The Impact of Aristotle's Scientific Ideas in The Middle Ages and at The Beginning of The Scientific Revolution

The Impact of Aristotle's Scientific Ideas in the Middle
Ages and at the Beginning of the Scientific Revolution

by Ingemar Du ring (Gteborg)1
Aristotle's Scientific ideas were not fully understood until his
writings were available in Greek in the sixteenth Century and until
European scholars knew enough Greek to be able to grasp the basic
ideas behind the words. Allowing us a certain simplification, we can
say that Aristotle's Scientific ideas were transmitted to the Middle
Ages in two main currents, one with its origin in Hellenistic doxography, Cicero and Pliny, the other with its origin in the Roman
edition of the Corpus Aristotelicum, made by Andronicus of Rhodes
sorne years after Cicero's death, and the paraphrases made during
the first Century of our era. The Latin tradition is a rather t hin
trickle, conveying little of Aristotle's basic scientific thought. But
what men like Cicero, Pliny and Augustine said about Aristotle had,
of course, always a great influence on the Latin tradition. Cicero
knew little about Aristotle's physics and cosmology. Pliny was
uncritical. As A. Steier2 shows, Pliny accepted without objection
many of the gross mistakes made by Aristotle. He was a diligent
Compiler and his principle was prodenda quia prodita sunt. His mind
was utilitarian; he also swallowed all kinds of magic and superstition. His favourite idea was to show that nature and everything
brought into being by nature existed to serve the purpose of man.
His mind was not that of a scientist and consequently he had no
interest in the basic theories of Aristotle, although it is quite clear
that he had a good first-hand knowledge for instance of Aristotle's
De Partibus Animalium. Yet Pliny's Historia Naturalis served s
textbook in natural science until the sixteenth Century. We cannot
really wonder that the early mediaeval scholars who relied mainly
on the Latin tradition, preserved in the compilations of the Latin
encyclopaedists, knew n ext t o nothing about Aristotle's scientific
methods and ideas.
1
2
Although not a mediaevalist I have, in honour of my friend Paul Wilprrt, vonlm

cd to offer thcsc rather sketchy rcinarks on a vast themo.
"Zoologische Probleme bei Aristoteles und Plinius", Zoologische Annalrn f> (1!MH)
207305.
Bereitgestellt von | The John Rylands Library, University of Manchester (The Joh
Angemeldet | 172.16.1.226
Heruntergeladen am | 28.02.12 14:1
116
I. D r i n g
In the Greek tradition the scconcl Century A. D. is most important. From the dialogues of Epictetus we know that, about the
year 100 A.D., Aristotelian logic had been introduced in the
schools. We can see the result of this and the increased acquaintance
with Aristotle's scientific methods and writings in the works of the
great scientists in the middle of the second Century, especially
Ptolemy and Galen. No one can read the introductory chapter of
Ptolemy's Theory of Harmonics without observing the Aristotelian
tenor in language and methods of demonstration and definition.
In Galen's writings we frequently meet Aristotle's narne; he obviously knew the works that we possess in the Corpus Aristotelicum
very well, but his Interpretation of Aristotle's basic ideas is rather
capricious; his style and, to a certain extent, also his terminology
and methods are un-Aristotelian. It is understandable that Aristotle,
Ptolemy and Galen became the great authorities for the Arabs and
through them for the Middle Ages. Aristotle's cosmology was amalgamated with Ptolemy's mathematical and astronomical account;
some of Galen's doctrines were founded on his Interpretation of
'Hippocrates', Plato and Aristotle. When through Latin translations of the Arabic compilations this body of ideas reached the
Latin West, it was feit that the works of Aristotle, Ptolemy and
Galen constituted a complete rational System, explaining the universe and the natural phenomena s a whole in terms of natural causes.
In the early twelfth Century European scholars began to become
acquainted with Aristotle through other sources than the old Latin
tradition and the old Latin translations of the Organon. Little by
little they became aware of the gulf between the old Latin and the
new Graeco-Arabic tradition. Yet they were dependent on the
translations, and everybody who has personal knowledge of the
early Latin translations from Arabic knows how deficient they are.
Albert Magnus did not understand Greek or Arabic. He was obliged
to rely on Latin translations of Aristotle's works. It is a marvel that
he acquired such a profound knowledge of Aristotle. Yet it must
be observed that he was more interested in facts than in theories.
From my own experience of his writings I cannot say that he
showed much interest in Aristotle's philosophy of nature. But s a
naturalist, an empirical Student of natural phenomena, he is in my
opinion the greatest student of nature after Theophrastus3 and by
3
H. Stadler, in: Verhandlungen deutscher Naturforscher und rzte, I. Teil, Leipzig

1909, p. 35 (quoted by B. Geyer, Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie.
Berlin 1928, p. 410) writes: "Albert war ein Beobachter ersten Ranges, und wre
The Impact of Aristotle's Scicntific Idcas in the Middle Ages
117
his contemporaries he was rightly called "nostri temporis stupor".

