United Nations

Security Counci


i7 July 2015
Original: English

Uÿffed States of America: draft resoluti@ÿ
The SeNitiO' CoHnci/,
Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/I5. and its resolutions

I696 (2006). ÿ737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (200S), I835 (2008), and !929
ReaÿfirmhTg its commimÿem to @e Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, the need ÿ'or all States Party to thin Treaty to comply fully with their
obligations, and recÿTh'iÿg the right oi: States Party, in con[ormhy with Articles I and
II of thin Treaty, to devNop ÿesearch, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination°
E,,n!)hasi=iÿTg @e importance of political and dipbmatic efforts to find a
negotiated solution guaranteeing that [ran% nut!ear programme is exclusively for
peaceful purposes, and notilÿg @at such a solulion would benefit nuclear
Wcomitÿg diphmmtic efforts by China, Franc< Germany° @e Russiarÿ
Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the High Representative o[ the
European Union for Foreigÿ Affairs and Security PoJicy, and [ran to reach a
comprehensive, hmgqerm and proper solutRm to the Iranian nuclear issue,

c@minafing in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concluded on
14 July 2015. (S/2015/544, as attached as Ampex A to flis resolution) and the
establishmem of the Aim Commissiom
Welcoming h-an's reaffirmation it, the JCPOA that iÿ will mÿder no
circumstances ever seek. develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.
Noti,'Tg the statement of 14 July 2015. i]om China. France, Germanyÿ the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States. and the European
UnRm aimed at pro, meting transparency and creating an atmosphere conducive to

@e full implementation of the ]CPOA (S/2015/545, as mtached as Armex B to @is
resolution ),

z{£yhmitTg that conclusion of ÿhe JCPOA marks a fundamemal shift hs its
consideration of this issue, and expressiÿTg its desire to build a new relationship with
Iran strengthened b} the implememation of the JCPOA and ÿo bring to a satisfactory
concIuskm its consideratRm of this mauer,
k,f,)qrmiÿTg that I'uH implemer}tation of the JCPOA will contribute to buiIding
confidence in flÿc exctusiveIy peaeef@ nmure of Iran's nuclear programme,

15-] 2004 tel


Stroÿ,gly supporti,zg the essential and independent role of the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying compliance with safeguards
agreements, including the non-diversion of declared nuclear material to undeclared
purposes and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and undeclared nuclear
activities, and. in this context, in ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's
nuclear programme, including through the implementation of the "'Framework for
Cooperalion'" agreed between Iran and the IAEA on 11 November 2013 and the
"Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues", and
recogrÿizilÿg the IAEA's important role in supporting full implementation of {he

Affi'rmiÿg that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental component of nuclear nonproliferation, promote greater confidence among Staÿes. inter aliaÿ by providing
assurance {hat States are complying with their obligations under relevant safeguards
agreements, conlribute to strengflÿening their collecti,,e security and help to create
an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation, and further recoglÿizitÿg that
elfective and efficient safeguards implementalion requires a cooperative effort
between the 1AEA and States. that the IAEA Secretarial will continue to engage in
open dialogue on safeguards matters wilh States to increase transparency and build
confidence and to interact with them on the implementation of safeguards, and in
this case, avoid hampering the economic and technological development of Iran or
international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities; respect health.
safety, physical protection and other security provisions in force and the rights of
individuals; and take every precaution In protect commercial, technological and
industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge,
E,ÿcouragi,g Member Slates to cooperate, including through IAEA
involvement, with Iran in the framework Hf the JCP()A in the field of peaceful uses
of nuclear energy and to engage in mutually delermined civil nuclear cooperation
projects, in accordance with Annex lIl of the JCPOA,
Notillg the termination of provisions of previous resolutions and other
measures foreseen in this resolution, and itÿvitiÿg Member States to give due regard
to these changes,

Emphasiziÿg that the JCPOA is conducive to promoting and facilitating the
development of normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with Iran, and
having regard to States" rights and obligations relating to international trade,

Uÿderscoriÿg that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter
of the United Nations to accept and <arry out the Security Council's decisions,

EÿMorses the JCPOA, and urges its full implementation on the timetable

established in the JCPOA:
2. Calls Ul)Oÿ all Members States, regional organizations and international
organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the
implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the
implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and this resolution and by refraining from
actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA;
3. Requests the Director General of the IAEA to undertake the necessary
verification and monitoring of h'an's nuclear-related commitments for the full
duration of those commitments under the JCPOA, and Jwÿfirms that Iran shall


S/20! 5/547

cooperate t'u]]v as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve a}i omstandhsg issues° as

kJentffied in IAEA reports:
4. Rcqn(,.ÿLs rise Director General of dee IAEA to prox, kle regular updates to
he IAEA Board of Oo'ernors and a,'4 appropriate, in parallel ÿo flÿe Securhy
Council on hanÿs implementation of its commimÿems under the JCPt)A and also to
rcporÿ to dÿe IAEA Board of Goxernors and is parallel to flÿe Securhy Council at any
time iI" the Director Generaÿ has reas<mable grounds to bdieve there is an issue of
c(mcern directly affecting fulfiImem of JCPOA commimÿents:

Rcqÿ(,.vts d-,au as so<m as flÿe IAEA bus verified dÿat Ira,ÿ has takeÿ flÿe

actions specified hÿ paragraphs 15.1-!5.11 el" Annex V of flÿe JCPOA. ÿhc Director
General of the IAEA submit a report confirming dsis fact to dÿe IAEA Board of
Go\emote and in paralld to the Security Council:
6. Rcq,';r.'stx further tlÿaÿ, as soon as die IAEA has reached the Broader
Conclusion flÿaÿ all nuclear material iÿ h-an remains in peaceful activities, dÿe
Director General of fl-m IAEA submit a report confirming flÿis conc[ushm to the
IAEA Board of Govermÿrs and iÿ parallel to tlÿ.e Security Council:

Dÿ*'('idu.ÿ, actiÿg mÿder Article 41 of the Charter of flÿe Uÿlited Natfo,ÿsÿ

that, upon receipt b)flte Security Comÿcil of the report fl'om the ÿAEA described in
paragraph 5:
(a) The provisions of resolutions 1696 (20(16L 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007),
1803 (2008), I835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) shall be terminated:
(b) All Staÿes sbatJ comply with paragraphs l, 2. 4, and 5 and flÿe provisions
in subparagraphs (a)-(f) of paragraph 6 or Annex B for tlÿe duration specified in
each paragraph or subparagraph, and are called uporÿ m comply with paragraphs 3
and 7 of'Annex B:
8. Ducidÿ,so acting under Article 41 of the Charter of flÿc United Nations,
flÿat on flÿe due *en years after flÿe JCPOA Adopt.ion Day, as defined in flÿe JCPOA.
all lhe provisions of flÿis resolution shall be termiÿated, and none of flÿe previous

resolutions described in paragraph 7 (a) shal] be applied, flÿe Security Counciÿ will
have concluded its consideration of flÿe Iranian nuclear issue, and the item
°ÿNon-proliferafion'" will be removed fiom flÿe list of matters of which flÿe Council is
9. Dr,'cidÿ<r. acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nation, so
that the termhÿations described in Am'ÿex B and paragraph 8 of flÿis resolution ÿ',hall
not occur if the provisions of previous resokÿtions have been applied pursuam to

paragraph ] 2:
Application of Provisions of Previous Resohÿtions
10. Encg),'ÿra'gc.v China, France, GerÿaD,, d-ÿe Russiaÿ Federation, flÿe United

Kingdom. flÿe United States, flÿe European Union (EU), aÿd kan (dÿe "ÿJCPOA
participants") to resolve a,ÿy issues arisi,ÿg v, ith respect m implementation of
JCPOA commitments fiÿrough flÿe procedures specified in tlÿe JCPOA, and e;7)re.s.ÿe.v
its intemhm to address possible c,'ÿmpIaints by JCPOA participants ÿbouÿ significam
non-performance by arloflÿer JCPOA parficipam:

311 @4


II. Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations,

that, within 30 (lays of receiving a notification by a JCPOA participant State of an
issue thal the JCPOA participant State believes constitutes significant nonperformance of commitments under flÿe JCPOA, it shall vote on a draft resolution to
conlinue in etT"ecl ihe ierminations in paragraph 7 (a) of" this resolution, decides
further that if, within 10 days of the notification referred to above, no Member of
the Securily Council has submitted such a draft resolulion for a wÿte, then tlle
President of the Security Council shall submit such a draft resolution and pul it to a
vote within 30 days of the notification referred to above, and exl)resses its intention
to take into account the views of lhc Stales involved in the issue and any opinion on

the issue by the Advisory Board established in ihe JCPOA:
12. Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations,
that. if the Security Council does not adopt a resolution under paragraph l l to
continue in effect file terminations in paragraph 7 (a), then effective midnight
Greenwich Mean Time after the thirtieth day after the notification to the Security
Council described in paragraph 11, all of the provisions of resolulions t696 (2006),

t737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and t929 (2010) that have
been terminated pursuant to paragraph 7 (a) shall apply in the same manner as they
applied before tile adoption of this resolution, and the measures contained in
paragraphs 7. 8 and 16 to 20 of this resolution shall be terminated, unless the
Security Council decides otherwise:
13. Ut?derscores that. in the event of a notification to the Security Council

described in paragraph 1t, Iran and the other JCPOA parlicipants should strive to
resolve file issue giving rise to tile notification, expresses ils intention to prevent the
reapplicalion of the provisions if the issue giving rise to lhe notification is resolved,

decides, acting under Article 4l of tile Charter of tile Untied Nations, thai if lhe
nolifymg JCPOA participant Slate informs the Security Council that such an issue has
been resolved before the end of the 30-day period specified in paragraph 12 above,
then the provisions of this resolution, including the terminations in paragraph 7 (a),
shall remain in effect notwithstanding paragraph 12 above, and ÿlotes Iran's statement

that if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12 in
whole or in part, h-an will treat this as grounds Io cease performing its commitnaents

under the JCPOA:
14. AffTrms that the application of the provisions of previous resolutions
pursuant to paragraph 12 do not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed
between any party and Iran'or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of
application, provided lhat tile activities contemplated under and execulion of such
contracts are consistent with the JCPOA, this resolulion and the previous

