Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

PIO MODESTO and CIRILA

RIVERA-MODESTO,

Petitioners,

G.R. No. 189859

Present:

NACHURA, J.,

versus

BRION, Acting Chairperson,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

CARLOS URBINA, substituted by

MENDOZA, and

Designated Additional Member of the Third Division, per Special Order No. 907
dated October 13, 2010.
Designated Acting Chairperson of the Third Division, per Special Order No. 906
dated October 13, 2010.

the heirs of OLYMPIA MIGUEL

VDA. DE URBINA (Surviving
Spouse) and children, namely:
ESCOLASTICA M. URBINA, ET
AL.,
Respondents.

SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 18, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Pio Modesto

and Cirila Rivera Modesto (Modestos or petitioners) dated March 1, 2010,1[1]
seeking to reverse our January 11, 2010 Resolution, which denied their petition for
review on certiorari for lack of merit.2[2]

Designated Additional Member of the Third Division, per Special Order No. 911
dated October 15, 2010.
1[1] Rollo, pp. 97-118.
2[2] Id. at 95.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Civil Case No. 53483

This case stems from a complaint for recovery of possession filed by

respondent Carlos Urbina (Urbina) against the petitioners with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 53483.

In his complaint, Urbina alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land

situated at Lower Bicutan, Taguig, designated as Lot 56, PLS 272. According to
Urbina, the Modestos, through stealth, scheme, and machination, were able to
occupy a portion of this property, designated as Lot 356, PLS 272. Thereafter, the
Modestos negotiated with Urbina for the sale of this lot. However, before the
parties could finalize the sale, the Modestos allegedly cancelled the transaction and
began claiming ownership over the lot. Urbina made several demands on the
Modestos to vacate the property, the last of which was through a demand letter sent
on July 22, 1983. When the Modestos still refused to vacate, Urbina filed the
present action against them.

In their answer, the Modestos claimed that Urbina could not be the lawful
owner of the property because it was still government property, being a part of the
Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation.

After the resolution of various procedural issues, 3[3] the RTC of Pasig City
rendered a decision in favor of Urbina on April 24, 2000, ordering the petitioners
to immediately vacate and surrender the lot to Urbina and to pay him P200.00
monthly as compensation for the use of the property from July 22, 1983 until they
finally vacate.4[4]

3 [3] On February 17, 1989, the RTC issued a ruling based solely on the pleadings in favor of
Urbina, and ordered the Modestos to vacate the lot. The RTC also ordered the Modestos to pay
Urbina the amount of P200.00 a month as reasonable rental from the time of their occupation
in July 1983 until they finally vacated the premises, and to pay P3,000.00 as attorneys fees.
On appeal, the CA set aside the RTC judgment on the pleadings, and ordered a remand of the
case to the lower court for further proceedings or trial on the merits, as the case may be.
After conducting trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a decision dated March 4, 1996 which
dismissed Urbinas complaint without prejudice on the ground that the proper government
office in charge of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, being an indispensable party,
should be impleaded under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Urbina moved for reconsideration, which the RTC thereafter granted in its Order dated
May 21, 1996. In the same order, it ordered Urbina to include Fort Bonifacio Military
Reservation in its complaint. Urbina then filed an amended complaint, impleading the
Bases Conversion Development Authority as party defendant. The RTC admitted the
amended complaint. The parties, however, subsequently agreed to drop the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority as party defendant since the assailed lot is no
longer within the supervision of the BCDA but within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands. Id. at 63-65.

4[4] Rollo, pp. 62-69.

The RTC noted that the petitioners recognized Urbinas possessory rights
over the property when they entered into a negotiated contract of sale with him for
the property. Thus, the Modestos were estopped from subsequently assailing or
disclaiming Urbinas possessory rights over this lot.

The petitioners appealed this decision with the Court of Appeals (CA).

LMB Conflict No. 110

Urbinas claim of ownership over Lot 56 is based primarily on his

Miscellaneous

Sales Application

No.

(III-1)

460

(Miscellaneous

Sales

Application), which he filed on July 21, 1966.5[5]

While Urbinas accion publiciana complaint was pending before the RTC,
the Modestos filed a letter-protest against Urbinas Miscellaneous Sales
Application with the Land Management Bureau (LMB) on January 29, 1993,
claiming that: (a) they are the owners of Lot 356, PLS 272; 6[6] (b) they have been
occupying this lot for almost 33 years; and (c) their house is constructed on this lot.

5[5] Id. at 65.

6[6] The portion of Lot 56 that the Modestos were occupying.

The Modestos also alleged that they filed an unnumbered sales application
for Lot 356 with the LMB, based on their actual occupancy of the property,
pursuant to Proclamations 2476 and 172, on February 10, 1993.

On January 31, 2008, the LMB denied with finality the Modestos
unnumbered sales application/protest against Urbinas application, in turn
upholding Urbinas Miscellaneous Sales Application.

Refusing to give up, the Modestos filed a motion for reconsideration. They
also filed an Insular Government Patent Sales Application over Lot 356 on January
27, 2009.7[7]

THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

The CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 53483 on
January 26, 2009.8[8]

The CA agreed with the RTCs observation that the

Modestos were estopped from challenging Urbinas right to possess the property
after they acknowledged this right when they entered into the negotiated contract
7[7] Rollo, p. 122.
8[8] Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag, with the concurrence of Presiding
Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., and Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid. Id. at
45-60.

of sale. The CA also gave credence to the January 31, 2008 LMB order in LMB
Conflict No. 110, ruling that this LMB order bolstered Urbinas possessory rights
over the subject property.

At the time the CA decision was issued, respondent Carlos Urbina had
already passed away and had been substituted by his surviving heirs, his spouse,
Olympia Miguel Vda. de Urbina, and his children, Escolastica, Cecilia, Efren,
Manolito, and Purificacion, all surnamed Urbina (respondents).

THE PETITION

The petitioners subsequently filed a petition for review on certiorari with

this Court, asserting that the CA committed reversible error in finding that Urbina
had possessory rights over the property. The Modestos mainly argued that at the
time Urbina filed his MSA and acquired tax declarations over the subject
property, the property was still government property, being part of a military
reservation. The property was thus not alienable and disposable, and could not
legally be possessed by a private individual. Accordingly, Urbina could not use the
MSA and the tax declarations as proof of a better right to possess the property as
against the Modestos.

The Modestos further claimed that the CA committed grievous error when it
held that they were estopped from challenging Urbinas right to possess the subject
property. While they admitted to negotiating with Urbina for the sale of the
property, they alleged that they did so based on Urbinas misrepresentation that he
had a legal claim of ownership over the property. Since their offer to buy the
property from Urbina was based on his false assertions, the principle of
estoppel cannot apply.

Additionally, the Modestos alleged that since the property is covered by

Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum Order No. 119, the lower courts should
have given due consideration to the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Director of Lands (of the Bureau of Lands, now Director of the Land Management
Bureau) over these parcels of public lands.

Lastly, the Modestos questioned Urbinas qualifications to possess the

property, claiming that Urbina was not in actual, adverse, public and continuous
possession of the property. According to the Modestos, from the time that Urbina
filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application in 1966 until the present, Urbina was a
resident of Makati City, and did not actually occupy the property.

In our Order dated January 11, 2010, we denied the Modestos petition for
failing to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed CA decision.

THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

On March 3, 2010, the Modestos filed their motion for reconsideration,

raising essentially the same grounds already brought up in their petition for review
on certiorari.

Notably, the Modestos attached LMB Order dated February 19, 2010
(February 19, 2010 LMB Order), which resolved their motion for reconsideration
of the LMBs January 31, 2008 order in LMB Conflict No. 110. This Order held
that the subject property had indeed been a part of the Fort Bonifacio Military
Reservation, and only became alienable and disposable after October 16, 1987.
Thus, Urbinas Miscellaneous Sales Application over the property was improper
and could not be the source of possessory rights over the property.

The order also noted that Urbina failed to comply with the requirements of
an applicant for ownership of the property, as set forth in Memorandum No. 119,
the implementing guidelines of Proclamation No. 172.

Responding to this motion, the respondents, in their Comment dated May

31, 2010, reiterated that the petitioners are estopped from assailing Urbinas
possessory rights over the property after they entered into a negotiated sales
contract with him over the subject property. They also accused the Modestos of
employing dilatory tactics in filing the present motion.

THE RULING

We GRANT the motion for reconsideration.

Procedural issue

An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better

right of possession of realty independently of title. 9[9] Accion publiciana is also
used to refer to an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the
grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost
9[9] Bejar v. Caluag, G.R. No. 171277, February 17, 2007, 516 SCRA 84, 90; Sps.
Cruz v. Torres, 374 Phil. 529, 533 (1999); Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286,
291 (1906); Ledesma v. Marcos, 9 Phil. 618, 620 (1908).

for more than one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court. The objective of a plaintiff in accion publiciana is to recover possession
only, not ownership.10[10]

In asking us to determine which of the parties has a better right to possess

the property, we are asked to resolve a factual issue, involving as it does the
weighing and evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties in the courts
below. Generally, such an exercise is not appropriate in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to resolve only
questions of law. Moreover, the factual findings of the CA, when supported by
substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not
reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following
recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
10[10] Spouses Padilla v. Velasco, G.R. No. 169956, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA
219.

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.11[11]

Since the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC, we would normally
be precluded from re-examining the factual circumstances of this case. However, it
appears that the RTC and the CA, in concluding that Urbina has the right to
lawfully eject the Modestos from the lot in question, have greatly misapprehended
the facts of this case.

In finding for Urbina, both the RTC and the CA mainly relied on the
principle of estoppel, and focused on the Modestos admission that they entered
into a negotiated contract of sale with Urbina. In the process, they injudiciously
ignored the other material issues that the Modestos raised regarding the validity of
Urbinas possession of the property, specifically the Modestos allegation that at
the time Urbina began staking his claim over the property, it was still government
land.

