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Moderating Islamism in Indonesia: Tracing Patterns of Party Change in the Prosperous Justice Party
Dirk Tomsa
Political Research Quarterly 2012 65: 486 originally published online 12 May 2011
DOI: 10.1177/1065912911404566
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404566
404566TomsaPolitical Research Quarterly

PRQXXX10.1177/1065912911

Moderating Islamism in Indonesia:

Tracing Patterns of Party Change in
the Prosperous Justice Party

Political Research Quarterly

65(3) 486498
2012 University of Utah
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1065912911404566
http://prq.sagepub.com

Dirk Tomsa1

Abstract
This article analyzes why, how and to what extent Indonesias once staunchly Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (Partai
Keadilan Sejahtera; PKS) has become more moderate through its participation in democratic procedures. It also examines
how this moderation process has affected the partys electoral performance and the overall quality of democracy
in Indonesia. It is argued that PKS has indeed become more moderate and that this moderation has, after initial
electoral success, now posed some serious challenges to the partys organizational coherence.The article concludes by
highlighting that moderation is a process that is neither linear nor unreservedly positive for democratization.
Keywords
Indonesia, political parties, Islam, inclusion, moderation, elections

Despite the fact that around 90 percent of Indonesias population are Muslims, the countrys Islamic parties have
struggled to win broad popular support. The most recent
election in 2009 produced particularly disappointing
results as the combined vote share of all Islamic parties
declined to under 30 percent and only four of them won
seats in parliament. Even for the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera; PKS), which was the
only of the bigger Islamic parties not to lose votes, the
meager gains of less than 1 percent must have felt like a
defeat as party strategists had hoped to double their
astounding 2004 result of 7.3 percent. PKS may now be the
strongest Islamic party in Indonesia, but its election result
suggests that the party as well as political Islam in Indonesia on the whole have reached an important crossroads.
PKS has long been regarded as very different from the
rest of Indonesias parties, including those with an Islamic
outlook. With its ideological roots in a campus-based
Islamist movement and a reputation for extraordinary
organizational discipline, the party was concurrently
feared and admired when it initially rose to prominence in
the 2004 election. But following the success at the ballot
box that year, both fear and admiration soon began to
wane as PKS embarked on a controversial shift away
from its Islamist origins toward a more moderate orientation. Over the past few years, this moderation was
reflected in a number of political maneuvers including,
among others, electoral alliances with non-Muslims in

gubernatorial and district head elections, steadfast support for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyonos sometimes controversial economic policies in the run-up to the
2009 elections, and various symbolic gestures in support
of pluralist democracy.
This article examines how this incremental moderation and the partys wider participation in the political
mainstream have affected its internal organizational
dynamics. It also analyzes whether the moderation of
PKS has affected its electoral performance and to what
extent it has made a positive contribution to the overall
process of democratic consolidation in Indonesia. Based
on a thorough evaluation of recent election results, media
articles, and scholarly literature on political Islam, the
article argues that the moderation process has caused
internal divisions and compromised the partys credibility among its original constituencies while failing to convince potential new supporters. For the consolidation of
Indonesias young democracy, the organizational development of PKS has had both positive and negative consequences at the same time. On one hand, the partys
1

La Trobe University, Melbourne,Victoria, Australia

Corresponding Author:
Dirk Tomsa, School of Social Sciences, Politics and International
Relations Program, La Trobe University, Melbourne,Victoria 3086,
Australia
Email: d.tomsa@latrobe.edu.au

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Tomsa
transformation has enhanced the quality of political participation, but on the other hand it has also reduced PKSs
capacity to act as a genuine counterforce to Indonesias
notoriously weak mainstream parties.
Following this introduction, the article begins with a
brief recapitulation of the most important arguments of
what the literature refers to as the inclusion-moderation
thesis. It then turns to an in-depth analysis of the organizational and ideological development of PKS from its
early days as a campus-based social movement to its
arrival in contemporary mainstream politics. Different
aspects of the partys gradual moderation are highlighted
and eventually evaluated in the context of broader trends
in Indonesian politics.

Islamist Parties and the InclusionModeration Thesis

Islamist parties have received enormous scholarly attention in recent years. Given the heterogeneity of political
Islam across the globe, no academic consensus exists on
what exactly constitutes an Islamist party, but in the
broadest possible sense such parties can be defined as
parties that strive for the implementation of Islamic law
(sharia) in all aspects of political, economic, social, and
cultural life. For many, though by no means for all
Islamist parties, democracy is inherently incompatible
with such a sharia-based worldview because sovereignty,
in their view, rests with God, not with the people. Apart
from this very fundamental issue, some Islamists also
tend to espouse nondemocratic viewpoints in regard to
questions of basic human rights such as freedom of
speech, the role of women, and religious freedom.
Nonetheless, many Islamist parties all over the world
have at the very least embraced the procedural dimension
of democracy and, if allowed, participated in competitive
elections. Some even have taken over cabinet posts in
democratically elected governments.
Against this background, the questions of whether
Islamist parties will moderate over time as a result of this
inclusion and to what extent they will ultimately make a
positive contribution to, depending on political context,
democratic transition or consolidation have been discussed extensively in the scholarly literature (Bayat 2007;
Schwedler 2006; Clark and Schwedler 2003; Tezcr
2010a, 2010b; Wickham 2004).1 Influenced by Kalyvass
(1996) pioneering study about Christian Democratic parties in Europe, proponents of the so-called inclusionmoderation thesis usually argue that exposure to
alternative political views and the institutional constraints
of electoral competition help to moderate extremist parties. The needs to negotiate with other parties on one hand
and to win votes at the ballot box on the other hand, so
they argue, provide incentives for these parties to soften

