Padlan v. Dinglasan,G.R. No.

180321March 20, 2012FACTS:

Respondent
was
the
registered
owner
of
a
parcel
of
land.
While
on
board a jeepney, respondents mother, Lilia, had a conversation with one Maura regarding the sale of the said property.
Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owners copy of the TCT from respondent and gave it to Maura.
Maura then subdivided the property into several lots. Through a falsified deed of sale, Maura was able to sell the lots to different
buyers. Maura sold one of the lots to one Lorna who sold the same to petitioner for P4,000.00. Respondents filed a case
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title before the RTC. Summons was, thereafter, served to petitioner through her mother,
Anita Padlan. The RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and, consequently, dismissed the
complaint. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered the cancellation of the TCT.
ISSUE: Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter
HELD:
NO.
In order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination of the complaint is essential. Basic as a
hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred bylaw and determined by the allegations in
the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The Court has
already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest
thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject
property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. Since the
amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction
over the action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.

G.R. No. 181622

November 20, 2013

GENESIS INVESTMENT, INC., CEBU JAYA REALTY INC., and SPOUSES RHODORA and LAMBERT LIM,Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS of CEFERINO EBARASABAL,* NAMELY: ROGELIO EBARASABAL, SPOUSES LIGAYA E. GULIMLIM AND JOSE GULIMLIM,
SPOUSES VISITACION E. CONEJOS and ELIAS CONEJOS, BEN TEJERO, POCAS TEJERO, GERTRUDES TEJERO, BANING HAYO,
LACIO EBARASABAL and JULIETA EBARASABAL; HEIRS OF FLORO EBARASABAL, namely: SOFIA ABELONG, PEPITO
EBARASABAL AND ELPIDIO EBARASABAL; HEIRS OF LEONA EBARASABAL- APOLLO, namely: SILVESTRA A. MOJELLO and
MARCELINO APOLLO; HEIRS OF PEDRO EBARASABAL, namely: BONIFACIO EBARASABAL, SERGIO EBARASABAL and JAIME
EBARASABAL; HEIRS of ISIDRO EBARASABAL, NAMELY: SPOUSES CARLOSA E. NUEVO and FORTUNATO NUEVA;** HEIRS of
BENITO EBARASABAL, namely: PAULO BAGAAN, SPOUSES CATALINA A. MARIBAO and RENE MARIBAO, VICENTE ABRINICA and
PATRON EBARASABAL; HEIRS of JULIAN EBARASABAL, NAMELY: ALFREDO BAGAAN, JUAN BAGAAN, AVELINO BAGAAN,
FERDINAND BAGAAN, MAURO BAGAAN, SPOUSES ROWENA B. LASACA and FRANCISCO LACASA,*** SPOUSES MARIA B. CABAG
and EMILIO CABAG and ESTELITA BAGAAN, all being represented herein by VICTOR MOJELLO, FEDERICO BAGAAN and
PAULINO EBARASABAL, as their Attorneys-in-Fact, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 and Resolution,2 dated July 11, 2007 and January 10, 2008, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 01017.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
On November 12, 2003, herein respondents filed against herein petitioners a Complaint 3 for Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees. The Complaint was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Barili, Cebu.
On August 5, 2004, herein petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss4 contending, among others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction to try
the case on the ground that, as the case involves title to or possession of real property or any interest therein and since the
assessed value of the subject property does not exceed P20,000.00 (the same being only P11,990.00), the action falls within the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).5
In its Order6 dated September 29, 2004, the RTC granted petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, holding as follows:

xxxx
And while the prayer of the plaintiffs for the annulment of documents qualified the case as one incapable of pecuniary
estimation thus, rendering it cognizable supposedly by the second level courts but considering that Republic Act No. 7691
expressly provides to cover "all civil actions" which phrase understandably is to include those incapable of pecuniary estimation,
like the case at bar, this Court is of the view that said law really finds application here more so that the same case also "involves
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein." For being so, the assessed value of the real property involved is
determinative of which court has jurisdiction over the case. And the plaintiffs admitting that the assessed value of the litigated
area is less thanP20,000.00, the defendants are correct in arguing that the case is beyond this Court's jurisdiction.7
Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,8 arguing that their complaint consists of several causes of action,
including one for annulment of documents, which is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, as such, falls within the jurisdiction
of the RTC.9
On March 17, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting respondents' Motion for Partial Reconsideration and reversing its earlier
Order dated September 29, 2004. The RTC ruled, thus:
On the issue of want of jurisdiction, this court likewise finds to be with merit the contention of the movants as indeed the main
case or the primary relief prayed for by the movants is for the declaration of nullity or annulment of documents which
unquestionably is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus within the exclusive original jurisdiction of this court to try
although in the process of resolving the controversy, claims of title or possession of the property in question is involved which
together with all the other remaining reliefs prayed for are but purely incidental to or as a consequence of the foregoing
principal relief sought.10
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,11 but the RTC denied it in its Order dated June 23, 2005.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. However, the CA dismissed the petition via its assailed Decision
dated July 11, 2007, holding that the subject matter of respondents' complaint is incapable of pecuniary estimation and,
therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that the main purpose in filing the action is to declare null and void the
documents assailed therein.12
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was, subsequently, denied in the CA Resolution dated January 10, 2008.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue, to wit:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in concluding that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60 of Barili,
Cebu has jurisdiction over the instant case when the ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT clearly shows that the main cause of
action of the respondents is for the Recovery of their Title, Interest, and Share over a Parcel of Land, which has an assessed
value of P11,990.00 and thus, within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.13
The petition lacks merit.
For a clearer understanding of the case, this Court, like the CA, finds it proper to quote pertinent portions of respondents'
Complaint, to wit:
xxxx
1. Plaintiffs are all Filipino, of legal age, surviving descendants either as grandchildren or great grandchildren and heirs and
successors-in-interest of deceased Roman Ebarsabal, who died on 07 September 1952 x x x
xxxx
8. During the lifetime of Roman Ebarsabal, he acquired a parcel of land situated in Basdaku, Saavedra, Moalboal, Cebu, x x x.
xxxx
with a total assessed value of P2,890.00 x x x. However, for the year 2002, the property was already having (sic) a total assessed
value of P11,990.00 x x x.