11[11] Ontimare, Jr. v. Elep, G.R. No. 159224, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 257, 265.

This error on the part of the lower courts is made more evident when we take
into account an intervening event which significantly affects the resolution of this
case the issuance by the LMB of its order dated February 19, 2010, which
expressly stated that Urbina did not acquire any possessory rights over the lot. For
these reasons, we find the review of the evidence on record proper.

Jurisdiction of the Court

The authority of the courts to resolve and settle questions relating to the
possession of property has long been settled. 12[12] This authority continues, even
when the land in question is public land. As we explained in Solis v. Intermediate
Appellate Court:13[13]
We hold that the power and authority given to the Director of Lands to
alienate and dispose of public lands does not divest the regular courts of their
jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants
against others to protect their respective possessions and occupations. While
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands [now the Land Management Bureau] is
confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public
lands or to cases which involve disposition of public lands, the power to
determine who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right
of possession over public lands remains with the courts.
12[12] See Omandam v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128750, January 18, 2001, 349
SCRA 483; Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa, G.R. No. 152807, August 12, 2003, 408
SCRA 692; City of Baguio v. Nino, G.R. No. 161811, April 12, 2006, 487 SCRA 216;
Estrella v. Robles, Jr., G.R. No. 171029, November 22, 2007, 538 SCRA 60.
13[13] G.R. No. 72486, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 267.

The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the
wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the means to prevent
disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants. Its power is clearly limited
to disposition and alienation and while it may decide disputes over possession,
this is but in aid of making the proper awards. The ultimate power to resolve
conflicts of possession is recognized to be within the legal competence of the
civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection to the actual possessors
and occupants with a view to quell social unrest.

Consequently, while we leave it to the LMB to determine the issue of who

among the parties should be awarded the title to the subject property, there is no
question that we have sufficient authority to resolve which of the parties is entitled
to rightful possession.

On the issue of possessory rights

Prefatorily, we observe that the subject property has not yet been titled, nor
has it been the subject of a validly issued patent by the LMB. Therefore, the land
remains part of the public domain, and neither Urbina nor the Modestos can legally
claim ownership over it. This does not mean, however, that neither of the parties
have the right to possess the property.

Urbina alleged that he is the rightful possessor of the property since he has a
pending Miscellaneous Sales Application, as well as tax declarations over the
property. He also relied, to support his claim of a better right to possess the

property, on the admission on the part of the Modestos that they negotiated with
him for the sale of the lot in question.

On the other hand, the Modestos anchored their right to possess the same on
their actual possession of the property. They also questioned the legality of
Urbinas Miscellaneous Sales Application, and his tax declarations over the
property, arguing that since these were obtained when the land was still not
alienable and disposable, they could not be the source of any legal rights.

After reviewing the records of this case, we find the reasoning of the Modestos to
be more in accord with applicable laws and jurisprudence.

The February 19, 2010 LMB Order

Factual findings of administrative agencies are generally respected and even

accorded finality because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these
agencies from handling matters falling under their specialized jurisdiction. 14[14]
Given that the LMB is the administrative agency tasked with assisting the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the
management and disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the public
14[14] Lim v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 130325, March 11, 2003, citing Mapa v.
Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76, 81 (1989).

domain,15[15] we defer to its specialized knowledge on these matters. In this

regard, we quote with approval the observations made by the Director of the LMB
in the February 19, 2010 LMB Order:

Movants [the Modestos] have anchored their Motion for Reconsideration

on three (3) assigned errors, to wit:
15[15] Section 14, Executive Order No. 192, provides: There is hereby created the
Lands Management Bureau which shall absorb functions and powers of the Bureau of
Lands except those line functions and powers which are transferred to the regional field
office. The Lands Management Bureau to be headed by a Director and assisted by an
Assistant Director shall advise the Secretary on matters pertaining to rational land
classification management and disposition and shall have the following functions, but not
limited to:
a. Recommend policies and programs for the efficient and effective
administration, surveys, management and disposition of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain and other lands outside the
responsibilities of other government agencies; such as reclaimed areas and
other areas not needed for or are not being utilized for the purposes for which
they have been established;
b. Advise the Regional Offices on the efficient and effective implementation of
policies, programs and projects for more effective public lands management;
c. Assist in the monitoring
management and disposition
effectiveness thereof;

and evaluation of land surveys,

of lands to ensure efficiency and

d. Issue standards, guidelines, regulations and orders to enforce policies for

the maximization of land use and development;
e. Develop operating standards and procedure to enhance the Bureau's
objectives and functions;
f. Assist the Secretary as Executive Officer charged with carrying out
the provisions of the Public Land Act [C.A. 141, as amended], who shall
have direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale, or any
other forms of concessions or disposition and management of the lands of the
public domain; and

g. Perform other functions as may be assigned by the Secretary and/or provided

by law.

I.

THIS OFFICE ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT THE AREA IS NOT

COVERED BY PROCLAMATION NO. 172, AS IMPLEMENTED BY
MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 119;

II.

THIS OFFICE ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT CARLOS T. URBINA

WAS IN ACTUAL, ADVERSE, PUBLIC AND CONTINUOUS
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION;

III.

THIS OFFICE ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT A NEW SURVEY OF

THE AREA IN QUESTION SHOULD BE DONE AND CONDUCTED
TO DETERMINE THE TRUE BOUNDARIES OF THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION VIS--VIS THE CLAIMS OF EACH PARTY.

In order to clarify the issues raised in the Motion for Reconsideration, this
Office ordered that another ocular inspection and investigation on the subject
premises be conducted by Special Investigator Danilo Lim. After said
investigation, Special Investigator, Danilo Lim, submitted his Report to the
Regional Technical Director, Lands Management Services, thru the Chief, Land
Management Division, DENR-NCR.
In his Report, Special Investigator, Danilo Lim made the following
findings:
The Miscellaneous Sales Application filed by Carlos
Urbina is not appropriate because Lot 356 had ceased to be
public land as it had become part of the Fort Bonifacio
Military Reservation, and hence, no one can claim possessory
rights over the said property since it is within said Military
Reservation. The subject area which is located in Lower Bicutan,
Taguig, only became alienable and disposable upon the issuance of
Presidential Proclamation No. 172 and its implementing guidelines
Memorandum Order No. 119 on October 16, 1987.
After a judicious evaluation of the arguments raised in the instant motion,
and taking into account the findings and recommendations of Special Investigator
Danilo Lim as contained in his Report, this Office finds the same to be not
entirely without merit.

Anent the first assigned error, Special Investigator Danilo Lim has found
that the area is indeed a part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation and

is covered by Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum Order No. 119. Upon a
thorough research of the origin of the subject property, it turned out that the area
was originally part of the vast parcel of land known as Hacienda De Maricaban.
Sometime in 1902, the United States of America purchased said vast tract of land
with an area of Seven Hundred and Twenty Nine and Fifteenth Hundred (729.15)
Hectares and spanning the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque and Pasay,
from its original owner, Dona Dolores Pacual Casal Y Ochoa, for the purpose of
establishing a US Military Reservation which they later named Fort William
Mc Kinley. On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation
No. 423, reserving for military purposes, the parcels of land identified as Parcel
No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4, Psu-2031, on which parcels of land excluding Parcel No.
2, the present Fort Bonifacio was established for the Republic of the Philippines.
Parcel No. 3, Psu-2031 is covered by T.C.T. No. 61524 registered in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 in order to exclude from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 which established Fort Bonifacio, certain portions of land
embraced therein known as Barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan, Western
Bicutan and Signal Village, all situated in the Municipality of Taguig, and to
declare the same open for disposition to actual occupants and qualified applicants
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 274 and Republic Act No. 730 in
relation to the Public Land Act as amended; and under Memorandum Order No.
119 issued by President Corazon Aquino. In Proclamation No. 172, Lower
Bicutan is described as Lot 3 situated in the Municipality of Taguig, M.M., and
containing an area of One Million Eighty Four Thousand Three Hundred Eleven
(1,084,311) sqm more or less or 108.43 hectares.
In view of all the above recitals, it appears that the parcel of land subject
of this case (Lot 356) which is located in Barangay Lower Bicutan, City of
Taguig is covered by Proclamation No. 172 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino, and hence, the same only became alienable and disposable to qualified
applicants after October 16, 1987, the date of its issuance, contrary to what is
believed in the assailed Order of this Office.

With respect to the second assigned error, the issue can be resolved by the
application of the legal provisions covering the subject property, which is
Proclamation No. 172 and its implementing guidelines. Under its implementing
guidelines, Memorandum No. 119, the following are the qualifications for an
applicant to be qualified to apply for and acquire a lot under Proclamation No.
172, among others, to wit:

(1) He/She must be a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas. To be

considered a bona fide resident, the applicant must have the following
qualifications:
a) A Filipino citizen of legal age and/or a head of the family;
b) Must have constructed a house in the area proclaimed for disposition
on or before January 6, 1986 and actually residing therein;
c) Must not own any other residential or commercial lot in Metro
Manila;
d) Must not have been a registered awardee of any lot under the
administration of the NHA, MHS, or any other government agency,
nor the AFP Officers village;
e) Must not be a professional squatter. A professional squatter, for
purposes of this Order, is one who engages in selling lots in the areas
proclaimed for disposition; and
f) Has filed the proper application to purchase.
Based on the Report of Special Investigator Lim and the other Land
Inspectors who investigated this case, namely: Jose P. Antonio and Jose P.
Parayno, it was found that Pio Modesto and his family are the actual occupants
of the area with a residential house and chapel made of light materials and
Pio Modesto and his family are actually residing in the said residential house. On
the other hand, it was established that Carlos Urbina has been a resident of
Pasay Road or 4929 Pio Del Pilar, Makati City. Applying the qualifications
provided for in Memorandum Order No. 119, we find that Spouses Modesto are to
be qualified to apply for the subject lot as they have been in occupation thereof
and have constructed their residential house thereon. Hence, they satisfy the
requirements in order to be considered a Bonafide Resident as defined in the
guidelines. As per our records, Spouses Pio and Cirila Modesto have also filed
an unnumbered I.G.P.S.A. Application for the subject lot on January 27,
2009. Carlos Urbina, however, never constructed any house on the subject lot
and neither did he actually reside therein. Besides, he already owns a
residential lot in Makati City where he had been residing all this time. Hence,
he cannot be considered a bonafide resident of the subject lot. He likewise failed
to file his I.G.P.S.A application for the lot. Instead, what he had filed on January
20, 1966 was a Miscellaneous Sales Application. At that time, however, the area
of Barangay Lower Bicutan, where the subject lot is located, was still part of the
Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, and the same had not yet been segregated
and declared to be alienable and disposable. Hence, no possessory rights could
have been acquired by his over the subject lot.16[16]

16[16] Rollo, pp. 120-122.

