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Brand Strategy in Professional Sports: The Case of French Soccer Teams

Vincent Couvelaere a; André Richelieu b
a
Total France, Toulouse, France b Faculté des Sciences de l'Administration, Université Laval, Québec,
Canada
To cite this Article Couvelaere, Vincent and Richelieu, André(2005) 'Brand Strategy in Professional Sports: The Case of
French Soccer Teams', European Sport Management Quarterly, 5: 1, 23 — 46
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European Sport Management Quarterly,
Vol. 5, No. 1, 23 /46, March 2005
ARTICLE
Brand Strategy in Professional Sports:

The Case of French Soccer Teams
VINCENT COUVELAERE* & ANDRÉ RICHELIEU**

Total France, Toulouse, France & **Faculté des Sciences de l’Administration,
Université Laval, Québec, Canada
ABSTRACT Sports teams generate an emotional response from their fans that is
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stronger than in any other industry. In an effort to capitalize on the emotional

relationship they share with their fans, professional sports teams try to position
themselves as brands. This paper examines the strategies and actions four French soccer
teams have implemented in order to build and exploit their brand. Our results
underline that the development and implementation of a brand strategy should be
profitable for most professional soccer teams. However, sport managers need to see the
relevance of building strong brand equity for their club. Admittedly, performance on
the field remains important in the development of the team brand equity. That is why
professional sports teams need to build a strong brand that will enable them to go
through performance cycles.
A professional sports team has the potential to build what is known as brand
equity by capitalizing on the emotional relationship it shares with its fans
(Underwood, Bond, & Baer, 2001). Brand equity is defined in terms of the
marketing effects uniquely attributable to the brand: ‘‘when certain out-
comes result from the marketing of a product or service because of its brand
name that would not occur if the same product or service did not have that
name’’ (Keller, 1993, p. 1). The brand equity of a company becomes the
promise it makes to its customers to meet their expectations and deliver
value on a continuous basis (Aaker, 1994; Kapferer, 1998).
A brand has both an accounting and commercial value (Keller, 1993).
First, an accounting value in terms of asset valuation for balance sheet,
merger, acquisition or divestiture purposes (Barwise, Higson, Likierman,
& Marsh, 1989). Second, a strong brand translates into additional sales of
products and services because of brand awareness and recognition, as well as
Correspondence Address: André Richelieu, Marketing Department, Faculté des Sciences de

l’Administration, Université Laval, Québec, G1K 7P4, Canada. Email: andre.richelieu@mrk.ulaval.ca
ISSN 1618-4742 Print/ISSN 1746-031X Online # 2005 European Association for Sport Management
DOI: 10.1080/16184740500089524
24 Vincent Couvelaere & André Richelieu
the promise of quality customers associate with the brand (Kapferer, 1998).
With higher costs, greater competition and flattening demand, companies try
to increase the efficiency of their marketing expenses. Consequently,
managers need a better understanding of consumer behaviour in order to
make better marketing strategy decisions (Keller, 1993).
With this in mind, some teams have gone beyond their status as mere
sports teams and have established themselves as brands in their own right
(Bobby, 2002; Burton & Howard, 1999; Shannon, 1999). Examples include
Manchester United, Real Madrid, the New York Yankees and the Dallas
Cowboys. These clubs epitomize the success of an aggressive brand strategy
by well-endowed big market teams. However, some smaller market teams
are following suit, such as the Green Bay Packers in the National Football
League (Bobby, 2002; Shannon, 1999).
Sports teams generate an emotional response from their fans that
is stronger than in any other industry, with the exception of actors and
singers (Underwood et al., 2001). With a strong brand, a team can
potentially develop and nurture the loyalty of fans, which helps generate
additional revenues through the sale of a variety of goods and services
(Burton & Howard, 1999; Gustafson, 2001; Mullin, Hardy, & Sutton,
2000). For example, today, the Glasgow Celtic soccer club generates more
money from merchandise sale than from TV rights and sponsorship
combined (Worsley, 2001).1 The same can be said of Real Madrid with
merchandise sales of US$225 million in 2004, which is equal to the
total revenues from all sources in 2000 (The National Post, 2004). Indeed,
strong brands have a financial value that is inherent to their ability to
generate additional revenues for the company (Bousch & Loken, 1991;
Kapferer, 1998).
However, still relatively few teams seem proactive in building and
leveraging their brand, and a lot of academic work remains to be done on
brand equity in professional sports (Burton & Howard, 1999; Desbordes,
Ohl, & Tribou, 2001; Mullin et al., 2000). The purpose of our research is to
examine what strategies and actions French teams use to build and exploit
their brand.
Like in other European championships, the French Professional Soccer
League (LFP, first division) has a relegation/promotion format that
challenges the stability and continuity of soccer teams: Saint-Étienne just
came back in first division in 2004, Marseille has spent several years in
second division and the legendary Reims has disappeared in anonymity.
Furthermore, it is only recently that soccer teams in France changed from
non-profit to profit organizations, which means that French soccer teams
can now be managed as companies (Bolotny, 2002). Even though the
championship is not as unbalanced as in some European countries (Nether-
lands, Portugal, Scotland), huge disparities remain between top tier clubs
and the rest of the pack.
1
Also see the Glasgow Celtic web site, which is available at http://superstore.celticfc.net.
Brand Strategy in Professional Sports 25
Hence, what strategies and actions could these French teams use in order
to survive and eventually prosper? We will start our investigation with the
review of the literature. Second, we will underline the methodology
used. Third, we will present the results of the research. A discussion
will follow and we will end the paper with a conclusion and some
recommendations.
Literature Review
A brand is:
. . . a name, a word, a sign, a symbol, a drawing, or a combination of

these, which aims at identifying the goods and services of a company and
differentiates them from the competitors. (Kotler, Filiatrault & Turner,
2000, p. 478)
A brand is a differentiating asset for a company (Kapferer, 2001; Keller,