9. Upon the death of said Roman Ebarsabal, his eight (8) children named in par. 7 above, became co-owners of his abovedescribed property by hereditary succession; taking peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same in fee simple pro indiviso,
paying the real estate taxes thereon and did not partition the said property among themselves until all of them likewise died,
leaving, however, their respective children and descendants and/or surviving heirs and successors-in-interest, and who are now
the above-named plaintiffs herein;
10. The plaintiffs who are mostly residents in (sic) Mindanao and Manila, have just recently uncovered the fact that on 28th
January 1997, the children and descendants of deceased Gil Ebarsabal, namely: Pelagio, Hipolito, Precela, Fructuosa, Roberta,
Florentino, Erlinda, Sebastian, Cirilo, all surnamed Ebarsabal, have executed among themselves a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale of Roman Ebarsabal's entire property described above, by virtue of which they allegedly extrajudicially
settled the same and, for P2,600,000.00 although only the sum of P950,000.00 was reflected in their Deed of Sale for reason
only known to them, they sold the whole property to defendants Genesis Investment Inc. represented by co-defendant Rhodora
B. Lim, the wife of Lambert Lim, without the knowledge, permission and consent of the plaintiffs who are the vendors' co-owners
of the lot in question, x x x.
11. Surprisingly, however, the defendant Genesis managed to have the Tax Declaration of the property issued in the name of codefendant Cebu Jaya Realty Incorporated, a firm which, as already intimated above, is also owned by Spouses Lambert and
Rhodora B. Lim, instead of in the name of Genesis Investment, Incorporated, which is actually the vendee firm of the lot in
question.
xxxx
Hence, the reason why Cebu Jaya Realty, Incorporated is joined and impleaded herein as a co-defendant.
12. Without the participation of the plaintiffs who are co-owners of the lot in question in the proceedings, the aforementioned
extrajudicial settlement with sale cannot be binding upon the plaintiff-co-owners.
13. Further, where as in this case, the other heirs who are the plaintiffs herein, did not consent to the sale of their ideal shares
in the inherited property, the sale was only to be limited to the pro indiviso share of the selling heirs.
xxxx
14. By representation, the plaintiffs, are therefore, by law, entitled to their rightful shares from the estate of the deceased
Roman Ebarsabal consisting of seven (7) shares that would have been due as the shares of seven (7) other children of Roman
Ebarsabal who are also now deceased, namely: Ceferino, Floro, Leona, Pedro, Isidoro, Julian and Benito, all surnamed Ebarsabal.
15. The defendants who had prior knowledge of the existence of the other heirs who are co-owners of the vendors of the
property they purchased, had unlawfully acted in bad faith in insisting to buy the whole property in co-ownership, only from the
heirs and successors-in-interest of deceased Gil Ebarsabal, who is only one (1) of the eight (8) children of deceased Roman
Ebarsabal, and without notifying thereof in whatever manner the plaintiffs who are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the
other co-owners of the property-in-question; thus, have compelled the plaintiffs herein to file this instant case in court to
protect their interests, x x x.
xxxx
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that, after due notice and
hearing, judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, as follows, to wit:
1 Declaring as null and void and not binding upon the plaintiffs, the following documents to wit:
(a) Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale executed by and between the heirs of deceased Gil Ebarsabal headed by
Pedro Ebarsabal, and Genesis Investment, Inc., represented by Rhodora Lim, dated 28th of January, 1997, marked as
Annex-A;
(b) Memorandum of Agreement executed between Pedro Ebarsabal and Genesis Investment, Inc., represented by
Rhodora Lim dated 27 January, which document is notarized;
(c) Tax Declaration of Real Property issued to Cebu Jaya Realty, Inc., marked as Annex-D;

2 Ordering the defendants to make partition of the property in litigation with the plaintiffs into eight (8) equal shares; to get
one (1) share thereof, which is the only extent of what they allegedly acquired by purchase as mentioned above, and to transfer,
restore or reconvey and deliver to the plaintiffs, seven (7) shares thereof, as pertaining to and due for the latter as the heirs and
successors-in-interest of the seven (7) brothers and sister of deceased Gil Ebarsabal already named earlier in this complaint;
xxxx
Further reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the premises are also herein prayed for.
x x x x14
It is true that one of the causes of action of respondents pertains to the title, possession and interest of each of the contending
parties over the contested property, the assessed value of which falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC. However, a complete
reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed
for, the action is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As stated above, it is clear from the records that respondents' complaint was for "Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery
of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney's Fees." In filing their Complaint with the RTC, respondents sought to recover
ownership and possession of their shares in the disputed parcel of land by questioning the due execution and validity of the Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale as well as the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by and between some of their coheirs and herein petitioners. Aside from praying that the RTC render judgment declaring as null and void the said Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale and Memorandum of Agreement, respondents likewise sought the following: (1) nullification of
the Tax Declarations subsequently issued in the name of petitioner Cebu Jaya Realty, Inc.; (2) partition of the property in
litigation; (3) reconveyance of their respective shares; and (3) payment of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees, plus appearance fees.1wphi1
Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of partition of or recovery of shares
or interest over the real property in question but includes an action for declaration of nullity of contracts and documents which
is incapable of pecuniary estimation.15
As cited by the CA, this Court, in the case of Singson v. Isabela Sawmill, 16 held that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery
of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts
or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms
of money, and are cognizable by courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts]. 17
This rule was reiterated in Russell v. Vestil18 and Social Security System v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila Inc. 19
Contrary to petitioners contention, the principal relief sought by petitioners is the nullification of the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale entered into by and between some of their co-heirs and respondents, insofar as their individual shares in
the subject property are concerned. Thus, the recovery of their undivided shares or interest over the disputed lot, which were
included in the sale, simply becomes a necessary consequence if the above deed is nullified. Hence, since the principal action
sought in respondents Complaint is something other than the recovery of a sum of money, the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and, thus, cognizable by the RTC.20 Well entrenched is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the party is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.21
Moreover, it is provided under Section 5 (c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court that where the causes of action are between the same
parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC provided one of the causes of
action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein. Thus, as shown above, respondents complaint clearly
falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution dated July 11, 2007 and January 10, 2008, respectively, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01017 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

posted in RESWRI2 cases by katcobing

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against
her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, privaterespondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the
same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality
of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an
unwanted product of an invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of
constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal
protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social
institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial
power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue
of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the
trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men
as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot
be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention that by not allowing mediation, the law
violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be
sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This
is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by
the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy.
Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 186366