Towards the middle of the thirteenth Century four channels of
transmission of Greek science were open: the Latin tradition preserved by the cathedral schools; the earliest Latin translations from
Arabic and Greek made in Sicily, Venice and Toledo in the twelfth
Century; later and better translations, for instance those made by
William of Moerbeke; they too are, however, word-for-word
translations and personally I find it difficult to see how a mediaeval
scholar, using these literal translations, could grasp the ideas that
Aristotle wanted to convey to him; finally, and for instance for
Albert Magnus extremely important, a large number of translations
of Arabic commentators, Avicenna, Averroes, Alpetragius and
others, and of Arabic compilations circulating under Aristotle's
name, including a number of pseudo-Aristotelian writings.
We know that this flood of new books kindled a new enthusiasm.
The result was an upsurge of intellectual activity and the rise of a
new professional interest in philosophy, the ultimate result of which
was the unification of European thought and the intellectual leadership of the Latin West.
Behind this revival of learning looms the great figure of Aristotle,
but, indeed, a Protean Aristotle. From Grosseteste (11751253) to
Galileo Galilei (15641642) Aristotle occupied the centre of the
stage. But this Aristotle has but little in common with the true
Aristotle, the problem-thinker, the seeker for truth. We know very
little about the books on which Robert Grosseteste, or a Century
later, Nicolas Oresme, relied for their knowledge about Aristotle,
but one thing is certain: they did not know him first-hand. Greek
books and Greek instruction were rare exceptions during the
Middle Ages. Every great thinker constructed his own image of
Aristotle; this sham-Aristotle was regarded s a final authority,
but at the same time he provided the weapons with which he was
attacked, and the schoolmen won their battles in fighting with
this .
Recent investigation has proved false the idea that the age of the
schoolmen was merely receptive and that the main achicvement of
this age was the absorption of the Greco-Arabic tradition. The
die Entwicklung der Naturwissenschaften auf der von Albert eingeschlagenen
Bahn weitergegangen, so w re ihr ein Umweg von drei Jahrhunderten erspart
geblieben". My study of Albert's zoological wrilings confinns 1 his view.
118
I. Du r i n ff
pondtilum has novv swung to the other extreme; the interest is now
focussed on the original contribuiions of the thirtecnth ancl fourteenth Century thinkers.
Broadly speaking, I think we ean still maintain that the GrecoArabie traclition transmitted to the West was a coherent System of
scientific ideas; the closeness of this System helped to preserve it,
especially after it had been digested and further systematized in
textbooks for the universities. At the average level, professors and
students used the same basic textbooks during four centuries, and
the \vorld-view propagated in these books was ultimately based on
Aristotelian cosmology: a good example is the textbook in astronomy, written about 1225 by John Holywood, latinized Sacrobosco,
used in all universities until after Galileo's time, after 1470 known
in some 250 printed editions. But if we study the great individual
thinkers of these centuries, the picture changes: none of them accepted the same system of ideas. What unites them is, s P. O. Kristeller
has said, the use of a common source material, a common terminology, a common set of definitions and problems, a common method of
discussing these problems. For this F. van Steenberghen has coined
the suitable term ,,an eclectic Aristotelianism".
As is well known, the Church intervened many times during this
Century and prohibited the study of certain of Aristotle's works.
The interventions are sometimes regarded s attacks on the freedom
of thought. Here, again, modern investigation has shed new ligth.
Thanks to a treatise by Boetius of Dacia we now know much more
about the radical and heterodox Aristotelianism, represented by
Siger of Brabant, the so-called Latin Averroism. The Church fought
against different forms of the new Aristotelianism, because the
conservative theologians did not want to sacrifice their belief in
God Almighty who can do with the world s it pleases Hirn. To
them the Aristotelian rationalism appeared s an impious attempt
to infringe God's omnipotence by pledging Hirn to obey the laws
of nature and necessity. The Church did not persecute the great
thinkers but took a firm position against the rationalism which,
relying on Aristotle, advocated the supremacy of the intellect.
R. Hooykaas has shown that this fight of the Church which culminated in Bishop Tempier's indictment from the year 1277, actually furthered the advancement of science. In the fourteenth
Century, again, the philosophy of nature inspired by the Occamist
school at Paris and Oxford attacked the scholastic Aristotelianism
from another angle. And during the whole period the followers of
The Impact of Aristotle's Scicntific Ideas in thc Middle Ages
119
Averroes and of Siger of Brabant fought against the Church,

belieying themselves to be the only true Champions for the freedom
of science. The Situation is thus extremely complicated: the Church
allowed freedom of thought, provided that the dogmas of Christian
faith were left untouched, but fought against the philosophers. In
a way, then, the dogmatic Aristotelianism of the university philosophers was a greater danger for the advancement of science than
the Church.
As an example illustrating what happened when a great thinker
about 1200 struggled to understand Aristotle and formulate his
own views I shall take Robert Grosseteste, on whom Dr. Crombie4
has published a penetrating study. According to Crombie, Grosseteste created a new scientific method, unknown to the Greeks. The
experimental science, usually regarded s a result of the scientific
revolution in Galileo's time, was according to Crombie in fact a
creation of Grosseteste and the Oxford school. Two factors made
this achievement possible: firstly, the remarkable advancement of
technical skill and practical knowledge which encouraged experiments and developed a new interest in practical scientific problems.
Early in the thirteenth Century this practical tendency began to
affect the teaching of the seven liberal arts. Even those writers who
approached technics and science s literary men, recognized in
theory that natural science rests on a basis of experience. The
second factor is of course the impact of the new knowledge of
Aristotle. Grosseteste's contribution still according to Crombie
was to unite the two twelfth Century traditions of technology and
logic, and to produce a methodus experimentalis, by which the world
of experience could be investigated and rationally explained. A
thorough examination of Grosseteste's commentaries on Aristotle
shows how he transformed Aristotle's deductive and geometrical
science into a science based on induction and experiment. The two
fundamental concepts in this new method was the doctrinc of
resolutio and compositio, that is, the use of both induction and
deduction in order to reach an exact Interpretation of natural
phenomena; the proposition which comes out s a result of this
Operation should be tested by verification or falsification. Crombic
then goes on to show how Grosseteste appliod this method in
clealing with various scientific problems.
This is a good example of thc new trond in appraisiiitf thc achievcment of the twelfth and thirteenth Century scholars. Crombii 's niain
4
l {ober l (Irossftrste and the Origiiis of Kxpcrimcntal Stirn, Oxford 1W>.'l
120
l. I ) r i n g
thesis arouses, however, some misgivings: it isfor me difficult to see

