10Aa

!"u$ u&'(, *(n$, -.un/ 0n. 1n,& 20 0n.

The Gemara will soon cite a dispute of Tanoim about whether the
obligation of Kesubah is Torah or rabbinic law. The statement in
Tosfos heading seems to say that Rav Nachmon in the name of
Shmuel follows the opinion that kesubah is rabbinic law, since he
clearly says that the Sages declared that a Kalloh should receive a
Kesubah.

ibcrs vcu,fs gnan

It is to be understood from Shmuels terminology - the Sages
instituted - that the obligation to pay a kesubah is rabbinic, not
Torah law.
There is another Gemara in Yevamos 89a that would lead us to this
conclusion:
The Mishna there is teaching us about the penalties instituted for a
woman who was informed that her husband was no longer alive by
one witness. She is permitted to marry, because the Sages felt that
she would be very careful to verify the accuracy of the witness
testimony. If she was indeed misled and did not do a proper
investigation, she is subject to many penalties. These too, serve as
an impetus to properly investigate the reported facts surrounding
her husbands death. Among those mentioned in the Mishna is that
she loses her kesubah. The Gemara there explains why.

tngy htn rnte vcu,f vk iht hcd (oau /yp ,unch) vcr vatvc ifu
tn,x tnkt wuf vthmuvk uhbhgc vke tv, tka vcu,f ibcr vk ubhe,
ibcrs vcu,fs rcx x"avs
So too, in Haeshah Rabah (Yevamos 89a), concerning a woman
who married a second husband based on the testimony of one witness
1 injb cr rnt vws wxu, /h

who testified that her first husband died, and the first husband was in
fact alive, in regard to the reason that she does not receive her
kesubah [the Gemara] explains: What is the reason that the
Rabonon instituted the obligation to pay of a kesubah? So that
[ones wife] should not be easy in his eyes to send her away etc. (1)
[In this case when her husband was found to be alive, it emerges that
she married illegally. We do want the husband to divorce her and we
do want to make it as convenient as possible for him to do so. We
therefore rule that he does not have to pay her kesubah.] Apparently,
since the Gemara there also uses the phrase the Rabonon instituted
the payment of Kesubah, the anonymous (2) Gemara holds that
the obligation to pay kesubah is rabbinic.
Tosfos has a difficulty with this conclusion.

t,hhrutsn hfhk uzjs i,tn hzuz ;xf vcu,fc cu,fk udvbs vaeu
This is difficult! For it is standard procedure to write in a
besulahs kesubah, when enumerating the amount to be paid: two
hundred silver zuz, that you are eligible to be paid by Torah law. It
is clear that our kesubah documents state that the kesubah payment is
required by Torah law, (3) whereas Rav Nachmon in the name of
Shmuel and the anonymous Gemara in Yevamos 89a state that the
obligation is rabbinic law.
This contradiction cannot be resolved. Our custom is obviously in
conflict with Rav Nachmon in the name of Shmuel. However,
Tosfos must show that there is in fact a dissenting opinion.

hnb vk h,hhns (:he ;s) tr,c erps whb,ns d"cart ibhfnxs ,"rutu
k"heu t,hhruts vcu,f rcxes theyupe ,ugnn vk i,ub rnts lunxc
u,banc d"carf
Says Rabbeinu Tam: That we rely on Rabon Shimon ben Gamliel
of the Mishna in the last Perek (110b) which will soon be cited in
our Gemara, who says that when a woman was married in
Cappadocia where the coins are worth more than those of Eretz
2 injb cr rnt vws wxu, /h

Yisroel, even if he divorced her in Eretz Yisroel he must pay her

with the coins of Cappadocia, which are of greater value, because
he holds that the payment of kesubah is Torah law, (4) and we rule
in accordance with Rabon Shimon ben Gamliel whenever his
opinion is mentioned in our Mishna.
Rashi ube, ohnfj vws explained that Rav Nachmons ruling that we
believe a Chosson who says that he found the entrance open is
because the kesubah is rabbinic law. If it was Torah law, the
presumption that he is telling the truth, otherwise he would not have
made such a lavish banquet, is not strong enough to free him from a
Torah obligation. If so, Rav Nacmons ruling that we do believe a
Chosson is dependent upon the kesubah being rabbinic law.
Tosfos will now show us that there are those who disagree with Rav
Nachmons ruling. They are obviously of the opinion that kesubah
payment is Torah law and we cannot believe the Chosson who
wishes to free himself from this obligation. According to this
opinion, the text of our kesubah makes perfect sense.

dhkps vtr,c tuvs hat cr tbjfats b"rf ik tnhhe tks h"rut sugu
iugyk kufh ubht anaun tka kf hb, (/ch ;s) t,hhrc inek .r,nsf vhkg
ost iht vezj ibhrnt tku rean tnak ahhjs tnkt ohku,c ,bgy
vshxpnu vsugxc jruy
Furthermore, RI says that we do not rule in accordance with Rav
Nachmon who says that we believe a Chossons claim that his Kalloh
was not a besulah, because we find that Rav Ashi who was a latter
authority argues with [Rav Nachmon], as [Rav Ashi] adjusts the
text of a Baraisa later (12a): Rav Ashi says, we must emend the text
of the Baraisa as follows: Any [Chosson] who was not examined by
the Kallohs attendant to ascertain that he did not destroy the
bloodstained sheets cannot claim that his Kalloh was not a
besulah. We are concerned that the Chosson may cheat and destroy
any evidence that his Kalloh was a besulah. Apparently, [Rav Ashi]
is concerned that [the Chosson] might lie and falsely claim that the
Kalloh was not a besulah, and we do not say that there is a
3 injb cr rnt vws wxu, /h

chazakah that a person would not trouble himself to prepare a

lavish wedding banquet and then ruin it by falsely accusing his
Kalloh of not being a besulah. Rav Ashi clearly holds that there is no
presumption that the Chosson is telling the truth. As explained, that is
because Rav Ashi believes that the kesubah is a Torah obligation.
This is in opposition to Rav Nachmon who holds that it is only a
rabbinic obligation. Since Rav Ashi is a latter authority, we rule in
favor of Rav Ashi that the kesubah obligation is Torah law and we
cannot believe a Chosson who wants to free himself of his Torah
obligation. We therefore write in the text of our kesubos that the
Kalloh is eligible for this payment by Torah law.

