One such model was proposed by Anthony Downs (1957) and is adapted by William H.

Riker and Peter Ordeshook, in A Theory of the Calculus of Voting (Riker and Ordes
hook 1968)
R = pB - C + D
where
R = the reward gained from voting in a given election (R, then, is a proxy for t
he probability that the voter will turn out)
p = probability of vote mattering
B = utility benefit of voting--differential benefit of one candidate winning over
the other
C = costs of voting (time/effort spent)
D = citizen duty, goodwill feeling, psychological and civic benefit of voting (t
his term is not included in Downs's original model)
A political science model based on rational choice used to explain why citizens
do or do not vote.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------The Calculus of Voting paper tries to use game theory to explain why people vote
. The equation is P * B + D > C.
P =
B =
D =
you
C =

Probability that your action will affect the decision

Benefit to you of the changed outcome
Sense of civic duty the user gets from the outcome - the sense you get when
are part of something bigger than youself
cost of the civic action

In the 2012 election, the likelihood of your vote changing the election is 0. P
* B is 0. People vote because of D outweighed the cost of voting. At the local l
evel this changes a little. Say you want a dog park, you have to drive to a meet
ing, do some public speaking. The cost is high. But the P is high, too. Your arg
ument might have a real impact.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Assuming at this stage that each member of the group has the
same probability of going to cast a votel given the turnout rate
~, the expected cost of voting for a representative member of the
group becomes ~ (t) ck (t), where ck denotes the costs made by a
person in group k, who actually casts a vote. These costs only occur
in election periods. Assuming constant prices2 , the index of
which is normalized to equal 1, a representative individual in k
obtains the following (expected) real disposable income Wk(t):
Wk (t) = (l-rk (t~ (t) - ~ (t)ck (t)
where w kb denotes the gross income of a representative member of,
group k.
The results obtained thus far imply that an individual will
vote if and only if:
(net benefits of voting) - (costs of voting and pressure production)
+ (benefits accruing from the fulfillment of civic
duty) ~ O.
-------------------------------------------------------------------The functional form chosen for the interest functions is of the
Cobb-Douglas type (cf. van Winden, 1983):

pk (t) (5.11)
with: t: time index;
WI<: the real disposable income for a representative individual
in position k;
x~: the amount of state-supplied goods available to a
representative individual in k;
ek : fraction of the total labor force in k (numerical
strength) ;
~: preference weight.
-------------------------------------------------------------there are three important reasons why
voter behavior is of interest for economists: (1) voter behavior is
as economic a phenomenon as the behavior of consumers or producers;
(2) voter behavior potentially has large influence on government
behavior; (3) through the government, voter behavior can have a significant
impact on the economy