15. Af/Trms that any application of the provisions of previous resolutions
pursuant to paragraph 12 is not intended to harm individuals and entities that. prior
to that application of those provisions, engaged in business with han or Iranian
individuals and entities that is consistent with the JCPOA and this resolulion,
encourages Member States to consull with each other with regard to such harm, and
to take action to mitigate such unintended harm for these individuals and entities,
and decides' if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to
paragraph 12 not to impose measures with retroactive effect on individuals and



erÿtilics for business activities with Iran that were consistenÿ with the JCPOA this
resolmhm aÿd the previous resolutions prior to ti7e applicaion of those provisiorÿs:

JCPOA hÿpbmentatioÿ
I6. Dÿ,cidr<v, acting under Article 4! oi the Charter of the United Nadoÿss, to
review recomrnerÿdations of /he Joint Comrnissi<m regarding proposals by States u>
participate in or permit rmcbar-related activities set forth in paragraph 2 of Ampex B,
and that such recommendations shal! be deemed to be approved urÿtess the Security
Comÿcil adopts a resolution to rejecl a Joint Commission recommcrÿdation wilhin
five working days of receiving iÿ:
!7. Pcqÿ4<st.r Member States seeking ÿo participate irl or pe, mi*. acÿi',.ities se/
forth in paragraph 2 of Armex B {o sÿ,bmiÿ proposals to the Secmiÿy Corn<it.
e.rt)rÿ,.vses its imenr4on to share such proposals with the Join{ Commisskm
established in dÿe JCPOA for hs review, itlvit(,.s any Member of the Security Comlcit
to provide rclexam informmion aÿd opinhms about these proposals, ÿ'ÿTcozcragc'ÿ' the
Joint Commission to give due consideration 1o any such information and opiniorÿs.
and rr, qrgc.vtx dÿe Joint Commisÿdon t<i provkb its lecommendaÿions on d?ese
proposals to the Security Council within twenty a.orking days (or. if ex/erÿded

witbhÿ thhbz working days t

in order to support JCPOA
to take the necessary administrathe measures to faciIhalc
communications with Member Stales and between the Securib, Council and the
Join[ Commission through agreed practical arrangemems:
I9. /-?(,qzÿt<w,v the IAEA and the Joint Commission 1o consuh and exchange
inibrmadom where appropriate, as specified in the JCPOAÿ and rc'qHcstx further that
the exporting states cooperate wffh the Joint Commission in accordmÿce whh Annex IV

of flÿe JCPOA:
20. Rr, qzÿc.s'l,r the Joint Commission m rexiew proposals for umnsfers and
activities described in paragraph 2 of Annex B with a view to rccomme,ÿding
approÿ,al where coÿsistent wiqÿ [his resoJuthm and the provisions and objectives of
the JCPOA so as /o provide for lhe transfer off items, materials, equipment, goods
and ÿechnohtgy required for han's mlclear activities under the JCPOAÿ and
'ÿcoÿrage.ÿ" the Joint Commission to estab]ish procedures to ensure detailed and
thorough review of atl such proposals:
21. Decide.v, acting mÿder Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations.

that the measures imposed in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006L ÿ747 (2007),
1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) shall sol apply m flÿe supply, sale, or
lransfer of iÿemÿ< materials, equipment° goods and technology, and the pro,,ision of
any related technicaI assistance, training, financial assistance, investment, brokering
or other servicesÿ b) ]CPOA participant SKates or Member States actiÿg in
coordination wiÿb/hem, that is directly related to: (a) dÿe modification of 1we cascades
at the Fordow facility for smbIe motope production: (b} the export of tran "s enriched
uranium in excess of 300 kilograms in reuÿrn for natural uranium: and (c) the
modernization of the Arak reacÿor based on the agreed conceptual desigÿ_ aÿd.
subsequently, otÿ the agreed final desiÿm. ÿ of :4uch reactor:



22. Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations,

that Member Slates engaging in the activities permitted in paragraph 21 shall ensm'e
that: (a) all such activities are undertaken strictly in accordance with the JCPOA;

(b) they notify the Commillee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and,
,a, hen conslituted, the Joim Commission ten days in advance of such activities;
(c) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in the relevant

INFCIRC referenced in resolution 1737 (2006), as updmed, have been met; (d) they
have obtained and are in a position Io exercise effectively a right to verify the enduse and end-use location of any supplied item: and (e) in case of supplied items,
materials, equipment, goods and technology listed in Hie INFCIRCs referenced in

resolution 1737 (2006). as updated. Ihey also notify lhe IAEA within ten days of the
supply, sale or transfers:
23. Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations,

also tllat the measures imposed in resolutions 1696 (2006), t737 (2006). 1747
(2007). !803 (2008), 1835 (2008). and /929 (2010) shall not apply lo the extent
necessary to carry out transfers and activities, as approved on a case-by-case basis
in advance by the Commiltee eslabtished pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006). that


directly related to implementation of the nuclear-related actions specified

in paragraphs 15.1-15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA:
(b) required for preparation Ikÿr the implementation of the JCPOA: or.

(c) determined by the Committee to be consistent with the objectives of this
24, Notes that the provisions of paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 27 continue in

effect if the provisions of previous resolutions are applied pursuant to paragraph 12:
Other Matters
25. Decides to make the necessary practical arrangements to undertake
directly tasks related to the implementation of this resolution, including those tasks
specified in Annex B and the release of guidance:
26. Urges all Slates, relevant United Nations bodies and other interesled
parties, to cooperale fully with the Security Council in its exercise of the tasks
related to this resolution, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal
on the implementation of the measures in lhis resolution:

27. Decides that all provisions contained in the JCPOA are only for the
purposes of its implementation between the E3iEU+3 and Iran and should not be
considered as setting precedents for any other State or for principles of international
law and the rights and obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally
recognized principles and practices:

28. Recalls that the measures imposed by paragraph 12 of resolution 1737
(2006) shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due
under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided
that the conditions specified in paragraph 15 of that resolution are met, and
z¢ÿzderscores, that if the provisions of previous resolutions are reapplied pursuant to

paragraph 12 of this resolution, then this provision will apply:

6/1 {}4


29. EHÿ/)"ÿ,xize'x the impc, rmnce of all Staÿes ÿaking the necessary measmes ÿo
erasure thaÿ no cÿaim shaÿl lie at ÿhe instance of 8ÿe Government of han. or ÿmy
persorÿ or entity in hano or of persons or enliÿies designated pursuant ÿo res,oluti(m
t737 (2()06) and relaÿed tesolu/h}ns, or any person claÿ.iming through or for ÿhe
benefh of any such person or endly, irÿ connection with any contract or oÿher
ransacÿion where its performance was prevented by reason of ÿhe application of the

provisions of resolulions !737 (2006), 1747 (20071. 1803 (20()g)ÿ 1929 (2()10)and
this resolution:
30. Dÿ<'ide.v to ÿemain seized of the matter untiÿ the termination of the
provisioÿs of this resolution iÿ accordance with paragraph 8.

7/! 04


Annex A: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna,

14 July 2015
The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United

Kingdom and the United States, wflh the High Representative of the European
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of lran
welcome this historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which wilt
ensure that Iran's nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a

fundame,ltal shif! in their approach ÿo Ibis issue. They anticipate that full
imp!ementa|ion of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and
international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will han
ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.
Iran envisions lhat this JCPOA will allow it to move lk)rward with an exclusively
peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme, in line with scientific and economic
considerations, in accordance wittÿ the JCPOA, and with a view to building
confidence and encouraging international cooperation. In Hÿis context, the initial

mutually determined limitations described in this JCPOA will be followed by a
gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of Iran's peaceful nuclear programme.
including its enrichment activities, to a commercial programme for exclusively
peaceful purposes, consistent with international non-proliferation norms.

The E3/EU+3 envision that the implementation of this JCPOA will progressively
allow them to gain confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's
programme. The JCPOA reflects mutually determined parameters, consistent with
practical needs, with agreed limits on the scope of Iran's nuclear programme,

including enrichment activities and R&D. The JCPOA addresses the E3iEU+3"s
concerns, .including through comprehensive measures providing for transparency
and verification.

