Annotated Bibliography

Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix1
AnnotatedBibiliography
PrimarySources(52)
"TheBattleForIran."N.d.TS,NationalSecurityArchiveElectronicBriefingBookNo.
435.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.TheNationalSecurityArchive.GeorgeWashington
University,19Aug.2013.Web.20Dec.2014.ThisrecentlydeclassifiedinternalCIA
reportsummarizesOperationAJAXsprocess,andconfirmsinanappendixthatmostof
thedocumentationcoveringthecoupwasdestroyed.Interestingly,itstatesthatmuchof
thepublicsknowledgeoftheeventaroundthetimeperiodwaswildlyinaccurate.
Additionally,itshowsthattheCIAwasextremelynaiveintheaftermathofvictory,
neglectingtofollowtheShahsgovernmentcloselyortheoppressiveregimethathe
beganwiththecreationofSAVAK.
Baraheni,Reza.""..AmnestyIntl.N.p.,28Oct.1976.Web.04Jan.2015.This
source,whichiswritteninArabic,wasusefulindetermininghowIranwasduringthe
brutalruleundertheshah.ThissourcewasadirectwritingfromRezaBaraheni,an
Iranianhistorianduring1976,whentheturmoilwasrisingandactionswerecomingtoa
head.ThissourcetalksabouthowlowthepublicopinionwasoftheIraniansecretpolice,
theSAVAK.Specifically,itdetailshowSAVAKwouldrandomlytakecitizensfrom
theirhouseandwouldtorturethemeveniftheysimplylivednexttoapossibleShah
protester,inagrotesquedescriptionofthebrutalityallowedundertheShahsregime.
BritishForeignandCommonwealthOffice,ed."BritishAmericanPlanningTalks,Washington,
October1011,1978."(n.d.):n.pag.TheNationalSecurityArchive(GeorgeWashington
University).GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.Web.13Oct.2014.Thisdocumentisaset
ofnotesfromameetingoftheBritishForeignandCommonwealthOfficefrom1978,as
theydiscussthestateofforeignaffairswithAmericanofficials.Inthesectionpertaining
toIran,thenotetakeroutlinesapointthatHenryPrecht,BritishCountryDirectorfor
Iran,makes,wherehecallsthemessinIran"theworstforeignpolicydisastertohitthe
Westformanyyears."PrechtgoesontocorrectlypredictthefalloftheShah's
governmentwithinayear,andtheuprisingofKhomeini.Allinattendanceagreedthat
howeverbadrelationswithIrangot,theycouldnotbeterminatedbecauseofIranian
dependenceontheWestbuyingoil.ThisshowsthatwhilebothAmericansandBritish
officialsunderstoodthesituationwasratherdireasaresultoftheCoup,andtheyrealized
theyhadmadeamistake,theydidnotfullyappreciatethelegacythattheycouldbe
leaving,andthefullextentoftheirmistakes,astheydidnotaccountfortheantiwestern
sentimentfeltinIranatthetimeofKhomeini'srisetopower.

Bruce,DavidK.,andRobertA.Lovett.BruceLovettReport.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,1956.Print.This
reportcommissionedbytheBoardofConsultantsonFederalIntelligenceActivities
highlightstheshortfallsoftheCIAorganizationalsystem,whichitdescribesas
freewheelinganduncheckedbyqualifiedauthorities,bothinternallyandexternally.
AuthorsDavidK.E.BruceandRobertA.Lovett(theSecretaryofDefense)werehighly
criticalofthefreenatureoftheCIA,statingthatitcontainednoneofthelongrange
guidanceandvisionsnecessarytoensureeffectivepolicyprocedure(PP)operations.
Theyprovidefewspecificdetailstosupporttheirclaims,usingmostlybroad
generalizationsaboutCIAworkersorleaders,althoughtheauthoritativenatureofthe
reportanditswritersleadsustobelievethattheyhavesomeweightbehindtheirclaims.
CampaigntoInstallaProWesternGovernmentinIran.N.d.CIA,Summary.Thisreport
releasedin2011withtheCIAFreedomofInformationAct,likelypreparedbyDonald
Wilbur,anarchitectofthecoup,detailstheUnitedStates'spointofviewandthought
processregardingtheeventsandtheiractionsinIran.Althoughlikelybiased,itprovides
anelucidatingperspectiveofthecoup,firstpresentingknowledgeoftheTudehparty's
andSovietUnion'sinfluenceandrecognizingtheexistenceofFedayenIslam.Itclaims
thattheUSsawitselfasan"honestbroker,"andthatitwas"admittedlyreluctant"totake
covertactioninIran,butthatthecoupwasa"moredesirablerisk"thanlettingtheSoviets
gainanadvantageintheregion.Itmaybeimportanttonotethatthedocumentwas
heavilyexcised,presentingthepossibilitythattheCIAiswithholdingyetmoreimportant
information.
Coyne,J.Patrick.CoyneReporttotheCIA.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,1956.Print.Thisreportonthestatus
ofCIAoperationssystemsprovidedacomprehensivesummaryoftheissueswithinthe
CIAorganizationalsystem.Primarily,alackofproperchecksandbalancesonCIA
operationsallowedittopursuemultiplepotentiallydisastrousundertakings,withoutany
ofthelongrangeguidanceandplanningthatshouldbeprovidedbytheStateand
DefenseDepartments.Overall,thissourceunderscoredthedownfallsoftheCIAatthe
time,andgavesomesuggestionsonhowtoimprovetheaccountabilityofthe
organization.
Daniel,Clifton."U.S.andBritainConfrontedByDilemmaonHelptoIran."TheNewYork
Times11Aug.1952:n.pag.Print.Thisprimarysourcenewsarticle,publishedinthe
NewYorkTimesaboutayearbeforethecoup,discussesthedilemmaoftheAmerican
andBritishgovernmentsindecidingwhetherornottoactinIran.TheprimaryBritish
motivationinIranwastocombatMossadeq'snationalizationoftheAIOC.TheBritish
insisteduponmeetingwiththeUnitedStatesfirstinordertogetthemtoagreetoassist.
OfparticularinterestinthisarticleisthefacttheUnitedStates'StateDepartmentwas

mentionedasthedrivingforcebehindtheAmericandecisiontoinstigatethecoupdueto
thebeliefofacommunistthreatbytheTudehParty.TheheadoftheStateDepartment,of
course,wasnoneotherthanJohnFosterDulles.Thisarticleprovidesaninterestinglook
athowtheBritishwereabletodragtheUnitedStatesalongwiththemtohelptheminthe
coup,andhowmisinformedtheUnitedStateswere.Italsoreflectsthemisguidedand
misinformedleadershipofJohnFosterDullesandtheresultinglegacyofthat.
Dulles,Allen."AllenDullesInterview."Interview.YouTube.Google,20Feb.2010.Web.13
Oct.2014.This1966interviewofAllenDullesprovidesagoodlookatDulles'spersonal
coveringupofthecoup.Whentheinterviewerdescribestheamountofdocumentsstill
classifiedbytheCIAabouttheCoup,Dullesclaims"Ithinkeverythingthatisvitalasfar
asformingajudgementastowhatreallyhappenedhasbeenmadeavailable."Thisisa
blatantlie,andtheinterviewercontinuestovoicehisskepticism,onlytobemetby
Dullesunyieldingandcharismaticdefense.Thissourcewasafairdemonstrationofboth
thelackofleadershipofthecoupbecauseitshowedtheCIA'sadamantdenialthatthey
messedup,andpartiallythelegacytoobecausetheywereunwillingtocomeoutwiththe
truthandtrytofixtheirmistakes.
Dulles,Allen."Correspondence."LettertoDonaldWilbur.30Jan.1954.MossadeghProject.
N.p.,22June2014.Web.22Nov.2014.InaninternalCIAletter/memorandum,Allen
DullescongratulatesDonaldWilburforhisworkonthe1953Iraniancoup.Thisletter
helpedusunderstandtherelationshipbetweentheBritishandAmericansidesofthecoup
thatWilburmediated,whichwasgenerallytactfulandprofessionalwithoutcopious
communication.Also,heonceagainexpresseshissomewhatignorantopinionofthe
coup'ssuccess,withoutanythoughtforthelongtermconsequencesofanoppressiveand
authoritarianregimeinIran,evenifitsupportedtheWest.
Dulles,Allen."AllenW.DullesOralHistoryInterview."InterviewbyThomasBraden.JohnF.
KennedyPresidentialLibrary.N.p.,n.d.Web.30Dec.2014.ThisinterviewofAllen
Dullesin1964coverstheplanningfor,execution,andaftermathoftheBayofPigs
invasionledbytheCIAduringDulles'stenureasDirector.Dullesexplainsthathemade
amistakeinallowingPresidentKennedytobecomesoinvolvedinthecrisis.Hebelieves,
despitethedisasterthatoccurred,thattheoperationhadhadsomehopeforsuccess,and
thatitwasmainlypoorluckandexecutionthatledtothepartialfailureoftheoperation.
ThissourcehelpedusunderstandDulles'sopinionsonhowCIAoperationsshouldberun
andled,withoutinterferencefromoutsidegovernmentagencies.
Dulles,Allen.Germany'sUnderground.NewYork:Macmillan,1947.Print.Thisbook,which
waswrittenbyAllenDulles,goesindepthintohowtheOSSwascreated,andhowthat

affectedtheeventsinWorldWarII.Withinthisbook,Dulles'judgmentalattitudeis
apparenttoalltheleadershedisagreedwith.HetalkedabouthowtheUnitedStates
should'vegottenintothewarasearlyaspossible.Fromthisbook,wecanseehowhis
thoughtsaboutradicalactionaffectedhisleadershipinthecoup.Itisaveryhelpful
primarysource,inthatitprovidesdeepinsightintoDullessperspectiveonhisown
leadership.Combiningitwithothersources,onecandrawconclusionsabouthis
overconfidence,andhowJohnFosterDulleswasoverconfidentaswell.Itwasvery
beneficialtotheleadershipargument.
Dulles,Allen.TheInvisibleWar.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,2007.HarveyMuddLibrary.Web.14Dec.
2014.ThisundatedOSSreportissuedbyAllenDullesexplainsthestandoffbetweenthe
UnitedStatesandtherecentlyinpowerCommunistsinRussia.Hespendsasignificant
amountoftimedetailingtheAmericanpublicopinionoftheCommunistadvance,though
hebelievesthatpeopleshouldbemorewaryofthethreat.Headmitsthatnobodyhasany
accurateinformationontheSoviets,showingthatmostofthehyperbolicclaimshe
continuestomakeareunfounded.Overall,itshowstheinaccuratepreconceptionsthat
DullesformedevenbeforehewasfullyinformedoftheCommunistsituationaroundthe
globe,andthereforeisveryhelpfulfortheleadershipargumentofimpulsiveforeign
policy.
Dulles,AllenW."THEPRESENTSITUATIONINGERMANY."CouncilonForeign
Relations.3Dec.1945.ForeignAffairs.Web.4Jan.2015.Thisisanofftherecord
speechwhichAllenDullesmadethatwasrecentlyreleasedtothepublic.Althoughitis
aboutGermanyin1945,itprovidesinsightintoDulles'sleadershipabilities.Heoften
describesthesituationasimpossibleandmakesbroadgeneralizationsaboutthe
populationsinvolved,supportingtheideathatDulleswasgenerallypessimisticinthe
shortterm,andthathewaspronetoromanticizethesituationinhismindtomatchwith
hisselfimageasaChristianAmericancrusaderouttohelpthepeopleoftheworld
againstallevils.
Dulles,Allen.SovietEconomicInfluences.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,1958.05Dec.2007.Web.6Jan.
2015.ThisreportwrittenbyAllenDullesfortheCIAoutlinesSovieteconomicactivities
aroundtheglobe,focusingmainlyon"thirdworld"countries,includingIran(althoughby
thispointIranwasalreadyunderUScontrol).Dullesexpressesconcernsofthepowerof
Sovietpropagandathroughouttheglobe,specificallyinEgyptandIran,demonstrating
hisfearoftheSovietsintheMiddleEast.Mostimportantly,though,hehighlightsthe
extentofSoviettradeintheMiddleEast,whichhebelievedtobeanindicatorofSoviet
expansionarytendencies.ThishelpedrevealthatwhileDulleswasanidealisticleader,set

inhisways,hewasstillbrilliant,andhadsufficientknowledgeofthesentimentsinIran
afterthecoup.
Dulles,JohnF."InterviewwithJohnFosterDulles."InterviewbyHull.AmericanHistory.
AshlandUniversity,2006.Web.15Dec.2014.InaninterviewwiththeForeign
IntelligenceAdvisoryBoard,JohnFosterDullesexplainshisviewonthepolicyof
containment.Hesaysthatamoredynamicandproactive"positive"policyisnecessaryto
countertheSoviets,andinordertofreethecaptivepeoplesunderSovietcontrol.He
statesthatadefensivepolicywillinevitablyfailandbepushedbackbyanaggressive
policy,sotheAmericansshouldassumeamoreaggressivestandpoint.Overall,he
believesthatthemoralsuperiorityoftheUnitedStatescanovercometheSoviet"evil"as
longastheydonottakeonanegativedefeatistattitudeastheyhadbeen,whichwould
requireamoreactiveforeignpolicyconcerningtheColdWar.
Dulles,JohnF."JohnFosterDullesInterview:U.S.SecretaryofStateunderPresidentDwightD.
Eisenhower."InterviewbyWilliamB.HuieandHenryS.Hazlitt.Longines
Chronoscope.1952.Television.ThistelevisedinterviewofJohnFosterDulleshimself
providedanuncensoredperspectiveofFosterDulles'sviewsontheColdWar.Ashe
explainedhimself,hebelievedthattheUnitedStatesneededtobecomemorevigorous
andregainAmerican"dynamism"inordertofightSovietRussiaindefenseofAmerican
andhumanrightsaroundtheworld.Healsostatesthatmoreopentradeandeconomic
policiesintheFirstandThirdworldswerekeytoholdingbacktheRussiansoffensives
aroundtheglobe.Dullesalsostatesthathedoesnotacceptthe"communizationofthe
Chinesemainland."InadditiontoshowingthefearDulleshadofCommunisminthe
world,theinterviewisalsoindicativeofhowDullesaffectedUnitedStatesforeign
policy.Theviewpointshesharesintheinterviewarethatofananticommunistideology
asopposedtoaprodemocracypolicy.Thisisextremelyrelevanttoourargumentthat
Dulles'leadershipleftthelegacyofafundamentalchangeinthegoalsofUnitedStates
foreignpolicy.
Dulles,JohnF."JohnFosterDullesonMassiveRetaliation."JohnBurroughsHistory.Web.15
Dec.2014.ThisstatementmadebyJohnFosterDullessummarizeshisperspectiveon
AmericanforeignpolicyconcerningtheSovietthreatonaglobalscale.Asheputsit,the
AmericanscouldnotaffordtoallowtheSovietstocometothem,orelsetheywouldbe
forcedtouse"massiveretaliation"measuresalloutornuclearwarinordertosimply
holdbacktheSoviets.TheSoviets,knowingthis,wouldthenbesecureintheirabilityto
dominatetheUnitedStates.Instead,hesays,theAmericancommunityhadtobe
proactiveandbecometheaggressoritself,sothattheSovietswouldnothavethechance