July 3, 2013

HEIRS OF JOSE FERNANDO, PETITIONERS,

vs.
REYNALDO DE BELEN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the 11 February 2009 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87588, setting aside the 28 October 2005 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 10 of Malolos City, Bulacan, which rendered a favorable finding for the petitioners in a complaint for recovery of
possession docketed as Civil Case No. 180-M-98.
The Facts
This case emanated from a complaint for Recovery of Possession3 filed on 6 March 1998 by the petitioners against Reynaldo De
Belen, herein respondent, before the RTC, Branch 10 of Malolos, Bulacan, involving a parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-487 (997) registered in the name of the late Jose, married to Lucila Tinio and Apolonia
Fernando, wife of Felipe Galvez, consisting of 124,994 square meters, more or less, which is situated in Baliuag, Bulacan.
In the said complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the children of the late Jose and they are in the process of partitioning
their inheritance. However, they could not properly accomplish the partition due to the presence of the respondent who
intruded into a portion of their property and conducted quarrying operations in its immediate vicinity for so many years, without
their knowledge and permission.4
Petitioners, therefore, wrote a letter5 dated 8 April 1997 to the respondent which was unheeded; thus, a barangay conciliation
was resorted to. For failure of the respondent to appear, a Certification 6 was issued by the Barangay Lupon that led to the filing
of the complaint before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 180-M-98 to assert and defend their right over
the subject property and for the respondent to vacate the premises and pay rental arrearages in the amount of P24,000.00,
attorneys fees of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of P20,000.00
Instead of filing an Answer, respondent Reynaldo De Belen filed a Motion to Dismiss 7 dated 22 June 1998, setting forth the
following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction; (2) lack of cause of action; (3) ambiguity as to the portion of the lot De Belen
occupies; and, (4) incomplete statement of material facts, the complaint having failed to state the identity, location and area of
the lot sought to be recovered.
The petitioners filed their Opposition8 on 17 July 1998, averring that the complaint states a cause of action and respondent need
not be confused because the estate under OCT No. RO-487 (997) is actually known as Psu-39080 with an area of 124,994 square
meters divided into Lot 1 (80,760 square meters), Lot 2 (22,000 square meters), and Lot 3 (21,521 square meters). Likewise,
petitioners also stated that their father, Jose and the latters sister, Antonia A. Fernando, were co-owners pro-indiviso of the
subject property and that as indicated in their demand letter, they represent the heirs of Jose and Antonia A. Fernando, both
deceased many years ago. Although, a matter of proof to be presented in the course of the trial, petitioners nonetheless
advanced that Antonia Fernando predeceased her brother Jose and she died without issue; thus, her undivided share was
consolidated with that of her brother.

Finding lack of merit, the motion was denied in an Order9 dated 3 November 1998, with the trial court ordering herein
petitioners to amend the complaint by indicating the details desired by the respondent in order for the latter to file a responsive
pleading.
On 12 February 1999, the Amended Complaint10 with its attachment was filed to which the respondent moved for a Bill of
Particulars,11 specifically questioning the legal basis for the complaint since the entire property appears to be co-owned by Jose
and Antonia Fernando and it was not particularized in the complaint as to what specific portion belongs to each of the coowners.
In addition, the respondent, in his Answer,12 claimed that even the Bill of Particulars13 did not clearly show the exact identity,
personal circumstances and relationship of the individual heirs of the decedent, location, area and size of the subject property.
Also, prescription, estoppel and laches had set in as against the petitioners.
The respondent further argued that the Amended Complaint was prematurely filed due to the fact that the Certification to File
Action was issued in violation of the prescribed procedure. The respondent likewise insisted on his right of possession over the
subject property as evidenced by the successive transfer from Felipe Galvez to Carmen Galvez on 11 March 1955; from Carmen
Galvez to Florentino San Luis to Reynaldo De Belen on 4 June 1979, and the receipt for the purchase price of P60,000.00 dated
19 June 1979. He asserted that from the date of his purchase, he has been in exclusive, continuous, open and public possession
of said parcel of land.
Trial on the merits ensued which eventually resulted in the 28 October 2005 Decision of the RTC which is favorable to the
petitioners. Thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby RENDERED:
(a)
Declaring as null and void and without legal force and effect the "Kasulatan Ng Pagbibilihang Tuluyan Ng Tumana"
dated March 11, 1955 executed by Felipe Galvez in favor of Carmen Galvez; "Kasulatan Ng Pagbibiling Tuluyan Ng
Tumana dated July 28, 1958, registered as Doc. No. 945; Page 59, Book XXIV; Series of 1958 of Notary Public Fermin
Samson executed by Carme[n] Galvez married to Luis Cruz in favor of Florentino San Luis; and "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang
Tuluyan Ng Lupang Tumana" dated June 04, 1979 executed by Florentino R. San Luis married to Agripina Reyes in favor
of defendant Reynaldo Santos de Belen, entered as Doc. No. 199; Page No. 41; Book No. 79; Series of 1979 covering
9,838 square meters of a parcel of land designated as Lot 1303-B per approved subdivision plan in Cad. Case No. 17,
Record No. 788 submitted before the defunct CFI of Bulacan and granted in a Decision dated December 29, 1929;
(b)
Ordering the reconveyance of the disputed subject property in question including all improvements thereon as abovedescribed by the defendant to the plaintiffs herein;
(c)
Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount of P10,000.00 a month from March 06, 1998 with legal interest
until the subject property is actually returned to the plaintiffs;
(d)
Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees;
(e)
Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the costs of suit. 14
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issues on jurisdiction for failure of the petitioners to state
the assessed value of the subject property, absence of evidence proving the lawful ownership of the petitioners and the grant of
affirmative reliefs which were not alleged or prayed for.
On 11 February 2009, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed decision setting aside the decision of the RTC for want of
jurisdiction and declaring further that the Amended Complaint must be dismissed.

