ABSTRACT The study investigates the impact corporate reputation has on cognitive, affective and behavioural customer reactions after price increases. Specifically, it includes inferred motive, price fairness, anger and purchase intentions. On the basis of equity theory, attribution theory and the theory of cognitive dissonance, the conceptual model is developed and tested using an experimental design set in the airline industry. Partial Least Squares serves to determine direct, mediated and moderating effects. Findings confirm that the more favourable the perceived reputation, the less likely customers are to attribute negative motives for the price increase or price unfairness. A larger price increase does not diminish the impact reputation has on perceived price fairness or on purchase intentions. Reputation also has an effect on anger mediated by price fairness. Firms should consider corporate reputation in pricing strategies as analysis of reputation can assist in forecasting consumer reactions to price increases and in augmenting profitability. INTRODUCTION Effective revenue and price management requires correct forecast of customers reactions to price changes (Homburg et al, 2005). Although price increases are typically three to four times more effective in increasing profitability
than a proportionate increase in sales
volume (Marn and Rosiello, 1992), the actual profit leverage depends on customers behavioural responses towards the specific price change. It is essential to understand possible negative customer reactions to price increases such as deteriorated customer attitudes, defection, unfavourable word of mouth or boycotts, as well as the factors that aid in preventing them (Dodds et al, 1991; Bolton and Lemon, 1999; Kohli and Suri, 2011). To date, however, customer reactions to price increases received relatively little scholarly attention. In this regard, the effects of perceived corporate reputation should be of considerable managerial and academic interest. A favourable corporate reputation may increase customers value perceptions, willingness to pay and purchase intentions despite the price variation (for example, Landon and Smith, 1997; Eberl and Schwaiger, 2005; Graham and Bansal, 2007). It is often expected that a firm with a favourable reputation can charge a price premium (Shapiro, 1983; Neville et al, 2005; Cheema, 2008) because reputation signals high quality of products and services (Shapiro, 1983) and creates customerperceived value (Petrick, 2002). Although numerous studies have attempted to determine the exact nature of the relationship
between corporate reputation and financial
success (for example, Vergin and Qoronfleh, 1998; Eberl and Schwaiger, 2005), research providing empirical evidence regarding the effects of reputation on individual stakeholder perceptions is relatively scarce (Eberl and Schwaiger, 2005; Walsh and Beatty, 2007), specifically in pricing-related literature. Campbell (1999) found reputation to moderate the impact of inferred relative firm profits on the motive consumers inferred for the price increase in an auction setting with one-time purchase opportunities. In addition, Cheema (2008) showed that price surcharges affect purchases more for sellers with lower customer ratings, a measure used as a proxy for seller reputation. On the basis of these initial findings, we address the following research question: How does perceived corporate reputation affect customers reactions to price increases? The study makes the following contributions: First, in response to criticism that studies in pricing typically only include product-related benefit and price perceptions of customers (Alba et al, 1994), our focus on corporate reputation adds a broader perspective. Second, in adding to extant knowledge regarding the interplay of reputation and customers willingness to pay (Landon and Smith, 1997; Graham and Bansal, 2007), we
empirically investigate the impact of corporate
reputation on cognitive, affective and behavioural customer reactions after price increases. Finally, this investigation of corporate reputation provides a response to Taylor and Kimes (2011), who advise researchers and managers to focus on pricing fairness and its determinants because of the strong relationship to purchase intentions. LITERATURE REVIEW As has been well established, price increases have a significant and immediate impact on profitability of the firm. Of all the tools available to marketing managers, pricing has the most immediate impact on both the top and bottom lines (Kohli and Suri, 2011, p. 2). However, price increases are also risky as they tend to affect customers value perceptions (Petrick, 2002). According to prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which postulates that people have a tendency to strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains, it would seem that price increases have a larger impact on customers value perceptions than gains in product utility (Monroe, 2005). As price increases ceteris paribus decrease customers perceived value, they negatively impact attitudes towards the firm (Dodds et al, 1991), leading to dissatisfaction, complaints and negative
word-of-mouth intentions (Bolton and
