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Journal of European Integration

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Mission Impossible: the European Union

and Policy Coherence for Development
Maurizio Carbone

Department of Politics , University of Glasgow , Glasgow, UK

Published online: 16 Jul 2008.

To cite this article: Maurizio Carbone (2008) Mission Impossible: the European Union and
Policy Coherence for Development, Journal of European Integration, 30:3, 323-342, DOI:
10.1080/07036330802144992
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European Integration
Vol. 30, No. 3, 323342, July 2008

ARTICLE

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Mission Impossible: the European

Union and Policy Coherence for
Development
MAURIZIO CARBONE
Department of Politics, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
MaurizioCarbone
Original
Taylor
302008
30
M.Carbone@lbss.gla.ac.uk
00000July
&
Francis
2008 Ltd
Journal
10.1080/07036330802144992
GEUI_A_314665.sgm
0703-6337
and
ofArticle
European
(print)/1477-2280
Francis
Integration
(online)

ABSTRACT The principle of policy coherence has been the object of a contentious
debate in the European Unions external relations, though discussions have been limited
mainly to its foreign policy and its ability to speak with one voice in the international
arena. Despite being institutionalized in the Treaty of Maastricht, policy coherence for
development (PCD), which implies taking into account the needs and interest of developing countries in non-aid policies, failed to make headway in the EU, remaining the
unheeded concern of some NGOs and a small group of member states. A change in
direction occurred in the early 2000s when the European Commission, taking advantage of a number of favourable conditions and using an astute strategy, managed to set
an ambitious agenda for the EU. This article, nevertheless, shows that promoting PCD
risks being a mission impossible for whoever attempts it due to the interplay of various
issues and interests, the different commitment to international development of the
member states, and the EUs institutional framework.
KEY WORDS: Policy coherence, EU development policy, foreign aid, Millennium
Development Goals

Introduction
The principle of policy coherence has been the object of a contentious debate
in the external relations of the European Union. These discussions, however,
have been limited mainly to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP),
where, without indulging in linguistic sophistry, coherence is used interchangeably with consistency (Krenzler and Schneider 1997; Tietje 1997;
Duke 1999; Smith 2001; Gauttier 2004; Nuttall 2005).1 In line with the
Correspondence Address: Maurizio Carbone, Department of Politics, University of Glasgow,
Glasgow, G12 OEG, UK. Email: m.carbone@lbss.gla.ac.uk
ISSN 07036337 Print/ISSN 14772280 Online/08/030323-20 2008 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/07036330802144992

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Maurizio Carbone

Single European Act (SEA), which called on the EU to act as a cohesive force
in international relations (Article 30.2[d]), the Treaty of Maastricht established that the The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its
external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security,
economic, and development policies (Article C).2 While previously greater
emphasis was given to the relationship between the member states and the
Union, the Treaty of Maastricht gave more prominence to consistency across
policies. Moreover, it introduced a single institutional framework to cover
the three pillars of the EUs activities, with both the Commission and the
Council sharing responsibility in ensuring consistency in the EUs external
activities. The aim was that the EU would not only speak with a single voice,
but would also be able to assert its identity on the international scene
(Duke 1999, Gauttier 2004).
Policy coherence for development (PCD) which according to a widely
accepted definition means taking account of the needs and interests of developing countries in the evolution of the global economy (OECD 2003, p. 2)
has been largely absent from this debate. This scant attention is rather
surprising if one considers that PCD is included in the EUs constitutional
charter it was introduced in the Treaty of Maastricht and strengthened in
the Treaty of Lisbon, an exceptional case among international donors and
that its scope reaches several hard policies, such as trade, agriculture, fisheries. True, very little progress was achieved throughout the 1990s, including
within the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which attempted
to further the discussion without much success (Forster and Stokke 1999a).
The adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), following the
Millennium Summit of September 2000, changed the parameters of
the debate (Payne 2005, Grieg et al. 2007). Specific targets were set, and the
international community was forced to face up to the widening gap between
the rich and the poor. This led to a renewed focus by most donors on foreign
aid and, in fact, the amount of development assistance increased enormously,
from 52 billion in 2000 to 104 billion in 2006 (DAC 2008; see also Riddell
2007). But to achieve the MDGs, it eventually became clear that foreign aid
was not enough, but better synergies between aid and non-aid policies needed
to be explored. The European Union this time took the lead and, in May
2005, in the context of the Millennium + 5 Summit and as part of a package that included a significant boost in its foreign aid, it agreed on an ambitious agenda on PCD (Council 2005). Even the DAC, which had always been
critical of EU development policy, acknowledged that the EU has actively
contributed to the growing international consensus on policy coherence
(DAC 2007, p. 16), is clear about its desire to help shape a broader international approach (ibid.) and that the Commission has performed its
catalytic role in selected areas of policy coherence with the support of a small
number of Member States (ibid., p. 19).
This volume analyses the evolution of policy coherence for development
from the EUs perspective. The aim is to shed new light on the EUs policymaking process, by looking at the nexus between various policy sub-systems,
and on the role that the EU wants to play in the international arena, by looking

