Balochistan versus Pakistan

Author(s): Aasim Sajjad Akhtar

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 45/46 (Nov. 10 - 23, 2007), pp. 73-79
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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Balochistan versus Pakistan

AASIM SAJJADAKHTAR

Theconflict
betweenBalochistanand thefederal
ofPakistanhas been amongstthe most
government

between
conflict
the past threeyears,a low-intensity
in the south-western
ethno-nationalists
provinceofBalochistanandthecentrehas ragedinPakistan.Thisisnotthe
ofthemanycentre-province
contradictions
persistent
has eruptedbetweenthecentralgoverntimethatconflict
first
thathavepersistedinthecountry.
Thefour-year
mentand dissidentBalochnationalists
claiminga greatershare
inthedecision-making
a
stake
and
more
of
of
was
the
1970s
resources,
generally,
suppressedbyarmy
insurgency
tookplaceinthe
A
of
the
state.
structures
prolongedinsurgency
action.Withthefederalgovernment
attempting
a claimmade
been
has
while
there
in
the
1970s
always
province
to reassertitsauthority
bybuildingnew military
to Pakiaccede
forced
to
were
that
nationalists
actually
they
by
cantonments
and mega developmentprojectsacross
stanin 1948[Khan1975].
The Balochstruggleis notthe only,or eventhemostpromiinBalochistanhas resurfaced.
theprovince,
militancy
ethno-nationalist
nent
challenge to the post-colonialstate's
while
Thispaperarguesthatthepresentstand-off,
was
itself
ThePakistanmovement
nationalism.
of
project unitary
concernsof
stillbroadlyinformed
bythetraditional
ProvFrontier
West
the
North
Pakhtuns
of
the
notsupported
by
Balochnationalism,
mustbe considereda response
ince(nwfp)whowereorganisedintheformoftheKhudaiKhidPakhtun
Afterthe creationof the country,
to intensive
neoliberal
to thestate'scommitment
matgarmovement.
in
the
Pakhtun
idiom
the
remained
nationalism
majorpolitical
natureofthe
accumulation.
The purelyreactionary
theirpoliticaland ecoareas.Sindhistoo have been protesting
explainsitsfragmentation.
insurgency
and
atthehandsofmigrants
nomicmarginalisation,
particularly
allotteesofstateland,sincewell before1947.1Finally,and most
the easternwing of Pakistansecededin 1971to form
notably,
The
ofthestateitself.
only24yearsaftertheinception
Bangladesh
voiced
Pakistan
in
east
movement
nationalist
grievconsistently
ances relatedto the ethnicallyskewedpower-sharing
arrangementinwhichPunjabisand Urdu-speaking
'muhajirs'(refugees)
settledinthewesternwingdominated.
Amongthemanyeffects
ofpowerwerelanguageriotsfuelledby
ofthisskewedstructure
Bengaliangeroverthe factthatBangla- the nativetongueof
morethanhalfthePakistanipopulation- was notaccordedthe
ofeconomiccoloniastatusofnationallanguage;a relationship
the
lismbetweenthetwowingswhereby exportearningsfrom
juteproducedin theeasternwingwereused to fundtheindusin thewesternwing;
trialenterprises
based almostexclusively
in
of Bengalis the administrative
and dismal representation
ofthestate[Ahmed1973;Ali1970].
institutions
Bothbeforeand afterthe secessionof the easternwingis the onlyinstancein the historyof the
which,importantly,
has
ofthepopulation
modernnationstatein whichthemajority
a
central
has retained
resistance
seceded ethno-national
place
thefactthatthe
on thecountry's
politicallandscape,reflecting
Pakistanistateremainsheavilycentralisedand dominatedby
to suggestthat
certainethnicgroups.It wouldnotbe incorrect
inPakistani
faultline
remainsthesinglebiggest
ethnicdifference
[ politicseven60 yearsafterthecreationofthestate.2
AasimSajjadAkhtar
is a Pakistani
political
Thecurrent
(amajid@comsats.net.pk)
withthePeople'sRightsMovement
activist
associated
andteachesat conflict
inBalochistanisyetanotherepisodeina longcontinuum,
theLahore
ofManagement
Sciences.
University
. andmusttherefore
context.
initshistoric
be considered
Economic
& Political
weekly November17,2007

