioner’s erroneous ad is covered by Article 26 of the Civil Code?

Ruling: Yes. St. Louis Realty’s employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil
and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit
its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just
contented itself with a cavalier “rectification “. Persons, who know the residence of
Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting
his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private
life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and
mental anguish. Moreover, The Supreme Court ruled that the damages fixed by Judge
Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219
allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily
explained by Justice Gatmaitan, the acts, and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.

TN: Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy, and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute
a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

SOLIVEN #129

Sps Hing v. Choachuy

GR No. 179736, June 26, 2013
Disrespect of Person

F:
· Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B); that
respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901
and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners.
· Respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C.
On April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction/TRO.
· Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said
construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners’ property.
· Preliminary injunction application was denied.
· In order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents illegally set-up and installed on
the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners’
property
· Respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took
pictures of petitioners’ on-going construction
· The acts of respondents violate petitioners’ right to privacy. Petitioners prayed that respondents
be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal
surveillance.
· RTC granted the application for a TRO and directed respondents to immediately remove the
revolving camera that they installed at the left side of their building. MR denied.
· Respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to
 show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ. The CA explained that the right to
privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property
subject of the controversy is not used as a residence. The CA also said that since respondents
are not the owners of the building, they could not have installed video surveillance cameras.
They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality. Thus, they are
not the proper parties.

I: Whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy.

R: Yes. The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. The right to privacy is enshrined in our
Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as “the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of
one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a
person’s ordinary sensibilities.” It is the right of an individual “to be free from unwarranted publicity, or
to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily
concerned.” Simply put, the right to privacy is “the right to be let alone.”

The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them against the State’s abuse of
power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one,
not even the State, except “in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent
procedural safeguards,” can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.

The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code covers business offices where the public are
excluded therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a
legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though
they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or
even restricted by others. It includes “any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the
residence of another without the consent of the latter.” The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s
residence,” however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy.

A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such
individuals as are allowed to enter may come in.

Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his
house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. In Ople v. Torres, it was enunciated that “the
reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test:
(1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and
(2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.” Customs, community norms,
and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Hence,
the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis
since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection
and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where
there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy
would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s
residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under
Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
Tagayan #130

MVRS Publications, Inc., v. Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines

G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003
Disrespect of Persons

F: The Respondents in this case, the ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, a local federation
of more than 70 Muslim religious organizations and individual Muslims, filed a complaint for damages in
their own behalf and as a class suit, against petitioner MVRS Publications arising from an article
published in Bulgar, a daily tabloid, which allegedly contained libelous statement which asserts that
Muslims worship the pig as their god, and this was published with intent to disparage the Muslims and
Islam, as a religion in this country.

The trial court dismissed the complaint since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not
specifically identified. The CA, however, reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the
petitioners to pay damages to private respondent Muslims. Hence, the petition for review assailing the
findings of the CA (a) on the existence of the elements of libel; (b) the right of respondents Muslims to
file the class suit; and (c) petitioners' liability for moral, exemplary damages and other costs.

I: Whether this is an action for defamation (libel) or an emotional distress tort action

R: The Supreme Court held that there is no cause of action for defamation.

(DON’T DWELL OR RECITE THIS PART)

DEFAMATION DEFINED:
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or
reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to
diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or
opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or
reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational
interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the
plaintiff.

GROUP LIBEL/DEFAMATION:
The defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement
must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently
specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically
pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be.

The statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not specifically identify nor refer to any
particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication. Respondents
can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages.

The action likewise is not for emotional distress.

(FOCUS HERE!!!)
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Primarily, an emotional distress tort action is personal in nature, it is a civil action filed by an individual
to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. It has no
application in the instant case since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article of
Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article, assuming there was any, falls under the
principle of relational harm which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form
of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm which includes injuries to
individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. In their complaint,
respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the standing of Muslims in the community, especially to
their activities in propagating their faith in Metro Manila and in other non-Muslim communities in the
country. It is thus beyond cavil that the present case falls within the application of the relational harm
principle of tort actions for defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on which the concept of
emotional distress properly belongs.

WHEN PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER:

To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) The
conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct was
extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe.

Extreme and outrageous conduct means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in civilized society. The defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to
humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.

Emotional distress means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish,
shock, fright, horror, and chagrin.

Severe emotional distress in some jurisdictions, refers to any type of severe and disabling emotional or
mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so,
including posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia. The plaintiff
is required to show, among other things, that he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe that
no reasonable person could be expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an element of the cause
of action, not simply a matter of damages.

Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation,
embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances,
petty expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether the tort of outrage had been committed,
a plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of criticism, rough
language, and to occasional acts and words that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact
that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt,
is not enough.
TAGAYAN #130
Disrespect of Persons

MVRS Publications, Inc., v. Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines

G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003

FACTS: The Respondents in this case, the ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE
PHILIPPINES, a local federation of more than 70 Muslim religious organizations and individual
Muslims, filed a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit, against petitioner
MVRS Publications arising from an article published in Bulgar, a daily tabloid, which allegedly
contained libelous statement which asserts that Muslims worship the pig as their god, and this
was published with intent to disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country.

The trial court dismissed the complaint since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were
not specifically identified. The CA, however, reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered
the petitioners to pay damages to private respondent Muslims. Hence, the petition for review
assailing the findings of the CA (a) on the existence of the elements of libel; (b) the right of
respondents Muslims to file the class suit; and (c) petitioners' liability for moral, exemplary
damages and other costs.

ISSUE: Whether this is an action for defamation (libel) or an emotional distress tort action

RULING: The Supreme Court held that there is no cause of action for defamation.

The action likewise is not for emotional distress.

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Primarily, an emotional distress tort action is personal in nature, it is a civil action filed by an
individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his
character. It has no application in the instant case since no particular individual was
identified in the disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article,
assuming there was any, falls under the principle of relational harm which includes harm
to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from
the principle of reactive harm which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility
in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. In their complaint, respondents clearly
asserted an alleged harm to the standing of Muslims in the community, especially to their
activities in propagating their faith in Metro Manila and in other non-Muslim communities in the
country. It is thus beyond cavil that the present case falls within the application of the relational
harm principle of tort actions for defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on which the
concept of emotional distress properly belongs.

WHEN PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER:

To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that:
(a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff;
(b) The conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection
between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The
plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and severe.

Extreme and outrageous conduct means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society. The defendant's actions must have been so
terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.

Emotional distress means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief,
shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering
and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin.

Severe emotional distress in some jurisdictions, refers to any type of severe and disabling
emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by
professionals trained to do so, including posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis, psychosis,
chronic depression, or phobia. The plaintiff is required to show, among other things, that he or
she has suffered emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to
endure it; severity of the distress is an element of the cause of action, not simply a matter of
damages.

Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety,
vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether the tort of
outrage had been committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to be
hardened to a certain amount of criticism, rough language, and to occasional acts and
words that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the actor knows
that the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not
enough.

DEFAMATION DEFINED:
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's
character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to
injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to
excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is
injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute.
Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the
community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.

GROUP LIBEL/DEFAMATION:
The defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the
statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or
class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the
defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if
need be.

The statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not specifically identify nor refer
to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication.
Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly
resulting in damages.
Tinae
Case No. 131
Dereliction of Duty
Tuzon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90107, August 21, 1992

Facts:
· The Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan adopted Resolution No. 9
for the construction of the Sports and Nutrition Center through a fund-raising scheme by
soliciting 1% donation from the thresher operators (of palay) who will apply for a permit.
· Private respondent Saturnino T. Jurado sent his agent to the municipal
treasurer’s office to pay the license fee of P285.00 for thresher operators.
· Petitioners Mayor Tuzon and Mapagu (municipal treasurer) refused to accept the
payment and required him to first secure a mayor’s permit.
· Jurado ignored the requirement.
· Jurado filed with the CFI a special civil action for mandamus with actual and
moral damages to compel the issuance of the mayor’s permit and license.
· He filed another petition for declaratory judgment against the said resolution and
the implementing agreement for being illegal either as a donation or as a tax measure.
· Trial court upheld the measure, but it dismissed the claims for damages of both
parties.
· CA affirmed the validity of Resolution No. 9 and the implementing agreement. It
found Tuzon and Mapagu to have acted maliciously and in bad faith.They were ordered
to pay damages.
· The petitioners stress that they were acting in their official capacity.
 · Private respondent avers that the signing of the implementing agreement was not
a condition sine qua non to the issuance of a permit and license. Hence the petitioners’
unwarranted refusal to issue the permit and license despite his offer to pay the required
fee constituted bad faith on their part.
· PR further assails Resolution No. 9 and the implementing agreement for
compelling the thresher to donate something which he does not yet own and that it
contravenes the limitations on the taxing powers of local government units.
· PR also claims he is entitled to actual and moral damages from the petitioners
under Article 27 of the Civil Code, and to the payment of attorney’s fees as well, for their
refusal or neglect, without just cause, to perform their official duties.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are liable in damages to the private respondent for having
withheld from him the mayor’s permit and license because of his refusal to comply with
Resolution No. 9.