Lemon, 1999; Xia et al, 2004). In most circumstances, raised prices will decrease demand and increase switching (for example, Maxwell, 2002). In some cases, more drastic reactions such as product boycotts may result (Xia et al, 2004). Such behavioural reactions following a price increase are of specific managerial interest because they directly impact profitability (Kohli and Suri, 2011). The size of the price increase plays a central role when studying customer reactions (for example, Dawes, 2009). In addition, price fairness judgments which involve a comparison of a price or procedure with a pertinent standard, reference, or norm (Xia et al, 2004, p. 1) are a recurring variable in research studies (Campbell, 1999; Homburg et al, 2005; Campbell, 2007). As Taylor and Kimes (2011, p. 272) pointed out, (p)erceived fairness is paramount to longterm revenue maximization. If a price is perceived to be unfair, the process of price determination is also most likely to be perceived as unfair (Maxwell, 2002). According to the dual-entitlement principle (Kahneman et al, 1986), a firm cannot increase its profits by arbitrarily violating the entitlement of its customers to the terms of the reference transaction and reference price. Customers will accept passed-on cost increases, but will perceive price
increases as unfair if they serve to maximize seller
profits (Martins and Monroe, 1994). Thus, customer reactions do not depend on the absolute price increase but on the context. In cases when motives are perceived as fair (as, for instance, in the case of increased costs for raw materials) more favourable customer reactions can be expected compared with cases when they have no information on motives or perceive these as unfair (Maxwell, 2002). A perspective largely neglected in the literature takes into account the emotional reactions associated with price increases (ONeill and Lambert, 2001; Xia et al, 2004). Emotions are mental states of readiness that arise from appraisals of events or ones own thoughts (Bagozzi et al, 1999, p. 184). Depending on their emotional state, customers will perceive the same price differently (Namkung and Jang, 2010). Emotions may also be an outcome of price variation (Campbell, 2007). For instance, price increases may evoke negative emotions (Xia et al, 2004) such as anger. Finally, evaluations of the firm are also relevant for customer reactions such as satisfaction (Homburg et al, 2005), past pricing strategies (Urbany and Dickson, 1991) or reputation (Xia et al, 2004). Corporate reputation is a global perception of the extent to which an organisation is held in high esteem or regard (Weiss et al, 1999, p. 75)
and as such reflects its relative success in fulfilling
the expectations of multiple stakeholders (Walsh and Beatty, 2007). It is a socio-cognitive construct based on the impressions people share about a firm (Highhouse et al, 2009). Summarising different definitions, Gotsi and Wilson (2001, p. 25) conclude that corporate reputation is a stakeholders overall evaluation of a company over time. This evaluation is based on the stakeholders direct experiences with the company, any other form of communication and symbolism that provides information about the firms actions and/or a comparison with the actions of other leading rivals. While information sources used for assessing a firm may differ for each stakeholder and different reputational perceptions may exist for the same firm, it has been suggested that a core set of reputation attributes are shared across stakeholders. Regarding these shared attributes, reputational perception among stakeholders is aligned (Bromley, 2001; Highhouse et al, 2009). The quality of products and services is one of these shared attributes (Helm, 2007). All stakeholder groups, but specifically customers, associate high-quality offerings with a good corporate reputation (Yoon et al, 1993; Neville et al, 2005). Reputation facilitates decision-making processes
of customers and serves as a heuristic stimulating
purchase behaviour (Chun, 2005). Increased customer acquisition, satisfaction and loyalty, improved product and brand attitudes, higher repurchase and cross-buying intentions, positive word of mouth, and increased willingness to pay are effects of corporate reputation associated with customer demand and firm profitability (for example, Yoon et al, 1993; Vergin and Qoronfleh, 1998; Chun, 2005; Jeng, 2008). The last mentioned effect, willingness to pay, coincides with extant research purporting that corporate reputation enables companies to establish a price premium for their products and services (Landon and Smith, 1997; Eberl and Schwaiger, 2005; Graham and Bansal, 2007) or increase acceptance of partitioned prices (Cheema, 2008). Customers acceptance of a price is determined by perceptions of the value proposition offered by the firm (Graham and Bansal, 2007). Before purchase, customers compare anticipated costs associated with obtaining (and using) the product or service and the anticipated utility received in return (Woodruff, 1997). The most common interpretation of perceived value is the ratio or trade-off between product or service quality and price (for example, Sweeney and Soutar, 2001). However, additional factors may add to better understanding of customers value perceptions.