1993). Through its brand, a firm creates and manages customers’ expecta-
tions (Aaker, 1994). Successful brands are able to quickly establish a strong
emotional and personal relationship with the customer. As a result, this

relationship can potentially trigger trust and loyalty toward the brand
(Bedbury & Fenichell, 2002; De Chernatony, 2001). For this reason,
companies that own strong brands try to turn the customer’s attention to
their brand image (Aaker, 1994; Rijkenberg, 2002).
A brand is a promise a company makes to its customers, and this promise
is built on the coherence and continuity of the brand’s products (Aaker,
1994; Kapferer, 1998, 2001). High levels of brand awareness and a positive
brand image should increase the probability of brand choice, as well as
generate higher consumer loyalty and reduce vulnerability to competitive
marketing actions (Keller, 1993).
A sporting event is intangible, short-lived, unpredictable and subjective in
nature (Gladden, Milne, & Sutton, 1998; Holbrook & Hirschman, 1982;
Levitt, 1981). It is produced and consumed at the same time and it comes
with a strong emotional commitment from the fans (Mullin et al., 2000). In
this regard, a strong brand can and should help a professional sports team
capitalize on the emotional attachment with the fans, in order to instill trust
and trigger fan loyalty (Holt, 1995). In return, this trust and loyalty can help
the sports team leverage its brand equity and generate additional revenues
through the sale of goods and services, within and outside the sports arena,
through brand extension (Bottomley & Doyle, 1996; Dawar & Anderson,
1994; Gustafson, 2001; Sunde & Brodie, 1993). For example, global sales
for sports licensed products represented close to US$17 billion in 2001
(Sport Business Group, 2002).
Strong sports brands are able to make the customers live the brand at
different moments of their daily lives. Because the brand is relevant, it is able
to transcend the sports arena (Richelieu, 2004). This being said, the team
must have a minimum level of success on the field. Otherwise, it becomes
difficult to ask the fans to associate themselves with a losing team, success
being a fundamental dimension in sporting events (Future Brand, 2002); but
also because the symbolic benefits (needs for social approval or personal
expression and outer-directed self-esteem; Keller, 1993) attached to the
sports teams are limited or inexistent when the team is performing poorly.
Furthermore, being a brand can enable a sports team to position itself
against other teams and entertainment offerings in the market: sports teams
must be innovative and competitive in how they seduce their fans and ensure
both affordability and accessibility (Mullin et al., 2000). All the more so
since sports teams are battling for the entertainment money of customers
against other leisure alternatives, such as festivals, movies, restaurants,
traveling, etc (Burton & Howard, 1999). Why should the customers spend
their emotions, time and money on a sports team? Mullin et al. (2000, p. 73)
suggest that teams should build ‘‘a positive attitude with reciprocity’’: this
means that sports teams’ marketers should try to create a relationship based
on reciprocity between the fans and the team, which shows the fans that they
are appreciated and valued. In return, this can help increase the sense of
belonging of fans toward their team. For instance, some sports teams put
photos of their fans taken at the stadium on their web site, which is updated
regularly.
Based on a review of the literature (Aaker, 1994; Gladden et al., 1998;
Kashani, 1995; Keller, 1993; Richelieu, 2004; Underwood et al., 2001) and
the case studies we have already completed for soccer and hockey (Richelieu
& Couvelaere, 2005), there are three steps that lead to the development of
brand equity in professional sports: (1) Defining the identity of the sports
team; (2) Positioning the sports team in the market; and (3) Developing a
brand strategy (Figure 1). The identity and positioning represent what
Kashani (1995) refers to as the strategic construction of the brand; or, in
other words, the foundations of the brand strategy (Gladden et al., 1998). It
is only with a clear identity and strong positioning that marketing actions
become relevant and can then serve the purpose of leveraging the brand
equity of a sports team. As Keller (1993, p. 2) underlines:
. . . brand equity exists when the consumer is familiar with the brand and
holds some favourable, strong, and unique brand associations in memory.
We followed this conceptual model when analyzing the strategies and

actions used by French soccer teams in building and exploiting their brand
equity. So, how do French soccer clubs try to develop their brand equity?
And what can we draw from their initiatives in order to establish some
guidelines for professional sports teams?
Research Methods
The methodology is qualitative and the research is exploratory in nature. We
proceeded with in-depth case analyses of four French soccer teams.
Brand equity
- Co nstra int s
Brand strategy and - Intern al catal ys ts
- “Moderating”
ma rk etin g a c tion s - Ex t e rn a l c at alys t s
varia b les
Positioning - Tar g e t m a r k e t
- Differentiation of the brand
- A ttri butes of th e br and (v al ues)

Identity - Coherence between the values of
the sports team and the perception
of the fans
Figure 1. A framework for building sports teams’ brand equity

Source: Richelieu (2004)
Case Selection and Sample

There are 20 soccer teams evolving in the French Professional League (LFP).
Case analysis limits the number of companies that can be studied within
a reasonable timeframe, at a reasonable cost. Eisenhardt (1989) recommends
using between four and 10 cases in order to allow, on the one hand,
an in-depth analysis of each case, and on the other, a relative diversity to
increase the validity of the results. Cases should be selected according to
their ability to provide information: the major determinants for the number
of cases are the quality of the information the cases provide and the
observational capabilities of the researcher rather than the sample size
(Patton, 1980).
As such, we chose our teams by convenience. First, we looked for teams
that were initiating brand and/or marketing actions. Second, we wanted to
have a sample of teams that were at different levels of development brand
equity:
. . . given the limited number of cases which can usually be studied, it

makes sense to choose cases such as extreme situations . . . in which the
process of interest is ‘‘transparently observable’’. (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.
537).
Our sample is made up of Lille Olympique Sporting Club (LOSC), Racing

Club de Lens (RCL), Girondins de Bordeaux (FCGB) and Olympique de
Marseille (OM).
Data Collection and Data Coding