toattackonitsownterms.Averyhelpfulleadershipsource,itprovidedtheinsighton
FosterDullessideas,whichwenthandinhandwithhisbrothers.
"EisenhowerDoctrine(1957)."WorldHistory:TheModernEra.ABCCLIO,2015.Web.29
Dec.2014.Thisprimarysource,commonlyknownastheEisenhowerDoctrine,isa
famousspeechthatdefinestheAmericanforeignpolicyofthatera.Inthespeech,
EisenhowerdeclaredthatMiddleEasternstatescouldrequestAmericanaidiftheyfelt
threatenedbyanotherforeignpower.Eisenhowerspecificallypointsoutthethreatofthe
SovietUnionandthespreadofcommunism.Thissourceisextremelyrelevantbecause
whatEisenhowerissayingperfectlyreflectsthefundamentalinfluencethattheDulles
brothers'leadershiphadonAmericanforeignpolicy.Eisenhowerevengoessofarasto
mentionJohnFosterandhisviewsonforeignpolicy.Assuch,thissourceisclearly
indicativeofthelegacyinforeignpolicyoftheDullesbrothers'leadership.
Eisenhower,DwightD.MandateforChange,19531956:TheWhiteHouseYears.GardenCity,
NY:Doubleday,1963.Print.Thisprimarysourcespansexactlythetimeperiodweare
interestedin.ItgivescopiesofEisenhower'scorrespondencewithIranianleadersand
alsogiveshisthoughtsontheirnationsrelationships.Specifically,hebelievedthatIran
andtheUnitedStateswerehighlydependentoneachother,mainlyduetothetrade
relationshiptheyheldwithIranianoilbeingusedinaAmericanandAmericanmilitary
supportinIran.However,hedoesnotmentionspecificallythecovertactionstheCIAhad
plannedforIranandMossadeq,whichwereonlylaterunveiledin2012.Ithelpswiththe
legacyinIranargument,showinghowthesituationwashandledinthecountryafter
Mossadeqwasoverthrown.
Eisenhower,DwightD."PresidentEisenhower'sFinalReplytoPremierMossadegh."Letterto
MohammedMossadeq.29June1953.TheMossadeghProject.MohammedMossadegh,
n.d.Web.4Jan.2015.NearlyamonthafterreceivingMossadeq'spleafordomestichelp
inIran,Eisenhower'sreplyisfranklycurt.HeputstheblameonIran'sinabilitytowork
withtheBritishinsteadofproposingwaysinwhichtheUnitedStatescouldhelp.Thisis
becausehehadalreadygiventheDullesbrothersthegoaheadtocarryouttheIranian
coup.ThiscorrespondenceshowshowlittleEisenhowerknewaboutIranoutsideofwhat
theDullesbrothershadtoldhim.Ithelpsshowthemisguidedleadership,andinformation
andcommunication,becauseEisenhowerwaswillingtoalienateMossadeqattheorder
oftheDullesbrothers,withoutbotheringtolearnanythingofthesituationhimself.
Eisenhower,DwightD."CorrespondencetoPremierMossadegh."Letterto
MohammedMossadeq.26Feb.1953.TheMossadeghProject.MohammedMossadegh,
n.d.Web.4Jan.2015.InEisenhower'scordialresponsehesayshewilltakeMossadeq's

viewsintoconsideration.Thisisinterestingbecauseatthistime,hewasawarethatthe
DullesbrotherswantedtooverthrowMossadeq.Thisbehaviorwas,frankly,blatantly
dishonestandareflectionoftheDullesbrotherspowerfulinfluencesoverEisenhower.
Inaddition,itshowstheAmericangovernmentswillingnesstosayonethinganddo
another,inthiscasemisleadingMossadeqwhileplanningtodeposehim.Thissource
Excised."AntiTudehActivitiesofZahediGovernment."CIAMemo.10Sept.1953.Web.2Jan.
2015.Thisprimarysourcedocument,obtainedbytheNationalSecurityArchivethrough
theFreedomofInformationAct,isaCIAmemoregardingtheantiCommunistactionsof
theZahedigovernmentinstalledbytheCIA.WrittenbytheActingChiefoftheCIA's
divisionofNearEastandAfrica,thememodiscussestheZahedigovernment'splanto
haveanationalcrackdownontheTudehpartyinIran.Thismemoisextremelyrelevant
toourargumentbecauseitshowstheintentionsoftheCIAthroughZahedi.TheCIA's
ultimategoalandconcerninthecoupwasthepresenceofthecommunistTudehparty
andtheirallegedgainingofpowerandinfluence.Assuch,theirfirstgoaluponinstalling
theirhandselectednewleaderofIranwastoremovethecommunistthreat.Thisis
indicativeoftheDullesbrothers'leadershipgoalsofdestroyingcommunism,andofthe
legacyofanticommunismthattheirleadershipcreated.
Gaddis,JohnLewis.TheUnitedStatesandtheOriginsoftheColdWar,19411947.NewYork:
ColumbiaUP,1972.Print.ThissourcedirectlyfromtheColdWarerawaskeyinhelping
developaconnectionbetweenthecoldwarandtheIraniancoup.Thisbooktooka
worldlyviewwhenexplainingeverythingthathadhappened,andhowtheworld
surroundingaffectedthecoldwar.Thisbookwentindepthintoexplainingevery
countriespartandcontributiontotheeventsthatleduptothecoldwar.Thisbookalso
goesbeyondandbrieflyexplainshowthearmsracehasledtoaviolentsocietytoday
obsessedwithstaying"safe"fromtheenemy.
Golestan,Erahim."ErahimGolestanDescribes28MoradCoup."Interview.TheMossadegh
Project.BBCPersian.England,n.d.Radio.Thisisaveryinterestingfirsthandaccountof
whatitwaslikeonthegroundduringthecoup.Itwillhelpuswithfiguringoutwhatthe
dayofthecoupwaslikeandhowtheDulles'actionshadanaffectonaveragepeoplein
Iran.Inparticular,thissourcedescribestheviolencebehindthecoup,andtheseemingly
obviousoutsideinfluencesthatwereaffectingtherevolution.Golestanbelievesinthe
goodintentionsofMossadeqasarepresentativeofthepeopleofIranandasastaunch
supporterofdemocracy,demonstratingthepositivepublicopinionthatthepublicheldof
MossadeqandthehypocrisywithwhichthepeopleofIranlaterviewedtheUnitedStates.
Haines,GeraldK.CIAandGuatemalaAssassinationProposals,19521954.Rep.N.p.:n.p.,n.d.

NationalSecurityArchive.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.Web.6Jan.2015.Inareport
totheCIA,analystG.K.Hainesgivesafairlyobjectiveandfactbaseddescriptionofthe
1954Guatemalancoup,whichwasthesecondCIAsponsoreddepositionofaforeign
government.Itprovidedaveryclearanalysisofthisevent,whichwasusefulin
improvingourunderstandingofthelegacyoftheIraniancoupinCIAforeignaffairs.
"InterviewwithRezaShahPahlavi."InterviewbyGerardDeVilliers.TheImperialShah.N.p.,
1975.15Nov.2014.Thisbrief,measuredinterviewofRezaShahPahlavishowssomeof
theShah'spublicopinionsofhisregime,andhisignoranceofthegeneralstateofhis
nation.Essentially,hehadneglectedhisdutiesasleaderduringhistenureasShahandas
aresultlosttouchwiththeneedsofhispeople,whoatthetimewerebeginningto
becomerestlesswithSAVAK'stightcontroloverthepopulationandtheShah'sinability
toimprovethesituation.TheShahseemedtobelievethattheoverallpopulationwas
relativelysubmissivetohispsychologicalpressures.
Jefferson,Thomas."Correspondence."LettertoMarquisDeLafayette.2Apr.1790.MS.New
York,NewYork.InapersonallettertotheMarquisdeLafayette,FoundingFather
ThomasJeffersonexplainshisgoalsforthenewAmericangovernment.Inparticular,he
statesthattheultimategoalofagovernmentistofaithfullysupportthevaluesupon
whichitwasfounded.InthecaseoftheUnitedStates,hemeansthatdemocracyshould
betheendgoalofallofthenewgovernment'sengagements,andthattheyshouldbe
honorableintheirpursuitsregardlessofcircumstances.
Killian,JamesR.,WilliamO.Baker,ClarkClifford,JamesH.Doolittle,GordonGray,EdwinH.
Land,WilliamL.Langer,RobertD.Murphy,andMaxwellTaylor.ForeignIntelligence
AdvisoryBoardReporttothePresident.Rep.Comp.J.PatrickCoyne.N.p.:n.p.,1956.
Print.ThisreportbytheForeignIntelligenceAdvisoryBoardisacompletedescriptionof
theCIA'slacklusterprocessesforapprovingpolicyprocedure(PP)actions,including
theIraniancoup.Inthemostbasicterms,therewasnoapparentevidenceofanysortof
checksonthepoweroftheCIA,whichwasabletoundertakeimpulsiveoperationswith
poorplanningandevaluationofpotentialconsequences.Theauthorsexpress"concern"
fortheweakornonexistentsystemsinplaceforqualitycontrolintheCIA,whichwere
forthemostpartinformalandproforma.
Kirkpatrick,LymanB.KirkpatrickReport.Rep.NationalSecurityArchive,14Apr.2011.
Web.10Nov.2014.TheKirkpatrickreportisacomprehensiveinternalCIAstudy
detailingtheAgency'sroleinBayofPigsInvasion.Itconcludesthat,essentially,theCIA
wasextremelydisorganizedandillpreparedtohandleanoperationofthescaleofthe
invasion.InamirroroftheBruceLovettandCoynereportsfollowingtheIraniancoup,

thisreportisextremelycriticaloftheoverallCIAexecution,andstatesthatitis
imperativetofixthesefundamentalshortfallswithintheAgency.Inparticular,itstates
thattherewerenomeasuresinplacetochecktheviabilityofsuchoperations,which
seemedtorunoutofcontrolontheideasoftheleadership,leadingtotheblameonand
eventualresignationofAllenDullesasDirector.
Koch,ScottA."Zendebad,Shah!":TheCentralIntelligenceAgencyandtheFallofIranian
PrimeMinisterMohammedMossadeq,August1953"N.d.TS,NationalSecurityArchive
ElectronicBriefingBookNo.435.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.TheNationalSecurity
Archive.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,19Aug.2013.Web.18Dec.2014.This
declassifiedCIAdocumentisthemostrecentlyreleasedinternalhistoryofthe1953
IraniancoupbyaCIAhistorian.Althoughheavilyexcised,itprovidesavaluable
perspectiveofthecoupfromsomeonewhowitnessedtheeventbuthadnodirectstakein
it.Basically,Kochgivesaplainsummaryofthecoupanditsaftermath.Incomparisonto
otherCIAdocuments,itismuchlessextremeinitsopinions,suggestingthatthepeople
behindthecoupwereslightlybiasedanddidnotnecessarilyhaveaccurateinformationor
opinions.
"MarshallPlan(1947)."WorldHistory:TheModernEra.ABCCLIO,2015.Web.6Jan.2015.
Thisprimarysourcedocument,aspeechbySecretaryofStateGeorgeMarshall,isthe
speechthatannouncedtheMarshallPlan,whichwasacrucialpieceoftheUnitedStates'
postWorldWarIIforeignpolicy.MarshallspeaksofthedireneedfortheUnitedStates
tohelprebuildthedemocraciesofEurope.Thisshowshowatthetime,Americanforeign
policywasmorecenteredaroundprotectingandpromotingdemocracythanactively
fightingCommunism.WhilethisisduetothefactthattheColdWarwasnotinfull
swing,thisisalsoindicativeofhowtheDullesbrothers'influencemanagedtochangethe
verybasisofAmericanforeignpolicy.ThelegacyoftheirleadershipliesinhowAmerica
shiftedfrompoliciesliketheMarshallPlantomoreactiveantiCommunistones.
Mossadeq,Mohammed."Mossadegh'sMessagetoPresidentEisenhower."LettertoDwightD.
Eisenhower.7Jan.1953.N.p.:n.p.,n.d.N.pag.TheMossadeghProject.Mohammed
Mossadegh.Web.4Jan.2015.InthisdirectcorrespondencetoPresidentEisenhower,
MossadeqrequestshelptheEisenhoweradministrationdemocraticgrowthinIran.This
showsthatMossadeqgenuinelybelievedindemocracy,askingforhelpfromtheUnited
Statesgovernment,despitewishingtostayneutralintheColdWarcapitalismvs.
communismconflict.ItsupportsourargumentforthelegacyregardingtheUnitedState's
ColdWarideology,inthatitshowsthattheUnitedStateswaswillingtobendorbreak
someofitsvaluesregardingdemocracyandfreedominordertostompoutwhatit
perceivedascommunismaroundtheworld.

Mossadeq,Mohammed."Mossadegh'sSecondMessagetoPresidentEisenhower."Letterto
DwightD.Eisenhower.28May1953.TheMossadeghProject.MohammedMossadegh,
n.d.Web.4Jan.2015.Inthisletter,Mossadeqisspecificallyoutliningthetroublesheis
havinginIrantoEisenhower.HetellsEisenhoweraboutthelowstandardoflivingofthe
IranianpeopleandasksforassistancewiththeBritishgovernmentbecauseMossadeqis
wishingtonationalizeoil.WhatMossadeqdoesn'trealizeisthattheplanningforthe
coupisalreadyunderway.
"Mossadeq'sSpyService."N.d.TS,NationalSecurityArchiveElectronicBriefingBookNo.
435.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.TheNationalSecurityArchive.GeorgeWashington
University,19Aug.2013.Web.20Dec.2014.ThisinternalCIApropagandapiece
illustratesclearlytheCIAperspectiveonMossadeq'sleadershipintheIranian
government.Accordingtotheauthor,Mossadeqisacorruptdictatorandrunsa
widespreadspysysteminordertocrushallinternalopposition.Theauthorcontinuesto
claimthatMossadeqheldstrongtieswiththeTudehandMoscow,andexpressesadesire
tobreakthosetiesandchangetheleadershipsituationinIran.
Naftali,Timothy,GeorgeEliades,FrancisGavin,ErinMahan,JonathanRosenberg,David
Shreve,PatriciaDunn,PhilipZelikow,andErnestMay,eds.TheGreatCrises,Volume
One.Rep.NationalSecurityArchive,2Apr.2014.Web.6Jan.2015.Thiscompilationof
PresidentJohnF.Kennedy'scorrespondencesincludesasectionregardingtheBrazilian
coupof1964,anotherCIAbackedoperation.Basically,ithelpedusunderstandthe
backgroundoftheBraziliancoup,whichwasadirect"descendant"oftheoperation
TPAJAXin1953.Especiallyusefulwasapassagedescribingingeneraltheeffectsofthe
coup,supportingourargumentforthelegacyofthe1953operation.
NationalSecurityArchive.Rep.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,11Dec.2011.Web.04Jan.
2015.InareportmadeduringtheVietnamcoup,theStateDepartmentdescribesthe
atrocitiescommittedbythevariouspartiesinvolvedduringtheevent.Thissourcewas
mainlyusefulforoutliningtheSouthVietnamcoup,improvingourunderstandingofthe
insidiouslegacythattheprecedentoftheIraniancoupleftin1953.Additionally,it
providedveryspecificstatementsthatwouldbehelpfulinexplainingtheimpactofthe
eventinthelongrun.
Nixon,Richard."RichardNixononthe1953CoupinIran."Interview.CSPAN.CSPAN,2014.
Web.29Dec.2014.Interestingly,thisvideointerviewisfrom1991andRichardNixon,
theVicePresidentunderEisenhower,admitsEisenhower'sroleintheoverthrowof
Mossadeqinararebreachofconfidentiality.HealsodefendsEisenhower'scontroversial