From this LMB order, we consider the following facts established:

First, the lot in question, situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan, was part of
the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, and only became alienable and disposable
after October 16, 1987, pursuant to Proclamation No. 172. This factual finding
finds further support in the testimony, before the RTC, of Jose Exequiel Vale,
Special Investigator and Assisting Hearing Officer of the DENR.17[17]

Second, the Modestos are bona fide residents of the lot in question, being the
actual residents of the lot and having built a house and chapel on the property.

Third, the Modestos have a pending Insular Government Patent Sales

Application over the lot in question, filed after the property became alienable and
disposable.

Taking these facts into account, we now make a distinction, based on the
corresponding legal effects, between: (a) possession of the property before October
16, 1987, when the land was still considered inalienable government land, and (b)
possession of the property after October 16, 1987, when the land had already been
declared alienable and disposable.
17[17] Id. at 64.

Possession prior to October 16, 1987

Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or

actually alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of
the public domain,18[18] and its occupation in the concept of owner, no matter how
long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. 19[19] It is only after the
property has been declared alienable and disposable that private persons can
legally claim possessory rights over it.

Accordingly, even if we recognize that Urbina had been in possession of the

property as early as July 21, 1966, when he filed his Miscellaneous Sales
Application, his occupation was unlawful and could not be the basis of possessory
rights, in keeping with Section 88 of the Public Land Act, that states:
Section 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section
eighty-three shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry,
sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared alienable under the provisions
of this Act or by proclamation of the President.

18[18] Seville v. National Development Company, G.R. No. 129401, February 2,

2001, 351 SCRA 112.
19[19] Spouses de Ocampo v. Arlos, G.R. No.135527, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA
716.

The same holds true for Urbinas tax declarations. Absent any proof that the
property in question had already been declared alienable at the time that Urbina
declared it for tax purposes, his tax declarations over the subject property cannot
be used to support his claim of possession.

Similarly, while the Modestos claim to have been in possession of Lot 356
for almost 33 years,20[20] this occupation could not give rise to possessory rights
while the property being occupied remain government land that had not yet been
declared alienable and disposable.

Possession after October 16, 1987

The different land investigators21[21] sent by the LMB to survey the subject
property have consistently held that the Modestos are the actual occupants of the
lot in question. This actual occupation is not denied by Urbina. As a matter of fact,
we know from Urbinas final demand letter that the Modestos have been in open
and continuous possession of the property since July 22, 1983.22[22] We also
consider established that the Modestos built a house on the subject property, a fact
20[20] Counted from January 29, 1993, when the Modestos filed their protest to
Urbinas miscellaneous sales application in LMB Conflict No. 110.
21[21] Special Investigator Danilo Lim, Land Inspectors Jose P. Antonio and Jose P.
Parayno.
22[22] Rollo, p. 62.

that Urbina affirmed in his testimony before the RTC. 23[23] From these
circumstances, we consider as settled the fact that the Modestos were the actual
possessors of the property when it was declared alienable and disposable on
October 16, 1987, and continued to possess the property until the present time.

Furthermore, the Modestos have a valid Insular Government Patent Sales

Application over the property pending with the LMB, which they filed on January
27, 2009.24[24] In contrast, Urbina has a Miscellaneous Sales Application filed in
1966, which the LMB considered invalid since it was filed when the property still
formed part of a military reservation.

As for the Certification from the City Treasurer of Taguig that the
respondents presented,25[25] which certified that Carlos Urbina had paid real estate
taxes on real property describe[d] in the name of Carlos Urbina, with property
located at Lower Bicutan, Taguig City from 2009 and prior years, we note that the
certification contains no description of the property subject of the tax declaration,
leaving us to wonder on the identity of the property covered by the declaration.

23[23] Id. at 63.

24[24] Id. at 122.
25[25] Attached to respondent Urbinas Comment dated May 31, 2010; id. at 140.

In any case, even if we consider this certification as sufficient proof that

Urbina declared the subject property for tax declaration purposes, it must be
stressed that the mere declaration of land for taxation purposes does not
constitute possession thereof nor is it proof of ownership in the absence of the
claimants actual possession.26[26] And in light of our categorical finding that the
Modestos actually occupied the property in question from the time that it was
declared alienable and disposable until the present time, the tax declaration fails to
convince us that Urbina has a right to legally possess it.

For these reasons, we find that Urbina utterly failed to prove that he has a
better right to possess the property. Thus, we cannot sustain his complaint for
ejectment against the Modestos and, perforce, must dismiss the same for lack of
merit.

On the finding of estoppel

26[26] See de Luna vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94490, August 6, 1992, 212 SCRA 276.

Lastly, we find the CAs reliance on the principle of estoppel against the Modestos
to be misplaced.

Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive

upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying on it.27[27] This doctrine is based on the grounds of public policy, fair
dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his
own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were
directed and who reasonably relied on it.28[28] It bears noting, however, that no
estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the party sought to be
estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake.29[29]

Here, the Modestos do not deny that they negotiated with Urbina for the sale
of the subject property. However, because they entered the negotiated sales
contract with Urbina on the mistaken belief, based on Urbinas erroneous assertion,
that he was the lawful owner-possessor of the property in question, we do not
consider them bound by this action. Consequently, the principle of estoppel finds
no application in this case.

27[27] CIVIL CODE, Article 1431.

28[28] Rockland Construction Company v. Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 164587, February 04, 2008, citing Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Appeals, Nos. L-30831 & L-31176, November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 357, 368.
29[29] Ramiro v. Grano, 54 Phil. 744 (1930), citing 21 C.J., 1125, 1126.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the motion and

REINSTATE the petition. Consequently, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
Decision dated January 26, 2009 and Resolution dated October 5, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68007. We DISMISS the complaint for
Recovery of Possession filed by Carlos T. Urbina for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987

September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both
assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of
Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land
situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by
sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of
71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased
the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the
property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse

possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the
judicial confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre
as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area
of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project
No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application
for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under
the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration
Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of
Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its
technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and
with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect
title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4
the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential
and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the
CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable
only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for
purposes of computing Malabanans period of possession.

Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs
decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5
(Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land.
In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as
alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect
title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration
Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land
subject of the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to
June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration
proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the
notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their
argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an
alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was
essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription at
the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to
establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the
part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land
as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of
the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or
disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit
title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of
the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their
favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20, 1998, he
had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time
when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to
the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication,
the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial
legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land
subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different
classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the
Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of
private ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public
use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of
such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public
service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the
patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it
belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country
from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the
public domain belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right
to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State
is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands
of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19
Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other
classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into
agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be
further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted.21 The identification

of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act
of the Executive Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the
public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands
of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil
Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by
the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently,
lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public
land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when
public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth,
thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until
the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until
Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public
service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows,
and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen
of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945,
or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise
classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it
excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage
of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act,
the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession
and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public
domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify
lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of

the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for
registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order
for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that
the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because
any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal
effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over
by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full
legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which
should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of
possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of
the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal
meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as
agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title
is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that
the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title
over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-ininterest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted
to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this
doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were
already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite
period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property
subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of
possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to
dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which
prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants
possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.
Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through
actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only
a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of
title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles
to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and
cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we
should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative
development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order
to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to
qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting
such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning
disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code,
in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription
can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands
of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private
ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated
or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public
Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs
only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application,
provided the applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June
12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the
applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete
title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of the public domain
and has become private property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer

intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed
from the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial
lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any
of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land
has been already converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive
prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article
1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without
satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be
considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has
remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation
declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the
respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 182913

November 20, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO, FELIZA, NEMESIO, ALBERTO, FELICIDAD, RICARDO, MILAGROS
AND CIPRIANO, ALL SURNAMED BACAS; EMILIANA CHABON, SATURNINO