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73

SPECIAL
ARTICLE

force
Thispaperwill attemptto analysethe mostrecentmanife- WhenPartition
finallycame to pass, the predominant
- the up Muslimsalariat- acquired
stationof Baloch nationalismin the "longue dure",witha ofthePakistanmovement
in cahootswiththePunjabiMuslimsaland discontinuities
between thereinsofgovernment
focuson thecontinuities
particular
thepresentmovement
thatofthe 1970s.The existingliterature ariat,inspiteofthefactthattheup was notpartofthenewstate.
civil bureaucracy
thatthenatureofPakistanistateformation
and itsun- Crucially,the Muhajir/Punjabi-dominated
confirms
leversof state
the
over
control
almost
nationalities
after
the
secetowards
unchallenged
acquired
changing
posture
oppressed
ofthe Punjabilandednotables,and
ssionof the easternwing have ensuredthatethno-nationalist powerwiththe complicity
ofwhomhailed
thevastmajority
fabric theMuslimLeaguepoliticians,
resistance
is structurally
ingrainedintothesocio-political
had no constiand
therefore
areas
the
Pakistan
-national
from
outside
the
of
ethno
reofthecountry.
recent
However,
phase
was
sistancewouldappearto be a directresponseto theaggressive tuencywithinthenew state.This "politicsofcompromise"
democratic
that
these
a
on
consensus
based
of
current
neoliberal
the
any
groups
amongst
militarygovernpursuit
policiesby
to theeasternwing
wouldresultin powershifting
ofdirectcontrolof dispensation
ment- and in particularthe establishment
landbythecentre- as opposed to a pro-activeand organised on accountofthedemographic
enjoyedbytheBengalis,
majority
the
total
of
cent
is far who comprised
movement.
Thusit followsthatthe current"movement"
53 per
populationof Pakistan
morefragmented
in comparisonto thatofthe 1970s.Nonethe- [Jalal1994:154-58].
formofrulewas
Overtime,a military-bureaucratic
oligarchic
less, in conclusionwe postulatethat,regardlessoftheweakin
itslotwiththe
threw
as
a
in
the
consolidated
the
ethno-nationalist
nessesofthispresent
of
largelyPunjabiarmy
struggle
phase
to
of
notables
and
landed
to
the
mathe
nationalist
idiom
remains
Punjab keep the Benbureaucracy
compelling
province,
This
of
in
out
that
a
of
the
and
Baloch
oligarchicdispensationremained
power.
change
galis
jority
only comprehensive
existence
the first24 yearsofthe country's
intactthroughout
theunitarystatestructure
can ensurepeace in theprovince.
thewestof
classes
of
the
due tothecomplicit
propertied
support
Colonial Inheritanceand State Formation
all atthwarted
ernwing,and thisallianceofforcesrepeatedly
HamzaAlavi's(1987)well known,albeitsomewhatdated,argu- temptsto institutionalisea politicalprocessthroughwhich
Indiato the ethnicimbalancein state institutionsand the decisionin British
mentpositstheMuslimnationalistmovement
or
the
be a struggleofwhathe calls the "salariat"
auxiliary makingstructuremore generallycould be redressed[Alavi
class of salaried professionalstypicallyseekingemployment 1972; 1990]. It was thus that Bengali nationalismreached
withinthe institutions
of the state- ratherthana millenarian a feverishpitch,and, in the aftermathof a bloodymilitary
acrossthe sub- operationinitiatedin March 1971,and the belated entrance
Muslimcommunity
of a monolithic
movement
Alavi's contentionis that the ofIndia intothefray,the new stateof Bangladeshcame into
continent.More specifically,
primarysupportforthe All-IndiaMuslimLeague (aiml) that being followingthe Pakistan army'ssurrenderin Dhaka in
was December1971.
was tobecomethePakistanMuslimLeague afterpartition
idiom in
While it is indubitablethat the ethno-nationalist
Provinces
foundamongstthe educatedeliteoftheUnited
(up)
an
excluof
a
function
in
has
Pakistani
been
within
the
whichdid notbecomepartof Pakistan.Moreover,
largepart
politics
to
nave
combe
it
would
economic
and
overshadowed
Pakistanareas,theMuslimsalariatwas greatly
order,
sionarypolitical
with
the
associated
what
withonlythePunjabiMuslimsalariat pletelyignore
"perennialist"
analysts
byitsHinducounterpart,
wouldassertaretheculturalbasesofnationalaccessto schoolofthought
somewhatcomparablein educationand professional
cannotbe reduced
ism [Smith1998].Bythislogic,nationalism
theup Muslimsalariat.
that
as
a
movement
to
movement simply political
Alavigoes on to showthattheMuslimnationalist
group
emerges a corporate
theguiseofbeinga "naunder
resources
material
to
itself
claim
oftheup salariatto assert
evolvedas a movement
lays
essentially
thefearsandin- tion",butinsteadnationalidentityshouldbe seen as rootedin
andthatitreflected
vis-a-vis
theHindumajority,
and
shared symbolssuch as language,territory
securities
ofa minority
community
facingtheprospectofmajori- historically
deveeven
can
nationalism
Ethnic
of
culture.
more broaderaspects
tariandemocracy.3
cannotbe ignored,
WhileAlavi'sinsights
ofconsider- lop "as peoplemobilisetheirown social and culturalresources
recentscholarship
has also suggestedtheimportance
movement as a 'defence,a resistanceagainstthe depredations'of what
oftheMuslimnationalist
ingtheideationaldimension
theprecisenatureofthepower- has been formanythelargelyemptypromiseoftheliberalna[Talbot1996].Moregenerally,
inthenewstatecan onlybe understood
by tionalismtransportedto the thirdworld".In the case of the
sharingarrangement
inPunjab,as Baloch thereexistsa substantialsharedhistoryand cultural
theroleoflandednotables,particularly
considering
wellas theroleofmigrant
and indeed imaginingwhich underpinsnationalistsentiment.Accordcivilservants,
politicians,
whoaccededto thelogicofthepoliticaleconomy inglyBalochnationalismcannotbe reducedonlyto functional
thesubalterns
oftheBalochelitewiththestateas a meansofsecurofdefence[Jalal1990;Waseem2002].4As such,itwas onlyafter engagements
theBritish
announcedtheirintentions
ofleavingIndiaattheend ingpoliticaland economicresources[Titus1996].
ofthesecondworldwarthatinfluentials
in theMuslimmajority
- and mostcruciallytheMuslimlandlordsofPunjab Old Wine in New Bottle
provinces
- decidedto allythemselveswiththeaiml, at whichpointthe Remarkably,
a littleovera yearafterthePakistanPeople'sParty
AliBhuttocametopowerfollowing
latter
was abletonegotiate
ofZulfikar
withthedeparting
colonialauthority (ppp)government
onbehalfofIndia'sMuslims[Jalal1985].
the military's
ignominiousdefeat,the centrehad once again
74

