ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES

FIRST SET
SUMMER 2015

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.

Maximo Calalang in his own behalf. Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor
General Amparo for respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan
(the case has 3 issues, about police power, social justice, and undue delegation, the third
being the most relevant in the sucject)
Facts:
Antecedent facts
-

Maximo Calalang petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D.

Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as
Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and
Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan
Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

It was alleged in the petition that:

-

National Traffic Commission recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la
Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30
p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of
the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic
National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution in pursuance of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
national roads;
that Director of Public Works, , recommended to the secretary of public works and
communcations the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to
traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street;
that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, approved the
recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to
traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above
indicated, for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic;
that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced the
rules and regulations thus adopted resulting to the prohibition of all animal-drawn
vehicles to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Contention of the petitioner: (issue of the case) Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the
Director of Public Works is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and
control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional because it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
" To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of
the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate
and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the
approval of the President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of
buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such
roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works
and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a
specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications."cralaw virtua1aw library
Ruling: NO.
The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon
the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to
carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote
safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by
acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to
close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or
the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience
and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law
shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use
of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed
to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements
of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly . It must depend on the discretion of some
other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper
occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is
the
making
of
the
law.
The proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to
make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would

be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful
legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore,
be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation."
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of
the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by
permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of
discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also
in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.

Philippines Association of Service Exporters Inc. (PASEI) v. Hon. Ruben D. Torres

(Secretary of DOLE) and Jose N. Sarmineto (Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA))
G.R. No. 101279
Aug. 6, 1992.
1. TOPIC: Express and Implied Powers
2. FACTS:
a. ANTECEDENT FACTS
- PASEI: private employment and recruitment agency duly licensed by
POEA to engage in the business of obtaining oversease employment
for Filipino workers.
- A petition for prohibition with a temporary restraining order filed by
Peititoner to prohibit and enjoin Respondents from enforcing DOLE
Department Order No. 16 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos.
30 and 37, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private
employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and
vesting the task of processing and deploying such workers in the
DOLE (through the POEA).
- Department Order No. 16 was issued on June 1, 1991 as a result of
published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipinos employed
in Hong Kong.
- Memorandum Circular No. 30 provided the guidelines on the
Government processing and deployment of workers to Hong Kong,
while No. 37 provided for the processing of employment contracts.
b. CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER
- The respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in
excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars
- The assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the
Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair, and oppressive
- The requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the
National Administrative Registrar were not complied with.
c. RULING OF LOWER COURTS: Not indicated.
3. ISSUES:

a. W/N the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in

excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars
b. W/N the respondents failed to meet the requirements of publication and
filing.
4. RULING
a. NO, this contention has no merit.
- Art. 36 of the Labor Code (Regulatory Power) grants the Labor
Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and
placement activities and authorizes the Secretary to issue and
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives.
- E.O. 797 (created the POEA), vests in the POEA the powers and
duties: (a) to establish and maintain a system to regulate private
sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, (b)
to recruit and place workers for overseas employment on a
government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as
policy may dictate.
- IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: The assailed circulars do not prohibit
the petitioner from engaging in the deployment of Filipino workers for
overseas employment (only specifically to Hong Kong). The
administrative issuances fall within the admiinistrative and
policing power expressly or by necessary implication conferred
upon the respondents. The respondents were granted by law the
powers and duties to restrict and to regulate. Their actions fall
within the scope of these.
b. YES, petitioner failed to meet the requirements of publication and filing in
the Office of the National Administrative Registrar (Art. 2 of the Civil Code,
Art. 5 of the Labor Code, and Sec. 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987).
- Admiistrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to imp,ement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
c. OVERALL RULING: The writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The
implementation of the DOLE Department Order No. 16 and POEA
Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37 are SUSPENDED pending
compliance with the statutory requirements.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. CA

Topic: Express and Implied Powers (Police Power)
Facts:
Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon C.
Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other
foreign destinations. The ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas
employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in

the system of deployment. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued
Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC).
Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations,[1] the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued
Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening
performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the
former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement
were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any
contract of employment by the POEA.
Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC's recommendation, issued a series of
orders fine-tuning and implementing the new system. Prominent among these orders were the
following issuances:
1.
Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training, testing,
certification and deployment of performing artists.
2.
Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which
could be processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has
passed the required tests.
3.
Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to
receive (not less than US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions
therefrom.
4.
Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the
ARB by returning performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special
Orientation Program (shorter than the basic program) although they must pass the academic
test.