injb crst dhkp hat crs rhtn ubhcr ic ejmh ubhcr whp ifu
So too, did Rabbeinu Yitzchok ben Rabbeinu Meir comment that
Rav Ashi disagrees with Rav Nachmon, and we rule in favor of Rav
Ashi.
We have now demonstrated that Rav Nachmons ruling which is
based upon his belief that payment of kesubah is rabbinic law, is not
universally accepted. Rav Ashi holds that we rule in favor of Rabon
Shimon ben Gamliel who holds that payment of kesubah is Torah
law. But the anonymous Gemara in Yevamos 89a seems to rule in
favor of Rav Nachmon who holds that payment of kesubah is
rabbinic law?
Tosfos offers an alternate approach to that Gemara. Let us remind
ourselves that the Gemara in Yevamos 89a seems to say that
kesubah is a rabbinic institution devised to be a deterrent to
frivolous divorce.

tfhv vcu,f ibcr ubhe, y"n (oau /yp ,unch) vcr vatvc ibhrnts tvu
tvh tka ubhe, b"v vthmuvk uhbhgc vke tv, tka vbnktc iudf ubhe,s
:vthmuvk uhbhgc vke tv,a hsf vk
That which the Gemara says in Haeshah Rabah (Yevamos 89a):
4 injb cr rnt vws wxu, /h

Why did the Rabonon institute the payment of kesubah? which

definitely implies that the kesubah payment is rabbinic, the intent of
that Gemara is not that all kesubah payment is rabbinic law, rather it
means that where [the Rabonon] did institute kesubah payment, for
example for a widow who is certainly not entitled to kesubah by
Torah law, they instituted a rabbinic kesubah so that should not be
easy in his eyes to send [ones wife] away. (5) (6) So too, when a
woman married illegally, based on the false testimony of a witness
who said her husband died, they instituted that she should not have
a kesubah, so that it should be easy in his eyes to send her away
and he need not be concerned about the financial burden of paying
her kesubah.
1) The financial burden of paying a kesubah, which is equivalent to a
years sustenance is a deterrent to frivolous divorce.
2) When the Gemara quotes a ruling in the name of any specific
amora, it is not necessarily proof that the Gemara accepts this
ruling as halacha. It is possible that there are others who disagree
with this opinion and the halachic ruling might favor the
opposition. Thus, if we find a dissenting opinion, we have the right
to follow that dissenting opinion. However, when the Gemara
anonymously quotes a ruling, it is a statement that there is a
consensus that this ruling is correct and it is to be followed in
halacha.
3) Tosfos interpretation of these words is extremely literal. We write
to the Kalloh that you are eligible to receive this money by Torah
law. This indicates that the obligation is Torah law. See Rosh 18,
who offers a slightly different explanation of the words that you
are eligible to receive by Torah law. Generally, when we say that
a person has a Torah obligation of any number of shekalim, the
coinage is that of Tyre. When we say that the obligation is
rabbinic, the coinage is of Medina, which is one eighth the value of
Tyre. If we say that the kesubah obligation is Torah law, it must be
paid with coins of Tyre that are worth eight times as much as the
coins of Medina. If we say that the obligation is rabbinic, it could
be said that the kesubah can be paid with the less valuable Medina
coins. The Rabonon who instituted the payment of kesubah wanted
5 injb cr rnt vws wxu, /h

the payment to be enough for a years expenses. In this case, even

if the obligation is initially rabbinic, the Rabonons intention was
that it should be paid with Tyre coinage, so that a woman would
have enough to survive for a year. Thus even though the obligation
is inherently rabbinic, it must be paid with the more valuable Tyre
coinage. In France and Germany they wrote into the kesubah
document that you are eligible to receive by Torah law not as a
declaration that the initial obligation is Torah law, but simply to
emphasize that the payment of kesubah is to be made as if it is
Torah law and the more valuable Tyre coinage is to be used.
4) Those who hold that kesubah is a rabbinic obligation, hold that
when the divorce takes place in Eretz Yisroel the kesubah may be
paid with the less valuable Eretz Yisroel coins, as will soon be
explained in our Gemara.
5) We see that when the Rabonon wanted to discourage frivolous
divorce, they legislated the financial burden of paying a kesubah.
It follows that when we want to encourage a divorce, such as when
a woman married while her first husband was still alive, we must
remove the deterrent of paying a kesubah.
6) Those who hold that kesubah payment is Torah law, derive it from
the verse ,uku,cv rvnf. The Torah is specifically discussing a
besulah. Any other kesubah payment is of rabbinic origin.

6 injb cr rnt vws wxu, /h

10Ab

/wuf jruy ost iht vezj

The Gemara tells us that the reason that we believe a Chosson who
says that the entrance was open is because, a person would not
trouble himself to make a wedding banquet and then ruin it by lying
that his Kalloh was not a besulah. As Rashi v"#$ vws says: if he
detested her, he would have divorced her before the Chupah. He
obviously did like her and fully intended to take her as his wife, but
was disappointed with her because she was truly not a besulah.
The proof of his good intentions is that he made a wedding feast
and according to his present declaration that the Kalloh was not a
besulah, he would lose the feast. Tosfos will analyze when and why
he loses the feast, and what would we rule when he does not lose the
feast? (1)
There are two cases where it is evident that by claiming his Kalloh
was not a besulah, he will lose her.

iuhf lfkhv vhkg trx,hns wdn v,ujpc ut ivf ,atc jbh, vnh,
intb vshxpns
This is bewildering! It is logical that he stands to take a loss when
he is a Kohain and his Kalloh is the wife of a Kohain who is
forbidden to her husband when he claims that she was not a besulah
as mentioned earlier on 9a, because there is only one doubt to
consider - did she cohabit with another man before or after betrothal.
Since there is only one doubt, we must be stringent in a case where
the prohibition to continue living with her is Torah law. Or if he was
not a Kohain, but was betrothed to him when she was less than three
years of age, when we are certain that she cohabited with another
man after betrothal and our only doubt is whether she was seduced or
raped. In this case as well, since there is only one doubt she is
forbidden to [her husband]. Therefore, since he does lose [his
- v"#$ vws wxu, :h

wife] as a result of his claim that she was not a besulah he is

believed to say that she was not a besulah.
There is a third scenario in which the Chosson will lose his wife
because of his claim, even though she is not forbidden to him.
The Gemara later on 11b discusses the case of a woman who was
found not to be a besulah. Let us assume that she lost her virginity
before betrothal and she is definitely not forbidden to her husband,
since she did not commit adultery. There are those who hold that
she receives a kesubah of one hundred zuz, which is the kesubah for
a non-virgin. Others hold that her Chosson may claim that if he had
known that she was not a besulah, he would not have married her at
all. His marriage to her was in error and she is not entitled to any
kesubah whatsoever.
Tosfos discusses the ramifications of the presumption that one
would not trouble himself to make a wedding feast and then ruin it
by lying that the Kalloh was not a besulah, according to both
opinions.