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at the impact of its policies on international development. In fact, the EU, with
its 27 member states, not only is the largest provider of foreign aid in the world
but it is also the venue in which a large number of policies affecting developing
countries are decided. This introductory paper presents the concept of policy
coherence for development and the debate since its institutionalization in the
early 1990s. The remainder of the volume concentrates on the linkages
between aid and various non-aid policies. Following Hollands paper, which
provides an analytical overview of the new aid initiatives in the EU and their
impact on the global development agenda, the first group of papers deals with
three common economic policies namely trade, agriculture and fisheries.
Elgstrom and Pilegaard show that the existence of value competition and
different priorities within the EU have significantly challenged policy coherence during the negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)
between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states.
Matthews argues that, despite successive reforms of the common agricultural
policy (CAP), which have reduced the distortions that it generates on world
markets, further elimination of export and production subsidies could
contribute to higher economic growth in developing countries if these countries did not have to abide by the EUs ever-stringent health and environmental
standards. Bretherton and Vogler look at the adoption of the new fisheries
partnership agreements, which, despite the promises, demonstrate that the
EUs economic interests take precedence over its commitment to promote
both sustainable development and poverty eradication. The second group of
papers examines socio-political policies. Youngs looks at the commitment to
link security and development, claiming that the EU, besides some rhetorical
commitments, has achieved little on the balance or direction of causality
between these two policy goals. Lavenex and Kunz investigate the EUs migration policy and show that the development-focused approach promoted
by various international organizations has not yet fully replaced the EUs
dominant security-orientated approach that focuses on the repression of
unwanted immigration. Finally, Orbie and Babarinde start from the role of
the EU in promoting the social dimension of globalization to demonstrate that
the direct impact of the EUs internal social policies has been limited, while
an indirect impact has occurred through its trade and development policies.
Understanding Policy Coherence for Development
Before discussing it in the context of development policy, it is useful to reflect
briefly on the general concept of policy coherence. Three preliminary considerations must be made. First, the existing literature often refers to policy
coherence within states, in which two or more domestic policies may push in
different directions. With globalization, not only has the distinction between
internal and external policies become blurred, but the interplay between
different policies also involves the regional and global level. Besides the EUs
distinctive institutional arrangements, a central difference with conventional
states is that the resolution of cases of incoherence in the EU is conducted
in the full glare of publicity, and through mechanisms which are not only

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imperfectly developed, but reflect diverging views about the proper form of
European governance (Nuttall 2005, p. 93). Secondly, policy coherence can
be explored as an outcome (what is achieved) and as a process (how it
is achieved) (Di Francesco 2001). In the first case, it implies the absence of
incoherencies between and the mutual impairment of policies adopting a
negative approach or the interaction of policies with the aim of achieving
overriding objectives using a more positive approach (Ashoff 2005, p. 11).
In the second case, the focus is on tools and mechanisms, often considered a
pre-condition for achieving policy coherence. Thirdly, to offer a meaningful
analysis of policy coherence, it is fundamental to identify the beholders
perspective: the same decision may be coherent from a trade perspective but
incoherent from a development perspective. This means that claims to perfect
coherence are unrealistic and that a certain degree of incoherence is inevitable in pluralist political systems (Koulamah-Gabriel 1999). The task
for policy makers is to avoid unnecessary incoherence, which implies that
winwin solutions are possible, whereas necessary incoherence, which results
from the aggregation of legitimate conflicting interests, is more acceptable
(Hoebink 2004, Picciotto 2005).
Rationale for and Obstacles to Policy Coherence
Traditionally, a distinction is made between two types of policy coherence.
Horizontal coherence refers to the potential problems raised by the interaction between various policy areas; more specifically to development policy,
it refers to the consistency between aid and non-aid policies in terms of their
combined contribution to development. Vertical coherence refers to the relations between the member states and the EU; more specifically to development
policy, it refers to the consistency between different policies across various
member states in terms of their combined contribution to development. In
addition to these two types, internal coherence refers to the consistency
between the objectives of a given policy; more specifically to development
policy, it refers to the consistency between purposes of aid (e.g. promoting
donor or recipient interests), channels (e.g. aid to states, aid to non-state
actors, aid to multilateral organizations), functions (e.g. budget support, aid
to the private sector, aid to the social sectors). Donorrecipient coherence
refers to the interaction between policies adopted by the industrialized countries and those adopted by developing countries. Multilateral coherence refers
to interaction between international organizations, such as the UN and the
International Financial Institutions, which often promote incompatible goals
(Hoebink 2004, Nuttall 2005, Picciotto 2005). The focus of this study is
primarily on horizontal coherence, though other types particularly vertical
and internal coherence unavoidably enter the discussions.
Policy coherence is both a political imperative i.e. avoiding being seen
as inconsistent by political competitors or by the citizens and, in the case of
EU external relations, avoiding undermining the credibility of the EU as an
actor in international politics and international development and an
economic imperative i.e. avoiding wasting scarce resources (Di Francesco

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2001). But, as mentioned earlier, a certain degree of incoherence is inevitable in a pluralist society because of the fragmentation of policy systems.
May et al. (2006) argued that policy coherence depends on the interplay of
issues and interests: a policy that has greater issue focus and is dominated
by few interests is likely to have stronger policy coherence. However, the
argument runs, even very crowded policy areas can still cohere if they
contain integrative properties that glue issues and interests, such as a clear
set of goals, a compelling policy image, a well-defined targeting, and the
strong involvement of the executive agency.3 Forster and Stokke (1999b)
maintained that coherence depends on dedication of the political and
administrative leadership at the centre, particularly relevant in the EU
where a not-too-strong centre must co-exist with various centrifugal forces.
Politics is compartmentalized; each sub-subsystem has its own logic reflecting perceptions, interests and values. To avoid incoherencies, the various
policies need to be coordinated. Coordination, and consequently coherence,
is not easily achievable when policy sub-systems relate to each other horizontally and there are only weak hierarchical coordination mechanisms.
Ashoff (2005) listed a number of potential causes for policy incoherence.
He noted that in the area of societal and political norms the pursuit of
policy coherence may be sacrificed to legitimate interests, whereas in the
area of political decision making coherence may be made more difficult by
globalization, the impact of external forces on policy making, and by decentralization, due to the increased number of negotiation levels to be taken
into account. In the area of policy formulation and coordination, coherence
is less likely when strategy, goals and objectives are unclear. In these
circumstances the structure and process of policy coordination do not work
effectively, and there is a shortage of information.
In light of these considerations, pursuing policy coherence for the promotion of international development and, more specifically, in the context of the
EU, is a sort of mission impossible for whoever attempts it. First, over the
past decade the number of issues to be included within the remit of international development has significantly increased. Development policy no longer
entails only the transfer of financial resources for economic and social development, but also involves other economic means (such as trade preferences
and foreign direct investment) as well as political considerations (such as the
promotion of human rights and democracy assistance). Nor is development
policy the exclusive preserve of state-to-state activity since it engages an
increasingly large number of actors (e.g. civil society, decentralized actors,
national and international corporations). Secondly, development interests
often succumb to other interests. The development constituency, made of aid
bureaucracies and the community of development NGOs, is often too weak
vis--vis agriculture groups, domestic firms, multinational corporations and
other organized interest groups. This implies that, for instance, when the economy is under pressure, not only is the aid budget the first to be cut, but
measures aimed at promoting international development indirectly, such as
trade preferences or liberal migration policy, are less acceptable to the public.
Some commentators have argued that while allocating development assistance