their ideological viewpoints and reach out to broader

constituencies.
In essence then, inclusion is expected to lead to moderation mainly because of the power of institutions to shape
strategic political behavior and because of the facilitation
of political learning through contact with actors who have
different worldviews. Inclusion is usually understood to
simply mean permission to participate in elections, but
elections are certainly not the only type of democratic procedure that can foster moderation. In this article, therefore,
the definition of inclusion goes beyond participation in
electoral competition and also incorporates involvement in
government and, more generally, permission to partake in
public debates. Both of these processes expose political
actors to specific kinds of institutional constraints and
opportunities for political learning that can be markedly
different from electoral competition, yet can also lead to
moderation. While the latterpermission to partake in
public debatesmay be more important in nondemocratic
settings where public space is subject to arbitrary controls,
the formerinvolvement in governmentis of particular
significance in democratic contexts, as the examples of
Turkeys Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve
Kalknma Partisi, AKP) and, as will be highlighted below,
Indonesias PKS demonstrate.
The inclusion-moderation thesis is not without its critics though. Skeptics assert that there is no automatism
between participation in democratic procedures, however
broadly defined, and moderation. At the very least, moderation is often a highly complex and multidimensional
process, as, for example, Schwedler and Clark (2003)
have stressed in their study of womens participation in
Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen. Moreover, moderation can be a double-edged sword as its effects on democracy can be both positive and negative (Tezcr 2010a).
Last but not least, critics also point to the risk of superficiality in the alleged moderation process. According to
this counterargument, extremist parties use democratic
procedures merely as an instrument, either to polarize the
population along communal cleavages (e.g., ethnic parties) or, in the case of what Gunther and Diamond (2003)
have called proto-hegemonic parties (e.g., Leninist,
ultranationalist, and religious fundamentalist parties), to
simply obtain power and then dismantle democracy altogether. Parties with such antidemocratic agendas should
therefore rather be excluded from participation in democratic elections to prevent election-related violence and,
in the worst-case scenario, a repeat of the events that
unfolded in post-Weimar Germany (Berman 2003;
Bermeo 2003).
The notion of superficiality is not easy to resolve, especially because few detailed case studies exist that provide
systematic explanations of what exactly moderation entails
and how it occurs. In an attempt to overcome this problem,

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Political Research Quarterly 65(3)

Schwedler (2006) proposes to look beyond a partys strategic behavior and focus on various dimensions of ideational
change. For her, moderation is the movement from a relatively closed and rigid worldview to one more open and
tolerant of alternative perspectives (Schwedler 2006, 3).
To trace this movement empirically, she seeks to identify
shifts in what she calls boundaries of justifiable action,
defined as distinctions made by political actors about
what is possible, who are friends and adversaries, and
which of the available options are justifiable in terms of
ones worldview (Schwedler 2006, 151). The concept is a
useful starting point to analyze discourses and debates
within the leadership of a particular party, but it takes a
highly elitist and strictly hierarchical view of political parties, neglecting the possibility that boundaries that were
shifted at the top might cause discontent at the grassroots
and might in fact not be followed by lower-ranking party
officials and ordinary party members.2 Furthermore, it is
not clear why ideational shifts should be any less susceptible to claims of superficiality or quick reversal than
behavioral change.
More generally, focusing too strongly on ideational
developments runs the risk of missing important instances
of behavioral change within a party that come after the
initial decision to join elections. For moderation to be
truly empirically traceable, words need to be complemented by deeds, and vice versa. Ideational change in
itself may count for little and could in fact be easily dismissed as superficial lip service if it is not followed by
clearly discernible behavioral moderation that goes
beyond merely accepting the electoral rules of the game.
It is therefore crucial to analyze bothideas and
actionsin tandem, rather than prioritize one over the
other.
One definition that attempts to capture these two
dimensions was coined by Wickham (2004) in her article
on political learning in Egypts Wasat Party. While still
predominantly concerned with the ideational dimension
of moderation, especially in regard to individual party
elites, her description of moderation as the abandonment, postponement, or revision of radical goals that
enable a movement to accommodate itself to the give and
take of normal competitive politics (Wickham 2004,
206) implies that ideational change may in fact be seen as
a kind of precondition for genuine behavioral change.
Tezcr (2010a, 73) has advanced a similar argument in
his conceptualization of moderation.
Apart from their comprehensive approach to moderation, the works of Wickham and Tezcr are insightful for
another reason. Like Schwedler and Clark (2003) before
them, the two both stress that moderation is neither irreversible nor necessarily a linear process. Instead, the
extent of moderation can differ dependant on the issue at
stake as parties may, as Wickham (2004, 206) put it,

espouse moderate positions on some issues and radical

positions on others and may undergo uneven moderation
(or radicalization) over time.
Building on the abovementioned approaches, this article adopts a broadly conceptualized definition of moderation as a multidimensional, issue-dependant process of
ideational and behavioral adjustments, which is reflected
in a partys gradually emerging readiness to abandon or
denounce radical goals and strategies and not only accept
the institutional rules of democracy but also embrace its
political norms and values. Radical goals and strategies in
this context are all those ideas and actions that run counter to the basic pillars of a democratic constitutional
framework, for example, the endorsement of violence;
the discrimination and denial of political rights to certain
segments of the population based on religion, ethnicity,
or gender; and the rejection of the concept of popular sovereignty. Based on this conceptual framework, the
remainder of this article proceeds to analyze the organizational and ideological development of the Prosperous
Justice Party (PKS), a party whose degree of radicalism
certainly pales in comparison with most Middle Eastern
Islamist parties but which in the context of contemporary
Indonesian politics, with its long tradition of what Hefner
(2000) once called civil Islam, nevertheless constitutes
a highly controversial type of party.
PKS represents an interesting case study for a number
of reasons. First, Indonesia is one of only a few Muslimmajority countries that fulfill the most basic characteristics of an electoral democracy (Freedom House 2010). In
contrast to Islamist parties in the Arab world, PKS therefore operates in a political environment that is shaped and
constrained by genuinely democratic procedures. Second,
PKS is a new type of party in Indonesia that is unusually
well institutionalized. Especially in the partys early days,
its orthodox interpretation of Islam as a comprehensive
value system for all aspects of social, political, and economic life provided a strong ideological glue that has
helped keep the party solid and coherent. Thus, it differs
from all other Islamic parties in Indonesia who tend to
regard Islam merely as a symbol rather than an essential
source of inspiration. Third, as Table 1 shows, PKS is
now the strongest of all Islamic parties in Indonesia. In
the 2009 parliamentary election it finished in fourth spot
on the voting tally, behind three secular parties but ahead
of all other Islamic parties (Mietzner 2009a). All these
factors make PKS an intriguing party to study.
Arguably one of the most fascinating trends in the
political development of PKS is its recent attempt to alter
its image from that of a puritanical Islamist party to that
of a more open and pluralistic party. This shift away from
the partys radical origins toward a more pragmatic orientation has not always been linear and continues to be the
subject of controversial discussions both within the party