Petrick (2002), for instance, suggested that corporate
reputation is a dimension of perceived value but, in a later study, failed to determine a direct effect of reputation on perceived value. However, reputation strongly affected quality perceptions (Petrick, 2004). Hansen et al (2008) argued that corporate reputation should have a direct effect not only on the benefit side of the value equation but also on the cost side, and explained that if a suppliers reputation is superior to its competitors less resources will be allocated towards safeguarding activities. That in turn reduces monitoring costs for customers. The authors find a strong direct effect of corporate reputation on perceived customer value in business services. As companies with a favourable reputation offer customers more value, it is to be expected that they can charge higher prices. Although the relationship between corporate reputation and price premiums is increasingly discussed in the literature, the impact of reputation in cases of price increase has remained rather uncertain. Our research adds to the noted study conducted by Campbell (1999) which was limited to a specific setting (one-time auction) and analysed reputation as a moderator of the impact of inferred relative firm profit on inferred motive. We broaden
this perspective and investigate the effect of
corporate reputation on a wider set of reactions in the case of a regular price increase in a more familiar consumption setting. THEORYAND HYPOTHESES We use equity theory, the theory of cognitive dissonance and attribution theory to explain how corporate reputation affects customer reactions to price increases. Equity theory (Adams, 1965) focuses on customer assessments of the costs and benefits of a transaction. Equity theory is based on the concept of social exchange (Homans, 1958), postulating that people evaluate exchange situations by judging the distributive fairness of the exchange. Inequity exists if an individual perceives that their outcomeinput relation is smaller than that of a reference person or the exchange partner (that is, the firm). Perceived inequity leads to tension which as explicated in the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) evokes emotional as well as behavioural reactions (Adams, 1965; Namkung and Jang, 2010). Some possible reactions are dissatisfaction and anger. The extent of emotional reaction depends on the degree of perceived distributive inequity (Adams, 1965). Equity theory has been applied in the context of pricing and reactions to price increases (for example, Martins and
Monroe, 1994; Homburg et al, 2005) and
suggests that a customer compares the relation of outcome and input before and after the price increase. If the net benefit after the price increase is smaller, the customer is expected to perceive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and reduced fairness (Adams, 1965). The extent of the dissonance is affected by attributions made regarding the reasons for the price increase (ONeill and Palmer, 2004). Attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1986) explains how people with limited or no information attempt to find explanations for events that are surprising, negative and/or important to them (Weiner, 1986), and predicts that ascription of causes or causal attributions influence subsequent perceptions and behaviour. Customers make attributions about a broad range of different events such as product and service failures, reasons for brand switching and employee strikes, or celebrities motivations for endorsing products (Dean, 2004). It is likely that customers also make attributions and develop their own subjective interpretation regarding price increases if the actual reasons remain unknown (Campbell, 1999; Maxwell, 2002; Xia et al, 2004). The presumed motives for the price increase are likely to be
consistent with the firms reputation as the
latter derives from the firms past actions (Campbell, 1999). As Xia et al (2004, p. 5) pointed out: A sellers good reputation may [] decrease buyers price unfairness perceptions when a disadvantaged price inequality occurs because customers grant the benefit of the doubt regarding the reasons for the price increase if they like the firm (Campbell, 1999). Comparable findings are reported by Coombs and Holladay (2006) who investigated the role of reputation in the context of product crises and found that a favourable reputation can create a halo shielding the firm from negative customer reactions. One might, however, also come to the contrary conclusion. Customers have high expectations regarding well-reputed companies. As reputation is formed over time, based on what the organization has done and how it has behaved (Balmer and Greyser, 2003), the price increase may violate expectations regarding the firms conduct. In such situations, negative events are graver as people take preexisting attitudes or expectations into account when evaluating new events or objects (Brown and Dacin, 1997). Thus, higher customer expectations regarding future actions might actually disadvantage well-reputed
companies (Coombs and Holladay, 2006). For