ABDON, ESTELA, CHABON, LACSASA DEMON, PDERITA CHABON, FORTUNATA

EMBALSADO, MINDA J. CASTILLO, PABLO CASTILLO, ARTURO P. LEGASPI, and
JESSIE I. LEGASPI, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to review, reverse
and set aside the November 12, 2007 Decision1 and the May 15, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64142, upholding the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 17, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC) , which dismissed the consolidated cases of Civil Case
No. 3494, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Antonio, et al. and Civil Case No. 5918, entitled
Republic of the Philippines v. Emiliana Chabon , et al. Said civil cases were filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) for the cancellation and annulment of Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 0-358 and OCT No. O-669, covering certain parcels of land occupied and
utilized as part of the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation, Misamis Oriental, presently the
home of the 4th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army.
The Antecedents:
In 1938, Commonwealth President Manuel Luis Quezon (Pres. Quezon) issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, reserving for the use of the
Philippine Army three (3) parcels of the public domain situated in the barrios of Bulua and
Carmen, then Municipality of Cagayan, Misamis Oriental. The parcels of land were withdrawn
from sale or settlement and reserved for military purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there
be."
Land Registration Case No. N-275
[Antonio, Feliza, Nemesio, Roberto, and Felicidad, all surnamed Bacas, and the Heirs of Jesus
Bacas, Applicants (The Bacases)]
The Bacases filed their Application for Registration3 on November 12, 1964 covering a parcel of
land, together with all the improvements found thereon, located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City,
more particularly described and bounded as follows:
A parcel of land, Lot No. 4354 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan, L.R.C. Record No. 1612,
situated at Barrio Carmen, Municipality of Cagayan, Province of Misamis Oriental. Bounded on
the SE., along lines 1-2-3-4, by Lot 4357; and alongline 4-5, by Lot 3862; on the S., along line 56, by Lot 3892; on the W. and NW., along lines 6-7-8, by Lot 4318; on the NE., along line 8-9,
by Lot 4319, along line 9-10, by Lot 4353 and long line 10-11, by Lot 4359; and on the SE.,

along line 11-1, by Lot 4356, all of Cagayan Cadastre; containing an area of THREE
HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN (354,377)
square meters, more or less, under Tax Declaration No. 35436 and assessed at P3,540.00.4
They alleged ownership in fee simple of the property and indicated in their application the names
and addresses of the adjoining owners, as well as a statement that the Philippine Army (Fourth
Military Area) recently occupied a portion of the land by their mere tolerance.5
The Director of the Bureau of Lands, thru its Special Counsel, Benito S. Urcia (Urcia) ,
registered its written Opposition6 against the application. Later, Urcia, assisted by the District
Land Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, thru the Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Misamis
Oriental, Pedro R. Luspo (Luspo) , filed an Amended Opposition.7
On April 10, 1968, based on the evidence presented by the Bacases, the Land Registration Court
(LRC) rendered a decision8 holding that the applicants had conclusively established their
ownership in fee simple over the subject land and that their possession, including that of their
predecessor-in-interest, had been open, adverse, peaceful, uninterrupted, and in concept of
owners for more than forty (40) years.
No appeal was interposed by the Republic from the decision of the LRC. Thus, the decision
became final and executory, resulting in the issuance of a decree and the corresponding
certificate of title over the subject property.
Land Registration Case No. N-521 [Emiliana Chabon, Estela Chabon and Pedrita Chabon,
Applicants (The Chabons)]
The Chabons filed their Application for Registration9 on May 8, 1974 covering a parcel of land
located in Carmen-District, Cagayan de Oro City, known as Lot 4357, Cagayan Cadastre,
bounded and described as:
A parcel of land (Lot 4357, Cagayan Cadastre, plan Ap-12445), situated in the District of
Carmen, City of Cagayan de Oro. Bounded on the NE. by property of Potenciano Abrogan vs.
Republic of the Philippines (Public Land); on the SE. by properties of Geronimo Wabe and
Teofilo Batifona or Batipura; on the SW. by property of Teofilo Batifona or Batipura; and on the
NW. by property of Felipe Bacao or Bacas vs. Republic of the Philippines (Public Land). Point
"1" is N. 10 deg. 39W., 379.88 M. from B.L.L.M. 14, Cagayan Cadastre. Area SIXTY NINE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY TWO (69,632) SQUARE METERS, more or less.10
They alleged ownership in fee simple over the property and indicated therein the names and
addresses of the adjoining owners, but no mention was made with respect to the occupation, if
any, by the Philippine Army. The Chabons likewise alleged that, to the best of their knowledge,

no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affecting said land with the exception of 18,957 square
meters sold to Minda J. Castillo and 1,000 square meters sold and conveyed to Atty. Arturo R.
Legaspi.11
On February 18, 1976, there being no opposition made, even from the government, hearing on
the application ensued. The LRC then rendered a decision12 holding that Chabons evidence
established their ownership in fee simple over the subject property and that their possession,
including that of their predecessor-in-interest, had been actual, open, public, peaceful, adverse,
continuous, and in concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years.
The decision then became final and executory. Thus, an order13 for the issuance of a decree and
the corresponding certificate of title was issued.
The present cases
As a consequence of the LRC decisions in both applications for registration, the Republic filed a
complaint for annulment of titles against the Bacases and the Chabons before the RTC. More
specifically, on September 7, 1970 or one (1) year and ten (10) months from the issuance of OCT
No. 0-358, a civil case for annulment, cancellation of original certificate of title, reconveyance of
lot or damages was filed by the Republic against the Bacases, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 3494. On the other hand, on April 21, 1978 or two (2) years and seven (7) months after
issuance of OCT No. 0-669, the Republic filed a civil case for annulment of title and reversion
against the Chabons, docketed as Civil Case No. 5918.
Civil Case No. 3494 against the Bacases
The Republic claimed in its petition for annulment before the RTC14 that the certificate of title
issued in favor of the Bacases was null and void because they fraudulently omitted to name the
military camp as the actual occupant in their application for registration. Specifically, the
Republic, through the Fourth Military Area, was the actual occupant of Lot No. 4354 and also
the owner and possessor of the adjoining Lots Nos. 431815 and 4357. Further, the Bacases failed
to likewise state that Lot No. 4354 was part of Camp Evangelista. These omissions constituted
fraud which vitiated the decree and certificate of title issued.
Also, the Republic averred that the subject land had long been reserved in 1938 for military
purposes at the time it was applied for and, so, it was no longer disposable and subject to
registration.16
Civil Case No. 5918 against the Chabons
In this case, the Republic claimed that it was the absolute owner and possessor of Lot No. 4357.
The said lot, together with Lots 431817 and 4354, formed part of the military reservation known

as Camp Evangelista in Cagayan de Oro City, which was set aside and reserved under
Presidential Proclamation No. 265 issued by President Quezon on March 31, 1938.18
In its petition for annulment before the RTC,19 the Republic alleged that OCT No. 0-669 issued
in favor of the Chabons and all transfer certificates of titles, if any, proceeding therefrom, were
null and void for having been vitiated by fraud and/or lack of jurisdiction.20 The Chabons
concealed that the fact that Lot 4357 was part of Camp Evangelista and that the Republic,
through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was its actual occupant and possessor.21 Further,
Lot 4357 was a military reservation, established as such as early as March 31, 1938 and, thus,
could not be the subject of registration or private appropriation.22 As a military reservation, it
was beyond the commerce of man and the registration court did not have any jurisdiction to
adjudicate the same as private property.23
Decision of the Regional Trial Court
As the facts and issues in both cases were substantially the same and identical, and the pieces of
evidence adduced were applicable to both, the cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
Thereafter, a joint decision dismissing the two complaints of the Republic was rendered.
In dismissing the complaints, the RTC explained that the stated fact of occupancy by Camp
Evangelista over certain portions of the subject lands in the applications for registration by the
respondents was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.24 It would have been
absurd to state Camp Evangelista as an adjoining owner when it was alleged that it was an
occupant of the land.25 Thus, the RTC ruled that the respondents did not commit fraud in filing
their applications for registration.
Moreover, the RTC was of the view that the Republic was then given all the opportunity to be
heard as it filed its opposition to the applications, appeared and participated in the proceedings. It
was, thus, estopped from contesting the proceedings.
The RTC further reasoned out that assuming arguendo that respondents were guilty of fraud, the
Republic lost its right to a relief for its failure to file a petition for review on the ground of fraud
within one (1) year after the date of entry of the decree of registration.26 Consequently, it would
now be barred by prior judgment to contest the findings of the LRC.27
Finally, the RTC agreed with the respondents that the subject parcels of land were exempted
from the operation and effect of the Presidential Proclamation No. 265 pursuant to a proviso
therein that the same would not apply to lands with existing "private rights." The presidential
proclamation did not, and should not, apply to the respondents because they did not apply to
acquire the parcels of land in question from the government, but simply for confirmation and
affirmation of their rights to the properties so that the titles over them could be issued in their

favor.28 What the proclamation prohibited was the sale or disposal of the parcels of land
involved to private persons as a means of acquiring ownership of the same, through the modes
provided by law for the acquisition of disposable public lands.29
The Republic filed its Notice of Appeal before the RTC on July 5, 1991. On the other hand, the
Bacases and the Chabons filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Execution and
Possession on July 16, 1991. An amended motion was filed on July 31, 1991. The RTC then
issued the Order,30 dated February 24, 1992, disapproving the Republics appeal for failure to
perfect it as it failed to notify the Bacases and granting the writ of execution.
Action of the Court of Appeals and the Court regarding the Republics Appeal
The Republic filed a Notice of Appeal on April 1, 1992 from the February 24, 1992 of the RTC.
The same was denied in the RTC Order,31 dated April 23, 1992. The Republic moved for its
reconsideration but the RTC was still denied it on July 8, 1992.32
Not satisfied, the Republic filed a petition before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28647,
entitled Republic vs. Hon. Cesar M. Ybaez,33 questioning the February 24, 1992 Order of the
RTC denying its appeal in Civil Case No. 3494. The CA sustained the government and,
accordingly, annulled the said RTC order.
The respondents appealed to the Court, which later found no commission of a reversible error on
the part of the CA. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal as well as the subsequent
motions for reconsideration. An entry of judgment was then issued on February 16, 1995.34
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appeal allowed, the CA docketed the case as CA G.R. CV No. 64142.
On November 12, 2007, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It explained that once a decree of
registration was issued under the Torrens system and the reglementary period had passed within
which the decree may be questioned, the title was perfected and could not be collaterally
questioned later on.35 Even assuming that an action for the nullification of the original
certificate of title may still be instituted, the review of a decree of registration under Section 38
of Act No. 496 [Section 32 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529] would only prosper upon
proof that the registration was procured through actual fraud,36 which proceeded from an
intentional deception perpetrated through the misrepresentation or the concealment of a material
fact.37 The CA stressed that "[t]he fraud must be actual and extrinsic, not merely constructive or
intrinsic; the evidence thereof must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant,
because the proceedings which are assailed as having been fraudulent are judicial proceedings
which by law, are presumed to have been fair and regular."38

