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Parashat Ki Tisa

16Adar 5775

Dont Put God in a Box

by Rabbi Chaim Poupko

No look of disappointment compares to that which appears

on the faces of students when a teacher arrives to a classroom ten
minutes late. All of the hope and anticipation built up in those
moments after the bell rings about the possibility of a free period
are dashed in one swing of the door. But couldnt students just
wait a little longer? Couldnt they wait and see what happens
before getting their hopes up?
We can ask a similar question by the Jewish people and their
sin with the Eigel HaZahav. How could Bnei Yisrael have
worshipped idolatry so quickly without having waited a little
more to see if Moshe was just running late? The quick turn to
idolatry must have been caused by something more sinisterit
couldnt possibly have merely been impatience.
If we look more closely we will find that the sin of the Eigel
reveals that more severe issues are at play.
Indeed, the very nature of the sin is a matter of discussion.
When they first notice Moshes absence, the Jewish people turn to
each other and decide to make an, Elohim Asher Yeilechu
Lefaneinu, Elohim that will go before them (Shemot 32:1).
Initially, this seems like idolatry. But they rationalize this
behavior by saying that that this Elohim is needed because the
whereabouts of Moshe who took them out of Egypt are unknown
(32:2). Apparently, the Jewish people arent replacing God; they
are replacing Moshe Rabbeinu. They still believe in God. What
they sought to do was introduce an intermediary. They didnt
violate the prohibition of Lo Yihiyeh Lecha Elohim Acheirim,
Do not have any other gods. Instead, they violated its
secondary manifestation, Lo Taaseh Lecha Pesel, Do not make
any graven image (20:2-3).
Why, then, does Hashem believe that the Jewish people
deserve to be destroyed for this sin? If they are not replacing God,
why does Hashem see no way to salvage them as a people?
If we carefully examine the episode, we discover that there
exists an even greater issue than creating graven images. After the
Eigel is made, the Jewish people commence a party during which
they engage in corrupt levity. The Rabbis understood this
behavior to be a descent into utter moral corruption. In essence,
once they are rid of Moshe, Gods representative of moral
responsibility, the Jews rapidly descend into decadence. They
replace Moshe with an inanimate object that made no
expectations of them and whose material consisted of that which
was solely materially desirable. The very constitution of the
Golden Calf represents their true ambitions. Hashem wants to

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March 7, 2015

Vol. 24 No. 23

eliminate them, because they abandoned all connection to the

standards He introduced to them. When God first alerts Moshe of
the proceedings going on in the camps, the first thing He says is
Go down because your nation has become corrupt. God doesnt
mention the Golden Calf first; He instead refers to the ultimate,
underlying issue their apostasy to moral corruption. The Torah
emphasizes how Moshe only casts down the tablets after he sees
the calf and the dancing at the bottom of the mountain. He saw
the making of the Golden Calf representing the corruption
displayed by the dancing.
The sin of the Golden Calf isnt a story about a grand betrayal
of God. It is a story of what happens when one simply
disconnects from God or puts Him in a box. By replacing Moshe,
the Jewish people were replacing moral responsibility for moral
indifference. While many of us dont feel like we are the verge of
a total descent into the moral corruption found in this episode, we
should nevertheless be wary of the temptation to turn off that
voice inside of us that may challenge us to avoid something we
want to do but know we shouldnt. On a micro level, we are often
faced with situations in which it is tempting to replace Moshe
with indifference, and to avoid religious responsibility by not
thinking about it at all. To make sure this does not happen is to
correct the sin of the Golden Calf. To make sure that our moral
and religious sensibilities always play a role in our decision
making in all situations is to ensure that God is not put into a box.

The Never-Ending Sin

by Aaron Fishkind (16)

In this weeks Parashah, the Torah recounts the story of Bnei

Yisraels regression from a nation that had the privilege of
hearing words emanate directly from Hashems mouth to a
nation that violated one of the most grievous sins in the Torah. In
order to better understand the Cheit HaEigel, it is important to
note the prelude to this event. How is it possible that anyonelet
alone an entire nationwould allow this to happen? There are a
few strange Pesukim that are placed right before the episode of
the Cheit HaEigel which discuss the sanctity of Shabbat and its
significance as being a symbol of affection as well as its being a
Brit between the Bnei Yisrael and Hashem. Seemingly, these
Pesukim are here not only to highlight the importance of Shabbat,
but to underscore the intense mutual love between Hashem and
Bnei Yisrael that was present immediately preceding Kabbalat
HaTorah. When Bnei Yisrael faltered tremendously with the sin
of the Eigel HaZahav, however, they lost that Brit and unique
connection with Hashem. As a result, Hashem decides that the
only way for the Bnei Yisrael to atone for their sin is for them to
be wiped out. Only after the desperate plea of Moshe and the
elucidation of the Thirteen Middot HaRachamim, does Hashem

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decide that He will not destroy the unworthy Jews.

