Professional Documents
Culture Documents
by
Joshua S. Gans
School of Economics
University of New South Wales
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia
E-Mail: J.Gans@unsw.edu.au
* This paper is an amended version of Chapter 4 of my Ph.D. dissertation from Stanford University (see
Gans, 1994a). I wish to thank Susan Athey, Antonio Ciccone, Avner Greif, Yingyi Qian, Philip Trostel,
Graham Voss, seminar participants at Stanford University, Monash University and the World Congress of
the Econometric Society (Tokyo, 1995), and especially, Kenneth Arrow, Paul Milgrom and Scott Stern for
helpful discussions and comments. I also thank the Fulbright Commission for financial support. All
errors are my responsibility.
I. Introduction
The recent theoretical literature on industrialisation has formalised the long standing
idea that development traps are the result of a failure of economic organisation rather than a
lack of resources or other technological constraints. The so-called “big push” models of
industrialisation have shown how, in the presence of increasing returns, many equilibria are
possible with some Pareto dominating others. Such a view not only provides an
explanation for the co-existence of industrialised and non-industrialised economies, but also
competing theories, these models emphasise the temporary nature of any policy.1 Thus,
rather than any change in the nature of the set of equilibria per se.
While the recent formalisation makes clear the possible role for the government in
coordinating economic activity, little has been said about the form such a policy should
take. Many have recently argued that intervention should target many sectors and that this
should occur more or less simultaneously (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). But an
earlier informal literature suggests that such conclusions are not obvious and perhaps that
even the reverse is true. That is, in the presence of coordination failure, industrialisation
policy might still be successful with a more limited focus and a more gradual application.
It is the purpose of this paper to construct a formal model to analyse the question:
what form should the “big push” take? In so doing, it will be shown here that the notion
that industrialisation policy should be broad and immediate is not a necessary implication
of such models. In this paper, it is argued that while many different industrialisation
policies can be successful in generating escapes from development traps, the form of the
policy that minimises the costs of this transition depends on the characteristics of the
1 This is in contrast to theories attributing the lack of industrialisation to a pure lack of incentives to adopt
modern technologies, leading to policies such as the building of new institutions for property rights and the
like (e.g., Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986; Greif, 1992).
2
and increasing returns, among others, all play a role in influencing the nature of
industrialisation policy.
Such ideas were present in the debates in development economics in the 1940s and
1950s regarding the form of industrialisation policy. The ideas underlying these less
formal debates inspired the recent formal literature but the policy elements of these have not
Principal among the earlier policy debates was that surrounding the efficacy and
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943, 1961) and Nurkse (1952, 1953) provided the rationale for the
notion that the adoption of modern technologies must proceed across a wide range of
industries more or less simultaneously. It was argued that the neglect of investment in a
Reacting to this policy prescription was the “unbalanced growth” school led by
Hirschman (1958) and Streeten (1956, 1963). They saw the balanced strategy as far too
costly: “The initial resources for simultaneous developments on many fronts are generally
lacking.” (Singer quoted by Hirschman, 1958, p.53) By targeting many sectors, it was
argued that scarce resources would be spread too thin -- so thin, that industrialisation would
It is not the task of this paper to reconstruct and piece together the lines of logic that
drove the past debate on balanced and unbalanced growth. Both sides appeared to have
2 Other work associated with the balanced growth school included Scitovsky (1954), Fleming (1955),
Chenery (1959) and Nath (1960).
3 Also termed “propulsive industries” (Perroux, 1958) or “development blocks” (Dahmen, 1950).
4 Other early opponents of balanced growth included Ellis (1958) and Myint (1960).
3
agreed that a “big push” was warranted, but they disagreed as to its composition (i.e., how
many and what type of sectors should be targeted). My purpose here is to use the
guidelines provided by the recent formalisation of the “big push” theory of industrialisation
to clarify the issue of the appropriate timing and degree of focus for industrialisation policy.