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Tomsa
Table 1. Results of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections in Indonesia
Party
Partai Demokrat (PD; Democrat Party)
Partai Golkar (Golkar Party)
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP; Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle)
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS; Prosperous Justice Party)
Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN; National Mandate Party)
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP; United Development Party)
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB; National Awakening Party)
Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement Party)
Hanura (Peoples Conscience Party)
Others
Total

Share of votes (%)

DPR seats

Share of seats (%)

20.8
14.4
14.0

148
106
94

26.43
18.93
16.78

7.9
6.0
5.3
4.9
4.5
3.8
18.4
100.0

57
46
38
28
26
17
0
560

10.18
8.21
6.79
5.00
4.64
3.04
0.0
100.0

Note: DPR = Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives), the Indonesian parliament

and among domestic and foreign observers (Buehler

2011; Hwang 2010; Shihab and Nugroho 2009). In the
following paragraphs, this article seeks to enrich this discussion by examining the nexus between moderation on
one hand and democratic consolidation on the other hand.
First of all, however, it is imperative to briefly reconstruct
the genetic model (Panebianco 1988) of PKS to contextualize the partys current status within its broader historical trajectory.

The Creation of an Indonesian

Dakwah Party
Even though PKS is a fairly young party that in its current form has existed for only less than ten years, its
origins reach back to the late 1970s and early 1980s when
the authoritarian New Order regime of former president
Suharto was at its peak (Machmudi 2005). During this
time, political activity was heavily restricted, and Islamic
parties, once powerful agents of sociopolitical mobilization in Indonesia,3 had been tamed into a largely compliant force under the organizational banner of the United
Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan,
PPP; Effendy 2003; Mietzner 2009b, 80). It was in this
repressive political climate that young Muslim activists
first began to disseminate the ideas of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood.4 From the 1980s onward these
dakwah (literally call, preaching; Islamic outreach) activities took a more systematic form, especially on the campuses of some of Indonesias most prestigious elite
universities. The movement soon became known as
Jemaah Tarbiyah (Education Movement), and by the
1990s it was well organized in numerous small, mostly
campus-based cells (usrah; Bubalo and Fealy 2005).
When President Suharto resigned in 1998, tarbiyah
leaders formed a political party and called it the Justice

Party (Partai Keadilan; PK). True to its original inspiration, PK was organizationally and ideologically modeled
on the Muslim Brotherhood: it was structured as a hierarchical cadre party based on small cells and it defined dakwah as its fundamental raison dtre (Shihab and Nugroho
2009). Furthermore, the party was committed to the promotion of sharia law, if not through formal means, then at
least through the process of dakwah which according to
PK strategists would ultimately lead to the gradual adoption of sharia principles in the legislation process in
Indonesia. To repeat, compared to other Islamist parties
in the Middle East, PK was, even in its early days, not
particularly radical, but in the context of Indonesian party
politics the mere ambition to replace the countrys seemingly untouchable state philosophy Pancasila (five pillars)5 with a sharia-based system was a radical departure
from the political mainstream.
With its emphasis on ideological commitment and
organizational discipline, PK differed markedly from the
rest of the new parties that were formed in the aftermath
of the fall of Suharto. While most other parties relied on
charismatic leaders and/or established organizational
infrastructures inherited from New Order institutions or
religious mass organizations, PK leaders created a completely new party that quickly earned a reputation for
remarkable levels of internal (though not external) transparency and accountability, strict recruitment guidelines
for new cadre, and strong sociopolitical values based on a
fairly orthodox interpretation of Islam (Hasan 2009;
Heilmann 2007). Nevertheless, the first election of the
post-Suharto era in June 1999 ended in disappointment
for PK. The result of 1.4 percent was insufficient to clear
the electoral threshold that would have allowed the party
to contest the next election in 2004.
PK leaders were not to be deterred though. In 2003,
they changed the partys name to PKS to be able to

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Political Research Quarterly 65(3)

contest the 2004 election. The new partys platform was

less explicit about religious issues than its predecessors,
and in the 2004 election campaign PKS focused almost
exclusively on neutral themes such as poverty alleviation,
social justice, the fight against corruption, and so on
(Bubalo and Fealy 2005, 71). This strategy worked well,
not least because it tapped into growing public discontent
with the established big parties that had won the 1999
election but had, in the eyes of many Indonesians, failed
to deliver positive change. PKS was able to exploit this
sentiment and managed to quintuple its share of the vote,
winning 7.3 percent of the vote and forty-five seats in the
new parliament. Soon after, it reaped more rewards when
it was given three cabinet posts in President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyonos first cabinet.

way of doing politics seemingly incompatible with the

partys original mission. However, this trend was still
being offset to some degree by the partys ongoing efforts
to nurture its image of being different, for example
through well-publicized gestures such as rejecting office
cars and laptops for its legislators. But with the introduction in 2005 of direct elections for governors, mayors,
and district heads, the need to negotiate and lobby other
parties within the newly emerging power structures put
renewed and ever-growing pressure on PKS politicians to
adjust and play by the rules of the democratic game. At
the same time, the prospect of getting involved in exactly
these procedures also provided new incentives for aspiring PKS members to remain loyal to the party (Hamayotsu
2009).

The Transition from PK to PKS:

The Beginning of a Moderation
Process?