kkf vcu,f vk iht vkugc ,tmnbu vku,c ,ezjc vxbf inek hnb s"nku
tuv ,ugy jen hrva vshxpn hnb t,avs tjhb
And according to the one who says later in the Gemara if one
married a woman under the presumption that she was a besulah
but she was found not to be a besulah, she receives no kesubah at
all, it is soundly understood that now as well [the Chosson] loses
his feast because the marriage was an acquisition made in error
and his Kalloh is not married to him at all. By claiming that she was
not a besulah, he is essentially saying that she is not my wife. I
intended to marry a besulah and she was not what I expected. The
marriage is null and void. Thus, he in fact loses the marriage feast
because he has no marriage.

vshxpvk tca tkt hshn shxpn tk vbn vcu,f vk ah s"nk kct

inhvn htntu shxpn tk vsugxv kct vbn v,cu,fn
. v"#$ vws wxu, :h

However, according to the one who says that she receives a

kesubah of a maneh, one hundred zuz, and she remains married to
him, he is losing nothing at all by claiming that she was not a
besulah. Rather, he is causing her to lose a maneh from her
kesubah because she was not a besulah as expected, but he is not
losing the feast since she does remain married to him. If so, why is
he believed to say that she was not a besulah? He is losing absolutely
nothing by his false claim that she was not a besulah. He is only
benefiting by reducing his kesubah liability from two hundred zuz to
one hundred zuz.

:inhvn tks vtrbu

It appears that he is not believed to say that she was not a besulah
when he will not actually lose the wedding feast as in the case that
Tosfos described, when he claims that she was not a besulah and she
is therefore only entitled to a kesubah of one hundred zuz.
1) Tosfos understanding of the term one does not trouble himself to
make a wedding feast and then ruin it is extremely literal. Tosfos
is constantly searching for how the lying Chosson might lose the
feast. In the instance that despite his lying, she legally remains his
wife, we will not believe his claim that she was not a besulah.
Ramban is not concerned with the legality of the situation. He
argues that a person who claims that his wife was not a besulah is
not intending to remain married to her even if he is legally allowed
to do so. In the words of Ramban - one does not spit into a cup and
then drink from it. By accusing his wife of not being a besulah, he
is destroying his marriage and we therefore believe him, even
when he legally remains married to her.

/ v"#$ vws wxu, :h

10Ac

!wuf vcd, tk thv ohnfj ,be,u khtuv

The Gemara is saying that the reason kesubah payment is to be paid
from inferior quality property is because the payment is mandated
by rabbinic law. We can infer that if the payment was mandated by
Torah law, the kesubah payment would be subject to all the
requirements of Torah payments.
Tosfos will discuss two rules of Torah payments:
A) Torah payments are to be paid from the ,hshg - finest properties
of the payer.
B) All possessions of the payer, movable and real, are subject to
collection in order to satisfy the debt.
Tosfos will now show that it appears that even those who hold that
kesubah payment is mandated by Torah law do not hold that
payment is to be made
A) from the finest property of the payer nor
B) from all possessions, even movable ones.
First, Tosfos will show that even R Meir who holds that the
kesubah payment is mandated by Torah law, does not hold that
payment is to be made from the husbands finest property.

wpcu t,hhruts vcu,fs (oau :ub) p"gt erpc inek vhk ,ht n"rs vnh,
,hbubhcc vat ,cu,fs n"r rcxes whrnt (oau ::jn ihyhd) ihezhbv
tbhj ouan
This is bewildering! For R Meir holds later in Perek Af Al Pi
(56b) that kesubah payment is mandated by Torah law, and in
Perek Hanizokin (Gitin 48b*) [the Gemara] says that R Meir
holds that a womans kesubah is to be paid from intermediate
quality property so that women will find favor (1) in the eyes of men
and the men will be anxious to marry them. They were concerned that
1 ohnfj ,be,u khtuv vws wxu, :h

if payment was to be with the poorest quality fields, the future

husband of this woman would find the financial situation too
burdensome, since her assets are of poor quality. They therefore
instituted that payment should be with middle quality property in
order to sweeten the financial attraction for the next husband. It
appears that if not for the special legislation of the Rabonon, the
payment of kesubah would be with the poorest quality, even though R
Meir holds that the kesubah obligation is Torah law. But we have just
learned that if the obligation to pay kesubah is Torah law, the
payment must be made with the finest?
Tosfos must first prove that Torah mandated payments must be paid
from the finest property.

ikufu (/v ;s) e"c ahrc ik tepbsf ,hshgc vbhs t,hhruts thuvs iuhfu
vbhs ughepv htntu ;xf okah vbh,b ,j, th,ts cyhnn okak ,uctf
And since the [kesubah payment] is Torah law according to R
Meir, the rule is that it is to be paid from the finest properties of the
husband as [the Gemara] deduces in the beginning of Bava Kama
(5a): and all payments required by Torah law are like the primary
damagers that must pay from the finest properties of the damager.
This is derived from a textual comparison using four words -',j,
okah 'vbh,b and ;xf (2). Why did the Rabonon revoke the ruling
that she should collect from the finest property of her husband? It
seems that the Gemara in Gitin 49b is explaining why she need not
collect from the most inferior quality, but what happened to her
inherent right to collect from the finest properties?
Secondly, Tosfos will now show that almost all Tanoim agree that
kesubah payment is to be made only from real property and not
from movable possessions. If the kesubah payment is mandated by
Torah law, this is problematic.