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Maurizio Carbone

is politically palatable because the costs are shared among a large number
of tax payers, measures that affect an economic sector concern a small but
powerful group, which can easily mobilize opposition (Grieg-Gran 2003).
Others, however, have pointed out that a significant correlation can be
expected between high levels of development assistance and policy coherence
for development, perhaps because the median voter in these countries (or
politicians seeking their votes), will have a heightened concern with tax monies
spent for that purpose (Kapstein 2004, p. 19).
Thirdly, the real commitment to international development of the various
member states varies significantly. The commitment to development index
(CDI), introduced by an American think-thank, shows that not only foreign
aid, but also other policies have an important role in affecting the pace of
development in poor countries.4 Going beyond the criticism of the arbitrary
choice and weight of the various sectors (Picciotto 2005), the CDI offers an
indirect measure of policy coherence across member states. The conventional
wisdom is that good performers in foreign aid are also committed to policy
coherence for development as also shown by the number of policy statements and mechanisms they have adopted over the years (ECDPM and ICEI
2006, ECDPM et al. 2007). The three states that score highest in the foreign
aid index (i.e. Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden) score only about average
in four of the remaining six policy areas. Those countries that perform poorly
in the foreign aid index (i.e. Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) perform
just below average in most of the other policy areas. The big three (France,
Germany and the UK) score around average in almost all the indexes. In
general, while the gap between countries in the foreign aid index is remarkable, it is less so in other indexes; the bottom line, therefore, is that all
countries could do much more to spread prosperity (Roodman 2007, p. 7).
Finally, some considerations should be made on the impact of the EUs
policy framework which, according to Nugent (2006, p. 389), can hardly
be said to display a clear pattern or coherence. Two broad methods of
decision making co-exist in the EU, though this difference is now questioned
(Stetter 2004). In the case of supranational policies such as trade, agriculture, fisheries decision-making processes are based on the interaction
between the three key institutions, with the European Commission spearheading the efforts to promote policy coherence. In the case of intergovernmental
policies e.g. foreign and security policy the European Commission and
the Parliament play a less relevant role than the Council, and the Presidency
is the key advocate of coherence. In areas of mixed competence, the decision
to grant authority to the European Commission to represent them is in the
hands of the member states. For instance, in the case of environment, climate
change, transport, energy (if linked to the internal market), information society, research, migration, and social policies, the initiative rests mainly with
the Commission, though national policies also exist and external action is
usually member-state led (Egenhoher 2006, pp. 67).5 Because of these institutional arrangements, various commentators have argued that achieving
policy coherence in the EU is extremely difficult, but we will return to this
point in the last section of this paper.

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The Global Context of Policy Coherence for Development

The efforts to promote policy coherence for international development are a
relatively recent phenomenon. The integration of various goals and objectives into development policy has, however, been a concern for industrialized
countries for a long time. In the 1960s, the idea of comprehensive planning
implied accelerating development by focusing on strategic economic sectors
and by adopting a national development plan produced through a bureaucratic process involving economic expertise in various ministries. In the
1970s, integrated development was the answer to the ineffectiveness of
project aid and rivalry between agencies, as it brought together under a single
institutional umbrella not only planning and design but also implementation.
In the 1980s, most donors took a common stand and coerced developing
countries into adopting structural adjustment programmes aimed at reforming their macro-economic framework, followed in the 1990s by an even more
rigorous programme aimed at implementing political reforms (Hydn 1999,
pp. 6473).
The first official discussion on policy coherence for development as such
was held in a High-Level Meeting of the DAC in December 1991. The DAC
concentrated on how non-aid policies (like macro-economic policies, trade,
exports credits, tied aid, foreign direct investment, agriculture, environment,
migration, arms trade, and drugs) could increase the effectiveness of aid. The
promotion of PCD was also sold as part of a strategy that contributed to
managing a number of challenges in the upcoming decade and implied also
the need for effective participation by developing countries in the global decision-making process (Forster and Stokke 1999b). In 1996, the DAC
published a much-quoted report, Shaping the 21st Century, in which it urged
industrialized countries to ensure that their policies do not undermine
development objectives with the aim of increasing effectiveness of aid. In
2001, it published the Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, which contained a
section on policy coherence and another section on institutional requirements for policy coherence (Ashoff 2005). Finally, since 2000, it has
included a separate chapter on coherence in the peer reviews that it conducts
on the development policies of its members. This new instrument has
contributed to raising awareness on best (and bad) practices, but at the same
time has failed to deliver rigorous assessment of PCD performance at the
country level because it is not governed by clear and uniform standards
connected to explicit PCD objectives (Picciotto 2005, p. 319).
While the DAC tried to play a leading role in furthering the PCD agenda
some talk also of institutional entrepreneurship or institutional
survival, which implies that some international organizations launch new
ideas and become their promoters to justify and preserve their existence,
engaging in a sort of competition with other organizations to set the international agenda (Forster and Stokke 1999b) the issue of policy coherence
has been dealt with in other international settings. At the level of the UN, the
decade of conferences on environment and development (Rio de
Janeiro 1992), social issues (Copenhagen 1995), gender equality (Beijing