Ultimately, however, Hashem sends a plague to punish Bnei
Yisrael. This plague signals the first time since the mention of
the Brit in which Hashem punishes the Bnei Yisrael. This
plague effectively marks the end of that special connection
between Bnei Yisrael and Hashem. Hashem was supposed to
lead Bnei Yisrael Himself into Eretz Yisrael, yet, after the
Cheit HaEigel, He sends a Malach to perform that task
instead. Clearly, that special connection that was described in
the Parashah of Shabbat right before the Cheit had been
severed.
Chazal teach that every sin that Bnei Yisrael committed
since the Cheit HaEigel has had a remnant of this original sin
permeating it. Consequently, the special connection that
existed after the spiritual high of Har Sinai seemingly never
fully recovered as Hashem continued to take the Cheit
HaEigel into account for the subsequent sins of Bnei Yisrael
(see Rashi to Shemot 32:34 s.v. UVeYom Pokdi). The
temptation to sin always lurks near the surface despite the
intense spiritual zenith that Bnei Yisrael were on. They had
just experienced a massive divine revelation at Har Sinai and
perceived the glory of Hashem as no generation had seen or
will see Him. Additionally, immediately following Cheit
HaEigel, the Jews inaugurated the Mishkan, donating so
much money that there was actually a surplus of material.
This behavior seems atypical of a nation who had just
violated such a grievous sin. If we understand that Bnei
Yisrael at the time of the Cheit HaEigel were truly devoted to
Hashem, we can learn a valuable lesson: As Jews in this
generation who have never experienced Har Sinai or been
part of a generation of people who portrayed such
zealousness to donate to a Makom Hashem, we are surely
more susceptible to sin than a nation who merited
experiencing Hashems voice and true power. Consequently,
this episode of the Eigel HaZahav and of the severing of that
once-in-a-lifetime connection has allowed us as Jews to gain a
unique perspective on the power and influence of sin, and
our Sisyphean struggle against it. We have to constantly focus
on our mission to serve Hashem and remind ourselves of this
national, calamitous sin in order to not enable the potential
egregious sins to permeate and fester in our homes and our
lives.

Dont Stay Stagnant

by Alexander Kalb (15)

In Parashat Ki Tisa, we read about the tragic downfall of

Bnei Yisrael due to the Cheit HaEigel. After relating to Moshe
that the nation had sinned grievously by constructing the
Eigel HaZahav and worshipping it, the Torah states,
VaYomer Hashem El Moshe Raiti Et HaAm HaZeh VeHineih Am
Kesheih Oref Hu, And Hashem said to Moshe, I have seen
this people and behold! It is a stiff-necked people (Shemot
32:9). What exactly does it mean to be an Am Kesheih Oref
and how does it affect Hashems anger and eventual
forgiveness towards Bnei Yisrael?
Rashi (ad loc. s.v. Kesheih Oref) and Seforno (ad loc. s.v.