Petitioner's Contention:
These department orders, 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing
contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process
of law. Further, the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal
and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty and property
Respondents Contention:
Respondent court concluded that the issuances constituted a valid exercise by the state of the
police power.
Issue: WON the department orders constitute a valid exercise of the states police powers.
(1) Lower Court:
(2) Appellate Court: YES
(3) Supreme Court: YES
a. Majority Decision:
The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire
spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's
police power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public
needs," this "least limitable" of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments
through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.

As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3 questioned by petitioners, we see

nothing wrong with the requirement for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a
minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), or the requirement for registration of returning
performers. The requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place
and nature of work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps
keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with
unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices. Parenthetically, none of these issuances
appear to us, by any stretch of the imagination, even remotely unreasonable or arbitrary.
They address a felt need of according greater protection for an oft-exploited segment of
our OCW's. They respond to the industry's demand for clearer and more practicable
rules and guidelines. Many of these provisions were fleshed out following recommendations
by, and after consultations with, the affected sectors and non-government organizations. On the
whole, they are aimed at enhancing the safety and security of entertainers and artists bound for
Japan and other destinations, without stifling the industry's concerns for expansion and growth.
In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government
to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. Obviously, protection to labor does not
indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the
Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the
government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce,
local or overseas.
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause
of the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed
regulatory measures because they abridge the freedom to contract. It was held that "[t]he nonimpairment clause of the Constitution... must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the
government." Equally important, into every contract is read provisions of existing law, and
always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject
impressed with the public welfare.

Benito Symaco v. Hon.Paterio Aquino,

L-14535
January 30, 1960
Topic: Ministerial and Discretionary Duty
Facts:
On May 22, 1957, the petitioner filed a building permit as required by a Municipal Ordinance in
the office of the respondent for the repairs to be made in his house, however on July 2, 1957
when the building inspector conducted an inspection of the repairs made by the petitioner, the
former advised that a new building permit should be secured since what the petitioner did was
constructing a new building. Consequently the petitioner filed the same, pending the approval,
counsel of the adversary party of a civil action of forcible entry filed against the petitioner inform
the office of the respondent to withhold the issuance of building permit pending the decision of
the case filed, in which the respondent wrote a letter to the Petitioner's counsel regarding the
issue. The non issuance of the respondent cause the petitioner to file a writ of mandamus.
Petitioner's Contention:

The duty of a Municipal Mayor in issuing building permit is a ministerial duty, thus the
respondent has no right to withhold such issuance when all the requirements stipulated in the
ordinance were complied by the petitioner.
ARTICLE I, Ordinance No. 20, Series of 1941Every owner, tenant, manager or contrator,
shall, before beginning the construction or repair of any edifice, obtain the necessary permit
from the Municipal Mayor, stating in the application the name of the owner, location of the
building, kind of materials to be used, and the floor area. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents Contention:
The respondent alleged that the proper remedy to be availed by the petitioner is section 2188 of
the Administrative Code and not the writ of mandamus.
Issue: WON the duty of the Mayor to issue building permit is ministerial or discretionary.
Court Decisions:
(1) Lower Court:
(2) Appellate Court:
(3) Supreme Court:
a. Majority Decision:
The duty of the Mayor to issue building permit is ministerial in nature based on the
ordinance that mandates it. After the petitioner complied with all the necessary
requirements stipulated in the ordinance, the petitioner is entitled to it and the
respondent's duty became ministerial. Thus it is incumbent upon the respondent to issue
the permit to the petitioner. Likewise the ordinance did not provide any provisions
granting discretion to the Mayor to refuse issuance of the permit when all the
requirements were complied.
The writ of mandamus is the proper remedy rather than section 2188 of the
Administrative Code as assailed by the respondent, because the said provision gives
disciplinary actions for erring municipal officer, rather than to compel the performance of
a legal duty.
b. Dissenting Opinion:
Definition of Terms:
Ministerial Duty - is one which the officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts , in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
Discretionary Duty - If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed.

LORENZO M. TAADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,

vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ,
CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO
HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer, respondents.
G.R. No. L-10520; February 28, 1957

FACTS:
After the1955 elections, Petitioner Senator Taada was the lone opposition
senator. The 23 other seats were filled up by the Nacionalista Party. Petitioner
Macapagal was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).
The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956:
upon nomination of Senator CiprianoPrimicias, on behalf of the
Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and
CiprianoPrimicias, as members of the SET.
upon nomination of petitioner Senator Taada, on behalf of the Citizens
Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said
Tribunal; then,
upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules
of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Taada and Sumulong,
the Senate chose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco
A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal.
Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed:
o (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and
private secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed
member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation
of said respondent; and
o (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and
private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed
member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, however reads:.
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior
Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Emphasis
supplied.).
Both petitioners called for the disqualification of Cuenco and Delgado as members
of the SET for Cuenco and Delgado were not nominated by the minority party, as
provided for in the Constitution.
But, since Sen. Taada is the lone member of the minority, the respondents
contended that if the Constitution should be followed to the letter, that would leave
the SET with only 7 members.