decisiontocontinuewiththecoup,despitetheobviousroleitplayedintheRevolution
justadecadeearlierandtheturmoiliscreatedwithinIranandforUSIranianrelations.
Obama,Barack."REMARKSBYTHEPRESIDENTONANEWBEGINNING."Cairo
University,Cairo,Egypt.4June2009.TheWhiteHouse.Web.4Jan.2015.Thisaddress
byPresidentBarackObamainEgyptspeaksofathawingofrelationsbetweentheUnited
StatesandMiddlesEasternnations,followingtheirturbulenthistory.PresidentObama
statesthattheAmericangovernmentwishestonormalizetherelationshipsbetweentheir
nations,afteradecadeslonghiatus.ThisshowsusthatonlynowaretiesbetweentheUS
andtheMiddleEast,specificallyIran,beinghealed,followingthecoupandthe
subsequentrevolution,duetothebrashdecisionsoftheDullesbrothers.
Pahlavi,Shah."INTERVIEWWITHTHESHAHOFIRAN1977."InterviewbyBarbara
Walters.YouTube.ABC,1977.Web.29Dec.2014.InterestingtoseetheShah"in
person."ThemostelucidatingpartwaswhentheShahisaskedifIranisgettingmoney
fromtheCIAand,andhebrazenlylies,statingthatIranisnotbeingfundedbytheUnited
States.ThishelpedusunderstandtherelationshipbetweenIranandtheUnitedStates
undertheShah,whichwasstillclandestineatthetime.Basically,welearnedthatthe
ShahwasstillastaunchsupporteroftheWestevenrightbeforehisdeposition,inreturn
forbeingplacedintopower,withhisunwillingnesstosellouthisallies.
Roosevelt,FranklinD."ArsenalofDemocracy"RadioAddressDeliveredbyPresident
Roosevelt,1940.RadioAddress,WashingtonDC.Address.Thissourceisaradioaddress
givenbyPresidentFranklinD.Rooseveltin1940abouthowtheUnitedStatesmustbean
"arsenalofdemocracy."RooseveltstatesthattheUnitedStatesmustaiddemocracyin
WorldWarIIby"bysendingeveryounceandeverytonofmunitionsandsuppliesthat
wecanpossiblysparetohelpthedefenderswhoareinthefrontlines."Thissourceis
extremelyusefulandrelevantbecauseitisindicativeofthepredominantideaof
prodemocracyinUnitedStatesforeignpolicypriortotheDullesbrothers,asopposedto
thelaterzeitgeistofanticommunism.Bypresentingtheblatantdifferencesinforeign
policygoalsbeforetheadventoftheDullesbrothers'decisions,thisspeechshowsthe
legacyoftheDullesbrothers'leadershipchoices.
Roosevelt,Kermit."CIA,MemofromKermitRooseveltto[Excised],July16,1953."(1953):n.
pag.TheNationalSecurityArchive(GeorgeWashingtonUniversity).CIA.Web.28Sept.
2014.ThisisaletterwrittenbyKermitRoosevelttoananonymousgovernmentofficial.It
wasdeclassifiedin2011,alongwithacollectionofotherlettersfromRoosevelt.Itisa
primarysource,andthereforegivesexactinsightintotheplanningprocessbehindthecoup.
Althoughthetypedletterisshort,itshowssomeleadershiponbehalfofKermitRoosevelt,

intheformofsimplyplanning,yetitalsoshowsalackofleadershipinthattheBritishand
AmericanintelligenceagenciesarehavingtroublepersuadingZaheditobethenextrulerof
Iran.
Roosevelt,Kermit.Countercoup:TheStrugglefortheControlofIran.NewYork:
McGrawHill,1979.Mohsen.1.banan.byname.net.Web.13Oct.2014.Roosevelt'sbook,
althoughpartiallycensored,providesanindepthlookathisperspectiveoftheevent,the
planningoftheevent,andhowtheycarrieditout.Partsofitaresimplyapersonalnarrative
andunhelpful,butthereareextremelyhelpfulsectionsthatdetailtheplanningprocess.
Throughwhatwehavealreadydeducedpertainingtothelackofleadership,thereisa
slightundertoneofconfusion,somesmallthingsthatdidn'tgoaccordingtoplan,evenin
thebookthathasbeenwrittensuchthatthesethingsaren'tonthesurface.Thissource
helpeddeterminewherethingswentwronginthecoup,asadirectresultoflackof
leadership.
StateDepartment.USIranianFriendship.MossadeghProject.N.p.,9May2014.Web.15Nov.
2014.ThisstatementissuedbyJohnFosterDullesimmediatelyfollowingthecoupoutlines
hishopesfortheUSIranianrelationship.Asheputsit,hehopesthattheywillbeableto
dobusinesswithIranasamembersofthe"familyoffreenations."Thishelpsshowthat
eventhoughDulleswasbeingdishonestaboutUSinvolvementinthecoup,hemaystill
havebeentrulyinterestedinsupportingIranagainstSovietinfluences,offeringsubstantial
amountsofemergencyaidinresponseto"recentCommunistabetteddisorders"inIran,
andhailingtheIranianambassadortotheUnitedStateswithgenuinerespect.
"SupremeCourtJusticeWilliamO.DouglasonMossadeghinIran."SupremeCourtJustice
WilliamO.DouglasonMossadeghinIran.TheMossadeghProject,n.d.Web.04Jan.
2015.ThisisacompilationofmanyprimarysourcesfromWilliamO.Douglaswhowasa
greatadmirerofMossadeq.Inaprevioussecondarysource,StephenKinzer'sbook,we
founditmentionedthatDouglaswasabigcriticoftheDullesbrothers.Becauseofthis,his
isainterestingperspectivebecausehewasoneoftheDulles'onlycontemporarieswho
wouldprobablyagreewithourargumentthattheDulles'didmoreharmthangood.
"TheSourcesofSovietConduct."ForeignAffairs.4Jan.2015.Web.4Jan.2015.
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23331/x/thesourcesofsovietconduct>.TheX
ArticlewaswrittenbyGeorgeF.Kennan,oneofthemostpowerfulvoicesinAmerican
foreignpolicyduringtheColdWar.Inthisarticle,Kennanoutlinesthetheoryof
containment,astrategytopatientlybutfirmlycontainSovietexpansionaroundtheworld.
ThisisincontrasttoJohnFosterDullessstrategyofrollback,thestrategytopushback
Sovietinfluences.Kennanessentiallyadvocatesforaslowbutsureprodemocracypolicy

thatwilleventuallybeabletoweardownthecommunistswithhelpfromtheinternal
issuestheUSSRfacesonitsown.
Townley,Michael.NationalSecurityArchive.Rep.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,11Sept.
1973.Web.6Jan.2015.ThisDINAreporttotheStateDepartmentcoverstheCIArun
coupinChilein1973,whichwasrunbythesameleadershipastheoriginalcoupin1953
AllenDulles.ThereportwasmostusefulinexplainingtheChileanoperation,and
provideduswithelucidatingquotesaboutthelegacyoftheChileancoupandhowitwas
affectedbytheCIAspoliciesformedduringthe1953operationinIran.
Truman,HarryS."RecommendationofAssistancetoGreeceandTurkey."Addressofthe
PresidentoftheUnitedStates.80thCongress1stSession,WashingtonDC.12Mar.1947.
TrumanLibrary.Web.2Jan.2015.ThisaddressbyPresidentTrumanistheaddressin
whichheannouncedthepolicyoftheTrumanDoctrine.WiththeTrumanDoctrine,
TrumanestablishedthattheUnitedStateswould"supportfreepeoplewhoareresisting
attemptedsubjugationbyarmedminoritiesorbyoutsidepressures."Itisindicativeof
America'sforeignpolicyatthetime,onethatostensiblypledgedtohelpdemocracybutin
actualitywasintendedtocombatcommunism.Thisprimarysourceisrelevantbecauseit
providesinformationaboutthegoalsofAmerica'sforeignpolicypriortotheDulles
brothers.Basedonthatinformation,itappearsthattheDullesbrotherswerenotthesole
forceintransitioningAmerica'sforeignpolicyfromoneofprodemocracytooneof
anticommunism.Instead,thelegacyoftheiractionsinAmericanforeignpolicywere
likelyanextensionofaprevailingAmericanzeitgeist.
UnitedStatesofAmerica.CentralIntelligenceAgency.ClandestineServicesHistory.Overthrow
ofPremierMossadeqofIran:November1952August1953.ByDonaldN.Wilber.
N.p.:n.p.,n.d.Print.Thisservicehistoryofthe1953Iraniancoup,knownastheWilber
reports,provideacompletehistoryoftheCIAsactionsinIran,andthusitisoneofthe
mostusefulandrelevantsourcesonthetopic.Whilesomenamesanddetailswerealtered
andexcisedbytheCIA,allofthevitalinformationisaccurateandintact.Thesource
delvesintodetailsabouttheimpetusforthecoup,thereasoningbehinddecisionsthat
weremade,thesituationinIran,andotherimportantaspectsofthecoup.Most
importantly,itrevealstheimpulsiveandmisguidedactionsoftheCIAduringthecoup.
ThereasoningbehindmanyoftheactionsdepictedinWilbersreportareflawed,andthe
leadershipquestionable.Thisisadirecteffectofaglaringlackofleadershipatthetopof
thechainofcommand:theDullesbrothers.Asawhole,theWilbertreportshowsthe

legacyofthemisguidedleadershipoftheDullesbrothers,whichwasextremelyvitalin
supportingourargumentandaidingourresearch.
Wilson,Woodrow.JointAddresstoCongressLeadingtoaDeclarationofWarAgainstGermany
(1917).UnitedStatesCongress,WashingtonDC.Thissourceisanaddressfrom
WoodrowWilsontoCongressdiscussingtheUnitedStates'declarationofwaragainst
GermanyduringWorldWarI.WoodrowWilsonemphasizestheimportanceof
protectingdemocracyintheglobalscale.Hisjustificationfordeclaringwaragainst
Germanyisthatitsactionsinthewararethreateningtheveryexistenceofdemocracy,so
itisthedutyoftheUnitedStatestonotonlyprotectdemocracyfortheirownbenefit,but
fortheentireworld's.ThissourcespecificallyshowstheprimaryideainUnitedStates
foreignpolicyatthetime:protectingandspreadingdemocracy.Thisstandsinstrong
contrastwithitsgoalsaftertheriseoftheDullesbrothers,wheretheyshiftedfrombeing
prodemocracytoanticommunism.Assuch,thissourceemphasizesthelegacyofthe
Dullesbrothers'leadershipdecisionsthatchangedthegoalsofUnitedStatesforeign
policy.
Wisner,Frank."Memorandum."N.d.TS,NationalSecurityArchiveElectronicBriefingBook
No.435.GeorgeWashingtonUniversity.NationalSecurityArchive.GeorgeWashington
University,19Aug.2013.Web.15Dec.2014.ThismemofromFrankWisner,oneofthe
plannersofOperationAJAX,isrecommendingacommendationforoneoftheother
participantsintheoperation,evenafterevidenceappearsthattheShahhasbegunto
implementhisbrutalregimeofoppression.ThisprimarysourceshowsthattheCIA
lackedanyforesightorevenadesiretomonitorthesituationinIranafterthecoup,
despitetheShah'sactionsinthecountry.
SecondarySources(107)
Abrahamian,Ervand,MichaelBarkan,ChristopherEn,JakeHernandez,AveryKaplan,and
JustinYannix."ErvandAbrahamianInterview."Telephoneinterview.7Jan.2015.We
werefortunateenoughtoarrangeaninterviewwithnotedIranexpertandMiddleEast
professorErvandAbrahamian.Hewasextremelyhelpfulingivingusinfoabout
AmericanmotivesbehindthecoupandtheleadershipbehindtheAmericansideofthe
coup,amongothertopics.Inparticular,heexplainedhowtheDulleses'preconceived
ideasledthemignoreother'sideas,evenfiringsomewhoexpressedcontradictory
opinions.TheinformationhegaveuspaintedaclearerpictureoftheDullesbrothers'
leadershipandgaveusabetterideaofthelegacyoftheiractions.

Abrahamian,Ervand."The1953CoupinIran."ScienceandSociety65.2(2001):182215.
JSTOR.Web.11Sept.2014.ThisbookbyErvandAbrahamian,anIranianhistorian,
helpeddescribetheIraniancoupdetailbydetail.Withinhisbookhegoesdeepintodetail
abouthowthecoupwasfabricated,andhowthemindsetsoftheleadersgreatlychanged
thesuccessofthecoup.Thisbooktalkedaboutthebrothersinvolvedinthecoup,andhow
theiraggressivedominationofthepeacetalksledtoanunsuccessfulcoupandadestructive
andlonglastinglegacy.
Abrahamian,Ervand.TheCoup:1953,theCIA,andtheRootsofModernU.S.Iranian
Relations.NewYork:TheNewPress,2013.Print.ErvandAbrahamianisahistorianofthe
MiddleEastspecializinginmodernIran,andaprofessoratBaruchCollegeoftheCity
UniversityofNewYorksystem.Thisbookprovidesextensiveandspecificdetailsabout
everythinginvolvingthecoup,includingCIAinvolvementandthelegacy.Abrahamian
discussesextensivelytheroleoftheCIA.AbrahamianarguesthattheUnitedStateswas
motivatedtosendtheCIAintoIrannotduetothethreatofcommunism,butduetotheiroil
interests.Thisdiffersfromtheargumentofthemajorityofotherhistorianswhoarguethat
communismwastheprimarymotive.ThisdrawsintoquestionwhatexactlytheCIAhoped
toachieveinIran.Whilethatremainsrelativelyunclear,thelegacyofitsactionsdonot.
SimilartowhathasbeenstatedbyotherpreeminentexpertsonIran,likeStephenKinzer,
AbrahamianstatesthatthecoupledtoeventsliketheIslamicRevolutionandtheriseof
extremistIslam.WhilethelegacyoftheCIA'sactionsareclear,theactionsthemselvesare
extremelyquestionableandmysterious,whichislikelyindicativeofalackofleadership.
Abrahamian,Ervand.FeathermanDistinguishedLectureonHumanities:The1953IranianCoup
Revisitedin2012.UniversityofNewEngland.24Oct.2012.Lecture.InalectureatUNE,
ErvandAbrahamiandetailsthecoupandarguesthatitwasmotivatedbyUSandBritishoil
interests.Abrahamian,ahistorianatCUNY,claimsthattheAmericanswantedcontinued
easyaccesstoIranianoil,insteadoftheoriginalbeliefthattheywereafraidofa
Communistcoupinthenation.HecontinuestoshowthattheTudehwerenotcapableofa
coup,despiteearlieropinions.Also,Abrahamianstatesthatbyfirstattemptingtoinstall
QavamintheplaceofMossadeq,andfailing,theygaveMossadeqmorelegitimacyand
popularsupportasatruenationalist.Heconcludeswiththelegacyofthecoupinthe
moderndaynuclearissue,sayingthattheWesternimperialisttendenciesoriginatingfrom
thecoupcontinuetoaffectUSIranianrelations,withtheUStryingtoconstrainIran.
Ali,Tariq."OperationIranianFreedom:Iran'sBriefExperimentwithDemocracyCametoa
TragicEnd,CourtesyofWashington."Nation18Aug.2003:37.StudentEdition.Web.21
Sept.2014.
<http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE|A106337103&v=2.1&u=mlin_m_bedhigh&it=

r&p=STOM&sw=w&asid=acc6ad41cdecb0c8625fc2faecd8cde0>.Acommon
misconceptionabouttheMiddleEastisthatithashasoneoppressiverulerafteranotherfor
thousandsofyears.Thisisnotthecase,thisarticlediscussesthetimeswhenIrantriedfor
democracy,mostnotablyunderMohammedMossadeq.Thisarticle,writtenbyan
establishedjournalists,isaboutStephenKinzer'sproMossadeqbook.Itprovidesmore
contexttosupporttheclaimthatAmericaandBritainroyallymessedupIranforthenext
50yearsbyoverthrowingMossadeq.
Amini,Fariba."FaribaAmini."Telephoneinterview.14Dec.2014.FaribaAminiisanIranian
journalistandalsothedaughterofMossadeq'spersonallawyerwhowasveryclosewith
Mossadeqinthefinalyearsofhislife.AminiprovidedanIranianperspectivetowardsthe
coupandexplainedheropiniontousthat,ratherthantheleadershipoftheDullesbrothers
beingardentlyanticommunist,itwasantinationalist.Shesaidthatmanyoftheleaders
weredrivenbymonetarygain.Also,shehadaveryidealogicalviewofMossadeqasaman
whotrulyloveddemocracy.Thisistrue,Mossadeqwasanidealistwhichmakesthelegacy
ofthecoupthatmuchmorecrushing.
Bahrampour,Tara."PatriotofPersia:AReview."WashingtonPost21July2012:n.pag.Print.
TaraBahrampour'sreviewofChristopherdeBellaigue'sbookprovidesbothaninsightful
summaryofhisviews,aswellasanexcellentoverviewofthelegacyofthe1953coup.
BahrampourgivesanexcellentsummaryofMossadeqslifepreceedingthecoup,including
hisbackground,andthereforethisservesasanexcellentbroadcontextsource,aswellasa
helpfulreview.BothBahrampourandBellaigueoffersympatheticviewstowards
Mossadeq,andseemhimasavisionarywhohadsomuchtoofferhiscountrybeforehe
wastragicallyremovedfrompower,andreplacedbyAmericaspuppet.Thissourcehelps
withthelegacyargument,bydescribinganIranthathadmaintainedMossadeqinpower,as
anillustrious,modernizedcountry.
Bamberg,JamesH."Mossadeq'sOverthrow,August1953."TheHistoryofTheBritish
PetroleumCompany.Vol.II.Cambridge:CambridgeUP,1994.48890.Print.Inthisbook
aboutwhatisnowBP,BambergexplainshowBPwasn'ttherootofalltheproblemsinthe
middleeasttoday,itwasmerelyacatalystfortheBritishandU.S.governmentstooust
communisminthemiddleeast.ThischapterfocusedonexplaininghowMussadiq's
decisiontobeuncompromisingwastherootofexistingproblemstoday,thattheU.S.and
britswereunwillingtomakeanotheroilcompromise.Bambergalsostatesbecause
Mussadiqwasn'twillingtoshareontheoilfront,thepoliticalreasoningbehindthecoup
wasnaughtbutasimpleexcuseforwantingtheoil.