Ruling: No. Article 27 of the New Civil Code, reads:

Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an
action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

Purpose of Article 27
It has been remarked that one purpose of this article is to end the "bribery system, where
the public official, for some flimsy excuse, delays or refuses the performance of his duty
until he gets some kind of pabagsak." Official inaction may also be due to plain indolence or
a cynical indifference to the responsibilities of public service. According to Phil. Match Co.
Ltd. v. City of Cebu, the provision presupposes that the refusal or omission of a public
official to perform his official duty is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. In
any event, the erring public functionary is justly punishable under this article for whatever loss or
damage the complainant has sustained.

Why was Article 27 not applied in this case?

1) It has not even been alleged that the Mayor Tuzon’s refusal to act on the private
respondent’s application was an attempt to compel him to resort to bribery to obtain
approval of his application.
2) It cannot be said either that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were
motivated by personal spite or were grossly negligent in refusing to issue the permit and
license to Jurado.
3) It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to show that the
petitioners singled out the private respondent for persecution.
4) Neither does it appear that the petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing
to issue to Jurado the mayor’s permit and license he needed. The petitioners were not
Jurado’s business competitors nor has it been established that they intended to favor his
competitors. On the contrary, the record discloses that the resolution was uniformly
applied to all the threshers in the municipality without discrimination or preference.

The petitioners acted within the scope of their authority and in consonance with their
honest interpretation of the resolution in question. In the absence of a judicial decision
declaring it invalid, its legality would have to be presumed (in fact, both the trial court and the
appellate court said there was nothing wrong with it). As executive officials of the municipality,
they had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been repealed by the Sangguniang Bayan or
annulled by the courts.

This might be asked:

As to the validity of Resolution No. 9, the SC did not rule on it because it was not raised as an
issue in the petition. But the TC and CA ruled that it is valid. However, the SC said CA’s
explanation is oversimplified. Hence, the SC stated:

While it would appear from the wording of the resolution that the municipal government
merely intends to "solicit" the 1% contribution from the threshers, the implementing
agreement seems to make the donation obligatory and a condition precedent to the
issuance of the mayor’s permit. This goes against the nature of a donation, which is an
act of liberality and is never obligatory.

If, on the other hand, it is to be considered a tax ordinance, then it must be shown in
view of the challenge raised by the private respondents to have been enacted in
accordance with the requirements of the Local Tax Code. These would include the
 holding of a public hearing on the measure and its subsequent approval by the Secretary
of Finance, in addition to the usual requisites for publication of ordinances in general.

The private respondent complains that as a result of the petitioners’ acts, he was prevented
from operating his business all this time and earning substantial profit therefrom, as he had in
previous years. But as the petitioners correctly observed, he could have taken the prudent
course of signing the agreement under protest and later challenging it in court to relieve him of
the obligation to "donate."

TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 132

Vital-Gozon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129132, July 8, 1998

Note: Petitioner - head or chief of the National Children's Hospital

FACTS: Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987 ordered the reorganization of the
various offices of the Ministry of Health where Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was demoted to
Medical Specialist II from being the Chief of the Clinics of the National Children's Hospital.

De la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board but was ignored and she
brought this to Civil Service Commission. While the case was pending, the position of Chief of
Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose D. Merencilla.

Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided and declared by the Civil Service Commission that the
demotion/transfer of appellant de la Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialists II as
null and void, the resolution became final.

De la Fuente there upon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center Chief of
National Children's Hospital, demanding the implementation of the Commission's decision but
she did not answer Dr. de la Fuente's letters or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise
compliance, with the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission.
She instituted in the Court of Appeals an action of " mandamus and damages with preliminary
injunction" to compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of
the NCH to comply with the final and executory resolution but Vital-Gozon did not respond to the
order of the court. Thus CA declared, that the said resolution declared dela Fuente as the lawful
and de jure Chief of Respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, had no discretion or
choice on the matter; the resolution had to be complied with. A writ of execution was issued
thereafter.

I: Whether Dr. Vital-Gozon is liable for damages under Article 27 NCC.

R: YES. There can be no question that private respondent was entitled to be restored to his
position as Chief of Clinics by virtue of the final and executory decision of the Civil Service
Commission. Petitioner, as head or chief of the National Children's Hospital, then had the duty
to... see to it that the decision be obeyed and implemented. This she failed to do and private
respondent's two official demands for compliance with the Civil Service Commission's decision
were merely referred by petitioner to the Legal Department of the Department of Health; and
as... further noted by this Court in its decision in G.R. No. 101428, "she did not answer [private
respondent's] letters not even to inform him of the referral thereof to the Assistant Secretary [for
Legal Affairs]. She chose simply to await 'legal guidance from the DOH Legal Department.'"