hkykynn vat ,cu,f vhk ,hts ouen ouac tb, yhn,ahn tks sugu
rnts thv n"r hbn tv (/ym ,unch) ih,fus kfc ibhrntsf n"rk tkt
vcu,fk hscg,an hkykyn
2 ohnfj ,be,u khtuv vws wxu, :h

Furthermore, there is another difficulty with the inference of our

Gemara that if the kesubah would be Torah law the laws governing
payment would be different, for we have not found any Tano in any
place in a Mishna or a Baraisa, who holds that a womans kesubah
is to be paid from movable possessions, but R Meir, as [the
Gemara] says in many places, when faced with a source that says a
womans kesubah can be collected from movable possessions: this
follows R Meir who says that movable possessions are collectible
for a womans kesubah. We do not find that this position is
attributed to any other Tano, even though there are other Tanoim who
hold that kesubah payment is Torah law, as we can see in our
Gemara, that Rabon Shimon ben Gamliel also holds that kesubah
payment is Torah law.

ibhpkh o,vns iuhf ihezhb unf hkykynn hcd tk htnt t,hhruts s"nku
But according to the one who says that kesubah payment is
mandated by Torah law, why can [a woman] not collect from
movable possessions just as damages can be collected from movable
possessions, since the payment of kesubah is derived from the
payment of damages, as the Gemara derives this ruling there in
Bava Kama 5a?
It seems that the inherent kesubah payment has been changed, even
if we hold that kesubah payment is Torah law. But why? In
conclusion Tosfos is compelled to say that even if kesubah payment
is mandated by Torah law, the Rabonon changed details of the
payment for practical considerations. The initial step was to insure
that the kesubah payment should not be an overly difficult financial
burden. If it was, young men might try to avoid marrying besulos, in
order to avoid the overly restrictive financial obligations.

ut ,hshg rufnk ufrymh ot ost hbc ivn uarph tka tngys k"hu
ohkykyn

3 ohnfj ,be,u khtuv vws wxu, :h

We can answer: That the reason the Rabonon amended the Torah
laws of payment and were more lenient than the Torah law of
payment would require is so that, people will not refrain from
marrying [besulos] which might happen if they would have to sell
their finest properties or their movable objects in order to pay a
kesubah, (3)

:ost hbc ivhkg umpeha hsf uaju

[the Rabonon] were concerned that the financial burden should not
be too difficult so that people should be desirous of marrying them.
(4)
* The Gemara is actually on 49b.
1) See Tosfos Gitin 49b who discusses two explanations of the
concept of tbhj. Eventually, Tosfos concludes that the concern of
tbhj is to make the payment to the divorced or widowed women of
a quality that would make their overall financial position attractive
to a potential second husband. It appears that Tosfos here is
working with that explanation of tbhj and I have translated
accordingly.
2) See Bava Kama 5a, where the Gemara says that all payment are
derived from the fact that one of these four words appears in the
verse that discusses the obligation to pay. According to our
Gemara as well, that the biblical obligation to pay kesubah is
derived from ,uku,cv rvunf kueah ;xf, the payments must be made
from the finest, since the word ;xf appears in the verse.
3) It is for this reason, that the Rabonon did not want to leave the
Torah law in place. They saw that making the financial burden so
difficult would make besulos less attractive for their potential
husbands.
4) Accordingly, they would have reduced the payment to the poorest
quality. However, they did want the financial package to be
attractive to a potential second husband and therefore did not
reduce payment to the most inferior quality, but rather left it at the
medium quality fields.
4 ohnfj ,be,u khtuv vws wxu, :h

5 ohnfj ,be,u khtuv vws wxu, :h

10Ad

!the%&pe )&gnn ,k i)&b

Tosfos initial assumption is that even if the Cappodician coinage is
of greater value than Eretz Yisroel coinage, the actual amount of
the payment of the kesubah is the same. We must calculate how
much the fifty shekalim of the Torah equals in present day coinage
and we give her that amount of money for her kesubah. If for
example 40 Cappodician selaim are worth the same as fifty Eretz
Yisroel selaim, which is the amount required by Torah law for
kesubah, the payment will be forty Cappodician selaim. Ultimately,
there will be no difference in the amount of money received for her
kesubah. It is with this understanding that Tosfos asks:

vk $,u' u'h) *+* ,ug*v $,u)* vk $,u'a vk )uv .uh/ v* h+/k v*h,
ohkea w' vua )k)
This is bewildering! What benefit is it to her that he pays her
[Cappodician] coinage? In any case, he will only give her the
value of fifty shekalim, the amount required by the Torah.

)he3upe5 oa $hs*uga ohkea vk $,hk 7h/8 okugks oh/*u) u'hhv o)u

).h' vuv k)/ah 9/) ka ohkea w' k)/ah 9/)5u )he3upe hkea w'
However, if we would say that one must always give her the
shekalim of the place where they presently are, for example when
they are in Cappodicia one must pay with fifty Cappodician
shekalim, and when in Eretz Yisroel one must pay with fifty
shekalim of Eretz Yisroel, it would make sense that she would gain
when paid in Eretz Yisroel with Cappodician shekalim,
Tosfos offers a precedent for paying a Torah obligation with the
coinage of a particular time and place.

/sahk :oau ;' ,u/u<5= /u<5 ah wp5 /u<5 $uhsps ohgkx wv h5d $'h/*)s<
- vk $,ub vws w*u, +h

uvk /sau uvhhkg uphxu)s )'h/.) ),kh, /*

as [the Gemara] says in regard to the five selaim of redemption
of the firstborn son in Perek Yesh Bchor (Bchoros 50a): Rav
Ashi sent Rav Acha son of Ravina seventeen zuz, which according to
his calculation was a two gerah ()more than the one hundred gerah
required by Torah law and he asked for a third of a zuz () change.
Rav Acha sent Rav Ashi a message that the Rabonon had added to the
required payment of one hundred gerah and it is now one hundred
twenty gerah, which equals twenty zuz. He said: The Master should
send us three zuz more, for [the Rabonon] have increased the
required payment. Tosfos () text in that Gemara is: Rav Ashi sent
them. It appears that when there is an increase in the amount of a
payment because of a change of currency, it is added to the payment
required by the Torah. So too, if the shekalim of Cappodicia are of
greater value than Eretz Yisroel shekalim, when in Cappodicia one
must pay with Cappodician shekalim.

