1350734, Daniel Leech, PHILM005_2014, Philosophy of Physics, Essay 1

The Real Possibilities of Morality in the Multiverse

Word Count: 6115

Introduction
This essay concerns how moral actions and considerations change between universe and
multiverse orientated perspectives. The factor which influences this change is the additional
knowledge which agents have within the multiverse, of world branches which are not their
own. Beginning with some preliminaries [1], I shall then consider the measurement problem
[2] and Everetts response to the problem [2.1]. I shall then consider how decision theory is
the current form that discussion of multiverse morality usually takes [3]. Contrary to what is
commonly argued I will show that decision theory is not unaffected between the universe and
the multiverse models, as decisions in the multiverse entail additional knowledge as a
consequence, which in the universe does not exist [3.1]. In the further sections I shall
elaborate on how this extra knowledge has an effect on an agents chosen actions, firstly
looking at the possible positive effects [4], and then at a case of what would usually be
considered an entirely immoral action [5], which becomes more acceptable and likely under
the many worlds interpretation (MWI). Objections to this argument will be considered, but
shown to not alleviate the problems which exist [5.1]. Finally there is a summary of the
argument [6] and a final note about how this may affect the acceptability of the MWI [7].

1. Preliminaries
I use the terms multiverse or many worlds theory interchangeably. These are to be
distinguished from my use of universe, by which I mean a single reality. Some authors
claim that we should think of there as being one universe with many worlds; I do not adopt
this usage of the term but retain the classical one, by which there is a single non-branching
reality. Although Everett is considered the founder of the many worlds theories, on the whole

I am not referring to his initial discussion (Everett, 1957) here but to more recent
elaborations, which concern themselves with multiverse morality.
It is central to this paper that metaphysical views affect ethical actions in some way. This
might seem a priori true, but it is worth elaborating. We act in the world according to the way
we think the world is. If the world is a hologram designed for our pleasure we should act
accordingly. If the world is a testing ground whereby we need to act perfectly to gain entry
into heaven, we should act accordingly. Wilson (2013) acknowledges this while discussing
action in the multiverse, and other authors have also acknowledged this intimate link between
metaphysics and morality (Ganssle, 2005; Gwozdz, 2010). My paper expressly addresses the
differences which can arise between acting in the universe and acting in the multiverse. Note
that we do not have to assume that the multiverse is actually real for such diversity in
morality to occur; all that is necessary is that an agent believes that it is real, which could be
the case in a single universe as well as a multiverse. Whether or not the multiverse theory is a
correct description of reality is one which is superfluous when analysing how believing such
a theory may lead us to act.
Another important assumption that has to be made in this paper is that agents have some kind
of ability to choose to act. This is a natural assumption of most, if not all, moral theorising; it
seems absurd to discuss morality unless agents have some choice over their actions. In the
context of MWI this usually entails some kind of capacity to choose which leads to a
branching specifically because of that choice. This seems assumed in discussion by such
authors as Greaves (2004, 2007), Wilson (2013), Wallace (2010), although whether or not a
standard notion of choice is actually compatible with the MWI is a questionable assumption,
but one I cannot address here. I am assuming a fairly classical and intuitive sense of choice,
whereby an agents considerations and volition can affect certain actions, which seems to be
the sense in which it is used in the literature, and so which seems valid to also adopt here.

2. The Measurement Problem

The measurement problem within quantum mechanics is probably the most difficult and
controversial conceptual puzzles of quantum physics. The problem is that the dynamical
equations which describe the evolution of the wavefunction do not equate to the reality which
is observed once a system is measured. Using a dynamic equation (such as the Schrodinger

equation), which we know adequately represents the evolving wavefunction, we are led to
believe that the states it describes are in a superposition. However, upon observation the
wavefunction collapses: the result is an observation of a particle which is not in
superposition. Therefore we have to represent an evolving quantum system as being affected
by our measurement; 1 if we leave it unmeasured, it evolves according to a dynamic equation,
but when we observe it the wavefunction is not in the state which the dynamic equation
describes.
We can represent collapse formulaically. Under the dynamical equations of motion two
mutually orthogonal components of the wavefunction, here distinguished as hard and soft,
are represented by the liner equation;