After all, the recent literature has stressed the roles of complementarities and increasing
returns that both of the older schools saw lying at the heart of their policy prescriptions.5
Nonetheless, throughout the paper, I will revisit aspects of the arguments of both schools
In this section, I present a simplified version of the model in Gans (1994a, 1995)
that itself is a dynamic version of Ciccone (1993). This model provides a rich array of
parameters to characterise the optimal choice of the government and weakens the strong
labour market assumptions made by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989). Moreover,
unlike that model (and similar models such as those of Matsuyama, 1992, and Ciccone and
Matsuyama, 1993) this model here allows for a clear separation of substitution and
The economy consists of two production sectors. The first is a downstream sector
with a measure one continuum of firms producing a homogenous final good, Y. Firms are
competitive price-takers and employ both labour, LY , and a composite of intermediate
inputs, X, according to, Y (t + 1) = X (t )α LY (t )1−α , α > 0. From the outset, the critical
feature to note about this production technology is that production of the final good takes
one period. The introduction of the lag structure here distinguishes this model from other
this time element adds a small amount of realism to the model that will turn out to have
∞ σ −1
X (t ) = ∫ xn (t ) dn , σ > 1,
σ −1
σ
0
Households consume final goods not used in production and supply one unit of
labour inelastically for which they receive a wage, w(t) in period t. Here I make the simple
assumption that household utility is linear in total consumption so that households solve:
∞ ∞ ∞
where v(0) is the value of share holdings in upstream firms, L is the constant total labour
endowment , and r(t) is the interest rate in t. Linear utility means that the interest rate is
constant over time and equal to r (t ) = (1 − δ ) / δ . 6
upstream sector. There is a continuum of such firms lying on the (extended) real line.
Apart from the usual pricing decisions, potential producers in this sector face the decision
of whether to enter into production or not. As such, as in Ciccone and Matsuyama (1993)
and Rodriguez-Clare (1993), the number of firms entering will constitute a measure of the
level of industrialisation.7
6 Many of the basic results of the model can be generalised beyond this specific assumption to general
utility functions. These issues are discussed in depth in Gans (1995). Because the focus here is on policy
issues it is convenient to focus on this special case. Note, however, that if there is perfectly mobile capital
internationally, then the interest rate will be fixed at its international level. The model here is still
consistent with this assumption if it is assumed that intermediate inputs are nontradables such as services.
Such an approach is taken by Rodriguez-Clare (1993).
7 In Gans (1994a, 1995), I develop a similar model that incorporates the view of industrialisation as the
adoption of increasing returns technologies (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) as well as the view here
that industrialisation involves the use of a greater variety of inputs in production (Ciccone and Matsuyama,
1993; Rodriguez-Clare, 1993). The decision to focus on a unidimensional measure of industrialisation
simplifies the exposition here, eliminating certain complicating factors addressed in Gans (1994a).
5
In order to facilitate a discussion of policy issues, I assume that there are two broad
classes of intermediate input varieties distinguished by their respective entry costs. First,
there are basic varieties with indexes n ∈[0, kB ] . Such varieties are assumed to have
already entered into production. Such producers are assumed to be monopolists.8 Second,
there are modern varieties with indexes n ∈[kB , ∞) . For these varieties, entry is costly in
that they cannot be produced without incurring a charge of F units of the final good. Thus,
it is a pure sunk cost of entry and need only be incurred in the period of the firm’s start-up.
As will be apparent below, firms will find it optimal to enter production if and only if they
face non-negative profits upon entry (given their optimal pricing decision) and having
The technologies of production are the same across intermediate input sectors
(whether basic or modern). Upstream producers, after they have entered production, can
generate output according to, xn (t ) = ln (t ) .
Having specified the sectoral structure, tastes and technology for this economy, it
rests on the outcome of a game played among intermediate input producers in their entry
decisions. With a bit of work it can be shown how the payoffs of this game arise out of the
general equilibrium structure of the model.9 This is done by first solving for optimal
household and final good producer allocation decisions and the optimal pricing decisions of
intermediate input producers. Then good and labour market clearing is imposed. This
yields to a precise specification of the equilibrium prices in the economy in each period --
pn(t) for each intermediate input variety and wages, w(t) -- contingent on the number of
firms in the economy, k(t), itself a measure of the level of industrialisation in each period.
8 The assumption that basic producers are monopolists is made for notational simplicity. It could have
been assumed that these sectors were perfectly competitive. This, however, would have served merely to
increase algebra in the pricing equations below without any change in the substantive results that are the
focus of this paper. Here k B represents an initial condition.