$hphxu*a< k5) uphxuv oue* k<5 uphxuva< o,vs v)/' $h) uvh*
),hh/u)s vs* v',a, 7<5a v)/' $h) s.) oue*5
However, this explanation, that one is always required to pay fifty of
the shekalim of the place where he is located regardless of their value
is not appealing. For there in Bchoros 50a when they added
eighteen gerah to the required payment of the redemption of the
firstborn, it was added everywhere, but when it is added in one
specific place, it does not appear that because the Cappodicians
increased the value of their coins, that the measure of the Torah
should change because of this.

)'u* h5/ oh,)* v5u,<s $h,h',*) $'hx/d $he/hps h*kau/h5 uvh*u

$<u )8uh g53* /*) )'u5 /5 )5) h5/ asev kea5 /*) k)u*a oa5
:h)/u*) v*< o,v hex*

. vk $,ub vws w*u, +h

10Ae

/vhk t'hc) t,frcn

Rav Nachman ruled that a man who claimed that his Kallahs
entrance was open must be flogged. He follows with the words vhk tyhc( t)*+cn - literally, the prostitutes of this city Mevorachta
were lying before him. There are two possible interpretations of
these words.
A) It is a rhetorical question. How did he become so knowledgeable
about this subject? Did he visit all the prostitutes of the city?
Certainly not. He is definitely not competent in this matter and
must be flogged for defaming a Jewish daughter.
B) It is an explanatory statement - his expertise must come from
visiting prostitutes. He must be flogged for visiting so many
prostitutes.
The Gemara will speak of two seemingly conflicting rulings of Rav
Nachman. We will refer to this ruling - that insists that the Chosson
be flogged - as the first ruling. We will refer to the ruling where Rav
Nachman says we believe him and does not speak of flogging as the
second ruling. (Actually, the second ruling is quoted earlier at the
beginning of the page, however, in the present dialogue it is
second.)
Tosfos will give us two explanations of this dialogue in the Gemara.
The dialogue consists of four steps:
1) Rav Nachmans first ruling.
2) A contradiction from his second ruling.
3) An answer.
4) Rav Achas alternative answer.
In Tosfos first explanation the meaning of the words - t)*+cn
tyhc( vhk - change from one step to the next. In the second
explanation these words will retain their meaning as an explanatory
statement in all steps of the dialogue.
2 t)*+cn v-s -/u) 1h

Step 1):
The Gemaras initial understanding of Rav Nachmans first ruling
was that it is a rhetorical question:

,uyucj ,ubu( hfu rean hrva ktrah ,c kg r"a thmuna uvuekv aurhp
inhvn tk 7fkv hec vhvha uhbpk
The explanation of Rav Nachmans first ruling : Flog him because
he is slandering a Jewish daughter, for he is lying - he definitely is
incapable of determining that her entrance was open, since he is
inexperienced in these matters. Rav Nachman asks rhetorically: Were
the prostitutes lying before him so that he became an expert to
determine that her entrance was open? Certainly that was not the
case. Therefore, we do not believe him. Since we do not believe him,
he is merely defaming a Jewish daughter and should be flogged.
Step 2):
The Gemara now attempts to disprove this ruling:

inhvn injb cr rnt tvu

But Rav Nachman said in a second ruling: We believe a husband
who says that he found the entrance open. Obviously, he must have
the expertise necessary to determine that her entrance was open.
Step 3):

hrpuf vhk ibhcxnu inhvn hbanu

[The Gemara] answers: We believe him that her entrance was
open, but even so we give him lashes.
But if the reason for flogging him is as we initially understood, that
he is not competent to determine that her entrance was in fact open,
why do we believe him? There must be a different explanation of
Rav Nachmans ruling that the young husband is flogged. At this
3 t)*+cn v-s -/u) 1h

point in the dialogue the statement - vhk tyhc( t)*+cn - changes, it

must be an explanatory statement, not a rhetorical question.

ubhntn vhv tkt ubhntn vhv tka ouan tk uvucxt rnts injb cru
,ub(v kg suaja hpk u,uekvk rntu
Rav Nachman who said flog him said so not because he did not
believe him for lack of expertise, but rather he did believe him and
he said that he should be flogged because he was suspected of
promiscuity. The statement - vhk tyhcj t,frcn - is now explanatory:
He must have visited the citys prostitutes in order to develop his
expertise.
Step 4):
The Gemara offers another interpretation of Rav Nachmans
position:

rujcc hrhhtu inhvn tks trehgn ik trhcxsf hban tjt cru

Rav Acha answers that Rav Nachmans ruling is to be understood as
we initially thought that the reason he is flogged is because he is
slandering a Jewish daughter and he is not an expert, the words
4 vhk tyhcj t,frcn - are a rhetorical question: Did he gain his
expertise from visiting prostitutes? Certainly, he did not, therefore,
we do not believe him. [Rav Nachman] in his first ruling is
speaking about a single man who does not have any experience and
we therefore consider him a slanderer. Rav Nachmans second ruling
that we do believe him is speaking about a man who was previously
married. (1)
Tosfos now suggests an alternative explanation of the Gemaras
dialogue. In this approach the words - vhk tyhc( t)*+cn - are an
explanatory sentence. There is no need to change the basic
understanding of the words - vhk tyhc( t)*+cn - from step to step,
they are consistently an explanatory statement.
5 t)*+cn v-s -/u) 1h

t,ujhbc k"hgu
We can also say that [the words - vhk tyhc( t)*+cn] are not a
rhetorical question, rather explanatory. (2)
Step 1):

,ub(v kg suaja hpk uvuekv intb tuva hp kg ;t vhk tyhcj t,frcn

Rav Nachman is explaining his ruling: The prostitutes of this city
Mevorachta were lying before him. That is how he developed his
expertise. Even though we do believe him that his kallah was not a
besulah, flog him because he is suspected of promiscuity. His
expertise must be the result of his promiscuous ways.
Step 2):
The Gemara now asks:

u,uekvk arhp tku intb injb cr rntvu

But Rav Nachman said in a second statement we believe him and
did not specify that we must flog him? It seems that all men even
without having visited prostitutes have the needed expertise to
determine that the entrance was open.
Step 3):