in what rcspect Grosseteste surpassed Aristotle. Crombie provides
the reader with ample material which, in fact, disproves his thesis.
Aristotle h ad recognized in principle the necessity for experimental
verification and falsification. As far s we know he made little use
of i t in practice. Are we t o believe that Grosseteste really applied
t hose principles better than Aristotle ? I am afraid the ans wer rnust
be 110, for in clealing with Grosseteste's theory of refraction, Crombie
teils us that Grosseteste did not even attempt to verify it by experiments: "he was a methodologist rather than an experimentalist." It is true that Grosseteste sometimes discusses the methods
of science in a spirit which foreshadows the subsequent development, but it is difficult to admit that his ideas were in any way
revolutionary.
That Roger Bacon was greatly influenced by Grosseteste is unquestionable but what he actually meant with his scientia experimentalis remains doubtful; he uses alternatively the two words
experimentum and experientia: it seems to me probable that what
he had in mind was the Workshop, the mechanical arts, and the
usefulness of practical experience, not scientific experiments s
those made by Stevin and Galileo in the seventeenth Century. It is
only in their new attitude to practical problems of applied science
that Grosseteste and Bacon foreshadow the future revolution in the
approach to scientific problems. In their discussions of method I
cannot see that they went beyond Aristotle, but their attitude to
the professions is something quite new.
Aristotle made a sharp distinction between the philosopher and
the practitioner. The mediaeval attitude is in principle the same.
The mediaeval practitioner was for many centuries a simple craftsman: the distinguished doctor did not soil his hands with blood;
the philosopher contemplated the musica mundana and wrote
erudite treatises on harmonics, but would never dream of touching
an Instrument; in natural science, the study of any other branch
than theoretical astronomy (that is, cosmology) and especially of
experimental natural science was regarded s belonging to the
black arts. Dante placed those who dedicated themselves to that
kind of study in Hell.
The attempts of the schoolmen to understand Aristotle has
rightly been called "a titanic failure", a failure not only to understand his scientific ideas and concepts, but also a failure to formulate
a philosophy of their own: they f ound themselves in a blind alley.
The Impact of Aristotlc's Scientific Ideas in thc Middle Ages
121
It is a fact, often overlooked, that many of Aristotle's fundamental scientific ideas were never understood during the manuscript age, not even in Antiquity when the Greek texts were
available. I shall illustrate this with the following example.
Aristotle did not only record observations or propound scientific
theories in general terms; at the same time he offered a detailed
account of the mechanism by which he thought the observed
phenomena came about. He did not consider i t sufficient to develop
his theory of 'form' embodied in 'matter*. But he explained precisely
how he thought this embodiment was effected. Like many of
Aristotle's fundamental ideas his theory of form embodied in matter
and separable from it only in thought, has its roots in his biological
view and approach to problems. The question he raised was this:
a corpse has the same shape and fashion s a living body, and yet
it is not a man. A hand constituted in any and every manner like
a living hand, for instance a bronze or wooden one, is not a hand
except in name; the same applies to a physician painted on canvas,
or a flute carved in stone. What is the essence and character of the
animal itself, and how are we to find out its form () ?
Aristotle's answer is this: the , the connate
pneuma, is the primary vehicle of life and of the processes peculiar
to living organisms. The pneuma is certainly corporeal, a kind of
matter, present in the animal from the moment of conception, and
so long s the animal remains alive. It is connate, not acquired from
outside, and it is the vehicle of the soul. In his physics its analogen
is the 'first body', , the substance out of which the
celestial spheres and the heavenly bodies are made. In material
objects, whether made by art or found in nature, its analogen is the
immanent Form, 5$.
It is interesting to follow how this concept of pneuma underwent
successive changes during the process of transmission. Aristotle's
connate pneuma is an important factor in his Solutions to the
problems of reproduction and Sensation, but it must be admitted
that his account of its function is obscure and even inconsistent.6
The Stoics adopted the concept of pneuma, but in their philosophy
its connexion with observed facts is omitted: it is a rather vaguc
concept, at once the matter from which all things have original cd
and an all-pervading world-reason; the Stoics proservod the
6
See my Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines I>,nkrns.