The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of al UN Security Council
sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to iran's nuclear
programme, including sleps on access in areas of trade, technolo.gy, finance, and


S/20l 5/547

The Islamic Republic of 1ran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France. Germany° fl-ÿe
Russian Federation° ÿ.he Uniÿ.ed Kingdom and the United S[aÿ,es. wiffÿ fl;e High
Represemativc of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)
have decided upon flÿis k}ngderm Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA). This ]CPOA, reJlecÿing a sÿep-by-step
includes the
reciprocal commimÿems as laid down in Hÿis document and the annexes hereto

and is ÿo be endorsed by ÿhe United Nations (UN) SecuriU Council

The full implen)enuÿfion of this JCPOA will ensure fl;e exclusiveJ}, pcacefu!
naULre of han's nuclear 1orogramme.


]ran realfirms tism under no circumslances will Iran ever seekÿ develop or
acquire any nuclear weapons,

i V.

Successfui implementation of dÿis ]CPOA will enable ]ran to fully enjoy its
right to nucIear energy for peaceful purposes under H-ÿe rdevanÿ articles of the
nuclear Non-PrdiFcraÿion Treaty (NPT) in line with iÿs obligations therein, and
the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as dlat of
any oÿher non-nuclear-weapon ÿate party lo the NPT.


This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Securhy
Council sanctions as well as mu!tila{cral and national sargon.ions relaÿed {(ÿ
han's nuclear prograli]llte, including sÿeps on access in areas of trade,
technology, finance and energy.


The E3/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and
principles el:the United Nations as set om in the UN Charÿer.


The E3/EU+3 and lran acknowledge that the NPT remains ÿhe cornerstone of
*.he nuclear non-proliferation regime and dae essential foundation for ÿhe
pmsuit of nuclear disarmament and for tIÿe peaceful uses ('d" nuclear energy.

viii. The E3/EU+3 and lran commit R) implement dÿis JCPOA in good faith and in a
consÿruclive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any
action inconsistent wi[h the leucr, spiriÿ and iment of {his JCPOA that would
undermiÿe iÿs successful implementation. The EB/EU+3 will refrain from
imposing discriminatory regulatory arid procedural requirements in lieu of the
sanctions and restrictive measures covered by Hÿis JCPOA. This JCPOA builds
on the implcmenÿalion of ÿlÿe Joh!l P]atl of Action (JPOA) agreed in Geneva on
24 November 2013.

A Joint Commission consisling of dÿe E3/EU+3 and h-an will be established to
monitor dÿe implemenuuh;n of Hlis ]CPOA and will carry out the functions
proxided [or in qais JCPOA, This Joinÿ Commission wi!I address issues arising
fl'om tl-ÿc implemenmdon of tiffs JCPOA and will operate in accordance with
the provisions as deÿailed in dÿe relevam annex.

The International Aÿomic Energy Agency (tAEA) will be requested ÿo monitor
and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA.
The IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates ÿo Hÿ.e Board of
Governors, and as provided for in this JCPOA, to dÿe UN Secnriw Couÿ_ci[. All
rele',ant rules and regulations of dÿe IAEA wiflÿ regard ÿo 1he proÿ.eclh)n of
information will be frilly observed by aI1 parties involved,




All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purpose

of its implementatjon between E3/EU+3 and lran and should not be considered
as setting precedents for any, other state or for fundamental principles of

international law and the rights and obligations under itÿe NPT and other
relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognised principles and

Technical details of the implementation of this JCP()A are dealt with in the
annexes to this document.


The EU and E3+3 countries and Dan, in the fi'amework of the JCPOA. will
cooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and
engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed in
Annex III. including through 1AEA involvement.


The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing
this JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental
shift in its consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new
relationship with Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also provide
for the termination on Implementation Day' of provisions imposed under
previous resolutions; establishment of specific restrictions: and conclusion of
consideration of the lran nuclear issue by the UN Security Council 10 years
after the Adoption Day.

X V.

The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for their
respective durations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes.


The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, or
earlier if needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adopt
appropriate decisions by consensus.


S/20] 51547

Iralÿ alÿd E3/EU+3 will take the followitÿg votu!ÿtary measures wfth#ÿ
the timeflrame as detailed iÿ this JCPOA a1ÿd its Alÿexes

Iran% long term plan includes ccrlain agreed limitadoÿs on ati uranium
enrichmem aÿd uranium enrichrnenÿ-relaed activhies
limitations on specific research and developmenÿ (R&D) activities for @e firsÿ
8 years, ÿo be followed by g:adual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to @e rÿext
sÿage of ]ÿs enrichment acfix,]ÿ]es for exclusively peaccfuI purposes, as
described in Annex L ]ran will abide by its wquntary commiunems, as
expressed in its owÿ Rmg-/erm enrichment and emicbmem R&D plan t(; be
submitted as part of @c initial declaration for Hÿe Additional Pr(uocol ÿo iran's
Safeguards Agreement.
Iran will begin phasing out its IR-] centrifuges in l() years. Dmdng @is period,
han ÿil] keep its emichmem capaci{> at Nalanz 21 up ÿo a ÿola] inslaHed
uranium enNchmenÿ capacib of 5060 IR-l centril%ges. Excess cen/rffuges and
enrichment-related infrasuucture aÿ Natgm7 witl be siored under ÿAEA
con@uÿous monitoring, as specified in Aimex I.


]]an will continue to conducÿ enrichment R&D in a manner that does m)1
accunmlate enriched uranium, lran's emichment R&D wi@ uranium for
10 years will only include IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and ]R-S cenlrifuges as ]aid OtI! in
Atmex I, and han will not engage in o@er isolope separation ÿeclmologies ÿor
enrichment of uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing iX-6
and 1R-S centri[uges, and will commence lesting of up u> 30 IR-6 aÿd IR-S
cenuifuges after eight and a half years, as deÿaiied in Annex ].
As ]ran will be phasing om its ]R-1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or
assemble o@er centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex ], and >ill replace
failed centrifuges wi@ cen@l%ges of @e same type. Iran will manufacture
adva,ÿced ccn@fuge machines only for @e purposes specified in this JCPOA.
From @e end of @e eighth year, and as described in Annex l, han will siarÿ to
marmfacturc agreed numbers of ]R-6 and ]R-S cenuqfuge madfines wi@ouÿ
rotors and will s[ore all of @e manufactured machines al Natanz, under [AEA
continuous monitoring until @ey are needed under han%
enrichmem and enrichment R&D plan.


Based on iÿs own king-term plan, for 15 years, ban will carry out its uraniun]
enrichmen{-rdated activities, including safeguarded R&D exclnsReb in @e
Naÿanz Enr]chmem f'acili% keep its ]eve] of uranium enricbmen{ at up {o
3.67q, and, aÿ Fordow, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium
enrichment R&D and fron:ÿ t<eeping any nuclear material.


Iran will convert the Fordow faciIiW into a nuclear, physics and technology
centre. [iÿernafiona! collaboration including hi @e fi)rm of sciemii']c joint
partnerships ,,viii be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-I
cemr]fuges in six cascades will remain in one wing aÿ Fordow. Tv, o of @ese
cascades will spin w]@o@ ura@um and v, il] be transifioncd, indud]Jÿg @rough
appropriate ]n/'rastrue{u.re nRÿdif]cafion, for suable isotope production. The



other Jk}ur cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All
other centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastruclure will be removed and
stored under IAEA continuous moniloring as specified in Annex I.

During the 15 yea] period, and as h'an gradually moves to meet in!ernational
qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran. it will keep its
uranium stockpile under 300 kg of up to 3.67c,ÿ enriched uranium hexafluoride
(UF6) or the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to
be sold based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer in
return for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to
natural uranium level. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from
Russia or other sources for use in Iran's nuclear reactors will not be counted

against the above stated 300 kg UF6 stockpile, if lhe crheria set out in Annex I
are met whh regard Io other sources. The Joint Commission will support
assistance to lran. includine throt>,h IAEA technical cooperation as
appropriate, in meeling internalional qualification standards for nuclear fucl
produced in Iran. All remaining uranium oxide enriched lo between 59ÿ and
20ÿ/, will bc fabricalcd into fuel tkÿr the Tehran Research Reactor (TP, R). Any

additional fuel needed for the TRR will be made available 1<} Iran at
international market prices.


Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water rcscarch reactor in
Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 qÿ,
in a form {/1" an international partnership which will certify the final design.
The reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production
for medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor
will nol produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the firsl core load, all
of the activities lk)r redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for
lhe redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran. All spent fuel from Arak will
be shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. This international

partnership will include participaling E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other
counlries as may be mutually determined, lran wil! Iake the leadership role as
the owner and as the project manager and the E3iEU+3 and h'an will, before
Implementation Day, conclude an official document which would define the

responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants.

Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological
advancement in relying on light water for its future power and research
reactors with enhanced international cooperation, including assurance of
supply of necessary fuel.


There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy
waler in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for
export to the international market.


Iran intends t{/ ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and
research nuclear reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for
in relevant contracts to be duly concluded with the recipient parly.