For the purpose of this study, we collected primary and secondary data. We
conducted in-depth interviews with vice presidents, marketing directors and
general managers of the four teams studied between December 2002 and
March 2003. Data were collected during one-on-one interviews, using a
semi-structured questionnaire that had open-ended questions. Four areas
were covered during the interviews: (1) general information on the sports
team; (2) marketing and brand strategy of the sports club; (3) catalyst factors
used by the team to build and leverage their brand; (4) constraints and
hurdles faced by the team in building and leveraging their brand.
Reliability of the instrument was reinforced by using a questionnaire
which remained the same in its structure and sequence of questions for every
interview. However, some minor adjustments had to be made in order to
take into account the specificities of all the teams studied.
Each one-on-one interview was held on the site of the respective team, and
lasted approximately an hour and a half. One or two persons were
interviewed for each team, depending on the expertise and availability of
the respondents (Matear, Gray, & Irving, 2000). The main criteria for
selecting a suitable subject in a case study is the quality of information:

therefore, the managers who were interviewed had a direct involvement in
their team brand and marketing endeavors. Moreover, the interviewees
should understand the purpose of the study and the measures solicited by the
interviewer (Cavusgil & Zou, 1994; Matear et al., 2000; Pellemans, 1999).
This is why we always interviewed the most suitable managers available.
The summary of each interview was written out 24 hours following the
interview, as recommended by Lofland and Lofland (1995). Also, to assure
the accuracy of the interview data, the managers were recontacted after the
interview by email or by phone in case of doubt about the information, or to
obtain additional information.
Moreover, in order to increase the validity of our data, scientific papers,
sports articles, team documents and media articles (print and electronic)
were consulted. In some cases, we were able to consult secondary data prior
to the interviews, which helped us collect more specific information
regarding the team and their brand endeavors during the interviews.
As far as data analysis is concerned, content analysis was used. For every
team, we analyzed the brand strategy, marketing actions and constraints
teams face, thus extracting the essence of the primary and secondary data
(Pellemans, 1999). The validity was ensured through the use of several
sources of information, the number of cases studied and the comparisons we
made between the cases (Perrien, Chéron, & Zins, 1986).
Results
Presentation of the French Soccer Teams
The four French teams we studied have a long history and tradition
(Table 1).
Table 1. An overview of the French soccer teams

Lille Olympique Sporting Racing Club de Lens Girondins de Bordeaux Olympique de Marseille
Club (LOSC) (RCL) (Girondins) (OM)
Web site address www.losc.fr www.rclens.fr www.girondins.com www.olympiquedemarseille.com
Established 1944 1906 1881 1899
Record French Champions (2) French Champions (1) French Champions (5) French Champions (9)
Cup Champions (5) League Cup (1) French Cup (3) French Cup (10)
League Cup (1) European Champions
League (1)

Key attributes Fighting spirit Unconditional passion for soccer Up-market brand Warm
(values) of the Solidarity Desire to win Tradition Emotional
brand Conviviality Search for perfection Finesse Sympathetic
Modernity Respect of others Prestige
Confidence
Humility
Formal brand Yes Yes Yes Yes

strategy Started in 2000 /2001 Started around 1998 Started around Started around 2002
1999 /2000
Capitalizing on relational Brand extension as a Brand extension as an Externalizing the brand strategy
marketing to develop the down- or mid-market brand up-market brand through partners (Adidas)
consumption for the LOSC brand
Lille Olympique Sporting Club (LOSC)2 was founded in 1944. It quickly

established itself as the best French soccer team after the Second World War,
winning two championships and five cups between 1946 and 1955. But
between 1955 and 2000, the club relegated six times in second division; at
best, it was a ‘‘middle of the pack’’ team. Back in first division in 2000, the
team, newly privatized, had great ambitions: becoming a modern sports and
entertainment company with a new stadium the managers intended to start
building at the end of 2003.
Racing Club de Lens (RCL),3 founded in 1906, became a professional
team in 1934. In 1969, with the economic recession in the region, the team
switched back to amateur status. For more than 20 years, RCL hit some
snags, finally reclaiming its place in first division in 1991. After winning the
championship in 1998, RCL rediscovered its ambitions: the team became
competitive at the national and continental levels and the budget increased
to 50 million euros for the 2002 2003 season. The focus was geared toward
/
developing new talent from within the organization, in order for the club to
remain competitive and financially viable.
Girondins de Bordeaux (FCGB),4 founded in 1881, became a professional
team in 1937. They won their first championship in 1950. It was in the 1980s
that the team had its best years, winning three titles (1984, 1985 and 1987),
two cups (1986 and 1987) and taking part in two Champions Cup semi finals
(1985 and 1987). However, excessive spending sent the club into bankruptcy
and second division in 1991. In the mid-1990s, the team got back on track. In
1999, the television group M6 bought the club and the same year, the
Girondins won their fifth championship in history. Today, M6 injects money
into the team for its operating budget, but also into a new training facility
that enables the team to develop new talent and remain competitive.
Olympique de Marseille (OM),5 founded in 1899, is one of the most
prestigious teams in France, if not the most. It has won nine championships,
10 cups and one Champions League cup. Olympique de Marseille lived its
glory days between 1986 and 1993, with Bernard Tapie as president. But
one week after its Champions League win against Milan A.C. in 1993, a
corruption scandal, combined with a huge deficit, sent the club into second
division. Since the 2002 2003 season, a new OM is being built. With new
/
management in place, the club wants to ensure financial viability and

autonomy by controlling expenses and increasing revenues.
Identity and Positioning

All four teams studied seem to know where they stand in terms of identity.
Some, however, appear to be more advanced than others in their reflection.
One of them is Lille Olympique Sporting Club.
2
The LOSC web site is available at www.losc.fr (accessed March 2004).
3
The RCL web site is available at www.rclens.fr (accessed March 2004).
4
The FCGB web site is available at www.girondins.com (accessed March 2004).
5
The OM web site is available at www.olympiquedemarseille.com (accessed March 2004).
Following market research, Lille Olympique Sporting Club identified four

key values the fans wanted the club to promote, namely fighting spirit,
solidarity, conviviality and modernity. These values are displayed on the
LOSC web site: ‘‘LOSC intends to rely on these four values in order to create
a universe around the brand and develop the purchase of LOSC products
and services’’ (LOSC Marketing Director). For instance, conviviality refers
to the interaction between the team and its fans, and the involvement of the
players in their community. In this regard, LOSC sponsors youth soccer
teams in the Lille region, which play with a LOSC badge on their jersey. This
can potentially trigger the sense of belonging to the team among young
customers who can become LOSC fans, if they are not already, and remain
fans for years to come (Bobby, 2002; Burton & Howard, 1999; Holt, 2002;
Mullin et al., 2000).
The identity of RCL is strongly linked to its values, which the managers
defined in 1997. These fundamental values are: (1) the unconditional
passion for soccer (RCL fans live and die with the team); (2) the desire to
win; (3) the search for perfection; (4) respect for others; (5) confidence; and
(6) humility. ‘‘The objective is to position the club as a convivial sport entity
that tries to win, makes people, young or old, proud to be fans of RCL,
during but also before and after the games’’ (RCL General Manager). In
other words, their objective is to provide fans with the experiential and
symbolic values defined by Keller (1993). Even though it has entered the
modern era of soccer with its view on the future, RCL wants to remain close
to its fans. RCL aims at nurturing an identity that is coherent with its
history, fans and core values:
Like in England, in Lens, people are fans for life. Fans accept the good and
the bad times, even though we would all prefer to have only good
moments. We cherish and protect our club . . . (RCL General Manager)
Thus, the team is able to trigger emotional value and psychological