Hence, the petition at bench seeking the reversal of the aforementioned decision.
The Issue
The core issue for resolution is whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction for failure to allege in the complaint the assessed value of the subject property.
Our Ruling
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court may be questioned at any stage of the proceedings. 15 Lack of jurisdiction is
one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or
the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss.16 So
that, whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This defense
may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is
conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.17
A reading of both the complaint and the amended complaint shows that petitioners failed to state the assessed value of the
disputed lot. This fact was highlighted by the Court of Appeals when it ruled:
Instant complaint for Recovery of Possession failed to specify the assessed value of the property subject matter of the action.
"What determines the nature of the action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and
the character of the relief sought." (Bejar, et. al. v. Caluag, G.R. No. 171277, February 12, 2007). The allegations in the
complaint and the relief sought by the party determine the nature of the action if the title or designation is not clear. The
complaint, in the case at bar, is bereft of any allegation which discloses the assessed value of the property subject matter
thereof. The court a quo therefore, did not acquire jurisdiction over instant action. The Amended Complaint does not state a
valid cause of action.18
Facially, the above disposition finds support from the provisions of Republic Act 7691 (RA 7691),19 the law in effect when the case
was filed. Section 1 of RA 7691, amending Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, pertinently states:
"Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts;
x x x x.
Thereby guided, the Court of Appeals no longer dwelt on the other issues and matters raised before it.1wphi1
Jurisprudence has it that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised.20 As held in the case of Solmayor v. Arroyo,21 it is not the function of this Court to analyze and weigh evidence all over
again. This is premised on the presumed thorough appreciation of the facts by the lower courts. Such that, when the trial court
and the appellate court, as in this case, reached opposite conclusions, a review of the facts may be done. There is a permissible
scope of judicial review on the factual findings of the lower courts as crystallized in Treas v. People of the Philippines,22 where
the Court cited contradictory findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court as one of the instances where the resolution of
the petition requires a review of the factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based.
So too are we reminded that procedural rules are intended to ensure the proper administration of law and justice and the rules
of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid sense, for they are adopted to secure, not override, substantial justice.23
We, accordingly, review the records of this case and note the facts and evidence ignored by the appellate court. We observe that
at the initial stage of this case when the respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC in a Motion to Dismiss, he solely
assailed the vagueness of the complaint for failure to allege the specific identity of the subject property and for being

prematurely filed. The trial court in its 3 November 1998 Order, settled the issue by declaring that the allegations in the
complaint make out for a case of recovery of ownership and that the petitioners need not wait for the lapse of one year from the
8 April 1997 demand letter to maintain the accion reinvidicatoria. The trial court went on to explain that the complaint clearly
gives the defendant, herein respondent, notice of their exclusive and absolute claim of ownership over the entire property
covered by the OCT No. RO-487 (997).
From the said Order, the respondent never raised any objection and did not even opt to elevate the matter to a higher court via
a certiorari case which is a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. If indeed respondent was not convinced of the
trial courts ruling, he could have availed of such remedy which is an original and independent action that does not proceed from
the trial that would lead to the judgment on the merits. As aptly cited in the case of New Frontier Sugar Corporation v. RTC,
Branch 39, Iloilo City,24 when the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory
order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment.
On the contrary, the respondent acquiesced to the 3 November 1998 Order of the trial court for him to file his
Answer,25 whereby, he asserted ownership over the portion of the subject property which he occupied. He attached the following
proof of his ownership, to wit: a) Deed of Absolute Sale by Felipe Galvez in favor of Carmen Galvez dated 11 March 1955; 26 b)
Deed of Absolute Sale by Carmen Galvez in favor of Florentino San Luis dated 28 July 1958;27 c) Deed of Absolute Sale by
Florentino San Luis in favor of Reynaldo Santos De Belen dated 4 June 197928 and the corresponding receipt of the purchase price
of P60,000.00 dated 19 June 1979.29
When the pre-trial conference was concluded, the trial court issued several Pre-Trial Orders,30 specifying the identity and
coverage of the subject property being claimed by the petitioners as well as that portion occupied by the respondent,
simplification of facts involved, and the issues which primarily centered on the validity of the transfer or disposition made by
Felipe Galvez of the paraphernal property of his wife Antonia Fernando from which transfer the respondent succeeded his right
over the portion he occupied.
During the trial, the petitioners were able to prove that indeed they are the rightful heirs of Jose and Antonia Fernando and that
they have right of ownership over the property covered by OCT No. RO-487 (997) as described in Plan Psu-39080 of Lots 1302-B
and 1303 prepared by Geodetic Engineer Alfredo C. Borja on 15 September 1997. 31 It was also proved through the admission of
the respondent that he has been occupying a portion of Lot 1303 which is the Sapang Bayan, the old river, titled in the name of
Jose and Antonia Fernando. Thus, it was ruled that the Deed of Sale in respondents favor which was traced from the transfer
made by Felix Galvez on 11 March 1955, without any participation of Antonia Fernando was likewise without any settlement of
property between the said husband and wife and the property remained to be the paraphernal property of Antonia.
Consequently, the trial court declared that the sale between Felipe Galvez and Carmen Galvez and its subsequent transfers are
void ab initio, as Felipe Galvez was neither the owner nor administrator of the subject property.1wphi1
Further, the trial court went on to state that respondent has not proved his status as a purchaser in good faith and for value
taking cue from the facts and circumstances as well as the numerous entries found at the dorsal sides of OCT No. RO-487 (997)
which should have put any of the buyers on guard.
After the entire proceedings fully participated in by the respondent, he cannot be allowed to question the result as having been
rendered without jurisdiction. This is the teaching in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, et al.32 as reiterated in Soliven v. Fastforms
Philippines, Inc.,33 where the Court ruled:
"While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened." In the
instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by
asking for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction, especially when an
adverse judgment has been rendered." (Italics ours)
Similarly, as this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,34 participation in all stages of the case before
the trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred the respondent by estoppel
from challenging the courts jurisdiction. The Court has consistently upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed
at any stage, a litigant who participated in the court proceedings by filing pleadings and presenting his evidence cannot later on
question the trial courts jurisdiction when judgement unfavorable to him is rendered.
Moreover, and of equal significance, the facts of this case demonstrate the inapplicability of RA 7691. The argument of
respondent that the assessed value of the subject property places the case outside the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court is
belied by respondents own Answer which states that:
xxxx
"16. That the defendants ownership and possession over the parcel of land ought to be recovered by the plaintiff is valid and
legal as evidenced by the following:35