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Maurizio Carbone

1995) which preceded the Millennium Summit held in New York in

September 2000, contributed to a better and wider understanding of development. The subsequent adoption of the MDGs marked a change of direction for the international community (Greig et al. 2007). In particular, the
inclusion of MDG-8 (Develop a global partnership for development)
acknowledged the need to go beyond development cooperation in other
policy areas, notably the development of an open trading and financial
system committed to good governance, development and poverty reduction,
and measures to address the special needs of least-developed countries
through tariffs and quota-free access for their exports (Grieg-Gran 2003).
The Bretton Woods institutions (i.e. World Bank and IMF) and the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) have apparently played a secondary role in the
promotion of PCD. Nevertheless, in addition to the structural adjustment
programme of the 1980s, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)
reflect the principles of comprehensive development, ownership, partnership
and results-orientated development (Picciotto 2005). The WTO has been the
key venue for discussions on the links between trade (but also agriculture)
and development. The adoption of the Doha Development Agenda in 2001
seemed to start a new era in global politics. However, the failure of the WTO
round in Cancun, particularly on the issue of cotton, showed how difficult it
is for developed countries including the EUs member states to reform
their trade and agriculture policies (Grieg-Gran 2003).
Policy Coherence for Development in the European Union
The origin of the debate on policy coherence for development in the EU can
be traced back to the Treaty of Maastricht, which officially introduced a
policy in the sphere of development cooperation among the activities of the
EU.6 The new legal framework included three principles for the functioning
of development policy, the so-called 3Cs: complementarity, coordination
and coherence (Holland 2002). Complementarity means that the member
states and the EU share competences in development policy, which must be
exercised alongside each other. Coordination implies that member states and
EU should coordinate their policies and consult on their aid programmes,
including in international organizations and during international conferences. Coherence entails that the EU shall take account of the objectives
of its development policy in the policies that it implements which are likely
to affect developing countries. These provisions on policy coherence were
generally considered weak. First, the word coherence was not mentioned
but was replaced by a less categorical takes into account. Secondly, the
attention was placed on the process rather than results, which means that
development policy, a soft policy, has been vulnerable to more powerful
interests, notably those of trade, fisheries and agriculture. Thirdly, the coherence article applied to supranational policies, which partially left unanswered the question of the coherence between intergovernmental policies and
development policy (Hoebink 1999, Koulamah-Gabriel 1999). In reality,
the Treaty of Maastricht also introduced the principle of consistency,

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which referred to all external policies, thus including foreign and security
policies.

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A Decade of Non-decisions
The discussion on the operationalization of the three Cs started before the
Treaty of Maastricht came into force, when the European Commission
published a communication on the future of development policy (entitled
Horizon 2000). However, the European Commission concentrated on coordination and the shortfalls of the implementation of a truly coordinated
policy; less attention was given to coherence (Loquai 1996). A majority of
member states seemed to be more ambitious and, in the Development Council
of November 1992, urged the European Commission to prepare a study and
to report within a year on the practical consequences of the coherence
principle. The European Commission failed to do so, lamenting inadequate
staff levels and a dismissive attitude of some member states (Hoebink 2004).
European NGOs tried to fill this policy void by launching a number of public
campaigns. One of the most visible was in April 1993 against the EUs meat
exports in West Africa, which were not only incoherent with the development
assistance aimed at supporting the meat industry in the region, but also
contributed to disrupting local markets. Other important campaigns were
carried out by NGOs during the 1990s, such as that of May 1996, against
the overcapacity of the EUs fishing fleets and for disregarding the impact of
its fisheries agreements on poor countries, and the 1997 campaign against the
chocolate directive, which penalized cocoa-producing countries to the advantage of the chocolate industry (Koulamah-Gabriel and Oomen 1997).
The combination of the first NGO campaigns and the pressure of some
member states forced the European Commission to publish a report in May
1994, in which it finally acknowledged the presence of incoherencies between
the CAP and development policy. It should, however, be noted that the European Commission itself was cautious, pointing to the fact that reconciling
different interests was extremely difficult. In the ensuing meeting of the Development Council in June 1995, a number of member states were favourable
to the idea of better coherence between development, trade and agriculture.
Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark, the most active among the member
states, proposed setting up mechanisms to raise cases of incoherence, such as
for example cross-sectoral meetings within the Council. This idea was
rejected by France and Germany, and progress on this issue stalled (Loquai
1996). Considering all these disagreements, it is not surprising that the
conclusions of the Council were very weak, simply asking the Commission
to continue its work on this issue (Council 1995). A similar outcome was
produced in 1997, when, thanks to initiatives of the Dutch Presidency (and
later also Luxembourg), supported by Denmark and Sweden, the Council
adopted a generic resolution covering links between development and four
themes: peace building, conflict prevention and resolution; food security; fisheries; and migration. The European Commission was once again very
cautious about linking development with trade and agriculture. In the final