1900. p. 342346.
122
I. D r i n g
Aristotrlian tonn aiul characterized thc soul itself s

>. This concept, perhaps because of its vagueness, madc a
strong appcal. Galen makcs extensive use of the idea of pneuma,
iiiul froin his writings it reached the Arabs; it was incorporated in
the Corpus of Galenic Writings and in Avicenna's Canon. Parts of
t his Corpus were translated by Constantine the African and through
the Masters of Salerno transmitted to the Latin West; the complete
trunslation was made by Gerard of Cremona in Toledo; this large
corpus and Avicenna's Canon served s medical textbooks for many
ccnturies; the idea of pneuma remained in fact a basic concept
until the later part of the 18 th Century.
But Galen's pneuma, again, was something quite different frorn
what Aristotle had taught and also different frorn the Stoical
pneuma. According to Galen, the pneuma enters the body with the
air, passes to the heart, where it combines with another kind of
pneuma, extracted by the liver from the chyle, forming the vital
spirit, . In Galen's explanation of the process of
reproduction, no reference is made to this concept. It is pure
speculation, and it was easy to refute s such.
Another Interpretation of the pneuma, which through the
Hermetic philosophy became very influential, is a curious blend of
Aristotle's connate pneuma and the corresponding Stoical concept.
As in Aristotle, the pneuma is compared with the , now
called the fifth element, and it is now almost identified with it; it is
also identified with the Aristotelian !$, the notion of the immanent form; in short, it is now thought of s the active principle in
all things. This concept of pneuma had a powerful influence in
moulding the ideas of the alchemists. The Book of the Fifth Nature,
by J bir ibn Hay n, transmitted these ideas to the Arabs. The
most celebrated Western counterpart to this book is Ramon Lull's
treatise De secretis naturae, seu de quinta essentia. LulTs very clear
account of what he meant by quintessence shows us to what extent
an Aristotelian concept could be distorted.
This brief survey shows that no one of those who adopted
Aristotle's technical expression understood the idea behind the
word. This has happened many times during the transmission of
Aristotle's scientific ideas. Many of his most profound ideas are
formulated in one or two words: those who hit upon those words
6
Chrysippus, S VF II 885. He probably means that is identical

with or a prerequisite for life.
The Impact of Aristotle's Scicntific Ideas in the Middle Ages
123
diel not always investigate their background. Take for instance his
word , a word which in the last Century owes to Driesch
its bad reputation; or take Aristotle's definition of time s
, the foundation of his
kinematics and that which most of all distinguishes his theory of
time frorn Plato's in the Timaeus. To understand technical expressions of this kind it is necessary to follow Aristotle's own principle
of , to attempt a comprehensive explanation of a whole complex of related phenomena. Isolated and taken
out of their context these words give little or no sense.
The first, s far s I can see, to understand completely Aristotle's
theory of form embodied in matter and of the ,
was William Harvey: with his work On the Generation of Animals
he founded modern embryology. Aristotle had clearly recognized
the fundamental problems of biology: sex, heredity, nutrition,
growth, adaptation, the scala naturae, the theory of epigenesis and
so forth. It happens still to-day when a new discovery is made that
scientists look up old Aristotle in order to see 7if he has observed the
fact. Just one example: Professor Haldane tried to show that
Aristotle probably has recorded an observation of bees' dances, the
method by which hive bees communicate with one another.
As a biologist Aristotle is first and foremost philosopher, not
scientist in our sense of the word. His biology is a philosophical
biology. As observer of nature he makes many good observations,
but he is also guilty of errors of far-reaching influence, for instance
his denial of the sexuality of plants, or his assignation of the heart
s the seat of intelligence, in spite of earlier Hippocratic views.
Almost all of Aristotle's main ideas in the field of biology were
forgotten within a generation after his death. Pliny became the
great authority during 1500 years. It took the combined efforts of
the best Renaissance naturalists to drive him out, or at least to
lessen the evil he had done. It is true that Galen was greatly influenced by Aristotle, but his two main ancient authorities were
'Hippocrates' and Plato's Timaeus and many of his doctrines were
purely speculative (I have already given one example). Galen's
theory that the human body is governed physiologically by three
distinct and graded sets of organs, fluids and pneumata, and bis
theory of the 'innate forces of the body', the \'$.
7
"Aristotle's account of bee's clanrcs", .///.S 75 (1055) LM 2f>. -ordinj? t < > manv
oppononts not plausible; I too doubt that Haldano's interptvlalion is valid
124
I. D u r i n g
are examplcs of this type of speculative amalgamation of ancient