Effects of Inclusion on PKSs

Policy Positions

The toning down of the religious rhetoric in both the PKS

platform and the 2004 election campaign was interpreted
by many observers as a sign that participation in electoral
politics had already helped moderate the Islamist ideologues in PKS. Shihab and Nugroho (2009), for example,
are among those who argue that the transformation from
PK to PKS was much more than just a cosmetic name
change. Others, however, are more skeptical. Heilmann
(2007), for instance, points to the use of internal training
manuals for new members that even after the 2004 election continued to frame the political world of PKS in
fairly extremist terms (Prayitno 2005a, 2005b).
Indeed, it seems likely that the absence of Islamist
rhetoric in the run-up to the 2004 election was purely
instrumental, driven by pragmatic opportunism with a
view to increasing the partys vote share. Internally, the
party appeared to remain guided largely by exclusivist
and intolerant attitudes. As the results demonstrated, the
calculation worked out and PKS managed remarkable
gains in the polls. Against this background, the party
leadership then decided to take more concrete steps to
reshape PKS as a moderate religious party. A key difference to the first rather superficial phase of moderation in
the run-up to the 2004 election, however, was that this
time the party was exposed to much more complex institutional opportunities and constraints. For example, with
three ministers in cabinet, forty-five seats in the national
parliament, and more than a thousand delegates in local
parliaments, PKS was now deeply entrenched in exactly
the kind of dealing and wheeling that the party had so
vigorously criticized before 2004.
To some extent then, one may argue that inclusion had
turned into co-optation as PKS quickly succumbed to a

While there may have been few signs of ideational moderation before the 2004 election, from about 2006 onward
party leaders became increasingly determined to steer PKS
toward the political center. Influential party figures began
to publicly reject the label Islamism, claiming that PKS
was now religious-nationalist in outlook. In February
2008, this paradigmatic shift toward what some observers
have called post-Islamism (Bayat 2007; Bubalo, Fealy,
and Mason 2008) culminated in a new program that was
launched at a major party event in Bali. The location was
carefully chosen. Bali is one of only a few Indonesian
provinces where Muslims are a minority. In explaining the
decision to hold the congress on the Hindu-dominated
island, PKSs deputy secretary general Fahri Hamzah
maintained that the party wanted to make it clear to everyone that it acknowledges pluralism and the nations religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity.6
With the adoption of the new party platform, PKS
turned selected statements by individual party leaders into
official party policy. What was particularly noteworthy
about the new platform was its elaborate commitment to
Indonesias state philosophy Pancasila. Invented in 1945
by Indonesias first president Sukarno, the Pancasila mentions Belief in One God as the first of Indonesias five
guiding principles, but it does not specifically refer to
Islam or sharia law, even though Islamic groups had
demanded the inclusion of such a clause back in 1945
(Mietzner 2009b, 74). Ever since the rejection of this
clause (the so-called Jakarta Charter), which would have
made it obligatory for Muslims to adhere to sharia law, the
Pancasila has served as a symbol of religious pluralism in
Indonesia. Unsurprisingly, PKS had initially been reluctant
to embrace the Pancasila and its underlying pluralistic values. In fact, the early PK program did not mention it at
all. The 2004 program then contained at least some brief

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Tomsa
references, but it was not before 2008 that the party explicitly endorsed the state philosophy (Shihab and Nugroho
2009, 246).
Apart from the new commitment to the Pancasila,
there were further changes in other policy positions as
well in recent years. For example, PKS has abandoned its
earlier opposition to women in leadership positions. It
also no longer categorically rejects cooperation with nonMuslims. In fact, it has even nominated both women and
non-Muslims for legislative and executive positions in
local elections and has formed coalitions and joint caucuses in local parliaments with an openly Christian party,
the Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera).7 At
the partys second national congress in Jakarta in June
2010, PKS even went another step further when it moved
to adjust its organizational statutes to allow for the inclusion of non-Muslims into executive positions within the
party. Furthermore, the party has shifted its approach to
foreign policy from its initially staunchly anti-Western
positions to a more accommodative stance. This was epitomized at the 2010 congress in Jakarta where the party
invited a number of ambassadors from Western countries
including the United States to participate in a series of
international seminars (Fealy 2010).
All these developments are clear signs of moderation
effectuated by the partys inclusion into democratic procedures such as elections, parliamentary negotiations,
and lobbying. The election results of 1999 and 2004 had
provided ample evidence that in contrast to ineffective
Islamist dogmatism moralist populism had immense
potential to appeal to wider segments of the population.
Thus, the need to be competitive on the electoral market
as well as the desire to be taken seriously by the international community as a potential future majority party
played a huge role in shaping the direction of PKSs
moderation.
And yet, it is important to note that the moderation process that has occurred within PKS in recent years is not a
linear process. On the contrary, despite increasingly frequent commitments to pluralism, PKS has also continued
to pursue more exclusivist policies. Arguably the most
prominent example is the 2008 antipornography law,
which declared various morally questionable activities illegal and was actively pushed by PKS legislators in parliament (Allen 2009). But there were other instances as well.
For example, in 20056 the party refused to support political action against the then growing spread of religiously
inspired bylaws (perda sharia) that were issued by
local governors and district heads in an effort to appeal to
local Islamic constituencies (Buehler 2008; Bush 2008).8
In 2008, PKS fuelled heated debates about religious freedom when it joined calls for the disbandment of the controversial Ahmadiyah sect, which many Muslim Indonesians
view as deviant (Hasan 2009, 11). Furthermore, PKS

ministers in cabinet have at times invited criticism from

democracy and human rights activists for their exclusivist
attitudes, especially the current communication minister
Tifatul Sembiring, the driving force behind Indonesias
recent move to censor sexually explicit Internet sites.
Examples from other parts of the world show that it is
by no means unusual for Islamist parties to moderate
selectively. The maintenance of intolerant and at times
radical policy positions can be interpreted as a kind of
reverse pragmatism, equally conditioned by electoral
participation as the opposite trend of moderation. Indeed,
PKS acted strategically not only when it began to moderate some of its fundamentalist policy positions but also
when it sought to reaffirm its Islamic credentials through
the abovementioned conservative policies. While the former were aimed at making the party more attractive to
liberal Muslims and non-Muslims, the latter were
intended to prevent alienating its more puritanical supporters from the tarbiyah movement. In both cases, it was
electoral competition with other political parties that provided the structural framework dictating the actions of
PKSs leadership.
As a matter of fact, PKSs more conservative actions
in the past few years have been much more of a reaction
to other parties than self-initiated action. On one hand,
the competition with other Islamic parties has made it
imperative for PKS not to overstretch its moderation
strategy. On the other hand, and perhaps more important
in view of the declining electoral appeal of political
Islam, the religious vote in Indonesia is no longer contested just by parties that call themselves Islamic. Partly
in response to PKSs success in 2004, Indonesias socalled secular parties like Partai Demokrat (PD), Golkar,
and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P) have
all begun to try portraying themselves as more and more
religious, too. PDI-P, for example, launched a new partyaffiliated Islamic organization in 2007 in an obvious if
somewhat halfhearted attempt to diffuse its image as a
party of secularists and non-Muslims.9 Given this new
competition, PKS has apparently deemed it necessary to
reaffirm its appeal to its original constituency by promoting some typical Islamic issues.