VeHineih Am Kesheih Oref Hu) explain that Kesheih Oref

describes a trait that causes a person to turn away from anyone
admonishing him and to refuse to heed calls to repentance. Thus,
they understand the Pasuk to be establishing two main points.
First Hashem informs Moshe Rabbeinu of the Jews sin, which
will engender a severe punishment. Following an actual or
implied plea for mercy with a promise of repentance and
rehabilitation issued by Moshe, Hashem refuses, stating, Am
Kesheih Oref Hu, indicating that the peoples stiff-necked
rejection of rebuke and clinging to their evil ways have made
them unsuitable for repentance. Therefore, Hashem states that He
will annihilate them (32:10).
According to this interpretation, however, it is very difficult
to understand a subsequent Pasuk. Immediately after
enumerating
Hashems Thirteen
Middot
HaRachamim
(Attributes of Mercy), Moshe beseeches Hashem, saying, Yeilech
Na Hashem BeKirbeinu Ki Am Kesheih Oref Hu VeSalachta
LaAvoneinu, Let Hashem go among us for it is a stiff-necked
people; and You shall forgive our iniquity (34:9). What was
Moshes intent in invoking the very same argument that solidified
Hashems anger and provoked Him to threaten Bnei Yisrael with
destruction? Based on Rashi and Seforno, it is impossible that
Moshe would state this to promote Hashems mercy!
Rashi (ad loc. s.v. Yeilech Na Hashem BeKirbeinu) explains
that the word Ki in this Pasuk means even though, not
because, meaning to say that even though Bnei Yisrael are a
stiff-necked people, Hashem should nevertheless have mercy on
them. In a similar vein, Seforno (ad loc. s.v. Ki Am Kesheih Oref
Hu) explains that Moshe is asking that Hashem remain in Bnei
Yisraels midst despite His presence resulting in harsher
punishment. Although Hashems absence prevents future
punishment, Moshe still believes that His presence is necessary.
Even though Bnei Yisrael would continue to sin, they needed
Hashem because, although He would punish them, only He could
provide the fairness and mercy necessary to ultimately forgive
them. Without Hashem, no atonement could ever be attained.
The Or HaChaim HaKadosh (ad loc. s.v. Yeilech Ki Am)
presents a novel interpretation. He highlights the fact that the
latter Pasuk uses Hashems name A-D-N-Y, which signifies His
mastery, rather than the name Y-K-V-K, which signifies mercy.
He therefore proposes that when Moshe hears the Thirteen
Middot HaRachamim and realizes the extent of Hashems mercy
and kindness, he fears that the Middah of Rachamanut (mercy)
would be dangerous for a stiff-necked people, for without any
fear of justice, they would be wanton in their sinfulness. Moshe
Rabbeinu therefore requests that Hashem balance the Middot of
Din and Rachamim. On the one hand, Yeilech Na Hashem
BeKirbeinu, let the Midat HaDin be among Bnei Yisrael, so that
the nation is aware of its obligations. On the other hand, Hashem
should also miantain his Midat HaRachamim, and Moshe
therefore requests, VeSalachta LeAvoneinu. The common
denominator between all Meforashim is that discipline is a
necessary and requisite part of our lives. We cannot always be
treated with mercy and kindness, without fear of punishment or
consequences. As Seforno states, without Hashem and his ability
to punish us, we wont get punished nor receive atonement. It is

ultimately to our benefit to receive rebuke in order to ultimately

grow and learn from our experiences.

The Tzefat Get of 5774 Part One

by Rabbi Chaim Jachter

The State of Israel Rabbinic Court of Tzefat, on Taanit Esther

5774 (2014) issued a groundbreaking ruling granting a divorce to
a woman whose husband has been in a permanent vegetative
state (PVS)1 for seven years after suffering a traumatic brain
injury in a motorcycle accident. Normally, Halachah requires that
both parties consent to divorce and that the husband first order a
scribe and two witnesses to sign the Get. This Beit Din, however,
conducted a procedure called a Get Zikuia Get issued by the
Beit Din on behalf of the comatose husband in order to permit
the woman to remarry after considering the case for many
months. The court published a lengthy 93-page ruling explaining
their decision. The ruling had the approval of the husbands
family and a court appointed attorney who acted as the executor
on behalf of the husband.

Shternbuch and Rav Chaim Zimbalist publicly coming out

against the ruling in the strongest of terms. Israels Sephardic
Chief Rabbi Rav Yitzchak Yosef also disagrees with the
Tzefat Beit Dins ruling In a fourteen page document, the
Tzefat Dayanim respond to their critics.
In this essay, we shall present a summary of the
arguments made by the Tzefat Beit Din as well as the
response of the critics. We hope to shed light into a situation
that has shaped up to be one of the most controversial cases
in rabbinical courts in years.