November 17, 2007

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Economic& PoliticalWEEKLY

SPECIAL ARTICLE

becausetherewas at leastsomesupportprovided
launcheda military
ethno- andostensibly
operationagainstanotherdissenting
Between40,000 and 80,000 squaremilesof
forces.7
nationalgroup.The newpopulistgovernment
to
external
managed piece by
werewrackedby unrest,an estimated
in
Balochistan
a
to
conclude
new
from
the
territory
together
enoughsupport
parliament
wereinvolved,and at leastfivedirectclashes
to ethno- 20,000insurgents
constitution
whichmadeconsiderably
moreovertures
tookplaceweekly
forcesandtheinsurgents
The betweengovernment
nationalists
undertheguiseofincreasing
autonomy.
provincial
the
Meaiiwhile
in
constitution
nationalists
the
was begrudgingly
deployed80,000
government
op- [Ahmad1974].
acceptedby
the
which
over
Awami
most
the
National
2006:6].
[icg
four-year
insurgency
Party(nap),
position, importantly
troops
and
thefactthatimmediately
withtheJami'at-e-Ulama-IslamUltimately,
hadformed
coalition
adjacentcountries,
governments
as
well
Baloch
to
were
hostile
in
both
nwfp
and
the
Balochistan
nationalism,
Iran,
(jui)
[Leghari1979:190-93].
particularly
use offorcebythe stateto crushthemoveHowever,tensionbetweenthe two provincialgovernmentsas thetremendous
and thecentreincreasedsteadily,the formerattempting
to as- ment,ensuredthatit was suppressed[Harrison1981].Leaders
serttheirautonomy,
thelatterinsistent
on assertingauthority. fledabroador werejailed, whiletheyoungcadreofthemoveOctober
conflict
had
1972,
By
alreadyemergedin Balochistan, mentwas, and continuesto be subjectedto, harassmentand
it was afterthe Zia-ul-Haq
Almostparadoxically,
between
that
tribes
were
alignedon eithersideofthe intimidation.
ostensibly
that
Bhutto
that
had
led
the
ppp
divide.
manynap leadersincluding
1973
coup
toppled
centre-province ByFebruary
government
- bothmem- WaliKhanand themajorBalochsardarsweregrantedamnesty.
dismissed
boththeBalochistan
andnwfpgovernors
bersofthenap - as well as theBalochistanprovincialgovern- However,therewas to be no revivalof resistance.Instead,in
ofmartiallaw,
mentunderthepretextthattherewas a plotbeinghatchedto September
1979,two yearsafterthe imposition
local
won
the
candidates
thecentralgovernment[Shafqat1997:102].
overthrow
non-party bodyelecpro-establishment
It is believedthatBaloch guerrillasoutsideof the nap-jui tionsin the provinceconductedby the regime,reflecting
just
had
of the movement
the infrastructure
had alreadybeen preparingfor armed struggle how comprehensively
government
nationalist
been
the
thesuccessof Bengali
[Jalal1994:17s].8
destroyed
againstthecentrefollowing
in achievingseparationfromPakistan.Thisguerrilla
movement
factionwas led by SherMohammadMarri[Noman1988: 66].6 Mythof Development
in Balochistanhas resura gap of25 yearsthen,militancy
inthe After
Whilethenap-jui government
was notinitially
implicated
between
differences
are
considerable
there
to
faced.
Needless
at
foreBaloch
were
the
the
sardarswho
say
guerrillapreparations,
confrontation
The
that
of
the
and
movement
the
Khair
ofthenap intheprovince,
front
1970s.
present
namelyAtaullahMengal,
bandof
BakhshMarri,andtoa lesserextentGhausBuxBizenjo,respond- thistimeappearstobe betweena muchmoreamorphous
natuof
Balochistan's
the
fate
over
authorities