xxxx
(c) Deed of Absolute Sale by Florentino San Luis in favor of Reynaldo Santos de Belen dated June 4, 1979 (Annex "3" hereof) 36 and
the corresponding receipt of the purchase price of P60,000.00 dated June 19, 1979 (Annex "4" hereof)."37
thereby showing that way back in 1979 or nineteen (19) years before this case was instituted, the value of the property was
already well covered by the jurisdictional amount for cases within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. The Regional Trial Court
Decision is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be remanded to the RTC, Branch 10, Malolos, Bulacan for execution.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174414

March 14, 2008

ELMER F. GOMEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. LITA A. MONTALBAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse (1) the Order1 dated 20 June 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Davao City, Branch 13, which granted herein respondent Ma. Lita A. Montalbans Petition for Relief from Judgment and dismissed
Civil Case No. 29,717-03 for lack of jurisdiction; and (2) the Order2 dated 2 August 2006 denying herein petitioner Elmer F.
Gomezs Motion for Reconsideration thereof .
On 30 May 2003, petitioner filed a Complaint3 with the RTC for a sum of money, damages and payment of attorneys fees against
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 29,717-03. The Complaint alleged, among other things, that: on or about 26 August 1998,
respondent obtained a loan from petitioner in the sum of P40,000.00 with a voluntary proposal on her part to pay 15% interest
per month; upon receipt of the proceeds of the loan, respondent issued in favor of petitioner, as security, Capitol Bank Check
No. 0215632, postdated 26 October 1998, in the sum of P46,000.00, covering the P40,000.00 principal loan amount and P6,000.00
interest charges for one month; when the check became due, respondent failed to pay the loan despite several demands; thus,
petitioner filed the Complaint praying for the payment of P238,000.00, representing the principal loan and interest charges, plus
25% of the amount to be awarded as attorneys fees, as well as the cost of suit.
Summons was served, but despite her receipt thereof, respondent failed to file her Answer. Consequently, she was declared4 in
default and upon motion, petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
After considering the evidence presented by petitioner, the RTC rendered a Decision5 on 4 May 2004 in his favor, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby decides this case in favor of [herein petitioner] and against [herein
respondent], ordering [respondent] to pay [petitioner] the following amounts:
1. P40,000.00 representing the principal amount of the loan;
2. P57,600.00 representing interest at the rate of 24% per annum reckoned from August 26, 1998 until the present; and
3. P15,000.00 representing attorneys fees.
On 28 May 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment 6 alleging that there was no effective service of summons
upon her since there was no personal service of the same. The summons was received by one Mrs. Alicia dela Torre, who was not
authorized to receive summons or other legal pleadings or documents on respondents behalf. Respondent attributes her failure
to file an Answer to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. She claimed that she had good and valid defenses against
petitioner and that the RTC had no jurisdiction as the principal amount being claimed by petitioner was only P40,000.00, an
amount falling within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC).

After petitioner filed his Answer7 to the Petition for Relief from Judgment and respondent her Reply, 8 the said Petition was set
for hearing.
After several dates were set and called for hearing, respondent, thru counsel, failed to appear despite being duly notified;
hence, her Petition for Relief was dismissed9 for her apparent lack of interest to pursue the petition.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of the dismissal of her Petition for Relief, stating that her counsels failure to
appear was not intentional, but due to human shortcomings or frailties, constituting honest mistake or excusable negligence.
On 18 November 2005, the RTC granted11 respondents motion for reconsideration, to wit:
In regard to the motion for reconsideration file by [herein respondent] of the order of the court dismissing her petition for relief
from judgment, the court, in the interest of justice, shall give [respondent] one more chance to present the merits of her
position in a hearing. The dismissal of the petition is therefore reconsidered and set aside.
On 20 June 2006, the RTC granted respondents Petition for Relief from Judgment and set aside its Decision dated 4 May 2004 on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The fallo of the assailed RTC Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for relief is hereby GRANTED. The decision of this court dated May 4, 2004 is RECONSIDERED and set
aside for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court, without prejudice to the case being refiled in the proper Municipal Trial
Courts.12
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted Order, but the same was denied by the RTC in another
Order13 dated 2 August 2006.
Hence, the present Petition filed directly before this Court.
In his Memorandum,14 petitioner raises the following issues for the Courts consideration:
1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over this case for sum of money, damages and attorneys
fees where the principal amount of the obligation is P40,000.00 but the amount of the demand per allegation of the
complaint is P238,000.00;
2. Whether or not respondents relief from judgment is proper during the period for filing a motion for reconsideration
and appeal.
Before the Court dwells on the principal issues, a few procedural matters must first be resolved.
Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court categorically provides that in all cases where only questions of law are raised, the
appeal from a decision or order of the RTC shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review oncertiorari in accordance with
Rule 45.15
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact has long been settled. A question of law exists when the doubt or
controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for
an examination of probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact
exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as
well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. 16
Simple as it may seem, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes complicated. In a case involving a
"question of law," the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it
is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a reevaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each
other, the issue in that query is factual.17
The first issue raised in the present petition is one of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter - meaning, the nature of
the cause of action and of the relief sought. Jurisdiction is the right to act or the power and authority to hear and determine a
cause. It is a question of law.18 The second issue refers to the aptness of the grant of a Petition for Relief from Judgment. These
questions are undoubtedly one of law, as they concern the correct interpretation or application of relevant laws and rules,
without the need for review of the evidences presented before the court a quo.1avvphi1