Talmudic Background
At first glance, the Tzefat Beit Dins ruling appears
utterly shocking. The Mishnah (Gittin 7:2) states that a Get is
invalid unless the husband orders the scribe and witnesses to
sign the Get. This seems to preclude the possibility that a Beit
Din may write a Get on behalf of a husband without him
ordering the Get to be written or at least express his consent 3.
Moreover, the Mishnah (Yevamot 14:1) states that if a man
became mentally incompetent he cannot give his wife a Get.
The Mishnah, Gemara and Rishonim present no exceptions
to this rule, creating the impression that there is no Halachic
Introduction
mechanism to permit the wife of an incompetent man to
The idea behind the Get Zikui is the Halachic principle of
remarry. In fact, rabbinical judges are well aware of this
Zachin LeAdam Shelo BeFanav (Ketubot 11a), that one party may
Halachah and take preemptive steps such as administering a
be benefited from the actions of another even in the formers
Get to avoid such situations, such as before a surgery is
absenceor without their explicit consent; in this case, it meant
performed on a husband when there is a high risk of the
taking into consideration that it would likely be the will of the
procedure rendering him mentally incompetent.
husband to grant his wife a divorce if he could, and thus he
benefits from the divorce as well, even though it is being imposed The First Prong ADaata DeHachi Lo Kidshah Atzmah
without his explicit consent.
The Tzefat Beit Din, however, develops two arguments
The case was heard by a panel of three Dayanim, rabbinic to permit the wife to remarry. The first argument, based on
judges, headed by Rav Uriel Lavi. It is reported that, initially, the Bava Kama 110b, is that regarding such a situation, a woman
Dayanim sought support from Chief Sephardic Chacham did not consent to marry. The Gemara poses a question as to
Yitzchak Yosef, head of the Rabbinical Court of Appeals. But he whether a woman whose husband died childless and now
refused, and they turned instead to Rav Zalman Nechemiah her husbands only brother (who is required to perform
Goldberg, one of the leading contemporary Halachic authorities, Yibbum, marry the widow) is a Mukkah Shechin (stricken
who reportedly consented to the procedure. The ruling also states with boils) may claim ADaata DeHachi Lo Kidshah Atzmah,
that Rav Shlomo Dichovsky, another leading contemporary she did not consent to marry to be placed in such an
Dayan, supports the Beit Dins decision. The decision was shown untenable situation. The Gemara proposes that the woman
to Rav Ovadiah Yosef a few months before his passing but he was does not require Chalitzah from the Mukkah Shechin
too ill to issue a ruling2.
brother-in-law in order to remarry. The Gemara rejects this
In their ruling, the Beit Din acknowledged that its ruling is a proposal concluding that we are concerned that the wife is
huge innovation. Nevertheless, they seek to demonstrate at among the minority of women who would consent to marry
great length in their ninety-three page ruling that the decision is any man, since some women believe better to marry a
Halachically valid. Not surprisingly, strenuous opposition has marginal husband than to live alone, commonly known as
emerged with great authorities such as Rav Avraham Dov Tav LeMeitav Tan Du MiLeMeitav Armelo and Nicha
Auerbach, Rav Moshe Mordechai Farbstein, Rav Moshe Lah BeChol DeHu4.
1

Even those Posekim who accept brain stem death (BSD) as a Halachically
acceptable definition of death would agree that a patient in a permanent
vegetative state is not considered to be dead. Although the PVS patients
brain is incapable of cognition (at least any observable cognition), his brain
still serves as the command and control center of the body. The brain of a
BSD patient is not only incapable of cognition but it also no longer serves as
the command and control center of the body.
2
Had Chacham Ovadiah ruled on the topic, there most likely would have
been far less controversy, since his rulings are highly authoritative,
especially regarding Igun resolution.

The Mishnah (Gittin 7:1) discusses a case where a husband is unable

to talk, but a Get can be written if when asked if he wishes to write a
Get for his wife, the husband nods his head in agreement. It must be
confirmed, in addition, that the husband is mentally competent by
posing questions to him and he responds in a reasonable manner (i.e. if
when asked, Do you want to build a snowman? in the middle of
summer, he nods his head yes, it shows that he is not mentally
competent; see Gittin 70b).
4
This explanation follows Rav Moshe Feinstein, Teshuvot Igrot Moshe
Even HaEzer 4:113.

The Maharam of Rothenburg (cited in Mordechai Yevamot

29, Teshuvot Maimoniyot HaShayachot LeSefer Nashim 29 and
Tur Even HaEzer 157) suggests that Tav LeMeitav Tan Du
MiLeMeitav Armelo and Nicha Lah BeChol DeHu do not apply
to a case which is more extreme than a Mukkah Shechin, a case of
a man who converted to another religion (Mumar). Rashi (cited
by Tur ad loc.) strongly disagrees, arguing that even in such a
case we do not apply the principle of ADaata DeHachi Lo
Kidshah Atzmah
The Shulchan Aruch (E.H. 157:4) cites the ruling of the
Maharam of Rothenburg and rules that it is not to be followed.
The Rama (ad loc.) adds that if a woman remarried without
Chalitzah because she did not know her deceased first husband
had a brother who is a Mumar, the opinion of the Maharam of
Rothenberg may be relied upon so that the couple need not
divorce5. The Beeir Heiteiv6 (ad loc. 2) cites the Radach (Bayit 9)
who rules that even Rashi would agree if the Yavam Mumar lives
in a location the Yevamah cannot access, that she may remarry
without Chalitzah7. The reasoning for the Radach is that a woman
has hope she may reform the Mumar, but this option is not
relevant if the widow cannot access the Mumar brother-in-law.
In an extraordinary ruling, Rav Zvi Pesach Frank8 (Teshuvot
Har Zvi E.H. 133) applies the Radachs ruling to a case where a
husband became mentally incompetent (a Shoteh) after having
delivered a Get to his wife. After the Get was delivered, it was
discovered that the husbands name was transliterated
improperly, which seemed to invalidate the Get (Mishnah Gittin
8:5). The husband could not authorize the writing of a new Get
since he became a Shoteh.
Rav Frank permitted the woman to remarry even without
receiving a new Get for a number of reasons. Rav Franks primary
consideration was that the improper transliteration in this specific
case does not invalidate the Get since the error was not egregious.
Rav Frank applies the Radach as a secondary reason to permit the
wife to remarry. He argues that the husband becoming mentally
incompetent is far worse than falling into a requirement to have
Yibbum with a Mukkeh Shechin. Rav Frank on this basis suggests
that regarding such a case we say ADaata DeHachi Lo Kidshah
Atzmah9.
5