and
the
militants
theirsuped tothedismissaloftheirgovernment
byannouncing
in
the
cantonments
of
ral
the
thatnothinglessthanindependprovresources, building military
portfortheguerrillas,
insisting
enceforBalochistan
was acceptable.TheBhuttoregimehadthus ince,and so-called"megadevelopment"
projects,includingthe
to once and forall dismantlethe soonto be completedGwadarporton the south-western
tipof
squanderedthe opportunity
for
demand
the
broader
While
the
the
and
autonomy
provincial
military-bureaucratic
province.
oligarchicdispensation overhaul
betweenthecentreand ethno-nationalist
discourse,it is clear
dissidents; continuedto informthe ethno-nationalist
relationship
to
has emergedinresponse
Bhutto's
of groupsdemandinggreaterprovincial thatthepresentphaseofthestruggle
"deepmistrust
conto
establish
initiatives
the
current
a chancetoreassert
itspowervery
allowedthemilitary
greater
regime's
military
autonomy"
ofBalochistan.
trolovertheresourcesand territory
soonafter
ofDecember1971(ibid:67).
thehumiliation
This unique conjunctureis explainedby the government's
Thestruggle
ofthe1970swas onethatenjoyedbroad-based
supand is best
to intensiveneoliberalaccumulation,
and leftist
forces commitment
as wellas nationalist
portacrossBalochsociety,
David
offered
framework
the
the country.
Harvey
by
throughout
Broadlymotivatedby Marxist-Leninistunderstoodthrough
and activistsjoined the struggle (2003) in explaining,as he calls it,thecurrent
phaseofcapitaprinciples,
manyintellectuals
the listimperialism.9
from
whereaswithinBalochistan,
HarveysuggeststhatsincethemidSpecifically
Punjabandotherprovinces,
tookplace in theglobaleconomy
a
shift
sardarleadershipofthenap was joinedbytheurban 1970swhen structural
prominent
basisto a financial
andprofessional
one,there
class,orinAlavi'swords,theBaloch froma largelyproduction-centred
intelligentsia
akin
to what
accumulation
of
state-led
a
reassertion
salariat[Harrison
ofthe has been
1981].Amongthemoreactivecomponents
this
"accucalls
accumulation".
BalochsalariatwastheBalochStudents
Harvey
(bso),which Marxcalled "primitive
Organisation
a
it
as
and
defines
mulation
of a large numberof Balochyouth.
processthtough
by dispossession"
capturedthe imagination
Manybso members
spenttimeabroadinthethenussr studying whichglutsof financialcapitalneedingspatialoutletsacquire,
in which
andimbibing
radicalideas,and havesincebecomemajorplayers typically
throughthe mediumof the state,territory
inBalochpolitics.
fixes"
can
be
undertaken.
Theleaderofthebiggestnationalist
partyinthe "spatio-temporal
over40 per cent
vast land mass - comprising
Balochistan
afterthe2002 elections
forexamBalochistan's
provincial
assembly
ofnatuendowment
a
its
reasonable
is
former
and
bso chairperson,
ofPakistan'sterritory
AbdulHayeeBaloch.
ple,
a
well
as
as
The insurgency
ral
was able to withstandtremendous
levelsof
resourcesincludingland, gas, minerals,
highly
staterepression
of a strategic
coastline,meanthatitis a viabletargetforspatio-temlargelybecause of the activeinvolvement
widecross-section
ofBalochsociety,
duetothefactthatall major poralfixes.The factthatthe regimeplansto construct
military
in Sui,hometo Pakistan'slargestknownsupplyof
nationalist
forceswereunitedin and aroundthenap dissidents, cantonments
Economic
& Political
weekly November17,2007