Effects of Inclusion on PKSs

Internal Coherence
There is no doubt that PKSs attempt to please two different constituencies has left a deep mark on the partys once
famous organizational coherence. If in the early days factionalism was practically unheard of within PKS, the party
is now confronted with a growing rift between supporters
and opponents of the moderation course initiated by the
top leadership. Apart from this horizontal dimension, the
simmering unease over the future direction of the party

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Political Research Quarterly 65(3)

also has a vertical dimension as the leadership is yet to

convince large parts of the partys grassroots members of
the virtues of its push toward the political center.
Factional infighting has been a strain on many
Indonesian parties since the beginning of the reform era
and has been identified as one of the key reasons for their
failure to properly represent the interests of their constituencies (Tomsa 2008). By contrast, PKS has long stood
out as a remarkably solid and unified party. Hamayotsu
(2009) attributes this organizational coherence to the
structural setup of the party, which has been built on fair
merit-based recruitment and promotion policies, transparent succession regulations, and the prioritization of
collective over individual interests. All these institutional
features provide party members with fair opportunities to
achieve positions of influence within the party, while at
the same time providing disincentives for patronage and
collusion, which are so prevalent in Indonesias other
major parties. As a result, serious factional divisions were
not discernible in PKS for a long time.
Lately, however, cracks have appeared in the partys
untarnished image. First, signs of internal frictions
became visible in mid-2004, when PKS leaders split over
the question of which candidate to support in the presidential election that year. Grossly simplified, the debate
divided the party into pragmatists and idealists, with the
latter sometimes labeled purists or ideologues to emphasize their strict allegiance to PKSs roots in Islamist ideology (Hwang 2010; Bubalo, Fealy, and Mason 2008). In
recognition of Clark and Schwedlers (2003) cautioning
against simplistic dichotomies, the terms are used here
with the caveat that they denote only very broadly conceived differences of opinion on how PKS should operate
within the framework of electoral politics. In this understanding, pragmatists are those who are willing to cooperate with any other political actor as long as PKS can
realistically expect to reap some absolute gains from this
cooperation. Idealists, on the other hand, are unwilling to
sacrifice the partys Islamist and reformist principles
purely for electoral gains.
In the debate about the 2004 presidential candidature,
idealists favored veteran Muslim politician Amien Rais,
the leader of the National Mandate Party with whom PK
had formed a joint parliamentary caucus between 1999
and 2004. Pragmatists, meanwhile, saw the candidature
of the former chairman of Indonesias second-largest
Islamic organization as a lost cause and began floating
the idea of supporting the controversial retired General
Wiranto for the presidency. In the end, the party did unite
behind Amien, who however, as expected, was ousted in
the first round of the poll. In the run-up to the second
round in October, tensions between pragmatists and idealists resurfaced again, this time over the question of
whether PKS should remain neutral or officially endorse

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the candidate who was

widely tipped to win the poll. This time the pragmatists
won, and PKS was rewarded for its support of Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono with three ministerial posts in the
new cabinet (Fauzi and Fuller Collins 2005).
The 2004 split was the first incident of serious divisions in the top party layers, prompted by the desire by
some influential elements in the party to prioritize access
to power over idealist goals. This dividing line soon
deepened as the central party leadership steered PKS
firmly away from its Islamist origins in the aftermath of
the 2004 elections. According to Bubalo, Fealy, and
Mason (2008, 65-68), four issues in particular caused tensions within the party, thereby indirectly contributing to
an intensification of the factional conflict. These four
issues included the procedures regulating candidate
selection during gubernatorial and district head elections,
support for controversial government policies such as the
reduction of fuel subsidies, the opening up of the party to
non-Muslims, and the growing number of disciplinary
transgressions of individual party members who had been
elected into positions of power.
For ideologues like Abu Ridho, Mashadi, or Daud
Rasyid, all these issues were evidence that participation
in electoral politics and particularly participation in cabinet merely leads to compromise and moral degradation.
Pragmatists like secretary-general Anis Matta, Fachry
Hamzah, or the powerful chairman of the partys almighty
Dewan Syuro, Hilmi Aminudin, on the other hand, argued
that support for the government and greater flexibility in
recruitment and nomination processes were necessary for
the party to gain political experience and enhance its
competitiveness in elections. Significantly, the pragmatists see no contradiction between these policies and
PKSs function as a dakwah party. For them, the ultimate
goal is to make Indonesian society more Islamic, and to
achieve this, so they argue, participation in the current
political system is imperative. To counter the concerns of
the ideologues, pragmatists therefore like to highlight the
successes of the party in their endeavor of Islamizing
Indonesia through engagement in democratic politics
(e.g., through the antipornography law).
Ever since the split between ideologues and pragmatists
became visible for the first time in 2004, it has shaped the
internal dynamics within PKS. Given that electoral success
in 2004 had been achieved largely because no overtly
Islamic agenda had been pursued, the pragmatists have long
had good arguments in the debate. Indeed, despite persistent
criticism, they have won most of the internal battles in recent
years. Perhaps surprisingly, even the stagnation in the 2009
election did not change the dynamics within the party significantly. Although some critics of the moderation course
seemed to become more outspoken after the election,10 pragmatists affirmed their current supremacy in the party during

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the 2010 National Congress. Not only were choice of the
congress motto (PKS for All) and the selection of the location for the event highly symbolicthe congress was held in
one of Jakartas most luxurious international hotelsbut
delegates at the event also endorsed the leadership team
around Hilmi Aminudin and Anis Matta for another term.
The 2010 congress was orchestrated as a show of force
and support for the moderation course, but party officials
at both the national and the provincial and district levels
acknowledge that there is substantial discontent at the
grassroots. Many longtime members who joined the party
for its religious zeal have not (yet) abandoned their exclusivist religious viewpoints and are yet to be convinced of
the necessity and usefulness of the moderation process
(Mietzner 2008a). For them, it is the spread of Islam not
participation in power politics that should be the prime
focus of PKSs organizational activities, and it is they
who do see a contradiction between the partys overly
pragmatic course and its dakwah mission. Party elites are
well aware of the mood at the grassroots but seem confident that the current course will eventually be accepted
by the skeptics.
The dilemma for PKS, however, is that it is not only
the traditional supporters who are unhappy but also those
party members who joined primarily not for religious reasons but because of PKSs reformist image. With the
party now increasingly enmeshed with old-established
power structures in Jakarta and elsewhere, disillusionment has spread among reformists, especially after PKSsupported governors and district heads failed to bring
about substantial change in their provinces and districts
after being elected. It is this dissatisfaction at the grassroots that explains why in 2009 PKS yielded its most disappointing results in exactly those places where the party
had actually done very well either in 2004 or in subsequent local elections (Mietzner 2009a, 14).