For 15 years h-an will not, and does not intend Io thereafter, engage in any'
spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel



or reproeossing R&D activities
ÿ,o a spenl fue!
reprocessin7 eapabilily, wi/h the solo e,×eepti(m of <4eparalh>n aclivities aimed
exclusively al file production of mcdicaH and induslrial radhÿdsou)pes from
irradhded emqched uranium Jargets,


Coÿlsislent wiflÿ flÿ_e respective roles of dÿe Prcsidenÿ and Majlis (ParliamenÿL

]ran will provisionally apply dÿe Additiorml Pro[ocol ÿo its Comprehensive
a Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Addifiomd
Protocol, proceed wiflÿ its ratification wifi?in the ÿdmeflame as detailed in

Anlÿex V and fully implement ÿlÿe modified Code 3.1 of the
Arrangemems toils Safeguards Agreement

han wilt fully implemem tl-ÿe "ÿRoadmap for Clarificalion of Pasÿ and Present
()mstandiÿg Issue,V" agreed wiflÿ fiÿe tAEA. comaining allan.somewaYs to
address pasÿ aÿld preseÿt issues of'eoncesxÿ relating lo its nuclear programme as
raised in dÿe ampex ÿ.o lhe IAEA repo!l of g No,,,enlber !011 (GOV/2011165).
Full implementation of aclh, ities undertaken under ÿhc Roadnmp by }{ran will
be completed by 15 ()clober 2(115, and subsequenlIv the Director General will
provide by 15 December 2015 rise final assessmenl on the resolution of all pasÿ
and present outstanding issues to [he Board of Governorsÿ arid ll?e E3+3. in
their capacity as members of the Board of Gover,lors, will subnÿiÿ a resolution
to {lÿe Board of Governors for Inking necessary aclhm, with a view to closing
the issue, without prejudice lo the competence of flÿe Board of Governors.


Iran will allow tlÿe IAEA lo monilor ffÿe implemenlation of ll]e voIurKary
measures for fl-ÿeh respective durations, as well as Uÿ implemem lransparency
measures, as set ouÿ in this JCPOA and its Asÿnexes, These measures include: a
IAEA preseÿce in han: ]AEA
of uranium ore
eonce,m'ale produced by ]ran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for
25 years: comainment arid surveillaÿce of centrifuge rotors and bellows for
20 years; use of tAEA approved aÿd certified modern lechnologies includiIÿg
on-line emichmem measurement and eteetr(mie seals; and a reliable
n-ÿcchaÿism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years,
as defined iÿ Annex I.


han will not enoao-e in activities, includinÿ al ttÿe R&D level, thal could
contribule to llse development of a nuclear cxpkÿsive device, including
uranium or plulonium mela!lurgy ae/i\.'ilies, as specified in Ampex I.


Dan will cooperate and acl in accordance with the procuremem ehannd in this
JCPOA, as detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by flÿe UN Sccurib' Council

1311 (}4


/8. The UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA will lerminate all
provisions of previous UN Security Council resolutions on tile Iranian nuclear

issue - 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008),
1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) - simultaneously wilh the IAEA-verified
imptemenlation of agreed nuclear-relaled measures by Iran and will establish
specific restrictions, as specified in Amaex V. l
19. The EU will terminate all provisions of the gg Regulation, as subsequently
amended, implementixÿg all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions.
including related designations, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified
implenaen{ation of agreed nuc!ear-related measures by h'an as specified in
Annex V, which cover all sanctions and resirictive measures in the following
areas, as described in Annex II:
Transfers of funds belween EU persons and entities, including financial
institutions, and Iranian persons and entities, including financia!

Banking activities, including the establishment of new correspondenl
banking relationships and the opening of new branches and subsidiaries
of Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member Stales;


Provision of insurance and reinsurance:


Supply of spccialised financial messaging services, including SWIFT, for
persons and entities set out iF! Attachment 1 to Annex I[. including the
Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions:



Financial support for trade with h-an (export credit, guarantees or
Commitments for grants, financial assislance and concessiona! loans to
the Government of han:

vii. Transactions in public or public-guaranteed bonds:
viii. Import and transport of Iranian oil, petroleum products, gas and
petrochemical products;

Export of key equipment or technology for the oil, gas and petrochemical


Investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors:


Export of key naval equipment and technology:

xii. Design and construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers;
xiii. Provision of flagging and classification services:
xiv. Access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights:
xv. Export of gold, precious metals and diamonds;
xvi. Delivery of Iranian banknotes and coinage:

The provisions of this Resolution do nol constitute provisions of this JCPOA.



xvik Export of graphite, raw oÿ semi-finished metals such as aluminum and
sÿeelÿ and expoÿ oÿ sol]ware for inte.gratin$ indumrial processes:
x,,iii. Designation of persons, entiHes and bodies (assd freeze and visa ban) set
out in Attachment I ÿo Annex H: and
×ix Associated services for each of the categories above


The EU will terminate aH provisions of @e El_] Regulmion irnplemendng all
EU proliferation-related sarÿcdons, including reIaÿcd designations, 8 years af]er
Adoption Day or when the ]AEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all
nuclear maÿ.erhJ hÿ [ran remains in peaceful acdNtics, whichever is eaNier.


The United Smÿes wilt cease the application, and witÿ continue to do so, in
accordance with @is JCPOA o[ @e sanctions specified in Annex ]i ÿo take
eff%ct imuJtaneously wi@ the IAEA-,,erified hnplementadon of rise agreed
nuclear-related measures by lran as specified [n Annex V. Such sanctions cover
he following areas as described hÿ Annex H:
Financial and banking transactions wi@ Iranian banks and ['inancial
ins@ufions as specified in Annex 1[I, indudhlg @c Centÿa) Bank of han
and specified individuals and entities identified as Government of han by
rise Office of Foreign Assets Control on the Specially Designated Nationals
and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), as set om in Attachmem 3 ÿo
Annex II (including tJÿe opening and main[emtnco <H" correspondent and
payable @rough-accounts at non-U.S. ['inanchQ i,ÿstituÿions° investments,

foreign exchange transactions and letters of credit):

Transactions in Iranian Ria!;


Provision of U.S. banknoiestotheGovernn/emo{h-an:


Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues abroa&
limitations on their transfer;


Purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of @c issuance of iranian
sovereign debt, including governmental bonds:


Financial messaging services ',o @e Cemral Bar@ of hart and Iranian
financial institutions sd ouÿ in Aÿmchmen! 3 to Annex 111:

vii. Underv, ridng services, insurance, or reinsurance;

viii. EffoHs to reduce ]ran's crude oil sales;

Investment, including participation in joim vemures, goods, services,
inlbrmathm, technology and {echnical expertise and support for lran's
oil,oÿ,as, and petrochemical sealers:


Purchase. acquisidom sale, transpormtiorÿ or marketing of pdroleum,
petrochemical produds and natural gas fronÿ Iran:


Export sale or
of refined
pdrochemical products [o Iran:


Transactions with Iran's ener%,'e sector:


xiii. Transactions with Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sealers and port



xiv. Trade in gold and other precious metals;
xv. Trade with han in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as
aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating induslrial
xvi. Sale. supply or lransfer of goods and services used in connection with
Iran's automotive sector:
xvii. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above:
xviii. Remove individuals and entilies set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II from
the SDN List, the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN
lran Sanctions Act List: and
xix. Terminate Executive Orders 13574. 13590, 13622, and 13645, and

Sections5 7and 15 of Execmive Order 13628.

The United States will, as specified in Annex II and in accordance with Annex V.
allow for the sale <>1" commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services
to Iran: license non-U,S, persons that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person
to engage in activities with Iran consistent with this JCPOA: and license the
importation into the United Slates of h'anian-origin carpets and foodstuffs.


Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader
Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities.
whichever is earlier, the United Stales wilt seek such legislative action as may
be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the
sanctions specified in Annex 1I on the acquisition of nuclear-related
commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA.
to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states
under the NPT.


The E3/EU and the United States specify in Annex II a full and complete list
of all nuclear-related sanctions or restriclive measures and will lift them in
accordance with Annex V. Annex II also specifies the effects of the lifting of
sanctions beginning on "Implementation Day". If at any time following the
Implementation Day. lran believes that any other nuclear-related sanction or
restrictive measure o1" the E3iEU+3 is preventing the fu!l implementalion of

the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the JCPOA participant in
question will consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue and, if they
concur that lifting of lhis sanction or restrictive measure is appropriate, the

JCPOA participant in question wilt take appropriate action. If they are not able
to resolve the issue, Iran or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue to
the Joint Commission.

If a law at the state or local level in the United States is preventing the

implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the United
States will take appropriate steps, taking into account all available authorities.
with a view to achieving such implementation. The United States will actively
encourage officials at the slate or local level to lake inlo account the changes

in the U.S. policy reflected in the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA and to
refrain from actions inconsistent with this change in policy.