Behrooz,Mazaria."TudehFactionalismandthe1953CoupinIran."InternationalJournalof
MiddleEastStudies33.3(2001):36382.JSTOR.Web.28Sept.2014.Throughoutour
researchwehavebeentryingtodeterminehowmuchofathreatcommunismreallywasin
Iran.ThisarticlewashelpfulinexplainingtheTudehrelationshipwithMossadeqandhow
complexitwas.Accordingtotheauthor,therealquestionwasnothowmuchofathreat
communismposed,butratherwhytheTudehpartydidnotactivelytrytointerferewiththe
coupandchangethelegacy.Theanswer,accordingtotheauthor,isthattheTudeh
leadershipwastofragmentedandindecisive.
Behrooz,Maziar."TudehFactionalismandthe1953CoupinIran."InternationalJournalof
MiddleEastStudies33.3(2001):36382.JSTOR.Web.05Oct.2014.Inthisjournal,
MaziarBehroozprovidesanoverviewofthelongtermlegacyofthe1953coup,mainly
concerningtheCommunistTudehparty.Behrooz,aprofessorofhistoryatSFSU,connects
thecouptothedownfalloftheTudehparty,andexplainsthattheywereneverableto
recoverduetothetimingofthecoupinalongsideaperiodofintrapartyfactionalism.
Additionally,hestatesthatthecoupisatleastpartiallyresponsibleforthe1979revolution
inIran,thetensionsincurrentUSIranrelations,andthearresteddevelopmentofIran's
nationalindependence,withtheinstitutionoftheShahhaltingconstitutionalprocessesand
themovetowardnationalistleadership.
Bezhan,Frud."AftershocksofIran's1953CoupStillFeltaroundtheWorld,60YearsLater."
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty.BroadcastingBoardofGovernors,15Aug.2013.Web.
3Oct.2014.Bezhan,anestablishedinvestigativejournalistwhospecializesinIran,details
thelegacyofthecoupinthepresentday.Citingvarioussources,hesaysthatthecoupwas
detrimentaltoWashington'sstandinginIran,andinthelongrunpavedthewayfora
powerfulantiAmericanregimetocometopower.Itallowedtwooppositiongroups,
radicalIslamistsandradicalleftists,torisetoprominenceinthewakeoftheShah.Also,
the"success"ofthecoupencouragedtheCIAtousesimilartacticsinothernationssuchas
Guatemala,leadingtostronglegaciesaroundtheglobe.
Bezhan,Frud."AftershocksOfIran's1953CoupStillFeltAroundTheWorld,60YearsLater."
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty.N.p.,n.d.Web.28Sept.2014.Althoughthisarticlewas
publishedbyRadioFreeEurope,amediaoutletinitiallystartedbytheCIAasasourceof
propaganda,itgaveinsightintothelegacyofthecoup.Forexample,inIranundertheShah
allpoliticalpartieswereoppressedwhich"pavedthewayfortwopoliticaltrendsradical
IslamistsledbyAyatollahRuhollahKhomeiniandradicalleftistsintheformofthe
militantMujahedineKhalq."TherepercussionsofthecouparestillfeltinIranian
animosityanddistrustoftheUnitedStates.

Bill,JamesA.TheEagleandtheLion:TheTragedyofAmericanIranianRelations.New
Haven:YaleUP,1988.Print.Thissourcewasfoundafteritwasmentionedas"required
reading"onUSIranianrelationsbyanotherjournalist.ItisanindepthhistoryofIranfrom
theendofWWIItothe1980'sanditexploreshowtheUSandIranwentfrombeingbest
friendstobitterenemies.ItalsoisverycriticalofAmericaninvolvementinthe1953coup.
JamesA.BillisacelebratedauthorityofIranianhistoryandapossibleinterviewcandidate
forlateroninourproject.
Blake,Kristen.TheUSSovietConfrontationinIran,19451962.Lanham:UofAmerica,2009.
Print.AuthorKristenBlakeisaprofessoratMolloyCollegeandanexpertontheColdWar
intheNearEast.Inhervolume,Blakecoversthepoliticalandeconomicdevelopmentsin
IraninthecontextoftheColdWarinahighlycomprehensivemanner,includingtheoil
nationalizationcrisisof1952.Takingapostrevisioniststance,shearguesthatthecoupwas
causedprimarilybyUSSovietrivalries,althoughherfocusremainsontheoriginsand
impactsoftheUSUKSovietrivalriesintheregion.Ultimately,thissourcedhelpedputthe
coupinthecontextoftheColdWar,andgaveinsightintothelongtermeffectsofthe
conflicts.
Blum,William.KillingHope:USMilitaryandCIAInterventionssinceWorldWarII.London:
Zed,2003.Print.Inthisbook,authorWilliamBlum,whoisahistorian,notedforeign
policycritic,andformeremployeeoftheStateDepartment,discussestheCIA'shistoryof
foreigninterventions,withonesectiondevotedtothe1953IranianCoup.Ofparticular
interestishowmuchofamesstheentireUnitedStatesoperationinIranwas.Inresponse
toaStateDepartmentreportthatessentiallystatedthattheTudehPartywasnotathreat,
KermitRoosevelt,theleaderofMiddleEastoperationsoftheCIA,said"Idon'tknowwhat
tomakeofthat...[aUSambassadortoIranin1953]thoughtthattherewasaseriousdanger
thatMossadeghwasgoingto,ineffect,placeIranunderSovietdomination."Thisshows
thelackofcommunicationandleadershipontheAmericansidetheleaderofoperations
didn'tevenknowthepurposeofwhathewasdoing.Ofcourse,lackofleadershipleadstoa
negativelegacy,whichisexactlywhathappenedinIran.TheIranianpeoplewereforcedto
endureanoppressivereignundertheShahandhisbrutalSAVAKpoliceforce.This
createdtheantiU.S.sentimentthatlikelycontributedtotheriseofradicalIslaminIran.
Blum,William."Iran1953:MakingItSafefortheKingofKings."KillingHope:U.S.Military
andCIAInterventionssinceWorldWarII.Monroe,Me.:CommonCourage,1995.6472.
Print.ThisbookisverycriticaloftheCIAandgaveafactualaccountofwhathappened
duringandafterthecoup,juxtaposedagainstwhatKermitRooseveltandotherCIA
insiderssaidhappened.ItshowshowunpreparedanduninformedtheCIAleadershipwas
inexamplessuchasquotesabouttheTudehthreatthatneveractuallygivespecific

examples.ItalsoshowshowunpreparedKermitRoosevelt,thedefactoleaderinthe
MiddleEast,was.Forexample,hehiredthetwokeyIranianagentsthedaybeforethe
coup.
Byrne,Malcolm."MalcolmByrneInterview."Telephoneinterview.7Jan.2015.Malcolm
Byrne,deputydirectoroftheNationalSecurityArchive,wasfortunatelywillingtotalkto
usoverthephoneandanswerafewofourquestions.Alargenumberofourprimary
sourcescamefromhiswebsiteatGeorgeWashingtonUniversitythatheandtheNational
SecurityArchiveobtainedfromtheCIAthroughtheFreedomofInformationAct.Hewas
helpfulingivingusmoreinformationabouttheCIA,specificallythebureaucracythat
preventedlowerlevelspecialistsfromvoicingtheirconcernsregardingtheoperation.
Unfortunately,weweren'tabletospeakwithhimaslongaswehadhopedto,andwedid
notgetmuchinformationabouttheDullesbrothersfromhim,butoverallhisinterviewwas
stillveryhelpfulinassistingourresearch.
Byrne,Malcom."IraniansDebatethe1953Coup."JSTOR.MERP,2000.Web.28Sept.2014.In
therecordingofatelevisionprogrambetweenIranianmen,thecoupisdiscussedina
differentlight,explaininghowitaffectedtheirlivesindividually,givinganinsightintoa
regularman'slife.ThemenmainlyfocusonhowthefailureoftheUStoputabetterleader
inplace,thenewgovernmentbegantofail,andtheUS'sincessantneedtoeradicate
communismmayhaveinfluencedIranfortheworse.
Byrne,Malcolm."Iran1953:TheRoleofMI6,BritishPetroleumandKermitRoosevelt's
Countercoup."TheNationalSecurityArchive(GeorgeWashingtonUniversity).George
WashingtonUniversity,13May2014.Web.05Oct.2014.Byrne,Directorofresearchat
theNationalSecurityArchivesponsoredbyGeorgetownUniversity,andauthorofseveral
bookschroniclingtheMiddleEast,providesalookatthecensorshipoftheIraniancoup.
HediscussesitbylookingatseveralkeychangesmadetoKermitRoosevelt'sbook
"Countercoup,"withaspecificfocusontheirkeepingtheAngloIranianOilCompany
frombeingmentioned.ThesourceprovidesalookintotheBritishleadershipofthecoup,
becauseallmentionsoftheAIOCwerechangedto"britishintelligence."Thereforethis
showsthattheBritishintelligenceagencywasessentiallyoverpoweredbyanoilcompany.
Thesourcewaspublishedfairlyrecently,withthehelpofseveralrecentlydeclassified
documents.
Caistor,Nick.Forward.NuncaMs.ComisinNacinalsobrelaDesaparicindePersonas.
London,ButlerandTannerLtd.Frome,1986.Thissecondarysourcewasaforwardtoa
book,writtenbyNickCaistor,apublishedhistoricalauthorveryknowledgeableaboutthe
DirtyWarthattookplaceinArgentina.Intheforwardhegoesintodepthaboutthe

repercussionsoftheDirtyWarandlosdesaparecidosandwhatitmeansforthemodern
world.ThisishelpfulforthelegacyargumentbecauseithelpsputtheIranianCoupinto
contextwithotherCIAcovertlybackedcoups.Additionally,theauthorprovideseasily
quotablestatements,compatiblewithatimelineinthelegacyargument.
Cohen,Roger."TheNewYorkTimesUpfront|TheNewsMagazineforHighSchool."TheNew
YorkTimesUpfront.Scholastic&TheNewYorkTimes,n.d.Web.27Sept.2014.Roger
Cohen'swellwrittenandauthoritativearticlemorethanadequatelydescribesthelegacyof
the1953Iraniancoup,indescribingtheleadup,theeventsof,andwhathappened
immediatelyaftertheIranianRevolutionandHostageCrisisattheendofthe1970's.
Cohenisawellestablishedjournalistwhohasworkedasaforeigncorrespondentinfifteen
countriesincludingplacesinthemiddleeast,whichensureshehasthenecessary
backgroundtomakethisarticlecredible.Ittiesinwelltoourtopic,becauseweneed
evidenceonhowthelackofstrongleadershipinthe1953coupleadtoabadlegacy.
Connor,JohnT.,RonaldReagan,andNelsonA.Rockefeller.ReporttothePresidentbythe
CommissiononCIAActivitieswithintheUnitedStates.WashintonDC:USGovernment
PrintingOffice,1975.Print.ThisprimarydocumentisareporttoGeraldFordonthe
actionsoftheCIA,andtimeswhenitdidthingsoutsideofit'sauthority.ItshowsthatCIA
andFBIleadershipattimesworkedagainsteachotherattheexpenseofnationalsecurity,
howevertheCIAhashadgoodtieswithstateandlocalpolicedespitethattheCIAisonly
supposedtodealwithforeignaffairs.ThisdocumentalsoshowshowthelegacyoftheCIA
wasshapedbythelawssayingwhatitcouldandcouldnotdo.
Cottam,RichardW."AmericanPolicyandtheIranianCrisis."IranianStudies13.14(1980):
279305.Web.4Oct.2014.ThisjournalbyRichardCottamplacesaheavyhandonhow
theinternalconflictsinIranmadeitweakandthereforesusceptibletoothercountriessuch
astheUStryingtoextortitsresources.Theseinternalconflictshestatedwerehowthe
separationbetweenthereligiousgovernmentandtheseculargovernmentwasn'tclear.This
uncertaintyinthegovernmentmadeitcleartotheUSthatsomethinghadtobedoneabout
thelackofleadership,thereforetheUSdecidedtoreplacethecurrentleaderwitha
prechosenone.ThishelpedIran'sgovernmentforawhile,anditalsoplayedtowardsthe
US'sinterests.
Cottam,RichardW."TheUnitedStates,IranandtheColdWar."IranianStudies3.1(1970):
222.JSTOR.Web.20Sept.2014.ProfessorandIranistRichardCottamoftheUniversity
ofPittsburghoverviewsAmericanforeignpolicyinIranduringtheColdWar.Inparticular,
hestatesthatwhilesomehistoriansbelieveoilinterestsprovidedtheprimarymotivefor
USactions,thereislittleevidenceofsuchinstead,Americanperceptionsofacommunist

threatcoloredAmericanforeignpolicy.Essentially,Cottamcreatesanoverviewofthe
eventsandmotivesofAmericanactionsinIranduringtheColdWar,andcontextualizes
thecoupinabroaderperiodofIranianhistory.
deBellaigue,Christopher."Coupdunnit:whatreallyhappenedinIran?"ForeignAffairs
Sept.Oct.2014.GlobalIssuesinContext.Web.11Sept.2014.Thissourcewasvery
usefulindetermininghowModerndayIranhasbeenaffectedbypastevents.Thissource
doesagreatjobofexplainingthepasteventsthathelpedgeneratetheturmoilthatexists
today.Thisarticlegoesontoexplainhowthecoupwasacrucialpartofthecurrentevents,
andhowtheremovalofthefirstdemocraticallyelectedprimeministerleaderwassoon
oustedandreplacedbyalongstringofleaderswhoweren'tnecessarilybad,butleaders
whodidnotimproveuponthepegsofIran,butsimplystayedwithinthetraditionalideas
ofthinking,anddidnotbringnew.Thisarticlealsoexplainedhowthecoupandthe
hostagecrisisledtoantiussentimentsthatcarrythroughtoday.
DeLuce,Dan."TheSpectreofOperationAjax."TheGuardian.N.p.,20Aug.2003.Web.3Oct.
2014.Inthiscontextsource,authorDanDeLuceprovidesasummaryoftheeventsofthe
1953IranianCoup.Whilethearticledidhelpbyprovidingageneralunderstandingofwhat
itwaslikeinIranin1953,andtheAmericanandBritishinvolvement,itisprimarily
interestingbecauseitsuggeststhatAmericanactionsinIranledtoIslamichostilitytoward
theUnitedStates.DeLucesaysthatAmericaninvolvementinMossadegh'soverthrow
helped"unleashawaveofIslamicextremismandassistedtopowertheantiAmerican
clericalleadershipthatstillrulesIran."ThisprovidesadefinitivelegacyofAmerica's
involvementinthecoupaftertwodecadesunderthedictatorialShah,theIranianpeople's
resentmentturnedtowardAmerica.Basedonwhatotherarticleswehavereadhavesaid
abouttheorganizationandleadershipoftheCIA,itisclearthatpoorleadershiponthe
AmericansideledtothislegacyinIran.TheGuardianisareputablepublication,sothis
sourceismostlikelytrustworthy.
Divine,RobertA."EisenhowerandtheMiddleEast."EisenhowerandtheColdWar.NewYork:
OxfordUP,1981.N.pag.Print.Thischaptergavesomehistoricalcontextforwhatwas
goingonwiththerestoftheColdWarconflictaroundthetimeoftheCoup.Foronething,
WashingtondidnotknowwhattomakeofthenewsthatStalinhaddied,theyhadlittleto
noinsideinformationandtheydidnotknowhowhisdeathwouldeffecttheSovietUnion.
AfewmonthsbeforetheCoupEisenhowergavehis"AtomsforPeace"speechwhich
showedthathewantedtoleadtheUnitedStatesintoaneweraofpeacewiththeRussians.
Hiswordsarecontradictorytotherealityofwhatwouldhappeninafewmonthstime.This
bookshowedthatdespitegoodwilledleaders,resolvingtheColdWarconflictwouldtake
alotmore.