PERTINENT ISSUE: WON the Constitutional provision on the nomination and

selection of the members of the SET is mandatory or directory.
RULING: The Constitutional provision on the nomination AND selection of the
members of SET is mandatory.
"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the
Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartially and independence in its decision, and that
is sought to be done by never allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal,
and secondly by seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left
in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor either
protestant or protestee." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363,
365-366; emphasis supplied.).
So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in
the Electoral Tribunals, that several members of the Senate questioned the right of
the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate and, hence, of
Senator Taada, as representative of the Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate
Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said party. Senators Lim, Sabido,
Cea and Paredes maintained that the spirit of the Constitution would be violated if
the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to the parties respectively
making the nominations.
"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions
in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from those which are
mandatory. However, in the determination of this question, as of every other
question of statutory construction, the prime object is to ascertain the
legislative intent. The legislative intent must be obtained front all the surrounding
circumstances, and the determination does not depend on the form of the statute.
Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object,
and the consequences which would result from construing it one way or
the other, and the statute must be construed in connection with other
related statutes.Words of permissive character may be given a mandatory
significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms of
a statute are such that they cannot be made effective to the extent of
giving each and all of them some reasonable operation, without
construing the statute as mandatory, such construction should be given; ..
On the other hand, the language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be
deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried out by such
construction, and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction;
but the construction of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted
and never where it would in fact make a new law instead of that passed by the
legislature. .. Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the
thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter
of form, and what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial

construction. Accordingly, when a particular provision of a statute relates to some

immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of
convenience rather than substance, or where the directions of a statute are given
merely with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of business, it is
generally regarded as directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition;
and a statute is regarded as directory were no substantial rights depend on it, no
injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislative can be
accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, with substantially the same
result. On the other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the thing to be
done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation
of a statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows
that the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the
validity of the act or proceeding, or when same antecedent and pre-requisite
conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power, or must be performed before
certain other powers can be exercise, the statute must be regarded as mandatory.
REVIEW (Might come up as a question)
What is a political question?
"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine
what matters, fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions
that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions, which under the
constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government."
In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy.
What is a justiciable question?
A justiciable question is one that can be decided by courts.
The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is
subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It
is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the
validity the proceedings in connection therewith.
".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the
judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed
election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a
particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly,
whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the
constitutional or statutory rights .."

Republic vs. Phil Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.

1970
1. Topic: Errors in Exercise of Powers
2. Facts
2.1. Antecedent Facts:
Respondent (registered owner of 238 motor vehicles) paid to the Motor
Vehicles Office the amount of P78,636.17 (second instalment of registration fees)
The amount was paid in the form of negotiable certificates of indebtedness, not
cash
2.2. Contention of the Petitioner:
Payment of registration fees in the form of negotiable certificates of
indebtedness is invalid
2.3. Contention of the Respondent:
The Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office had issued a circular (Circular No. 5)
that quoted a letter from the National Treasurer regarding the Back Pay Law (Republic Act 304),
allowing the acceptance of negotiable certificates of indebtedness in payment of registration
fees of motor vehicles
The Auditor General had concurred with the view of the National Treasurer
2.4. Ruling of the lower court:
Petitioners complaint was dismissed
The respondents payment using the negotiable certificates of indebtedness is
valid
3. Issues:
(a) Whether or not the acceptance of the negotiable certificates of indebtedness
tendered by the respondent bus firm to and accepted by the Motor Vehicles Office and the
corresponding issuance of official receipts therefor acknowledging such payment by said office
is valid and binding on petitioner Republic
(b) Whether or not the government is estopped for the mistakes committed by its agents
4. Ruling
4.1. Categorical answer to issues
(a) No
(b) No

4.2. Explanation for ruling

(a) Taxes were distinguished from regulatory fees. The object of the latter is the
enactment of specific measures that govern the relations not only as between individuals but
also as between private parties and the political society. The former has for its object the raising
of revenue. The Motor Vehicle Act requires the payment of registration fees. The Back Pay Law
relied by the respondent is applicable only to taxes, not to registration fees. Respondents mode
of payment is invalid.
(b) The lower court correctly referred to the national treasurer as being vested
with the function of administering the Back Pay Law. It concluded in its decision that the
government was bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and
the auditor general. The Court disagrees, citing the case of Aguinaldo de Romero v. Director of
Lands (1919). The Court also cited the case of Pineda v. Court of First Instance (1929) which
said that the government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents.
4.3. Doctrine
Relating the second issue and the topic, it would seem that if there are errors
committed in the exercise of powers by administrative agencies, the government is not bound
by the errors of said agencies.