,ueknc hrhht tk injb cru vhk ibhcxnu inhvn hbanu

[The Gemara] answers: Rav Nachman in his second statement also
meant: We believe him that her entrance was open and we flog him.
However, Rav Nachman in his second statement was not discussing
the flogging.
In this second approach as well, Rav Acha offers another
explanation of the seeming contradiction of Rav Nachmans
6 t)*+cn v-s -/u) 1h

statements. Rav Acha simply says that the two statements of Rav
Nachman are speaking about different people.
Step 4):

:huabcu ,uekn tkc ubhhv injb cr rnts intb =>? okugk rnt tjt cr
Rav Acha says: Actually when Rav Nachman in his second
statement said that (3) we believe [a husband who claims the
entrance was open] that means there is no need to flog him and it is
speaking of when he is a married man. Since he is married, he has
the expertise to determine that her entrance was open from his
personal life. If he is single, he could have only become an expert by
visiting prostitutes and he is flogged.
1) See Maharam Schiff who explains that this first explanation of
Tosfos first assumes that vhk tyhcj t,frcn is a rhetorical question
(step 1), then in the Gemaras first explanation (step 3) it is an
explanatory sentence and finally (step 4) Rav Acha explains it as a
rhetorical question. This inconsistency causes Tosfos to offer a
second explanation of the Gemaras dialogue.
2) t,ujhbc - literally - calmly. It is not said with the intonation of a
question. It is explanatory. I have translated the word according to
the context in which it is used by Tosfos.
3) See note 1. According to Maharam Schiff the benefit of Tosfos
second explanation is that the words vhk tyhcj t,frcn are
consistently throughout the four steps of the Gemara (step 1, the
question, step 3, the first answer and step 4, Rav Achas answer)
an explanatory statement. If so, Rav Nachmans first ruling
according to Rav Acha is that if he is single, we believe him and
flog him because he developed his expertise by visiting prostitutes.
Rav Nachmans second ruling is that if he is married, we believe
him and he is not flogged. An argument can be made that Rav
Acha is saying that we do not believe a single man at all as Rashi
says, however it is difficult to explain Tosfos this way. My
explanation of Tosfos second approach follows Rosh and
Maharshal.
7 t)*+cn v-s -/u) 1h

8 t)*+cn v-s -/u) 1h

10Ba

/"#uk&u "aurd "+nkt "ku,c

The Mishna is enumerating a series of women who were betrothed
and thus had the status of married women, but never lived with their
betrothed as husbands and wife. This is referred to as a widow or
divorcee from the ihxu%h&-betrothal. They are presumed to be
besulos. The Mishna adds a third woman who was also betrothed to
her first husband, but was widowed and eventually received
chalitzah from her brother-in-law. She too is presumed to be a
besulah since she never lived with her husband as man and wife.
Tosfos wonders why the Mishna includes a chalutzah in this list?
After all, she is also a widow from betrothal, which has already been
mentioned in the Mishna. Why should the chalitzah procedure
make us think that perhaps she is not presumed to be a besulah?

vmukj yeb t,ucrks arpk vtrb

It is appealing to explain that chalutzah is mentioned because
there is a novelty in this ruling. There is good reason to believe that
perhaps we should not assume that she is a besulah as we do in the
case of the women who were widowed or divorced from
1hxurht-betrothal. Since these women were not brought to the chupah,
their husbands never had a legal right to live with them. This is not
true of a chalutzah. The Yovom did have the right to cohabit with her.
Once this right existed, perhaps we should no longer consider her a
besulah, even though we believe that cohabitation did not take place.

hrva vpujk vxhbf trxjhhn tk och ,rnuas 1uhf tbhnt 7,gs tekxs
vjrf kgc vhkg tch vnch
For it might enter upon our minds to say that since for a widow
who is awaiting yibum it is not obligatory that she be brought to a
chupah and consent to be married, for the rule is that her yovom
may cohabit with her even against her will,
/ ()u*c (,s ,xu* .h

:k"ne thns vtuabfs t"vu

and I might say that she is the equivalent of a married woman
who was widowed after the chupah, where the woman is entitled to
only one maneh for her kesubah. Even though we believe that
cohabitation did not take place, since her husband had the right to
live with her, we no longer assume that she is a besulah. So too a
chalutzah, since her brother-in-law had the undisputed right to
cohabit with her it is as if she was already brought to the chupah, and
she might be entitled to only one maneh, therefore the Mishna must
inform us that she is still assumed to be a besulah.
Lexicon for this Tosfos:
Chalitzah - procedure of the widow of a childless man removing her
brother-in-laws shoe and becoming free to marry whomever she
pleases. In Talmudic times this was generally performed when the
brother-in-law refused to take his brothers widow as his wife.
Chalutzah - is the widow who performs the chalitzah.
Yibum - the procedure of the brother-in-law cohabiting with his
brothers widow.
Yovo - is the brother-in-law.
Maneh - one hundred zuz is the kesubah for a previously married
woman, who is assumed not to be a besulah. The kesubah of a
besulah is two hundred zuz.

0 ()u*c (,s ,xu* .h

10Bb

!"nhnk t(ht htn t,hh"utc tch,(s v.nkt

The Gemara says that the etymology of the word vbnkt-widow is
that she receives only one maneh for her kesubah. The Gemara
asks: this makes sense during Talmudic times when the Rabonon
instituted kesubah for a widow, but the word vbnkt already appears
in the Torah prior to the rabbinic enactment of kesubah? If the
etymology of the word is based on the maneh she receives for
kesubah by rabbinic decree, why does the Torah refer to a widow as
an vbnkt?
Tosfos is perplexed that the Gemara acknowledges this argument as
a reasonable question. Perhaps we should view the usage of the
word vbnkt as proof that a widow is entitled to a kesubah by Torah
law?

"vs "%&&'u"s) v*) v*)k" %,u%-s "-v) .u/0%s ')&)k "-&k "vu
'-- "k" v'u% v'&-zv "ks v/) &)&, v&v "k v*)
But this cannot be said: that we should resolve from this question
that the kesubah of a widow is a maneh by Torah law. Since we do
find that the Torah uses this word and we have no explanation other
than that it is a reference to the amount she receives for kesubah, we
should conclude that this kesubah is in fact Torah law. But why not?
Because the term maneh was non-existent in the days of Moshe,
for the Torah only mentions the word rff-kikar.(1) Since the word
v*)k" is based on the word maneh, it could not have been referring
to a coinage of biblical times.
There seems to be a contradiction from a Gemara in Bechoros 5a.
The Gemara there is discussing a perceived discrepancy in the
Torahs computation of the money collected for the Tabernacle by
Moshe Rabbeinu. In the Gemaras resolution of this discrepancy, it
refers to a maneh, which according to Tosfos did not exist in
0 vbnkt vws wxu, :h

biblical times.