instance, the study on product recalls conducted by Rhee and Haunschild (2006) found that, because of the expectancy violation effect, wellreputed firms can suffer a liability relative to badly reputed firms, making reputation a doubleedged sword in that it may have a significant downside. However, the expectancy violation effect could be neutralized in the case of price increases which are rather commonplace in todays markets. Customers often attempt to avoid or reduce dissonance by selective exposure to or re-assessment of information (Festinger, 1957) and they might ignore information that violates or contradicts their expectations regarding a firm they already view favourably (Coombs and Holladay, 2001). This is in line with the theory of motivated reasoning (Jain and Maheswaran, 2000) which postulates that customers are motivated to yield preferred conclusions resulting in biased processing of new information (Dean, 2004). Thus, it is likely that customers will give well-reputed firms the benefit of the doubt and not infer negative motives for a given price increase. Hence, we hypothesize that: Hypothesis 1: The more favourable customers perceptions of corporate reputation, the less negative their perceptions of the firms motive for the price increase.
Reputation is often associated with legitimacy
and consistency (King and Whetten, 2008) explaining why customers are more likely to perceive a price increase as fair if the firm has a favourable reputation. Corporate reputation serves as a heuristic for customers in attributing motives for the price increase. However, this benefit of the doubt should no longer be granted if the price increase reaches a certain level, meaning that the size of the price increase negatively moderates the relationship between reputation and perceived fairness. We hypothesize that: Hypothesis 2a: The more favourable customers perceptions of corporate reputation, the higher their perceptions of price fairness. Hypothesis 2b: The larger the price increase, the weaker the positive effect of corporate reputation on perceived price fairness. If the cause for a negative event is stable and controllable by the firm, customers may develop negative emotions (Weiner, 1986; Folkes et al, 1987) which is also a likely response to price increases. In his explanation of attribution theory,Weiner (1986) stated that customers appraisal of an event and resulting emotions and cognitions are guided by the identified causal dimensions. Anger, for instance, is brought about by negative situations that one believes could have been controlled by someone else
(Watson and Spence, 2007, p. 502). Accordingly,
customers of a well-reputed firm who perceive a price increase as fair (not controllable) should not be likely to experience anger. It is hypothesized: Hypothesis 3: The more favourable customers perceptions of corporate reputation, the lower their anger. This relationship is completely mediated by perceived price fairness. The positive relationship between corporate reputation and (re)purchase intentions has been theoretically and empirically supported in numerous studies (for example, Shapiro, 1983; Yoon et al, 1993; Jeng, 2008). However, as the benefit of the doubt induced by corporate reputation may be attenuated if the price increase surpasses a certain level, negative customer reactions can occur despite a favourable corporate reputation. The more substantial the price increase, the larger the decrease in customer demand, that is, purchase intentions and purchase behaviour (Bolton and Lemon, 1999; Homburg et al, 2005; Dawes, 2009).We hypothesize: Hypothesis 4a: The more favourable customers perceptions of corporate reputation, the higher their purchase intentions. Hypothesis 4b: The larger the price increase, the weaker the positive effect of corporate reputation on purchase intentions. As noted earlier, extant literature accepts the
notion that customer reactions to prices and
price increases depend on the (assumed) reasons or motives for the price increase that determine perceptions of price fairness (Martins and Monroe, 1994; Campbell, 1999; Maxwell, 2002; Xia et al, 2004). Negative motives for the price increase lead to perceptions of unfairness. We hypothesize: Hypothesis 5: The more negative customers view the motive for the price increase, the lower their perceptions of price fairness. Prior empirical analysis of customer reactions to price increases has mostly emphasized cognitive factors such as attribution of motives and fairness (ONeill and Lambert, 2001; Campbell, 2007), neglecting emotional factors (ONeill and Lambert, 2001; Xia et al, 2004). But already Homans (1958) argued that when the outcome of an exchange is lower than expected the recipient is likely to feel anger. As a price increase diminishes the customers outcome/input ratio while potentially benefitting the firm, this unbalanced transaction can lead to perceived unfairness (Adams, 1965), negative emotional reactions such as anger, and decreased purchase intentions. This leads us to hypothesize that: Hypothesis 6: The larger the price increase, the lower perceived price fairness. Hypothesis 7: The larger the price increase,
the greater customers anger.