Doenecke,JustusD."Revisionists,OilandColdWarDiplomacy."IranianStudies3.1(1970):
2333.JSTOR.Web.21Sept.2014.JustusD.Doenecke,ProfessorofHistoryatNew
CollegeofFlorida,explainstherevisionistviewpointofAmericanpolicyinIranduringthe
ColdWar.Adesirefornaturalresources,namelyoil,drovetheAmericanforcesinthe
region,eventuallyleadingtothecoupin1953.Ingeneral,thejournalplacesthecoupina
largercontextofAmericanpolicyinIranduringthetime,helpingtoillustratetherolethe
coupplayedduringtheColdWarinIran.
Dujmovic,Nicholas."IntelligenceinPublicLiterature."CentralIntelligenceAgency.Central
IntelligenceAgency,05Feb.2013.Web.05Oct.2014.InreviewingSarahJaneCorke's
book,NicholasDujmovic(amemberofCIAsHistoryStaffattheCenterfortheStudyof
Intelligence),highlightedpartsofCorke'sargumentsuchasthelackofCIAleadershipor
efficiencyinthebeginningwaspartlyduetotheTrumanadministrationnothavinga
comprehensiveplanforfightingcommunism.Whenlefttoitsowndevices,theCIAtended
tofollowtheDonovanmodelofcowboydiplomacy,however,Dujmovicmakesthepoint
thefactisthattherewassignificantpolicyinputfrombothStateandthePentagonforCIA
operationsintheFarEastintheearly1950s,mostofwhich...wereunsuccessful.Allthis
suggeststhatCIAsharestheblameforthesefailureswithotherpartsofthegovernment
andthatbettercoordinationdoesntnecessarilyleadtobetterormoresuccessfulcovert
action.
Frazer,Simin."SiminFrazer."Telephoneinterview.6Jan.2015.SiminFrazergrewupina
wealthyfamilyinIraninthe1960s,butsheisnowanAmericancitizen.Sheansweredour
questionsregardingwhatitwaslikeforanaveragecitizenfollowingthecoup.Herfamily
didwellundertheShah,butshehassincecometorealizationsabouthisregime.One
interestingthingshesaidwasthatsheneverlearnedaboutthe1953coupinschool,the
Shahasaleaderwasafactoflife.Overall,shewasabletoenlightenusinregardtothe
chaoticbutdiscordantcivilianexperiencefollowingthecoup.
Engdahl,William.ACenturyofWar:AngloAmericanOilPoliticsandtheNewWorldOrder.
London:Pluto,2004.Print.Thissourceisabookthatgoesindepthexplainingabouthow
politicsandoilhavebeeninterconnectedforthepastcentury.Thissourcealsoexplained
howsomepoliticalleaderstookthisopportunityofthecouptotakeadvantageofthepublic
eye,sopeoplesuchasZbigniewBrzezinskitookcreditforhelpingoutthesituationinIran.
Althoughhetookcredit,itwasmostlytheUSandbritishgovernments,notonesingle
personthathelpedliftoutthecorruptshah.

Gasiorowski,Mark."MarkGasiorowskiInterview."Telephoneinterview.6Jan.2015.Mark
Gasiorowskiisoneoftheleadingexpertsregardingthe1953coup.Inthe1980she
interviewedmanypeople,whohavesincedied,whoweredirectlyinvolvedinthecoup.He
alsotaughtinTehran.Hecomplicatedourthinkinginmanyaspectsofourprojectand
addednuancessuchasthedifferencesbetweenEisenhowerasarepublicanleaderand
Trumanasademocratleader.Healsoaddedtopreviousknowledgewhichwehadgained
fromStephenKinzeraboutthetruelegacyofthe1953coup.Inhiswords,itwassimplya
factorthatwasseperatedby25years,notadirectcauseandeffectrelationship.Thiswasa
veryhelpfulinterview.
Gasiorowski,MarkJ."The1953CoupD'EtatinIran."InternationalJournalofMiddleEast
Studies19.03(1987):26186.JSTOR.Web.1Oct.2014.Gasiorowski,politicalscientistat
TulaneUniversity,givesanoverviewofthepoliticalandoperationaldecisionsbehindthe
coup.Asheexplainsit,conflictingpointsofviewbetweentheTrumanandEisenhower
administrations,aswellaswithineachentity,ledtoseriousbureaucraticfailureinthe
Americandecisionmakingprocess.Theleaders,includingEisenhower,A.Dulles,and
others,supportedthecoup,butlowerlevelspecialistsrecognizedthepotential
consequencesofsuchanundertaking.Notonlyweretheleadersunabletowinthesupport
oftheirsubordinates,theythemselveswerenoncommittalforalongtime,andwhenthey
didmakethefinaldecisionstheyeitherlackedaccurateinformationonIran'spolitical
situationorchosetoignorethefacts.
Gasiorowski,MarkJ.,andMalcolmByrne.MohammadMosaddeqandthe1953CoupinIran.
Syracuse:SyracuseUP,2004.Print.Thisbookisoneofthedefinitiveresourcesonthe
coup.Itcoversalmosteverydetail.Thetwoauthors,GasiorowskiandByrne,aretwoof
thepreeminentexpertsonthecoupinIran.Oneoftheaspectsofthisbookthatmadeitso
specialwasthatithadmuchmoredetailabouttheDullesbrothersthanotheraccountsof
thecoup.Whileinotherbooksandarticles,onlyvaguementionsoftheCIAandtheState
Departmentareincluded,inthisbooktheDullesbrothersareexplicitlytiedtotheiractions
andthelegacyofthoseactions.Thisbookwasinstrumentalforusinformulatingourviews
ontheleadershipofthebrothers.
Gasiorowski,MarkJ."TheCIALooksBackonthe1953CoupinIran."MiddleEastReport216
(2000):45.JSTOR.Web.11Sept.2014.Thisarticlewaswrittenwithnearly50yearsof
hindsightontheeventsoftheIranianCoup,butitwasalsowrittenayearbefore9/11.
Fromthisperspective,itexploreshowtheCIAhaschanged,orfailedtochangesinceits
firstcovertoverthrowofaforeignregime.ThelegacyoftheCIAsinitialactionin1953
canstillbefeltinCIAsoperationstodayanditscontinuedinvolvementintheMiddle

East.However,afterthe1970s,theCIAbecamemarkedlysmallersothelegacyofthe
coupwassomewhatdiminishedatthattime.
Gates,RobertM."Intelligence,Democracy,andFreedom."PresidentialStudiesQuarterly22.2
(1992):23137.JSTOR.Web.21Sept.2014.
<http://www.jstor.org.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/27550944>.Thisessayisbasedon
RobertM.Gates'addressinMarch1992atthe23rdAnnualStudentSymposium,Center
fortheStudyofPresidency.Gates,formerdirectoroftheCIAandSecretaryofDefense,
referstoWilliamDonovanas"thefounderofmodernAmericanintelligence."Hedescribes
Donovan'sleadershipandsignificanceincreatingtheCIA,andthelegacyofthe
organization.Giventhattheessayispublishedinareputablejournal,andthatthespeaker
oftheaddressofwhichtheessayisderivedisextremelyauthoritative,thisisavery
trustworthysource.
Gavin,FrancisJ."Politics,Power,andU.S.PolicyinIran,19501953."(n.d.):n.pag.Harvard.
Web.21Sept.2014.FrancisJ.GavinmanagestomakeIranianpoliticsofthe1950'ssound
interesting,evenwhiletalkingaboutyawninducingtopicssuchasreligioustiestowards
economicpolicy.Thisacademicwritingwasbeneficialtoresearchingthecoupbecauseit
wasimportanttohaveastrongbackgroundknowledgeofIranianpolitics.Additionally,
GavinisanextremelywellestablishedexpertonAmericanforeignpolicy.
Ghosh,Palash."Iran:TheLongLastingLegacyofthe1953U.S./CIACoup."International
BusinessTimes.InternationalBusinessTimes,20Mar.2012.Web.21Sept.2014.
<http://www.ibtimes.com/iranlonglastinglegacy1953usciacoup214329>.Inand
interviewwithacollegeprofessor,thissourcestressestofindthelegacyofthecoup,and
allthesentimentstowardstheevent.Thisarticlealsodoesagoodjobofgoingintodetail
aboutcountryrelationsandhowpreviousleadersanddifferentcountriesimpactedIran's
history.FromthissourceIlearnedmuchmoreaboutrelations,suchastheU.Ssuffered
muchblowbackfromthecoup,becausethenewleaderdidhelpconsolidatepower,but
publicopinionofhimwasn'thigh,makingitseemasifhewasapuppet.Thissparkedthe
beginningofIraniandistaintowardstheU.S.
Grim,Ryan."BP'sLongHistoryOfDestroyingTheWorld."TheHuffingtonPost.
TheHuffingtonPost.com,08June2010.Web.21Sept.2014.
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/08/bpslonghistoryofdestr_n_604511.html>.
Inthisshortarticle,theauthorobviouslyhasabiastowardstheOilCompanyforcausing
manyoftheproblemsintheMiddleEast.Thissourcewasn'tonehundredpercentreliable,
butitdidprovideanothersideofthearguementstatingthatbadleadershipwasn'tthe
reasonforthecoup,butratheritwasforthecontrolofoil.Thisarticlesaysthemainand

onlyreasonforthecoupwasforoil,focusingontheeconomicviewofthecoupratherthan
political.Althoughthisarticleisratheronesided,theauthordoesprovideveryindepth
reasoningintowhyhefeelsthewayhedoes.Overallthisarticleiswellwrittenanddoes
providedecentinformation.
Hader,Leon."OurManinIran:HowtheCIAandMI6InstalledtheShah."OurManinIran:
HowtheCIAandMI6InstalledtheShah.N.p.,16Feb.2013.Web.05Oct.2014.Hader,
globalaffairsjournalistintheMiddleEastandcriticofAmericanpolicyintheMiddle
East,paintsaverynegativepictureoftheAmericanIntelligenceinchargeoftheIranian
Coup.HeputsMuhammadMossadeqinanewlight,describinghowhisgoalwasnotto
alignwiththeSoviets,butrathertoavoidtheColdWarconflictalltogether,andthatthe
nationalizationoftheAIOCwastoprotecteconomicinterests,nottospitetheBritish.This
sourcerevealsleadershipinanewway,showinghowthefirstworldcountriesactedoutof
fear,ratherthanlogicallyseeingthesituation.Itwaswrittenbeforethedeclassificationof
allIranianCoupdocuments,butthatchangeslittleasthetruthwasalreadypublished.
Hardy,ThomasS."IntelligenceReformintheMid1970s."CentralIntelligenceAgency.Central
IntelligenceAgency,04Aug.2011.Web.21Oct.2014.Thisarticletoldusalotaboutthe
leadershipwithintheCIAbycomparingthetheleadershipofAllenDullesinafledgling
branchofgovernment,tothesomewhathumiliatedleadersoftheCIAinthe1970swho
werelookingtoopenanewchapteronUnitedStatesintelligencegathering.Onethingthey
changedinthesereformmeetingsofthe1970swastheypassedlawsmakingtheCIAmore
accountabletotheSenate.ThisshowedbycomparisonhowunaccoutabletheCIAhad
previouslybeen.
Heaps,JenniferD.TrackingIntelligenceInformation:TheOfficeofStrategicServices61.2
(1998):287308.JSTOR.Web.21Sept.2014.
<http://www.jstor.org.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/40294089>.Thissourceprovides
informationabouttheOSS,theprecursortotheCIA.Itdelvesintodetailabouthowthe
OSSgatheredinformationandhowitfunctioned.AstheCIAeventuallywouldtakeover
thefunctionsoftheOSS,thearticleshedsvaluablelightontheoriginsoftheCIAandits
informationgatheringtactics.Thissourceisfromareputablejournalandistrustworthy.
Heiss,MaryAnn."TheUnitedStates,GreatBritain,andtheCreationoftheIranianOil
Consortium,19531954."Taylor&Francis.TheInternationalHistoryReview,1994.
Web.28Sept.2014.
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07075332.1994.9640686?journalCode=rinh
20>.ThissourcewaswrittenbyahistoricaljournalthatmadeamemoofameetinginIran
in1954.Thisdocumentfocusedonhowtheeventssurroundingthecoupchangedthe

worldmorethanthecoupitself,explaininghowoilisoneofthebiggestfactorsthat
decidedtheUS'sdecisiontointervine,butalsointheprocessofobtainingoil,alsostopped
thespreadofcommunism.Thisdocumentalsopaystributetotheoilnegotiationsin1954
thatHerbertHooverJr.hadcalled'perhapsthelargestcommercialdealeverputtogether.'
Hilsman,Roger."DoestheCIAStillHaveaRole?"ForeignAffairs74.5(1995):10416.
JSTOR.Web.21Sept.2014.
<http://www.jstor.org.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/20047303>.Thissourcediscusses
thechangingroleoftheCIA,andisthereforeparticularlyrelevanttotheorganization's
legacy.ThearticlediscussestherelevanceoftheCIA'sprimaryfunctions,likecovert
politicalactions,codebreaking,espionage,oresotericfunctions.Theauthorarguesthat,
whileonceusefulduringperiodssuchastheColdWar,theCIAsprimaryfunctionsareno
longercosteffectiveornecessary.TheauthorquestionsthepurposeoftheCIAsexistence
asawhole,andthereforeitslegacyasanorganization.Thearticlewasfoundinareputable
journal,andwhiletheauthorspersonalviewsmustbetakenintoaccount,theinformation
isauthoritativeandtrustworthy.
Historian,ClaytonLaurieCia."ANewPresident,aBetterCIA,andanOldWar:Eisenhower
andIntelligenceReportingonKorea,1953."TheEvolutionofCIAunderEisenhower54.4
(2010):n.pag.Web.ThisarticlewasveryhelpfulinexplainingEisenhowersroleinthe
growthoftheCIAintoatruecowboyorganization.Animportantdistinctionwasmade
betweentheRepublicanleadersunderEisenhowerandthemoreliberalleadersunder
Truman.Thissourceilluminatedourknowledgeoftheleadershipbehindthegovernmentat
thetimeofthecoup.
"HistoryofIran:AShortAccountof1953Coup."HistoryofIran:AShortAccountof1953
Coup.N.p.,n.d.Web.11Sept.2014.Thisbroadcontextsourceprovidedussomebasisto
ourargument.Itprovidednamesofleadersandablowbyblowoftheeventitself.The
actualonthegroundoperationwasledbyKermitRoosevelt,anditwastoputitlightly,a
fiasco.Initialattemptsatthecoupfailedanditseemedlikeallwaslost,untilariotincited
bytheCIAanditspropagandaanditsthugsbroughtdownMossadeq.Ifthispoor
leadershipandconfusionisanyindicationofthelargerorganization,theCIAshouldprove
tobequiteamess.
"HistoryoftheCentralIntelligenceAgency."Fas.org.FederationofAmericanScientists,n.d.
Web.04Oct.2014.ThisarticlefromtheFederationofAmericanScientiststalksaboutthe
originsoftheCIA.WhilethevalueofcentralizedintelligencewasmadeclearafterWorld
WarII,theinceptionoftheCIAwasatroubledandcontroversialprocess.William
Donovan,whoiscreditedasthecreatoroftheCIA,wantedanorganizationthatwould