proximity with its fans (Kapferer, 2001), by transcending the sports arena,
gender, age and social differences (Burton & Howard, 1999). In other
words, the team becomes more than a soccer team; it remains a part of the
fans’ everyday life (Richelieu, 2004).
The managers of Girondins de Bordeaux are aware of the importance of
their brand. They want to preserve its identity which was built over time and
is based on certain values: essentially an up-market brand, with tradition,
finesse and prestige. This brand identity is strongly linked to the region and
its history. Indeed, Bordeaux is a ‘‘bourgeois’’ city with old traditions.
Furthermore, in order to reinforce the identity of the Girondins brand and
nurture its up-market positioning, the style of the logo has been modified,
which provides a British look to it. The scapular and the traditional colors
(white and navy blue) have been kept. The founding date has been added to
the logo in order to reinforce the traditional dimension of the brand (see the
FCGB web site).
The identity of the Olympique de Marseille brand is coherent with the

values of the city, as underlined by the Marketing Director of the team
during the interview: ‘‘warm, emotional and sympathetic’’. The managers of
the team believe they have a strong brand that stands for itself:
OM is in harmony with the values of the city, a melting pot, a welcoming

city, looking toward the South, sometimes lazy, a little bit crazy, but
always very passionate and sympathetic for a lot of people. (OM,
Marketing Director)
What they need to do is monitor the evolution of the image of the brand,
without it being affected by on-field performance. Indeed, a brand evolves
over time and managers need to make sure this evolution is in line with the
attributes of the brand they want to promote (Aaker, 1994; Kapferer, 1998).
The OM brand changes with the city: since 2002, the club has evolved
toward a better image thanks to improved efficiency, professionalism, rigor
and transparency.
Marketing and Brand Strategy

All four French soccer teams studied appear to have not only a marketing
strategy, but also a brand strategy. These brand strategies have been
implemented in the late-1990s and beginning of 2000.
In the case of LOSC, the brand strategy is based on the vision of the
managers and the four values that have been identified through market
research: fighting spirit, solidarity, conviviality and modernity. Since the
identity and positioning, which make up the strategic construction of the
brand (Gladden et al., 1998; Kashani, 1995), are clear, it becomes easier to
capitalize on and leverage the brand equity through catalyst factors we will
underline in the next section.
RCL has transformed its marketing activities with the idea of leveraging
its values, while shaking up its image of a friendly club that is not always
taken seriously. This is a challenge in terms of brand strategy: if the team
does not want to alienate its original core fan base and because it remains a
regional brand, the RCL brand is, in a way, limited to remaining a down- or
middle-market brand. This has an impact, among other things, on its
merchandising initiatives across France (Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001;
Mullin et al., 2000). By down- or middle-market brand, we refer to a brand
that targets and is positioned for lower or middle class consumers (Kotler et
al., 2000).
The brand strategy of Girondins de Bordeaux is in line with the identity of
the city of Bordeaux and its region. Anchoring the brand in the local
environment can help leverage it in order to increase the association of the
fans to the brand. The actions undertaken by the team lie on the
development of different brands that target soccer fans, but also a regional
clientele looking for an up-market brand. By up-market brand, we refer to a
brand that targets and is positioned for upper class consumers (Kotler et al.,
2000). The brand extension of Girondins de Bordeaux (in other words the
use of the brand name for different product categories and product lines) is
coherent with the identity and positioning of the Girondins (Bottomley &
Doyle, 1996), which will be presented in the next section.
As far as OM is concerned, their brand strategy has been implemented in
the late-1990s. The club first decided to internalize its activities (merchan-
dising, shops, etc), then chose to outsource. In this regard, a small marketing
team collaborates with partners in relation to sponsoring and merchandis-
ing. This strategy aims at increasing profitability and reducing the
uncertainty associated with the team’s performance on the field. A key
partner is Adidas for both the design and distribution of team merchandise.
Catalyst Factors used by French Soccer Teams

We define catalyst factors as variables that can help a professional sports
team leverage its brand. Catalyst factors represent a set of tools a team might
use in order to establish itself as a brand and reinforce its brand image.
Internal factors usually belong to the sports team or are controlled by it.
External factors are environmental elements or factors that are out of the
immediate control of the sports team. These factors are presented in Table 2
(Richelieu, 2004).
We will now have a closer look at the catalyst factors on which French
soccer clubs try to capitalize in order to leverage their brand. When
analyzing the catalyst factors used by the four French soccer teams, one
element starts to emerge: Merchandising. Since the late-1990s/beginning of
2000, French soccer teams have improved their merchandising initiatives to
the point that in some instances, they have no reason to envy their British or
North American counterparts. These initiatives strengthened and were
coherent with the identity and positioning of the respective French clubs
(Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001; Mullin et al., 2000). Merchandising is not
an end in itself and an overextension could dilute the brand (Aaker, 1994;
Keller, 1993). Examples include brand extensions that are not considered
legitimate, motivated mainly by profit, which stretch the brand so thin, far
beyond the area of expertise of the company (Kapferer, 1998): Manchester
United getting into utility services and banking, Olympique Lyonnais
opening barber shops, driving schools and competing with Pizza Hut for
home delivery of pizzas. However, merchandising helps teams take
advantage of an established brand and generate much needed additional
revenues (Burton & Howard, 1999; Mullin et al., 2000; Sport Business
Group, 2002; Worsley, 2001).
Specifically, Lille Olympique Sporting Club has an exclusive agreement
with Décathlon stores, which design and distribute the team jersey under the
Kipsta brand. This strategic partnership enables LOSC to have a unique
jersey compared to the teams sponsored by Adidas, Nike, Puma or Umbro.
Also, playing with a unique jersey enhances the value of the LOSC brand.
From a distribution perspective, this agreement is part of a marketing
strategy used to leverage the LOSC brand and position it as a reference in
Table 2. Catalyst factors, constraints and ‘‘moderating’’ variables in building and leveraging
a sports team brand
Catalyst factors Constraints and ‘‘moderating’’ variables
Internal catalyst factors Constraints
‘‘Fans bonding with the team’’ Fashion