%u*u,/2, &3,u v&v 4)"* u*&,' v/) 56/u /v 8s9 %u'u-,, 4*&')"s "vu
v&v ku0- /su3 k/ v*)/ "k"
That which the Gemara says in Bechoros (5a) (2) when resolving
the discrepancy in the Torahs computation, Moshe Rabbeinu was
both trustworthy and expert in calculations. If so, how do we
explain the discrepancy? But the maneh coin used in the calculations
of the holy temple was double the value of a regular maneh coin.
This resolves the discrepancy, as is evident in the Gemara there, but
we do see that the Gemara refers to a maneh as the coinage of
biblical times. Tosfos has stated that there was no maneh in biblical
times.

k"3z2& &)&, /su3 k/ v*)/ u)- ')uk- "k" v/) &)&, v*) v&v/ "k
:v/) &)&, ku0- /su3 k/ '-- v&v ;- v&v ku0This does not mean that there was a maneh coin in the days of
Moshe, rather it is saying that just as the maneh coin of the holy
temple was double the regular maneh coin in the times of
Yechezkel as the Gemara demonstrates there in Bechoros, so too,
the kikar coin of the holy temple was double the regular kikar coin
in the days of Moshe.
1) See Shmos 38, 24 - 29).
2) See Artscroll Bechoros 5a2,3, notes 18-22 for the exact
calculations.

1 vbnkt vws wxu, :h

10Bc

!"#uv "'u #("kx uz ,u-# .xu" c, #0,u

The Gemara demonstrates that we do find a verse in the Torah that
uses a word that could not have been in use during the period the
Torah is discussing. We must therefore conclude that the Torah
uses words that would first make sense in the future. So too, the
word vbnkt, even though its etymology is based on events that would
first take place after the Torah was written, is used by the Torah.
The word cited as proof is ruat -which usually refers to Assyria.
The Gemara demonstrates that when the Torah uses this word, that
place could not have possibly been called ruat, and even so the
Torah uses that name because it would be called ruat in the future.
Rav Yosef said that the place ruat discussed in the Torah is the city
of Seleucia. The Gemara points out:

"kug ,'()cc ('uv (nu -)./u0c 1(2

Rashi explains: could this name, Ashur for the city Seleucia have
been in existence when the world was created? Obviously not, there
were no cities at the very beginning of creation. We must therefore
conclude that words of the Torah, Ashur for the city Seleucia in
Beraishis 2, 14, are used because they will eventually be called by
that name in the future.
Tosfos wonders why the Gemara must introduce Rav Yosefs
statement that the place ruat that the Torah is referring to is
Seleucia. It would seem that the name ruat itself used in Bereishis
2, 14, which is the name of a person mentioned in Bereishis 10, 11,
is sufficient proof that the Torah uses words and names of the
future. Presumably, the land ruat was named for the person ruat,
obviously the person ruat did not yet exist at the very beginning of
Creation, which the verse is discussing in Beraishis 2, 14. Why does
0 ;xuh cr tb,u :h

the Gemara refer to the Baraisa taught by Rav Yosef that ruat
refers to Seleucia, when the name of the land ruat also proves that
the Torah uses names of the future?

)ua'4 )n(nk 5/(6n4 7)2(nk (6n 'k au8n 58u )ua'n 9-u( c) 'kcu
78 "na v(v "kug ,un(nu )(gv "a 'ku :ujnv "a au8u
But if not for Rav Yosef, who identified Ashur in Bereishis 2, 14, as
the city Seleucia, from the word Ashur per se, and so too, from the
word Kush (Bereishis 2, 13) which is presumably named after the
person Kush, (Bereishis 10, 6) [the Gemara] could not have asked
its question to prove that the Torah uses names of the future from the
fact that the lands are called Ashur and Kush, because we could say
that Ashur and Kush are names of regions and not the names of
cities and those regions had those names from the beginning of the
world. It is only because Rav Yosef identifies Ashur of Bereishis 2,
14, as the city Seleucia, which definitely did not exist at the time of
creation that we see the Torah uses words that would first be relevant
in the future.
Tosfos will now present his difficulty with Rashis explanation of
the Gemara. According to Rashi, the Gemara is arguing that the
name Ashur for the city Seleucia, could not have been in use at the
time of creation, because there were no cities at that time. This is
definitely true, but it really does not adequately bring out the point
the Gemara trying to make.
Although the time period the Torah is discussing is the period of
creation, the Torah was not written at that time. The Torah was
written during the life of Moshe Rabbeinu. At that time the city of
Seleucia was already in existence and could have been called Ashur.
How does this prove that the Torah uses a word of the future?
When the Torah was actually written those events were past, not
future.

5u(8 "kug ,'()cc vuv 'k4 <=g' )ua'4 )ua'n (,((n ('n4 va0 kc'
1 ;xuh cr tb,u :h

c,8nk v(k vuv )(2a van (n(c vuv4

But this is difficult! What is [the Gemara] proving from the use of
the word Ashur? For although the city Seleucia which the Torah
calls Ashur did not exist when the world was created, since it did
exist in the times of Moshe, it is justifiably written in the Torah as
a description of that city,

u)u4c v(v 'k 5((4ga 5u(8 cu,8k uk v(v 'k v/n kc'
but the word maneh, as the root of v/nk' because she receives only a
maneh of one hundred zuz as kesubah, should not have been
written, since it was not yet a coin in his generation?
In order to answer Tosfos question, we must say that the Torah is
speaking of events that had not yet happened when the Torah was
written during Moshe Rabbeinus life and even so the Torah uses
those words.

v(v 'k '0(k-4 v(k "(04 ('uv (n van (n(c '0(k-4 a)2k (=)k v')/u
van (n(c
It is appealing to RI to explain that that the Gemara is asking Was there a city by the name of Seleucia in the days of Moshe?
This proves that the Torah uses words that are relevant only in the
future, for it was known to [the Gemara] that the city Seleucia did
not exist during the times of Moshe. Since that city did not yet exist
during Moshes lifetime, his use of that word is based on what would
eventually occur in the future. So too, the word v/nk' is used even
though it would be relevant only in the future.
But if the region known as Ashur did exist during Moshes lifetime,
perhaps he was referring to the region and not to the city Seleucia?
Tosfos rejects this hypothesis.