"correlatetheintelligencematerialcollectedbyallgovernmentagencies."Hisplanwas
opposedbymanydifferentgovernmentdepartments.Itisclearthatatthattime,many
AmericansdidnotsupportthecreationoftheCIA,butinthewakeofWorldWarII,itwas
deemedanecessaryevil.Aninterestingthingmentionedinthearticleishow,astime
passed,theCIAgrewlargerinsizeandinfluence,yetitsactionsbecameincreasingly
secretive.ThisisrelevanttothecoupinIran,aboutwhichtheCIAwasextremely
secretive.Basedonthearticle'sdescriptionoftheorganization'sstructureanditssecrecy,
thenegativelegacyleftinIranbytheCIAcouldverywellbeaproductofpoorleadership.
Thesecrecyoftheorganizationlikelyprovidedasortofveilthatgaveitsleadersasafety
nettomakepoordecisionsintheeventthattheyfailed,nobodywouldknowwhoto
blame.
"HistoryoftheCIA."CentralIntelligenceAgency.CentralIntelligenceAgency,18Feb.2014.
Web.11Sept.2014.ThissourcewasveryhelpfulindetermininghowtheCIAwasbrought
up,andwhythataffectedtheeventssurroundingit.Thissourcewentintothehistoryof
howoriginallytheCIAwastheOSS,whichwasbornoutoftheaftermathofWorldWarII.
ThissourcealsotalkedabouttheleadersoftheCIA,andhoweachleaderandtheir
differentideologyaffectedtheoverallleadershipoftheCIA.Thehistoryofeverythingthe
CIAwasinvolvedwithwasnotdiscussedhowever,manyofthecovertoperationsand
failuresthatwelearnedaboutwerenotdiscussedastomaketheCIAlookgood.
Holsti,Ole."The"OperationalCode"ApproachtotheStudyofPoliticalLeaders:JohnFoster
Dulles'PhilosophicalandInstrumentalBeliefs."CanadianJournalofPoliticalScience/
RevueCanadienneDeSciencePolitique3.1(1970):12357.JSTOR.Web.04Oct.2014.
OleHolsti,professorofpoliticalscienceatDukeUniversity,providesanintensive,
extensive,andhighlysystematicanalysisofJ.Dulles'sbeliefsasapoliticalleader.Inshort,
hehadverystrongbeliefsinthepowerofmorality,waspessimisticintheshorttermbut
optimisticlongrun,andbelievedthatinflexibilityinpoliticalgoalswasextremely
importanttodefendcredibilityandpreserveperceivedstrength.Additionally,Holstistates
J.Dulles'sbeliefthataleader'sspiritualqualitiesdirectlyaffectforeignpolicy,implying
thatJ.Dullessoughttohaveastronginfluenceoninternationalaffairs,includingthecoup.
Holsti,OleR."WilltheRealDullesPleaseStandUp."InternationalJournal30.1,Diplomatic
Method(1974):3444.JSTOR.Web.28Sept.2014.OleHolsti,ProfessorEmeritusof
PoliticalScienceatDukeUniversity,createsanimageofJ.Dullesasanidealisticandrigid
leaderwhoseambitionblindedhimtotheconsequencesofmanyofhisactions.By
choosingtoignoreorsuppressmanyoftheopinionsofhissubordinates,J.Dullesrana
verydictatorialsystem,wherehemademanydecisionswithoutoutsideinput.Thisperhaps

causedJ.Dullestomakemanyimprudentchoices,resultinginmanynegativelongterm
consequencessuchasthelegacyofthecoup.
Immerman,RichardH."EisenhowerandDulles:WhoMadetheDecisions?"Political
Psychology1.2(1979):2138.JSTOR.Web.28Sept.2014.Indescribingtherelationship
betweenJ.DullesandEisenhower,Immerman,aprofessoratTempleUniversity,bringsup
twodifferentviewsoftheirleadershipdynamic,especiallyregardingtheColdWar.The
firstandmorecommonlyacceptedisthatJ.Dulles'sforcefulstyledominatedEisenhower's
morepassiveleadership,butthesecondclaimsthatEisenhowerhadmorecontrolthan
previouslythought.Bothperspectiveshelpunderstandthehowthebureaucraticmachine
thatistheAmericangovernmentfunctionedduringtheIraniancoup.
Immerman,RichardH.JohnFosterDullesandtheDiplomacyoftheColdWar.Princeton,NJ:
PrincetonUP,1990.Print.ProfessorImmermanofTempleUniversitydescribesJ.Dulles
asamuchmorecalculatingleaderthanotheranalystshavedescribed,althoughhe
concedesthathewasnotnecessarilyanymorefarsightedthanpreviouslythought.
ImmermancreatesanargumentfortheabilityofJ.Dullesasadiplomatwhowasableto
usehisleadershipskillstoeffectivelyguideandforcewhathewantedoutofothers.
Johnson,LochK."CovertActionandAccountability:DecisionMakingforAmerica'sSecret
ForeignPolicy."InternationalStudiesQuarterly33.1(1989):81109.JSTOR.Web.12
Oct.2014.Johnson,aprofessorofpoliticalscienceattheUniversityofGeorgia,providesa
historyofthedecisionmakingprocessforcovertactionintheUSgovernment.Byhis
description,thevastmajorityofthemoderndayprocess,includingalmostalloftheofficial
controlsandexaminations,wereonlyimplementedaftertheNixonadministration.Before,
theleadersoftheCIAhadfreereign,andwentlargelyuncheckedintheactionsabroad,
creatingthepotentialfordangerousorevendisastrouscovertoperationstotranspire,such
asthe1953Iraniancoup.
Kangas,Steve."TimelineofCIAAtrocities."Serendipity(2002):n.pag.MicrosoftAcademic
Search.Web.28Sept.2014.Inthisarticle,writtenbyaformermilitaryintelligence
worker,thehistoryoftheCIAischronicledtosupporttheauthorsargumentthattheCIA
shouldbedismantledbecauseofitspatternoforchestratingmilitarycoupswithlegaciesof
humanrightsabusesandthencensoringmediaabouttheCIA'sinvolvementinfailed
coups.Itmakesthepointthatfromitsinception,theCIAlackedmoralleadershipbecause
theCIAleadershiponlyansweredtothePresidentaccordingtotheNationalSecurityAct
of1947.

Karasipahi,Sena."ComparingIslamicResurgenceMovementsinTurkeyandIran."TheMiddle
EastJournal63.1(2009):87107.JSTOR.Web.5Oct.2014.Wheninitiallychoosingour
topicweknewthattheoppressiveregimeoftheShahhadledtoreligiousinstitutionsbeing
theonlyplacewherecitizenscouldexpressdissentandthisiswhytheAyatollahKhomeini
wasabletooverthrowtheShah.Thisarticle,however,explainshowmuchmorecomplex
thereasonsfortheIslamicRevivalinIranwere.Theauthor,aprofessoratTexasA&M
University,sites"denunciationofsubserviencetotheUS,"asonlyonereason.Others
includetheinfluenceofreformistintellectualsduringthe1970s,thetraditionsofShi'a
Islam,andIslamasanideologytotakerefugeintoconfrontWesternizationandits
challenges.
Kinzer,Stephen.AlltheShah'sMen:AnAmericanCoupandtheRootsofMiddleEastTerror.
Hoboken,NJ:J.Wiley&Sons,2003.Print.AlltheShah'sMenisafantasticbookand
source.Itheldsomuchinformationdirectlyrelatedtoourtopic.Itclearlyoutlinesthe
leadershipofAllenDullesandotherssuchasresistancefighterswhomadethiscoup
possible.Possiblythebestpartofthisbookisthattheauthorisnotonlyanauthorbutalso
somewhatofaninvestigativejournalist.Amajorityofhisinformationarethingssuchas
interviews,publicsources,anddeclassifiedinformation.Thisbookcoverssomuch
informationrangingtothelivesofthoseinvolvedinthecoup,tothingssuchasthefact
MohammadMossadeqoftenworepajamasduringaffairsofstatewithofficials.Kinzeralso
providesspeculationfortherelevancetoday,withanargumentbackingitup.
Kinzer,Stephen."BPandIran:TheForgottenHistory."CBSNews.CBSInteractive,2010.Web.
05Oct.2014.InthisnewsarticlewrittenbytheStephenKinzer,theblameforissues
withinIran'sgovernmentarerestedontheshouldersofBP(BritishPetroleum).Kinzer
statedBPwasoverzealousandwishedtoprofitheavilyfromIran,andtakeit'sresources.
ThisleadMossadeqtotakeonanationalisticvalue,andtakebackIran'soiltomaximize
theircountriesprofit.Britaindidnotwanttheoiltofallintothehandsofthecommunists,
soOperationAjaxwasputintoplace.Kinzerexplainshowthelackofauthorityand
cooperationinoperationajaxledtotheendofdemocracyiniran,eventuallyleadingto
newleaderswithanantiwesternattitude.
Kinzer,Stephen.TheBrothers:JohnFosterDulles,AllenDulles,andTheirSecretWorldWar.
N.p.:n.p.,n.d.Print.Thisbookiswhereweinitiallycameupwithourideaforhistoryfair.
Asthetitlewouldsuggest,itdealsmainlywiththeleadershipoftheDullesbrothers.It
beginswithathorough,albatedramatized,depictionoftheiryouthandschoolingandthus
describeshowtheygrewuptobethementheybecame.Therestofthebookissplitupinto
thesixmaincountrieswheretheycarriedouttheirsecretwartogetridofleadersthat
wentagainsttheirAmericanvalues.Themostvaluableknowledgeabouttheirleadership

whichItookawayfromthisbookisthat,asthemosthighconcentrationofpowerbetween
relativesintheUSinhistory,theiropinionsandpolicieswereessentiallyanechochamber
ofeachother.Theirleadershipwascloseminded,andthisledtodisastrousresults.
Kinzer,Stephen."TheBrothers."PoliticsandProse,Washington,D.C.03Oct.2013.Lecture.In
alectureforPoliticsandProse,acclaimedjournalistandacademicStephenKinzerexplains
someoftheDullesbrothers'reasonsforinitiatingthecoupinIran.First,beingraised
extremelyreligiously,theybelievedinthestarkcontrastbetween"good"and"evil,"and
thatasChristianstheyhadtoactivelycombatimmoralityaroundtheglobe.Additionally,
aslawyersatSullivan&Cromwell,theDulles'soriginaljobsweretoprotectAmerican
businessinterestsfromgovernmentsaroundtheworld,andtheirfirstshockingdefeatcame
whenIrannationalizeditsoilindustry,causingtheDulles'stohaveahugegrudgeonce
theyarrivedinofficein1953.Asbrotherswithalmostidenticalworldviews,theydidnot
consultorseekapprovalfromothers,andinsteadwereconvincedfromthestartoftheir
decisions.Finally,Eisenhower'sopinionsregardingdefensethatcovertoperationswere
superblyeffectiveonlyencouragedthemtocontinuewiththeirplanstooverthrow
Mossadeq,despitetheiradmittedlackofinformation.
Kinzer,Stephen."FTMWeeklyInterview:StephenKinzeronOperationAjaxandtheBlowback
fromIranSince1953."InterviewbyJerryRobinson.FTMDaily.FTMDaily,11Feb.
2012.Web.12Oct.2014.
<http://ftmdaily.com/ftmweeklyradiointerviews/ftmweeklyinterviewstephenkinzeron
operationajaxandtheblowbackfromiransince1953/>.Wehaveusedmanysources
fromStephenKinzer,asheappearstobethepreeminentexpertonthe1953CoupinIran
andOperationAJAX.ThisisanextremelyusefulinterviewbecauseKinzer'sargumentis
thattheCIAandtheUnitedStates'involvementinthecoupdirectlyledtoitscurrent
conditions.KinzerstatesthatinIran,thecommonsentimentpeoplegivehimis,"Weused
tohaveademocracyhere.ButyouAmericanscameoverhereanddestroyedit.Andever
sincethen,wevebeenspiralingdown."KinzeralsostatesthatCIAinterventioninIranled
toa"cliqueoffanaticallyantiAmericanmullahswhoareinpowernow."Kinzerformsa
directconnectionbetweenCIAactionsinIranandthelegacyoftheriseofextremistIslam.
NotonlydoesKinzerdiscussthelegacy,howeverhetiesitbacktoCIAactionsandits
leadership,orlackthereof.KinzersaysthatsendingtheCIAtoIransentIraninto"total
chaos,"andthatwhenyoulookbackattheevent,itisclearthat"theAmericanrolein
crushingIraniandemocracyin1953...setIranandtheMiddleEastintoturmoilfromwhich
ithasneverrecovered."Duetoitsactionsduringthecoupthatresultedfromlackof
leadership,AmericaanditsorganizationsliketheCIAareresponsibleforthenegative
legacy.

Kinzer,Stephen."HowTwoBrothersWagedA'SecretWorldWar'InThe1950s."Interviewby
ArunRath.NPR.NPR,2013.Web.13Oct.2014.StephenKinzersuccinctlyand
eloquentlydescribestheargumentinhisbookduringthisinterview.Hetalksabouthowthe
Dullesbrotherswereinfluencedbytheirprotestantupbringingtonotsitbackandletbad
thingshappen,buttointervene,andalsothattheworldisveryblackandwhiteandsplitup
intogoodandevil.TheDullesbrothersleadershipinwagingasecretwarbeginningin
1953showedtheinfluenceoftheirleadershipandalsorepresentedthecovertandovert
partsofAmericanForeignPolicy.Finally,KinzerdiscussedthelegacyofAmericansecret
interventionaroundtheworldandhowAmerican'sthesedaysaremoreawareofit.
(Avery)
Kinzer,Stephen."InsideIran'sFury."Smithsonian.SmithsonianMagazine,Oct.2008.Web.05
Oct.2014.StephenKinzerhaswrittenmanybooksandarticlesabouttheUnitedStates'
involvementinthecoupinIran,andgivenhishistoryasacorrespondentfortheNewYork
Timesandasanacademic,heisclearlyanexpertinthisfield.Inthisarticle,Kinzertells
Iran'ssideofthestory.Iranhashadalonghistoryofbeingdominatedbyforeignpowers,
andtheCIA'sroleinthecoupaswellastheAmericanfundingoftheShahonly
exacerbatedtheintenseresentmenttheIranianpeoplebuiltup.Thecoupitselfwasapoor
leadershipdecisionbytheCIA,onlyinitiatedduetoa"wilddistortion"aboutaCommunist
threatthattheBritishfedtotheCIA.Additionally,thedecision"wasallveryemotional
andveryquick.TherewasnorealattempttofindoutwhoMossadeghwasorwhat
motivatedhim."AsaresultofpoorAmericanleadership,antiUnitedStatessentiment
continuedtobuildupinIran,resultinginthe1979hostagecrisisandthelegacyofan
antiAmericansentimentthatpermeatestothisday.
Kinzer,Steven."KinzerInterview."Telephoneinterview.6Dec.2014.Ourfirstinterviewwas
illuminatingintheareaofleadershipbecauseKinzerwrotethebookwhichinitiallygave
ustheideatostudytheDullesbrothersinthisproject.Healsofurtherexplainedthecoup's
legacyinIran.Specifically,hesaidthatadirectcauseandeffectlinecouldbedrawn
betweentheeventsof1953andtheeventualrevolutionin1979.Finally,hedirectedus
towardsomeverygoodprimarysourcestospeakwith,includingMalcolmByrneandMark
Gasiorowski'sworksonthecoup.
Little,Douglas."Chapter2."AmericanOrientalism:TheUnitedStatesandtheMiddleEast
since1945.ChapelHill:UofNorthCarolina,2002.4346.Print.Inthisbookabout
IranianAmericanrelations,theauthoroutlinesthelegacyofthebureaucraticfailures
leadinguptothecoupin1953.TheauthorstatesthatthelackofsupportersofMossadeq's
regimewaspartialininfluencinghisdecisions.Overalltheauthorsaidthatthefailureto
cometoasolidcompromiseovertheoilcausedmanyofthelonglastingproblemstoday.