icloas. In thcthirleenthCenturyrcvival, Albert Magnusisanexception.
As l have said above, he was an excellent observer of facts, with a
fine understanding of morphology and ecology, unsurpassed since
Tlioophrastus, but he was less interested in ideas, and he had no
followers. W. Pagel h s made a pertinent observation concerning
the tvvo main currents of mediaeval intellectual life: Aristotelian
rationalism, usually allied with theological scholasticism, was
anti-scientific, whereas experimental empiricism, reacting against
this intellectualism, found an ally in mysticism. The empirical
attitude, so conimon in the professions, gradually resulted in a
remarkable development of technique and industry; in the Schools,
on the other hand, the religious climate fostered an interest in logic
and abstruse speculation. In a most interesting way the t wo
currents met in the writings of Francis Bacon. As a young precocious
boy in Trinity College he developed his distaste for the scholastic
Aristotle; themainpointinhis criticism of the Aristotelian philosophy
was that it concerned itself with a small rnge of problems; the
horizon was limited; again we are reminded of the narrowness of
the scholastic Aristotelianism by contrast to the true Aristotle. In
his brilliant book Advancement of Learning he forecast visions of
the new knowledge within reach of man. He wanted to bring about
"the true and lawful marriage of the empirical and rational faculties,
the unkind and ill-starred Separation of which has thrown into
confusion all the affairs of the human family. For when philosophy
is severed from its root in experience, whence it first sprouted and
grew, it becomes a dead thing".
Tirades of this kind, which are numerous in Bacon's works, are
of course not directed against the real Aristotle, whom Bacon
simply did not know, but against the sham-Aristotle of the schoolmen. Bacon's own biology is fll of belief in magic and time-worn
legend, more akin to Pliny than to Aristotle and this in spite
of his demand for an "absolute regeneration of science". Nor is
there in my opinion anything real novel in his logic or in his rules of
induction.
Aristotle's biologic concepts were rediscovered towards the end
of the 16th Century. William Harvey feit himself deeply indebted to
Aristotle, and, what is more, he had really penetrated the depths of
his thought: "The authority of Aristotle has always such weight
with me that I never think of differring with him inconsiderately."
The Impact of Aristotle's Scicntific Idcas in the Middle Ages
125
It is the last word in this scntence that makes the whole difference
in attitude.
Even in those branches of learning in which the scholars of the
Middle Ages were specialists we meet a profound misunderstanding
of Aristotle's thought. Here I must take an example from Aristotle's
so-called metaphysics, which few, if any, seientists today regard s
a legitimate branch of science, preferring to speak of laws, hypotheses, and using other terms. I have the highest respect for Thomas
Aquinas s an outstanding scholar in his own right. But I cannot
side with those who hold that Thomas understood and interpreted
Aristotle in a way which is still valid for us who have access to the
original Greek texts.
According to Aristotle the ultimate aim of scientific thinking is
to discover the enduring and intelligible reality behind the changing phenomena perceived through the senses: he wanted to define
what he called the , that is the existence of things, underlying
and causing all observed facts. To his mind the worid, its material
things, its living organisms, its Spiritual phenomena, was one and
the same reality. Some aspects of this reality might be revealed by
physics or natural science, others by mathematics, others again by
what Aristotle called "philosophy of first things" and we call metaphysics. The different branches of science, the , were
conceived of s roads leading to truth, ,
and the discussion of these 'roads' or is constantly carried
on parallel with the account of concrete investigation.
The concept of a unified Cosmos in which Spiritual and material
phenomena differ only s the concave and convex sides of a sphere,
and of a unified science without the modern cleavage between the
humanities and the sciences dominated the teaching in the European universities until the middle of the seventeenth Century.
During this time the question guiding scientific inquiry was essentially the same s it had been to Aristotle. A natural consequcnce
of this is, for instance, that Aristotle's biology and physics are
interwoven with metaphysical and ontological spcculation. Although he himself says so he never clearly distinguished descriptive
natural science, , from the inquiry into the causes and
essence of things, the . His leading idca was that "naturo
does nothing in vain". Perhaps the modern biologist is right, who
said: "Teleology is a lady without whom no biologist can live; yet
he is ashamed to show himself in public with her." Aristotle was
not ashamed; on the contrary, he was never content to ask "Wliat
126
I. D r i n
is it?", but imnuidiately raisccl the question "Why". To most

sciontists todny this is rcpellent: the wliole method is regarded s
obsolete and unscieiitific. Whcther this twentieth Century attitude
is ritfht or wrong I shall leave asidc: what I want to stress is that a
systoin of thought bascd on teleology and on the pre-Cartesian
oonception of a unified Cosmos becomes intelligible only if we understand the questions it was designed to ariswer.
To illustrate my point I shall select one of the fundamental
concepts of mediaeval philosophy, the socalled analogia entis.
Thomas Aquinas based his doctrine on Aristotle's doctrine of
in Metaphysics Gamma 2, one of the most profound chapters in this
collection of lectures on the 'philosophy of first things'.
Aristotle says s follows: The world s the order of many can,
when we try to analyse it, be divided in various ways. We can
detach parts of it ancl study them separately, for instance an animal
or a star. We can also divide the phenomena according to another
principle: we can detach, s it were, layers from reality and make
arithmetic, geometry, dynamics deal with things so far s they are
countable, spatial, or moving in space, and so forth. But Being s
plain Existence cannot be detached or cut. Substantiality is a
whole of instrumental momenta which cannot be separated. His
conclusion is: Existence itself is analogous in all beings8. Existence
is nothing self-existent, but the actual presence of the form of a
thing here and now. Unity, definiteness, and existence are correlative notions. The notions beloiiging to the concept existence are
Trpos , that is, they refer to one and the same nature. There
are no things that are matter without form, or form without matter.
In his account of the doctrine of this chapter Thomas inverted
the meaning. He replaced the Aristotelian by God, and
changed immanence into transcendence. And this he gave out s
Aristotle's doctrine. This doctrine, supposed to be Aristotle's, was
for centuries the object of dispute and discussion. But s far s I
know, no mediaeval scholar used the simple method which any
scholar would use today, namely to check his quotations and his
Interpretation. The reason for this is simple: Greek texts were
scarce; if available, few, if any, could understand them; the Latin
translations were very unsatisf actory, the language vague, especially
in texts of this subtle kind.
3
Met. Eta I 2, 1043 a 5. See my Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines

Denkens. Heidelberg 1966, p. 619.
The Impact of Aristotle's Scientific Ideas in the Middle Ages
127
The first weU-known scholar to raise his voice against the scholastic misrepreiitation of Aristotle was Petrarch; the battle-cry
was "Aristotle is better than his translators". But with him started
the rebellion against Aristotle; really good translations from Greek
to Latin were first made by the Renaissance scholars; the importance of this fact has in my opinion not yet been sufficiently
appreciated. I agree entirely with P. O. Kristeller9 that we have
to reconsider our view of the Renaissance Aristotelianism. It is
generally believed that the upsurge of science in the beginning of
the seventeenth Century was inspired by a reaction towards Aristotle
and a renewed interest in Plato; this view can no loiiger be maintained without considerable modifications. The transmission of
Aristotle's scientific ideas to the Latin West was not completed
until the first half of the seventeenth Century.
We can illustrate this by returning to our example, the Interpretation of the so-called analogia entis. In the sixteenth Century,
when good texts and good translations were available, this doctrine
was well understood. Jean Fernel, in his Dialogue on the Hidden
Caiises of Things, a very popul r book published in 1548 and reprinted in many European countries during onehundredandfifty
years, gives an account of Aristotle's doctrine which comes very
close to the original. He recognized the interrelation between
Aristotle's notions of pneuma, (form), and . In his
preface he gives us the reason: "We have recovered the true texts
of the masterpieces of Greek wisdom; learning and the fine arts
are blooming afresh after a frost of thirteenth centuries." At the
same time it is characteristic that Fernel avoids the word 'substance'. He, like many philosophers today, associated this word
with the unfruitful speculation of the schoolmen: referring to
Aristotle's classical metaphor, "Nature works on matter, s the
sculptor works on bronze", he substituted the word 'nature'. This
is what he says: "Each animal and plant, each mineral, whatever
is in this sublunary world, contains a particular iiialterable nature,
which maintains and Orders it and its kind and combines the whole
to a universal nature. This particular nature is its form and true
being, and it is form coming to the material which makes i t the
individual thing that it is."
For Fernel 'form' was substantial over and above the elcmental
matter. Although inseparable from the individual thing, it was.
0
The Classics and Renaissance Thougtot (Martin Classical 1-crtiircs vol. XV),
Harvard UP 1965, p. 34.
128
I. Drintf
f/
Bring, acttially scparablc. Tliis comes very close to Aristotle's
vicw, convctly intrrprcited by thc Grcek commentators, from
Alexander of Aphrodisias to Philoponus. The Arabs did not understaiul this doc.trim and madc form and substance to qualitics and
propcrtics. Through Averrocs this doctrine was transmitted to the
Latin \\Vst and persisted for centurics s a materialistic Interpretation of Aristotle, in competition with the Thomistic doctrine.
When we look back at the period from 1200 to 1500 we are
inclincd to regard it s entirely dominated by the figure of Aristotle.
In schools and universities he is the authority; in the populr
literature and in art we meet the so-caUed Legend of Aristotle, a
curious mixture of Oriental, Greek and European fiction; manuals
in social behaviour for princes and noblemen were edited s works
of Aristotle; pseudo-Aristotelian writiiigs provided an arsenal for
the black arts. Great individuals, of course, introduced new ideas.
We may recall the names of Jean Buridan, Nicolas Oresme, Nicolas
of Cusa, Regiomontanus. But recent estimates of their work s
forerunners of a scientific revival serve rather to emphasize the
continuity of thought than to indicate a break with the past. The
impetus-theorists, for instance, were only a minority movement,
and so was the Occamist school. Their doctrines becarne known
only to a small circle. The relative scarcity of books during the
manuscript age and the limited Communications between scholars
delayed real advancement. The Situation changed drastically from
about 1450. According to Sarton the Veiietian printers alone
produced about two million printed volumes in the 15th Century10;
this is hard t o believe, but the figure given shows how quickly the
Situation must have changed. The multiplicity and cheapness of
books, the introduction of Standard texts and Standard illustrations
to which one could easily refer the importance of these material
facts can hardly be exaggerated.
But, essentially, the conception of the world remained unchanged:
two passages in Galileo's famous Dialogiie Concerning the Two
Chief World Systems teil us why. There are three Speakers, Salviati,
representing Galileo himself, Simplicio, the intelligent Aristotelian,
and Sagredo, the educated layman.
10
In the Convento de Santa Monica in Puebla, Mexico, I saw in 1947 vast and dusty
piles of incunabula and early sixteenth Century books, printed in Venice and
Holland, obviously shipped to Mexico in the early sixteenth Century. The University of Mexico was founded in 1551.
The Iinpact of Aristotlc's Scicntific Idcas in the Middlc Agcs
129
Salviati says s follows: "It is vanity to imagine that one can