The EU w[li refÿmin fÿom re-inÿx)duchsg oÿ- rc.dmposing dÿe sanctions ÿIm[ it

has [ermhmted implemerÿfing under ÿhis ]CPOA whhou[ prejudice to the
dispme resolution process provided for under dÿis JCPOA There will be no
new nuclear-related UN Sccurib, Council sanctions and no ÿ-ÿew EU nuclearrelated sanctions or restrictive measures. The United Simon wilt make bcsÿ
eft'errs in good f'aith ÿo sustain this JCPOA and ÿo prcvcm imerfeÿence wiflÿ the
rcalisatk)n o[ fl-ÿc [u]] bone[it by ]ran of the sanctions ]ifdng specified in Anne×
IIÿ The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective rotes of the
President and the Congress, will tel'rain from re-inlroducing oÿ re-imposing the
sanctions specified in Annex I] dsat it has ceased applying under finis JCP()A,
without pÿeiudice ÿo dÿe dispute resolution process provided I'oÿ under this
JCP()A. The U.Sÿ Administration, acting consislent with file ÿespeefive ÿ-oJes of
the President and fiÿe Congress, will ÿefrain from imposing ,sew nuclear-related
sanctions han has stated lhaÿ it will /rea! such a re-introduction oÿ" reimposition el ÿhe sanctions specified in Annex IL or such an imposition of new
nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds ÿo cease performing its comn-dÿrnents
under {Isis ]CPOA in whole or in pro1.


The ES/EU+3 will take adequate administrafi',e and reguÿatot'y measures m
ensure clarib' and d'f'ecfivcness wi8ÿ ÿespect to flÿe litring of sanctums under

flÿis ]CP()Aÿ The EU and its Member Staÿes as well us dÿe Uni*,ed Sta[es witl
issue relevant guidelines and make publicly accessible statements on tlÿe
details of sanctions or restrictive measures which have been lifted under dds
]CPOA. The EU and im Member States and ÿ_he [_!,sited Staÿes commit ÿo
consuh with ]ran regarding ÿhe contem of such guidelines and smtcmems, on a
regular basis and whenever appropriate.

The E3/EU+3 and han commfl to impJement this JCPOA in good faith and in a
consÿruclive ammsphere, based on mutual respect, and {o refrain from any
aclion inconsisiem wilh rise le!ter, spirh and in!era of 4ÿis ]CPOA dml wou$d
undermine its successful implementation. Senior Government officials of Ihe
E3/EU+3 and h-an will make ex.ery eft'on m supporl ÿl-ÿe successful
implementation of this ]CPOA includ[n<ÿ in Iheir public stalemem.',; The

E3/EU+3 will rake all measures required lo Iifi sanctions and will refrain from
imposing exceptional or
regulatory and proceduraJ
requirements in lieu of file sanctions and restrictive measures coxered by dÿe


The EU and i[s Member Slates and flÿe Uni*cd Statesÿ consisÿen* wifls their
respective laws, will refrain from any policy specificaIÿy intended to direcdy
and adversely affect tlÿe normalisation of trade and economic relations with
han inconsislent with their commitments no{ m undermine the successful

implementation of this JCPOA.

The ES/EU+3 will noÿ appJy sanctions or restrictive measures ÿo persons or
entities for engaging in activities co',ered by.' flÿe lifting of sanctions provided
for in this ]CP()A. provided flint such activities are otherwise consistent with
E3/EU+3 laws and regulations in effect. Following the lifting of" sanctions
under" tiffs JCPOA us specified in Annex tL ongoing investigadorÿs on possible

2 ÿGovernmcnt officials° for the [1.S. means senior officials of the U.S. Adminis{radom



infringements of such sanctions may be reviewed in accordance wilh
applicable national laws.

Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the EU and ils Member Slates
will terminate the implemenlation of the measures applicable to designated
eniities and individuals, including the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian
banks and financial institulions, as detailed in Annex I! a0d the attachments

thereto. Consistent wilh fhe timing specified in Annex V, the United Stales wil!
remove designation of certain enlities and individuals on the Specially

Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, and entities and individuals
listed on the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, as detailed in Annex II and the
altachments lhereto.

EU and E3+3 countries and inlernational participants will engage in .ioinl
projects wilh Iran, including fhrough IAEA technical cooperation pro iecls, in
the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including nuclear power plants,
research reaclors, fuel fabrication, agreed .joint advanced R&D such as fusion,
establishment of a state-of-the-arl regional nuclear medical centre, personnel
training, nuclear safety and securily, and environmental proleclion, as detailed
in Annex 1II. They will take necessary measures, as appropriate, for the
implementation of ÿhese projects.


The E3iEU+3 and Dan will agree on steps to ensure Iran's access in areas of
trade, technology, finance and energy. The EU will further explore possible
areas lk)r cooperation between the EU. its Member States and Iran, and in this
context consider the use of available instruments such as export credits to
facililate trade, pro iect financing and inveslmenl in Iran.




has and the E3/EU+3 ,,ÿill inplement ÿheir JCPOA eornmiÿmenÿs according to
tlse sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones lor impkuÿemadon are as
FinaXsaÿion Day is dÿe daÿe on which neootiadons of dsis JCPOA are
concluded among dÿe E3!EU+3 and Irart, ÿu be followed pÿompl]y by
submission of dÿe resolmion endorsing ÿhis ]CP()A ÿo the UN Security
Council for adoption wiÿhom de!ay.

Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement oÿ this ]CP()A
by the UN Security Council, or such earlier dale as may be determined

by mmua] consent of the JCPOA participanu% at which time ÿhis JCPOA
and the commitmen[s in this ]CPOA come into cffuct. Beginning on that
date, JCPOA participants will make necessary arrangements and
preparations for the inplementation of their JCPOA cumnÿitments

h-nplcmentation Da\, is the date on which, simultaneously with dÿe ]AEA
report \.erifying impJenÿenÿation by h-an of the nuclear-related measures
described in Sections 15.1. to 15.1I of Annex V, the EU and dÿe United
States lake the actions described in Sections i6 and 17 of Annex V
respectively and in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutiom
dae actions described in Section I8 of Annex V occur at the UN los, el.
Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day or tI-ÿe daÿe on
which the Director General of the ]AEA submits a report stating t!ÿat the
tAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuctear maÿeriaI in
Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichexer is canter. ()n that date, the

EU and the United Sÿates will take the actions described in Sections 20
and 21 of Annex V respectivdy and h'an will seek° consistent with the
Constitmional roles of the President and PaNiamen< ratilication of the
Additional Protocol.


UN Security Council resolution Termination Day is d?e date on which the
UN Securib, Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminates
according to its terms° which is to be ]0 years from Adoption Day,
provided that the provisions of previous reso]mions have not been
reinstmed. On tha{ date. the EU will {ake the actions described in
Section 25 of Annex V.

The sequence and milestones set fordÿ aboxe and in Annex V arc without
prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments sta{ed in this JCP()A.


If han believed that anÿ or aH of the E3/EU+3 were noÿ meeting their
commitments under this ]CP()A, Iran could reÿ%r the issue to the Juim
Commission for resoludon: similarb,< if any of the E3!EU+3 bdi e,,ed ÿhat Iran
was noÿ meeting its eomnÿhments mÿder this JCPOA. any of the E3/EU+3
could do ÿhe same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resohe the
issue, unless the time period was extended by consetlsus, After Joint
Commission consideration, any paHicipanl could retkr the issue ÿo Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, if it believed the comp!iance issue had ÿot been resoh'ed.

t 9/I 04


Ministers would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was
extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration - in parallel
with (or in lieu of) review at the Ministerial le,ÿel - either the complaining
participant or tile participant whose performance is in question could request
that the issue be considered by an Advisory Board. which would consist of
three members (one each appointed by the participants in the dispute and a
third independent member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-binding
opinion on the compliance issue within !5 days. If, after this 30-day process
the issue is not resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion of
the Advisory Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If the
issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining
participant, and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute
significant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved
issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in

whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the
issue constitutes significant non-performance.

Upon receipt of the notification from {he complaining participant, as described
above, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made to

exhaust ttÿe dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UN
Security Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution
to continue the sanctions lifting. If the resolution described above has nol been

adopted within 30 days of tile notification, then the provisions of the old UN
Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN Security
Council decides otherwise. In such event, these provisions would not apply
with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and 1ran or
Iranian individuals and entities prior to tile date of application, provided tllat
the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are
consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council
resolutions. The UN Security Council, expressing its intention to prevent the

reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is
resolved within this period, intends to take into account the views of the States
involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue of the Advisory Board. han
has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that
as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or
in part.



JCPOA Annex I - Nudearordated measures

The sequence of implementation of {he corrimiurÿents deÿaited in @is Annex is
specified iri Annex V ÿo @e Joint Compreherisive Plari el: Aclion (JCPOA).
Uÿicss otherwise specified, @e durations of @e commi{melus in dfis Annex
arc from Impleriÿenlafion Day.


l-ran wiI1 modernise @e Arak heavy water research reacÿor {o supporÿ peaceful
nuclear research and radioisotopes production for medical and hÿdus{rial
purposes, lran will redesign and rebuild @e reac!orÿ based on @e agreed
conceptual design (as at{ached 1o @is Annex) ÿo supper{ iÿs peaceful nuclear
research and production needs arid purposesÿ including testing of fuel pins and
assembly proÿo{ypes and struc{uraJ materials, The design wi]ÿ be such as to
mirdmise @e producthm of pJt4oriium and noÿ ÿo produce weapon-grade
plmonium in normal operafiori. The power of the redesigned reactor will rioÿ
exceed 20 MW@. The ES/EU+3 and Iran share @e understanding @at @e
parameters in the conceptual desiÿ,n, ÿ_ are ,ÿubiecÿ, to possible and necessary
adjusÿmems in devdoping @e final design while fully preserving @e abovementioned purposes and principles of modernisafion.


