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Determinism states that given a specified state of events at time T1, the state of
events at all future times T1+x are fixed according to natural law. Simply put,
causal determinism states that every event is caused by a string of antecedent
factors. As intuitively the idea of determinism is incompatible with free will the
question arises; what of moral responsibility? Philosophy has, as a major pursuit,
attempted to address moral responsibility within the framework of determinism
and in this essay I will explore contributions to the debate including primarily the
works of van Inwagen, Strawson and Frankfurt. I hold that determinism is
incompatible with moral responsibility and that the latter requires a kind of
freedom not allowed for by determinism.
Central to this issue is an appropriate definition of moral responsibility. This is
separated from causal responsibility in that the latter implies causal attribution
while the former requires moral accountability. For example, say Robert suffered
an epileptic seizure while holding a crowbar and involuntarily killed a passerby.
He would not be held morally accountable in the same way if he had killed the
passerby in order to take his money. In a sense then we can define moral
responsibility as a state whereby the agent is deserving of moral sentiments for
an action or omission. A moral agent is defined in that he can be deserving of
such sentiments1. An intuitive condition of being a moral agent in a particular
circumstance is that the outcome must be 'up to us'. This premise is the basis of
van Inwagen's Consequence Argument2 for the incompatibility of determinism
and free will. Adapted to the issue at hand, this line of reasoning states that;
P1: We can only be morally responsible for acts that are up to us
P2: If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of
nature and events in the remote past
P3: The laws of nature and the events of the remote past are not up to us
P4: Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are
not up to us
Bibliography
Ekstrom, L W (2000). Free Will. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press
Eshleman, Andrew, "Moral Responsibility", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/moral-responsibility/>.
Fischer, J M. (2003). Responsibility and Alternative Possibilites. In: Widerker D.
and McKenna M. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot:
Ashgate. p27-52
Frankfurt, H. (2003). Responsibility and Alternative Possibilites. In: Widerker D.
and McKenna M. Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot:
Ashgate. p17-26