NEGATIVE

Callahan 73 "The tyranny of survival" pg. 91-93.

Utilitarian methods and outcomes ignore conclusive aftereffects for the sake of universal
survivability or achieving a greater good for most. Such actions focus not individually, but
universally deemed to be righteous nevertheless impairing attention to the immediate effect of
the action. Ignoring the rationality of the action simultaneously ignores the impending
consequence of it that is the direct antithesis in any means of the term utilitarian and the
predicted result for the sake of utilitarianism is eventually faulty.
By recognizing the weight of an action rationally and governing oneself in regard to it, I
negate the resolved: In the United States criminal justice system, truth-seeking ought to take
precedence over attorney-client privilege.
Truth seeking infringes on the normative concept of attorney-client privilege, or ACP, which is
a representative of privacy, and the infringement in every sense is immoral and thus
irrational because the governing body of the US is based on a sense of morality and John
Locke's social contract which dictates that the authority must not implement unjust acts or in
result be terminated. Injustice would be to infringe on its own laws bestowed on the citizens,
or merely breach the indispensable human rights to life, liberty, and property.
Through the process of considering morality and its pioneering aftereffect, the negation values
Autonomy. Individual Autonomy is an idea that is understood to refer to the capacity to be
one's own person, to live one's life according to reasons and motives that are taken as one's
own and not the product of manipulative or distorting external forces. The governing body
has the of maintaining a preordained unique degree of autonomy that was settled at the
time of its inception and any means to abstain from the distinct way of governing itself or the
act of infringing on attorney client privileges is undoubtedly immoral.
For clarification, the affirmation now provides definitions.
United States criminal justice system: System of law enforcement that is directly involved in
apprehending, prosecuting, defending, sentencing, and punishing those who are suspected or
convicted of criminal offenses.
Truth seeking: The pursuit of discovering truth
ACP: Also known as ACP, is a legal concept that protects certain communications between a
client and his or her attorney and keeps those communications confidential.

To provide a basis of judgment for the value, the negation offers the criterion of Kant's
categorical imperative.
The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)
Immanuel Kant (17241804) argued that moral requirements are based on a standard of

rationality he dubbed the Categorical Imperative or (CI).

Immorality thus involves a violation of the CI and is thereby irrational . Other philosophers, such as
Locke and Hobbes, had also argued that moral requirements are based on standards of rationality. However, these
standards were either desire-based instrumental principles of rationality or based on sui generis rational intuitions.

Kant agreed with many of his predecessors that an analysis of practical reason will reveal only the
requirement that rational agents must conform to instrumental principles. Yet he argued that
conformity to the CI (a non-instrumental principle) and hence to moral requirements
themselves, can nevertheless be shown to be essential to rational agency. This argument was
based on his striking doctrine that a rational will must be regarded as autonomous, or free in the sense of being
the author of the law that binds it. The fundamental principle of morality the CI is none other

than the law of an autonomous will. Thus, at the heart of Kant's moral philosophy is a conception of
reason whose reach in practical affairs goes well beyond that of a Humean slave to the passions . Moreover, it
is the presence of this self-governing reason in each person that Kant thought offered decisive
grounds for viewing each as possessed of equal worth and deserving of equal respect. The
authority over the governed is autonomous in the way that it must not infringe upon its own
laws bestowed on the governed and that all actions must be based on the moral standard of
rationality, without which makes the sovereign immoral and allows the termination of it by
the governed due to John Locke's social contract being the foundation of United States'
policy.
instrumental principle rationality: instructs agents to take those means that are necessary in
relation to their given ends.
Contention 1: Any action carried out by an entity must be good willed
- Kant's analysis of commonsense ideas begins with the thought that the only thing good
without qualification is a good will. While the phrases he's good hearted, she's good
natured and she means well are common, the good will as Kant thinks of it is not the same
as any of these ordinary notions. The idea of a good will is closer to the idea of a good
person, or, more archaically, a person [or entity] of good will. This use of the term will early
on in analyzing ordinary moral thought in fact prefigures later and more technical discussions
concerning the nature of rational agency. Nevertheless, this idea of a good will is an important
commonsense touchstone element to which he returns throughout his works. The basic idea
is that what makes a good person good is his possession of a will that is in a certain way