introduce a new philosophy merely by refuting this or that author.
It is necessary first to teach the reform of the human mind and to
reiider it capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood."
In these words we suddenly hear a new accent, famili r to
everybody who has read Plato11 and Aristotle. But during almost
two thousand years, between Aristotle and Galileo, nobody said
anything like this. Again we realize that a creative thinker can be
enthroned only by another creative thinker, not merely by negative
criticism.
The second passage is this: When Salviati has expounded the
new discoveries of sun-spots, comets and so forth, Simplicio first
does not answer. Sagredo then says: "I can see that Simplicio is
deeply moved by the overwhelming force of these arguments, and I
seem to hear him say: Who would there be to settle our controversies, if Aristotle were to be deposed? What other authority
should we follow in the Schools, the Academies, the Universities ?
Which philosopher has written the whole of natural philosophy, so
well arranged, without omitting a single conclusion ? Ought we to
desert that structure on which so many travellers have recuperated ?
Should we destroy that haven, that Prytaneum where so many
scholars have taken refuge so comfortably; where, without exposing themselves to the inclemencies of the air, they can acquire a
complete knowledge of the universe by merely turning a few pages ?
Should that fort be levelled, where one may abide in safety against
all enemy assaults?"
Another example I shall take from the correspondence between
Leibniz and his teacher Jakob Thomasius about 1670. The scientific
revolution is now a fact: In a letter to his old friend Leibniz teils
him about the new books he has received from the Royal Society,
and about the new philosophy which is now forming: "Such a
philosophy, he says, will by no means imply a break with Aristotle.
For most scholars now agree that during the age of the schoolmen
Aristotle has been obscured by clouds of smoke and that the real
Aristotle is in remarkable agreement
with Galileo, Bacon, Gassendi,
Hobbes, Cartesius and Digby12. The Greek commentators iriterpreted him, on the whole, correctly, but the schoolmen di st rt d
his doctrines. When now our minds have been cnlightened, philos11
12
$ $, Rcp. 526 C. 518 H, ' 51 i H

T bis swccpiiig generaJizalion is of coursc not truo
Anh. (;esch. Philosophie, Ikl. 5
130
1. D r i i i K
ophrrs prooord along main roads: one foolish, s for instance

Paracvlsiis; oni audacious, s for instance Cartesius who rejccts
<vrn t In ronvct opinions of Ihc ancionts; the third road is the best;
t hosr who follow this roacl admirc Aristotlc s a brilliant thinkcr
who is niostly right, although we have advanced further."
Thomasius' reply is a moving document: the old professor congratulati's his young brilliant disciple on being fortunate enough to
livr and vvork in an age in which philosophy undergoes a complete
change and concludes: "I spent my apprentice years in the Old
Agf (he was born 1022), and I worked my way up to a certain
Standard of education. I am now too old to start from the beginning again. Allow me, my young friend, to stay where I am, sheltered
by the entrenchments, like an old cautious Veteran."
'To start from the beginning.' That is exactly what Galileo,
Drscartes and the other innovators did. But they were educated in
the Old Age and they were steeped in ancient literature. In the
history of the transmission of Aristotle's scientific ideas this is the
last time that his writings played a conspicuous part in fermenting
European thought. It is true that in our Century there are signs of
increased interest in certain of Aristotle's writings from professional
philosophers, especially in ethics (G. E. Moore), logic and semantics
(G. Ryle, A. J. Ayre, and others). But it would be an exaggeration
to speak of a revival.
It has often been maintained that Galileo became the father of
modern science by replacing the speculative method with the
empirical, experimental method. We know now that this is not
true. Aristotle's basic scientific ideas are based on a common sense
appraisal of the reality surrounding him. This is one of the reasons
why it was so difficult to overthrow his idea of the universe and the
process of nature. It became possible only by a quite new approach,
by bold speculation along new avenues, by substituting entirely
new , new starting-points of thought, or s we use to say,
new fundamental principles. Galileo rejected Aristotle's theory of
the earth s a centre of the universe. By his experiments he asked
nature whether this hypothesis was sound. It was with this new
approach to the problem of motion that Aristotle's explanation of
motion and rest definitely feil to the ground. It is, however, curious to
note that Galileo did not reject Aristotle's theory of circular uniform
movement, although he knew that Kepler had determined the true
orbits of the planets. So strong is the power of prejudice even in a
great thinker.
The Impact of Aristotle's Scientific Idcas in the Middle Ages
131
In bis foreword to Drake's translation of Galileo's Dialogue

Einstein makes a pertinent remark. He finds that a close analogy
exists between Galileo's rejection of Aristotle's hypothesis of a
centre of the universe for explaining the fall of heavy bodies and
the rejection of Newton's hypothesis of an inertial System for the
explanation of the inertial behaviour of matter, which is the basis
of the theory of general relativity.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth Century, then, for the first
time, Aristotle's basic scientific ideas were understood and correctly
interpreted. The great scholars of this period testify to the Stimulus
they received from reading his works. Aristotle suggested to them
long-forgotten types of inquiry and disclosed a wider horizon than
that known to the mediaeval philosopher. Men like Galileo and
Harvey saw in Aristotle a kindred mind: another episode in Galileo's Dialogue well illustrates my point:
Salviati says that Aristotle's theory of the heart has recently been
proved false by anatomical dissection, and he describes the scene
in Venice. "Turning to a gentleman whom he knew to be an Aristotelian philosopher, the doctor asked whether he was at last satisfied
and convinced that the nerves originate in the brain and not in the
heart. The philosopher answered: You have made me see this
matter so plainly and palpably that if Aristotle's text were not
contrary to it, stating clearly that the nerves originate in the heart,
I should be forced to admit it to be true." Then Salviati says:
"Here you can see how dangerous this authority of his ipse dixit is.
It is the followers of Aristotle who have crowned him with authority,
not he who has usurped or appropriated this to himself. If he had
been present at the dissection, do you not think he would have
applauded the doctor, and been angry with this philosopher who
caed himself a Peripatetic ? Do you not think that Aristotle would
have used the telescope if he had known it ? Do you not know that
Aristotle said that those who deny the evidence of their senses
ought t o be deprived of them ?"
Descartes, a mathematical mind, was of course more inspired by
Plato than by Aristotle. But in his writings, too, we find a strong
influence from Aristotle, perhaps unconscious to him. Very un-Arislotelian is his attitude to his predecessors: "The prevailing confusion
in the sciences arose from the fact that they have been built up by
many people over a long period of time. Tliere is usually no order
arid no plan in houses built by succcssive generations, in contradistinction to those that are thc work of one man. Tho best thing to
132
l. IHirin
( is inake a clean sweep and begin anew, rclying on pure