Where m represents the reading on the measuring device, and e represents an electrons
composition. This equation describes there being as a superposition of hard and soft states for
the electron simultaneously.
However, the formula which is correct once we take into account the measurement of the
system is different, and non-linear;

This is the formula that describes what we find when we try and actually observe the
wavefunction in an experiment. The wavefunction is no longer in a superposition, and is
acting with particle-like behaviour. This is a seemingly empirically incommensurable finding;
the wavefunction once collapsed is a different type of thing to the wavefunction left uncollapsed. Therefore what it is that measurement actually does to a system, and how it can
cause the collapse which we observe, is a fundamental problem for quantum mechanical
theories.2

1 What it actually means to be measuring a system is an unresolved question; there is presently no

consensus of an adequate definition of the term measurement as applied in quantum physics,
although it is generally accepted that some kind of interaction between systems is required.

2.1 Everetts Interpretation and Many Worlds Theories

In 1957 Hugh Everett III proposed a solution to the measurement problem which continues to
receive support, in various forms, to this day. He proclaimed that the electrons or other
dynamically evolving systems which we measure and consider to have collapsed, have in fact
not collapsed; they are still in a superposition of states, even if we do not observe them in this
way. Our observation of a collapsed state is merely a representation of a part of the
superposition, which appears to us to be singular but is actually occurring across the
waveform in all the possible states. Each observer state is a branch of the whole reality, which
is the waveform as a superposition, as described by the dynamical equations of motion.
Therefore the measurement problem is not a conceptual problem for the physics; the
waveform governed by the dynamic equation is the true and complete reality, but because we
only occupy separate parts of that waveform we do not observe it as a whole. Being only one
of the possible branches in the superposition of the waveform we can only observe our single
branch, and can infer, but not experience, the many separate parallel branches.
Although Everett himself did not elaborate to a great extent as to how this theory postulates
reality to exist, he observes in a footnote that all of the possible branches of reality are
equally actual. None of the branches have any kind of greater reality than the others, all of
them are co-existing at once within the waveform, with none of them interacting even while
they exist simultaneously. Everetts was the very first outlining of a multiverse or manyworlds theory, but it is one which has since been clarified and expanded upon. These differ in
certain respects, for example David Deutsch (1985) argues that there are not only multiple
worlds within the universal waveform set but also multiple universes, and Albert and Loewer
(1988) claim that we should consider there to be an infinite set of minds rather than an
infinite set of worlds. For the purposes of this essay these interpretations shall be set aside;
the interpretation which is being addressed is the decoherence interpretation which follows
that used by Greaves (2007) in a paper which specifically deals with engaging in moral
theorising, especially through decision theory, under MWI, which is also the focal point of
this paper.

2 For further discussion of the general measurement problem see Albert (1992 ch.4 &5) and Cushing
(21.3, 21.4, 21.5), see Bchtold (2008) for a detailed discussion of the various ways that this problem
has been formulated.

3. Decision Theory in the Many Worlds

A fair amount of deliberation has been given to how our actions are affected by believing in a
multiverse, mostly by referring to decision theory. Deutsch (1999), Wallace (2002/2003) and
Greaves (2007) have addressed the issue of multiverse morality in this way; decision theory
is used to investigate how we act in the face of an imminent quantum measurement, and
therefore a branching of realities.
Decision theory describes an agents actions in terms of comparative probabilities and
consequences of actions. An agent is inclined to act in a way which results in the best
consequences, maximising expected utility. This is particularly applicable to cases of
uncertain future probabilities, such as taking a bet. It is assumed that an agent weights the
comparative consequences of the outcomes in respect to their probability. In a coin flip,
because the probabilities are equal, if there is a nominally good outcome and an extremely
bad outcome, the agent shouldnt take the bet, as the overall consequence is bad, and vice
versa. In unequally weighted probabilities the agent should average out the possible
consequences; if betting on a six sided dice roll will result in a loss of a hundred pounds if the
dice lands on a 6, but a win of 50 pounds on the other five sides, we can depict the expected
utility of the bet in compact notation, taking the form;
EU(B)=( PW UW) + (P~W U~W)
Becoming,