The Rama, though, cites an opinion that she requires a subsequent

Chalitzah in order to remain married.
6
The fact that the Beeir Heiteiv cites the Radach demonstrates that this
opinion is regarded as a mainstream opinion.
7
The Radach conditioned his ruling upon the consent of two other major
Halachic authorities endorsing his bold ruling.
8
Rav Frank (1880-1960) served as the Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem and is
regarded as one of the leading Halachic authorities of the twentieth century.
We should note that this responsum is included in a volume of Teshuvot Har
Tzvi that was published decades after the sages passing. Rav Hershel
Schachter reported to this author that a Teshuvah published posthumously is
regarded as less authoritative since it was not edited and prepared by its
author for publication as a ruling for all generations (it does tell us, however,
how the Gadol ruled in a particular situation and thus does have significant
value).
9
This ruling seems to contradict the aforementioned Mishnah Yevamot 14:1
that if a husband who became a Shoteh cannot give his wife a Get (due to his
incapacity). This Mishnah seems to imply that the wife has no Halachic
avenue to permit her to remarry in such a tragic situation. Rav Frank could
respond that a Shotehs limitation applies only to the husbands inability to
order a Get to be written, but that there might actually be an alternative

The Tzefat Beit Din follows in the footsteps of Rav Frank and
applies the Radach to their situation. The Tzefat Beit Din argue
that since the husband cannot by any stretch of the imagination
execute any of his duties to his wife that are expected by
Halachah, it is most reasonable to apply the principle of ADaata
DeHachi Lo Kidshah Atzmah10. However, since Rav Frank used
this approach only as a consideration for a lenient ruling and not
the entire basis of his permitting the wife to remarry, the Tzefat
Beit Din utilized this only as the first of a two prong approach to
permit the woman in their case to remarry. In addition, the Tzefat
Beit Din utilizes this argument to establish that the wife is only
possibly married to her husband in the PVS state due to the
possibility that ADaata DeHachi Lo Kidshah Atzmah. This
diminishes the level of obligations the wife has towards her
husband since she is only possibly married to him. Thus, for
example, the Tzefat Beit Din wrote that she is not obligated to
mourn for him when he dies11. This paves the way for their
argument that it is a Zechut (benefit) for a husband in a
permanent vegetative state to divorce his wife, in part since her
obligations to him are greatly reduced.
Rav Farbstein, on the other hand, includes in his list of
complaints against the Tzefat Beit Dins ruling the argument that
since the life expectancy for someone in a permanent vegetative
state is very limited, it can be expected that the husband will die
in relatively short order. Rav Farbstein believes that since in this
case one cannot apply the idea of ADaata DeHachi Lo Kidshah
Atzmah, since some women, he believes, would consent to be
married for five years to a man who would subsequently be
incapacitated for seven to eight years. According to Rav
Farbstein, applying the idea of ADaata DeHachi Lo Kidshah
Atzmah to our case is entirely inappropriate and cannot serve
even as a consideration in a lenient ruling.
Next week we will, IYH and BN, present the second prong of
the ruling of the Tzefat Beit Din.
argument, ADaata DeHachi Lo Kidshah Atzmah, to permit the wife to
remarry.
10
The Tzefat Beit Din argues (towards the end of the ninety three page
Teshuvah) that Yevamot 14:1 applies only to a conventional Shoteh and not
to someone in a permanent vegetative state, in which the principle
of ADaata DeHachi Lo Kidshah Atzmah applies.
11
This could be due to the fact that the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deiah
399:13 and Beeir Heiteiv 398:2) rules that mourning is only a rabbinic
obligation and therefore one may rule leniently regarding a matter of doubt
pertaining to rabbinic law (Safeik MiDerabbanan LeKula).
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