David Hume

Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

The Dialogue format was probably chosen by Hume as a way of distancing himself
from the arguments hes going to make, but it also allows for an interesting presentation
of counterarguments.
In the opening, the Pamphilus argues that there are two subjects to which dialoguewriting is particularly adapted.
1. A point that is obvious. (Everyone knows God exists.)
2. A point which is both obscure and uncertain. (Nature of the Divine, what
God wills, etc.)
READ Highlight on page 2.
Demeas Method of Education (p. 3)
Teach:
logics
ethics
physics
theology
Why?
(to season their minds with piety)
to show the uncertainty and disputes in the other sciences and the weakness of
human reason.
prepare their minds for the study of theology
Philos Skepticism (p. 4)
Human reason is limited.
Arguments depend on unproven assumptions.
Our senses are unreliable.

Cleanthes response to Philos Skepticism:

External objects press in . . . (p. 5)
Two kinds of skeptics (pp. 8-9):
brutish and ignorant . . . which gives vulgar and general prejudice against what
they do not easily understand . . . (A lot of THEOLOGICAL thinkers are like
this)
refined philosophical skeptics who are forced to proportion their assent to
the precise degree of evidence which occurs
In vain would the skeptic make a distinction between science and common life, or
between one science and another. The arguments employed in all, if just, are of a
similar nature and contain the same force and evidence. The point is that
Cleanthes wants to apply one standard of reason to all arguments, including
theology.
READ pp.11-12; this is Philo.
Some Key Terms:
a priori --based on theoretical deduction rather than empirical observation.
All bachelors are unmarried.
Anselms Argument for the Existence of God
a posteriori -- proceeding from observations or experiences to the deductions of
probable causes.
Some bachelors are lonely.
Design Argument for the Existence of God
inductive inference -- We draw a conclusion about something we have not seen,
based upon something we have seen.
-chocolate on a childs face
-pile of stones at a fork in a trail
-message written in sand at the beach
argument from analogy--When we draw a conclusion about a particular phenomenon
based upon another, better understood, but similar phenomenon.
-historical analogies (Iraq with WWI, WWII, and Vietnam)
cause --> effect
___?__ --> effect
*Some people think all arguments from analogy are false.

Demeas Initial Position

He asserts (p. 13) that nobody could doubt the existence of God; the question is his
nature.
Demeas definition of God is that he is Being without restriction. (p. 14)
His position (p. 13) is that its just about as bad to claim that we can understand God as
it is to claim that there is no God.
Demeaa fideistic skeptic. He believes that we cannot possibly come to know the
nature of God by human reason; Gods nature is beyond reason. However, he is no
skeptic. He believes in God (presumably the God of eighteenth-century European
Christianity), but he believes that faith, apart from reason, is the only way to really know
about God. Sometimes this position is known as fideism.
PhiloHe is a philosophical skeptic. He agrees that God is incomprehensible, though
he claims that he is not an atheist.
Cleanthesan empirical theist. He thinks we can know something about God by
reasoning from the natural world (of experience). Sometimes this position is called
empirical theism.

Philos Syllogism (p. 15)

Our ideas reach no farther than our experience.
We have no experience of divine attributes and operations.
Therefore, __________________________.
We can note how similar Philo s and Demea s positions are in this regard.

Cleanthes Argument. (READ. p. 15)

Demea s Objection to Cleanthes (p. 15)
God and men are not so similar.
By neglecting a priori arguments, and relying on experience, Cleanthes is supporting the
cause of the atheists (because a posteriori arguments are arguments for probability).
Philos Objections to Cleanthes (pp. 16-21)
The key to his objection is that for an argument from analogy to work at all (even just for
probability) the comparison has to be close--the closer the better--and the more similar
the effects, the more likely the causes will be the same.
World doesnt really resemble a machine.
Cleanthes is reasoning from a part to a whole (like a hair to a man).
We have only observed a small part of the whole (universe).
Does organic generation really require intelligence? Why privilege a little
agitation in the brain?
Cant reason from a late form to an earlier one.
Inferences depend on repeated observations, but this phenomenon (the creation
of the universe) is unique. We need to observe a lot more universe
creations. We can infer the builder from the house because we have seen a
lot of houses being built.
Cleanthes Response/Defense (pp. 23-26)
He claims that nature is something like an awesome, articulate voice. This may be his
way of saying he is arguing more for simple signs of intelligence than an argument from
analogy.
The anatomy of an animal is like a book--it shows reasoning and intelligence in it. (PostDarwin we would say it shows design, but not intelligence.)
Examples of fine-tuning like an eye, sexual reproduction, etc. suggest intelligence
behind their design.
Demeas Objections to Cleanthes (pp. 26-27)
When reading a book, we enter the mind of the author; this is not possible with God.
All our ideas derived from the sense are confessedly false and illusive, and cannot
therefore be supposed to have a place in a Supreme Intelligence. (READ on p. 27). His
point is that Gods mind cannot be similar to ours, which are flawed.