TheauthoralsonotedhowthesituationscouldhavebeenavoidediftheUnitedStates
greedhadnotcloudeditspoliticalagenda.
Little,Douglas."19491958,Syria:EarlyExperimentsinCovertAction."PressforConversion!
51(2003):1213.Web.WrittenbyDouglasBrown,aprofessoratBrownUniversity,this
secondarysourceprovidesinsightontotheSyriancoupwhichwasaidedbytheCIAfrom
1949to1958.ItelaboratesontheDullesroleinthecoup,primarilyJohnFosterDulles's,
butthesourcewasprimarilyusedforthelegacyargument,specificallyforreferencetothe
legacyinAmericanforeignpolicy.IthelpsshowtherelationoftheIranianCouptoother
covertoperationscarriedoutbytheCIAduringtheColdWar,andprovidesquotable
statementswhichareextremelyusefulforthewebsite.
Marsh,Steve."TheUnitedStates,IranandOperation'Ajax':InvertingInterpretative
Orthodoxy."MiddleEasternStudies39.3(2003):138.JSTOR.Web.11Sept.2014.This
articlediscussestheUnitedStatesinvolvementinthe1953IranianCoup.Itgoesintodetail
abouttheobjectivesandmotivesoftheTrumanandEisenhoweradministrations.The
articlearguesthatultimately,theUnitedStates'motivationtogetinvolvedinthecoupwas
tostopthespreadofcommunism.TheEisenhoweradministrationhadreachedapoint
whereitsonlytwooptionsinIranwere"writingIranofftocommunismasanexpendable
asset,"orOperationAJAX.Thearticleisrelevantbecauseitdiscussestheleadershipofthe
peoplebehindtheAmericansideofthecoup.Thearticlewaspublishedinarespected
journal,andislikelyreliable.
MatinDaftari,Hedayat."HedayatMatinDaftari:Mossadeq'sLegacyToday."MERIPReports
No.113.IranSincetheRevolution(1983):2425.JSTOR.Web.05Oct.2014.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/3011075?ref=noxroute:449ac2d06abdf97da9e075e
e9bb34590>.InaninterviewwiththegrandsonofMohammadMossadeq,thereasonfor
thecoupof1953inIranwereputintocontextexplainingtheworldhadbeenunder
immensepressureatthetime,andthattheweaknessoftheleadershipinRussiaafterthe
deathofStalinhadcontributedtotheWestthenbeingallowedtotinkerinthebusinessof
themiddleeast.HeydeyatMatinDaftariarguesthatMossadeqonlyhandledthesituations
poorlyduetothelackofhisresources.
McCurdy,Dave."GlasnostfortheCIA."ForeignAffairs73.1(1994):12540.JSTOR.Web.5
Oct.2014.OnetheoryforwhytheCIAdidsomanymorallyquestionablethingsduringthe
ColdWaristhatitwasasecretiveagencythatonlyhadtoanswertoonebranchof
government.Inthe1970's,theUSgovernmenttriedtoaddressthisissuebycreatingthe
HouseIntelligenceCommitteesotheCIAwouldhavetoanswertoCongressalso.Rep.
DaveMcCurdyservedonthiscommitteefortenyearsandinhiswritingaboutwaysthe

CIAmustchangeaftertheColdWar,itpaintsapictureofhowtheCIAwasduringthe
ColdWar.ItwasaninstitutionwiththesinglegoalofbeatingtheSovietsanditwasavery
closedinstitution.McCurdysaysthattheCIAneedstobringinmoreoutsideexperts
becauseduringtheColdWar,theleaderswereveryclosedandinneedofacademicand
businessexpertsasleaders.
McMahon,RobertJ."EisenhowerandThirdWorldNationalists:ACritiqueoftheRevisionists."
PoliticalScienceQuarterly,1989.Web.28Sept.2014.Inthisjournalarticle,theleadership
ofEisenhowerwasgreatlycriticized,sayinghewasa"lazyloof".Thisarticleobviously
hasabiasbysayinghedidn'tcontributetohelprelations,butitalsogoesasfartosay
Eisenhower,eventhoughhighlyregarded,wasactuallyworseningrelationsbetweenthe
USandtheMiddleEast.Thisarticlewasadifferentpointofviewontheleadershiporlack
ofitthatwentintothecoupbeingsuccessful,butinthelongrun,worseningrelations.
MERIP."ACelebrationofPower."MiddleEastResearchandInformationProject(n.d.):
36+14.Web.28Sept.2014.ThissourceisamemoirwrittenbyaPeaceCorpsvolunteer
inIranin1971,18yearsafterthecoupthatdroveMossadeqoutofpower.Theauthor
describesthedilapidatedandoppressivestateofthecountryinthemidstoftheShah'srule.
ThearticledescribestheviolentoppressionoffreespeechbySAVAKagents,the
consolidationofpowertotheShah,andthepoorlivingconditions.Thisisparticularly
relevantbecausethelandreformthatconsolidatedpowerintothehandsoftheShahwas
duetopressurefromtheUnitedStates,andtheUnitedStatescontinuedtogivetheShah
weaponsandaidafterthecoup.AstheCIAwastheprimaryUnitedStatesorganization
involvedwiththecoupinIran,thisarticleisparticularlyrelevanttotheCIAbecauseit
showsthelegacyofitsactions.ThelegacyinIranofwhatwasmostlikelyweakleadership
intheCIAisanoppressive,dilapidatedcountry.Whilenoindividualauthoriscredited,the
articlewaspublishedbytheMiddleEasternResearchandInformationProject,arespected
independentresearchgroup,soitisareliablesource.
Mintz,HelenC."IranMOSSADEQANDOILNATIONALIZATION."IranMOSSADEQ
ANDOILNATIONALIZATION.LibraryofCongress,1987.Web.11Sept.2014.The
NationalizationofIranianoilwasahugepartofwhytheUSandBritishintervened,and
withinthisarticle,theimportanceoftheoilwasheavilydisplayed,andthecoupandmany
othereventswereblamedonthenationalizationofIransoil.Theoilwasnationalized,and
soonafter,thebritishandtheamericansbecameveryangry.Theyviewedmossadeqasa
communistandwantedtogettheirhandsonIransoil,theybelievedtheonlywaythey
couldachievethiswasbykickingoutMossadeqandbyputtinginsomeonewithideas
similartotheirs.

Moaddel,Mansoor."TheoriesofRevolution."Introduction.Class,Politics,andIdeologyinthe
IranianRevolution.NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1993.123.GoogleBooks.Web.13Oct.
2014.Moaddel,MiddleEasternstudiesprofessorattheUniversityofMichigan,providesan
excellentsourcethatlooksatthecausesofthe1979IranianRevolution,whichwasthe
ultimateresultofthe1953Coup.Publishedin1993,itwasbeforetheCIAreleasedmostof
itsresourcessurroundingtheCoup,butsufficientlylateenoughsothatenoughinformation
wasavailabletoformanopinionontheCoup,andenoughtimehadelapsedafterthe
Revolutiontoseemostofitseffects.Ithelpsassemblemorepiecestothelegacyofthelack
ofleadershipinthe1953Coup,byexploringitseffects.
Mokhtari,Fariborz."Iran's1953CoupRevisited:InternalDynamicsversusExternalIntrigue."
MiddleEastJournal62.3(2008):45788.JSTOR.Web.11Sept.2014.Thisarticle
discussesthesituationinIranbefore,during,andafterthecoupin1953,aswellasthe
BritishandAmericanrole.AfterMossadeqcametopower,theUnitedStatesbegantofear
thatIranwasfallingbehindthecommunistIronCurtain.SecretaryofStatesJohnFoster
DullesaskedtheCIA,ledbyhisbrotherAllenDulles,toformulateacoupforMossadeq's
removalfrompower.ThisarticleisparticularlyrelevantbecauseitdiscussestheAmerican
andCIAleadershipbehindthecoup,aswellastheimmediateeffectsoftheleadership's
decisionsinIran.Thiswaspublishedinarespectedandauthoritativejournal,andis
thereforeatrustworthysource.
Nalapat,M.D."WahhabismKhomeinismIsTheEnemyOfIslam."
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty.RadioFreeEurope,13Mar.2009.Web.23Oct.2014.
Nalapat,directorofaninternationalrelationsdepartmentatanIndianUniversityprovides
anindepthlookattheidealsofWahhabismandKhomeinism,thenamegiventothe
IslamicideologythatemergedfromKhomeini'sriseto,andtimespentinpower.Although
thetwogroupsdonotlikeeachotherasoneisaformofSunniIslamwhiletheotheris
Shi'a,inrealitytheybothpracticeverysimilarthings.Thissecondarysourcewashelpfulin
thatithelpedconnectsomeofthedistantlegacyeventsfromtheIranianCoup.Thisis
becauseitdiscussesidealsthatemergedfromoneofthecoupsbiggesteffects.
Norourzi,Arash."Eisenhower'sDiaryConfessionofCIACoupinIran:Oct.8,1953."
Eisenhower'sDiaryConfessionofCIACoupinIran:Oct.8,1953.TheMossadeghProject,
n.d.Web.13Oct.2014.ThisisanarticlefromthepresidentoftheMossadeghProject,
whichbyitsselfwasnotaveryhelpfularticle,butitincludedaonepageexcerptfrom
Eisenhower'sdiarythreeweeksaftertheIranianCoup.Initheexpresseshisprideinand
admirationofKermitRoosevelt'sleadership.HementionsthatRooseveltdidanincredible
jobdespitebetrayalsatthebeginningofthecoup,whichcontradictsotherinformationwe
havefoundthatshowsthattheissuesatthebeginningofthecoupweremostlyduetoCIA

oversight.ThisshowsthatEisenhowerfullysupportedtheleadershipbehindthecoupand
believedittobeasuccessthatwouldhaveapositivelegacywhichtheUnitedStateswould
benefitfrom.
Norouzi,Arash."Eisenhower'sDiaryConfessionofCIACoupinIran:Oct.8,1953."
Eisenhower'sDiaryConfessionofCIACoupinIran:Oct.8,1953.TheMossadeghProject,
8Oct.2013.Web.13Oct.2014.Inthiswebsitededicatedtoexplainingthetruthabout
whoMossadeghreallywas,theauthorputsaheavyblameonEisenhower,whoinadiary
entryboastsaboutthegreatoperationandanimpliedagent,(KermitRoosevelt)whowas
successfulandquickwitted.TheauthorstatesEisenhowerandmanyotherU.S.officials
weregenerallycocky,andfeltasiftheyhaddonewithbestjobwithease.Wheninreality
theoperationwasverylackluster,andleftIranwithalotofproblemsforthefuture.The
authorarguesthelackoftrueleadershipleadtoalegacyofconfusionandconflictinternal
andexternal.
OperationAjax.Perf.KermitRoosevelt.IRTV,1973.Youtube.Web.13Oct.2014.Inthisshort
clipfromadocumentaryabouttheeventsofthecoup,KermitRooseveltisinterviewed
abouthisrole.HeexplicitlystatesthenumberoneruleforOperationAjaxwastoensure
thattheU.S.wasnotshowninabadlight,thattheU.S.didnotwanttobereflectedbadly
uponiftheoperationfailed.Rooseveltsaysthisoperationwasverycheapanddidn't
requirepersonnel,andwasquiteproudofthatfact.Onthecontrarythough,thenarrator
explainsthesmallnumberofpersonnelwasactuallydetrimental,thattherewasnostrong
leadership,thatthecoupledtomoreconflictinthefuture.
Risen,James."SecretsofHistorytheCIAinIran."NewYorkTimes(2000):n.pag.NewYork
TimesontheWeb.Web.Thisthorougharticlewascompiledfrommanyprimarysources
anddigestedwithoutmuchopinionadded,simplythefacts.Itwasinterestingbecause,
althoughitwasnotwrittenatthetimeofthecoup,ithasthestyleofanewspaperarticle.It
describedthelegacyofthecoupinitsrelationtotheoverallriseofradicalIslaminIran.It
helpedmeunderstandtheimportantdistinctionbetweenSunniandShiamuslims,andalso
thepulloftheAyatollahin1979.Itmadeclearalsothatthecoupwasjustanothereventin
alonghistoryinIranandtheinstabilityanduncertaintyoftheColdWarwhichculminatd
inthe1979revolution.
Risen,James."TryingtoPersuadeaReluctantShah."NewYorkTimesonthe.TheSecretsof
History,theCIAinIran,2000.Web.13Oct.2014.Thisarticlereinforcesothersourceswe
havefoundwhichshowKermitRoosevelttobeanimpulsiveleader,andtheCIAtohave
overlookedmajorissueswhenplanningthecoup.Thecoupwasalreadyinmotionbefore
Eisenhowersignedoffonit,andtwoweeksintotheexpensivepropagandacampaignand

protestswhichmayhaveincludedCIAagentsposingascommunistsandblowingupa
building,theshahstillhadcoldfeet.Herefusedtosigntheproperpaperswhichwould
inditeMossadeghandittooktwoweeksforRooseveltandtheCIAtoconvincehim.This
showstheShah'sweakleadership,andtheCIAslackofplanningintheirleadership.
Roberts,G."Moscow'sColdWaronthePeriphery:SovietPolicyinGreece,Iran,andTurkey,
19438."JournalofContemporaryHistory46.1(2011):5881.Web.21Sept.2014.This
sourceprovidedanewviewpointofIran'sroleintheColdWar,bysummarizingtheSoviet
thoughtprocessonIran,amongotherstates.ProfessorRobertsemphasizesthatIranwasa
secondaryobjectivefortheUSSR,incontrasttomoreimportantgoalsinEasternEurope.
Overall,RobertscreatesanimportantperspectiveofIran'srolerelativetothelargerCold
War.
Ruehsen,MoyaraD."Operation'Ajax'Revisited:Iran,1953."MiddleEasternStudies29.3
(1993):46786.JSTOR.Web.11Sept.2014.ThisarticlepublishedinthejournalMiddle
EasternStudieswasveryhelpfulinprovidingcontextaboutthecoupandsheddingsome
lightaboutwhoexactlywasinvolved,andtheextenttowhichtheywere.While
Eisenhower,JohnFosterDulles,andAllenDulleswereallinterestedintheregiondueto
thethreatofcommunism,thearticledescribeshowtheUnitedStateshadtobeswayedby
theBritishtobeinvolvedinthecoup.ThearticledescribesthepoorleadershipoftheCIA
indecidingtoinitiateOperationAJAX.KermitRoosevelt,whowashighlyinvolvedinthe
coup,saidthat,atthemeetingwhereJohnFosterDullesdetailedhisplansforthecoup,
many"iftheyhadfeltfreeorhadthecouragetospeak,wouldhaveopposedthe
undertaking."MuchoftheCIA'sactionsduringthecouparedetailed.AlmostallCIA
actionswerecovertandindirect.ThissuggeststhattheCIA'sprimaryinterestwasmaking
thebestdecisionforIran,itwassimplytoeliminatetheexistingproblemasefficientlyand
quietlyaspossible.Manypeopleintheorganizationdidnotliketheideaofthecoup,but
wentalongwithitbecausetheysawnobetteroption.Thisisanexampleofweak
leadershipbytheCIA,andbyinstallingtheShahintopower,anegativeandoppressive
legacyinIranwouldblossomfromthelackofleadership.
Sanchez,Raf."BritishDiplomatsTriedtoSuppressDetailsofMI6RoleinIranCoup."The
Telegraph.TelegraphMediaGroup,19Aug.2013.Web.05Oct.2014.Sanchez,anational
newsreporterforTheTelegraph,aBritishnewspaper,discussesBritishinvolvementinthe
Iraniancoup.Althoughthismaynotsoundintegral,heisoneofthefewsourcesthat
specificallydiscussesMI6'sinvolvementintheIranianCoup.Sanchezdiscussestheir
pursuitofkeepinginformationabouttheCoupconfidential,andactivedenialoftheir
involvement,howeveritisworthnotingthatthisarticlewaspublishedseveralweeks