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75

ARTICLE
SPECIAL

has remainedlargelymarginaltopublicdiscourse
Balochistan
naturalgas, Gwadar,a highlystrategiccoastal city,and Kohlu
themost
and economically
and is stillpolitically
in
recent
of
wherethereare reportedly
years,
energy
untapped
majordeposits
this"territorial
wouldseemto corroborate
reserves,
imperative". excludedof all provincesin Pakistan.The quitesuddenattenhas decidedto accordit has
blatantresource- tionthatthe presentgovernment
withtheincreasingly
Thisalso seemsconsistent
IndeedGeneral
of
in
the
couched
been
the
which
has
state
antics
of
the
dominant
"development".
language
actor,
military,
grabbing
of"security
the
that
claimed
has
Musharraf
with
and
inrecent
decadesbuiltupa hugecorporate
purpose
consistently
capture
empire,
oflandas one ofitsmajorcomponents
commercialisation
takingplacein theprovinceis to suppresstheresist[Siddiqa operations"
WarnsSloganforces('Musharraf
controlhas also facilitated ance of "anti-development"
ofterritorial
2007].10Theestablishment
the
central
In
has
subwhich
ofmultinational
theexpandinginterests
Dawn).
government
23,
particular,
May
mongers',
capital
on keepkeen
that
are
sardars"
"tribal
it
the
that
is
insisted
tenure
of
has
the
in
Pakistan
increased
its
during
presence
stantively
Chinesecompanieswere ingtheirsubjugatedpeople backwardand ignorant,whereas
thepresentregime.Mostimportantly,
to extricatethe Balochfromthe
is attempting
ofthe thegovernment
to undertake
construction
givenalmostexclusivecontracts
sardars.
of
these
million
vicious
investment
of
Gwadarport,thefirst
$
248
grip
totalling
phase
discourseflagsa coupleof crucialpoints.First,
Thisofficial
ofwhichtheChineseprovided$ 198million[gop 2005].
whiletribalsardarshave alwaysmaintaineda centralposition
Discourse on Gwadar
withinBaloch politics,theyneithermonopolisepoliticaldisbutforthe
The nationalistdiscoursesurroundingGwadar indicatesthe coursenormaintainsubstantialpoliticalinfluence
areas in whichtheirtribesare settled.
broaderfears of culturalextinctionthat remain embedded immediate
geographical
withinBalochpolitics.Alongsidethedemandthat"development Forexample,theMengal,Marriand Bugtitribes,arguablythe
visibleofall oftheBalochtribesareconcentrated
butnotlimitedtothepro- mostpolitically
benefit
theBaloch,including
projects"
smallgeographicalzone towardsthenorthhave also withina relatively
forBaloch youth,nationalists
visionof employment
in Balochistan
of
the
noneast
an
influx
of
to
that
is
Gwadar
province.Second,ethno-nationalism
likely precipitate
protested
- forjobs,and due tobroadermultiplier - whilecentredaroundthebroadpoliticalslogansofautonomy
Balochintotheprovince
- is heavilyinfluenced
- thatwill further
imbalancein and self-determination
skewthe demographic
effects
bytherealmateoftheBalochsalariat.In fact,as Ahmed(1998)arForat leasttwodecadestheBalochhaveclaimed- rialconcerns
theprovince.
in
ofall themajorethno-nationalmovements
theSindhishavebeen at itforevenlonger- thattheyarebeing guesconclusively,
in
successful
most
been
has
the
centre
reignin theirown provincedue to successive Pakistan's
turnedintoa minority
history,
because thePakhtunsalariathas
waves of in-migration.
primarily
Indeed,it is widelybelievedwithinthe inginthePakhtuns
ofthe
intothe institutions
induction
been
in
were
census
held
national
that
in
the
last
1998
co-optedthrough
province figures
and
the
the
the
to
avoid
the
bureaucracy.12
state,
including military
uproar
government
deliberatelyfudgedby
As such,therecenthistoryof Balochnationalism
emphasises
that would necessarilyhave ensued if the genuineextentof
has been
and
the
from
had
become
exclusion
in
Balochistan
thePakhtundemographic
arrangement,
power-sharing
majority
withthe
the
and
Baloch
sardars
the
both
salariat,
that
masestablished
It
has
been
represented by
recently
publicknowledge.11
of the Baloch
oftenconsideredthe symbolicfigurehead
less former
has takenplaceinGwadarthatis nothing
sivelandacquisition
or
hands(Dawn, people.Whileitwouldbe facileto downplaytheimportance
oflandfromBalochto non-Baloch
thana transfer
the
that
of
in
mind
to
bear
it
is
the
of
a
matereal
land
is
not
the
of
Thus
sardars,
important
centrality
7,2007).
only
capture
February
a
thestatehas alwayspatronised
dozensoftribesin Balochistan,
as weil.
cultural
encroachment
rialconcern
butisconsidered
thatcanbe tracedtotheso-calledSandea practice
ofBalo- largenumber,
to bear in mindthatthevastmajority
It is important
thatthe
thetribalsystem
undertheBritish
statejuris- mansystem
hasremainedlargelyoutsideformal
chistansterritory
whereby
thegrantwas consolidated
oftheKalatstateintoPakistanin colonialpowerencountered
through
dictionsincetheincorporation
and thenvestingin themsubto "chiefs"
PakistaniBalochistanwas ingofhereditary
rights
1948.UndertheBritish,
present-day
betweenordinary
mediate
to
stantial
British
Balochistan
two
distinct
into
people
authority effectively
entities,namely
splitup
revenue-collection
and
in
the
state
and
the
colowas administered
and theKalatstate.The former
administrative,
judicial
by
nial authority
to therestofBritish-administered
India, matters[Ahmad1992:97-101].At the presenttime,one of the
similarly
powerof the 'thana' and majordissidentBalochsardarsof the 1970s, AtaullahMengal
repletewiththe formalinstitutional
inMusharraf's
Kalat
a
In
was
lap" ('Interview
princelystateand, likethe claimsthat"72sardarsare sitting
'kutchery'. contrast,
morethan500 princely
statesacrossIndia,was accordedconsi- withSardarAtaullahMengal',TheFridayTimes,July7-13,2006).
mustbe considered
inBalochistan
movement
to conductitsaffairsas itsaw fitso longas it Thusthenationalist
derableautonomy
and
infact,itcanbe
of
a
whim
than
broader
much
and
affairs
sardars,
British
over
external
simply
provided
accepted
sovereignty
in spiteof
has survived
sentiment
Delhiwitha certainfixedrevenue[Ahmad1992: 113].Accord- arguedthatBalochnationalist
the
state
with
sardars
of
the
Kalat
the
former
in
of
the
areas
oligarchy.
state,
complicity many
comprising
ingly, many
thePakistanistate'swrithas been limited;this not onlyprovides insightintowhyinsurgentswere able to hold thestate Resurgence of Insurgents?
at bayforfourlongyearsin the 1970s,butalso lendsweightto The state'sattemptsto depictthe conflictin termsof a dichoterritorial
controloverBalo- tomybetweenitselfas pro-developmentand the sardarsas
thispaper'sclaimthatestablishing
are based primarilyon the well-publicised
an endinitself.
forthisgovernment,
chistanrepresents
anti-development
76