EU(B)=

( 56 50)+( 16 100)

Leaving the value of

EU(B)= 41.7-16.7
EU (B)= 25

Therefore the agent should take the bet 3, as it has a positively valued outcome overall. If
betting on the dice roll resulted in an overall negative outcome and expected utility, the agent
shouldnt take the bet. It seems obvious that decision theory is an intuitive framework which
we do generally apply in everyday life; we act in the way which will bring the best
consequences.
The application of decision theory to actions in the multiverse as well as the universe seems
like a natural move from a certain perspective; the future possibilities in the universe and the
future possibilities in the multiverse may be equally weighted, and therefore equally effective
in guiding our decisions. From our perspective, there is no change in how we act, as we are in
the same positions of uncertainty, and therefore guided by the same principles. Greaves
caring measure for successors (Greaves, 2004, 2007) is one of the formulations which
consider that decision theory retains an equal moral compass within the multiverse and the
universe. Greaves translates the idea of possibility which is present in the universe into an
understanding of successor outcomes in the multiverse. On her view, if we commit to an
action with knowledge of outcomes in many worlds, we do so because we care about the
future successors; specifically, we believe that future successors are better off because of that
action. The idea of caring for the outcome for ourselves which exists within classic decision
theory is converted into a caring for our successors in the branching worlds. We act according
to the future selves which we care most about. Deutsch (1999) and Wallace (2005) align with
Greaves in claiming that there is no significant difference in the application of decision
theory between the universe and the multiverse; therefore a believer in the universe who
starts to believe in the multiverse does not have to change their decision making process.
3.1 The Different Consequences of Making a Decision in a Multiverse
There is a significant difference which authors have as yet failed to notice within the
literature on decision theory in MWI, which I will show has consequences for decision
making and acting. The difference revolves around the fact that in the multiverse, all of the
possible options definitely occur, while in the universe only one of the possible options will
occur. At some point in the universe, possibilities will have either a 1 or 0 certain reality;
however in the multiverse we know that the possibilities are all actual and definite. Having
3 Under normal circumstances- perhaps certain agents value the one hundred pounds more than for
the specific numerical monetary value (e.g. they need it to pay off Big Tony, who will break their
kneecaps if they dont have it) in which case the value of the money would have to be weighted
differently.

this additional knowledge itself becomes a consequence of our actions, affecting our appraisal
of the outcome and utility of our actions. Rather than altering whether we can apply decision
theory, this can change how we weight the consequences of our actions.
This difference between multiverse decision theory and universe decision theory can be
illustrated vividly. Suppose I have to decide whether to take a bet, where there is an equally
weighted fifty percent chance of eating a slug or a chocolate coin. I take the bet knowing I am
in the universe; I eat the slug, and am disappointed that I did not get the chocolate. If I eat the
chocolate, then I am glad I did not eat the slug. Suppose then that I take the bet knowing that
I am in the multiverse; I eat the slug, and whilst doing so know that there is alternate reality
where I am eating the chocolate. This may make me jealous of that me, or it may provide me
comfort. If, on the other hand, I get to eat the chocolate then I would feel lucky that I am that
version of me, but also sorry for the other version of me who I know is now eating the slug.
That there is a difference here is clear; in the multiverse I am inclined to believe in and
empathise with the alternate reality in a way that does not happen in the universe. In the
universe once either possibility has occurred, that is the only reality, and the only one that we
can consider as actual. The alternative option is then impossible and non-existent. In the
multiverse the other option is not impossible, just not perceivable to my current self: another
self (which is exactly the same as me in every other way) is living out that possibility,
whatever it may be. The knowledge of and empathy which we can feel between worlds
therefore changes our perception of the situation as it happens and after it happens; and this
therefore will affect whether we want it to happen or not. This difference can be displayed
more formally:
In the universe either;
(A) will happen and I know (B) wont happen,
or
(B) will happen and I know (A) wont happen.
In the multiverse either;
(A) will happen and I will know that (B) is also happening,
or

(B)

will

happen

and

will

know

that

(A)

is

also

happening.