Entertainment experience for the fans Trend phenomenon
Team’s involvement in its community
Competent managers Decrease in loyalty
Physical facilities Decrease in customer loyalty
toward brands
Marketing actions Less and less loyalty from the
On-field jerseys players toward their team
Sale of team’s merchandise
Players’ management Life cycle of sports leagues
Promotional campaigns Maturity or decline phase of
Commercial partnerships professional sports leagues
Customer Relationship
Management programs (CRM) General entertainment offering
Competition from other

entertainment alternatives
External catalyst factors
Market size ‘‘Moderating’’ variables

Access to a large fan base and
lucrative TV deals Legal framework
Centralization in managing the
Industry changes league’s brands
Merger of sports with the Legal status of the team
entertainment and communications
industries Finances
Resources of the team
Technological advances
Development of new means of On-field performance
communications Winning!
Source: Richelieu (2004)
France, and maybe even in Europe because it offers LOSC some promising
opportunities for the distribution of LOSC merchandise.6 However,
numbers on merchandise sales were not provided by the managers we
interviewed.
RCL works with its equipment maker, Nike, for its line of soccer
merchandise. The team has recently returned to its original red and yellow
home jersey, which will help crystallize a coherent and stable visual identity,
6
See www.lavoixdunord.com/vdn/journal/plus/sport/foot/losc/0817mag2.shtml (accessed December
2002).
and reinforce the identity and visibility of the RCL brand, as underlined by
the General Manager of the team:
The yellow is more yellow, the red is redder for a better contrast between
the two colours. Also, the logo of the sponsor fits well on the jersey that
way.
RCL also develops its line of complementary products, such as food

products (milk; L’Équipe, 2000). These extensions involve affordable goods
which capitalize on the strong attachment of RCL fans and take into account
the limited buying power of local consumers. As a result and for the time
being, we believe the team should capitalize on their core customers through
a down- or middle-market brand that is coherent with the attributes of the
brand before trying to extend to an up-market brand, if it becomes their
goal. Otherwise, it could appear to the customers as ‘‘fuzzy’’ positioning
(Kotler et al., 2000). In 2002 2003, the team generated 5 million euros or
/
15% of its total revenues from merchandise sales, which is among the
highest rates for French soccer clubs.
Another example of building brand equity through brand extension is the
Girondins de Bordeaux. The Girondins de Bordeaux (2004) soccer team has

four different brands: the game brand (Adidas Collection), a sportswear
brand sold in superstores (Club Collection), a leisure brand (Girondins Sport
Collection) and an upscale brand (Scapulaire Collection). The legitimacy of
this extension, coherent with the brand image, enables the Girondins to
protect and enhance its brand equity, especially in the long term, in the
region and eventually in France and Europe. However, the team wants to
preserve its up-market brand and is very selective in its distribution channels,
especially outside the Bordeaux region. In 2002 2003, the club generated 3
/
million euros from the sale of its licensed merchandise and sold 30,000
official jerseys.
Olympique de Marseille has outsourced its marketing and brand
strategies. One of its strategic partners is Adidas, which designs and
distributes the team jersey and other OM merchandise. For OM, it is a
way to leverage the brand through the distribution channel of Adidas in
France, Europe and even internationally. Olympique de Marseille capitalizes
on the distribution channel of Adidas to increase its visibility and leverage its
brand (Motion, Leitch, & Brodie, 2003), even though, as the Marketing
Director mentioned ‘‘in 10 years, the team has probably lost all the
international lustre it had gained in 1993’’. OM and Adidas strengthen
and leverage each other’s brand (Speed & Thompson, 2000; Sport Business
Group, 2002). Also, as explained by the Marketing Director of the club, the
brand extension of OM remains within the sports arena in order to avoid
diluting the brand and spreading resources all over the place. In 2002 2003,
/
OM generated close to 20 million euros in merchandise sales and sold

200,000 official jerseys. This makes the managers of the team say that ‘‘OM
can compete with anyone in terms of merchandising. OM is selling more
jerseys than Arsenal’’.
Another area that is becoming strong for the French soccer clubs studied is
the teams’ involvement in their community. Indeed, they are all increasing
their activities and involvement in the city or region where they are
established. We talked earlier of the LOSC, which sponsors youth soccer
teams in the Lille region. Other teams are following suit in order to
strengthen the emotional connection with their fans, develop a good citizen
image and move the younger fans along the emotional continuum by getting
closer to them (Burton & Howard, 1999).
However, the entertainment experience is still underdeveloped among
French soccer teams. Even though a soccer game is mostly a ritual in Europe,
the entertainment experience could be upgraded, because fans are potentially
both consumers and actors of the sporting event (Holt, 1995), especially in a
postmodern age (Holt, 2002). Being part of the event is a ‘‘must’’ from the
standpoint of the social actualization of the fans (Keyes, 1998). The game in
itself is the core product over which a team (marketer and front office staff)
does not have a lot of control. The entertainment surrounding the game,
before, during or after the soccer match, is an auxiliary feature or an
extension (Mullin et al., 2000) that can potentially enhance the overall
experience of the fans and the brand equity of the team, and one that a team
can funnel into its own entertainment script.