Thus, with only questions of law raised in this Petition, direct resort to this Court is proper. 19
The Court shall now discuss whether the RTC has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 29,717-03.
Petitioners Complaint before the RTC reads:
3. On or about August 26, 1998, [herein respondent] obtained from the [herein petitioner] a loan for the principal sum
of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) with a voluntary proposal on her part to pay as much as 15% interest per
month. Machine copy of Cash Voucher dated August 26, 1998 is herewith attached as Annex "A".
4. Upon receipt of the proceeds of the said loan, [respondent] issued in favor of the Plaintiff Capitol Bank Check with
check nos. 0215632 postdated on October 26, 1998 for the sum of Forty Six Thousand Pesos (P46,000.00) as security on
the loan with P6,000.00 as the first month of interest charges. When the check became due, [respondent] defaulted to
pay her loan despite several allowances of time and repeated verbal demands from the [petitioner]. The said check
was later on dishonored for the reason: "Account Closed". Machine copy of Capitol Bank Check wit nos. 0215632 is
herewith attached as Annex "B".
5. On July 4, 2002, [petitioner] engaged the services of the undersigned counsel to collect the account of the
[respondent]; thus, on the same day, a demand letter was sent to and received by her on July 9, 2002. And despite
receipt thereof, she failed and continues to evade the payment of her obligations to the damage and prejudice of the
[petitioner]. Thus, as of July 4, 2002, [respondent]s loan obligation stood at TWO HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND
PESOS (P 239,000.00), inclusive of interest charges for 32 months. Machine copy of Demand Letter and its registry
receipt and return card is herewith attached as Annexes "C"; "C-1" and C-2", respectively.
6. In view of [respondent]s refusal to pay her loan, [petitioner] is constrained to engage the services of counsel to
initiate the instant action for a fee of 25% for whatever amounts is collected as flat attorneys fee. [Petitioner] will
likewise incur damages in the form of docket fees.
PRAYER
WHERFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that Decision be rendered ordering the [respondent] to pay
[petitioner] as follows:
1. The amount of P238,000.00 with interest charges at the sound discretion of the Honorable Court starting on July 4,
2002 until paid in full;
2. The sum equivalent to 25 % of the amount awarded as attorneys fee;
3. Cost of suit;
4. Other relief that the Honorable Court may find just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed
for.20 [Emphasis ours.]
The Court gleans from the foregoing that petitioners cause of action is the respondents violation of their loan agreement.21 In
that loan agreement, respondent expressly agreed to pay the principal amount of the loan, plus 15% monthly interest.
Consequently, petitioner is claiming and praying for in his Complaint the total amount ofP238,000.00, already inclusive of the
interest on the loan which had accrued from 1998. Since the interest on the loan is a primary and inseparable component of the
cause of action, not merely incidental thereto, and already determinable at the time of filing of the Complaint, it must be
included in the determination of which court has the jurisdiction over petitioners case. Using as basis the P238,000.00 amount
being claimed by petitioner from respondent for payment of the principal loan and interest, this Court finds that it is well within
the jurisdictional amount fixed by law for RTCs. 22
There can be no doubt that the RTC in this case has jurisdiction to entertain, try, and decide the petitioners Complaint.
To this Court, it is irrelevant that during the course of the trial, it was proven that respondent is only liable to petitioner for the
amount of P40,000.00 representing the principal amount of the loan; P57,000.00 as interest thereon at the rate of 24% per
annum reckoned from 26 August 1998 until the present; and P15,000.00 as attorneys fees. Contrary to respondents contention,
jurisdiction can neither be made to depend on the amount ultimately substantiated in the course of the trial or proceedings nor
be affected by proof showing that the claimant is entitled to recover a sum in excess of the jurisdictional amount fixed by law.
Jurisdiction is determined by the cause of action as alleged in the complaint and not by the amount ultimately substantiated and
awarded.23

Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action.24 The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein.25 The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted.26 Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. 27
On the propriety of the granting by the RTC of respondents Petition for Relief from Judgment, the Court finds and so declares
that the RTC did indeed commit an error in doing so.
First of all, a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is only available against a final and executory
judgment.28 Since respondent allegedly29 received a copy of the Decision dated 4 May 2004 on 14 May 2004, and she filed the
Petition for Relief from Judgment on 28 May 2004, judgment had not attained finality. The 15-day period to file a motion for
reconsideration or appeal had not yet lapsed. Hence, resort by respondent to a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38
of the Rules of Court was premature and inappropriate.
Second, based on respondents allegations in her Petition for Relief before the RTC, she had no cause of action for relief from
judgment.
Section 1 of Rule 38 provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings. When a judgment or final order is entered, or any
other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he
may file a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the court may grant relief from judgment only "[w]hen a judgment or final order
is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence x x x."
In her Petition for Relief from Judgment before the RTC, respondent contended that judgment was entered against her through
"mistake or fraud," because she was not duly served with summons as it was received by a Mrs. Alicia dela Torre who was not
authorized to receive summons or other legal processes on her behalf.
As used in Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, "mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the
case.30 The word "mistake," which grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error
which the court might have committed in the trial. Such errors may be corrected by means of an appeal. 31This does not exist in
the case at bar, because respondent has in no wise been prevented from interposing an appeal.
"Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the aggrieved party from having a
trial or presenting his case to the court,32or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy. 33This is
not present in the case at hand as respondent was not prevented from securing a fair trial and was given the opportunity to
present her case.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.34 Under Section
1, the "negligence" must be excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding
on the client.35 To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to disown his counsels conduct would render proceedings indefinite,
tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek
administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the courts ruling. 36
Third, the certificate of service of the process server of the court a quo is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out
therein.37 According to the Sheriffs Return of Service,38 summons was issued and served on respondent thru one Mrs. Alicia dela
Torre, thus:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on June 25, 2003 at around 1:45 p.m. the undersigned sheriff caused the service of summons issued in
the above-entitled case together with attached complaints and annexes for and in behalf of defendant [respondent] thru a
certain Mrs. Alicia Dela Torre inside their compound at the given address who acknowledged receipt by signature and notation of
said dela Torre appearing thereof.
Wherefore, this summons is respectfully returned to the Honorable Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Davao City, duly SERVED for
its records and information."