9 See Gans (1995) for a derivation.
6
Using this can be shown that, in each period, the operating cash flow of a producer
of modern varieties is, π n (t ) = ( pn (t ) − w(t )) xn (t ) = w(t ) L ( σ α−α )k (t )−1 , with the charge of F
being deducted in n’s first period of production. Substituting the relevant aggregate
variables into this equation gives a convenient reduced form for the payoffs of an
system-wide point of view, there exists a positive feedback between the past entry choices
of intermediate input producers and the firm’s current choice, if it is a modern variety
producer. To see this more clearly, suppose that there is no further increase in overall
industrialisation in period t. Then operating cash flow is increasing in k (t − 1) if and only
α
if k (t − 1) σ −1 k (t )−1 is nondecreasing in k (t − 1) . Holding the current increment to
which is true if and only if σ − 1 ≤ α . Then, ceteris paribus, the greater the past level of
industrialisation, the greater is the return to entry. Thus, if the so-called increasing returns
due to specialisation ( (σ − 1)−1 ) outweigh the decreasing returns to additional use of the
intermediate input composite (α), the game between intermediate input producers exhibits,
in this sense, strategic complementarities. I will have more to say about these parameters in
It is worth noting, however, that the decision to enter in the current period is a
strategic substitute with the current entry choices of other intermediate input producers. So
while a greater level of past industrialisation raises the return to entry today, greater current
entry dampens those incentives. The former (complementary) effect emerges because
greater past industrialisation pushes up current wages which in turn raises demand for
intermediate inputs through higher aggregate demand. On the other hand, the latter
7
(substitution) effect occurs because of the reduction in current intermediate input prices
Equilibria
Having derived the payoff functions, the equilibria in the game between
enter, non-active firms would earn negative profits and all active firms earn non-negative
of basic varieties is small, the market size is small and fixed costs are large), then the
economy will be in a development trap with only firms producing basic varieties active.
1995), that if at some time k(t) becomes greater than some critical level, k * where
( )
σ −1
k* = Λ
1 σ −1−α
F (1− δ ) , the level of industrialisation will continue to expand thereafter.10 Thus,
in the spirit of “big push” theories of industrialisation, the economy can be stuck in a
development trap from which an escape could be made provided sufficient coordination of
Note, however, that this model of dynamic coordination failure differs from
analogous static models in that optimistic expectations would not generate an escape from
the development trap. In many models of coordination failure, there exist rational
10 This result is related to the Momentum Theorem, initially stated in Milgrom, Qian and Roberts (1991)
for contracting problems, and was extended, in Gans (1994b), to game theoretic contexts. It provides a
simple method of proof of the existence of a steady state in a discrete time framework.
11 Indeed, using the zero profit condition, it is easy to see that for the case of persistent industrialisation the
α
expectations paths between equilibria. Here, however, there exists no rational expectations
To see this, beginning in the development trap, suppose that all potential modern
intermediate input producers expect k − kB others to enter in the current period. Suppose
that k > k * , so that expected level of industrialisation would make these entry decisions
profitable when considered over time. The question must be asked: is it profitable for a
given modern input producer to enter this period? The alternative would be to wait one
period. To consider the optimal decision, all that is relevant are the cash flows of firms in
the current and next period. The two period cash flow from entering today is,
α α +1−σ
ΛkB k −1 + δΛk
σ −1 σ −1
− F , and the two period cash flow from waiting until tomorrow to enter
α +1−σ
is, δΛk σ −1
− δF . Thus, there is a trade-off between the earnings from production today
and deferring the sunk costs of entry. An intermediate input producer will choose to wait
α
rather than produce if (1 − δ ) F ≥ ΛkBσ −1 k −1 . This inequality holds for any k ≥ kB , strictly,
by the condition for the development trap. This makes it always optimal to wait.
Proposition 1. Given any initial level of industrialisation, k(0), if k (0) < k * then the
economy is in a development trap for all t. Otherwise, it is in a state of persistent
industrialisation.
path exists from the development trap to persistent industrialisation. The reason for this is
that if it is always optimal for one intermediate input producer to wait, by symmetry, it is
optimal for all firms to do so.12 As a consequence no industrialisation occurs and hence,
any expectations to the contrary would not be fulfilled. Observe that this result holds for
any positive discount rate.13 Thus, the non-industrialisation equilibrium is absorbing in the
12 This distinguishes the model from Matsuyama (1991, 1992) and Krugman (1991) both of whom rely on
an exogenously specified adjustment cost to generate their results. Here the inertia is endogenous arising
out of general equilibrium interactions. This result is similar in flavour to the example of Rauch (1993)
although he assumes the differing substitution and complementary effects rather than deriving them as is
done here.
13 Moreover, this result holds for more general utility functions (see Gans, 1995) and for the case of an
small open economy with non-tradable intermediate inputs and perfect capital mobility since, in that case,
interest rates are exogenously determined.