That petitioner then committed an actionable wrong for unjustifiably refusing or neglecting to
perform an official duty is undeniable. Private respondent testified on the moral damages which
he suffered by reason of such misfeasance or malfeasance of petitioner, and the... attorney's
fees and litigation expenses he incurred to vindicate his rights and protect his interests. The
Court of Appeals which heard him gave full faith and credit to his testimony. Private respondent
declared that by reason of the "unjust action" or "refusal" of petitioner... when she did not
recognize, ignored and disregarded the final and executory Civil Service Resolution.

Petitioner's contention that she cannot be liable for damages since she was sued in her official
capacity is without merit. Whether petitioner was impleaded as respondent in an official
capacity, i.e., solely in her capacity as Chief of the National Children's Hospital, is best...
determined from the Petition as well as the Supplemental/Amended Petition. For one, in the
captions in both, she is named as one of the respondents without any express mention that she
was so sued in her "capacity, as Chief of the National Children's Hospital." For another, the...
allegations in the body of the Petition clearly show that she was sued in both her official and
private capacities. As to the former, paragraphs 1 and 7 respectively allege petitioner's
position as a public official, and specifically as "Head of the Children's Hospital;" her...
duty to restore private respondent to his position by virtue of the final decision of the
Civil Service Commission; and her refusal to allow private respondent to perform and
discharge his duties and responsibilities as Chief of Clinics. As to the latter, paragraph
16 of the Petition explicitly speaks of petitioner's personal liability.Moral damages
include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. They
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant‘s wrongful act or
omission. The instances when moral damages may be recovered are, inter alia, ―acts
and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 of the Civil Code,‖33
which, in turn, are found in the Chapter on Human Relations :

ART. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an
action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

Section 1 of Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers) of the Constitution:

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

It is thus evident that under Article 27, in relation to Articles 2219 and 2217 of the Civil
Code, a public officer, like petitioner herein, may be liable for moral damages for as long
as the moral damages suffered by private respondent were the proximate result of
petitioner’s wrongful act or omission, i.e., refusal to perform an official duty or neglect in
the performance thereof. In fact, if only to underscore the vulnerability of public officials
and employees to suits for damages to answer for any form or degree of misfeasance,
malfeasance or nonfeasance, this Court has had occasion to rule that under Articles 19
and 27 of the Civil Code, a public official may be made to pay damages for performing a
perfectly legal act, albeit with bad faith or in violation of the ―abuse of right doctrine
embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code concerning Human Relations
Principles: It is thus evident that under Article 27, in relation to Articles 2219 and 2217 of
the Civil Code, a public officer, like petitioner herein, may be liable for moral damages for
as long as the moral damages suffered by private respondent were the proximate result
of petitioner's... wrongful act or omission, i.e., refusal to perform an official duty or
neglect in the performance thereof.

In fact, if only to underscore the vulnerability of public officials and employees to suits
for damages to answer for any form or degree of misfeasance, malfeasance or...
nonfeasance, this Court has had occasion to rule that under Articles 19 and 27 of the
Civil Code, a public official may be made to pay damages for performing a perfectly legal
act, albeit with bad faith or in violation of the "abuse of right" doctrine embodied in the
preliminary... articles of the Civil Code concerning Human Relations.

Abisana Case #133

Torio v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978

F: On October 21, 1978, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed Resolution No. 156
whereby it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23,
1959. Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the town fiesta committee with Jose Macaraeg as
Chairman. The amount of P100.00 was also appropriated for the construction of two stages, one for the
zarzuela and the other for the cancionan. On January 22, while in the midst of the zarzuela, the stage
collapsed, pinning Vicente Fontanilla who died thereafter. The heirs of Fontanilla filed a petition for
recovery of damages. Defendant councilors contend that they are merely acting as agents of the
municipality.

I: Are the councilors liable for the death of Fontanilla?

R: No. Since it is established that the municipality was acting a proprietary function, it follows that it
stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation where officers are not held liable for the
negligence of the corporation merely because of their official relation to it. Thus, the municipal councilors
are absolved from any criminal liability for they did not directly participated in the defective construction of
the stage.
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or
neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief
against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

Baute
Case no. 134

Rico v. Deguma
G.R. No. 211861 (Notice), July 31, 2019
Article 27: Deriliction of Duty

Facts: Rico was the private complainant in Criminal Case for violation of the Philippine Highway
Act of 1953 raffled in the sala of Judge Mareiana Deguma, Branch 1, MTCC of Iloilo City. During
the proceedings, accused Leah and Venus Valencia filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which was
submitted for resolution on May 27, 2003. Rico repeatedly followed up on its resolution, but the
Demurrer remained unresolved for two (2) years, and was eventually denied by Judge Deguma.