Although improvements have already been made, some work needs to be
done on the web sites of French soccer teams, to help leverage the teams’
brands and build virtual communities beyond their local market and give
fans that do not live near their team’s market the opportunity to maintain
and increase their affiliation with their club (Mullin et al., 2000; Sport
Business Group, 2002).
Finally, we should mention that French soccer teams do not use a lot of
advertising, with the exception of ads for season ticket and game day sales. A
major reason is to avoid being perceived as too mercantile to the detriment
of what happens on the field.
Constraints and ‘‘Moderating’’ Variables

Constraining factors are variables that can stop or prevent a team from
leveraging its brand. Constraining factors can be seen as obstacles in a
team’s pursuit to establish its brand. ‘‘Moderating’’ variables can help a
team build and reinforce its brand equity, as much as they can hurt the
team’s brand equity or restrain its expansion. We refer to them as
‘‘moderating’’ variables because of (1) the relative lack of control teams
have on these variables; and (2) the impact on brand equity that is both
generally difficult to assess for sports teams and ambivalent (Table 2;
Richelieu, 2004).
Overall, the development of the brand equity of French soccer clubs is
affected by several constraints in relation with TV rights, brand ownership,
stadium management and the mode of operation of the League (Bolotny,
2002).
First, French soccer clubs do not control TV rights. The owner is the
French Professional League (LFP), which shares the revenues equally among
the teams, based on the principle of solidarity in order to preserve the
interest of the championship. This centralized approach penalizes the most
popular teams, all the more so since clubs cannot exploit the images
associated to their home games. This limits the development of the brand
equity of the team on both TV and the Internet.
Second, French soccer clubs do not own their brand. It belongs to the
sports association that oversees the club (one sports association per team),
not to the commercial company. This does not stop the clubs from building
and leveraging their brand equity, but owning their brand would provide
them with a legal security and an additional leverage.
Third, with the exception of A. J. Auxerre, French soccer teams do not
own the stadium in which they play. This is a major brake on their
development because they cannot invest as they wish in their ‘‘show room’’.
They must rely on the local authorities, which own the stadium and are
bureaucratic. Long-term leases, which allow teams to invest in the
development of the stadium facilities, seem to be a realistic and interesting
solution for clubs which want to use their stadium as an additional leverage
for their brand.

Moreover, the League has no control on marketing or branding actions
initiated by the clubs and does not provide either resources or marketing
support to its clubs. Thus, the system of the French soccer league opens the
door to huge discrepancies between the most dynamic teams and the others
and it does not ensure the coherence of the overall League brand. At the
same time, it might encourage French soccer teams to initiate marketing
actions in order to compete against other European brands.
We should add that all four French soccer teams studied have gone
through some financial problems, one of which (Marseille) is still working
its way out of trouble. As the Marketing Director of the club told us:
Everybody mentions Manchester United and how they were able to

develop their brand. Great! But OM does not have the resources and does
not operate in an environment as conducive to developing its brand as
Manchester United.
The reality is that financial stability is key before resources are allocated to
brand strategy and marketing actions (Bobby, 2002; Mullin et al., 2000).
The main challenge French soccer teams face are their modest resources
either at the national (LOSC, RCL) or European level (FCGB, OM).
In another area, winning is important because the fans need hope in order
to become emotionally involved with the team (Bobby, 2002; Waltner,
2000). A manager of Lille Olympique Sporting Club told us: ‘‘If we relegate
in Second Division, that could well be the point of no return, as fans might
start supporting another team, never to come back to us’’. But winning also
increases the value of the brand, from a financial and marketing perspective.
And in this regard, the style of play should be coherent with the identity of
the brand (Sport Business Group, 2002). For instance, Girondins de

Bordeaux has a tradition of an elegant style of play which fits well with
the image of the city and the team of Bordeaux.
Discussion
The four cases studied present various approaches in developing a sport
team brand equity. These differences come from different identities and
positioning, catalysts that teams capitalize on, the constraints they face, and
different stages teams have reached in developing their brand equity as we
will see when we introduce Figure 2.
The LOSC case illustrates the challenges in building a brand which cannot
rely on a strong identity yet and whose history is too distant to capitalize on
(Mazur, 2002). Moreover, the development of the brand is potentially
weakened by the uncertainty surrounding the team. In fact, even though
LOSC has existed for 60 years, the team really started building its brand
equity in 2000, thanks to good performance on the field in France. The
strategic construction of the brand they initiated was a critical first step in
building and leveraging a young brand which still lacks credibility against
the more established soccer brands in France (Bordeaux, Lyon, Marseille

and Paris Saint-Germain for instance; Gladden et al., 1998). The LOSC
brand is an emerging brand which needs to increase its regional presence and
reinforce its national image. Its potential is good, but the team will have to
overcome some hurdles, such as ensuring more consistency on the field and
finalizing the new stadium project. As mentioned by the Marketing Director
of the team: ‘‘The club is now on top of a hill . . . it either takes off or it
crashes’’.
The RCL case underlines that the development of the brand image of a
team strongly depends on the roots and social characteristics of the local
community (De Chernatony, 2001; Kapferer, 2001). RCL remains a regional
brand, which carries values that are coherent with the popular dimension of
the region. As Serge Doré, the General Manager mentioned:
What is possible in the region is not necessarily feasible in Lyon or

Bordeaux, where the customers are more ‘‘bourgeois’’. In the northern
part of France, when people buy a Lens product, they feel like they
provide the club with additional financial means. (L’Équipe, 2000)
If the team continues to perform well at the French and European level, a
national positioning of the brand could be done, without alienating local
fans, respecting in this regard the family spirit and the historic values of the
RCL. That is why the club could start by expanding its brand in French
regions where the people share similar values as those in the Lens region,
such as in industrial zones.
The case of Girondins de Bordeaux is interesting. The club is a regional
brand from the south western part of France, but it also has the potential to
become a national brand, because of its glory days in the 1980s. In this
- F i n an c i a l re s ou r c e s
Level - Players’ management
of - Exposure in the media
brand
+ International brand
Objective: Export and globalize the brand

On-field ⇒ Increase brand recognition and presence worldwide
performance Means: International strategic partnerships (with equipment
+
makers, distributors, media, foreign clubs), tours or
OM tournaments abroad, hiring of international stars, Web site
tailored for different countries and languages, opening of
stores abroad
National brand
+
FCGB
Objective: Reinforce the national positioning
⇒ Increase brand recognition and presence

RCL Means: National strategic partnerships (equipment makers, distributors,
+ media), new design for team jersey or launching of a vintage collection,
Web site hiring of star players
Regional brand
LOSC
Objective: Build and perpetuate the brand