G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI
Topic :Quasi-Legislative Power : In General
Facts:
Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlitodel Rosario
were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with
having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.
It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to
electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor
banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray
or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat
webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment
which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments
catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffedreach, to
the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429).
Contention of the Petitioner
- The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh
water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the
Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the
Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and

regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the
development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512;(3) the declared national
policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No.
3512), and(4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation of" the
Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall subject the
offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
Lower Court :
- Municipal court :quashed the complaint.
-The Court of First Instance of Laguna :affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36).
The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an
obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and
that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances.
The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the
executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.
-The case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution.

Issue/s:
W/N Administrative order 84 and AO 84-1, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries,
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law valid?
Ruling :
-No.
Explanation for Ruling :
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries AdministrativeOrders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that
those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Lawdoes not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro
fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in
punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls within the category of
"other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next
lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in
section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations
fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the powerto declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of
the penalty provided for in the law itself . (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur.
965 on p. 11 32).
the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law,
under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro
fishing.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could
have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.

Smart communications, Inc. (SMART) and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PILTEL) v.

National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
G.R. No. 152063
Aug. 12, 2003
1. TOPIC: Quasi-legislative Powers in general
2. FACTS:
a. ANTECEDENT FACTS
- Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the NTC issued
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (June 16, 2000), promulgating
rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunication devices. The
Circular provided it shall take effect 15 days after its publication
(Philippine Star, June 22, 2000).
1) Billing statements to be received by the subscriber not later
than 30 days from the end of each billing cycle. If receipt does
fall within this period, the subscriber is granted a grace period
to pay the bill and the service shall not be disconnected by
public telecommunications entities (PTC) within the grace
period
2) No charge for calls diverted to voicemail.
3) PTEs shall verify the ID and address of each purchaser of
prepaid SIM cards, which shall be valid for at least 2 years
from first use. After such, the SIM is invalid unless replenished
by the holder within 2 years and 45 days from the first use. No
additional charge for the installation of the validity of an invalid
SIM upon request.
4) The unit of billing for CMTS (prepaid or postpaid shall be
reduced from 1 minute/pulse to 6 seconds/pulse
- The NTC also issued a Memorandum (Aug. 30, 2000) to all cellular
mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators on measures to help
minimize the incidence of stealing of cellphones. Such measures
include requiring all existing prepaid SIM card holders to register and
present valid IDs and denyign acceptance of customers using stolen
cellphone units (registered to someone else).

b. CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONERS

- Petitioners filed an action for declaration of nullity of the
Memorandums and a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injuneciton and TRO.
- The NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer
goods (such as the prepaid call cards) since jurisdiction belongs
to the Dept. of Trade and Industry (under the Consumer Act of
the Philippines).
- The Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory, and violative of the
Constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due
process
- The Circular will impair the viability of the prepaid cellular service by
unduly prolonging the validity of the prepaid SIM and call cards
- The requirements of identificaiton of prepaid card buyers and call
valance announcement are unreasonable
c. RULING OF THE LOWER COURTS
- Petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, Inc. filed
a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-inIntervention, which was granted by the trial court.
- Oct. 27, 2000, the trial court issued a TRO enjoining NTC from
implementing. NTC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
- TRIAL COURT: On November 20, 2000, the trial court denied the
motion to dismiss and granted the application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunection (enjoining the respondent NTC from
implementing pending finality of the case). A motion for
reconsideration by the respondents was denied.
- COURT of APPEALS: NTC filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition before the CA. The CA.granted the petition, declared that
the prliminary injunction be annulled and set aside and that the
complaints be dismissed. Petitioners MR were denied in a resolution
for lack of merit.
3. ISSUES:
a. W/N the CA gravely erred in holding that the NTC and not the regular
courts has jurisdiction over the case.
b. W/N the petitioners failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.
c. W.N the CA erred in applying doctrine of primary jurisdiction in declaring
that NTC possesses jurisdiction over the case.
4. RULING:
OVERALL RULING: The petitions are GRANTED. The decision of the CA is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the RTC is reinstated and the
cases is REMANDED for continuation of the proceedings.
a. YES
IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: Administrative agencies possess quasilegislative (rule-making powers) that allow them to make rules and
regulations (delegated legislation) that is within: (a) the confiines of the