beforetheCIAdeclassifiedalldocumentsrelatedtothecoup.Thissourcepertainsmuch
moretoleadership,asitbrieflydiscussesMI6'sroleinassistingtheCIAinthecoup.
Schlesinger,Arthur,Jr."EffectiveNationalSecurityAdvising:AMostDubiousPrecedent."
PoliticalScienceQuarterly115.3(2000):34751.JSTOR.Web.28Sept.2014.Thisarticle
discussesPresidentEisenhower'sleadershipstructureduringhistimeintheWhiteHouse,
andhisuseoftheCIA,incontrastwithhissuccessor,JohnF.Kennedy.Eisenhower,
reluctanttouseconventionalforce,oftenturnedtotheCIAasatoolforinternational
interventionthecoupinIranwasanexampleofthis.DuringEisenhower'spresidency,the
CIA'scovertoperationsdrewcriticismfrommembersofEisenhower'sBoardof
ConsultantsonForeignIntelligenceActivities,someofwhicharguedthattheCIA'saffairs
werecostlyandnotjustifiable.ThearticleisparticularlyrelevanttothecoupinIran
becauseitcriticizestheAmericanleadershipandtheCIA,sayingthatthe"freewheeling"
CIAhada"destructiveimpactontheoverallconductofforeignaffairs."Thisdestructive
impactwasdueinlargeparttoalackofstrongleadershipintheCIA.Thisarticlewas
foundinarespectedjournal,andthefactualinformationisreliabledespitetheauthor's
bias.
Shoamanesh,SamS."Iran'sGeorgeWashington:RememberingandPreservingtheLegacyof
1953."MITInternationalReview(2009):n.pag.Web.5Oct.2014.Thisonlinejournal
providesasummaryoftheeventsandeffectsofthe1953Iraniancoup.Shoamanesh,an
adviserattheInternationalCriminalCourt,statesthatthelegacyofthecoupcreateda
blowbackforUSIranrelationsanddirectlyimpededthedevelopmentofIranianpolitical
andnationalistdevelopment.Additionally,heclaimsthatthecoupcreatedanexcuseused
bymoderndayIranianleaderstoavoidaccountabilityforthemyriadnationalissues,and
influencedIranianculturetodevelopa"mistrustfulmind"mindset,preventingthemfrom
trustingoutsideforcesandinhibitingIraniandevelopmentininternationalaffairs.
Simkin,John."SpartacusEducational."SpartacusEducational.N.p.,Sept.1997.Web.11Sept.
2014.ThisarticlepointsouthowtheCIA,aftertryingoutmanycoups,nowheldasenseof
secrecyamongthepublic.Theamountofconspiracytheoriesbegantorise,andasthis
articlestates,theassassinationofJFKcouldhavebeenacoverupbythegovernment,and
theybeganthisstyleoflyingoncetheybegancovertoperationsinothercountries.
Smith,andRedfield."IranCoupD'etat1953."Utexas.edu.UniversityofTexas,n.d.Web.11
Sept.2014.Thisbroadarticleheldsomeinterestinginsightsintothe1953coup.It
addressedpartofthelegacyofthecoup,thatitplantedantiAmericansentiment.This
wouldprovetobeaveryimportantissueleadingtothe1979IslamicRevolution.Another
thingthisarticleaddressesisthefactthatmanyoftheleadersinvolvedontheIranianside

withthecoupwere,infact,exnazis.Thisshowsjusthowdeepthefearofcommunismran
withAmericanleaders,thattheywerewillingtoconsortwithexnazisinordertoachieve
thegreatergood.
Smith,Gaddis."TheShadowofJohnFosterDulles."ForeignAffairs52.2(1974):40308.
JSTOR.Web.27Sept.2014.G.G.Smith,professorEmeritusofHistoryatYale,providesa
descriptionofJohnDullesintheAmericanpoliticalmachine.SmithcharacterizesJ.Dulles
asapoliticallydriven,hardline,passionateleaderintheAmericangovernmentwhose
viewswereextremelyinfluentialinAmericanforeignrelations.Thisjournal,however,
createsaconnectionbetweenJ.Dulles'sleadershipandmanyofthenegativelegaciesof
theEisenhoweradministration,includingtheIraniancoup,citingthesomewhat
contradictorystancesofEisenhowerandJ.Dulles.
Smith."IranCoupD'etat1953."Utexas.edu.UniversityofTexas,n.d.Web.11Sept.2014.This
broadarticleheldsomeinterestinginsightsintothe1953coup.Itaddressedpartofthe
legacyofthecoup,thatitplantedantiAmericansentiment.Thiswouldprovetobeavery
importantissueleadingtothe1979IslamicRevolution.Anotherthingthisarticleaddresses
isthereasonsfortheUnitedStatestogetinvolvedinIraninthefirstplace.Oneshiftinthe
UnitedStatespolicyoccurredwhenEisenhowercameintoofficeafterTruman.
Eisenhowersleadershipwasalsoreflectedintheleadersheelected,suchastheDulles.
Sonnenberg,Ben."OSSintoCIA."GrandStreet2.2(1983):17786.JSTOR.JSTOR.Web.21
Sept.2014.<http://www.jstor.org.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/25006495>.Ben
Sonnenberg'sarticleprovidesaninsightfullookattheearlyrootsoftheCIA.Ofparticular
interestisthearticle'sdescriptionofDonovan'sleadershipandsentimentsintheinception
oftheCIA.ThearticleprovidesrichdetailsaboutDonovan'smotivations,struggles,
conflicts,andvalues,andhowhisinfluencereflecteditselfintheCIAsmodusoperandi,
andthereforeitslegacyasanorganization.Thisisanauthoritativesecondarysource,
publishedinawellknownandrespectedjournal.
Tehranian,Majid.Rev.ofEmpireandNationhood:TheUnitedStates,GreatBritain,andIranian
Oil,19501954,byMaryA.Heiss.IranianStudies3.3/4(2000):51012.JSTOR.Web.7
Jan.2015.TehranianbasicallygivesasummaryofHeiss'sbook,comprehensively
describingherargumentsavespecificdetails.Thisreviewwashelpfulinthatitpointsout
therelationshipbetweenradicalIslamintheMiddleEastandglobalism,andstatesthatthe
crisisintheMiddleEastanticipatedthelargerglobalclashbetweenthetwosystems.

"TextofGorbachev'sFarewellAddress."TheNewYorkTimes.TheNewYorkTimes,25Dec.
1991.Web.07Jan.2015.FollowingtheendoftheColdWar,fromanewlensewecansee
howtheIraniancouptrulychangedthecourseofourhistorystartingwiththecoldwar.
Becauseofourimpulsiveleadershipandourimpulsiveactions,theeventsintheColdwar
couldhavebeendeterminedbytheleadershipofthecoupandtheactions.Becauseofthe
coup,whichleadersbelievedtobeasuccessatfirstwasthenseenasafailure,sinceit
obviouslycreatedmanynewproblemsinthearea.Howeveritwastoolate,these
destructiveideologieshadalreadyspilledintotheplanningoftheColdWar.
Takeyh,Ray."WhatreallyhappenedinIran:theCIA,theousterofMosaddeq,andthe
restorationoftheShahRayTakeyh."ForeignAffairsJulyAug.2014.GlobalIssuesin
Context.Web.11Sept.2014.Thissourcegoesintodetailaboutthethoughtprocessesand
whathappenedinthecoupfromapoorIranianperspective.Thistalksabouthowthe
majorityofcommoniranianswereveryawareofthiscoup,anddidnotwantMossadeq
ousted.IttalksabouthowMossadeqwasevenusedasasignofpeaceandprosperityin
manycases.TheleadershipofZahediwasalsoaddressedandhowhisrulewaslackluster
insubstancetomoveIranforwardeconomically,politically,andsocially.Theiranians
knewhewasafigurehead,buthewasstillexpectedtohelpserveIrananditsinterests.
"WahhabismKhomeinismIsTheEnemyOfIslam."RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty.N.p.,n.d.
Web.23Oct.2014.Thisarticlegavemeamorecomplexunderstandingoftheviewsof
someIranians.Obviously,allIraniansarenotradicalmuslims,butthisarticleshowedme
anevenmorenuancedperspectiveonthecultureofIslaminthepostrevolutionworld.It
talkedabouthowthemilitarizedradicalpanArabicWahhabibrandpropagatedby
KhomeiniisverydifferentfromthemoremoderatespiritualbrandofIslam,whichiswhat
trueislamis.Itsaysthatpartofthe1953coupslegacywas,notonlyaddingtothe
eventualresultoftherevolution,butalsoitembitteredtiesbetweentheUnitedStatesand
IransomuchsothatmanyAmericanshaveatwistedviewofIranians.Thissourceshowed
thatthelegacyofthecoupismuchmoreculturallycomplexthanweinitiallythought.
Ward,StevenR.Immortal:AMilitaryHistoryofIranandItsArmedForces.WashingtonD.C.:
GeorgetownUP,2009.Print.Reviewingthisbookwasverybeneficialtomyresearchfor
thisproject.Thiswasaveryhighqualitysource,withmanyotherindepthsourcesbacking
itup.Thisbookwaspublishedbyauniversity,soalltheinformationinthisbookwasvery
specificandauthoritative.Whileonlyafewchaptersweredirectlylinkedtoourtopic,each
chapterheldrelevantspecificinformation.Fromthissource,Iwouldsayitsstrongestpoint
isthequantityofinformationleadinguptoeachevent.Thisbookwasveryheavyon
explainingtheleadershipthatwasrequiredforthecoupandeventsleadinguptoit,butalso
explainingthelegacyandaftermath.

Weiner,Tim."C.I.A.DestroyedFileson1953IranCoup."TheNewYorkTimes.TheNewYork
Times,28May1997.Web.11Sept.2014.Thiswasaveryinterestingarticlethatexposes
howcorrupttheCIAcanbe.Ithabituallyneedsmorespaceinitssafesandburnsallof
itsdocuments.ThisisadirectlegacyoftheOSSandWildBillDonovansidealsabouta
cowboyorganizationthatcollectsintelligence,actsfirstandthinkssecond.Thisarticle
wasalsointerestingbecauseUSleadersdidnotofficiallyacknowledgethatAmericawas
behindthecoupuntil2012.ItdiscussestheinternalworkingsoftheCIAandhowitspread
thecoupasasuccesswhenitfirsthappened,whichcreatedalegacyoftheUnitedStates
overthrowinggovernmentsallaroundtheworldoncethisprecedentwasset.
Weiner,Tim."PartTwo"AStrangeKindofGenius""LegacyofAshes:TheHistoryoftheCIA.
NewYork:Doubleday,2007.N.pag.Print.It'snowonderthatthisbook,basedon50,000
originaldocumentsandprimaryreporting,wonthePulitzerPrize.Thisbookisorganized
byUSpresidentandhowtheCIAinteractedwitheachadministration.Thechaptersabout
EisenhowerwerehelpfulinunderstandinghowtheCIAmanipulatedandwhitewashed
informationinordertopreserveacertainpublicimageandtocarryoutdubiousoperations.
ThisbookalsohasaninformativechapterontheIraniancoupandwhyitwastheCIA's
onlysuccessfulcoup.
Wilber,DonaldNewton."VII.ApparentFailure."ClandestineServiceHistory:Overthrowof
PremierMossadeqofIran,November1952August1953.Washington,D.C.?:Central
IntelligenceAgency,ClandestineService,1969.4464.Print.Inthenewlydeclassified
documentsexplainingtheentiresituation,inthechapter:APPARENTFAILURE,Donald
Wilberexplainshowatfirst,duringthenightwhenthemilitarywassupposedtobesetup,
bureaucraticfailuresledtolittletononeofthenecessarypersonnelshowingupoutsidethe
compound.Heexplainsthatiswaspandemoniumandeveryoneinvolvedwasrunning
aroundblindlywithoutanycleardirection.Overall,Donaldshowstheentiresituationwas
draggedoutlongerthanithadtobe,allbecauseofbureaucraticinconsistenciesandthe
lackofastrongleadertoguidethemission.
Wilbert,Caroline."HowStuffWorks"HowtheCIAWorks""HowStuffWorks.N.p.,n.d.Web.
11Sept.2014.Thiswasapodcastwelistenedto,anditgavegreatinsightonhowtheCIA
operates,andwhytherewereweaknessesintheCIAsleadershipwhenitwasfirstcreated.
ItisstatedthattheamountofthingsthathadbeengoingonaroundthecreationoftheCIA
developedastressfulenvironmentfortheworkers,andtheleadersbecamelessefficient,
ruleswerepassedlazily,andtheCIAwasamessforawhile.Thiswouldhelpexplainthe
lackoffunctionalityatthetimeoftheIraniancoup,whentheleadershipwasamess,and
thefollowingyearswereinthewakeofadestructivebeginning.

Weldin,Zelda."Turkey:LandmarkTrialof1980MilitaryCoupLeadersBegins."GlobalLegal
Monitor:.N.p.,n.d.Web.07Jan.2015.ThisarticleexploresthelegacyoftheIraniancoup
inAmericanForeignpolicyandhowitindirectlyledtothe1980coupinTurkey.Itwasnot
astraightcauseandeffect,ratheraprecedentsentbytheIraniancoupwhichcreateda
cultureinwhichtheTurkishcoupcouldhappen.Thisalsogaveusgoodhistoricalcontext
inunderstandingwheneventsinthecoldwartookplaceandhowtheactionmovedaround
theworld.
Wilford,Hugh."IKnewThatTheyLovedMe."AmericanHistory48.6(2014):50.Academic
OneFile.Web.21Sept.2014.Oneofthefewsourcesthatactuallydoesso,"Iknewthat
theylovedme"providesanindepthlookatwhyKermitRoosevelt,anactiveArabistand
antiimperialist,wouldhelpcauseacoupthatprettymuchdestroyedeverythinghewas
workingfor.WrittenbyHughWilford,aprofessionalhistorian,thesecondarysourceis
bothauthoritative,andstillquitebroad.Itsimultaneouslynarratestheeventsofthe1953
coupandinterspersesitwithadiscussionofRooseveltsmotivations.
Woods,Jennifer."TheUnitedStatesandtheOverthrowofPrimeMinisterMossadeghin1953."
(2008):n.pag.UMBC,17May2008.Web.21Sept.2014.Whilenotwrittenbyan
acclaimedhistorian,thissourcealsoprovidesauthoritativeinsightintothelegacyshortly
afterthecoup.Alsopotentiallyhelpfularethesourcesprovidedbytheauthor.Mostare
citationstobooksandscholarlyjournals,allofwhichlooktobeveryusefulsources.
Young,Michael."CentralIntelligenceArabists:HowtheCIATiltedtowardtheArabsinthe
1950sand'60s."ReasonApr.2014:56.StudentEdition.Web.21Sept.2014.Theviewof
theauthoressentiallyisthat"spiescannotsubstitutefordiplomats."Thissourceisareview
ofabookbyhistorian,HughWilford.Itdoesagoodjobofcondensingoneargumentinthe
book,theroleof"Arabists"intheCIA.ItprovideshistoricalcontexttotheIraniancoup
regardingotherwaystheCIAwasdismissiveofotherMiddleEasternleaderswhodidnot
sharetheirhateoftheSovietstheresultssuchasNasseracceptingtheCzecharmsdeal.
Zahrani,MostafaT."TheCoupThatChangedtheMiddleEast:Mossadeqv.TheCIAin
Retrospect."WorldPolicyJournal19.2(2002):9399.JSTOR.Web.11Sept.2014.Inthis
article,Dr.MostafaT.Zahrani,formerIraniandiplomatattheIranmissiontotheUnited
NationsandthedirectorgeneraloftheIranianInstituteofPoliticalandInternational
Studies,arguesthatthe1953CoupinIrandirectlyleadtotheriseofradicalIslamandthe
tensecurrentIranianU.S.relations.Whilethearticledidgointosomedetailaboutthelack
ofCIAleadershipbehindthecoup,itwasprimarilyusefulbecauseoftheexplicit
connectionsitmadeaboutthelegacyofthecoup.ZahranistatesthattheUnitedStatesand

theCIA'sinvolvementin1953madeIraniansextremelydistrustfulofAmericans,which
directlyledtothe1979hostagecrisis.Also,Zahranimentionsthat"Washingtonresisted
joiningwithBritaintounseatMossadeq"untilthefinalmonthsbeforethecoup,andthat
UnitedStatesmotivesarestillgenerallyunclear.Thisisextremelyindicativeofaglaring
lackofleadershipbytheCIAandtheotherassociatedAmericanorganizations.
Additionally,theradicalAyatollahRuhollahKhomeiniemergedasa"powerfuldissenting
voice"inthemidstofthechaosofthecoup,whichledtotheriseofradicalIslaminIran
andantiAmericansentiments.Zahraniexplicitlytiesthelegacyoftheemergenceof
radicalIslamtotheconditionscausedbythelackofleadershipinthecoupof1953.Thisis
adirectconnectionbetweenthelackofCIAleadershipinthecoupandalegacyof
extremistIslam,whichisexactlytheevidencewewerelookingfortodefendourthesis.
Zirinsky,Michael.Rev.ofMohammedMossadeqandthe1953CoupinIran,byMark
GasiorowskiandMalcolmByrne.IranianStudies39.39(2006):15054.JSTOR.Web.7
Jan.2015.ZirinskyhighlightsinhisreviewofByrneandGasiorowski'sbookthemoral
hypocrisythatwasapparentwithintheUnitedStatesgovernmentwhentheyoverthrew
MohammedMossadeq,ademocraticallyelectedleaderandsupporterofliberalvalues.
PerhapsmostimportantwasthedescriptionofByrneandGasiorowski'sapparent
perspectivesofthedifferentpartiesinvolvedinthecoup,whicharedecidedlycritical.

Annotated Bibliography

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Annotated Bibliography

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Barkan,En,Hernandez,Kaplan,Yannix1

You might also like