Citing the rule that "[t]he fraud is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of their day in
court and, thus, prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in the name of
the applicant,"39 the CA found that there was none. The CA agreed with the RTC that there was
substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. The allegation of the respondent that
Camp Evangelista occupied portions of their property negated the complaint that they committed
misrepresentation or concealment amounting to fraud.40
As regards the issue of exemption from the proclamation, the CA deemed that a discussion was
unnecessary because the LRC already resolved it. The CA stressed that the proceeding was one
in rem, thereby binding everyone to the legal effects of the same and that a decree of registration
that had become final should be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested
and determined, but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land
registration proceeding.41
Not in conformity, the Republic filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on May 15,
2008 for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
GROUNDS RELIED UPON
WARRANTING REVIEW OF THE
PETITION
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT
THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION FILED BY RESPONDENTS DESPITE THE
LATTERS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF
INDICATING ALL THE ADJOINING OWNERS OF THE PARCELS OF LAND
SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENTS HAVE A REGISTRABLE RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT PARCELS
OF LAND WHICH ARE WITHIN THE CAMP EVANGELISTA MILITARY
RESERVATION.
3. IN G.R. NO. 157306 ENTITLED "REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
ANATALIA ACTUB TIU ESTONILO, ET AL.," WHICH INVOLVES PRIVATE
INDIVIDUALS CLAIMING RIGHTS OVER PORTIONS OF THE CAMP
EVANGELISTA MILITARY RESERVATION, THIS HONORABLE COURT HELD
THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS COULD NOT HAVE VALIDLY OCCUPIED THEIR
CLAIMED LOTS BECAUSE THE SAME WERE CONSIDERED INALIENABLE

FROM THE TIME OF THEIR RESERVATION IN 1938. HERE, THE CERTIFICATES

OF TITLE BEING SUSTAINED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS WERE ISSUED
PURSUANT TO THE DECISIONS OF THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT IN
APPLICATIONS FOR REGISTRATION FILED IN 1964 AND 1974. VERILY, THE
COURT OF APPEALS, IN ISSUING THE HEREIN ASSAILED DECISION DATED
NOVEMBER 15, 2007 AND RESOLUTION DATED MAY 15, 2008, HAS DECIDED
THAT INSTANT CONTROVERSY IN A MANNER THAT IS CONTRARY TO LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE.42
Position of the Republic
In advocacy of its position, the Republic principally argues that (1) the CA erred in holding that
the LRC acquired jurisdiction over the applications for registration of the reserved public lands
filed by the respondents; and (2) the respondents do not have a registrable right over the subject
parcels of land which are within the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation.
With respect to the first argument, the Republic cites Section 15 of P.D. No. 1529, which requires
that applicants for land registration must disclose the names of the occupants of the land and the
names and addresses of the owners of the adjoining properties. The respondents did not comply
with that requirement which was mandatory and jurisdictional. Citing Pinza v. Aldovino,43 it
asserts that the LRC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. Moreover, such omission
constituted fraud or willful misrepresentation. The respondents cannot invoke the indefeasibility
of the titles issued since a "grant tainted with fraud and secured through misrepresentation is null
and void and of no effect whatsoever."44
On the second argument, the Republic points out that Presidential Proclamation No. 265 reserved
for the use of the Philippine Army certain parcels of land which included Lot No. 4354 and Lot
No. 4357. Both lots were, however, allowed to be registered. Lot No. 4354 was registered as
OCT No. 0-0358 and Lot No. 4357 as OCT No. O-669.
The Republic asserts that being part of the military reservation, these lots are inalienable and
cannot be the subject of private ownership. Being so, the respondents do not have registrable
rights over them. Their possession of the land, however long, could not ripen into ownership, and
they have not shown proof that they were entitled to the land before the proclamation or that the
said lots were segregated and withdrawn as part thereof.
Position of the Respondents
The Bacases

The Bacases anchor their opposition to the postures of the Republic on three principal
arguments:
First, there was no extrinsic fraud committed by the Bacases in their failure to indicate Camp
Evangelista as an adjoining lot owner as their application for registration substantially complied
with the legal requirements. More importantly, the Republic was not prejudiced and deprived of
its day in court.
Second, the LRC had jurisdiction to adjudicate whether the Bacases had "private rights" over Lot
No. 4354 in accordance with, and therefore exempt from the coverage of, Presidential
Proclamation No. 265, as well as to determine whether such private rights constituted registrable
title under the land registration law.
Third, the issue of the registrability of the title of the Bacases over Lot No. 4354 is res judicata
and cannot now be subject to a re-litigation or reopening in the annulment proceedings.45
Regarding the first ground, the Bacases stress that there was no extrinsic fraud because their
application substantially complied with the requirements when they indicated that Camp
Evangelista was an occupant by mere tolerance of Lot No. 4354. Also, the Republic filed its
opposition to the respondents application and actively participated in the land registration
proceedings by presenting evidence, through the Director of Lands, who was represented by the
Solicitor General. The Republic, therefore, was not deprived of its day in court or prevented from
presenting its case. Its insistence that the non-compliance with the requirements of Section 15 of
P.D. No. 1529 is an argument that is at once both empty and dangerous.46
On jurisdiction, the Bacases assert that even in the case of Republic v. Estonilo,47 it was
recognized in Presidential Proclamation No. 265 that the reservation was subject to private
rights. In other words, the LRC had authority to hear and adjudicate their application for
registration of title over Lot No. 4354 if they would be able to prove that their private rights
under the presidential proclamation constituted registrable title over the said lot. They claim that
there is completely no basis for the Republic to argue that the LRC had no jurisdiction to hear
and adjudicate their application for registration of their title to Lot No. 4354 just because the
proclamation withdrew the subject land from sale and settlement and reserved the same for
military purposes. They cited the RTC statement that "the parcels of land they applied for in
those registration proceedings and for which certificates of title were issued in their favor are
precisely exempted from the operation and effect of said presidential proclamation when the very
same proclamation in itself made a proviso that the same will not apply to lands with existing
private rights therein."48
The Bacases claim that the issue of registrability is no longer an issue as what is only to be
resolved is the question on whether there was extrinsic or collateral fraud during the land

registration proceedings. There would be no end to litigation on the registrability of their title if
questions of facts or law, such as, whether or not Lot No. 4354 was alienable and disposable land
of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement and reservation for military
purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265; whether or not their predecessors-in-interest
had prior possession of the lot long before the issuance of the proclamation or the establishment
of Camp Evangelista in the late 1930s; whether or not such possession was held in the concept
of an owner to constitute recognizable "private rights" under the presidential proclamation; and
whether or not such private rights constitute registrable title to the lot in accordance with the land
registration law, which had all been settled and duly adjudicated by the LRC in favor of the
Bacases, would be re-examined under this annulment case.49
The issue of registrability of the Bacases title had long been settled by the LRC and is
res judicata between the Republic and the respondents. The findings of the LRC became final
when the Republic did not appeal its decision within the period to appeal or file a petition to
reopen or review the decree of registration within one year from entry thereof.50
To question the findings of the court regarding the registrability of then title over the land would
be an attempt to reopen issues already barred by res judicata. As correctly held by the RTC, it is
estopped and barred by prior judgment to contest the findings of the LRC.51
The Chabons
In traversing the position of the Republic, the Chabons insist that the CA was correct when it
stated that there was substantial compliance52 with the requirements of the P.D. No. 1529
because they expressly stated in their application that Camp Evangelista was occupying a portion
of it. It is contrary to reason or common sense to state that Camp Evangelista is an adjoining
owner when it is occupying a portion thereof.
And as to the decision, it was a consequence of a proceeding in rem and, therefore, the decree of
registration is binding and conclusive against all persons including the Republic who did not
appeal the same. It is now barred forever to question the validity of the title issued. Besides, res
judicata has set in because there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.53
The Chabons also assailed the proclamation because when it was issued, they were already the
private owners of the subject parcels of land and entitled to protection under the Constitution.
The taking of their property in the guise of a presidential proclamation is not only oppressive and
arbitrary but downright confiscatory.54
The Issues

The ultimate issues to be resolved are: 1) whether or not the decisions of the LRC over the
subject lands can still be questioned; and 2) whether or not the applications for registration of the
subject parcels of land should be allowed.
The Courts Ruling
The Republic can question even final and executory judgment when there was fraud.
The governing rule in the application for registration of lands at that time was Section 21 of Act
49655 which provided for the form and content of an application for registration, and it reads:
Section 21. The application shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by applicant, or by some
person duly authorized in his behalf. x x x It shall also state the name in full and the address of
the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all adjoining owners and occupants, if known;
and, if not known, it shall state what search has been made to find them. x x x
The reason behind the law was explained in the case of Fewkes vs. Vasquez,56 where it was
written:
Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act an application for registration of land is required
to contain, among others, a description of the land subject of the proceeding, the name, status and
address of the applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land and of
all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of the steps taken to locate them. When the
application is set by the court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing), addressed
to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners,
and indicating the location, boundaries and technical description of the land being registered,
shall be published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive times. It is this publication of the
notice of hearing that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in
land registration cases, for the proceedings being in rem, it is only when there is constructive
seizure of the land, effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the res is vested
on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and publication of the hearing that would enable all
persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests in the property, to come forward and
show to the court why the application for registration thereof is not to be granted.
Here, the Chabons did not make any mention of the ownership or occupancy by the Philippine
Army. They also did not indicate any efforts or searches they had exerted in determining other
occupants of the land. Such omission constituted fraud and deprived the Republic of its day in
court. Not being notified, the Republic was not able to file its opposition to the application and,
naturally, it was not able to file an appeal either.