granting statute and (b) the doctrine of non-delegability and the

separation of powers.
The rules should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the agency. It is required that
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and
its standards. In case of conflict between a statute and an
administrative order, the former must prevail.
This is not to be confused with the quasi-judicial power, whereinn officers
and agencies investigate facts to determine conclusions as a basis for the
exercise of their official action.
b. NO. In quesitoning the validitiy of a rule, a party may not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court when the act concerned
was performed pursuant to the agencys quasi-legislative function. Even
assuming aguendo that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies applies, the petitioners sufficiently complied with it.
c. YES, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only when the agency
exercises its quasi-judicial function. In cases involving specialized
disputes, the practice is to refer it to the administrative agency exercising
specialized competence (primary jurisdiction). The courts will not
determine a controversy involving a question within the agencys
jurisdictipon (involves sound exercise of agencys special knowledge,
experience, and services) prior to its resolution by the agency. But when
what is assailed is the validity of a rule issued by the agency (quasilegislative power), the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon
the same (power of judicial review). The issuance of the Memoranda
were pursuant to its law-making powers and the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does NOT APPLY (i.e. RTC may take cognizance).

Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners

G.R. No. L-11216
March 6, 1916
1. TOPIC: Delagation of Legislative Powers
2. FACTS
a. ANTECEDENT FACTS
- Appeal of an order of respondents requiring petitioner to file a
detained report of its finances and operations in the certain form.
- The petitioner is a foreign corporation organized under Spanish law
and engaged in business in the Philippines as a common maritime
carrier (of both people and products)
- June 7, 1915, the respondents issued an order requiring petitioner to
show cause why it should not be required to present detailed annual
reports of its finances and operations of its vessels in the form
attached. After a hearing, respondent ordered the same.
-

b. CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS
- The respondent Board has no authority. The provision of Act No.
2307 on which it based its order is invalid since it is an unlawful
delegation of legislative power to the board.
- Said requirements are also unnecessary and cumbersome.
3. ISSUES
a. W/N the authority exercised by the respondent Board has been validly
delegated by the Legislature.
4. RULING
OVERALL RULING: The order appealed from is SET ASIDE. The Board
Commissioners are ordered to DISMISS their proceedings.
a. NO, the respondent Board has no valid authority since the law does not
establish a valid form of delegation of legislative power.
IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: Sec. 16 of Act No. 2306 provides that the
Board shll have power to require public utilities to furnish annual detailed
reports of finances and operations in prescribed forms.The provision is
very general. Leaving the nature of the reports, its contents, the
guidelines, and similar matters to the discretion of the board is not
an expression of the will of the State. The broad scope of the provision
indicates that the Legislature delegated to the Board all of its powers on a
given subject matter in a manner almost absolute without laying rules
on how the power is to be applied.
In delegating, the law must be complete in all its terms and
provisions and nothing must be left to the discretion of the delegate.
Congress must lay down the general rules for guidance. When the law
reaches the delegate, nothing must be left for it to do than to implement
and execute the law. However, leaving the caryring out of details to the
delegate is valid.
IN THIS CASE, the law does not lay down general rules of action by
failing to prescribe in detail what the reports must contain. Practically
everything is left to the Boards discretion.

People v. Vera

Restituto Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), at al.

G.R. No. 74457
March 20, 1987
1. TOPIC: Delegation of Legislative Power
2. FACTS

a. ANTECEDENT FACTS
- E.O. No. 626-A prohibits the interprovincial movement of
carabaos/carabeef and any transported in violation of said E.O. shall
be subject to confiscation/forfeiture by the government to be
distributed
1) to chartiable institutions and other similar organizations as the
Chariman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may
see fit (carabeef), or
2) to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry may
see fit (carabaos)
- On Jan. 13, 1984, the petitioner had transported six carabaos in a
pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo, which were confiscated by the
police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo.
b. CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER
- The E.O. is unconstitutional since it authorizes outright confiscation in
violation of due process (no right to be heard)
- The E.O. is also an improper exercise of the legislative power by the
former President (Marcos).
c. RULING OF THE LOWER COURTS:
- The RTC sustained the confiscation of the Carabaos and, since they
could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond of
P12,000.00 filed by the petitioner. It also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the EO for lack of authority and for presumed
validity.
- The IAC upheld the trial court.
3. ISSUES
a. W/N the RTC has the power to examine the constitutionality of the E.O.
b. W/N due process of the petitioner has been violated
c. W/N the E.O. provides for a valid delegation of legislative power.
4. RULING
OVERALL RULING: E.O. 626-A is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The decision of the
CA is reversed.
a. YES, the jurisdiction of the SC provides that it may review the orders of
lower courts involving the constitutionality of certain measures (implying
that lower courts may pass judgment on the same, subject to review by
higher courts). The presumption of validity is also not conclusive.
b. YES. The minimum requirements of due process (notice ad hearing) were
not met. While the objective of protecting carabaos and their owners may
be a valid subject of police power, it fails to meet the requisite for the
exercise of police power (that the means be reasonably necessary to
achieve the lawful objective). E.O. 626-A prohibits the movement of
carabaos and the Court fails to see how this can prevent their needless
slaughter since carabaos may be unlawfully killed in any place. The
confiscation was also not justified by the immediacy of a problem.
c. YES.
- The assailed E.O. is actually a presidential decree (promulgating a
new rule instead of merely implementing existing law. It was issued by