determined by, or [that he] makes [his] its decisions on the basis of, the moral law. The idea
of a good will is supposed to be the idea of one who only makes decisions that she holds to be
morally worthy, taking moral considerations in themselves to be conclusive reasons for guiding
her behavior. This sort of disposition of character is something we all highly value. Kant
believes we value it without limitation or qualification. By this, I believe, he means primarily
two things.
First, unlike anything else, there is no conceivable circumstance in which we regard our own
moral goodness as worth forfeiting simply in order to obtain some desirable object. By
contrast, the value of all other desirable qualities, such as courage or cleverness, can be
diminished, forgone, or sacrificed under certain circumstances: Courage may be laid aside if it
requires injustice, and it is better not to be witty if it requires cruelty. There is no implicit
restriction or qualification to the effect that a determination to give moral considerations
decisive weight is worth honoring, but only under such and such circumstances.
Second, possessing and maintaining one's moral goodness is the very condition under which
anything else is worth having or pursuing. Intelligence and even pleasure are worth having
only on the condition that they do not require giving up one's fundamental moral convictions.
The value of a good will thus cannot be that it secures certain valuable ends, whether of our
own or of others, since their value is entirely conditional on our possessing and maintaining a
good will. Indeed, since it is good under any condition, its goodness must not depend on any
particular conditions obtaining. Thus, Kant points out that a good will must then also be good
in itself and not in virtue of its relationship to other things such as the agent's own happiness
or overall welfare.
Resolution is linked to this argument in the way [as] that truth seeking requires a condition, a
condition of infringing the ACP, which is a representative of privacy. To retain morality and the
power to govern, the authoritative body cannot go through with an act that requires a
condition to be accomplished, because having any condition implies there is a 'side effect' of
implementing the action, which makes it immoral and in turn irrational.
The impact is that the government can be dismantled as per to the people's disposition
because the governing body will have to infringe on its own laws, thus fail to be truly
autonomous and be an entity without a good will.
On an ending note, the persons of the United States will be governed by an immoral
sovereign which not only encourages immorality in the population itself, but also through the
means of disregarding the worth of being good willed, this degrading process leads to putting
ITSELF AND THE PEOPLE at a risk of IMPERICAL EXTINCTION. -end

EXTINCTION CARD:
Policy decisions directed at maintaining human survival through whatever means will
encourage genocide, war, and the destruction of moral values
Callahan 73 Co-Founder and former director of The Hastings Institute, PhD in philosophy from
Harvard University (Daniel, The Tyranny of Survival, p 91-93)
The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the

name of survival,
all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including
the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domination has for over two decades fueled the drive of
militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World
War II, native Japanese-Americans were herded, without due process of law, to detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme
Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in the general context that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly
unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimations of Nazism. Under the banner of
survival, the government of South Africa imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has
seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival: the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not
only in a political setting that survival has been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The

main rationale B. F. Skinner offers in

Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jacques Monod,
in Chance and Necessity, survival requires that we overthrow almost every known religious, ethical and political system. In genetics, the survival
of the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and
bearing children. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means by which
those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the
field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and
in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to surviving populations of nations which
have not enacted population-control policies. For all these reasons it

is possible to counterpoise over against the need for

survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing
to inflict on another for sake of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to
suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their
aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper
than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore,
suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential

tyranny survival as value is that it is

capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease,
provoking a destructive single-mindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and
psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other
rights make much sense without the premise of a right to lifethen how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without,
in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is
human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end
all Pyrrhic victories. Yet it would be the defeat of all defeats if, because human beings could not properly manage their need to survive, they
succeeded in not doing so.

Various sources/ info [not the case]