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weekly
& Political
Economic

ZZZZI SPECIALARTICLE

seriesofrelatively
consistent
attackson gas pipelines,installa- inrecentyears,butstillremainsa popularfrontfora largeproand
tracks
other
militas. portionof the educatedyouthin Balochistan'scitiesas well
tions,railway
targetsby unidentified
the
Theseattacksstartedas earlyas September
and
have
taken as in Karachi.The bso's affiliatedpoliticalorganisation,
2004
a
also
been
has
Movement
National
in
and
in
the
borthe
northern
of
Balochistan
Balochistan
(bnm)
parliaplacemostly
part
itselffromother
deringareasofPunjaband Sindh.Itwouldappearthatthebasic mentary
partyformanyyears,butdistinguishes
onmost
partiesbyadoptinga moreradicalposition
objectivehas beento disruptsuppliesofgas and otherresources parliamentary
attacks[bnm2004]. Whilethereis
themilitant
fromBalochistanto the northof the country.13
The attacksdo issues,including
notappear,however,to be guidedby a verycoherentmilitary no conclusiveevidencethatbso or bnmactivistshavebeen inAs mentioned
earlier,it appearsas ifthe attackshave volvedinperpetrating
sabotage,theyhavebeenmajortargetsof
strategy.
andheldfor
witha numberofactivists
been reactionsto the government's
decisionto buildnew mili- staterepression,
kidnapped
after
in
the
and
the
without
due
and
construction
of
months
intensive
2004.l6
September
period
process
tarycantonments,
ongoing
Gwadarport.The sparkforthecurrentunresthoweverwas the
All ofthesegroups- Balach Marri'smilitia,thevariousfac- have publicly
a
of
at
doctor
the
Sui
an
and
tions
ofthebso, and thenationalistformations
rape
lady
gas plantby armyofficer,
thesubsequentshieldingofthisofficer
fromcriminalprosecu- supported,to varyingdegrees,the militantactivitiesof the
tionbythegovernment
itwas follow- nebulousgroupsnamedthebla andtheblf. WhileBalachMarri
[icg 2006:8]. Importantly,
withthe
the
unrest
that
the
incident
the military and thebso/bnmare notengagedin anynegotiations
ing
triggered
by
rape
Jamhoori
the
two
in
the
moved
to
take
over
direct
control
over
the
biggerparliamentaryparties
actually
gas plant state,
undertheguiseof"protecting
which WatanParty(jwp) of the late Nawab AkbarBugti and the
thenationalinstallations",
wouldappeartocorroborate
ourhypothesis
thatthestateis keen BalochistanNationalParty(bnp) of AtaullahMengal- have
withthe stateforgreatto establishcontroloverat least partof Balochistan'sterritory adopted a dual policy of negotiating
their
whilst
in
underwhatever
itcan ('SecurityForcesto Remain Sui: er powersharing
bargainingpowerby
bolstering
pretext
Owais',January
30,2006,Dawn).
supporttomilitants.
providing
In any case, whilethe state'scontinuing
into
encroachment
territory
previouslycontrolledautonomouslyby the Baloch Makingofa Martyr
the
themselves
has continued,
thescope ofthenationalistresponse In spiteofthelackofunityamongstthevariousprotagonists,
ento
be
seemed
cause
of
the
Baloch
and
has notincreased,or at theveryleast,the nationalistsdo not visibility scope
likely
Akbar
Nawab
of
the
Bugti
following killing
appearto have becomeveryorganised.On the one hand this hanceddramatically
is a function
ofthefactthatBalochnationalismis now articu- by securityforcesin August2006. Bugtihad emergedas the
ofthe currentnationalistwave because theSui gas
latedbyat leastfourdifferent
partiesas opposedto theunified figurehead
took over in March 2005
forceofthenap inthe1970s.14
Ithas beenacknowledged
byall of plantthat the centralgovernment
that
which
action
theseparties,particularly
thenp whichclaimsto be representa- the one government
triggeredthe most
the
tiveofthenon-tribal
middleclasses,thatthereare considerable unrestand violence is effectively preserveof the Bugti
differences
betweenthefourparties.WhileAkhtar
Mengalofthe tribeof whichAkbarBugtiwas the chief.Indeed,the governBNPclaimsthat"ontheBalochistanissue,we are one",itis clear menttoo had engagedwithBugtias thede factorspokesperson
thatBalochnationalists
in the mainstream
politicalsphereare oftheBaloch.
was constituted
committee
a parliamentary
notnearlyas unitedas in the1970s[icg 2006:11].
Morespecifically,
in
conflict
the
current
battle
of
ofthefirst
This is reflected
in the factthatall of the majornationalist intheaftermath
major
Balochistan's
of
thenature
grievances.
partiesare unwillingto claim any director formallinkto the March2005toinvestigate
a high-profile
visitto Dera Bugtiby rulingparty
thatare actuallyengagingthestatein armedconflict.15Subsequently,
militants
about the militantsis sparse.Various leadersChaudhryShujaatand MushahidHusainwas organised
Meanwhile,information
nameshavebeen floatedforthe entityperceivedto be guiding in whichtheywerehostedby NawabAkbarBugti.Shujaatand
measureswould
the attacksagainstthe authorities,
includingthe Balochistan Husain proclaimedthat confidence-building
use ofviolencebytheauthorities
Liberation
Army(bla) and BalochistanLiberationFront(blf) be takenand thatanyfurther
ofBalochistan's
butneither
ofthese oranyotherorganisationhas a publicface wouldbe eschewed.A reportdetailingthehistory
to
thatcan confirm
demandsand the overallcontours alienationfromthe centreand the government's
willingness
grievances,
.17
visit
ofthemilitants'
that addressoutstanding
concernsfollowedthe
Itis clearhowever,
[gop2006]
politics[icg 2006:12-13].
It appearshoweverthatthisreportwas preparedonlyto temsupportforthe militantsis increasingbecause it appearsas if
Balocharewillingto supportanyentity
thatchallenges perthe angerrifeamongstBalochnationalistsand noneof its
ordinary
Thisrehavebeenimplemented.
whatis perceivedto be a colonial armyengaged in blatant fundamental
recommendations
to
ofthemilitary
flectstheunwillingness
highcommand temper
self-aggrandisement.
an approthecarrot,
Ofthemajornap leadersthatwereinvolvedinthe1970sinsur- thepolicyofwielding
thebigstickbydangling
and
gency,
onlyKhairBakhshMarrihas stayedoutofparliamentary achthattheauthorsofthereport,Shujaat Husain,ostensibly
intheconflict
thereleaseofthereport,
Meanwhilehis son Balach Marriis reputedto favour.
Indeed,following
politicsentirely.
hills
into
be oneofthemajororganisers
ofthemilitascurrent
activeinthe tensified,
leadingtotheNawabAkbarBugti'sfleeing the
killedin a military
operation.
province.
Progressive
politicalelementsare also involvedin the ofKohluwherehe was eventually
mostobviously
thebso,whichhas fragmentedTheresponseto Bugti'skillingwas acute,withbothBalochistan
movement,
present
Economie& Politicalweekly