Finally, even assuming arguendo that the RTC had no jurisdiction over respondent on account of the non-service upon her of the
summons and complaint, the remedy of the respondent was to file a motion for the reconsideration of the 4 May 2004 Decision by
default or a motion for new trial within 15 days from receipt of notice thereof. This is also without prejudice to respondents
right to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the order of default of the court a
quo and the proceedings thereafter held including the decision, the writ of execution, and the writ of garnishment issued by the
RTC, on the ground that it acted without jurisdiction.39 Unfortunately, however, respondent opted to file a Petition for Relief
from the Judgment of the RTC, which, as the Court earlier determined, was the wrong remedy.
In Tuason v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court explained the nature of a petition for relief from judgment:
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other
available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new
trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief
will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due
to his own negligence;otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru
inexcusable negligence. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
In the case at bar, there being no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that would have prevented petitioner from
filing either a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review on certiorari of the 4 May 2004 Decision of the RTC, her resort
to a Petition for Relief from Judgment was unwarranted.
This Court also notes that when respondent was declared in default for her failure to file an Answer to the Complaint, she did
not immediately avail herself of any of the remedies provided by law. Lina v. Court of Appeals41 enumerates the remedies
available to a party declared in default:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath,
to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18 [now Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]);
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has
become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a
petition for relief under Section 2 [now Section 1] of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no
petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him (Sec. 2, Rule 41). (Emphasis added)
In addition, and as this Court earlier mentioned, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default is also
available if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly declared a party in default,
if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration.42
If respondent is really vigilant in protecting her rights, she should have exhausted all the legal remedies above-mentioned to
nullify and set aside the order of default against her, and should no longer have waited for the judgment to be rendered.
Respondent does not deny that she did receive the summons, although she alleges that it was not properly served upon her, yet
she chose to sit on her rights and did not act immediately. For respondents failure to act with prudence and diligence in
protecting her rights, she cannot now elicit this Courts sympathy.
Respondents petition for relief from judgment is clearly without merit and should not have been granted by the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is herby GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated 4 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 29,717-03 is hereby REINSTATED and the Order dated 20 June 2006 granting the petition for
relief from judgment is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,

vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 189121

July 31, 2013

FACTS
Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma. Lourdes Belen. When Eliseo died
intestate, Elise represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Pias
City in order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her appointment as
administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children, filed an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City. In addition to their
claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix
of Eliseos estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. In validating the findings of the RTC, the
Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a
common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in
1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached
by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City.
ISSUE/S:
1.
2.

Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.

Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.

HELD:
1.
YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of
his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. 13 Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual
residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC
that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the records that
during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for
the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
2.
Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be
an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners
pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to

reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is
on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts
of the estate are satisfied.Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can
rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
G.R. No. 183984

April 13, 2011

ARTURO SARTE FLORES, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR. and EDNA C. LINDO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 30 May 2008 Decision2 and the 4 August 2008 Resolution3of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94003.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts, as gleaned from the Court of Appeals Decision, are as follows:
On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo Flores (petitioner) amounting to P400,000 payable on 1
December 1995 with 3% compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in case of late payment. To secure the loan, Edna
executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage4 (the Deed) covering a property in the name of Edna and her husband Enrico
(Enrico) Lindo, Jr. (collectively, respondents). Edna also signed a Promissory Note 5 and the Deed for herself and for Enrico
as his attorney-in-fact.
Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting
petitioner to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against respondents. The case was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33 (RTC, Branch 33) and docketed as Civil Case No. 00-97942.
In its 30 September 2003 Decision,6 the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33 found that the Deed was executed by Edna without the consent and authority of Enrico. The
RTC, Branch 33 noted that the Deed was executed on 31 October 1995 while the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed
by Enrico was only dated 4 November 1995.
The RTC, Branch 33 further ruled that petitioner was not precluded from recovering the loan from Edna as he could file a
personal action against her. However, the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the personal action which
should be filed in the place where the plaintiff or the defendant resides in accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order7 dated 8 January 2004, the RTC, Branch 33 denied the motion for
lack of merit.
On 8 September 2004, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages against respondents. It was raffled to
Branch 42 (RTC, Branch 42) of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and docketed as Civil Case No. 04-110858.
Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims where they admitted the loan but stated that
it only amounted to P340,000. Respondents further alleged that Enrico was not a party to the loan because it was
contracted by Edna without Enricos signature. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of improper
venue, res judicata and forum-shopping, invoking the Decision of the RTC, Branch 33. On 7 March 2005, respondents also
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of action.
The Decision of the Trial Court
On 22 July 2005, the RTC, Branch 42 issued an Order8 denying the motion to dismiss. The RTC, Branch 42 ruled that res
judicata will not apply to rights, claims or demands which, although growing out of the same subject matter, constitute
separate or distinct causes of action and were not put in issue in the former action. Respondents filed a motion for

reconsideration. In its Order9 dated 8 February 2006, the RTC, Branch 42 denied respondents motion. The RTC, Branch 42
ruled that the RTC, Branch 33 expressly stated that its decision did not mean that petitioner could no longer recover the
loan petitioner extended to Edna.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 30 May 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 22 July 2005 and 8 February 2006 Orders of the RTC, Branch
42 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the general rule is that a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable, the
rule admits of exceptions. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC, Branch 42 acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying respondents motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may not institute more
than one suit for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the
filing of one on a judgment upon the merits in any one is available ground for the dismissal of the others. The Court of
Appeals ruled that on a nonpayment of a note secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the
debtor, that is recovery of the credit with execution of the suit. Thus, the creditor may institute two alternative remedies:
either a personal action for the collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both. The Court of
Appeals ruled that petitioner had only one cause of action against Edna for her failure to pay her obligation and he could
not split the single cause of action by filing separately a foreclosure proceeding and a collection case. By filing a petition for
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had already waived his personal action to
recover the amount covered by the promissory note.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 4 August 2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing the complaint for
collection of sum of money on the ground of multiplicity of suits.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the
debt.10 The mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a
real action to foreclose on the mortgage security.11 An election of the first bars recourse to the second, otherwise there
would be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending on the location of
the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.12
The two remedies are alternative and each remedy is complete by itself.13 If the mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate
mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the debt, and vice versa.14 The Court explained:
x x x in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a
personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two
remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is
complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for
attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues
his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for
deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open
to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and
any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of
election. On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and
simultaneously or successively another action against the mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits
so offensive to justice (Soriano v. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio v. San Agustin, 25 Phil.