President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative authority under

Amendment No. 6 (whenever in his judgment, there existed a grave
emergency requiring immediate action and the legislative failed to act
adequately, he could issue decrees, orders, LOIs with the force/effect
of law)
IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: E.O. 626-A is an invalid delegation
of legislative powers. The disposition of the confiscated property is
questionable. The seized property is distributed to charitable
institutions or other institutions as the Chariman may see fit (in the
case of carabeef) or to deserving farmers as the Director may see fit.
May see fit is too broad and no reasonable guidelines or
limitations for the actions of the officers were provided. This
gives the officers exclusive jurisdiction.

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)

et al.
G.R. No. 76633
Oct. 8, 1988
1. TOPIC
2. FACTS
a. ANTECEDENT FACTS
- Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of M/V Eastern Polaris. He was killed
in an accident in Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985
- His widow, private respondent Kathleen D. Saco, sued for damages
under E.O. 797 and Memorandum Ciruclar No. 2 of POEA. The POEA
assumed jurisdiction and awarded her P192,000.
- The POEA was created under E.O. 797 to promote and monitor
overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. Sec. 4(a)
provides that POEA is vested with original and exlusive jurisdiction,
including money claims, involving employee-employer relations
arising from laws or contracts involving Filpino contract workers,
including seamen. The 1985 Rules and Regulations issued by the
POEA include claims for death, disability, and other benefits.
- The awarding of benefits by POEA was based on its Memorandum
Circular No. 2, which prescribed a standfard contract to be adopted by
both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino
seamen for overseas employment.
b. CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER
- The awarding of P192,000 to private respondent was not valid. POEA
had no jurisdiction because her husband was not an overseas worker.
The complaint was cognizable by the Social Security System and
should have been filed against the State Insurance Fund.
- Petitioner filed before the SC a motion to dismiss on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies (NOTE: ordinarily the
decisions of POEA should be first appealed to NLRC, giving the
agency opportunity to correct the errors of its subordinates, but this

case falls under the exception since what have been raised are
questions of law).
- Memorandum Circular No. 2 is violative of the principle of nondelegation of legislative power. Hence, POEA has no authority to
promulgate said regulation.
c. RULING OF LOWER COURTS: N/A
3. ISSUES
a. W/N the deceased was an overseas worker
b. W/N Memorandum Circular No. 2 violatyes the principle of non-delegation
of legislative power.
4. RULING
OVERALL RULING: The petition is DISMISSED. The TRO is LIFTED.
a. YES. The SC sees no reason not consider Vitaliano Saco as an overseas
employee at the time he met the fatal accident. Under the 1985 R&R,
overseas employment is defined as employment of a worker outside the
Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying international
waters. The petitioners actions also indicate acknowledgement of this,
such as indicating in the receipt of the burial benefits overseas contract
worker Vitaliano Saco and the submission of its shipping articles to
POEA for processing.
b. NO, the Memorandum Circular (MC) is a valid delegation of legislative
power.
IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: The authority to issue said regulation is
provided in Sec. 4(a) of E.O. 797 (POEA shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions
of the Administration). What can be delegated is the discretion to
determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law should be.
To determine whether there is a valid delegation of legislative power, two
tests are applied: (1) the completeness test (the law must be complete
in all its terms and conditions so that when it reaches the delegate, he will
only have to implement it), (2) the sufficient standard test (adequate
guidelines to map the boundaries of the delegates authority).
The model contract in the MC is a valid administrative regulation. The
model contract prescribed therein There is a sufficient standard is present
in E.O. 797 mandating the POEA to protect the rights of OFWs to fair
and equitable employment practices.