Hypothesis 8: The larger the price increase, the lower purchase intentions. Customers have been found unlikely to continue patronizing a firm that has behaved in an unfair manner (Kahneman et al, 1986; Campbell, 1999; Taylor and Kimes, 2011). Fairness perceptions are also likely to impact negative emotions such as anger (Xia et al, 2004; Namkung and Jang, 2010) which in turn strongly affect behaviour (Folkes et al, 1987).We therefore expect the effect of fairness perceptions on behavioural intentions to be mediated by anger (Xia et al, 2004) and hypothesize: Hypothesis 9: The higher customers perceptions of price fairness, the higher their purchase intentions. This relationship is partially mediated by anger. The conceptual model for the study is summarized in Figure 1. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY Research design and participants In order to establish the hypothesized relationships, we conducted an experiment utilizing a 22 between-subjects design. We manipulated corporate reputation (favourable versus unfavourable) and price increase (large versus moderate). All groups were completely randomized. In accordance with prior experimental studies
(for example, Dollinger et al, 1997; Campbell,
1999; Taylor and Kimes, 2011), we employed a scenario design. We chose the airline industry as the setting because corporate reputation is specifically important in airline services due to customers high-risk perceptions (Lee, 2005; Neville et al, 2005). Specifically, as the introduction of lowcost, new entrant airlines, price variations are common in this industry (Brunger and Perelli, 2009) and the price discrimination tactics broadly employed emphasize the role of perceived fairness, customer trust (McMahon-Beattie, 2011) and corporate reputation. We used a student sample to achieve homogeneity of the sample; prior studies in reputation research as well as pricing have successfully employed student samples as well (Campbell, 1999; Maxwell, 2002; Graham and Bansal, 2007). In total, 276 business students from two German public universities participated in the study. We excluded 26 questionnaires from further analysis: 12 students indicated that they had not used airlines in the year preceding the study and 14 were excluded due to their incomplete data. This procedure led to a net sample size of 250. Of these, 115 (46 per cent) students were female. Participants were on average 22 years old and their average monthly income was 532. Procedure
Including all possible characteristics of a firms
reputation would have led to extreme complexity of scenarios. As research has shown that stakeholders focus on a limited set of facets when evaluating a firms reputation (Bromley, 2001; Helm, 2007; Highhouse et al, 2009), a core set of attributes were identified in a preliminary study in which we asked 98 students to take on a customer role and list important attributes of corporate reputation. We identified customer orientation, product quality, fair treatment of employees and perceived value for money as the most relevant reputational attributes. Because the evaluation of reputation may be based on different information sources such as personal experience, word of mouth, a firms media profile or public relations activities (Bennett and Kottasz, 2000), we designed the scenario to imply that participants gained information about the firm from several information sources. Each subject received a questionnaire booklet with the description of a specific transaction with a fictitious airline. All participants were asked to imagine that, in 2 months, they intended to visit their best friend who was spending a semester abroad in London. Their online search for a good connection led them to a ticket offer from the fictitious airline. Participants were told that they were familiar with this
airline because several of their friends had used it
in the past and they had also seen the airlines commercials. Furthermore, they had recently read an article on current airline rankings conducted by an independent testing facility. To manipulate reputation positively, participants were told that, as in recent years, passengers ranked the airline first in service and value for money. The airline was also described as a very popular employer. In the negative reputation scenario, the airline was said to have been ranked last and was a very unpopular employer. To establish price and price increase of the ticket, we used real market data generated from a German Internet flight agency. The average price for the one-way ticket to London was 55 and price increases between 4.8 and 20 per cent were recorded over the time period of the research project. Accordingly, we manipulated the price increase by informing participants that the airline increased prices by 3 and 10, respectively. Specifically, participants were told that shortly before they intended to book their flight to London, they learned that the airline had announced price increases so that the ticket would now cost [3/10] more (the price rose from 55 to 58/65 including taxes and fees). To facilitate subjective attributions of motive and fairness, we did not provide information
regarding reasons for the price increase.