Rico filed before the Office of the Court Administrator an Administrative Complaint against
Judge Deguma, alleging gross inefficiency and serious misconduct for deliberately failing to
resolve the Demurrer within the 90-day period under Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution.
Following this, Rico wrote Judge Deguma, requesting her to inhibit from the criminal case in
light of the administrative case he had filed against her.

Believing that Judge Deguma ignored the request, Rico filed a Motion to Recuse, citing the
criminal case he filed and the judge's close relationship with a sibling of one (1) of the accused.
He then filed another Motion requiring the receiving clerk to explain why his request supposedly
failed to reach the judge. When both these pleadings remained unresolved, Rico filed a
Supplemental Complaint before the Office of Court Administrator. Additionally, Rico filed a
second supplement to the Administrative Complaint, alleging that Judge Deguma violated Rule
20, Section 2 of the Rules of Summary Procedure and Rule 30, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
when she postponed a series of hearings in in the criminal case for around three (3) months.

Further, Rico filed a Complaint for damages against Judge Deguma alleging that the judge
maliciously delayed the resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence and persistently refused
resolving the two (2) other motions, violating Articles 27,15 32(8), and 32(19)16 of the Civil
Code and Article 207 of the Revised Penal Code. Rico also claimed that his right to information
was violated when his request for copies of the records in the criminal case was denied.

Judge Deguma justified the delay in resolving the motions asserting that when the Demurrer to
Evidence was submitted for resolution, she had just been appointed as a new judge who
inherited the docket of her predecessor, the presiding judge on the Demurrer then. If ever there
was delay, it was not deliberately done and there was no malice or bad faith on her part.

While these are pending, Rico filed another Administrative Complaint against Judge Deguma,
this time alleging that she denied his right to access the criminal case records, which was
resolved in Judge Deguma’s favor as Rico was not entitled to secure the copies since he did not
state his request's purpose.

The trial court found that Rico had no cause of action under Article 27 of the Civil Code,
explaining that Judge Deguma's resolution of the Demurrer to Evidence obviated the delay and
belied her "continuing refusal or indifference" to resolve the case. It also ruled that Rico had no
right to damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code, as this provision expressly precludes a
demand for damages arising from a judge's act or omission. CA affirmed the trial court’s
decision.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge is liable under Articles 27 and 32 of the Civil Code.

Ruling: No. Article 27 of the Civil Code only covers acts amounting to nonfeasance, or
the non-performance of a public duty. The alleged infractions of the respondent are not
actionable under this provision.

Rico anchors his claim on three (3) grounds: (1) respondent was negligent in delaying the
resolution of the incidents in the criminal case; (2) she violated his constitutional right to access
public records; and (3) she should have inhibited from the criminal case.

The first incident ascribes negligence to Deguma, which is not actionable under Article 27. In
this instance, Rico does not claim that Deguma absolutely did not act on the motions. As
correctly ruled by the trial court, there is no nonfeasance since the alleged delay has been
obviated by Deguma’s resolution of the motions.

Moreover, Deguma has sufficiently justified her delay in resolving the incidents. Both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals noted that Deguma was not yet the presiding judge at the time
the Demurrer to Evidence was filed; moreover, as a newly appointed judge, she had to study all
the cases in her docket while attending trainings.

Furthermore, Deguma cannot be held liable for denying Rico's request to access case records
since such denial was justified. Deguma reasoned that she denied the request because she
was using the records, with her personal notes attached. Moreover, as this Court noted in the
Resolution of the Administrative Complaint, the request's denial is justified because: (1) Rico did
not state his request's purpose; and (2) as the private complainant in the criminal case, he
should already have had a copy of the records he was requesting.

On the last incident, Deguma has the discretion on whether to inhibit from the criminal case.
Besides, Rico's allegation that she was biased in the accused's favor cannot stand: Deguma's
supposedly close relationship with the accused's sibling was not proven since Benuesa testified
that she only recognized Deguma because they used to work in the same building.

All these show that the infractions Deguma supposedly committed are not actionable
under Article 27 of the Civil Code. Quite the contrary, the records show that respondent's
actions, while they may have resulted in delays, were justified and reasonable.
Similarly, Deguma is exempt from liability under Article 32, being a judge who acted in
the exercise of her judicial functions and within the bounds of her jurisdiction. Her
actions do not violate any penal statute.

Note: ARTICLE 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action
for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.