>van (n(c v(va )ua' k6' 'ku k04j 7kuv '0(k- c(c-u
2 ;xuh cr tb,u :h

Because it is around Seleucia that the Tigris flows and not near
the region Ashur that existed in the times of Moshe. Since this is a
geographical fact known to the Gemara, the use of the word Ashur as
a description of the area where the Tigris flows must be based on
facts that would occur in the future. So too, the word v/nk' used in
the Torah, is based on the future.

3 ;xuh cr tb,u :h

10Bd

!v#u% k( )%#n, k,( c# #n(

In parshas Shemini (Vaikra 10, 9) the Torah discusses various
activities that are forbidden after one drinks wine. In that verse the
Torah speaks of a Kohain doing the service in the Bais Hamikdosh.
In verse 11, the Torah speaks of ruling in matters of Torah law and
says that it is prohibited to do so after drinking wine.
The exact expression of the Torah is !#" !%&
$ t' r+,#$ u" ./h'h - do not drink
wine and r+,#$ before doing the Temple service or ruling in matters
of Torah. What exactly does the word r,1 mean? The Gemara in
Kereisus 13b cites a dispute of Tanoim about the meaning of this
word.
A) R Yehudah holds that r,1 includes other means of becoming
drunk, i.e. very sweet figs or dates can also cause a drunken
stupor (especially for diabetics). By adding the word r,1 we
know that even when one is drunk not as a result of drinking
wine, but because of ingesting other intoxicants, he is not
permitted to do the service in the Bais Hamikdosh or to rule in
matters of Torah.
B) R Elozor holds that the word r,1 does not come to include other
intoxicants, rather it is qualifying the drinking of wine and
saying that only when one drinks wine in the manner that it
causes drunkenness is he liable. If he interrupts the drinking of
the required amount or dilutes the required amount with a drop
of wine, he is not liable.
It emerges that there is a dispute among the Tanoim about whether
the Torah prohibits one to rule when he is in a stupor caused by
other intoxicants. R Yehudah prohibits, while R Elozor permits.
Rav, who in our Gemara rules that one may not rule after eating
dates seems to agree with R Yehudah. However, Tosfos finds that
Rav rules like R Elozor in Kereisos 13b who holds that the Torah is
not including other forms of becoming drunk. There seems to be a
: cr rnt 45s 57u8 9h

contradiction in Ravs position.

v#kv cr r't )t*+v cr r't, )-.+ /0h 2s, 4+4hr#s 056cs r't4 -t+
sckc 7hhv kg tkt 7hr#.' rt. kg chh9' +*hts r:gkt wr#
If you ask: but in the third Perek of Kereisos (13b) Rav says that
we rule like R Elozor who holds that one is not liable for serving
in the Bais Hamikdosh when intoxicated because of ingesting other
intoxicants, rather one is liable for serving only after drinking wine.
This contradicts Ravs ruling here that one may not rule after eating
dates.

4+r+vk r+<t .s=' 4thc kg chh9' tks 05gt k5h+

We can answer: even though R Elozor holds that one is not liable
for the death punishment (1) for entering the Temple, he is
forbidden to rule in matters of Torah. (2)
Tosfos cites a Gemara in Bechoros 45b where it is evident that only
R Yehudah holds that one is even liable for doing the Temple
service while under the influence of other intoxicants, but even
those who disagree with R Yehudah, hold that it is initially
forbidden for a person under the influence of other intoxicants to
perform the Temple service.
The Mishna there lists a drunkard as one who is not allowed to
perform the service, but does not disqualify the service post facto.
The Gemara says that according to R Yehudah who holds that one
is liable even for performing the service while under the influence
of other intoxicant, the service should be disqualified as well. The
Gemara there concludes that the Mishna follows the opinion of R
Elozor who holds that one is not liable for performing the service
while under the influence of other intoxicants, but even so it is
initially forbidden to do so.

tks 7t'k vs+cgk k+<6s )/v' 4+r+#c, 7h'+' +kt 65<c g'.' *5v+
; cr rnt 45s 57u8 9h

/vr+h kts h'* 7hsv t+v kh9t tk vs+cgs c0 kg 2t 7hr#.' rt.t chh9'
So too, it is to be understood at the end of Perek Ailu Mumin
(Bechoros 45b), that one is initially disqualified from performing
the Temple service even according to the one who holds that one is
not liable for death punishment when performing the service while
under the influence of other intoxicants, even though he holds that
post facto the service performed is not disqualified. So too, the rule
is the same in regard to ruling in matters of Torah, even though R
Elozor holds that the service is not disqualified post facto, initially
one must not rule in matters of Torah.
1) The punishment for performing service while intoxicated is death
by heavenly decree.
2) Tosfos in Kereisos 13b says that according to R Elozor the
prohibition to rule when intoxicated by other intoxicants is
rabbinic. The gloss both here and in Kereisos holds that Tosfos
here disagrees and holds that even according to R Elozor, the
prohibition of ruling when under the influence of other intoxicants
is by Torah law. If so, we need to understand how Tosfos
distinguishes between the prohibition of ruling and the liability for
performing the temple service while intoxicated. See t56 -5c'r
c5v .s=' 4thc 4+#kv who does in fact rule that one who performs
the service when under the influence of other intoxicants is not
liable for the death punishment but is liable for lashes. So too, the
Rambam there rules in 05v that one may not rule in matters of
Torah when under the influence of other intoxicants. See v*.' 2<#
there who explains that the position of the Rambam is based on
ruling in accordance with R Elozor. It emerges that according to
Rambam there is a Torah prohibition against performing Temple
service while under the influence of other intoxicants as it is
forbidden to rule in Torah matters. Tosfos here may subscribe to
the opinion of the Rambam.

< cr rnt 45s 57u8 9h