Emmanueal Pelaez vs. Auditor General

G.R. No. L-23825
Dec. 24, 1965
1. TOPIC: Delegation of Legislative Powers

2. FACTS
a. ANTECEDENT FACTS
- From Sept. 4 to Oct. 29, 1964, the President, claiming to act pursuant
to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code (REC), issued E.O.
Nos 93-121, 124, 126-129, creating 33 municipalities.
- Petitioner, as Vice President and as a taxpayer, filed for a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction against respondent to restrain
him and his agents from using and/or allocating any public funds in
implementation of said EOs.
- Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 2370 provides that Barrios shall not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress and Upon petition of a
majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be
createdupon the recommendation of the council of the
municipality..Provided, however, that no new barrio may be created
if its population is less than five hundred
- Sec. 68 of the RAC provides that the President may by EO define the
boundaries of any province, municipality, any other political
subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory therein, separate
political divisions other than a province as may be required, merge
such sudivisions with another, name any new subdivisionprovided
that the authorization of Conngress must be first obtained whenever
the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined/divided.
The President may also change the seat of the government in such
subdivisions to such place therein as public welfare may require.
b. CONTENTION OF PETITIONER
- The EOs are null and void since Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed
by Act No. 2370 (Can the President create a municipality when he
cannot even create barrios, the units of municipalities)
- The EOs also constitute an undue delegation of legislative power
c. CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT
- The President can create a new municipality without creating new
barrios by allocating old barrrios under the jurisdiction of a new
municipality.
- The power of the President to create municipalities under Sec. 68 of
RAC does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power.
3. ISSUES
a. W/N the President has been duly delegated legislative power to create
municipalities.
4. RULING:
OVERALL RULING: The Executive Orders in question are declared NULL AND
VOID ab initio.
a. NO, Sec. 68 does not delegate legislative power to create munipalities
upon the President.
- IN RELATION TO THE TOPIC: The power to fix common boundaries
in order to settle conflicts of jurisdiction may be administrative in
nature since it involves adopting mean to put the law creating
municipalities into effect. The authority to create municipal
corporations is legislative. While Congress may delegate the power to

fill in the details of its executions, the law must pass the
completeness test and sufficient standard test so that there be no
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Sec. 68 of the RAC does not meet these requirements of a valid
delegation. It does not identify a policy to be carried out by the
President, does not provide sufficient standards. The last part
provides as the public welfare may require. While it has been held in
previous cases that public interest/welfare are sufficient standards for
valid delegation, they must be construed in relation to the facts
involved (i.e. the public interest must be related to the
function/purpose of the administrative agency, such the power of the
Director of Public Works to issue rules and regulations to promote
safe transit on roads). NOTE: In other words, the public interest
involved must be related to the specific purpose for which the agency
was made.
In this case, the creation of municipalities is not an
administrative function but legislative. Public interest becomes a
purely legislative/political question and no longer a question of fact.
Sec. 68 does not prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to
particular states of fact.
Sec. 10(1) of Art. VII of the Constitution provides that the President
shall have control over executive departments and offices, and
exercise general supervision over all local governments. The
President has only limited authority over local governments and
cannot interfere as long as they act within their authority. Therefore,
Sec. 68 of the RAC (approved March 1917) must be deemed
REPEALED by the subsequent adoption of the 1935 Constitution
(incompatible).

Romeo F. Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner v. Hon.Vicente G.

Ericta, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII,
Quezon City
Topic: Delegation of Legislative Power
Facts:
The petitioner as Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the respondent judge of the CFI, who grants the petition of certain Galo and
others for writ of preliminary injunction of the Reflector Law which amended the Land
Transportation Code, as well as the Administrative Order issued by the petitioner as
implementing rules and regulations of the aforementioned law.
Petitioner's Contention:
The Reflector Law is constitutional, likewise the Administrative Order he issued providing
specific rules and regulations in order to properly implement the aforesaid law.

Respondents Contention:
The Reflector Law is unconstitutional because it is an invalid exercise of police power for being
violation of the due process clause, thus the issuance of the Administrative Order is an undue
exercise of the legislative power by the Petitioner-Commissioner.
Issue: WON the Administrative Order issued by the Petitioner confirms as a valid delegation of
Legislative Power.
Court Decisions:
(1) Lower Court:
(2) Appellate Court:
(3) Supreme Court:
a. Majority Decision:
Yes, the Administrative Order confirms as a valid delegation of Legislative Power,
because what cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws
and to alter and repeal them. To test the validity of the delegated power, two test must be
done, 1. Completeness Test - that the statute is complete in all its terms and provisions
when it leaves the hands of the legislature, and 2.Standard Test - there must be a
standard which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy.
The Court ruled, all that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law, that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but
conform to the standards that the law prescribes.
The Reflector Law which provided the authority of the petitioner to issue the order
as an implementing rules and regulations is constitutional. Galo and others who filed a
writ of preliminary injunction for the implementation of the law and the order erred in
their contention, the law and administrative order did not violate the due process clause
of the Constitution since the main purpose of the law is for public safety, which is a valid
exercise of police power.

Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of
Fatima Blood Bank, et. al., vs. The Secretary of Health
Topic: Delegation of Legislative Power
Facts:
Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Association of Blood Banks, a duly registered non-stock and non-profit association
composed of free standing blood banks. Petitioners prays for a writ of prohibitory
injunction enjoining the Secretary of Health from implementing and enforcing the
National Blood Services Act of 1994 and Administrative Order No. 9 series of 1995
as its implementing rules and regulation. Also petitioned for mandatory injunction
ordering and commanding the Secretary of Health to grant their renewal of license
to operate free standing blood banks.

The law steamed from the report of an institution tasked to evaluate the safety of
the Philippine Blood Banking System, the report shows that the country relied
heavily on commercial blood banks, and the blood sold by the persons to such
establishment are more likely to have any of the 4 tested infections or blood
transfusion transmissible diseases such as AIDS, Malaria, syphilis and Hepatitis B.
As a solution, the legislature enacted the statute in questioned which provides the
phase outing of commercial blood banks within 2 years from the effectivity of the
law, which can be extended for a maximum of 2 years by the Secretary of Health. In
relation to the said statute, the Secretary executed an Administrative Order as
implementing rules and regulations, which also provides the process of phase
outing the commercial blood blanks reiterating sec.7 of the statute authorizing the
same, also with a statement that the decision to extend shall be based on a result
of careful study and review of the blood supply, demand and public safety.
Petitioner's Contention:
Petitioners alleged that the law constitutes undue delegation because
section 7 of the law constrained the Secretary of Health to legislate
whether or not to extend the license of the commercial blood banks for a
maximum period of 2 years.
Respondents Contention:
The respondent contend that the blood from commercial blood banks are unsafe
and in the exercise of police power can close down such establishments to protect
the public.
Issue:
WON Section 7 of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 constitutes
undue delegation of Legislative Power
Court Decisions:
(1) Lower Court:
(2) Appellate Court:
(3) Supreme Court:
a. Majority Decision:
No, it does not constitutes undue delegation because the law is
complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the
Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and
has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is
the phase out of commercial blood banks, the law has sufficiently provided
a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying
out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a
safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By
its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of

Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the

law.
Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate it's policies. The Secretary of Health has been
given broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act.

Sergio I. Carbonilla et. al. vs. Board of Airlines Representative

Topic: Delegation of Legislative Power
Facts:
In connection with section 608 of the Tariff and Custom Code of the Philippines
which provides authority to the Commissioner of Bureau of Customs to promulgate
rules and regulations in accordance with the code, also section 3506 which
stipulates the assignment of Customs employees to overtime work with a rate fixed
by the Commissioner of Customs when the service rendered is to be paid for by
importers, shippers or other persons served, the rates to be fixed shall not be less
than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise, an
Administrative order was issued by the Commissioner amending the rate of
overtime pay of Customs employees in NAIA from 25 pesos to 55 pesos as an on
going exchange rate per US dollar.
Petitioner's Contention:
Petitioners are customs employees affected by the result of the validity of the
Administrative Order issued and the Office of the President, they alleged that the
respondent did not question the prior Administrative Order which provides the 25
pesos rate of overtime pay, in which that rate is the exchange rate of that time.
Also, BOC was merely exercising its rule making power or quasi legislative power
when it issued the Administrative Order. Likewise there is a legal presumption that
the rates fixed by an Administrative agency are reasonable, and that the fixing of
the rates by the Government, through its authorized agents, involved the exercise
of reasonable discretion.
Respondents Contention:
The respondent contentions are, 1.BOC failed to comply with the publication
requirement, 2. that the foreign exchange cannot be a basis for rate increase, and
3. that increase in rate was ill-timed.
Issue: WON there is a valid delegation of legislative power by the
Commissioner of Customs
Court Decisions:

(1) Lower Court:

(2) Appellate Court:
(3) Supreme Court:
a. Majority Decision:
Yes, it is a valid delegation of legislative power, TCCP section 608
and 3506 pass the completeness and sufficient standard test because the
law is complete in itself that it leaves nothing more for the BOC to do; it
gives authority to the collector to assign customs employees to do
overtime work, the Commissioner of Customs fixes the rates of which it
shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of
private enterprise.
Likewise, it does constitutes as a double pay because it is a payment
for additional work rendered after regular office hours.