Iran will no{ pursue construction a[ @e exfs@sg unfimshed reacRÿr based on its
original desion and will remove {he exisfim, calaridria and retain it in Iran. The

calandNa will be made inoperable by filling any openings in @e calandria wi@
coricr@c such that tile IAEA can verif} @at il will not be usable lbr a furore
riuclear application. M redesigning and ÿeco,ÿsUucfing of @e modernized Arak
heavy waÿer research reacÿor, han will maxbÿise @e use el existing
inflastructure already installed at ÿhe currenÿ Arak research reactor.

Iran will u@e @e leadership role as {he owner and as @e projecÿ manager, and
have responsibili%, for overall implementation of @e Arak modernisation

pro iccR xÿ,i@ EB/EU+3 participants assuming responsibilities regarding @e
modernisafion of @e Arak reacuÿr as described in this Annex. A Working

Group composed of E3iEU+3 parlicipams will be established to faciliÿale @e
redesigriirig and rebuilding of @e reacRm An international partnership
composed of tran and 1.he Working Group would implement the Arak
modernisafion projecu The Working Group could be enlarged ÿo include @her
countries by consensus of ÿhe participariÿs of @e Working Group and Iran.
E3/EU+3 parficipan{s and h'an wiJ! conclude an officia] doeumenl expressing
@eir sÿrong commitments ÿo @e Arak modernisafion project in advance of
]mplemenÿafioÿ Day which would provide an assured pa@ forward ÿo
modernise the reacÿor arid would define @e responsibilities assumed by @e
E3iEU+3 parÿicipari{s, arid subsequetltly com'racts wo@d he cow, eluded. The
participants of the Working Group will provide assistance needed by Iran for
redesignirig and rebuilding @e reac{or, consistent wi@ their respective m4ional
laws, iri such a mariner as lo enable the safe and timely conslrucfiori arid
commissioning of @e modernised reactor.

Iran and the Working Group wiI! cooperaÿe ÿo develop @e l'inal design el" @e
moderriised reacÿor arid @e desfgri of the subsidiary laboratories ÿ.o be carried



out by Iran, and review conformity with international safely slandards, such
that the reactor can be licensed by the relevanl Iranian regulatory authority for
comnaisshming and operation. The final design of the modernised reactor and

the design of the subsidiary laboratories will be submitlcd to the Joint
Commission. The Joint Commissh>n will aim to complete its review and
endorsement within three months after the submission of the final design. If
the Joint Commission does not complete its review and endorsement within
three months, h'an could raise the issue (hrouÿ,he the dispute resolution
mechanism envisaged by this JCPOA.


The 1AEA will monitor the construction and report to the Working Group for
confirmation that the construction of the modernised reactor is consistent with
the approved final design.


As the project manager, Iran will take responsibility for the construction
efforts. E3/EU+3 parties will, consistent with theil" national laws, take
appropriate administrative, legal, technical, and regulatory measures to
support co-operation.

E3/EU+3 parties will support the purchase by lran, Ihe lransfer and supply of
necessary materials, equipment, instrumentation and control systems and
technologies required for the construction of the redesigned reactor, through

the mechanism established by this JCP()A, as well as through exploration of
relevant funding contributions.

E3!EU+3 parties wilt also support and facilitate the timely and safe
construction of the modernized Arak reactor and its subsidiary laboratories,
upon request by Iran, through IAEA technical cooperation if appropriate,
including but not limited lo technical and financial assistance, supply of
required materials and equipment, state-of-the-art inslrumemation and control
systems and equipment and support for licensing and authorization.

The redesigned reactor will use up to 3.67 percent enriched uraniurn in the

form of UO2 with a mass of approximately 350 kg of UO2 in a full core load,
with a fuel design to be reviewed and approved by the Joint Commission. The

inlernational partnership with the participation of Iran will fabricate the initial
fuel core load for the reactor outside lran. The international partnership will
cooperate with Dan, including through technical assistance, to fabricate, test
and license fuel fabrication capabilities in Iran tkÿr subsequent fuel core reloads
for future use with this reactor. Destructive and non-destructive testing of this
fuel including Post-Irradiation-Examination (PIE) will take place in one of {he
participating countries outside of lran and that country will work with Dan to
license the subsequent fuel fabricated in Iran for the use in the redesigned
reactor under IAEA monitoring.

Iran will not produce or test natural uranium pellets, fuel pins or fuel

assemblies, which are specifically designed for the support of the originally
designed Arak reactor, designated by the IAEA as IR-40. Dan will slore under
IAEA continuous monitoring all existing natural uranium pellets and IR-40
fuel assemblies until the modernised Arak reactor becomes operational, at
which point these natural uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies will be
converted to UNH, or exchanged with an equivalent quantity of natural
uranium. Iran will make the necessary technical modifications to the natural


5/20 ÿ 5/547

uraMurn fuel production process line thaÿ was intended to supply fuel for {he
IR-40 reactor design, such dÿat iÿ can he used %r the fabricaÿiorÿ of /he fuel
rdoads for rise modernised Arak reactor.

All spent fuel from ttÿe redesigned Arak reaetorÿ regardless of its origin, for fhe
lifetime ,q" the reactor, will be shipped out of Jhan ÿo a mutually deterrrdscd
location in E3/EU+3 countries or ÿ.hi]d countries, for fmlher treatment or
dxposhion as provided for iÿs l-elevast contracts [o be concluded, consistent
with national laws. ,s.idÿ the
party, wiflÿin one year from the
unloadhÿg from rise reactor or whenever deemed to be safe for transfer by the
recipient co,4nlrv.

]ran w}H submit the D]Q of the redesigned reactor ÿo /he IAEA which wiÿi
include information on file planned radio-isotope production and reacÿor
operation programme. The reactor will be operated m-ÿder ]AEA monitoring.

Iran will operate tile Furl Manufacturing Planÿ only to produce fueI aÿ;semblies
for light water reactors and reloads for flÿe modernixed Arak reactor.


All excess heavy water which is beyond han's needs for flÿe modernised Arak
research reactor, the Zero power heavy water reactor, quanfiiies needed for
medicM research and production of deu{erate solutions and chemical
compounds including, where appropriate, contingency stocks, will be made
available for export to flÿe hÿternational market based (m mÿernafioiÿa[ prices
and delixered to tlÿe international buyer for t5 years. Iran's needs, consistem
with the parameters above, are estimated to be 131) metric ÿonnes of nuclear
v, ater or iis equivalent in different emichmems prior k}
commissioning of the modernised Arak research reactor, and 90 rnelric tonnes
al]er the corriniissioningÿ including the anmmÿt contah]ed in i.l]e reactor.


]ran will inform file IAEA about dÿe hp,'entory and the production of ÿlÿe
HWPP and wilt allow rile IAEA re monitor tIÿe quantifies of ÿ,tÿo heavy water
stocks and tile amount of heavy >ater produced, including flsrough [AEA
visits, as requested, to flÿe HWPP


Consistent with its plan, h-an wil! keep pace \v]th the uÿend of international
technological advancement in relying only on light water for its fmure nuclear
power and research reactors with enhanced international cooperation
assurances of supply of necessar3 fuel,


han intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present nuclear power
and research reactors, for further treatment or disposition as presided for in
relevam contracts to be concluded consistent >ith national laws >[th flÿe
recipienÿ path",

!S, For 15 years ]ran will ÿoL and does not intend to flÿereaf{er, engage in any
spent fuel reprocessing or speiÿt fuel reprocessing R&D activities, For dee
pro'pose of this annex, spoilt fuel incIudes al] Wpes of irradial.ed I:tÿeI.




For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, reprocess spent
fuel except for irradiated enriched uranium targets for production of radioisotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.


For 15 years han will not, and does not intend to thereafter, develop, acquire
or build facilities capable of separation of plutonium, uranium or neptunium
from spenI fuel or t¥om fertile targets, other |ban for production of radioisotopes for medical and peaceful industrial purposes.


For 15 years, Dan will only develop, acquire, build, or operate hot cells
(containing a cell or interconnected cells), shielded ce]ls or shielded glove
boxes with dimensions less {han 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with the
specifications set out in Annex I of the Additional Protocol, These will be colocated with the modernised Arak research reactor, the Tehran Research
Reactor, and radio-medicine production complexes, and only capable of the
separation and processing of industrial or medical isotopes and non-deslrucÿive
PIE. The needed equipment will be acquired through the procurement
mechanism established by this JCPOA. For !5 years, Iran wilt develop,
acquire, build, or operate hot cells (containing a cell or interconnected cells),
shielded cells or shie]ded glove boxes with dimensions beyond 6 cubic meters
in voJume and specifications set out in Annex ] of the Additional Protocol,
only after approval by the Joint Commission,


The E3iEU+3 are ready to facilitate all of the destructive and non-deslructive
examinations on fuel elements and/or fuel assembly prototypes including PIE
for all fuel fabricated in or outside Iran and irradiated in h'an, using their
existing facilities outside Iran. Except for t!le Arak research reactor complex.
lran will not develop, build, acquire or operate hot cells capable of performing
PIE or scek to acquire equipment to build/develop such a capability, for
15 years.


