TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 561
Art. III Sec 4: Libel as Unprotected Speech
BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER V. CA
Facts: Petitioner Hamada was the president and general manager of the
Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., which publishes the Baguio Midland
Courier, a weekly newspaper published and circulated in Baguio City and
other provinces within the Cordillera region. Petitioner Afable was Baguio
Midland Couriers editor-in-chief and one of its columnists who ran the column
In and Out of Baguio. On the other hand, private respondent Ramon L. Labo,
Jr., was among the mayoralty candidates in Baguio City for the 18 January
1988 local elections. Before the local elections, petitioner Afable wrote in her
column a series of articles dealing with the candidates for the various elective
positions in Baguio City. Respondent Labo alleged that in Afable’s column
made it appeared that he (private respondent) could not comply with his
financial obligations of Php27,000.00, yet, he will be donating millions to the
people. Mr. Labo filed criminal and civil actions for libel.
Issue: Whether the article made by the petitioner against the private
respondent constitutes libel.
Ruling: YES. it was reiterated that the public has the right to be informed on
the mental, moral, and physical fitness of candidates for public office.
However, the rule applies only to fair comment on matters of public interest,
fair comment being that which is true,or if false, expresses the real opinion
of the author based upon reasonable degree of care and on reasonable
grounds. The principles does not grant an absolute license to authors or
writers to destroy the person of candidates for public office by exposing the
latter to public contempt or ridicule by providing the general public with
publications tainted with express or actual malice.
MainPoint: the remedy of the person allegedly libeled is to show proof
that an article was written with the author’s knowledge that it was
false,or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or true.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 562
Art. III Sec. 4: Libel as Unprotected Speech
DISINI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Facts: These are consolidated petitions seeking to declare several
provisions of R.A. No. 10175 (The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012),
unconstitutional and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating
undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.
Issue: Whether Sec. 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10125 (Cybercrime Prevention Actof
2012) violate the right to free expression
Ruling: NO. Sec. 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10125 which punishes libel does not violate
the right to free expression. Libel is not protected speech; there is no
freedom to unjustly destroy the reputation of a decent woman by publicly
caliming that she is a prostitute. Xxx The constitutional guarantee against
prior restraint and subsequent punishment, the jurisprudential requirement of
actual malice and the legal protection afforded by privilege communications
all ensure that protected speech remains guarded.
MainPoint: as long as the expression or speech falls within the
protected sphere, it is the solemn duty of courts to ensure that the
rights of the people are protected.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 563
Art. III Sec. 4: Libel as UnproteCted Speech
PEOPLE V. SANTOS, MARIA RESSA, RAPPLER
Facts: The Manila Regional Trial Court Branch 46 in the Philippines found
Maria Ressa, the executive editor of the online news website Rappler, and
the journalist Reynalodo Santos Jr guilty of “cyberlibel”. The case was
brought following a 2012 Rappler story concerning the businessman Wilfredo
King’s alleged involvement in “human trafficking and drug smuggling,” as well
as his links to then-Supreme Court chief justice Renato Corona. The Court
convicted Ressa and Santos pursuant to Section 4(c)(4) of the 2012
Cybercrime Prevention Act (CPA), and sentenced them to imprisonment of
up to six years and a fine of PhP 200,000 (approximately USD 4,000).
Issue: Whether Maria Ressa, Santos & Rappler are liable for libel
Ruling: YES. Although the original article was published before the law was
passed and four years prior to the charges bring brought, the Court reasoned
that the article was “republished” on 19 February 2014 when Rappler
updated their article to fix a typographical error. Further, as the CPA does not
expressly include a prescriptive period to bring charges, the Court found that
Republic Act No. 3326 applies, which provides a 12-year prescriptive period.
Finally, the Court recognized the importance of the right to freedom of
speech under the Philippines Constitution, but found that the defendants
failed in their journalistic responsibilities to verify the facts and to publish the
requested clarifications or corrections. Considering the influence of online
news organizations, the Judge noted that the “keyboard is now mightier than
the pen,” making cyberlibel far more serious than traditional libel.
Main Point: the Court considered the importance of the right to freedom
of speech under the Philippines Constitution. The Court acknowledged
the right to “speak freely without fear of retribution or retaliation” and
the right of the press to “freely report news and opinion without undue
restraint.” Noting the case of Tulfo v. People: “This Court does not turn
a blind eye to some of them who twist the news to give an ambiguous
interpretation that is in reckless disregard of the truth.”
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 564
Art. III Sec. 4: Libel as Unprotected Speech
VELASCO V. CAUSING
Facts: Atty. Causing sent a direct message to complainant's son, Jomel A.
Velasco, through Facebook, a social networking site, stating as follows:
"[p]akitignan mo ang iyong ama, iho at huwag mo syang gayahin ha." The
message was accompanied by a link to a post published by Atty. Causing on
Facebook with the caption "Wise Polygamous Husband?" Thereafter, he
"shared" the subject post to his other Facebook account under the name
"Berteni 'Toto' Cataluña Causing" and to a Facebook group likewise under
the same name which is a public group with more or less 3,500 members.
Resultantly, the subject post generated negative reactions and comments
against complainant. Atty. Causing admitted that he published the subject
post in his Facebook account and sent the link thereof to complainant's son.
However, he denied harassing complainant and insisted that he was only
performing his duties as the "spokesman-lawyer" of his client.
Issue: Whether Atty. Causing should be held administratively liable for
publishing the subject post and photographs of complainant's petition
in the nullity case in his Facebook accounts.
Ruing: YES. Here, Atty. Causing had clearly violated Section 1221 of
Republic Act No. 8369, or the Family Courts Act of 1997, which prohibits the
publication or disclosure, in any manner, of the records of Family Court
cases. This is, in itself, a breach of his duties under Canon 1 as well as
Canon 13 and Rule 13.02 of the CPR as the subject post not only disclosed
confidential information regarding the nullity case, but also included his own,
strongly-worded opinion regarding complainant's character and the
circumstances surrounding the case.