9
sense of Matsuyama (1991, 1992).14 Note also that there is no rational expectations path
from industralisation back to the development trap. This latter feature is a direct
The above result follows directly from the assumed time lag in production of the
final good. This assumption makes entry today a strategic substitute with similar decisions
on the part of other producers. That is, each individual producer of modern varieties
benefits from the current entry of others in that it makes future entry profitable. However,
for each, the current entry decision is dominated by the decision to wait an additional
period. Therefore, there exists a multiperson prisoner’s dilemma among intermediate input
argued that the role for the government is to coordinate the expectations of individual
agents, making them consistent with those for persistent industrialisation. This is also the
stated goal of indicative planning. If possible, such a policy would be costless (save,
perhaps, the costs of communication), and firms would modernise on the basis of
optimistic expectations.
Proposition 1 shows that this solution will not work. This is essentially because the
firms should start-up, even if this were believed perfectly by firms, each individual firm
would still have an incentive to wait one period before entering into production. And, in
that case, the optimistic expectations created by the government would not be realised and
14 Matsuyama (1991) states that one state is accessible from another if there exists a rational
expectations/perfect foresight equilibrium path from one that state that reaches or converges to the other. A
state is absorbing if, within a neighbourhood of it, no other state is accessible.
10
Irreversibility and the time lag of production mean that history rather than
determines what path the economy will take in the future. This is why it is difficult to
characterise the industrialising paths of the economy. It is also difficult to characterise the
issues and decisions facing a government. As discussed earlier, the aim of this paper is to
address the issue of how a government can facilitate a transition from the development trap
to a state of persistent industrialisation. Thus, it is imagined that, for historical reasons, the
economy, while producing some of the final good, has not industrialised. Given this
Proposition 1 implies that if a level of industrialisation greater than the critical level,
k * , can be generated, then the economy will escape from the development trap. The issue
for the government, therefore, is to intervene when the economy is in the development trap
required to ensure that the process of industrialisation persists. Nonetheless, generating the
critical level of industrialisation may involve certain costs. It is the nature of these costs that
Here it is assumed that the costs of inducing a firm to enter into production can be
represented by the function, cn ( k (t − 1), φ ) . This function is the individual (transition)
cost for period t and it is everywhere positive. φ represents the vector of exogenous
parameters, σ, δ, α, F and L .
What are the potential sources of such costs? One could suppose that in order
convince a firm to enter and adopt more modern technologies one would need to
compensate it for its perceived potential losses. Thus, the cost could take the form of an
investment subsidy. On the other hand, since in many respects the reason individual firms
do not enter and adopt more efficient technologies is due to insufficient demand, this cost
could take the form of a direct demand stimulus. Finally, these costs could represent the
behaviour would involve different costs in of themselves, but in considering the issue of
the degree of balance in industrialisation policy and its timing, the significant point is that
there are such costs. After all, it was the fear that scarce resources would be spread too thin
In order to characterise the optimal policy choices of the government, the way the
level of industrialisation influences these individual transition costs, cn , deserves some
comment. A complete specification might also have the current level of industrialisation in
the cost function. The effect of this on costs is, however, a complicated manner. If firms
were somewhat myopic, greater current levels of industrialisation might raise individual
transition costs. But if they were farsighted it may reduce them. To avoid these
difficulties, it is assumed that the current level of industrialisation influences future but not
present costs.
As for the past level of industrialisation, as was discussed in Section II, there exists
a positive feedback between the past level of industrialisation and the entry decisions of
firms. The marginal returns to entry are raised by greater past industrialisation. Therefore,
17 If there were no time lags in production and the model was one of pure coordination failure, the
considerations here would still apply if one believed that the cost functions represented the expenses of
communicating plans to additional sectors.
12
The precise way the exogenous parameters enters into the cost function turns out to have no
A government with utilitarian goals would aim to maximise the utility of the
representative household over time. This would involve, not only engendering transition,
but undertaking policies that ensured optimal growth thereafter. Since the concern of this
paper lies solely with the former policy, here I choose to focus on a more restricted goal for
the government -- cost minimisation. That is, the government chooses the
industrialisation policy that minimises the sum of individual transition costs incurred over
time subject to the constraint that a “big push,” (i.e., critical level of industrialisation) is
realised. From that point, industrialisation will proceed of its own accord. This goal is
reasonable since these costs may involve the sacrificing of consumption or may be funded
Funding
If cost minimisation is the goal of the optimal transition policy, then the precise
source of funding is immaterial. The early debate on industrialisation policy often implicitly
supposed that the funds or goods needed for industrialisation would come from some
external source. This implied some sort of foreign aid or loans. Such external resources
18 The instruments of inducing individual change may also be imperfect mechanisms involving some
deadweight losses for the economy.