The Republic can also question a final and executory judgment when the LRC had no
jurisdiction over the land in question
With respect to the Bacases, although the lower courts might have been correct in ruling that
there was substantial compliance with the requirements of law when they alleged that Camp
Evangelista was an occupant, the Republic is not precluded and estopped from questioning the
validity of the title.
The success of the annulment of title does not solely depend on the existence of actual and
extrinsic fraud, but also on the fact that a judgment decreeing registration is null and void. In
Collado v. Court of Appeals and the Republic,57 the Court declared that any title to an
inalienable public land is void ab initio. Any procedural infirmities attending the filing of the
petition for annulment of judgment are immaterial since the LRC never acquired jurisdiction
over the property. All proceedings of the LRC involving the property are null and void and,
hence, did not create any legal effect. A judgment by a court without jurisdiction can never attain
finality.58 In Collado, the Court made the following citation:
The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as public
navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration
of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners
may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by
any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations.59
Prescription or estoppel cannot lie against the government
In denying the petition of the Republic, the CA reasoned out that 1) once a decree of registration
is issued under the Torrens system and the reglementary period has passed within which the
decree may be questioned, the title is perfected and cannot be collaterally questioned later on;60
2) there was no commission of extrinsic fraud because the Bacases allegation of Camp
Evangelistas occupancy of their property negated the argument that they committed
misrepresentation or concealment amounting to fraud;61 and 3) the Republic did not appeal the
decision and because the proceeding was one in rem, it was bound to the legal effects of the
decision.
Granting that the persons representing the government was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel
cannot be taken against the Republic. It is a well-settled rule that the Republic or its government
is not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals,62 it was written:

In any case, even granting that the said official was negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot
operate against the State . "It is a well-settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic or its
government is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents
(Manila Lodge No. 761 vs. CA, 73 SCRA 166, 186; Republic vs. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238, 244;
Luciano vs. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769).
Consequently, the State may still seek the cancellation of the title issued to Perpetuo Alpuerto
and his successors-interest pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act. Such title has not
become indefeasible, for prescription cannot be invoked against the State (Republic vs. Animas,
supra).
The subject lands, being part of a military reservation, are inalienable and cannot be the subjects
of land registration proceedings
The application of the Bacases and the Chabons were filed on November 12, 1964 and May 8,
1974, respectively. Accordingly, the law governing the applications was Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 141,63 as amended by RA 1942,64 particularly Sec. 48(b) which provided that:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.
As can be gleaned therefrom, the necessary requirements for the grant of an application for land
registration are the following:
1. The applicant must, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, have been in
possession and occupation of the subject land;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of ownership for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and
4. The subject land must be an agricultural land of the public domain. As earlier stated, in
1938, President Quezon issued Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which took effect on
March 31, 1938, reserving for the use of the Philippine Army parcels of the public
domain situated in the barrios of Bulua and Carmen, then Municipality of Cagayan,

Misamis Oriental. The subject parcels of land were withdrawn from sale or settlement or
reserved for military purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be."65
Such power of the President to segregate lands was provided for in Section 64(e) of the old
Revised Administrative Code and C.A. No. 141 or the Public Land Act. Later, the power of the
President was restated in Section 14, Chapter 4, Book III of the 1987 Administrative Code. When
a property is officially declared a military reservation, it becomes inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.66 It may not be the subject of a contract or of a compromise agreement.67 A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership, until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from
being such.68 In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and De Jesus,69 it was even stated that
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired.1wphi1 The claims 0f persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of
public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are
usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving
certain lands and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously
acquired in such lands by a person who was settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right
of purchase. And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or
appropriate, are void.
Regarding the subject lots, there was a reservation respecting "private rights." In Republic v.
Estonilo,70 where the Court earlier declared that Lot No. 4318 was part of the Camp Evangelista
Military Reservation and, therefore, not registrable, it noted the proviso in Presidential
Proclamation No. 265 requiring the reservation to be subject to private rights as meaning that
persons claiming rights over the reserved land were not precluded from proving their claims.
Stated differently, the said proviso did not preclude the LRC from determining whether or not the
respondents indeed had registrable rights over the property.
As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had been segregated from the
military reservation, the respondents had to prove that the subject properties were alienable and
disposable land of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and settlement and
reservation for military purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265. The question is of
primordial importance because it is determinative if the land can in fact be subject to acquisitive
prescription and, thus, registrable under the Torrens system. Without first determining the nature
and character of the land, all the other requirements such as the length and nature of possession
and occupation over such land do not come into play. The required length of possession does not
operate when the land is part of the public domain.
In this case, however, the respondents miserably failed to prove that, before the proclamation, the
subject lands were already private lands. They merely relied on such "recognition" of possible

private rights. In their application, they alleged that at the time of their application,71 they had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land for at
least thirty (30) years and became its owners by prescription. There was, however, no allegation
or showing that the government had earlier declared it open for sale or settlement, or that it was
already pronounced as inalienable and disposable.
It is well-settled that land of the public domain is not ipso facto converted into a patrimonial or
private property by the mere possession and occupation by an individual over a long period of
time. In the case of Diaz v. Republic,72 it was written:
But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was established as a
military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of evidence with respect to its
occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. x x x.
x x x.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of
cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not
exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing
livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession,
the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial enclosures, or other
permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription.
The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not
operate against the State unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same
under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.
[Emphases supplied]
In the recent case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines,73 the Court
emphasized that fundamental is the rule that lands of the public domain, unless declared
otherwise by virtue of a statute or law, are inalienable and can never be acquired by prescription.
No amount of time of possession or occupation can ripen into ownership over lands of the public
domain. All lands of the public domain presumably belong to the State and are inalienable.
Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or disposed.74
Another recent case, Diaz v. Republic,75 also held that possession even for more than 30 years
cannot ripen into ownership.76 Possession is of no moment if applicants fail to sufficiently and
satisfactorily show that the subject lands over which an application was applied for was indeed
an alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. It would not matter even if

they declared it for tax purposes. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio,77 the rule was reiterated.
Thus:
Well-entrenched is the rule that unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and
disposable, occupation in the concept of an owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title. Consequently, respondents could not have occupied the
Lot in the concept of an owner in 1947 and subsequent years when respondents declared the Lot
for taxation purposes, or even earlier when respondents' predecessors-in-interest possessed the
Lot, because the Lot was considered inalienable from the time of its declaration as a military
reservation in 1904. Therefore, respondents failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the Lot is alienable and disposable.
Public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable land remain part of
the inalienable public domain. In view of the lack of sufficient evidence showing that the Lot
was already classified as alienable and disposable, the Lot applied for by respondents is
inalienable land of the public domain, not subject to registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529
and Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by PD 1073. Hence, there is no need to discuss the
other requisites dealing with respondents' occupation and possession of the Lot in the concept of
an owner.
While it is an acknowledged policy of the State to promote the distribution of alienable public
lands to spur economic growth and in line with the ideal of social justice, the law imposes
stringent safeguards upon the grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands to the
prejudice of the national patrimony. We must not, therefore, relax the stringent safeguards
relative to the registration of imperfect titles. [Emphases Supplied]
In Estonilo,78 where the Court ruled that persons claiming the protection of "private rights" in
order to exclude their lands from military reservations must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the properties in question had been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public
lands, the respondents therein failed to clearly prove that the lands over which they lay a claim
were alienable and disposable so that the same belonged and continued to belong to the State and
could not be subject to the commerce of man or registration. Specifically, the Court wrote:
Land that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belongs to
the State as part of the public domain. For this reason, imperfect titles to agricultural lands are
subjected to rigorous scrutiny before judicial confirmation is granted. In the same manner,
persons claiming the protection of "private rights" in order to exclude their lands from military
reservations must show by clear and convincing evidence that the pieces of property in question
have been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands.

In granting respondents judicial confirmation of their imperfect title, the trial and the appellate
courts gave much weight to the tax declarations presented by the former. However, while the tax
declarations were issued under the names of respondents predecessors-in-interest, the earliest
one presented was issued only in 1954.19 The Director, Lands Management Bureau v. CA20
held thus:
"x x x. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership.1wphi1
They are mere indicia of [a] claim of ownership. In Director of Lands vs. Santiago:
x x x [I]f it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in
possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation purposes for the first
time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property."
In addition, the lower courts credited the alleged prior possession by Calixto and Rosendo Bacas,
from whom respondents predecessors had purportedly bought the property. This alleged prior
possession, though, was totally devoid of any supporting evidence on record. Respondents
evidence hardly supported the conclusion that their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since "time immemorial."
Moreover, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the evidence on record
merely established the transfer of the property from Calixto Bacas to Nazaria Bombeo . The
evidence did not show the nature and the period of the alleged possession by Calixto and
Rosendo Bacas. It is important that applicants for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles must
present specific acts of ownership to substantiate their claims; they cannot simply offer general
statements that are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession.
It must be stressed that respondents, as applicants, have the burden of proving that they have an
imperfect title to Lot 4318. Even the absence of opposition from the government does not relieve
them of this burden. Thus, it was erroneous for the trial and the appellate courts to hold that the
failure of the government to dislodge respondents, judicially or extrajudicially, from the subject
land since 1954 already amounted to a title. [Emphases supplied]
The ruling reiterated the long standing rule in the case of Director Lands Management Bureau v.
Court of Appeals,79
x x x. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens
system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his
land. He must show, even though there is no opposition to the satisfaction of the court, that he is
the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property under the

Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence
of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground
that the facts presented did not show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land
which he is attempting to have registered.
The Court is not unmindful of the principle of immutability of judgments that nothing is more
settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable.80 Such principle, however, must yield to the basic rule that a decision which is null
and void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court is not a decision m contemplation of law and
can never become final and executory.81
Had the LRC given primary importance on the status of the land and not merely relied on the
testimonial evidence of the respondents without other proof of the alienability of the land, the
litigation would have already been ended and finally settled in accordance with law and
jurisprudence a long time ago.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 12, 2007 Decision and the May 15,
2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 64142 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Judgment is rendered declaring the proceedings in the Land Registration Court
as NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, Original Certificate of Title Nos. 0-358
and 0-669 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City are CANCELLED. Lot No.
4354 and Lot No. 4357 are ordered reverted to the public domain.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 186961

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
- versus -

Chairperson,
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

EAST SILVERLANE REALTY

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.