Main Point: The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions
has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive."
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 565
Art. III Sec. 4: Obscenity as Unprotected Speech
MILLER V. CALIFORNIA
Facts: Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale
of "adult" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting
the distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's
brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings.
Issue: Whether the mass mailing campaign of obscene material violates
the right to free expression
Ruling: YES. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials did
not enjoy First Amendment protection. The Court modified the test for
obscenity established in Roth v. United States and Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, holding that "The basic guidelines for the trier of facts
must be: “(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest… (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patenty offensive way, sexual consuct specifically
defined by the applicable state law, and © whether the wrk, takes as a
whole lacks serious literacy, artistic, political of scientific value.”
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 566
Art. III Sec. 4: Obscenity as Unprotected Speech
GONZALES V. KALAW-KATIGBAK
Facts: Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the
Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition
that certain deletions were made and that it was shown on adults only. The
petitioner brought an action, claiming violation of their freedom of expression.
Issue: Whether the movie kapit sa Patalim violates their right to
freedom of expression being shown only to adult viewers only.
Ruling: NO. For freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the
exception. The power to impose prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather
the presumption is against its validity. Censorship is allowable only under the
clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. The
Board committed an abuse of discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty
and travail before the movie was classified as "For adults only" without
deletion. However there is not enough votes to consider the abuse of
discretion grave as it explained that there were reasons for its action
because of the scenes showing women erotically dancing naked and kissing
and caressing each other like lesbians. On the issue of obscenity, the SC
held that sex along is not necessarily obscenity, the test being whether,
using contemporary community standards, the dominant appeal us to
the prurient interest. (Miller v. California), but the court noted that
stricter rules could be followed for television
TINGKAHAN
CASENO. 567
Art. III Sec. 4: Obscenity as Unprotected Speech
PITA V. CA
Facts: an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila,
Ramon D. Bagatsing, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors,
newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene,
pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at
the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila. Among the publications
seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-
edited by petitoiner Leo Pita. Petitioner also filed an Urgent Motion for
issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure,
confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending
hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the
temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the
TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether the seizure violated the freedom of expression of the
petitioner
Ruling: NO. Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has
the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to
public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and
sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say,
that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but
rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any
constitutional protection.
Main Point: the Supreme Court declared that the determination of what
is obsence is a juridical function.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 568
Art. III Sec. 4: Obscenity as Unprotected Speech
BARNES V. GLEN THEATER
Facts: Glen Theatre and the Kitty Kat Lounge in South Bend, Indiana,
operated entertainment establishments with totally nude dancers. An Indiana
law regulating public nudity required dancers to wear "pasties" and a "G-
string" when they perform. The Theatre and Lounge sued to stop
enforcement of the statute.
Issue: Whether the prohibition on public nudity violates the first
amendment’s freedom of expression.
Ruling: NO. The Court was fractured and there was no majority opinion.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a plurality opinion, conceded that nude dancing
was a form of expressive activity. But he maintained that the public
indecency statute is justified despite the incidental limitations on such
expressive activity. The statute "furthers a substantial government interest in
protecting order and morality." The proscription on public nudity is unrelated
to the erotic message the dancers seek to convey.
Main Point: The statute "furthers a substantial government interest in
protecting order and morality." The proscription on public nudity is
unrelated to the erotic message the dancers seek to convey.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 569
Art. III Sec. 4: Obscenity as Unprotected Speech
FCC V. PACIFICA FOUNDATION
Facts: During a mid-afternoon weekly broadcast, a New York radio station
aired George Carlin's monologue, "Filthy Words." Carlin spoke of the words
that could not be said on the public airwaves. His list included shit, piss, fuck,
cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. The station warned listeners that
the monologue included "sensitive language which might be regarded as
offensive to some." The FCC received a complaint from a man who stated
that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son.
Issue: Whether the First Amendment deny government any power to
restrict the public broadcast of indecent language under any
circumstances
Ruling: No. The Court held that limited civil sanctions could constitutionally
be invoked against a radio broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with
sex and execration. The words need not be obscene to warrant sanctions.
Audience, medium, time of day, and method of transmission are relevant
factors in determining whether to invoke sanctions. "[W]hen the Commission
finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power
does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene." Stricter rules have also
been allowed for radio especially because of its pervasive quality and
because of the interest in the protection of children.
Main Point: limited civil sanctions could constitutionally be invoked
against a radio broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex
and execration. The words need not be obscene to warrant sanctions.
Stricter rules have also been allowed for radio especially because of its
pervasive quality and because of the interest in the protection of
children.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 570
Art. III Sec. 4: Obscenity as Unprotected Speech
RENTON V. PLAYTIME THEATER
Facts: The city of Renton, Washington, enacted a zoning ordinance that
prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating with in 1,000 feet of
"any residential zone, single-or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or
school." Playtime Theatres, Inc., challenged the ordinance and sought a
permanent injunction against its enforcement.
Issue: Whether the Renton ordinance violate either the First or
Fourteenth Amendment
Ruling: NO. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the zoning ordinance
did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that the
ordinance was a form of time, place, and manner regulation, not a ban on
adult theaters altogether. The Court reasoned that the law was not aimed at
the content of the films shown at adult motion picture theaters, "but rather the
secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community." The
Court found that the ordinance was designed to serve a substantial
governmental interest in preserving the quality of life and allowed for
"reasonable alternative avenues of communication."
Main Point: the ordinance was a form of time, place, and manner
regulation, not a ban on adult theaters altogether.