Therefore the consequences of taking the bet in the universe are different from the
consequences of taking the bet in the multiverse; there is additional knowledge concerning
the reality we will create as a consequence, and knowledge concerning the reality we will
create can affect our motivations to act towards creating that reality. We may still apply
decision theory to our choices, but the outcomes of those choices are different between the
universe and the multiverse, so our decisions will also be affected.
This significant difference is not observed currently by authors such as Greaves, Wallace and
Deutsch because they have not allowed that this additional knowledge is something which
itself affects our reasoning; they assume we reason towards the actual state we will be in i.e.
the single reality we will experience occupying; and neglect to observe that within that single
reality we have the extra knowledge of the parallel realities actual existence. This additional
knowledge is a crucially important factor to our understanding of the consequences of our
actions. We have to factor in this knowledge to expected utility; while a universe decision
theorist who is deciding whether to play Russian roulette will be able to relax once the trigger
has been pulled on an empty chamber, the multiverse decision theorist will have to spend the
rest of their life knowing that they have actually allowed themselves to die, albeit not in the
world being experienced personally. There is a clearly perceived difference in outcome
between these two theorists, directly because of this additional knowledge we have
concerning reality if we believe in the MWI. From here this paper will be spent illuminating
how this difference may affect our considerations of the consequences of actions, and change
our decision making process accordingly.

4. Positive Multiverse Morality

It is worthwhile to discuss the possible effects there can be on the moral agent who believes
they inhabit a multiverse rather than a universe. It shall be seen that these may be positive, as
explored now, or negative, as explored more fully in the next section. Crucially, there is a
4 This additional knowledge is distinct from the imagining which might happen in its place in the
universe, in the same way that imagining a friend falling down the stairs is different when it actually
has happened from when it could have happened; we know we are thinking of real events in one case
and non-real events in another.

definite difference in outlook and moral action between believing in a universe and a
multiverse.
Positive effects which believing in a multiverse may inspire are related to empathising with
not only our own world, but also the branching worlds which we create. If we truly believe
that in taking a chance, the worst outcome will certainly happen in reality, although perhaps
not within our world, then we might (and perhaps should) be more inclined to avoid taking
that chance. In taking that chance we make it a certain reality that that bad outcome will
occur. If the negative consequence is to occur to ourselves we may feel particular empathy
and therefore aversion from taking that chance, but the bad outcome need not affect ourselves
in our successors, but also others, for us to consider it an unacceptable course of events,
therefore abstaining from acting.
There is evidence that this mentality is one which a many worlds theorist will adopt. On a
respectable internet forum concerned with human rationality, in a discussion of many worlds
theory, user HalFinney (2008) posted this insight into how multiverse theories affects his
actions, which provides a first hand and seemingly appropriate viewpoint of how MWI
believers may act, specifically because of the extra knowledge which the many worlds
interpretations entails :
One place I tend to think differently in the context of multiverse theories is
behaviour that puts other people at risk. Occasionally I am in a hurry and drive too
fast through a residential neighbourhood. Then afterwards, I think its lucky that no
young children came running out into the street at the time, I might not have seen
them and been able to stop in time. But in the context of the MWI, it did happen in
some worlds. My reckless action did not merely have a probability of causing harm, it
did cause genuine harm. I directly reduced the measure of living beings. Its true, I
didnt see the results of my actions; it is a bit like tossing a hand grenade over a wall. I
dont see what happens, but I know bad things did happen out of my sight.
Thinking like this has perhaps moderated some of my more reckless tendencies.
This account highlights the key difference which affects our actions in the multiverse;
possible chances are not just possible, they are always actually realised. In the case above,
this leads to being more cautious about potentially negative actions, but it should be noted
that this is not the only situation where adaptations in our behaviour are justifiable by

considering effects in the multiverse rather than the universe; and those adaptations may lead
towards immoral actions as well as moral ones.