Effects of Inclusion on PKSs

Organizational Structures and
Procedures
The split between pragmatists and ideologues as described
in the previous section is one of a number of symptoms
of organizational change within PKS. Another important
change, which in many ways has been possible only
because of the broader ideational moderation, has been
the consistent process of opening the party toward nonMuslims and Muslims from a non-tarbiyah background.
This practice began for purely instrumental reasons in the
run-up to the 2004 election, with a view to broadening
the partys electoral appeal in regions with large nonMuslim populations. Following the success of the 2004
elections, however, the practice was not only continued

but also institutionalized, resulting in two striking organizational developments.

First, party membership grew exponentially over the
years. If in 1999 PKSs predecessor PK had well fewer
than 100,000 members, PKSs pool of cadres in 2004
amounted to around 400,000. By the time of the 2009
election, this figure had probably at least doubled.11 Thus,
within the space of ten years, party membership had risen
extraordinarily. For those who orchestrated PKSs opening up, this is good news and vindication for their strategy. For opponents of the new direction, however, the
growth in membership is a cause for concern rather than
celebration as they fear that the influx of new members
without adequate religious backgrounds will undermine
the partys organizational solidity and water down its
ideological identity.
Second, it is important to note that non-Muslims and
Muslims from outside the tarbiyah family were not simply invited to join the party but at times offered controversial fast-track appointments to positions as party
candidates in legislative or direct elections for governor,
mayor, or district head. Party leaders called this political
recruitment to draw a line between these candidates and
traditional party members who were recruited via the
tarbiyah-inspired educational path (Hwang 2010, 670).
In the 2004 legislative election, for example, PKS fielded
several non-Muslim candidates in the Christiandominated province of Papua. In the run-up to the 2009
election, too, PKS opened its candidate lists for nonMuslims,12 but at the end of the day all successful candidates for the national parliament in that year were
Muslims.13 Furthermore, during direct local elections,
which have been held in hundreds of provinces and districts since 2005, PKS also supported various candidates
with dubious Islamic credentials. Often these candidates
came from a background in business or the bureaucracy
and received the nod for their candidature only after paying huge amounts of money to the party. In adopting this
kind of nomination procedure, PKS basically emulated
the practices of other parties that are widely known for
effectively auctioning off nominations for these executive elections to the highest bidder (Mietzner 2008b;
Tomsa 2009).
Both of these developments are significant because
they call into question the rigidity of PKSs famous internal organizational principles. According to the partys
hierarchical structure, PKS members who enter via the
educational path are divided into six categories.14 New
members normally start as an anggota pemula (beginner)
and can rise to the next level only after passing through a
party-internal examination procedure that tests the members commitment to the party and its objectives. Since
the primary objective of PKS is dakwah, it should follow
that it is basically impossible for a non-Muslim to pass

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this examination. In other words, even though the party

statutes do not explicitly state that all members must be
Muslims, in practice all members are normally expected
to engage in Islamic activities. Moreover, to be nominated as a candidate for a legislative election, potential
candidates, even if they are from outside the party structure, are usually expected to have proven not only their
political capabilities but also their moral integrity according to Islamic law. However, many candidates who were
recruited via this political path possessed neither political
capabilities nor moral integrity. No wonder that critics of
the partys pragmatic course have found it difficult to
comprehend how such candidatesespecially if they
were non-Muslimssecured their nominations.15
In 2010, the PKS leadership responded to its critics by
taking the moderation course to the next level and formally amending the partys organizational statutes to
accommodate non-Muslims into the party structure.
Thus, from 2010 onward non-Muslims were invited to
not only run for office on behalf of the party but also actually take up leadership positions within the party.16 With
these amendments, PKS has attempted to salvage what is
left of its reputation as a party with strict organizational
rules. As a matter of fact, when PKS was initially formed,
its strict internal rules helped the party gain a significant
institutional advantage over many of its electoral rivals.
As Hamayotsu (2009) has demonstrated, PKSs clear
regulations provided incentives for many young and
ambitious Muslims to join the party. With the opening up
of the party to broader constituencies, however, these
rules were repeatedly bended, much to the dismay of not
only the conservative ideologues in the top party ranks
but also the rank and file that constitutes the partys
human capital. Whether the official endorsement of a
common but highly controversial practice such as the
inclusion of non-Muslims will placate the critics remains
to be seen.

Effects of PKSs Moderation

on the Quality of Indonesias
Democracy
Seen from a purely procedural perspective in the way
Schumpeter (1947) or Huntington (1991) have defined
democracy, Indonesia is now widely regarded as a consolidated electoral democracy. All political parties that
through their participation in elections have demonstrated their acceptance of democratic procedures have
contributed to this consolidation process, and PKS is no
exception in this regard. If, however, we conceptualize
democracy more elaborately and take, for example,
Diamond and Morlinos (2004) eight dimensions of
democracy as a benchmark, the picture becomes more