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Maurizio Carbone

resolution, the Council invite[d] the Commission to present regularly, preferably on an annual basis, a report to the Council on questions related to
coherence in connection with development cooperation and to raise any
possible case of negative effects [on development policy] as arising from
unintended incoherence of policies (Council 1997). The European Commission was very slow and circulated a non-paper only in May 1999, in which
it proposed a categorization of various types of coherence, but failed to
advance innovative proposals (Hoebink 2004, pp. 203204).
In the new Commission appointed in November 1999, the Development
Commissioner Poul Nielson, who had been very active as Danish Minister
for development policy, made coherence a central issue of his mandate. In
February 2000, DG Development issued a paper Towards improved coherence between the Community development policy and other Community
policies, in which it was far more critical than in the past, focusing particularly on the trade, agriculture and fisheries policies. It also proposed a
number of institutional mechanisms, to be set up within DG Development.
The document, however, was considered too critical and a watered-down
version was adopted by the College in April 2000 and then discussed in the
Council in May 2000 (Hoebink 2004). A symptomatic conclusion of this
period is the first statement on EC development policy, jointly adopted by
the Council and the Commission, which, like ten years earlier, simply
proposed to ensure that Community development policy objectives are
taken into account in the formulation and implementation of other policies
affecting the developing countries. In sum, despite its institutionalization
with the Treaty of Maastricht, the principle of coherence for development
failed to make headway in the EU during the 1990s. Throughout the decade,
the issues of the implications of trade, agriculture and fisheries policy for
developing countries were neglected, not only because the EU placed its
interests before those of developing countries, but also because of the
assumption that the needs of developing countries were taken care of
through development assistance.
A New Ambitious Agenda
With the beginning of the century, a new season opened in EU development
policy (Carbone 2008). This era was characterized by an extensive reform of
both the management which essentially means delivering aid better and
faster and the content of the policy which implies the elevation of
poverty reduction as the guiding principle of all the Community external
assistance programmes. This process culminated in the adoption of the European Consensus on Development (signed in December 2005 by the European
Commission, Parliament and Council) and the Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour (adopted by the Council in May 2007),
which commit the member states and the EU institutions to a common view
on the promotion of international development and a common implementation strategy. Meanwhile, in view of the Financing for Development conference held in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002 and thanks to the leadership

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of the European Commission, the EU adopted a number of commitments

aiming at boosting the volume of aid and enhancing its effectiveness (the socalled Barcelona commitments). More significantly, by acting as a unitary
actor, the EU had shaped the global agenda on development policy. The European Commission also managed to play a leading role in the post-Monterrey
period and used the monitoring reports not only to follow progress on the
Barcelona commitments but also to launch important initiatives (Carbone
2007). In view of the Millennium+5 Summit planned for September 2005, the
European Commission proposed a comprehensive package consisting of
three different proposals: a new ambitious target for EU aid; more aid to
Africa; a new initiative on policy coherence (European Commission 2005a). 7
The first communication ever on policy coherence for development started
from the idea that the committed additional volume of aid is important, but
in itself is not sufficient to enable developing countries to reach the Millennium Development Goals (p. 3). The European Commission therefore
discussed the impact of various non-aid policies, either directly or indirectly,
on the achievement of one or more MDGs. In particular, it argued that the
EUs policies on trade, agriculture, fisheries, transport and energy have a
direct impact on the ability of developing countries to generate domestic
economic growth, which is the basis for progress towards all the MDGs. The
EUs policies on migration, through the role of remittances; research, for its
role in improving access to health and education; and security, by creating a
conducive environment for business, play an indirect yet significant role in
the attainment of various MDGs. Finally, the EUs policies on the environment and climate change affect global progress towards environmental
sustainability (which is MDG-7). Against this background, the European
Commission identified eleven policy areas (trade; environment; security;
agriculture; fisheries; social dimension of globalization, employment and
decent work; migration; research and innovation; information society; transport; and energy) and, for each of these priority areas, established specific
coherence for development commitments. It also pointed out that existing
technical mechanisms to promote policy coherence, often limited to the
field of development cooperation, were insufficient and that the real challenge would be at the political level. Finally, it proposed to monitor
progress on PCD through the publication of a biannual report (European
Commission 2005b). The General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) of May 2005 confirmed the eleven priority areas identified by the
European Commission and added a twelfth one, climate change. It also
decided to examine the Councils procedures, mechanisms and instruments
in order to strengthen the effective integration of development concerns in
the decision making procedures on non-development policies and, at the
same time, invited member states and the European Commission to do the
same (Council 2005).
The crystallization of policy coherence for development into the new
European Consensus on Development (ECD) confirmed the ambitions of the
EU in this area. Jointly agreed by the European Commission, Council and
Parliament in December 2005, the ECD established a common vision on

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development policy, in which policy coherence for development found a

central space. In the absence of a new Treaty, which would update the legal
framework for development, the ECD established that PCD was no longer
only about supranational policies, but was also to be extended to all EU
policies.8 It also mentioned that the European Commission fand the member
states would prepare a rolling work programme as a new tool for following
up on the twelve priority areas, which would propose priorities for action,
define roles and responsibilities of Council, Member States and Commission and serve as a reference point for all levels of decision making
involved in the implementation of the PCD commitments (Council, Member
States and Commission) and to integrate PCD commitments into the examination and discussion of Commission proposals and EU standpoints in
international fora where relevant (Carbone 2007). The rolling work
programme, proposed by the European Commission, became a joint tool of
the Commission and the Council to identify common priority actions; this
was confirmed by the Council in April 2006, which invited each Presidency, at the beginning of the Presidency and with the help of the Council
Secretariat, to engage with the Commission to identify which priorities
need to be updated.9
The first biannual report on PCD was adopted by the European Commission in September 2007 (European Commission 2007a, 2007b). 10 Contrary
to general expectations, the European Commission produced a critical report.
In general, it acknowledged that awareness of PCD has increased not only
within EU institutions but also across the member states, but is still below
the ambitious agenda initiated two years earlier. The promotion of PCD
works better within the European Commission than in the Council, and this
is attributed to the presence of effective mechanisms (i.e. Impact Assessment
System; Inter-Service Group; CSPs).11 Within the Council, some progress has
been achieved thanks to the initiatives of individual Presidencies, but the
principle of PCD is not well institutionalized in the decision-making process.
The European Parliament has started to engage in this debate through reports
and resolutions. At the level of member states, despite some notable exceptions such as Sweden and Denmark, who adopt a whole-of-government
approach the picture is less optimistic, with progress being hampered by
the low political commitment of non-development ministries, insufficient
capacity and knowledge among officials, and the belief that achieving policy
coherence is simply too difficult and it is an either/or choice between development and domestic interests.
The findings of the European Commission need some further explanations.
In general, achieving policy coherence is easier within the European Commission where decisions are taken by the Commission as a whole, if necessary,
compromise at the level of the College of Commissioners than in the
Council. In the case of the latter there is more dispersion in light of the nine
ministerial formations and the sector logic at lower levels. The Presidency is
an important source of leadership, but its achievements in promoting coherence depend on the goodwill of individual member states. At the level of the
Council, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) should play