reasoa."
Aristo o, too, ralsccl new and revolutionary questions, but he
diffonvd
from Decartes in acknowiedging thc principle of :
44
No one is alone able to hit witli precision the parts of the truth he
wants to hit, bui ihe small results attaincd by each thinker make
together gradually a considerable total''13. That is why Aristotle
introduced the historico-critical method: he invariably opens a
ciiscussion of a new problem with a critical review of his predecessors.
The rational optimism is the same in Aristotle and Descartes
"Because everything that can fall under human knowledge forms
a sequence, and, so long s we avoid accepting s true what is not
so, and always preserve the right order of deduction of one thing
from another, there can be nothing too remote to be reached in the
end or too well hidden not to be discovered." The words are Descartes', but we often meet the same stupendous
confidence in the
capacity of the human mind in Aristotle14.
The difference is, however, significant, too. Aristotle says: "The
chain of reasoning does not extend in i n f i n i t u m , it stops
somewhere." Descartes says: "Though the chain of reasoning
extends in i n f i n i t u m , we must stop somewhere."
To Aristotle the world was finite, a unity of soul and body,
matter and form. The idea of the infinite is one of the greatest
discoveries of Descartes. It is clear and positive and therefore a
true idea, but it is for u s an indistinct one. "We have to stop
somewhere." The consequence is that all questions that involve
infinity are beyond our science. There is a certain likeness between
Descartes' God and Aristotle's Prime Mover, an infinite being that
gives being to everything that is in this world. Descartes destroyed
the wellordered, rieh and colourful Cosmos of ancient and mediaeval
science. "Give me extension and motion, and I will construct the
world." Beside this universe of extension and motion, there is also
the Spiritual world in which man alone participates by virtue of his
soul. Until recently this dualism has been fundamental in European
thought.
After Descartes the interest in Aristotle s a philosopher has
been directed chiefly to his non-biological works. Scientists have
13
14
Met. Alpha clatton l, 993 a 30.

See my Aristoteles, p. 22.
Thc Jmpact of Aristotle's Scicntific Ideas in the Middle Ages
133
chiefly directed their attention to those parts of his biological

works in which he has either recorded some notable observation or
has indicated some general line of classification which has proved
of permanent interest or value. His philosophy of nature has aroused
some interest, but chiefly from the standpoint of the historian of
ideas, s for instance in Sir Charles Sherrington's book Man on his
Nature.
During the 19 th and 20th Century an enormous amount of
investigation has been carried out by classical scholars and philologists with the object of providing reliable texts, translations,
commentaries and indices. In this respect the transmission of his
thought t o us is now almost completed. Professional interest will
always take the classical scholar, the philosopher and the historian
of ideas back to Aristotle. His world of ideas is for us more than a
limbo of curiosities, it is a permanent legacy of stimulating ideas
and of acutely formulated problems. It is possible that a scientist,
too, would find a fresh approach rewarding.

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The Impact of Aristotle's Scientific Ideas in the Middle

Ages and at the Beginning of the Scientific Revolution

Although not a mediaevalist I have, in honour of my friend Paul Wilprrt, vonlm

H. Stadler, in: Verhandlungen deutscher Naturforscher und rzte, I. Teil, Leipzig

The Impact of Aristotle's Scicntific Idcas in the Middle Ages

his contemporaries he was rightly called "nostri temporis stupor".

The Impact of Aristotle's Scicntific Ideas in thc Middle Ages

Averroes and of Siger of Brabant fought against the Church,

l {ober l (Irossftrste and the Origiiis of Kxpcrimcntal Stirn, Oxford 1W>.'l

thesis arouses, however, some misgivings: it isfor me difficult to see

The Impact of Aristotlc's Scientific Ideas in thc Middle Ages

See my Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines I>,nkrns.

Aristotrlian tonn aiul characterized thc soul itself s

Chrysippus, S VF II 885. He probably means that is identical

The Impact of Aristotle's Scicntific Ideas in the Middle Ages

are examplcs of this type of speculative amalgamation of ancient

The Impact of Aristotle's Scicntific Idcas in the Middle Ages

is it?", but imnuidiately raisccl the question "Why". To most

Met. Eta I 2, 1043 a 5. See my Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines

The Impact of Aristotle's Scientific Ideas in the Middle Ages

The Iinpact of Aristotlc's Scicntific Idcas in the Middlc Agcs

Salviati says s follows: "It is vanity to imagine that one can

$ $, Rcp. 526 C. 518 H, ' 51 i H

Anh. (;esch. Philosophie, Ikl. 5

ophrrs prooord along main roads: one foolish, s for instance

The Impact of Aristotle's Scientific Idcas in the Middle Ages

In bis foreword to Drake's translation of Galileo's Dialogue

( is inake a clean sweep and begin anew, rclying on pure

Met. Alpha clatton l, 993 a 30.

Thc Jmpact of Aristotle's Scicntific Ideas in the Middle Ages

chiefly directed their attention to those parts of his biological

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