differentiated. The dimensions, proposed as tools to actually measure the quality of democracy, include the rule of
law, participation, competition, vertical and horizontal
accountability, freedom, equality, and responsiveness.
Space constraints prevent a detailed analysis (not to mention measurement) here, but even just a cursory look at
how PKSs moderation has affected some of these
dimensions will illustrate that the partys ideational and
organizational development has both facilitated and jeopardized the consolidation of Indonesias democracy at the
same time.
Take, for example, the dimension of participation.
According to Diamond and Morlino (2004, 23-24),
[D]emocratic quality is high when we in fact observe
extensive citizen participation not only through voting
but in the life of political parties and civil society organizations, in the discussion of public policy issues, in communicating with and demanding accountability from
elected representatives, in monitoring official conduct,
and in direct engagement with public issues at the local
level. In regard to these issues there can be little doubt
that no other political party in Indonesia has done more to
raise the quality of democratic participation than PKS. It
is the only party that operates actively outside election
times (especially at the local level), whose members meet
regularly to discuss public policy, and that takes its supervisory and monitoring functions as a political party reasonably seriously.17
At the same time, however, there are also counterexamples that show that the moderation of PKS either has
directly compromised the quality of Indonesias democracy or has simply not gone far enough to prevent negative effects of the partys involvement in democratic
procedures. With regard to the former, it is important to
note that inclusion in mainstream politics and the partys
subsequent moderation have weakened PKSs credibility
as a clean, noncorruptible reform party. Several party
members have been implicated in corruption scandals in
recent years, and the partys promotion of former dictator
Suharto as a national hero in a dubious public relations
campaign to attract conservative but secular voters in
2008 also did little to endear it to democracy activists
(Tomsa 2010). Inconceivable in the early PK days, these
developments were possible only after PKS had accepted
inclusion in the formal political arena and softened its
attitude toward Indonesias notoriously corrupt politics.
Needless to say, they have undermined rather than
strengthened PKSs capacity to improve the quality of
democracy, especially in the dimensions of rule of law
and horizontal accountability. With regard to the latter,
PKSs continued support, either tacit or explicit, for
selected Islamist policies such as the antipornography
law or regional sharia bylaws indicates that the party is
not yet fully committed to democratic pillars such as

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freedom and equality. Thus, as a result of PKSs inclusion
in democratic law-making processes, Indonesia now has
laws that are regarded by many as inherently discriminatory against women.18 Clearly, moderation has not gone
far enough in these aspects to actually facilitate democratic consolidation.

PKS in the Footsteps of Turkeys

AKP?
As a case study of an incremental yet uneven moderation
process within the context of reasonably established
democratic procedures, the development of PKS shows
certain parallels to the Turkish AKP. Both parties were
originally inspired by the ideals of the Muslim
Brotherhood (Bubalo, Fealy, and Mason 2008) but have
undergone significant if not necessarily teleological
moderation as they positioned themselves as potent
political actors in highly competitive party systems. In
the process, both parties have sought to appease the
political center without completely abandoning their
Islamist origins. Another parallel can be seen in their
eagerness to interact with non-Islamist parties and institutions from other countries. Where the AKP especially
in its early days in power espoused a strongly pro-EU
orientation (Tepe 2005), PKS has established working
relations with, among others, the Australian Labor Party
and has even sent delegates to China to engage with the
Chinese Communist Party. That this results in political
learning can be seen in individual PKS officials no longer
objecting to a legalization of a communist party in
Indonesia, a very significant if clearly not yet majoritysupported shift in the boundaries of justifiable action.
Finally, a third, if somewhat less auspicious parallel is the
declining credibility of the two parties as forces of reform
as patronage and corruption quickly began to affect the
parties organizational procedures. While initially both
parties were hailed for their intraparty democracy, they
were soon subjected to increasing accusations of topdown decision making and lack of transparency (Fealy
2010; Heilmann 2007; Tepe 2005; Tezcr 2010a).19
Yet, despite the parallels, it is important to note that
the two parties are still products of very specific historical
and political contexts that put certain limits on the basis
for comparison. The AKP, for instance, operates under
the extremely watchful eyes of a powerful military and a
staunchly secular, interventionist Constitutional Court
(Dagi 2008, 26). In Indonesia, a Constitutional Court was
established only in 2004 and has only recently begun to
make decisions that directly affect the nature of the political system (Mietzner 2010). At the same time, the veto
power of the military in Indonesia has declined rapidly in
the post-Suharto era, so that a party like PKS need not
fear to be shut down by coercive means from the armed

forces. Other differences are apparent in the nature of the

political systems in Turkey and Indonesia and the roles
the two parties play in these systems. Clearly, the AKP
and the PKS occupy very different positions in very different institutional environments and are therefore
exposed to very different opportunity structures and constraints. While the AKP is the biggest party in a parliamentary system that uses a closed-list proportional
representation system with an extremely high electoral
threshold (10 percent), PKS is still only a medium-sized
party in a presidential multiparty system that has used different electoral systems with different thresholds in each
election since 1999.

Concluding Remarks
Overall, the development of PKS from a small, staunchly
Islamist antisystem party to a religious-nationalist yet
still very conservative mainstream party demonstrates
that inclusion can indeed lead to moderation. By changing the stance on the Pancasila, opening the party to nonMuslims, and engaging in processes of political learning
not only from fellow Indonesian parties but also from
foreign parties including overtly nonreligious ones such
as the Chinese Communist Party, PKS leaders have
shifted the boundaries of justifiable action quite substantially over the years. However, it has also been highlighted that there is also significant opposition to this
moderation course, among both elites and the party faithful at the grassroots. Clearly, moderation is a multifaceted rather than a linear process and poses new challenges
not only to the party itself but also to the broader process
of democratic consolidation in Indonesia. PKS is now in
a crucial phase of transition, and its ability to manage this
transition will to a large degree determine the future of
the party.
Effectively, PKS will need to reposition itself as an
established party without being seen as part of the establishment, a task that many other formerly radical parties
have struggled with. At this point, PKSs main strength is
still its relatively high level of institutionalization, especially its comparatively strict adherence to rule-based
decision-making processes and the enduring appeal of
Islam as ideological inspiration (Hamayotsu 2009). But
the inclusion of not-so-pious Muslims and non-Muslims
into the party as well as the party leaderships somewhat
halfhearted responses to allegations of corruption and
misconduct from PKS cadres have negatively affected
the partys institutional solidity. Contradictory signals to
the outside world during the 2010 congressopenness in
engagement with the West on one hand but secrecy in
regard to leadership elections and programmatic discussions on the other handhave done little to convince the
partys critics (Fealy 2010).