john rawls: philosopher of justice

Rawls is far from the only thinker to conceive of moral development in terms
substantially derived from Jean Piaget's work, and at the time Rawls was writing A
Theory of Justice, educational psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg was working out a
Piaget-inspired conception of moral development that postulated six stages of human
moral development. Kohlberg claimed that the highest stage of such development
involves a concern for justice and human rights based on universal principles, and he
relegated sheer concern for relationships and for individual human well-being to
lower stages of the process. Moreover, he saw the ordering of the different stages in
Piagetian fashion as basically reflecting differences in rational understanding: those
whose moral thinking involved the invoking of universal principles of justice and
rights were said to show a more advanced cognitive development than those
whose moral thought appeals primarily to the importance of relationships and of
human well-being or suffering.
This treats utiltarianism as less cognitively advanced (more primitive) than
rationalist views like Rawls's and Kant's, and utilitarians (like Hare) have naturally
called into question the objectivity and intellectual fairness of Kohlberg's account. (In
fact, Rawls also questions whether any purely psychological theory of moral
development could ever undercut utilitarianism in the way Kohlberg sought to do.)
More significantly, perhaps, the evidence for Kohlberg's stage sequence was drawn
from studies of boys, and when one applies the sequence to the study of young girls, it
turns out that girls on average end up at a less advanced stage of moral development
than boys do.
--> 48 hour investigations and a janitor was forced to lie on stand to get a conviction against
some other guy. authority said he will get arrested and be jailed if he doesn't tell the court he
say some guy kill someone. kennedy cousin =/= {killed} martha moxley case.

In Kant's terms, a good will is a will whose decisions are wholly determined by moral
demands or as he often refers to this, by the Moral Law. Human beings view this Law as a
constraint on their desires, and hence a will in which the Moral Law is decisive is motivated

by the thought of duty. A holy or divine will, if it exists, though good, would not be good
because it is motivated by thoughts of duty. A holy will would be entirely free from desires
that might operate independently of morality. It is the presence of desires that could operate
independently of moral demands that makes goodness in human beings a constraint, an
essential element of the idea of duty. So in analyzing unqualified goodness as it occurs in
imperfectly rational creatures such as ourselves, we are investigating the idea of being
motivated by the thought that we are constrained to act in certain ways that we might not
want to, or the thought that we have moral duties.
Talks of having thoughts worthy of being good willed does not naturally mean the end result
must be beneficial in some way, but that the actual course of it must not depend on
conditions; that is there must be no "ifs" when carrying out an action in good will, and any
action abstaining from that process is immoral and in turn is irrational, which violates the CI,
and thus makes the government immoral and automatically makes it vulnerable to be
dissolved from a motion or movement from the governed.

The force of moral requirements as reasons is that we cannot ignore them no

matter how [what the] circumstances might [be] conspire against any other
consideration. Since they retain their reason-giving force under any circumstance,
they have universal validity.
According to Kant, what is singular about motivation by duty is that it consists of
bare respect for lawfulness. What naturally comes to mind is this: Duties are created
by rules or laws of some sort. For instance, the bylaws of a club lay down duties for
its officers. City and state laws establish the duties of citizens. Thus, if we do
something because it is our civic duty, or our duty as a boy scout or a good
American, our motivation is respect for the code that makes it our duty. Thinking
we are duty bound is simply respecting certain laws pertaining to us.
However intuitive, this cannot be all of Kant's meaning. For one thing, as with the
Jim Crow laws of the old South and the Nuremberg laws of Nazi Germany, the laws
to which these types of actions from duty conform may be morally despicable.
Respect for such laws could hardly be thought valuable. For another, our motive in
conforming our actions to civic and other laws is never unconditional respect. We also
have an eye toward doing our part in maintaining civil or social order, toward
punishments or loss of standing and reputation in violating such laws, and other
outcomes of lawful behavior. Indeed, we respect these laws to the degree, but only
to the [a] degree, that they do not violate values, laws or principles we hold more
dear. Yet Kant thinks in acting from duty that we are not at all motivated by a

prospective outcome or some other extrinsic feature of our conduct. We are motivated
by the mere conformity of our will to law as such.
By contrast, the value of all other desirable qualities, such as courage or
cleverness, can be diminished, forgone, or sacrificed under certain circumstances:
Courage may be laid aside if it requires injustice, and it is better not to be witty if
it requires cruelty.
Second, possessing and maintaining one's moral goodness is the very condition under
which anything else is worth having or pursuing.
Intelligence and even pleasure are worth having only on the condition that they
do not require giving up one's fundamental moral convictions. The value of a
good will thus cannot be that it secures certain valuable ends, whether of our own or
of others, since their value is entirely conditional on our possessing and
maintaining a good will. Indeed, since it is good under any condition, its goodness
must not depend on any particular conditions obtaining. Thus, Kant points out
that a good will must then also be good in itself and not in virtue of its
relationship to other things such as the agent's own happiness or overall welfare.