It is not the great power status but practical needs that decide Chinas behavior

in the international scene. To what extent do you agree with this view of Chinas
foreign relations since 1978?
Great Power status can be closely associated with the Chinese Middle Kingdom
mentality. The mentality stems from the Chinese cultural pride 5000 years ago
that it was the most civilized nation and by extension the suzerain-nation of the
other countries as tributary states. In the context of 1978 onwards, it refers to
China trying to regain her former glory as a global power and take her rightful
place as such in the international community. Her foreign policies and relations
since 1978 charged by proponents of the conventional view, reflect her
tendencies to recover her lost pride and hence make China as the world power.
The unconventional views supporters think otherwise.
Chinas relations since modernization in 1978 seek to recover her pride and lost
status befitting of a glorious and powerful nation 5000years ago. Traditionally,
the Chinese take the 100-plus years beginning in the mid-19 th century as a
period of national humiliation. It was a time when the once powerful middle
kingdom was invaded and bullied and transformed into a semi-colonial nation by
Western powers and Japan. It was also the time when China realized, for the first
time in its 5000-year history, that it was no longer a glorious nation. Hence, her
foreign relations since 1978 have been aggressive. However, Beijings pattern of
action suggests that its stated prioritiesto create a favourable international
environment to facilitate Chinas international economic development and to
preserve Chinas independence, sovereignty and territorial integrityindeed
reflect the primary motivations behind Chinas current and national practical
needs. Chinas desire to develop its comprehensive national power, whether
economic, military, or otherwise, is connected to ensure that its interests and
freedom of action are protected in international affairs. Its priority attention to
domestic development has resulted in a posture that seeks to set aside areas of
disagreement in relations with other nations, promote economic ties, and
reassure others about the peaceful nature of Chinas rise. That is why Beijing has
placed increasing emphasis on relations with its immediate periphery like East
Asia and Southeast Asia.
China has displayed its thirst for great power status through the display of
military might over the row with Taiwan at the Taiwan Strait. During the then
President Jiang Zhemins administration, China has forcefully warned Taiwan that
should the latter go for unilateral independence with or without American
support, China would effect a military invasion of Taiwan to protect Chinas
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Between 2001-2008, China fired several
missles across the Taiwan Strait to warn Taiwanese not to vote for Chen ShuiBian
of the Democratic Progressive Party which called for Taiwans independence. This
sparked off international fear of an imminent war in East Asia, complicated by
the American intervention. The fear was a reminiscent of the Manchu invasion of
the island in the 17th century and Mao Zedongs attempted invasion of the
Kuomintang in Taiwan in 1949 that brought the US 7 th nuclear fleet into the
Taiwan Strait. However, because of the practical need to preserve Chinas
sovereignty and territorial integrity, Chinas goals of unification with Taiwan also
serve as a central animating component of Chinese foreign policy. Between
2001-2008, Taiwan called for independence away from China. Chinas policy, in
particular, was to isolate the island internationally to deny its diplomatic space
and thus prevent its permanent separation. In 2009, with president Ma Ying
Jeous warming relations with China, the tensions between both thawed. China

has reiterated its peaceful unification with Taiwan through economic integration.
In the same year, Hu Jing Tao changed Chinas foreign policy from peaceful rise
to peaceful development. It is argued that Chinas option today does not allow
for a war scenario in East Asia, especially in the context of the global financial
Crisis in 2009 when many countries look to China as a source of economic
assistance and for her to bring about economic recovery due to global credit
squeeze that originated in the USA.
China has demonstrated her search for great power status through a global
search for natural resources and energy needs. It has been alleged that Chinas
aggressive foreign relations in the following areas are the results of her middle
Kingdom mentality to establish tributary claims. Chinas claims over the Spratly
Islands in the South China Sea with Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Philippines;
Chinas historical dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands or Diaoyutai, SinoJapanese oil and gas claims in the East China Sea. Chinas economic inroads into
Southeast Asia via cooperation with ASEAN since 1997 Asian Financial Crisis viz.,
ASEAN+3, ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), etc. China has
established economic relations with Sudan and Venezuela. However, the search
for natural resources, particularly energy, to fuel its economic growth has
become an increasingly important component of Chinese foreign policy in recent
years. This has led to reinvigorated relations with the developing world, where
many of these resources are located, and often led to support for unsavory
regimes such as Myanmar, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Iran. The apparent purpose of
Chinas outreach to the African continent Latin American countries and ASEAN is
largely defensive and focused on the economic interests, on the presumption
that economic growth is imperatively important to maintaining CCPs legitimacy
and domestic stability in China. Since the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 where
international condemnation was virulent, Beijing has realized that its best bet to
remain in control of China, and hence CCPs legitimacy is to deliver prosperity to
tis citizens.
China has attempted to extend her influence over its immediate neighborhood
though Chinas political influence in Central Asia. Chinas role in the creation of
Shanghai Cooperation Organization with the Central Asia Republics and the East
Asia Summit has raised fears of the China military threat. At the last summit of
the SCO in 2008, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev pushed the SCO to
recognize the independence of Abkhazia & South Ossetia in Georgia. But the SCO
baulked the groups Central Asian membersKazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistanwould not have stood up to the Kremlin without Chinas
support. However, Chinas role in the formation of the SCo reflects her practical
needs to in ensuring her strategic concerns in the defence of her northwest
periphery. In view of the rising Russia in the last few years, China is worried over
Russias attempt to reassert her influence reminiscent of the Cold War period. In
other words, the SCOs creation could be seen as Chinas pre-emptive move
rather than reviving her past suzerain status. In fact, from the Chinas
standpoint, the former Soviet Unions collapse was Chinas great pain. The Soviet
military threat, once so severe caused Mao Zedong to invite the then US
President, Richard Nixon to China in 1971.
China is trying to exert her power and influence in the global economy. Chinas
increasing trade surplus and hence USAs increasing trade deficit with China
since 1990 sparks hear of reassertion of her traditional tributary system where
the Middle Kingdom demanded homage and respect via economic and trade
superiority. The latest international diplomacy by China to persuade the world to