Measurements of the dependent variables and the constructs for manipulation checks were based on established scales (see Table 1 for individual items and literature). Specifically, we used a global measure for corporate reputation to reflect shared meanings as reputation, according to Weiss et al (1999, p. 75), tends to be regarded as a unidimensional, not multidimensional, construct. All items were measured on seven-point scales with 1 indicating low or unfavourable values and 7 indicating high or favourable values. Finally, the questionnaire contained demographic information, participants average annual flight frequency, measures for the realism of the scenario and participants understanding of the goal of the research. Results First, we checked the realism of the scenarios. Participants regarded the scenario as realistic and they could imagine the situation well (realistic = 5.74, imagine =5.48). Second, we ensured that our manipulations of reputation and price increase were successful. We established a significant main effect of the factor corporate reputation on perceived reputation (F(1; 246)=556.642, P<0.001) whereas the main effect of the size of the price increase was not significant (F(1; 246)=0.397, n.s.). This means
that perceived reputation was only influenced
by the manipulation of reputation, not the manipulation of price increase. We then confirmed successful manipulation of positive and negative reputation (pos rep=5.52, neg rep= 2.44, t(df =248)=23.486, P<0.001). Manipulation of price increase did not affect reputation (PIlow=3.94, PIhigh =3.90, t(df= 248)=0.187, n.s.). Next, we assessed convergent validity for the construct measures using factor loadings (0.76), t-values (17.56) and composite reliability (CR0.87). To fully satisfy requirements for discriminant validity, average variance extracted (AVE) has to exceed the recommended threshold of 0.5 and to be larger than the variance shared between constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). All squared covariances were smaller than the AVE (AVE0.70). See Table 1 for detailed results. Following Bagozzi et als (1991) suggestions for analysing experimental data, we employed Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis which works well with comparatively small sample sizes and binary variables (see also Lei et al, 2008). As a non-parametric estimation procedure, PLS uses as its conceptual core an iterative combination of principal components analysis that relates
measures to constructs and path analysis that
captures the structural model of constructs. Using the bootstrap procedure packaged in the SmartPLS 2.0 software (Ringle et al, 2005), we calculated the standard deviation and an approximate t-statistic. To assess the structural model, we evaluated path coefficients and t-tests as well as the coefficient of determination (R2). In addition, the predictive relevance of the PLS model can be assessed using the Stone-Geisser sample reuse technique (Q2; Chin, 1998). R2s were larger than 0.3 except for Negative motive and Anger; Q2 was above 0 for all dependent variables (see Figure 2). Corporate reputation, Extent of price increase and Price fairness did not substantially contribute to an explanation of the variance of Anger (22 per cent); Corporate reputation only marginally contributed to an explanation of the variance of Negative motive (5 per cent). Nevertheless, all constructs were retained in the model to facilitate mediation analyses (see below). Figure 2 shows the results for direct effects including path coefficients and significance. To estimate full and partial mediation, the direct effect of Price fairness on Anger and Anger on Purchase intention needed to be included (see dotted lines in Figure 2). Path coefficients indicated that, with the exception of the effect of Corporate reputation on Anger,
Anger on Purchase intention and the effect of
Extent of price increase on Anger, effects were significant at the 5 per cent level. To better understand potential mediated effects, mediation was tested according to the method suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986). Structural equation models allow for simultaneously estimating the direct path (for example, Corporate reputationAnger) and the indirect path (for example, Corporate reputationPrice fairnessAnger). That is, the mediated effect is tested while statistically controlling for the direct path. To establish the mediating effect, the indirect effect must be significant. To test for significance, we applied a Sobel test (Baron and Kenny, 1986). The relationship between Corporate reputation and Anger was fully mediated by Price fairness (z=3.71), meaning that the effect of Corporate reputation on Anger was fully dependent on how customers perceive the fairness of the price increase. Price fairness affected purchase intentions significantly but, contrary to our expectation, the effect was not mediated by Anger. Given that no significant effect of Anger on Purchase intention could be established, there also was no mediation effect. Finally, we checked the proposed moderating effects of Extent of price increase.