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a central role in ensuring coherence across policies. In reality, it makes final

decisions on a small number of issues (15 per cent), whereas the majority of
proposals (about 70 per cent) are agreed in the Working Groups, in which
the sectoral logic prevails. Only rarely do members of the Development
Working Group attend meetings of other Working Groups and, if they do so,
as in the case of the 133 Committee during the EPA negotiations, they play
a marginal role.12 The division of tasks between Coreper I (addressing the
internal market, industry and energy) and Coreper II (who address external
relations, economy and finances and justice and home affairs) does not help.
At the Ministerial level (where the remaining 15 per cent of proposals are
agreed), Ministers have more in common with their sectoral colleagues
than with their colleagues in the national cabinets. The GAERC, which is in
charge of coordinating the work of the various Council formations, is theoretically supposed to ensure coherence. However, over the last decade it has
lost a substantial part of its coordinating powers due to the increased amount
of time it spends on the EUs external relations (Egenhofer 2006). At the level
of member states, the debate on PCD started in the mid-1990s, though
progress has been slow, with some differences. A first group of countries
(Cyprus, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia) does not make reference
to PCD in their official policy documents. A second group (Belgium, Estonia,
Greece, Italy, Poland and Slovak Republic) have adopted policy statements
but have not translated this commitment into institutional and administrative
mechanisms to promote PCD. A third larger group (Austria, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain and the UK) has operationalized and put into
practice mechanisms to promote PCD (ECDPM et al. 2007).
Overview of the Volume
The biannual report of the Commission discusses in detail the progress made
within the EU in improving the integration of the twelve PCD commitments,
showing that even policies generally perceived as having only an internal
dimension also have a strong external component that can directly or indirectly affect the development process. In general, progress has been slower
than anticipated since the promotion of European interests and the identification of partner countries own concerns must be balanced, with a view to
finding winwin solutions (European Commission 2007a, p. 10). The
potential synergies between development and various EU policies are
discussed in detail in the papers that follow this introduction. However, some
points can be made on policies that for reasons of space are not covered in
this volume. For instance, climate change will hit developing countries hardest and earliest; in this sense, the EU climate policy aimed as a long-term goal
to limit climate change to an average of 2C as compared to pre-industrial
levels, will directly and indirectly significantly benefit developing countries.
The provision of an effective and efficient infrastructure system, which is a
key element underpinning competitiveness and economic development, is a
central element of all EU development programmes, as shown by a number

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of recent initiatives (e.g. EU Energy Initiative for Poverty Eradication and

Sustainable Development, EUEI; the EUAfrica Infrastructure Partnership
and the EUAfrica Energy Partnership). Other polices have great potential for
development but they have failed to produce significant results. In particular,
EU research and ICT policies should contribute further to creating contextspecific knowledge and building capacity in developing countries, with the
aim of bridging the knowledge and digital gap between the North and the
South (European Commission 2007a, 2007b).
The remainder of the volume covers the links between development and
six policy areas trade, agriculture, fisheries, security, migration, and social
policies. These chapters are preceded by Hollands paper on the wider
context of international development and the role that the EU has played in
shaping it. Holland shows that while in the 1990s there was a loss of interest
in development (exemplified by the declining volume of aid and doubts about
the real impact of aid), at the beginning of the 2000s the international
community began to construct a new agenda to address global inequalities.
The EU has been a core partner sometimes with a leading role of a
larger movement that includes the UN, the World Bank and various international activists. This new aid agenda revolves around the MDGs, though
increasingly the initial optimism has become subdued by the realization that
most of the targets set for individual MDGs will not be reached. The EU has
contributed by boosting its volume of aid, including a special focus on Africa,
and by addressing the lack of coordination among its member states, which
too often leads to duplication of efforts. Despite these commitments, some
critics have pointed to the issue of real aid more than half of the aid
provided by developed countries is absorbed by over-pricing, inefficient
cooperation or used to fund programmes that are not strictly associated with
development. Moreover, the exclusion of technical cooperation and food aid
from the DAC Recommendation on untying aid shows that much still needs
to be done in the area of internal coherence.
Elgstrom and Pilegaard look at the coherence between trade and development, arguing that the evolution of the process of European integration has
produced a highly compartmentalized system, with autonomous sectors each
reflecting different logics, which makes policy coherence difficult to achieve.
This natural inclination towards incoherence is tempered by external obligations primarily the principles of trade liberalization and reciprocity sponsored by the WTO and by the fact that the European Commission is the
sole actor in charge of conducting international trade negotiations. This
struggle for coherence is explored in the context of the negotiations of the
EPAs between the EU and the ACP group. While previously the competence
for trade with the ACP fell within the competence of DG Development, with
the Prodi Commission it moved to DG Trade. This new organizational
arrangement, which resulted from a fight against perceived ineffectiveness in
the EUs external relations, implied not only that the EPA negotiations were
framed as trade negotiations but also that DG Trade was in charge of
conducting the negotiations on behalf of the EU. However, the existence
of different values among the member states not only the traditional