Promulgated:

February 20, 2012

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This Court is urged to review and set aside the July 31, 2008
Decision30[1] and February 20, 2009 Resolution31[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143. In its July 31, 2008
Decision, the CA affirmed the August 27, 2004 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40 of Cagayan De Oro City. The
dispositive portion thereof states:

WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated August 27,
2004 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.32[3]

30
31
32

In its February 20, 2009 Resolution, the CA denied the petitioners

August 29, 2008 Motion for Reconsideration. 33[4]

The Factual Antecedents

The respondent filed with the RTC an application for land

registration, covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9039 of
Cagayan Cadastre, situated in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental and
with an area of 9,794 square meters. The respondent purchased
the portion of the subject property consisting of 4,708 square
meters (Area A) from Francisca Oco pursuant to a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 27, 1990 and the remaining
portion consisting of 5,086 square meters (Area B) from Rosario U.
Tan Lim, Nemesia Tan and Mariano U. Tan pursuant to a Deed of
Partial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 11, 1991. It
was claimed that the respondents predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of
the subject property since June 12, 1945.

After hearing the same on the merits, the RTC issued on

August 27, 2004 a Decision, granting the respondents petition for
registration of the land in question, thus:
33

ACCORDINGLY, finding the application meritorious, and pursuant

to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter, particularly the
provisions of P.D. 1529, judgment is hereby rendered granting the
instant application. The Land Registration Authority is hereby ordered
to issue a decree in the name of the applicant EAST SILVERLANE
REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION covering the parcel of
land, Lot 9039, Cad 237, having an area of 9,794 square meters
covered by the two (2) tax declarations subject of this petition. Based
on
the
decree, the Register of Deeds for the Province of Misamis Oriental is
hereby directed to issue an original certificate of title in the name of
the applicant covering the land subject matter of this application. 34[5]

On appeal by the petitioner, the CA affirmed the RTCs August 27,

2004 Decision. In its July 31, 2008 Decision, 35[6] the CA found no
merit in the petitioners appeal, holding that:

It is a settled rule that an application for land registration must

conform to three requisites: (1) the land is alienable public land; (2) the
applicants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof must be since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and (3) it is
a bona fide claim of ownership.

In the case at bench, petitioner-appellee has met all the requirements.

Anent the first requirement, both the report and certification issued by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shows
that the subject land was within the alienable and disposable zone
34
35

classified under BF Project [N]o. 8 Blk. I, L.C. Map [N]o. 585 and was
released and certified as such on December 31, 1925.

Indubitably, both the DENR certification and report constitute a

positive government act, an administrative action, validly classifying
the land in question. It is a settled rule that the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or
forest land is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government. Accordingly, the certification enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. As it is, the said
certification remains uncontested and even oppositor-appellant
Republic itself did not present any evidence to refute the contents of
the said certification. Thus, the alienable and disposable character of
the subject land certified as such as early as December 31, 1925 has
been clearly established by the evidence of the petitioner-appellee.

Anent the second and third requirements, the applicant is

required to prove his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim
of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

xxxx

In the case at bench, ESRDC tacked its possession and

occupation over the subject land to that of its predecessors-in-interest.
Copies of the tax declarations and real property historical ownership
pertaining thereto were presented in court. A perusal of the records
shows that in 1948, a portion of the subject land was declared under
the name of Agapito Claudel. Subsequently, in 1957 until 1991 the
same was declared under the name of Francisca Oco. Thereafter, the
same was declared under the name of ESRDC. A certification was
likewise issued by the Provincial Assessor of Misamis Oriental that
previous tax declarations pertaining to the said portion under the
name of Agapita Claudel could no longer be located as the files were
deemed lost or destroyed before World War II.

On the other hand, the remaining portion of the said land was
previously declared in 1948 under the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho.
Subsequently, in 1969 until 1990, the same was declared under the
name of Jacinto Tan. Thereafter, the same was declared under the
name of ESRDC. A certification was likewise issued by the Provincial
Assessor that the files of previous tax declarations under the name of
Jacinto Tan Lay Cho were deemed lost or destroyed again before World
War II.

In 1991 or upon ESRDCs acquisition of the subject property, the

latter took possession thereto. Albeit it has presently leased the said
land to Asia Brewery, Inc., where the latter built its brewery plant,
nonetheless, ESRDC has its branch office located at the plant
compound of Asia Brewery, Inc.

Corollarily, oppositor-appellants contentions that the court a

quo erred in considering the tax declarations as evidence of ESRDCs
possession of the subject land as the latters predecessors-in-interest
declared the same sporadically, is untenable.

It is a settled rule that albeit tax declarations and realty tax

payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of
owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain
title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State
and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens ones
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Finally, it bears stressing that the pieces of evidence submitted

by petitioner-appellee are incontrovertible. Not one, not even
oppositor-appellant Republic, presented any countervailing evidence to
contradict the claims of the petitioners that they are in possession of

the subject property and their possession of the same is open,

continuous and exclusive in the concept of an owner for over 30 years.

Verily, from 1948 when the subject land was declared for
taxation purposes until ESRDC filed an application for land registration
in 1995, ESRDC have been in possession over the subject land in the
concept of an owner tacking its possession to that its predecessors-ininterest for forty seven (47) years already. Thus, ESRDC was able to
prove sufficiently that it has been in possession of the subject property
for more than 30 years, which possession is characterized as open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious in the concept of an owner. 36[7]
(citations omitted)

The petitioner assails the foregoing, alleging that the

respondent failed to prove that its predecessors-in-interest
possessed the subject property in the manner and for the length
of time required under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act (PLA), and Section
14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529). According to the
petitioner, the respondent did not present a credible and
competent witness to testify on the specific acts of ownership
performed by its predecessors-in-interest on the subject property.
The respondents sole witness, Vicente Oco, can hardly be
considered a credible and competent witness as he is the
respondents liaison officer and he is not related in any way to the
respondents predecessors-in-interest. That coconut trees were
36

planted on the subject property only shows casual or occasional

cultivation and does not qualify as possession under a claim of
ownership.

Issue

This Court is confronted with the sole issue of whether the

respondent has proven itself entitled to the benefits of the PLA
and P.D. No. 1529 on confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles.

Our Ruling

This Court resolves to GRANT the petition.

Preliminarily, with respect to the infirmity suffered by this

petition from the standpoint of Rule 45, this Court agrees with the
respondent that the issue of whether the respondent had
presented sufficient proof of the required possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership raises a question of fact, considering

that it invites an evaluation of the evidentiary record. 37[8]

However, that a petition for review should be confined to
questions of law and that this Court is not a trier of facts and
bound by the factual findings of the CA are not without
exceptions. Among these exceptions, which obtain in this case,
are:

(a)

when

the

judgment

of

the

CA

is

based

on

misapprehension of facts or (b) when its findings are not

sustained by the evidence on record.

This Courts review of the records of this case reveals that the
evidence submitted by the respondent fell short of proving that it
has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property under
Section 48 (b) of the PLA. The respondent cannot register the
subject property in its name on the basis of either Section 14 (1)
or Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It was not established by the
required quantum of evidence that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the subject property for the
prescribed statutory period.

The PLA governs the classification and disposition of lands of

the public domain. Under Section 11 thereof, one of the modes of
disposing public lands suitable for agricultural purposes is by
37

confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. 38[9] On the other

hand, Section 48 provides the grant to the qualified possessor of
an alienable and disposable public land. Thus:

SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying

lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:

(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to

the United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other
form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal
decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the
proceedings in connection therewith, but have with or without default
upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if
such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and
cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in

interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by

themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
38

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation

of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30
years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof.

Presidential Decree No. 1073 (P.D. No. 1073), which was issued on
January 25, 1977, deleted subsection (a) and amended subsection
(b) as follows:

SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter

VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant thru himself or
thru his predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945.

Notably, the first PLA, or Act No. 926, required a possession

and occupation for a period of ten (10) years prior to the
effectivity of Act No. 2096 on July 26, 1904 or on July 26, 1894.
This was adopted in the PLA until it was amended by Republic Act
No. 1942 on June 22, 1957, which provided for a period of thirty
(30) years. It was only with the enactment of P.D. No. 1073 on
January 25, 1977 that it was required that possession and
occupation should commence on June 12, 1945.

P.D. No. 1529, which was enacted on June 11, 1978, codified all the laws
relative to the registration of property. Section 14 thereof partially provides:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription

under the provision of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned

river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.

Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2) are clearly different.

Section 14 (1) covers alienable and disposable land while
Section

14

(2)

covers

private

property.

As

this

Court

categorically stated in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the

Philippines,39[10] the distinction between the two provisions lies
with the inapplicability of prescription to alienable and disposable
lands. Specifically:

At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation the entire
regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold
true with respect to Section 14 (1).40[11]

Property is either part of the public domain or privately owned. 41

[12] Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the following properties
are of public dominion:

(a)
Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads and others of similar character;

(b)
Those which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

39
40
41

All other properties of the State, which is not of the character

mentioned in Article 420 is patrimonial property, 42[13] hence,
susceptible to acquisitive prescription. 43[14]

In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and

occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the
periods provided under the Civil Code do not automatically
convert said property into private property or release it from the
public domain. There must be an express declaration that the
property is no longer intended for public service or development
of

national

wealth.