404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of
the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies. 15
The Court has ruled that if a creditor is allowed to file his separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to
recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, he will, in effect, be authorized plural redress for a single breach
of contract at so much costs to the court and with so much vexation and oppressiveness to the debtor. 16
In this case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes into consideration.
Petitioner filed an action for foreclosure of mortgage. The RTC, Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial
foreclosure because the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed without Enricos consent. The RTC, Branch 33 stated:
All these circumstances certainly conspired against the plaintiff who has the burden of proving his cause of action. On the
other hand, said circumstances tend to support the claim of defendant Edna Lindo that her husband did not consent to the
mortgage of their conjugal property and that the loan application was her personal decision.
Accordingly, since the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was executed by defendant Edna Lindo lacks the consent or authority of
her husband Enrico Lindo, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code.
This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff cannot recover the P400,000 loan plus interest which he extended to
defendant Edna Lindo. He can institute a personal action against the defendant for the amount due which should be filed in
the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides at the election of
the plaintiff in accordance with Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. This Court has no jurisdiction to
try such personal action.17
Edna did not deny before the RTC, Branch 33 that she obtained the loan. She claimed, however, that her husband did not
give his consent and that he was not aware of the transaction.18 Hence, the RTC, Branch 33 held that petitioner could still
recover the amount due from Edna through a personal action over which it had no jurisdiction.
Edna also filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93 of San Pedro Laguna (RTC, Branch 93), which
ruled:
At issue in this case is the validity of the promissory note and the Real Estate Mortgage executed by Edna Lindo without the
consent of her husband.
The real estate mortgage executed by petition Edna Lindo over their conjugal property is undoubtedly an act of strict
dominion and must be consented to by her husband to be effective. In the instant case, the real estate mortgage, absent
the authority or consent of the husband, is necessarily void. Indeed, the real estate mortgage is this case was executed on
October 31, 1995 and the subsequent special power of attorney dated November 4, 1995 cannot be made to retroact to
October 31, 1995 to validate the mortgage previously made by petitioner.
The liability of Edna Lindo on the principal contract of the loan however subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the
mortgage. Indeed, where a mortgage is not valid, the principal obligation which it guarantees is not thereby rendered null
and void. That obligation matures and becomes demandable in accordance with the stipulation pertaining to it. Under the
foregoing circumstances, what is lost is merely the right to foreclose the mortgage as a special remedy for satisfying or
settling the indebtedness which is the principal obligation. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed remains as evidence or
proof of a personal obligation of the debtor and the amount due to the creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action.
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the deed of real estate mortgage as void in the absence of
the authority or consent of petitioners spouse therein. The liability of petitioner on the principal contract of loan however
subsists notwithstanding the illegality of the real estate mortgage.19
The RTC, Branch 93 also ruled that Ednas liability is not affected by the illegality of the real estate mortgage.
Both the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 misapplied the rules.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy,
which must be availed of within five years from the date of contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a reproduction of Article 96 of the
Family Code which applies to community property.
Both Article 96 and Article 127 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void.
However, both provisions also state that "the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors."
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special
Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse
that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
a valid contract.
However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner allowed the decisions of the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 to
become final and executory without asking the courts for an alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner
merely relied on the declarations of these courts that he could file a separate personal action and thus failed to observe the
rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioners avenue for recovery of the loan.
Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under the law.
In Chieng v. Santos,20 this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may institute against the mortgage-debtor either a personal
action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. The Court ruled that the remedies are alternative and not
cumulative and held that the filing of a criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was in effect a collection
suit or a suit for the recovery of the mortgage-debt.21 In that case, however, this Courtpro hac vice, ruled that respondents
could still be held liable for the balance of the loan, applying the principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at
the expense of another.22
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money
or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience." 23 The principle of unjust
enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such
benefit is derived at the expense of another. 241avvphi1
The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of
another without just cause or consideration.25 The principle is applicable in this case considering that Edna admitted
obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void
erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she
filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33
for an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have done, because the RTC, Branch 33
already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might have against Edna.
Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail
over the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals, in the assailed decision, found that Edna admitted
the loan, except that she claimed it only amounted to P340,000. Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself
because of the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the validity of the Deed. Moreover, Edna
still has an opportunity to submit her defenses before the RTC, Branch 42 on her claim as to the amount of her
indebtedness.

WHEREFORE, the 30 May 2008 Decision and the 4 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94003
are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 is directed to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 04110858.
SO ORDERED.

Spouses Decena vs. Spouses Piquero [G.R. No. 155736. March 31, 2005]
Post under case digests, Remedial Law at Sunday, March 04, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: On September 7, 1997, Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Spouses
Pedro and Valeria Piquero for the sale of their titled property in Paranaque, costing P6,900,000.00, for the price of P940,250.00
only, payable in six (6) installments via postdated checks. The MOA stipulated that the that the petitioners obliged themselves to
transfer the property to the respondents upon the execution of the MOA with the condition that if two of the postdated checks
would be dishonored by the drawee bank, the latter would be obliged to reconvey the property to the petitioners. The vendees
forthwith took possession of the property.
The first two checks issued by the respondents were dishonored by the drawee bank and were not replaced with cash despite
demands by the petitioners who on May 17, 1999 filed a complaint, before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan where they reside,
against the respondents for the annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession and damages, alleging that they did not
transfer the property to and in the names of the respondents as a result of the dishonored checks.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Malolos Bulacan gained jurisdiction over the case and should be the venue of litigation.
Held: NO.The action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA on account of the respondents' breach thereof and the
latter's failure to return the premises subject of the complaint to the petitioners, and the respondents' eviction therefrom is a
real action. As such, the action should have been filed in the proper court where the property is located, namely, in Pararaque
City, conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court
The action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA on account of the respondents' breach thereof and the latter's failure
to return the premises subject of the complaint to the petitioners, and the respondents' eviction therefrom is a real action. As
such, the action should have been filed in the proper court where the property is located, namely, in Pararaque City,
conformably with Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. ' Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated.
Since the petitioners, who were residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed their complaint in the said RTC, venue was improperly laid;
hence, the trial court acted conformably with Section 1(c), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court when it ordered the dismissal of the
complaint.