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divisions between free trade and development-leader Northern member states

and protectionist and development-laggard Southern member states and
inside the European Commission with tensions between DG Trade and DG
Development has contributed significantly to challenging policy coherence. The eventual conflict between the official EU stance and the heterodox
positions taken by some member states and by the European Parliament
showed how difficult it is for the EU to produce coherent policy outcomes.
Matthews explores one of the most controversial policies in the EU, the
CAP, asking whether the criticism that the CAP is incoherent with development policy is still valid. The conventional view is that EU-subsidized exports
compete unfairly with developing country production and that the presence
of high tariff barriers prevents developing countries from exporting their
agricultural products into the EU. Various reforms started in the early 1990s
have progressively reduced the distortions on world market that the CAP
generates; however, their impact on developing countries varies: while the
CAP hurts those countries that are net food exporters, the situation is less clear
for net food importers. Moreover, further reforms of the CAP may produce
not only winners but also losers among developing countries. For instance,
the elimination of export subsidies to rice and cotton, and the removal of
protection to meat, diary products, fruits and vegetables would generally
produce benefits for many developing countries. By contrast, the reform of
the sugar and banana sectors would be borne by relatively vulnerable lowincome economies. Finally, the CAP is not the only obstacle to agricultural
products coming from developing countries, which in fact must face everstringent sanitary and phyto sanitary (SPS) and environmental standards.
Bretherton and Vogler look at the implications of fisheries policy for
development policy, within the context of the EUs promotion of sustainable
development. In particular, in the 1980s and 1990s the EUs fisheries policy
constituted a serious threat to the marine environment due to overexploitation of fish and other marine resources and to the health, livelihood,
social cohesion and economic development of coastal communities in developing countries. The adoption of the Fisheries Partnership Agreements
(FPAs) in the early 2000s was meant to demonstrate the EUs commitment
to sustainable development and to address the increased calls for policy
coherence with development policy. In reality, not only have the negotiations of the various FPAs resulted in EU monologues (rather than the
announced dialogues), but they may have also contributed to delaying
further the economic and social development in developing countries. Structural problems in the fishing sector in most developing countries, combined
with problems of access for processed fish products into the EU market,
such as the restrictive rules of origin and other technical barriers, imply that
developing countries have no other choice than agreeing on the conditions
set by the EU. The case of fisheries policy, in sum, has revealed a number of
unresolved incoherencies at the horizontal (between the EUs fisheries and
development policies) and vertical levels (between the approach of the EU
and that of various member states), and has also shown a gap between the
EUs claims to promote sustainable development and the practice.

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Youngs examines the links between security and development, particularly

in light of the rise in international terrorism. Following the 9/11 events, the
general assumption, especially among European governments, was that the
roots of international instability lay in economic and political under-development; the consequent expectations were that security concerns could
unlock additional resources for development. Not all member states accepted
this kind of approach, pointing to the fact that such resources generally
targeted middle-income countries rather than the poorest developing countries. In reality, no mass diversion of aid resources has occurred, though
increases in resources have often reflected approaches that have little do to
with development. More generally, Youngs shows that the EU has not only
made modest progress in promoting synergies between security and development, but has also failed to clearly spell out a vision on the balance and
direction of causality between these two policies. In fact, while the European
Security Strategy expresses the view that security is a precondition for development, the European Consensus on Development refers to a two-way
linkage: development is necessary for security and security is necessary for
development. Evidence of progress in both directions of the development
security link shows that development-related decisions in the security fields
receive little input from development circles, while some progress has been
achieved in making development funding more security-aware one of the
examples being the African Peace Facility, set up with resources coming from
the European Development Fund (EDF).
Lavenex and Kunz explore the developmentmigration nexus in the external activities of the EU. While, for many years, migration was considered the
outcome of lacking or failed development, since the early 2000s the link
between migration and development has been promoted actively by international organizations in an attempt to maximize the gains for developing
countries. However, the broad variety of institutions involved in the debate
generated tensions over two competing ways of framing the issue: a rightbased frame (sponsored by the International Labour Organization, ILO, and
the International Organization for Migration, IOM), focusing on protecting
the rights of migrants and harnessing the potential development impact of
their return to the country of origin; a money-based frame (sponsored by the
World Bank), emphasizing the value of remittances as an important source
of development financing. These debates have influenced the EU, where,
following the incidents at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in the
autumn of 2005, various initiatives proposing a closer coordination between
migration and development policies proliferated. The proposed Global
Approach which implied facilitating the flows of remittances, engaging
with countries of origin, mitigating the negative effects of brain drain
proved too ambitious: the existing prevailing securitarian-frame, based on
the repression of unwanted immigration and on getting countries of origin
to sign re-admission agreements, has not been yet been substituted by the
development-based approach.
Orbie and Babarinde explore whether and how the EU has integrated
social policies into its relations with the developing world. While their direct

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impact on developing countries is negligible, the EU has promoted social