Without

such

express

declaration,

the

property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains

property of the State, and thus, may not be acquired by
prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty

of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. It is
this provision that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property
which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the property
42
43

belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable

or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if
when it is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. (emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the

State that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without
such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription
can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law.44[15]

In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14

(2) and set up acquisitive prescription against the State, it is
primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first
established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the
classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be considered
in determining the completion of the prescriptive period.

To prove that its predecessors-in-interest were in possession

of the subject property on or prior to June 12, 1945 or had
44

completed the prescriptive period of thirty (30) years, the

respondent submitted the following tax declarations:

a)

Tax Declaration in the name of Agapita

Claudel for the year 1948;

b)

Tax Declarations in the name of Francisca

Oco for the years 1957, 1963, 1969, 1973, 1974, 1980,
1987, 1989 and 1991;

c)

Tax Declarations in the respondents name

for the years 1991, 1992 and 1994;

d)

Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan

Lay Cho for the years 1948 and 1952;

e)

Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan

for the years 1969, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1989 and 1990;
and

f)

Tax Declarations in the respondents name

for the years 1991, 1992 and 1994.

Pursuant to Agapita Claudels 1948 Tax Declaration, there

were nineteen (19) coconut and ten (10) banana trees planted on
Area A. The coconut trees were supposedly four years old, hence,
the reasonable presumption that she had been in possession even
before June 12, 1945.45[16]

The respondent also offered the following testimony of

Vicente Oco:

Q Mr. Witness, If you know about what period your

predecessor has started to possess this land subject matter of this
application?

A Per my personal knowledge, it was before the second world

war but the Municipality of El Salvador was created on June 15, 1948
by virtue of RA 268 and its started to officially function only on August
2, 1948[.]

Q From whom did you acquire this information?

45

A From the seller and the adjoining lot owners. 46[17]

To prove that its predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of

dominion over the subject property, the respondent claimed that
per Francisca Ocos Tax Declarations, the following improvements
were introduced in Area A: nineteen (19) coconut and ten (10)
banana trees in Area A in 1957 and 1963; thirty-three (33)
coconut trees in 1969 and 1973; thirty-three (33) coconut trees,
one (1) mango tree and three (3) seguidillas vines in 1974; thirtythree (33) coconut trees in 1980; eighty-seven (87) coconut trees
in 1987; and fifteen (15) coconut trees in 1989. Per Jacinto Tans
Tax Declarations, there were fifty-seven (57) coconut trees in Area
B in 1973, 1974, 1980, 1989 and 1990.47[18]

A reading of the CAs July 31, 2008 Decision shows that it

affirmed the grant of the respondents application given its
supposed compliance with Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It ruled
that based on the evidence submitted, the respondent is not
qualified to register the subject property in its name under
Section

14

(1)

as

the

predecessors-in-interest
46
47

possession
commenced

and
after

occupation
June

12,

of

its

1945.

Nonetheless, as the CA ruled, the respondent acquired title to the

subject property by prescription as its predecessors-in-interest
had possessed the subject property for more than thirty (30)
years. Citing Buenaventura v. Republic of the Philippines,48[19]
the CA held that even if possession commenced after June 12,
1945, registration is still possible under Section 14 (2) and
possession in the concept of an owner effectively converts an
alienable and disposable public land into private property.

This Court, however, disagrees on the conclusion arrived at

by the CA. On the premise that the application for registration,
which was filed in 1995, is based on Section 14 (2), it was not
proven that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the subject property in the manner
prescribed by law and for the period necessary before acquisitive
prescription may apply.

While the subject land was supposedly declared alienable

and disposable on December 31, 1925 per the April 18, 1997
Certification

and

July

1,

1997

Report

of

the

Community

Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), 49[20] the

48
49

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) converted the same from

agricultural to industrial only on October 16, 1990. 50[21] Also, it
was only in 2000 that the Municipality of El Salvador passed a
Zoning Ordinance, including the subject property in the industrial
zone.51[22] Therefore, it was only in 1990 that the subject
property had been declared patrimonial and it is only then that
the prescriptive period began to run. The respondent cannot
benefit from the alleged possession of its predecessors-in-interest
because prior to the withdrawal of the subject property from the
public domain, it may not be acquired by prescription.

On the premise that the application of the respondent is

predicated on Section 14 (1), the same would likewise not
prosper. As shown by the tax declarations of the respondents
predecessors-in-interest, the earliest that the respondent can
trace back the possession of its predecessors-in-interest is in
1948. That there were four-year old coconut trees in Area A as
stated in Agapita Claudels 1948 Tax Declaration cannot be
considered a well-nigh controvertible evidence that she was in
possession prior to June 12, 1945 without any evidence that she
planted and cultivated them. In the case of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho,
the earliest tax declaration in his name is dated 1948 and there is
no evidence that he occupied and possessed Area B on or prior to
50
51

June 12, 1945. Furthermore, the testimony of the respondents

lone witness that the respondents predecessors-in-interest were
already in possession of the subject property as of June 12, 1945
lacks probative value for being hearsay.

It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and

occupation required to acquire an imperfect title over an alienable
and disposable public land must be open, continuous, exclusive
and

notorious

in

character.

In

Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba,52[23] this Court explained

that the intent behind the use of possession in conjunction with
occupation

is

to

emphasize the need for actual and not just constructive or

fictional possession.

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words

are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is
not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader
than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with
the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify,
his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a

52

nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. 53[24]
(citations omitted)

On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the required

nature of possession and occupation, thus, requiring a reference
to the relevant provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And
under

Article

1118

thereof,

possession

for

purposes

of

prescription must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful

and uninterrupted. In Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v.
Raon,54[25] this Court expounded on the nature of possession
required for purposes of prescription:

It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions

laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept
of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is
open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not
clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not
intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can
show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his
own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession
must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive
prescription.55[26] (citations omitted)

53
54
55

This Court is not satisfied with the evidence presented by the

respondent to prove compliance with the possession required
either under Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2).

First, the twelve (12) Tax Declarations covering Area A and

the eleven (11) Tax Declarations covering Area B for a claimed
possession of more than forty-six (46) years (1948-1994) do not
qualify

as

competent

evidence

of

actual

possession

and

occupation. As this Court ruled in Wee v. Republic of the

Philippines:56[27]

It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations

(for the years 1957, 1961, 1967, 1980 and 1985) for a claimed
possession and occupation of more than 45 years (1945-1993). This
type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged
ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation. In any event, in the absence
of other competent evidence, tax declarations do not conclusively
establish either possession or declarants right to registration of title. 57
[28] (emphasis supplied and citation omitted)

56
57

The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, and in

concept of owner, by which the respondent describes its
possession and that of its predecessors-in-interest is a conclusion
of law. The burden of proof is on the respondent to prove by clear,
positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of
its predecessors-in-interest was of the nature and duration
required by law.58[29] It is therefore inconsequential if the
petitioner failed to present evidence that would controvert the
allegations of the respondent. A person who seeks the registration
of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself
and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and
convincing

evidence, i.e.,

he

must

prove

his

title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the

evidence of the oppositors.59[30]

The respondents claim of ownership will not prosper on the

basis of the tax declarations alone. In Cequea v. Bolante,60[31]
this Court ruled that it is only when these tax declarations are
coupled with proof of actual possession of the property that they
may become the basis of a claim of ownership. 61[32] In the
58
59
60
61

absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration

of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. 62[33]

Second, that the nineteen (19) coconut trees supposedly

found on Area A were four years old at the time Agapita Claudel
filed a Tax Declaration in 1948 will not suffice as evidence that her
possession commenced prior to June 12, 1945, in the absence of
evidence that she planted and cultivated them. Alternatively,
assuming that Agapita Claudel planted and maintained these
trees,

such

can

only

be

considered

casual

cultivation

considering the size of Area A. On the other hand, that Jacinto Tan
Lay Cho possessed Area B in the concept of an owner on or prior
to June 12, 1945 cannot be assumed from his 1948 Tax
Declaration.

Third, that plants were on the subject property without any

evidence that it was the respondents predecessors-in-interest
who planted them and that actual cultivation or harvesting was
made does not constitute well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of
actual possession and occupation. As this Court ruled in Wee:

62

We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that the mere

existence of an unspecified number of coffee plants, sans any evidence
as to who planted them, when they were planted, whether cultivation
or harvesting was made or what other acts of occupation and
ownership were undertaken, is not sufficient to demonstrate
petitioners right to the registration of title in her favor. 63[34]

Fourth,

Vicente

Ocos

testimony

deserves

scant

consideration and will not supplement the inherent inadequacy of

the

tax

declarations.

undoubtedly

Apart

hearsay.

from

being

Vicente

self-serving,
Oco

it

is

lacks

personal knowledge as to when the predecessors-in-interest of

the respondent started to occupy the subject property and
admitted that his testimony was based on what he allegedly
gathered from the respondents predecessors-in-interest and the
owners of adjoining lot. Moreover, Vicente Oco did not testify as
to what specific acts of dominion or ownership were performed by
the respondents predecessors-in-interest and if indeed they did.
He merely made a general claim that they came into possession
before World War II, which is a mere conclusion of law and not
factual proof of possession, and therefore unavailing and cannot
suffice.64[35] Evidence of this nature should have been received
with suspicion, if not dismissed as tenuous and unreliable.

63
64

Finally, that the respondents application was filed after

only four years from the time the subject property may be
considered patrimonial by reason of the DARs October 26, 1990
Order

shows

lack

of

possession

whether

for

ordinary

or

extraordinary prescriptive period. The principle enunciated in

Heirs of Malabanan cited above was reiterated and applied in
Republic of the Philippines v. Rizalvo:65[36]

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for

application for registration because his claim of ownership and
possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years.
However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of
prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership and registration of
public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the
moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property
is
no
longer
intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. 66[37]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is

GRANTED. The July 31, 2008 Decision and February 20, 2009
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143 are
REVERSED

and

SET ASIDE and the respondents application for registration of

65
66

title over Lot 9039 of Cagayan Cadastre is hereby DENIED for

lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.