5. Jack and his Nan

In this section I present a possible case of immoral action that becomes more acceptable, and
indeed feasible, if we believe in a multiverse; yet which seems obviously unacceptable and
impossible if we believe in a universe. The case is as follows:
Jack is a young man, who has a good yet not impeccable moral conscience. The only family
he has remaining is his nan, who is in her late seventies, but still has her health. She is a
wealthy lady, and is leaving everything to Jack once she passes away. Now, Jack isnt in
financial trouble particularly, but could do with a bit of extra capital to put towards a
mortgage. Conveniently, Jack has recently been interested in quantum physics and has
become convinced of the many worlds interpretation; he absolutely believes that it is true.
One day, Jack realises something; if he set up a Stern-Gerlach experiment, by which on spinup he poisons his nan, and on spin-down he leaves her alone, then Jack can have the best of
both worlds! He can both let his nan live, in an alternative world, and hopefully receive his
inheritance early, in this world. If the experiment is spin-down for Jack as he perceives it, he
can test again every week until it is spin-up for him. Each experiment will lead to an extra
world with Jack having his early inheritance, and there will always be a world where his nan
is left alive. If Jack starts feeling bad that the experiment was spin-up and questions his
imminent action, he can start performing the experiment again, and create another world
where nan gets to live, and other worlds where he gets his early inheritance. This comforts
Jack up until the point he poisons his nan, and knowing that there are worlds where she is
living out her natural life helps Jack to rationalise away the occasional guilt he feels after she
is dead.

Figure 1: The Killing and

Not Killing of Jacks Nan

This is an alarming case which serves to highlight part of the difference in maintaining moral
activity within the multiverse. Jack can know that his nan is alive, and also that he receives
his inheritance early. It is a win-win situation for him; he is literally getting the best of both
worlds. What is ultimately providing Jack with the solace which he would not receive in the
universe is the fact that his nan doesnt have a zero-existence. He is not responsible for
eliminating his nan from reality in the multiverse, even if he is responsible for creating
worlds where he receives his early inheritance which involved the act of killing his nan. To
Jack, though, thinking about killing his nan is to be ignoring the facts; as well as killing his
nan, he is also not killing his nan; she is actually still living out a full life, albeit not in the
world which Jack wants to experience.
We can apply this sort of example to many sorts of immoral actions which may serve a selfish
purpose at the cost of immoral actions. A thief may decide using a Stern-Gerlach device
whether or not he will earn an honest months wage or resort to pick pocketing. A sex offender
might decide whether to go on the prowl or stay at home by the same measure. Each person,
in putting their fate in the hands of the Stern-Gerlach device, is alleviating guilt from
themselves for their actions; while they are acting immorally, they are also acting morally in
an alternate world. This allows believers in the multiverse to self-justify their immoral
actions, choosing actions they desire but dont want to lead to the purely bad consequences

which will make them feel guilty. So long as they act within a branching world structure, an
agent can know that there is a world where the right thing is happening.
5.1 Defending Multiverse Morality
There are possible defences that the MWI supporter may want to present in response to this
case. These come under two categories; firstly, showing that current moral guidelines prevent
the immoral cases presented in both the universe and the multiverse, or secondly, claiming
that morality can be changed in certain ways which will lead to correct action in the
multiverse.
5.1.1 Current Morals Suffice
A multiverse supporter might make a defence as follows; Jack is essentially wilfully entering
an immoral situation. He knows that it is immoral; it obviously goes against the moral axiom
do not murder which is pretty much universally accepted. Therefore we can see that Jacks
actions are condemned in the universe and the multiverse. In fact, in taking the bet Jack
creates far more worlds where his nan is murdered than the ones in which she is saved; as
Jack has decided to keep on betting every week as long as his nan is alive. Therefore every
week Jack will both kill his nan, and let her live. Once she does actually die of natural causes,
Jack will have committed as many murders as there have been weeks since he started testing.
This could be in the hundreds. This, if anything, should be considered more wrong in the
multiverse than in the universe, as Jack has caused multiple branches of reality where he is a
murderer.
This response to the case of Jack is certainly convincing in some respects, as it highlights
what is wrong about Jacks actions; over the total world branches he will become a murderer,
multiple times. The consideration that needs to be raised, which is the consideration that
prompted Jack to start making the bet, is whether or not murder is murder if the victim is left
alive. This seems problematic; at the least we are inclined to say it is a murder of a different
quality. Of course, the chances are that the victim will not be left alive (in the world of Jack
before taking the bet), but ultimately there will be some branch of reality where Jacks nan
lives out her full natural life. Notably, in respect to Jacks situation, she has as many fully
lived lives as she would have had he played it or not; one. If he feels guilty after a spin-up
result and retries the experiment, then an additional world branch is created which would
never have existed without Jack playing the game; Jack actually increases the amount of