⇒ Work on the brand image, build fan loyalty and increase regional
presence
Means: Strategic construction of the brand, CRM, advertising campaigns,
distribution partnerships in order to increase the regional presence, leverage
Local brand the social identity of the brand
Time since implementation of brand strategy
Figure 2. Conceptual framework for the development of French soccer team brands
Source: Adapted from Couvelaere (2003)
regard, Girondins de Bordeaux can capitalize on a rich history and a good

record on the field to build and leverage its brand. In fact, consistently strong
performances on the field could help the team generate a national interest,
which would be reinforced by an up-market positioning and values such as
prestige (Future Brand, 2002). The Girondins de Bordeaux brand could very
well become a national brand if the team regularly ranks among the top
three teams in France, combined with a solid performance at the continental
level. But the managers are realistic. As the Marketing Director of the club
mentioned:
In Europe, there are two types of clubs: those that take part in the
Champions League and the others. That is why, right now, Bordeaux can
only pretend to be a regional and national brand.
And adding to this: ‘‘A great soccer club needs four things: a rich history, a
strong record, loyal fans and a good stadium’’. Bordeaux is trying to
capitalize on these four assets to leverage its brand.
Olympique de Marseille underlines that a team with a rich and glorious
past can capitalize on its record in order to remain a national brand
and try to leverage its potential at the continental and international level:
telling the story helps emphasize the values of a company in the eyes
of the customers (Mazur, 2002; Muniz & O’Guinn, 2003; Travis &
Branson, 2000). Outsourcing the merchandising of the team by using
complementary partners is a strategy which aims at reinforcing the visibility
and the presence of the brand, while capitalizing on the reputation
and distribution channels of partners at a low cost. Through co-branding
and licensing agreements, especially with Adidas, OM is able to generate
more value for its brand (Motion et al., 2003). In France, OM is already
a strong established brand, which can rely on the loyalty of its
fans. However, the team will have to perform again at the highest level
in European competitions in order to increase its notoriety and visibility
beyond France, coupled with sound management. This last point is
critical and vital to the ability OM will have in leveraging its brand
in the future. Repeated financial scandals in the 1990s have led to
the relegation of the club in second division and the liquidation of
the assets of the team. The credibility of the OM brand depends on
the ability current and future managers will have in stabilizing the club.
Furthermore, we believe that a sports team could reach four levels of
brand equity along the ‘‘brand equity pipeline’’: there are local, regional,
national and international sports teams brands (Richelieu, 2004). A team
could use certain tools to leverage its brand depending on the stage at which
it is, as well as its objectives at this stage.
The Local Brand

The objective of a local brand is to strengthen its position locally and move
toward becoming a regional brand. In this regard, a club in this situation
should work on the strategic construction of the brand (identity and

positioning) in order to increase the loyalty of its fan base and try to seduce
potential fans.
As far as the marketing tools are concerned at this stage of brand
development, merchandising is important as the brand needs to increase its
visibility; local and regional distributors could help the club in this regard.
Customer Relationship Management (CRM) can be beneficial as it could
help the club increase the loyalty of the fans through customized offering.
However, the administrative costs of a CRM program could become
prohibitive, especially for a local sports team brand. Furthermore, the social
identity of the team represents an interesting leverage as it can increase the
sense of belonging of the fans to the team. Finally, promotional campaigns
could enable the club to position itself against other sport or entertainment
alternatives, as well as promote team merchandise.
The Regional Brand

The regional brand should aim at strengthening its regional position.
Management should work toward increasing the brand recognition and
strengthening its positioning nationally. In order to achieve this, the regional

sports team brand can use strategic partnerships for its merchandising and
introduce new models of jerseys or a vintage collection that could appeal to
die hard fans, collectors and fashion fans (hip hop, rap). The regional brand
could also try to increase its television exposure, improve its web site in
order to build a brand community that transcends the local and regional
markets and hire national star players.
The National Brand

The national brand needs to reinforce its position nationally and looks at
becoming an international brand. A national brand could use different levers
in this regard: (1) strategic partnerships with other clubs for co-branding or
the creation of subsidiaries abroad (Newcastle United in Hong Kong,
Amsterdam Ajax in South Africa; Browne, 1999; Sport Business Group,
2002); (2) strategic partnerships with global companies, such as equipment
makers, distributors, media, which can help promote the brand abroad; (3)
tours or tournaments abroad, such as the Champions World Series, held in
North America in the summer of 2004, which involved among others
Manchester United, A. C. Milan, Glasgow Celtic and Bayern Munich; (4)
the hiring of a foreign player who is a star in his country (Nakata in Japan)
or a player that already has a worldwide appeal (Beckham); (5) a recognized
sports league can represent a leverage for itself and its portfolio of teams
abroad. Examples include the National Basketball Association (NBA) and
the European Champions League of soccer. We should mention that the first
three levers presented in this section can mostly be used by the most
powerful clubs, which can truly leverage their brand equity internationally.
The International Brand

The goal of the international sports team brand is to remain competitive
globally and develop its presence on different international markets, using
the levers mentioned under the national brand section. The achievement of
an international brand is to become a true global brand, such as Real Madrid
or Manchester United. In this regard, teams which evolve in sports that have
a strong international appeal have a better chance of becoming global
brands; for instance, soccer teams in comparison with ice hockey teams or
American football teams. Finally, in order to evolve through the brand
equity pipeline, sports teams are influenced by variables that they do not
control, the most important of which is on-field performance, which impacts
financial resources, the hiring of star players and media exposure (Figure 2).
Conclusion
In this paper, we have tried to underline that the development and
implementation of a brand strategy could help teams grow, expand and
provide them with long term commercial viability. It is up to sports teams’
managers to realize the relevance of building their club brand equity. We