13
might be limited, especially if they were in the form of final goods, and thus, minimising
A similar criterion applies for internal funding (which is possible since there is
some production even in the development trap). Suppose that the funds for transition are
raised internally through a lump sum tax on the incomes of households. The aggregate
revenues from this tax at time t is denoted by τ(t). Note, however, that it must be assumed
that τ (t) < Y(t) always. In each period, household consumption is reduced by τ (t).
subsidy or direct demand stimulus,19 the total transition costs are being added to the
aggregate cash flow of intermediate input producers. Thus, there is no direct effect on
aggregate income (apart from any dead-weight losses from intervention), only a re-
consumption, making it desirable to minimise the costs of transition and, hence, the level of
the tax.
In general, in addition to the length of the intervention, the government chooses the
number of firms targeted for change in each period. That is, in each period, t, the
government chooses a set of firms, K (t ) ⊆ ℜ + , that have not entered into production in the
Suppose that the government chose to intervene from period t to period T. 20 Then
in order to generate persistent industrialisation after period T, the total number of firms
∑
T
targeted, s=t
K ( s) , must be greater than k * − kB . Thus, for this application, the level of
industrialisation. It is important to note that the goal of achieving this minimal level of
19 Since the government’s additional demand would be inelastic, I am assuming implicitly that firms
continue to charge the same price to them as to final goods producers.
20 The actual choice of T will be governed by preference considerations as well as costs. As such, it is not
considered explicitly here. Nonetheless, if persistent industrialisation is a desirable long-run outcome, it is
reasonable to suppose that T is finite.
14
entry, the minimal level of industrialisation need not be generated in a single period. While
not an issue with respect to whether an escape from the development trap will be
successful, by smoothing the costs of transition over a period of time, the government can
take advantage of the fact that the individual transition costs fall with past entry.
problem,
T
Symmetry among firms makes it reasonable to suppose that their individual cost functions
are symmetric as well. Moreover, this also makes it reasonable to imagine that firms are
targeted in order of their index. Therefore, K (t ) = [kB , k (t )], K ( s) = [k ( s − 1), k ( s)] and
T
U s=t
K (s) = [kB , k (T )]. With this information, the government’s optimisation problem can
be re-written as,
T k(s)
min {k ( s )} T
s =t
∑ ∫ c(k (s − 1),φ )dn subject to k (T ) ≥ k .
s = t k ( s −1)
*
Even with these simplifications this problem is rather complicated. Using the
characteristics of the model of Section II, however, some analysis of its properties is
possible. First, the issue of the timing will be addressed, while Section VI will turn to a
escape from the development trap is independent of the issue of timing. Nonetheless, how
quickly should the critical aggregate be generated given cost side considerations?
Consider the optimisation problem when the government chooses to intervene for
one period only. This policy is referred to as a big bang, in which the government solves,
k (t )
Nonetheless, such a big bang policy never minimises the total costs of transition.
Proposition 2. Assume (A) and suppose that the intervention begins in period t.
Then the cost minimising industrialisation policy always involves a choice of T > t.
To see this, start from a big bang industrialisation policy with T = t. Then imagine that
rather than targeting a few upstream firms in period t, they were targeted in period t + 1
instead. Note that the “big push” constraint remains satisfied after this change. In this
case, (A) guarantees that the individual transition costs for this firm are lower if it is
targeted in period t + 1 rather than t. This is because the level of industrialisation, k (t ) is
necessarily larger than k (t − 1) = kB . Thus, total costs are reduced by extending the period
of the intervention. Concentrating intervention in a single period does not yield any of the
benefits associated with this fall in marginal costs. As such, this provides a reason why a
For instance, a government concerned about the utility of the population over time as well
as cost minimisation could be motivated for a gradual industrialisation policy for the
traditional taste-side reasons favouring less period-by-period saving -- i.e., low discount
depreciation in the initial start-up investment would mitigate against the irreversibilities
assumed in Section II and may make a less gradual approach more desirable.
The motive for spreading intervention over time raises another important issue: how
should the number of upstream sectors targeted for change move over time? Assuming
16
(A), it is not difficult to see that the number of sectors targeted in each period will grow
over time. The reasoning here is similar to that leading to the motivation for gradualism.
That is, consider any two time periods, τ > s, and start from the situation in which
∆k (s) = ∆k (τ ) . Targeting a firm for entry in a later time period has a lower marginal cost
since the industrialisation level is higher. Therefore, in the optimal policy, ∆k (s) ≤ ∆k (τ ) .
was effectively concerned with the number of sectors that needed to be targeted for change.