switch using the American dollar to Chinese yuan as the international trading
currency in the context of the unworthiness of the dollar in the current global
financial squeeze.Hence the American coinage of the China Threat Theory.
However, the global economic dominance meant that US-China trading relations
would be more important than that of other countries. As Chinas main trading
partner, the USA is key to the export growth of the Chinese economy. The USA
could hinder the growth of the Chinas influence by criticizing its actions such as
int eh areas of human rights. And strong and sustainable economic growth is
vital to internal stability in China. This partly explains why in 2008 and 2009
during the financial crisis in the world as a result of the global credit squeeze in
the USA, Prime Minister, Wen JiaBao kept exhorting that China can still maintain
a plus 8% growth in the GDP when other countries lamented a negative 8-10%
non-growth. The audience intended was obviously the Chinese citizens. China is
now the most important market for US industrial goods such as aircrafts, fruit
and soybean. Compared with only 18% growth of total US export over 5years
from 1999 to 2004, US export to China grew by 169% in the same period. The
number of US invested projects in China has topped 40thousand, with a total
paid-in investment of 50billion US
Dollars. Many Chinese companies have also set up business in the US. From 1978
to 2004, Chinas GDP grew from 150billion to 1.65trillion US dollars and its per
capita GDP from 190 to over 1200 US dollars. Import and export total soared
from 20.6billion to 1.15trillion US dollars. Therefore, China cannot afford to be
seen as an economic threat.
China is augmenting her military power through military modernization and a
heavier spending on military. Since the early 1900s, and accelerating in recent
years, China has set out to comprehensively modernize its military: in doctrine,
training, education, force structure, and overall operational capability. Beijing
increased its military spending to US$59billion in 2008. China is determined to
build at least 2nuclear aircraft carriers by 2012. China has sent arms supplies to
Sudan since 2007 to support the rogue regime there. China has also send arms
to Sri Lanka in 2009 to help the latter to crush the Tamil Tiger Movement that has
embroiled Sri Lanka in a civil war of 28years. China has not renounced her
military invasion of Taiwan should the latter declares independence. In China,
patience is visibly tapering off and both arrogance and ignorance are brewing. A
revival of the Chinese tianxia worldview and the efforts of restoring the past
glory of Imperial China and promoting Confucian values for a harmonious new
world order signal a new era when China is increasingly taking the offensive
posture in the ideological contest with the US. In reality, Chinese military
spending has grown much faster than economic growth in the past decade,
leading to the emergence of a PLA that is rapidly acquiring blue-water
capabilities and theater superiorities. However, Chinese leaders have no illusions
that the PLA is a match for the US military. What China does seek are niche
capabilities to exploit US vulnerabilities in order to deter, complicate and delay if
not defeat US or other intervention in a Taiwan scenario. Beijing also seeks more
broadly to prevent the US are its allies from containing Chinas economic and
military development through military action or intimidation. This explains why
China has supplied arms to Sudan and supplied arms to Sri Lanka and sent her
navy to Somali to protect her merchant ships as she needs to protect her
shipping lanes worldwide and to protect her strategically. The fast expanding PLA
Navy in recent years and Beijings reiteration that it will have at least 2aircraft
carriers by 2012 are more for the purpose of protecting sea lanes vital to Chinas
maritime trade and globalization outreaches. There is no doubt that Beijing
would take military action should it become clear that Taipei has foreclosed the

possibility of future unification. However, at present, China seems to prevent

independence rather than compel near-term unification. Such an approach is
consistent with Beijings focus on domestic development and on promoting a
benign international image.
China wants to hedge on to the benefits of globalization for development.
However, in the event, she raised questions of her desire to achieve global power
status. Its foreign relations since 1978 were calculated to progress in a peaceful
international environment and cordial environment. For the present, practical
needs rather than expansion dictate Chinas foreign policy, which Hu Jin Tao aptly
calls it peaceful development and not peaceful rise.