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77

SPECIAL ARTICLE

-=

thereis also
shareofjobs. Furthermore
and the interior
of Sindhparalysedby protests.Subsequently garnereda significant
fearamongtheBalochthatthecurrent
therehasbeena markedincreaseinthenumberofyoungpeople an unmistakeable
phase
inBalochistanwillleadtofurther
drawnto the militantsthathave challengedthe government'sofexpandedstateintervention
has not
erosionofculturalautonomy.
toestablishitscontrolovertheprovince[icg 2006:9].
However,thisfrustration
attempts
movecoherentnationalist
a revivalofa politically
thattheuse offorceto killBugti precipitated
Itwas knownto themilitary
of
the
for
forces
with
other
that
allies
ment
this
the
across
wouldfurther
enfiarne
purposes
progressive
province,
yet
publicopinion
transformative
a numberof genuine
didnotdiscouragethehighcommand.Thisreflects
change.
First,themilitary
appears
important
aspectsaboutthestand-off.
to be convincedthatthe militantsdo notoffera potentthreat FutureProspects
natureof
and somewhatreactionary
to thestate's"development"
agenda and in factthatkillingthe In spiteofthefragmented
ofisa
handful
one
of
that
it
is
it
clear
is
nationalism
Baloch
weakto
movement
is
in
the
ethno-nationalist
time,
likely
majorfigure
the
resentment
for
rod
become
that
has
in
Pakistan
sues
shift
has
been
no
there
further.
en themovement
lightning
Second,
major
ofPakistanisforthe currentmilitary
regime.
inthestate'sattitude
towardstheBaloch,notwithstanding
major feltbya majority
aided in Thelatteris widelyviewedas a clientoftheus and committed
Andthird,the stateis undeniably
claimsto thiseffect.
and theresistitssuppression
oftheBalochresistanceby easy recourseto the to a ruthlessmodelof neoliberalaccumulation,
has gaineda greatdeal ofpopular
"anti-terrorist"
discoursethatallows statesto use forcewithout ance of Balochnationalists
to deal withso-called"terrorist"
althoughthishas yetto translateintoa challengetothe
threats,a chargethat support,
impunity
tercentre's
since
the
has beenlevelledagainsttheBalochmilitants
ongoingpolicyoftakingcontroloverBalochistan's
regularly
the
that
to
reasonable
It
would
seemingly
of
the
stand-off.
suggest
appear
ritory.
beginning
oftheBalochcould- ifitwere
The stateappearstobe rightin itsanalysisthatthenationalist narrowethno-nationalist
struggle
"movement"
is poorlyequippedto genuinelychallengeIslama- tobecomemorecoherentand linkedup to otherpeople'smoveto thecurrent
phaseof
bad. Withintwo monthsofBugti'skilling,thetenorofthepro- ments- becomea majorsiteofresistance
whichis heavilydependenton thestate'scoercive
Forthe mostpartthiswas a neoliberalism
testshad died downconsiderably.
a systematic powertosuppressresistance.
inparticular,
staterepression;
ofintensified
function
ofthedebateover
Saul (2005) arguesthatthere-emergence
was
activists
and
even
of
political
"disappearing"
policy arresting
of
the
era
in
nation
state
the
of
relevance
the
activists
who
bso
globalia
focus
on
with
imperialist
particular
clearlyimplemented,
radical
that
characterise
binaries"
"false
of
one
sation
of
the
to
be
are reputed
is,
many
among
majorsupporters underground
on
While
time.
at
the
discourses
and
academic
more
militant
present
political
important
groups[hrcp 2007]. However,perhaps
those
of
the
hand
Saul
the
one
that
the
current
above:
approach
is whathas alreadybeen asserted
critiques oversimplistic
phase
has been characterised
ofethno-nationalism
bythequiteerratic
natureofthemobilisations.
oftheparliamenhas also reducedthecredibility
Bugti'skilling
havebeen
formations
nationalist
taryoption,andthemainstream
CD-ROM2005
inthe
faith
are
toannouncethattheytoo quickly
losing
compelled
The digital version of Economic and Political Weeklyis now available for
has also exposedthe
Thepost-Bugti
situation
"political
process".18
2005 on a single disk.
The
how
to
cleardividesbetweenthemajorpartieson
proceed.
as a partywiththegovernment This electronic edition contains the complete content of all the issues
eliminated
jwp, hasbeenvirtually
published in 2005. The CD-ROM 2005 comes equipped with a powerful
theleadhis
and coercing sonswho inherited
variously
co-opting
search as well as utilitiesto make your browsing experience productive.
has been subject
MeanwhiletheBNP-Mengal
ershipoftheparty.
The contents are indexed and organised as in the printedition,with articles
Akhtar
minister
with
both
ex-chief
to intenserepression,
laid out in individual sections in each issue. Users can browse through the
Mengal
or use the sophisticated search facilityto locate articles and
sections
on
the
list
national
Rauf
andthemember
ofthe
Mengal
assembly
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of
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ofthehundreds
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& Political
Economic

~ SPECIAL ARTICLc

isa crucialrequirement
committed
to challengingthe neoliberalglobalisationproject [icg2006:14]. ThussecuringBalochistan
in
the
of
the
neoliberal
success
within
the
a
situated
for
transformative
region,andparticuproject
exclusively
strategy
through
thenationstatecontext,
on theotherhe doubtstheefficacy
ofa larlyso forthePakistanistatewhichhas allieditselfveryclosely
and multinational
inisolation.Saul, withwesterngovernments
thatemphasisesglobaltransformation
capital.Converstrategy
of
the
intentions
about
insecure
remain
nationalists
Baloch
ima
that
the
for
sely,
amongothers,argues
strategy acknowledges
Baloof
and
resources
the
to
use
that
seek
all
than
and
rather
the
national
of
territory
local,
attempting players
portance
global
an exclusivesiteforradicalresistanceto neoliberal- chistanfortheirownparochialpurposes.Thisis the"NewGreat
to identify
ism.A ethno-nationalist
high [Rashid
strugglewithina rentierpost-colonial Game" and the stakes involvedare extremely
is able to
Baloch
the
of
If
the
be
statesuchas Pakistanthatchallenges
thestateitself,
could one 2001].
struggle
long-standing
Balochistan
that
the
suchsiteofresistance.
position
recognise immenselyimportant
It is important
thisassertion.Atthe occupiesat thepresenttime,and allyitselfwithforcescommitto further
contextualise
to tednotonlyto therightsoftheBalochpeople,butalsothe"rolltimeBalochistan
is ofcrucialgeostrategic
significance
present
and the military-bureaucratic
numerousworld powers on account of its proximityto back"of neoliberalism
oligarchy,
and
an
overhaulof the ethnically-skewed
for
In
the
the
and
the
of
central
Asia.
fact,
potentialities
Afghanistan
Caspianregion
be
can
state
closestwarmwaterportto the Caspianregionwill be Gwadar centralised
exploited.
post-colonial
notes