Cleanthes to Demea (pp. 28-29)

He says a mystic like Demea is just like a skeptic or atheist, because by claiming God
is unknowable you are asserting we know nothing about God.
Philo Objects some More (pp. 29-43)
READ pp. 34-35 as a summary.
Intelligent designer doesnt help; where did the order in the designers mind come
from? (We can liken it to the infinite regression of tortoises.)
Also, order and thought do not necessarily go together.
Empirical theism does not get you to the God of Christian theism:
Not infinite.
Not perfect.
Not one God.
Not spiritual (but mortal, sexual, etc.)
Machine is not the only analogy possible; what about a body-soul analogy?
Cleanthes response:
more like a plant than an animal
the universe is clearly not eternal

They are all accused of being atheists by the others:

Demea. Mystics, by allowing no content to God, void the concept.
Philo. Leads you to doubt the reasonableness of your belief.
Cleanthes. The best you can get is probability and what you come up with will be
anthropomorphic.

Philo develops his analogy

Part VII
If the universe bears a greater likeness to animal bodies and to vegetables than to the
works of human art, it is more probable that the cause resembles the cause of the
former than that of the latter, and its origin ought rather to be ascribed to
generation or vegetation than to reason or design. (p. 44)
Demea responds: this power would still be an additional argument for design in its
author.
Philo responds that generation and vegetation are mindless processes; in all our
experience, minds come from the mindless processes of bodies, not the
other way around.
Particles in Motion
Part VIII
Philo speculates the universe might be the product of randomly moving particles that
occasionally find themselves arranged in an orderly pattern. If these patterns prove
useful, they might survive. (This is a variation on the old Epicurean hypothesis: a
finite number of moving particles must eventually be arranged in every possible
arrangement.)
Demea objects that Philos moving particles have no mover.
Philo counters by saying it is no easier to understand how a mind could move matter
than to assume that the matter might be in motion already.
Cleanthes objects that the world we live in seems to be far superior to a world that is the
product of random forces--we have eyes, ears, horses, camels, etc.--benefits that
speak to the existence of a benevolent creator.
Philo agrees that his system has problems, but so does Cleanthes: weve never seen
mind influence matter, yet that seems to be what Cleanthes proposes. We just
cant know anything about the ultimate cause of the universe: its beyond our
experience.

Demeas Ontological Argument

Part IX
Everything that exists must have a cause for its existence; nothing can produce itself.
This means we would have an infinite chain of causes unless (or until) we come to a
cause that is necessarily existent.
It is clear that A is absurd. Though each link in the chain is sufficient to cause the
next, there is no cause for the existence of the chain itself. Why this particular
chain? Why not no chain at all?
So what is the cause of the chain?
External causes? There are supposed to be none.
Chance is a word without meaning.
Nothing? Nothing cant produce anything.
We must therefore have recourse to a necessarily existent Being who carries
the reason for his existence in himself . . .
In sum: everything in the universe has a cause but what is the cause of
everything? There must be a necessary Being that requires no cause
(i.e., God).

Cleanthes Responds
Matters of fact cannot be proven a priori. (Why?)
Nothing is demonstrable unless the counter implies a contradiction.
Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction.
Anything we can conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent.
There is no being, therefore, whose non existence implies a contradiction.
Therefore, there is no being whose existence is demonstrable.
Further, why not just say the universe itself is the thing that is necessarily existent (if
such a concept is valid)?
Also, it seems absurd to look for the cause of an eternal chain; anything that is
externally existent doesnt need a cause.

Theodicy Discussion
Part X
Demea: each man feels . . . the truth of religion within his own breast . . . and from a
consciousness of his imbecility and misery rather than from any reasoning, is led to
seek protection . . . (p. 58)
Philo and Demea: Life is short (and miserable) . . . and then you die.
Philo: And is it possible . . .you can still persevere in your anthropomorphism and
assert . . . [Gods] justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude . . .? Is [God] willing
to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then
is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil? (p. 63)
Demea: This is an old question; already been answered: This world is but a point in
comparison of the universe; this life but a moment in comparison of eternity. The
present evil phenomena, therefore, are rectified in other regions, and in some
future period of existence. And the eyes of men, being then opened to larger views
of things, see the whole connection of general laws, and trace, with adoration, the
benevolence and rectitude of the Deity through all the mazes and intricacies of his
providence. (p 64)
Cleanthes: things arent so bad. (pp. 64-65).
Philo: maybe health is more common than sickness, but pain is a lot more durable and
exercises much greater influence on us.
Cleanthes Responds to the Theodicy Discussion
Part XI
Cleanthes: But supposing the Author of Nature to be finitely perfect . . .a lesser evil
may then be chosen in order to avoid a greater; inconveniences be submitted to in
order to reach a desirable end; and, in a word, benevolence, regulated by wisdom
and limited by necessity, may produce just such a world as the present. (p. 67)
Philo: Maybe, if you had some good reason to believe that God was good, Cleanthes
idea might make sense, but with an a posteriori argument you could never get to
that conclusion. (Example: bad palace and a good architect.)
Philo: four preventable causes of misery:
1.Pain. Why is pain necessary to protect/motivate animals?
2.Laws that govern the world. Why not have it ruled by Gods will directly so that
God could prevent, for example, children from falling out of trees and getting
hurt?
3.The frugality of faculties. Animals seem to have skills/abilities that just barely
match the minimum requirements of survival.

4.Inaccurate workmanship. There is a tendency for elements of nature that seem

good in moderate levels to get out of whack: floods, droughts, excessive
heat/cold, etc.
Philo: The forces of nature seem to be driven by neither malice nor goodness.
Part XII
Uh????
Whats wrong with religion?
Philo: To be a philosophical skeptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential
step towards being a sound, believing Christian . . .
Pamphilus: . . . those of Cleanthes approach still nearer to the truth.