... both doctrines are examples of an acceptance of the necessity for a “big push” (broadly
defined) in economic development. The overt difference seems to be where and over how
wide a field the push is to be applied. Thus on a cardinal issue the two doctrines are
united in their rejection of economic development by piecemeal marginalism. (Sutcliffe,
1964, pp.627-628)
The balanced growth school argued that the neglect of too many sectors could thwart a
successful transition, while the unbalanced growth school believed that the targeting of a
few key sectors could generate sufficient momentum for industrialisation to proceed of its
own accord. The model of Section II argues that a big push is required to generate
persistent industrialisation. This section will show that the cost minimising composition of
The “degree of balance” was often ill-defined in the early informal literature. While
horizontal sectors (e.g., among final goods producers), others have focused on
intermediate input sectors versus final good sectors or other forms of heterogeneity (e.g.,
interdependencies between decisions of sectors at the same production level -- even though
these may be derived from upstream and downstream interactions. In this sense, the
symmetry between the sectors being considered biases one towards a definition of the
17
degree of balance based on the number of sectors targeted for change at the same level of
the economy. Thus, a bias is introduced in the following discussion towards the balanced
On this basis, the model presented in Section II provides a clear definition of the
degree of balance. Proposition 1 showed that if the government targeted a critical mass of
sections, k * , for change, then industrialisation would persist thereafter. This number,
precisely what is required for a “big push” to take place. Therefore, one way to
conceptualise the debate between the balanced and unbalanced schools is to reduce it to a
debate over what determines the magnitude of k * . Nonetheless, the way in which the
model determines k * could potentially neglect some effects and trade-offs that play a role in
For now, it is instructive to reflect upon how the parameters of the model determine
k * and how this relates to earlier discussions over the appropriate degree of balance. Recall
( )
σ −1
that: k * = Λ
1 σ −1−α
F (1− δ ) . The relationship between the exogenous parameters of the model
This simplicity of the model of Section II yields a clear characterisation of the optimal
industrialisation policy. The cost minimising policy will be more unbalanced the less
upstream firms discount future earnings (higher δ), the higher is the fixed size of the labour
force (higher L ) and the lower are the sunk costs of entry (lower F). Also, note that no
clear result is possible for the parameters α and σ . Why this is so and the significance of
21 Nonetheless, this definition is closely related to notions of balance in other recent formal models (e.g.,
the number of final goods sectors in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989 and Matsuyama, 1992; and the
number of intermediate input producers in Rodriguez-Claire, 1993, and Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1993).
See Sutcliffe (1964) for an interesting discussion of the earlier informal literature on this point.
22 Rauch (1992) and Litwack and Qian (1993) also consider similar definitions of the balance of government
industrial policy but their analyses are made in very different contexts.
18
parameter and k * . Increasing L , raises the operating profits earned in each period of
production but, more importantly, raises ∆π n (t ) / ∆ℑ(t − 1) , the strength of strategic
smaller F raises the returns to entry regardless of the level of industrialisation. Finally, a
lower discount rate (higher δ ) shifts weight to the future benefits of entry and away from
current costs, again raising the incentive to enter. Each of these forces has the effect of
lowering k * , the critical level of industrialisation making entry profitable. This means that
the incentives of individual firms to enter production at low levels of industrialisation are
more sensitive to positive entry decisions by a few firms and hence, more unbalanced
policies will be successful. Of course, the goal of cost minimisation means that a
government would not wish to target more than k * firms in any industrialisation policy.
Of these parameters F has probably received the most discussion. In many ways,
this parameter represents the strength of increasing returns in the production technology of
producers of modern varieties. This is because lower levels of F imply lower sunk entry
costs. Therefore, while one requires some degree of increasing returns to generate the
rationale for a “big push” intervention, the stronger these are the more an unbalanced
Another parameter that seems to have been given a potential role in the past debate
on industrialisation policy is the discount rate, δ. Matsuyama (1992) interprets the discount
low discount rate indicating the existence of greater entrepreneurial resources, i.e.,
farsighted decision-making.23 If this is so, then the above result implies that with a relative
Curiously, it was, however, the relative scarcity of entrepreneurial talent that seemed to
Hirschman at make the success of a balanced strategy unlikely: “... the major bone that I
23Matsuyama’s (1992) definition also encompasses adjustment costs which are not part of the model here.
Using different language, Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1994) have a similar interpretation of the discount rate.
19
have to pick with the balanced growth theory: its application requires huge amounts of
precisely those abilities which we have identified as likely to be in very limited supply in
underdeveloped countries.” (Hirschman, 1958, p.53) While I do not argue that the logic
of Proposition 3 contradicts the line of argument of Hirschman, it does indicate that the
drives the rationale for a “big push” into persistent industrialisation. But a major dispute in
the earlier industrialisation policy literature is whether this very fact implies the optimality of
The model of Section II, like many recent models, shows that the determinant of the
success of industrialisation policy is the size of variables such as k * , the critical level of
industrialisation to achieve any escape. This leaves no room for any choice regarding the
total number of sectors targeted for change and hence, a first approximation to answering
complementarities and k * .