Tawarorganisation
ofNawabKhairBakhshMarri
andtheNational
(NP)ofAbdulHayeeBaloch.
Party
do salutethestrugWhileall ofthepolitical
groups
forthem
andwarnthatsupport
gleofthemilitants
Balochwillincreaseifthestate
amongstordinary
a
distance
all
maintain
doesnotalteritsstance,
they
NawabAkbar
fromthesabotageattacks(interview,
Amanullah
Kanrani,
Bugti,March12,2005;Senator
July16,2005).
outoverthestatus
ithasbeena falling
Incidentally,
betweenthechiefjustice
of"disappeared
persons"
thecurhas
that
andthemilitary
precipitated
regime
rentpolitical
crisisinPakistan.
Indeed,on variousoccasionssincethe emergence
haveacknowfunctionaries
ofconflict,
government
attention
ledgedthattherehas notbeensufficient
to
the
federal
government Balochistan's
paid by
needsinthepastandthatthiswouldberectified
bythe
ofthecurrent
regime.
policies
pro-development
announced
hisagreement
hadalready
Bugtihimself
thatthetimefordialoguewaspast,
withthemilitants
war
now"
that
"it
is
in
2006
[Hussain
saying January
2006].

1
2

Grare,Frederic(2006): 'Pakistan- The Resurgence

of Baloch Nationalism'Carnegie Papers 65,
Carnegie Endowmentfor InternationalPeace,
NewYork.
Shadow- Baloch
Harrison,
Selig(1981):InAfghanistan's
EndowandSovietTemptation,
Nationalism
Carnegie
mentforInternational
Peace,NewYork.
UniOxford
David(2003):TheNewImperialism,
Harvey,
Press,NewYork.
versity
of Pakistan(2007):Annual
HumanRightsCommission

SeeAnsari(2005).
15
One couldarguethattheethnicimbalanceof the
to the dominance
stateis symbiotically
connected
oftheadministrative
thecivil
institutions,
namely,
andthemilitary.
bureaucracy
3 See alsoBrass(1974)whomakestheimportant
point
maintained
a
thattheMuslim
eliteintheUPactually
and
to
the
state 16
share
of
access
disproportionate jobs
inrelation
ofthepopulation,
toitsoverallpercentage
Reporton HumanRights2006, HRCP, Lahore.
butthatthissharewasbeingsteadily
eroded.
Hussain,Zahid(2006):'It'sWarNow- A MajorRebellion
4 In Gellner's
(1983)language,thestateadoptedthe
PoliciestoTest',January
Musharraf's
PutsPresident
to Urdu-speaking
familiar
migrants 17
"highculture"
US.
16,Newsweek,
of
ofthePunjabisalariatas thesymbol
andmembers
CrisisGroup(2006): Pakistan:TheWorsInternational
ofthe
nationalism
whilethe"lowcultures"
Pakistani
Asia ReportNo 119,
in Balochistan,
eningConflict
Thisensureda
weremarginalised.
indigenous
groups
Brussels.
betweenthestateanda critisymbiotic
relationship
JinnahTheSoleSpokesman,
Cambridge
(1985):
Jalal,
Ayesha
createda
andthereby
calmassofmigrant
subalterns
UK.
Press,Cambridge,
University
forthestate'scensureofethno- 18
natural
constituency
- (1990):Pakistan:ThePoliticalEconomy
ofDefence,
nationalist
resistance.
UK.
Press,Cambridge,
University
Cambridge
5 SeeTan(2005)whotracestherootsofmilitary
power
- (1994):'TheStateandPolitical
inPakistan'
Privilege
order
inpost-colonial
totheadministrative
Pakistan
Weiner
inAliBanuaziziandMyron
(eds),ThePolitics
incolonial
Punjab.
of Social Transformationin Afghanistan,Iran and
Front(BPLF)
theBalochPeople'sLiberation
6 Indeed,
New
Press,Syracuse,
Pakistan,SyracuseUniversity
the1970s REFERENCES
forceduring
whichwasthemainguerrilla
US.
York,
had alreadycomeintobeingwhileGeninsurgency
Journal Khan, Ahmad Yar (1975): InsideBaluchistan A Political
toa PoliceState',
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eralAyub
[Grare Ahmad,
Eqbal(1974):'Signposts
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chistan,Royal
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oftheStrugFeroz(1973):'TheStructural
in PakiLeghari,Iqbal (1979):'The SocialistMovement
were
tionseemstobe thatmajorsourcesofsupport
Hari
and
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in
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gle
stan- An Historical
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Survey',
andtheSovietUnion.
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in South
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ordinary
amongst
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(2005).
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The
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and
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in
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and
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Leys(eds),
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- (1990):Authoritarianism
inPakistan
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Saeed(1997):Civil-Military
ofState Shafqat,
andLegitimation
11 The officialfiguresin the 1998 census indicate
- FromZulfiqar
WestAliBhuttotoBenazirBhutto,
inSubatraK Mitra(ed),ThePostPowerinPakistan'
ofthepopulation
ethnicbreak-up
onlyin termsof
view
Colorado.
Press,
colonialStateinAsia: Dialectics
ofPliticsand Cul"mother
55
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inPost-ColonialBalochistan,
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