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With a view to the consolidation of Indonesias young

democracy, the development of PKS provides risks and
opportunities. Generally speaking, the partys moderation
should be conducive to the consolidation process because
it reduces the potential for polarization in the party system. Indeed, throughout the past few years, PKS has
demonstrated that it is willing and able to operate within
the rules and regulations of a democratic political system.
The more familiar the party became with the system, the
more the party was shaped by the values and norms of
this system. PKS leaders had to acknowledge that exclusivist policies are neither popular with the electorate nor
helpful in interparty negotiations and lobbying.
However, not all the norms and values of Indonesias
political systems and especially the party system are actually facilitating the process of democratic consolidation.
Corruption, in particular, but also parliamentary inefficiency and party-internal factionalism have put consistent strains on Indonesias political development. In the
early days, PKS set out to provide a counterbalance to
these problems, but with moderation came a decline in
determination to be that counterbalance. The party, it
seems, is now at risk of being completely co-opted into
Indonesias traditional power politics, a prospect that will
serve neither the party nor Indonesias democratic consolidation. If, however, PKS manages to fully transform
itself into a moderate Islamic yet still reform-oriented
party, it could play a vital role in improving transparency
and accountability in the broader political system and
thus make a major contribution to the consolidation of
Indonesias young democracy.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Mirjam Knkler and Manfred
Brocker for inviting him to the initial workshop on moderation
and inclusion at Princeton University. Furthermore, he would
like to thank the two conveners and all participants at the workshop as well as Michael Buehler and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared that they had no conflicts of interests
with respect to their authorship or the publication of this
article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research and/or
authorship of this article.

Notes
1. With most Muslim-majority countries under authoritarian
rule (Freedom House 2010), many studies discuss the role
of Islamist parties in the context of potential transitions to
democracy or the capturing of limited political space under

nondemocratic rule (Schwedler, 2006). Turkey and Indonesia represent the two most important cases of democratic
Muslim-majority countries with significant Islamist parties
(Bubalo, Fealy, and Mason 2008).
2. While Schwedler dedicates considerable attention to internal organizational developments within the Jordan IAF and
the Yemenite Islah party, these are almost entirely limited
to the leadership level. This is highlighted in the conclusion, where she explains the lack of moderation within the
Islah party by, among other things, the absence of redrawn
boundaries of justifiable action...that rendered cooperation with Leftists acceptable on Islamic terms in a way
recognized across the party leadership (Schwedler 2006,
197, emphasis added).
3. Islamic organizations had played an important role in
Indonesias independence struggle and were at the forefront of party politics in the immediate postcolonial era.
In the 1950s, two Islamic political parties, Masyumi and
Nahdlatul Ulama, won significant shares of the vote in
Indonesias first democratic election, but as the country
descended into authoritarian rule from the 1960s onward,
political Islam was increasingly sidelined. Masyumi was
banned as early as 1960 for its support for regional movements, whereas Nahdlatul Ulama was forced to become
part of PPP and later withdrew from party politics, returning to its roots as a socioreligious mass organization. Both
Nahdlatul Ulama and Indonesias other Islamic mass
organization, Muhammadiyah, retained a certain degree
of autonomy during the authoritarian Suharto era but had
relatively little political influence.
4. The term Muslim Brotherhood (rather than Muslim Brothers, as in some literature on Islamism in Egypt) is used
here without any pejorative intentions or connotations.
5. See below for a more detailed discussion of the Pancasila.
6. PKS Gelar Mukernas di Bali, February 1, 2008, http://
www.pk-sejahtera.org.uk/index.php?Itemid=46&id=
109&option=com_content&task=view (accessed November 20, 2009).
7. For example in the municipality of Manado, North
Sulawesi.
8. Officially, these bylaws were usually justified by pointing
to the alleged spread of vice and moral degradation. Strikingly, most were passed by governors and district heads
affiliated with secular parties like Golkar (Buehler 2011),
but as Shihab and Nugroho (2008, 249) point out, even
though PKS had little active involvement in these regulations, the party actually endorsed their application.
9. Megawati Lantik Baitul Muslimin Indonesia Siang Ini,
Tempointeraktif, August 5, 2007.
10. Komunikasi Politik PKS, Republika, May 1, 2009.
11. Accurate figures are difficult to obtain though. Shihab and
Nugroho (2009, 239) speak of 975,000 cadres, referring to
data from a personal interview with Suharna Surapranata,
one of the founders of PKS and currently the State Minister

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Tomsa
for Research and Technology. During the 2010 congress,
several party leaders were quoted as saying that PKS had
around 700,000 cadres. See PKS Target Dua Juta Kader
di 2014, Vivanews, http://politik.vivanews.com/news/
read/158084-pks-target-dua-juta-kader-di-2014 (accessed
June 16, 2010).
12. PKS terbuka bagi Non-Muslim, http://pksmakassar
.multiply.com/reviews/item/15 (accessed February 1, 2010).
13. At the local level, however, around twenty non-Muslim
candidates did win seats for PKS in regional parliaments,
especially in the Christian-dominated provinces of Papua
and East Nusa Tenggara. PKS Siapkan Jalur Anggota
Nonmuslim, Vivanews, http://politik.vivanews.com/
news/read/158079-pks-siapkan-jalur-anggota-nonmuslim
(accessed June 16, 2010).
14. All the relevant party statutes can be accessed on the PKS
website at http://pk-sejahtera.org/.
15. With regard to nominees for governor or district head,
the situation is slightly different since PKS can nominate
(and has done so in the past) candidates from outside the
party structure. However, even though these candidates
may not be formal party members, PKS leaders have routinely argued that they are required to enter into a political
contract with the party that obliges them to follow PKSs
political and religious guidelines. PKS-supported candidates for governor in Jakarta or Maluku, to name only two
examples, hardly fulfilled these criteria (Bubalo, Fealy,
and Mason 2008; Tomsa 2009).
16. Sejauh Mana PKS Akomodasi Nonmuslim? Vivanews,
http://politik.vivanews.com/news/read/158573-sejauhmana-nonmuslim-diakomodasi-pks (accessed June 18,
2010).
17. Its reputation for the last of these activities suffered a bit
when it became bogged down in political maneuvers during a parliamentary inquiry into a corruption scandal in
2010.
18. PKSs rather ambiguous stance toward women is also evident in its organizational structure. While women are heavily involved in the partys grassroots activities, they are
extremely underrepresented in the partys leadership board
and parliamentary fraction (Hwang 2010, 666-68).
19. See Buehler (2011) for an interesting argument as to why
this hierarchical structure has facilitated the moderation of
PKS across different administrative tiers.

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