It has been argued by several authors with similar models (e.g., Romer, 1987;
Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1993; and Ciccone, 1993) that the parameters α and σ are
measures of the strength of complementarities or linkages among sectors (see Ciccone and
Matsuyama, 1993, and Romer, 1994). These parameters are, however, only imperfect
measures of the linkage strength. Take, for example, σ which parameterises the technical
with a lower σ implying stronger technical complementarities.25 The stronger are these
24 Although if one were to interpret the quote as emphasising the importance of the existence of basic
varieties then Hirschman’s argument would be supported by Proposition 3.
25 This can be seen most clearly be observing that the derivative of X with respect to a simultaneous
increase in the quantity employed of some (non-measure zero) group of varieties is larger the lower is σ.
20
complementarities the closer the market linkage between the demand for any given variety
and the demand for other varieties. This effect is sometimes referred to as the returns to
specialisation (Ethier, 1982; Romer, 1987). The idea here is that a lower σ raises the
But lowering σ also influences the total wage workers receive and hence, total
profits. This effect is ambiguous, but it is possible that a reduction in σ , could reduce
wages by enough so as to lower the marginal returns to entry favouring a more balanced
The model then does not contain a parameter that measures perfectly the strength of
thus far can shed some light on the issue at hand. As discussed earlier, the lower is k * , the
more likely will individual upstream producers enter in response to similar past entry
decisions by others. Therefore, there is a sense in which the level of k * itself describes the
industrialisation policy. As more entry takes place, those investments would “... call forth
complementary investments in the next period with a will and logic of their own: they block
out a part of the road that lies ahead and virtually compel certain additional investment
decisions.” (Hirschman, 1958, p.42) That is, the stronger are strategic complementarities
or linkages among sectors (as represented by a smaller k * ), the more forcefully will
But the focus on this effect is an artifact of the model presented here -- an artifact
shared by most other “big push” style models of industrialisation. The uni-dimensional
choice of entry means that k * is fully determined by the parameters of the model. Thus,
26 Alternatively, one could argue, as does Romer (1994), that a lower σ (higher α ) means that a greater
proportion of the returns to entry are appropriated by individual firms rather than workers. This is because
the ratio of profit to wage income is decreasing in σ.
21
varying any parameter directly influences the level of k * and hence, the magnitude of the
“big push.” The larger the required “big push,” of necessity, the greater are the number of
sectors that need to be targeted for change over time. Cost-side considerations do not enter
into the calculus here nor is there any degree of freedom regarding the ultimate composition
In Gans (1994a), in addition to entry, firms can also undertake investments to raise
labour productivity (i.e., adopt more modern technologies).27 This gives a second
can choose both the firms targeted for entry and also firms targeted for modernisation.
Indeed, to achieve the critical level of industrialisation, the government faces a trade-off
between these two dimensions. A “big push” can be achieved by many alternative
strategies: for instance, targeting a smaller number of firms to enter and modernise to a
large degree (an unbalanced strategy) or targeting many firms to enter and modernise just a
little (a balanced strategy). In this case, the “big push” constraint does not uniquely
determine the degree of focus in industrialisation policy but leaves numerous options open
effects.28 First, as with the simple model here, the magnitude of the “big push,” i.e., the
critical level of industrialisation, can rise or fall, directly influencing the number of sectors
that need to be targeted for change. This is the Hirschman effect. Second, a parameter
change can raise the returns to both entry and modernisation. This reduces the costs to
obtaining a given level of entry and modernisation for an individual firm making it possible
to achieve the critical aggregate by focusing on fewer firms. Finally, parameter changes
alter the trade-off between entry and modernisation levels in the make-up of the “big push.”
27 This more general model, however, involves many complications that make the proofs of all the
propositions here and the discussion throughout much more cumbersome. Therefore, I chose in this paper
to focus on a simpler model, commenting on the potential differences as they arose.
28 It turns out that the analogs of the other parameters in the model of Gans (1994a) while having some the
potential effects outlined here, do not possess the same difficulties as presented by α and σ.