Moderating effects impact the strength and/or
direction of the relationship between exogenous and endogenous variables (Baron and Kenny, 1986) and can be estimated based on interaction effects (for example, Lei et al, 2008). The interaction effect can be assessed using the coefficient of determination (R2) to calculate the effect size ( f 2). However, effect sizes of Extent of price increase were negligible ( f 2=0.0034 and 0.0080). DISCUSSION The study results provide support for most of the hypothesized direct effects. Results confirm that perceived corporate reputation plays an important role in understanding customer reactions to price increases. First, we could establish a significant effect of reputation on perceived motives of the firm, supporting Hypothesis 1. The more favourable the perceived reputation, the less likely customers are to attribute negative motives for the price increase. However, the share of variance explained is low, meaning that reputation alone is not sufficient in determining the valence of the motive. Additional factors such as the general economic conditions of the industry or competitors actions might additionally aid customers in attributing motives for price increases. In support of Hypothesis 2a, perceived reputation was found to impact perceived
price fairness. If companies with a
favourable reputation are raising prices, customers are more likely to accept this as a fair move compared with companies with an unfavourable reputation. The moderating effects of the extent of the price increase suggested in Hypothesis 2b could not be established indicating that the relationship between perceived reputation and perceived price fairness is not affected by the extent of the price increase. Even if customers perceive a price increase as larger, this may not diminish the impact reputation has on perceived price fairness. We could also show that perceived corporate reputation has an effect on anger which in confirmation of Hypothesis 3 is completely mediated by perceived price fairness. Reputation alone does not affect the emotional reaction to a price increase; emotional reaction largely depends on perceived fairness of the price increase. In addition, while directly and significantly impacting purchase intentions in support of Hypothesis 4a, the moderating effect of the extent of the price increase suggested in Hypothesis 4b could also not be established. The impact of reputation on purchase intentions is not affected by the extent of the price increase. This may mean that corporate reputation is a stable determinant of purchase intentions
regardless of the size of a price increase.
The extent of the price increase showed a significant negative effect on purchase intentions in support of Hypothesis 8. Perceived price fairness is significantly affected by the extent and the perceived motive for the price increase, supporting Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6. If the price increase appears to be large or customers perceive a negative motive for the price increase, perceived price fairness decreases. The extent of the price increase, however, did not directly affect anger leading us to reject Hypothesis 7. Price fairness directly and significantly affected purchase intentions as well as anger as an emotional reaction to price increases. This means that the more positive the cognitive appraisal of a price increase, the less likely customers are to become angry. We found no significant relationship, however, between anger and purchase intentions, meaning that the mediated effect of anger on the relationship between price fairness and purchase intentions as hypothesized in Hypothesis 9 had to be dismissed. IMPLICATIONS The study results indicate that it pays off for companies to invest in their reputation as it buffers from negative repercussions of price increases. This might be specifically relevant for
industries using dynamic pricing where competitors
face the risk of entering price wars, such as airlines (Burger and Fuchs, 2005). Here, perceptions of fairness and reputation may become particularly important as multiple prices exist for ostensibly identical units of output (McMahon-Beattie, 2011). Given the high effectiveness of price increases in augmenting profitability (Marn and Rosiello, 1992; Homburg et al, 2005), such findings are important in gauging customer reactions. We showed that a favourable reputation enables firms to command higher prices without having to face the negative reactions a badly reputed firm would have to fear. Higher reputation also leads to increased purchase intentions, positively impacting sales. Although pricing has to be modified very carefully (Kohli and Suri, 2011), a firm with a good reputation seems to have more leeway in raising prices. Before establishing price increases, managers should therefore take into account the firms reputational standing. But not only is reputation notoriously hard to monitor (Walsh and Beatty, 2007), a strong emphasis on short-term sales maximization could conflict with the achievement of a favourable reputation (Avlonitis and Indounas, 2005). Managers may feel tempted by the short-term profits resulting from exploitation