For 15 years, in addition to continuing current fuel testing activities at the
TRR, Iran will undertake non-destructive post irradiaIion examination (PIE) of
fuel pins, fuel assembly prototypes and structural malerials. These
examinations will be exclusively at the Arak research reactor complex.
However, the E3/EU+3 wilt make available their facilities to conduct
destructive testing with Iranian specialists, as agreed. The hot cells at the Arak
research reactor in which non-destructive PIE are performed will not be
physically interconnected to cells that process or handle materials for the
production of medical or industrial radioisotopes.


For 15 years, Iran will not engage in producing or acquiring plutonium or
uranium metals or their alloys, or conducting R&D on plutonium or uranium
(or their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining plutonium or
uranium metal,


Iran will not produce, seek, or acquire separated plutonium, highly enriched
uranium (defined as 20(/ÿ or greater uranium-235), or uranium-233, or
neptunium-237 (except for use as laboratory standards or in instruments using
neptunium-237) for 15 years.


If Dan seeks to initiate R&D on uranium metal based TRR fuel in small agreed
quantities after 10 years and before 15 years, lran will present its plan to, and
seek approval by, the Joint Commission.


S/2@! 5/547


27. lratl will keep its enrichmem capacity at no more ÿIlaÿt 506(} IR-I centrifuge
maehhses in no more tJlaI1 30 cascades ilÿ ÿheh current configuratiolls hi
currently operating mlits at flit Natarÿz Fuel Etsrichmenÿ Pÿaÿ (FEP) for
10 years.

28ÿ ]{ran will keep its level of uranium eÿsrichmelÿ aÿ up ÿo 367 percem for
15 years.

]ran will remove rise followinÿ excess cemrifuÿ,es and infrastructure n(ÿ
associaled witlÿ 5060 IR-i ccÿrifuges iÿl FEP, which will be stored at Natural
ila Haÿl B of FEP urÿder ÿAEA c<mHlÿuous moÿitorhÿg:


AH excess cclm-ifuge machines, incJLÿding iR-2m ceÿttrifuges. Excess ÿR-I
centrifuges will he used for the repJacemenl of failed or damaged centrifuges
of the same type on a one-for-one basis

29ÿ2. UF6 pipework iÿcludiIÿg sub headers, valves and pressure traÿlsducers a!
cascade le'ÿcl, and frequency irwerlers° aÿld UF6 wiflldrawal equipment from
oÿle of tile withdrav, al sÿafiolls, wMch }s curren!iy not iÿl :,ervicc, illc}uding iÿs
wÿcuum pumps aÿd chemical traps,

For Hÿe purpose of tlÿis Allÿcx, fl?e IAEA will confirm fluough {he esÿ.abJishcd
practice the failed or dÿmÿaged status of cerm'ifuge machines before removal.


For 15 years,
han will install oas
c, - cemritu<,e
ÿ.- machirÿes, ol emiC}lment-reJaed
infrastructure, whedler suitable for uraÿium elÿrichment, research arid
deveh)pmem, or stiÿbie isotope enrichmenL exclusively at {he ÿocations and Rÿr

file activities specified under rids JCPOA.


Iran will cominue to conduct em'ichment R&D in a mamÿer tim{ does not
accumulate emiched uranium. For I0 years and c(msisleÿl! with its elÿrichment
R&D plan, Iran's enrichment R&D \vidÿ uranium will only include IR-4, JR-5.
1R-6 aÿld IR-8 cerÿrifuges. Mechanical ÿesling (m up to ÿv,.'o :-dng]e cenlrifÿges
for each bÿpe will be carried out only on file tR-2m. IR-4, tR-5, IR-6. IR-6s,
IR-7 and IR-S. Iran will buiJd or test. \,,'ifll or without mailium, olÿIy those gas

centrifuges specified iÿ ÿhis JCPOA.

Consiste,ÿt widÿ iÿs pkln, ban wi]l continue workiÿlg wifll {lÿe 164-machine
IR-2m cascade at PFEP in order ÿo complete flÿe necessary tests umil

30 November 2015 or tile day of implememafi<m of this ]CPOA, whichever
comes later, and after flmÿ iÿ will take dlese machines out of the PFEP and
store them mÿder IAEA coivinuous m(miÿoring at Nalanz in Hall B of FEP.



Consis{er,ÿ with its pla,ÿ, ]ran will cominue working with the 164-machi!ÿe IR-4
cascade at PFEP in order ÿo complete ÿhe necessary tests mÿfi] 30 No\ember
20t5 or flÿe day of implemelVation of finis JCPOA.whichever comes ]ater, and
after that iÿ will ÿ.ake these machiÿles om of flÿe PFEP aÿd sÿore them under
IAEA cominuous molÿitoriÿg at Naÿ.aÿlx in Hall B of FEP.
Iran wiIl confiÿme flÿe ÿesHilg of a single 1R-4 cermifuge machine aÿld ÿR-4
centrifuge cascade of up to 10 cenÿ,rifuge machi!ÿes for 10 years

25/1 {}4



h'an will test a single IR-5 centrifuge machine for 10 years.


h'an will continue testing of the IR-6 on single centrifuge machines and its
intermediate cascades and will commence testing of up to 30 centrifuge
machines from one and a halt" years before tile end of year 10. Iran will
proceed from single centrifuge machines and small cascades to intermediate
cascades in a h)gical sequence.


Iran will commence, upon start of implementation of the JCPOA, testing of the
IR-8 on single centrifu*,e machines and its intermediate cascades and will
commence the testing of up to 30 centrifuges machines from one and a half
years before the end of year 10. Iran will proceed from single centrifuges to
small cascades to intermediate cascades in a logical sequence.


For 10 years, Dan, consistent with the established practice, will recombine the
enriched and depleted streams from the IR-6 and IR-8 cascades through the
use of welded pipework on withdrawal main headers in a manner that
precludes Ihe wiflÿdrawat of enriched and depleted uranium materials and

verified by the IAEA.

For 15 years, Iran will conduct all testing of centrifuges with uranium only at
the PFEP. Iran will conduct all mechanical testing of centrifuges only al the
PFEP and the Tchran Research Centre.


For tile purpose tel" adapting PFEP to the R&D activities in Hae cm-ichment and
enrichment R&D plan. Dan will remove all centrifuges except those needed for
testing as described in the relevant paragraphs above, except for tile IR-1
cascade (No. 1) as described below. For file full IR-I cascade (No. 6), Iran will
modify associated intÿastructure by removing UF6 pipework, including
sub-headers, valves and pressure transducers at cascade level, and frequency
inverters. The IR-I cascade (No. 1) centrifuges will be kept but made
inoperable, as verified by the IAEA, through the removal of centrifuge rolors
and the injection of epoxy resin into the sub headers, feeding, product, and
tails pipework, and the removal of controls and electrical systems for vacuum,
power and cooling. Excess centrifuges and infrastructure will be stored at
Natanz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring. The R&D space

in line No. 6 will be left empty until Iran needs to use it for its R&D

Consislent with the activities in the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan,
han will maintain the cascade infrastructure for testing of single centrifuges
and small and intermediate cascades in two R&D lines (No. 2 and No. 3) and
will adapt two other lines (No. 4 and No. 5) with infrastructure similar to that
for lines No. 2 and No. 3 in order to enable future R&D activities as specified

in this JCPoA. Adaptation will include modification of all UF6 pipework
(including removal of all sub headers except as agreed as needed for the R&D
programme) and associated instrumentation to be compatible will1 single
centrifuges and small and intermediate cascade testing instead of full scale

Consistent with its plan and internationally established practices, Iran intends
to continue R&D on new types of centrifuges through computer modelling and
simulations, including at universities. For any such project to proceed to a



prototype stage for mechanical leming wiflin lO years, a fu!l presentation Ru
and approval b}< @e Joim Commission is needed


The Fordow Fuel Emqchment Ham (FFEP) will be converted into a nuclear,
and ÿechnology centre and ]mernafional collaboration will be
encouraged in
areas of research. The Joim Commission will be
irq'ormed in advance o[ @e specific projects that will be undertaken aÿ Fordow.


Iran wi!l no[ conducÿ any uranium enricbmem or any masium cnrichmcm
rehned R&D and will have no nuclear maleriat m @e Fordow Furl Enrichmcnÿ

Plant (FFEP) for 15 years.

For 15 years, h-an will maimain no more than 1044 IR-1 centrifuge machines

at one wing of rise FFEP of which:
46.1. Two cascade,'ÿ @al have not experienced UF6 before will be rood!tied for
@e production of stable isotopes. The uansidon ÿo stable isotope
production of @ese cascades at VFEP will be vonducled in ,iohv
partnership between the Russian Federation and [ran on @e basis of
arrangements to be mutualb, agreed upon. To prepare @cse two cascades
for installation of a new cascade architecRÿre appropriate £or sÿable
isoupe production by rise ,iuint partnership° tran v, ilI rernove rise
connection to ÿhe UF6 feed main header, and move cascade UF6
pipework (except for @e dump line in order to maimain vacuum) m
storage in Fordow under IAEA cominuous monhoring. The Aim
Commission will bc informed about @e concepma! framework of stable
isotope production at FFEP.
46.2. For four cascades wkh all associated in!'ras[rucmre remaining except for
pipework flsat enaNes ¢rosso,,er tandern connections, ÿwo will be placed
in an idle smL not spinninoÿ,. The other txÿo cascades will continue to
spin until the traÿ?sifion to stable isotope production, described in the
previous subparagraph has been completed. Upon comNefion of rise
tratÿsition t(ÿ stable isotope production described in @e prexious
subparagraph, these two spinning cascades will be placed in an idle staÿe,
not spinning,
47. Iran wil!:
47.l,remove the other 2 cascades of IR-] cen[rifuges from @is wing° by
removing all cemrifuges and cascade UF6 pipcwork, including
sub-headers, valves and pressure transducers aÿ cascade level, and

frequency inverÿers.
47.2. also subsequently remove cascade electrica] caning, individual cascade
control cabincls and vacuum pumps. All @ese excess centrifuges and
hÿfrastructure will be mored at Namnz in Hall B of FEP under IAEA
continuous monitoring.