22
three effects need to operate in the same direction. While this might be true for other
parameters,29 at a fundamental level it will not be true for any parameter that might measure
the strength of complementarities. For while the Hirschman effect and the cost-side effect
are likely to be correlated in many models, as they are plausibly in the model of this paper,
this will not be true for the third effect. That effect concerns the marginal influence of a
industrialisation policy choice will be more unbalanced the more an individual firm’s entry
raises the measure of the aggregate level of industrialisation. But the weaker are the
linkages among intermediate input sectors, the more this will be the case. When linkages
are strong, a firm’s entry will have a small influence on the aggregate level of
1943, p.205) Neglect of sectors in an industrialisation policy may make it highly costly to
achieve the critical level of industrialisation.30 This effect emphasises the trade-off between
the number of sectors and their degree of modernisation in producing the critical level of
industrialisation with stronger linkages implying that a broad approach with shallow
29 In Gans (1994a), it is shown that these effects all reinforce each other for the parameters, thus, generating
the same conclusions as Proposition 3.
30 In contrast to the model here, the model in Gans (1994b), eliminates the Hirschman effect and focuses
exclusively on the Rosenstein-Rodan effect.
31 There is evidence that the tension between the two effects was recognised. Hirschman clearly recognises
the possibility of a Rosenstein-Rodan effect: “We are not thinking here of situations where A and B must
be employed jointly in fixed proportions. In this case it would not make much sense to say that demand for
A and the subsequent increase in its output provide an incentive for the production of B, as it is rather the
demand for the good or service into which A and B enter jointly which explains the demand for both
products. This is the familiar case of derived demand.... An example of the rigid type of complementarity
in use (best treated as derived demand) is cement and reinforcing steel rods in the construction, say, of
downtown office buildings. Examples of the looser, “developmental” type of complementarity (entrained
want) can be found in the way in which the existence of the new office buildings strengthens demand for a
great variety of goods and services: from modern office facilities, stylish secretaries, and eventually perhaps
to more office buildings as the demonstration effect goes to work on the tenants of the older buildings.”
(Hirschman, 1958, pp.68-69; the italics are mine)
23
complementarity coin. Complementarities and linkages are stronger when (i) increases
aggregate activity raise the marginal returns to further activity by more; and (ii)
Moreover, one effect favours an unbalanced and the other a balanced policy. Thus, the role
considered carefully before its role in industrialisation policy can be assessed properly.32
The central message of this paper is that conclusions regarding the timing of
industrialisation policy and its degree of focus are complex and dependent on the
does not necessarily imply that transition can be a simple matter of coordinating
expectations via some kind of indicative planning. Nor does it mean that policy must be
balanced and take a “big bang” form in order to be successful. A wide variety of
industrialisation policies can generate a “big push” and the choice between them is,
characterisation of the optimal policy quite difficult. To take advantage of falling entry
costs, a gradual policy is always optimal. Moreover, in such a gradual policy, the number
of sectors targeted in each period is rising over time. But pairwise interactions between
general dynamic settings. So while the simplicity of the model presented here identified
some characterisations of the degree of balance, there was reason to believe that with regard
32 The model here also assumes that linkages among sectors are global with one sector affecting and being
effected by all others. In Gans (1994a), the model is amended to a parameter allowing a variation the degree
of localisation of linkages. It was found that as linkages became more localised in nature, a more
unbalanced policy was cost minimising.
24
to some parameters, ambiguities are more fundamental. For instance, weak sectoral
linkages tend to reduce the sensitivity of individual firms to small changes in the level of
industrialisation favouring a more balanced approach in order to minimise costs. But at the
same time, weaker linkages allow individual firm technology adoption decisions to have a
Thus, the tensions are complex and more ambiguous than the (sometimes contradictory)
Nonetheless, there is a sense in which the above model does not capture potentially
important ingredients of the industrialisation policies described by both sides of the earlier
debate. The model here has been symmetric. Thus, the emphasis on the heterogeneity
between sectors that pervades the work of Hirschman (1958) is excluded. So questions
such as: what are the characteristics of sectors that should form a critical mass and how do
they use the information of other sector’s investments, are not addressed here. Also, the
hierarchical relations among many sectors are not a feature of the model. Should one target
Another important range of issues not addressed in this paper are those concerned
with the international trade aspects of industrialisation. If one assumes that the intermediate
input sectors produce non-tradable goods then the model here sits easily within an open
would construct a model more suitable to address open economy matters.34 For instance,
open question for “big push” theories. The questions of which sectors might be
appropriate targets in such policies remains an open area for formal analysis.
33 Of course, by focusing on intermediate input sectors rather than on final good production, I have
implicitly concerned the analysis with issues closer to the discussion in Hirschman (1958).
34 See Nurske (1958), Hirschman (1958), Sheahan (1958), Scitovsky (1959) and Montias (1961).
25
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