of a favourable reputation, specifically as
most incentive schemes implemented in firms today are not necessarily geared to safeguard long-term assets such as reputation. Some industries are in the limelight of public discourse more than others. Price increases that affect broad segments of the population such as travel and mobility, food, insurance or health care are widely discussed by the media and the citizens. Here, favourable corporate reputation can help to reduce negative repercussions. In the long term, however, reputation is also likely to be affected by pricing decisions, calling for a careful approach in communicating price changes. It is important to note that customer perception of the reason underlying a price increase has a strong impact on perceived price fairness. As our study implies, perceptions of motives for the price increase and price fairness are affected by corporate reputation, granting good companies the benefit of the doubt when increasing prices. Airlines and other companies should recognize how important psychological aspects such as perceived corporate reputation are in the establishment of effective pricing strategies (Namkung and Jang, 2010). LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES Our study exhibits limitations and offers several
opportunities for further research. First, general
disadvantages from using a student sample have to be considered, although we may assume acceptable external validity as we ensured that the student participants were familiar with the service category (Lynch, 1999). Using a more heterogeneous customer sample could result in more variance and would also facilitate inclusion of additional personal characteristics. Similarly, general concerns regarding the use of fictitious scenarios and experimental designs apply. As online channels account for the majority of airline ticket sales (Brunger and Perelli, 2009), our scenario was realistic. However, information presented to participants may have been more condensed than is usually the case although airline customers have been found to use rather limited search strategies (Brunger and Perelli, 2009). By including real companies or brands, future studies could focus on the interplay between reputation and participants prior experiences with the firm, thereby shedding light on possible context or expectancy violation effects (Brown and Dacin, 1997; Rhee and Haunschild, 2006). The manipulation of reputation in experimental designs is prone to criticism, given that reputation is thought to evolve over time (Gotsi and Wilson, 2001). Our experimental manipulations aimed at improving internal validity by
identifying shared reputational criteria while
including different hypothetical information sources (Bennett and Kottasz, 2000). As we attempted to create a realistic scenario, we excluded information on the firms motivations in increasing prices which are often not made public. However, this may have decreased the manipulations strength in evoking a strong emotion such as anger. A similar finding was reported by Namkung and Jang (2010). In their study on service fairness, they established a non-significant relationship between negative emotion and behavioural intentions and interpret this as a result of participants variations in emotional expressivity and/or involvement that could obstruct the expression of negative feelings, even on self-reported questionnaire (Namkung and Jang, 2010, p. 1250). A scenario suggesting a self-interested motive of the firm might elicit stronger anger in participants. In addition, anger resulting from the price increase might not impact purchase intentions but variables outside the nomological network of our study, for instance complaint intentions or word of mouth (Watson and Spence, 2007). This suggests that future studies might include additional outcome variables as well as other emotional reactions. The strength of these emotions might also depend on the way the
price increase is communicated to customers,
adding another possible avenue for research. Studies in different industries characterized by more or less price transparency could add to a better understanding of the role of reputation and possible customer reactions. Determination of thresholds between large and small price increases or inclusion of dynamic pricing schemes would offer clear guidance for marketers in optimizing pricing strategies. To date, research on dynamic pricing has only explored revenue impacts (Burger and Fuchs, 2005), but not the effects on other value components, such as reputation. Finally, it would be beneficial to analyse how pricing strategies that focus on short-term profit maximization affect long-term management of intangible assets such as reputation (Doyle, 2008). This would not only be of interest for pricing and reputation management but would also be relevant at the level of corporate governance and public discourse