goals through its trade and development policies. Proposals for a social
clause in trade relations were discussed in the early 1990s, but by the 2000
it became clear that the integration of labour considerations into its relations
with developing countries was unsuccessful. The explanations that focusing
on the reluctance of developing countries to accept clauses that would hide
protectionist intentions of EU countries should be supplemented by explanations that focus more on the EU. Not only have member states often failed
to take a common stance but, more significantly, the commitment of the EU
itself has been ambiguous, with labour considerations being overshadowed
by other priorities. Similarly, the new ambitious initiative to promote decent
work is still at an explanatory stage. Conversely, the European Commission
has played a proactive role in stimulating the international promotion of the
corporate social responsibility, meant to encourage companies to integrate
social and environmental corners into their operations.
Conclusion
The issue of policy coherence for development emerged at the beginning of
the 1990s. The Development Assistance Committee played an important role
in attempting to drive this agenda forward without much success. Within the
EU, the debate started with the Treaty of Maastricht in the context of the socalled 3Cs (complementarity, coordination and coherence) but, for various
reasons, limited progress was made for the rest of the decade. The incoherence
of the EU in its approach to international development was questioned by the
NGO community which, in turn, carried out a number of public campaigns
mainly against the EUs common trade, agriculture and fishery policies. A
number of member states, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and
the UK, were also active on the coherence issue. This coherence gap
reflected negatively on the credibility of the EU in the international arena and
on its stated commitment to international development. The era of passivism ended with the beginning of the new century, when the European
Commission, taking advantage of a number of favourable conditions and
using an astute strategy, managed to set an ambitious agenda for the EU. First,
it rallied the principle of PCD around the MDGs, indicating how each PCD
commitment served the purpose of meeting one or more MDGs. Secondly, it
proposed PCD within a package deal, which included an additional volume
of aid and concentration of efforts in Africa. In this sense, the European
Commission showed that the MDGs would not be achieved if the international community and, more specifically, the member states and the EU, did
not take concrete initiatives on the issue of policy coherence for development.
Thirdly, it linked the issue of PCD to the new role of the EU as a single actor
in international development and to its ability to shape the global agenda.
The adoption of the PCD communication and the subsequent Council
conclusions marked a significant change in the EU, as confirmed by a leading
official in DG Development: Even though the concept of policy coherence for
development was enshrined in the Treaties a long time ago, the issue has never

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made it all the way up to the Commission Things have changed, however,
since the adoption of the MDG package; development is not always losing any
more.13 The central question is the implementation of the commitments. This
Special Issue tries to suggest that, although it is not an easy task, achieving
better policy coherence for development is no longer a mission impossible.
However, it is not simply a matter of designing mechanisms. It is also, if not
mainly, a matter of commitment at the highest political level. In the future, one
may anticipate a further politicization of this issue, which may also entail that
the call for better policy coherence for development will be intertwined further
with the role that the EU wants to play in international politics. The new global
agenda on quantity and quality of aid shows that, by acting as a unitary actor,
the EU is able to shape the pace of international development. The European
Consensus on Development and the Code of Conduct on Complementarity
and Division of Labour indicate that there is a change of course whereby the
member states are more committed to improving the effectiveness of EU aid,
the visibility of the EU in international development, including its ability to
shape the global agenda. Similarly, more member states have started to
acknowledge that their domestic policies must take due account of the interest
of developing countries. In sum, only by combining its significant efforts in
foreign aid with non-aid policies will the EU be able to make an indent in bridging the widening gap between the rich and the poor.
Notes
1. The various translations of the Treaty of Maastricht show that the English version speaks of consistency, whereas the French (but also the German, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese) speak of coherence.
Tietje (1997) preferred to use the term coherence rather than consistency because the two words
mean different things: Consistency in law is the absence of contradictions; coherence on the other
hand refers to positive connections. Moreover, coherence in law is a matter of degree, whereas
consistency is a static concept (Tietje 1997, p. 212). Similarly, Gauttier (2004, pp. 2526) saw the
two concepts not as interchangeable but as mutually reinforcing: horizontal coherence encompasses
both the absence of contradictions within the external activity in different areas of foreign policy
(consistency), and the establishment of a synergy between these aspects (coherence) The requirement
of consistency forms therefore the first degree of horizontal coherence.
2. In reality, calls for consistency had started already in the late 1960s and continued with the European
Political Cooperation (EPC), though the word consistency made its first appearance in EU texts in
the Paris Summit of December 1974. On this, see Duke (1999) and Nuttall (2005).
3. May et al. (2006), who discuss American politics, argued that greater coherence is linked to policy
domains for which there is greater concentration of committee involvement in holding hearings.
4. The CDI ranks industrialized countries on a number of issues, notably foreign aid; openness to developing country exports; policies that promote investment; migration policies; environmental policies;
security policies; support for creation and dissemination of new technologies. See www.cgdev.org
[Accessed 15 January 2008].
5. For a detailed analysis of the issues of competence in EU external relations, see Eeckhout (2004). For
a detailed analysis of the policy-making process, see inter alia Wallace et al. (2005).
6. However, it should be noted that the quest for coherence, which implied the involvement of developing countries in the EU development policy, was present in the Yaound Convention and the Lom
Convention (Picciotto 2005).
7. In March 2002, the EU set a collective target of 0.39 per cent of its combined Gross National Income
(GNI) to be reached by 2006 (and an individual target of at least 0.33 per cent) and in May 2005 a
collective target of 0.56 per cent to be reached by 2010 (and an individual target of at least 0.51 per
cent for EU-15 member states and 0.17 per cent for EU-10 member states).

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8. These views on policy coherence are also included in the Lisbon Treaty, which kept development as
an independent policy: Union development cooperation shall have as its primary objective the
reduction, and in the long term, the eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the
objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect
developing countries (Article III 316-I).
9. A proposal was also made to use the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) to detect and implement policy
coherence at the country level. The first generation of CSPs, however, show that policy coherence
has been dealt with inadequately. The sections in the CSPs are, in fact, rather short, superficial and
generally too optimistic (Hoebink 2005).
10. The Commission report was based on the answer to a questionnaire sent to the member states in
January 2007.
11. The Inter-Service Group on PCD, set up in 2006, comprises members of relevant DGs, the SecretariatGeneral and the Legal Service. The Impact Assessment System allows the evaluation of consequences
of major policy proposals and the assessment of alternative options. The Inter-service Consultation,
although not specifically set up to promote coherence, ensures that DG Development raises development issues when other DGs draft policy proposals.
12. See Heynes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006).
13. These words are those of Bernard Petit, deputy Director General of DG development, expressed in a
meeting of the European Parliament. See www.eucoherence.org [Accessed 15 January 2008].

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