have insisted on the strategic construction of the brand, prior to implement-
ing a brand strategy using internal and external levers, while trying to
minimize the effects of some constraints on the brand equity of the sports
team.
We chose French soccer clubs because they are facing strong competition
from other European clubs, in addition to having to cope with scarce
financial resources and reduced visibility. The implementation of a brand
strategy and an increase in revenues associated with the exploitation of their
brand equity could enable French soccer clubs to bridge, at least partly, the
gap between them and their European counterparts in England, Germany,
Italy and Spain.
We must say that the environment plays a major role, as the mode of
operation of the league determines the growth potential of the brand equity
of a sports team. The legal framework in which French soccer clubs operate
is not always conducive to developing strong brand equity at the team level.
For instance, the decentralized approach of the French soccer league, in
other words leaving every team take charge of managing their brand
according to their resources, gives way to huge discrepancies between the
most dynamic teams and the others. At the same time, French soccer clubs
do not own their stadium and are at the mercy of local authorities.
Building a brand is not a miracle remedy or panacea. Nonetheless, we
believe that it is part of the equation in order to help sports teams gain some
financial stability and viability, especially for smaller market teams. Indeed,
strong brands are able to generate trust and loyalty from their customers and
reinforce the emotional and personal relationships with their fans (De
Chernatony, 2001; Kapferer, 2001). Consequently, teams can make their
fans live the brand and thus generate revenues even beyond the sports arena,
especially during less successful times (Bobby, 2002; Gladden et al., 1998).
If financial resources and winning are sufficient when building and
leveraging a brand, this is not the case when building brand equity. It is also
how you spend your money that matters (Future Brand, 2002; Gladden et
al., 1998) and how you take advantage of winning in order to increase fans’
attachment and loyalty to the team, among others through the sale of team
merchandise (Mullin et al., 2000; Sport Business Group, 2002). Ideally, a
team should build a strong enough brand to protect itself from the
contingencies of on-field performances. Furthermore, history and tradition
can be a double edge sword for teams that go through a rebuilding process.
If the actual product on the field is not coherent with what the team used to
stand for and poor performance extends in time, fans can start distancing
themselves from the team and the brand.
That is why we believe the mindset could be switched from building a fan
base to building a team’s brand community that transcends gender, age,
social classes and geographical boundaries (McAlexander, Schouten, &
Koenig, 2002; Muniz & O’Guinn, 2003). Sports teams need to find ways to
combine the intangible benefits (essentially the emotions lived at the stadium
and the pride to be associated with the team) with the tangible dimensions of
the product (result of the game, merchandising, draws during the game, area
for family and kids to play outside or inside the stadium, facilities at the
stadium, etc; Burton & Howard, 1999). Hence, the brand truly becomes a
unifying, coherent and holistic offering which enables a team to instill trust
and develop customers’ loyalty toward its products (De Chernatony, 2001).
At the next stage of our research, we will take a closer look at the different
types of sports teams’ fans, the attributes of the sports team brand they are
looking for when they are in contact with the team, as well as the most
appropriate marketing actions teams could undertake in order to satisfy the
needs of their different fan groups (Pons & Richelieu, 2004). We shall also
study the synergies that exist between the brand strategies of sports teams,
the policies of the league and the merchandising actions of licensees, and
how these synergies could be improved in order to better help teams leverage
their brand.
The weaknesses of the study are intertwined with its exploratory nature.
First, because of time and resource constraints, we worked with four teams.
These teams have similarities but do represent realities of their own, which
in a way limits the external validity of our research. Second, because of
resource constraints, only one or two managers were interviewed, which
could affect the validity of the results. However, we believe the risk was
reduced in part by the different sources of information we consulted (Perrien
et al., 1986). Third, what we have presented here is an analysis of the brand
strategy of four soccer clubs, based on the results of content analysis,
following interviews with managers of the teams. Truly, the point of view of
consumers would have been interesting and should be part of a next iteration
on this study. Nonetheless, we believe that the results we present have value
from a strategic point of view.
Finally, to summarize our study, we could say that a team is a brand in its
own right, on which management needs to capitalize to strengthen to
emotional connection with their fans and help the club work toward
ensuring a longer term commercial viability. This is one of the challenges
French soccer clubs have undertaken to compete against their counterparts
in England, Germany, Italy and Spain.
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European Sport Management Quarterly

Brand Strategy in Professional Sports: The Case of French Soccer Teams

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Brand Strategy in Professional Sports:

VINCENT COUVELAERE* & ANDRÉ RICHELIEU**

stronger than in any other industry. In an effort to capitalize on the emotional

Correspondence Address: André Richelieu, Marketing Department, Faculté des Sciences de

. . . a name, a word, a sign, a symbol, a drawing, or a combination of

A brand is a differentiating asset for a company (Kapferer, 2001; Keller,

emotional and personal relationship with the customer. As a result, this

We followed this conceptual model when analyzing the strategies and

- A ttri butes of th e br and (v al ues)

Figure 1. A framework for building sports teams’ brand equity

Source: Richelieu (2004)

Case Selection and Sample

. . . given the limited number of cases which can usually be studied, it

Our sample is made up of Lille Olympique Sporting Club (LOSC), Racing

Data Collection and Data Coding

selecting a suitable subject in a case study is the quality of information:

Table 1. An overview of the French soccer teams

Web site address www.losc.fr www.rclens.fr www.girondins.com www.olympiquedemarseille.com

Established 1944 1906 1881 1899

Brand Strategy in Professional Sports 29

Formal brand Yes Yes Yes Yes

Lille Olympique Sporting Club (LOSC)2 was founded in 1944. It quickly

management in place, the club wants to ensure financial viability and

Identity and Positioning

Following market research, Lille Olympique Sporting Club identified four

Thus, the team is able to trigger emotional value and psychological

The identity of the Olympique de Marseille brand is coherent with the

OM is in harmony with the values of the city, a melting pot, a welcoming

Marketing and Brand Strategy

Catalyst Factors used by French Soccer Teams

Internal catalyst factors Constraints

‘‘Fans bonding with the team’’ Fashion

Competition from other

Market size ‘‘Moderating’’ variables

Source: Richelieu (2004)

RCL also develops its line of complementary products, such as food

Girondins de Bordeaux. The Girondins de Bordeaux (2004) soccer team has

OM generated close to 20 million euros in merchandise sales and sold

can funnel into its own entertainment script.

Constraints and ‘‘Moderating’’ Variables

for their brand.

Everybody mentions Manchester United and how they were able to

the brand (Sport Business Group, 2002). For instance, Girondins de

the more established soccer brands in France (Bordeaux, Lyon, Marseille

What is possible in the region is not necessarily feasible in Lyon or

Objective: Export and globalize the brand

Brand Strategy in Professional Sports 39

Objective: Build and perpetuate the brand

Time since implementation of brand strategy

regard, Girondins de Bordeaux can capitalize on a rich history and a good

The Local Brand

should work on the strategic construction of the brand (identity and

The Regional Brand

strengthening its positioning nationally. In order to achieve this, the regional

The National Brand

The International Brand