world branches where his nan lives out a full life. Not only that, but Jack will only have
experienced committing the murder once himself; and he will get to know that there is at least
one reality where his nan is still alive, which helps him alleviate the guilt for that one act of
killing. If we consider that murder is bad because it involves ending the life of another
person, then we have to admit that Jack committing murder in the multiverse is not as bad as
it would be in the universe.
The MWI defender may make another remark in response to this, claiming that moral laws as
they stand are suitable for dealing with one world, and so we may maintain acting in the same
way in the universe as the multiverse. In other words, Jack is still murdering his nan in the
world he lives in, so he is still equally morally culpable, whether or not there are branches of
reality where his nan is alive. There are, however, problems with dealing with the issue in this
way. Firstly, it seems to be an argument ignoring the fact that consequences in the multiverse
are different to consequences in the universe. If we truly believe that there is a multiple
branching structure to reality, to consider this as superfluous to our judgements seems to be
ignorant of the facts. A millionaire donating a thousand pounds to charity on the decision of a
Stern-Gerlach device is acting in a more altruistic way in the multiverse than in the universe,
as he is certain of his donation. Secondly, as much as we may be able to try and convince the
population that they should act as if they are living in a single world rather than a branching
one, knowledge of the multiverse in itself provides a psychological mechanism whereby
people may feel less (or more) obliged to act morally. Jack wouldnt have killed his nan if he
hadnt been comforted by the fact that she was still living her full life, albeit not in his reality.
Perhaps the best way to act morally is to act as if there is only a single, non-branching
universe; however knowing that this isnt the case is in itself problematic, by allowing agents
the possibility of creating their own immoral/moral branches, whether or not it is also taught
that we should forget about the metaphysical truth while choosing how to act: our knowledge
of and ability to empathise with people in other world branches as well as our own would
remain.

5.1.2 Adapting Morality for the Multiverse

One of the ways to deal with the Jacks nan examples would be to create a new moral law
whereby contrived situations which led to immoral branches of the world were themselves
made to be immoral, or outlawed. The usage of quantum experiments akin to Jacks might be

banned, and restricted for purely scientific purposes. However, this approach meets problems
when we consider exactly where and when world branches occur; human quantum
experiments are only one of those situations, and are the most unusual. We can identify two
other processes which lead to world branching; natural quantum measurements, and classical
chaotic processes (Wallace; 2001, 2011). These two processes are ubiquitous, which creates a
difficulty if we are to attempt to make it immoral to manipulate these world branches.
Especially problematic for this is the possibility that human choice is itself a quantum
process, which leads to world branching. This seems likely considering that neurons have
been shown to have a wide range of possible eigenstates (Hameroff, 2014). If this is the case,
then every time we choose between actions, there are different world branches for different
choices. Jack would not even need to rely on the Stern-Gerlach experiment to create the
moral and immoral world branches; every time he considers his options then he is effectively
performing one of the experiments.
The other proposal which might be forwarded by an MWI supporter would be to create a
system of absolute morality, whereby we are responsible for all world branches equally, and
therefore should endeavour to maintain our moral codes such as do not murder across all of
them as far as is possible. Any action which will lead to a branching where one of the
branches is immoral is therefore immoral. This may seem like an appropriate response, but
has feasibility issues. Our control over world branching is limited. If thinking about doing
something immoral leads to world branching where that immoral activity occurs, it seems
that we must consider it immoral in the worlds where it did not occur as well. Apart from it
seeming strange to reprimand someone for something which they considered doing, but
havent actually done (in our world) there is a huge problem in knowing exactly what is
happening in the other world branches; we can only assume immoral activity actually
resulted. There are other difficulties in knowing how to act in a world where we are
responsible for all possible branches, as it seems to imply that we should spend a great deal of
effort in creating alternate realities in beneficial ways, which seems both impractical and
unreasonable (Wallace 2006). This approach might also lead to an over-cautious morality;
any slightly risky activity would be reprehensible. A pensioner wanting to run a marathon for
charity would be chastised by his family for leading to world branches where he dies.
Allowing oneself to be distracted while driving would be considered as inevitably causing an
accident. Although these possibilities are obviously undesirable, within the universe we are

able to accept that they will almost certainly end up as having a non-existence, which
sensibly alleviates the need to absolutely condemn them.

6. Considering Morals in the Multiverse

The primary difference which affects our change in morals between the universe and the
multiverse is the fact that the consequences of our actions in terms of how the world is
affected have changed, even if the possible consequences for ourselves as individuals have
not. Applying decision theory to our activity might be a valid guide to action in both versions
of existence, but we will weight our options differently between them; as in the multiverse we
have additional knowledge concerning the reality we create. The consequence of acting
immorally in a multiverse does not have to lead purely to an existence in which we are
immoral agents; it can lead to existences where we have acted both morally and immorally.
Therefore immoral actions can become more attractive to an agent who, like Jack, has
motives to act in a certain way, but doesnt like the negative consequences of their actions. In
the multiverse, the negative consequences are not inevitably total, unlike in the universe.
Writers who claim that decision theory is unaffected between the universe and the multiverse
do not note this key factor of multiverse action; that no matter which outcome occurs to
ourselves, we are aware that the alternative outcomes also occurred, and this in itself
changes the consequences of our actions. MWI decision theory is usually taken to be applied
by a person who considers that they will only have one reality, and end up in one branch
themselves. What is crucial and overlooked by authors such as Greaves, Deutsch and Wallace
is that even if that person does only experience one world, and knows that they will only
experience it as a single outcome, they will then know that the other outcomes occurred as
well. Moral considerations are not naturally confined to what we perceive directly, but also to
what we know has happened outside of our direct perception. Because of this we act
differently in the multiverse, because we know there are different consequences of our
actions than there would be within the universe.
It should be noted that moral actions are almost entirely dependent upon the agents selfcontrol. Systems of punishment are not perfect, and ultimately a person chooses what to do
by their own volition. Some of the most powerful motivations which agents experience are
emotions, especially, in the case of immoral actions, empathy and guilt. Psychopaths are
more likely to commit crimes, especially heinous crimes, precisely because they lack these

feelings. Living in the multiverse changes the applicability of these feelings, as we can
empathise with not only people and activity in our own world, but also in other worlds. This
seems to be an inevitable consequence of believing in a multiverse; and even if our ethical
axioms are specifically stated to exclude all other world branches except for our own, they
are unlikely to affect our natural ability to empathise with those realities, even if we know we
shouldnt. In the multiverse we can murder and not murder, steal and not steal. The
knowledge that we have done something bad loses its emotional power, as we can also have
the knowledge that we didnt do that thing. When Jack goes round to his nans house the
morning after he slipped poison in her bed-time hot chocolate and finds her dead, he can look
at her dead body and be comforted by the fact that there is another branch of reality where
she is alive and well. Clearly his considerations of the consequences of his actions are
different within this multiverse oriented perspective than they would be had he never chosen
to accept the many worlds interpretation as a proven truth.

7. A Concluding Remark
Although we should fit our moral theories to our empirical evidence, in the case of the MWI
we are presented with a theory which is not empirically certain; there are competing theories
which explain the measurement problem, in GRW and Bohmian mechanics. If we have to
choose between three competing theories, and one of them leads to substantial and negative
consequences for morality, as I have shown MWI does, we seem to have good reason to
refrain from accepting the MWI, as long as no more empirical evidence is discovered which
supports it. This is a consideration I cannot fully contemplate here, but an analogy may serve
to illustrate the situation: if three pieces fit the same space in a jigsaw puzzle, but one burns
your hands when picked up, believing that piece is the most appropriate one to use seems
both theoretically and pragmatically preposterous.

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