Iran wil!:
48. t.remove all excess
aml uranium enrichmem rehned
inÿ'rasÿructure from @e o@er wing of @e FFEP. This wil! include removal



of all centrifuges and UF6 pipework, including sub headers, valves and
pressure gauges and transducers, and frequency inverters and converlers.
and UF6 feed and withdrawal stations.
48.2. also subsequently remove cascade electrical cabling, individual cascade
control cabinets, vacuum pumps and centrifuge mounting blocks. All
these excess centrifu,,es and infrastructure will be stored at Natanz in
Hall B of FEP under IAEA continuous monitoring.

Centrifuges from the four idle cascades may be used for the replacement of
failed or damaged centrifuges in stable isotope produclion al Fordow.


han will limit its stable isotope production activities with gas cenlrifuges to
lhe FFEP for 15 years and will use no more than 348 IR-1 centrifuges for these
activities at the FFEP. The associated R&D activities in Iran will occur at the
FFEP and aI Iran's declared and monitored centrifuge manufacturing facilities
['or ÿesting, modification and balancing these IR-1 cemrifuges.


The IAEA will establish a baseline for the amount of uranium legacy from past
enrichment operations that will remain in Fordow. Iran will permit the 1AEA
regular access, including daily as requested by the IAEA. access {o the FFEP
in order to monitor Iran's production o[" stable isotopes and the absence of
undeclared nuclear maleriat and activities at the FFEP for 15 years.


Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments as expressed in its own long term
enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the initial

declaration described in Article 2 of the Additional Pro|ocol.:ÿ The IAEA will
confirm on an annual basis, for lhe duration of the plan that the nature and
scope and scale of h'an's enrichment and enrichment R&D activities are in line
with this plan.

Iran will start to install necessary infraslructure for the IR-8 at Natanz in Hall
B of FEP after year 10.


An agreed template for describing different centrifuge types (IR-1. 1R-2m, 1R-4,
IR-5, IR-6, ][R-6s, IR-7. IR-8) and lhe associated definitions need to be
accomplished by implementation day.



An agreed procedure for measuring IR-1. IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuge
performance data needs to be accomplished by implementation day.


lran will maintain a lotal enriched uranium stockpile of no more than 300 kg
of up to 3.67c/ÿ enriched uranium hexafluoride (or the equivalent in different
chemical forms) for 15 years.


All enriched uranium hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.679ÿ
enriched UF6 (or the equivalent in different chemical forms) will be down
blended to natural uranium level or be sold on the internationa! market and
delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to

:ÿ lran will permit the IAEA Io share the content of the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan. as
submitted as parl of the initial declaration, with the Joint Commission participants.



Iranÿ [ran will eÿter isle a commercial contract with an entity outside han for
the purchase and transfer of its enriched uranium stockpile in excess of 300 kg
UP6 in return for na[ura[ uranium delivered to lran. The E3/EU+3 will
facititaL where applicable, /he conclusion and
oÿ ÿhis
contract. ]ran may choose to seek ÿo sell excess enriched urahfulss [o ÿhe IAEA
fuel bank in Kazakhstan wherÿ [lie fuel bank becomes operational.

All urankuÿs oxkte enriched ÿ.o between 5% and 20ÿ/ÿ wilt be fabNcaÿed imo
fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or wansferred, based on a
commercia! ÿransacÿion, omside of ]ran or dilu[ed [o an enrichment level ol
3.67G or ÿess. Scrap oxide and other R}rms not in plates ÿhaÿ cannot be
fabricated into TRR fueÿ plaÿes will he ÿransferred, based oÿ a commercial
ransacdon, outside oflran or diluled to an enrichmem level of 3.d7g/ÿ or less.
In case of [:uÿure supply of I9.75% enriched uraniun-t oxide (U3OS) for TRR
fuel pJaÿes fabrieadom all scrap oxide and oÿ.her forms not in piates dial cannot
be fabrica{ed imo TRR fuel pÿates, comaining uranium enriched Io between
5g and 2(}g, will be transferred, based on a commercial transaction, outside
of ]ran or dib{ed {o an enrichment level of" 3.67ÿ/ÿ or less wi{hin 6 months of
its producNon. Scrap plaÿes will be {ransl'erred, based on a comrnerciaÿ
{ransacdon. ou{side lran. The commercial transactions should be slruclured {(}
return an equivalent amounÿ of naRHat uranium ÿ.O han. For 15 years, ]ran wilI
not build or operate facilities for converting fuel plates or scrap back ÿo UP6.


Russian designed, fabricated and licensed fuel a,;sembÿies for use in Russiansupplied reac[ors in h'an do not cou,W against the 300 kg UF6 s{ockpiie timil,
Enriched uranium in fabricated fue! assemblies flom other sources omside of
han for use in Iran's nuclear research and power teat!ors, including those
which wili be ÿ'abricatcd omside of h-an for the ini{ial fuel toad of the
modernised Arak research reactor, which are certit'icd by lhe fuel supplier and
he appropria{e Iranian atHhority {o meet imernationan standards, will no{ count

against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile HmiR The Joint Commission will establish a
Technical Working Group with ÿhe goal of enabling fuel to be fabricated in
h'an ÿhile adhering to ÿhe agreed sÿockpile parameters (300 kg of up to 3.67 5ÿ
enriched UF6 or 1he equivalent in different chemical forms). This Technical
Workiÿg Group will alSOo within one )'ca,. work ÿo develop objective technicaÿ
criteria for assessing whether fabricated fuel and hs imermediate producÿs can
be readily convened to UF6. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies
and ils imermediaÿe products manufactured in ]ran and cerufied 1o meeÿ
imernadonaI standards, including ÿhose for the modernised Arak research
reactor° will no[ count against the 300 kg UF6 stockpile limit provided Ihe
Technical Working Group o[dÿe Joinÿ Commission approves ÿhat such fuel
assemblies and their intermediale products cannot be readily reconverÿed imo
UF6. This could for instance be achieved ÿhrough impurities te.g. burnable
poisons or otherwise) contained in fuels or {hrough the fuel being in a
chemical form such that direct conversion back ÿo UF6 would be technically
difficult widHmt dissolution and purification. The objecuve technical criteria

wil! guide tlÿe approval process of ÿhe Technical Working Group. The [AEA
will m,,mhor ÿhe fuel fabrication process [or any fue! produced hÿ lran to verify
haÿ tlÿe fuel and imermedhHe producÿs comport with ÿhe fuel fabNcaÿiou
process that was approved by the Technica! Working Group. The .Joint
Commission will able support assistance lo ]ran including through IAEA

2911 (}4


technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification
standards for nuclear fuel produced by [ran.

Iran will seek to enter into a commercial contract with entities outside Iran for
the purchase of fuel for tile TRR and enriched uranium targets. The E3/EU+3
will facilitate, as needed, the conclusion and implementation of this contract.
In the case of lack of conclusion of a contract with a fuel supplier, E3/EU+3

will supply a quantity o[" 19.75(} enriched uranium oxide (U308) and deliver
to h'an, exclusively for the purpose of fabrication in Iran of fuel for the TRR
and enriched uranium targets for the lifetime of the reactor. This 19.75%
enriched uranium oxide (U308) will be supplied in increments no greater than
approximately 5 kg and each new increment wilt be providcd only when the
previous increment of this material has been verified by the 1AEA to have
been mixed with aluminum to make fuel for the TRR or fabricated into
enriched uranium targets. Dan wilt notify the E3/EU+3 within 2 year before
the contingency of TRR fuel will be exhausted in order to have the uranium
oxide available 6 months before the end of the 2 year period.


Consistent with its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, lran will only
engage in production of centrifuges, including centrifuge rolors suitable for
isotope separation or any other centrifuge componems, to meet lhe enrichment
and enrichment R&D requirements of this Annex.


Consistenl with its plan, Iran will use the stock of IR-I centrifuge machines in
storage, which are in excess of the remaining 5060 IR-t centrifuges in Natanz
and the [R-I cenlrifuges installed at Fordow, for the replacement of failed or
damaged machines. Whenever during the 10 year period IYom the slart of the

implementation of the JCPOA. the level of stock of IR-I machines falls to 500
or below. Iran may maintain this level of stock by resuming production of IR-!
machines at a rate up to the average monthly crash rate without exceeding the
stock of 500.


Consistent with its plan, at the end of year 8, lran will cormnence
manufacturing of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges without rotors through year 10 at a
rate of up to 200 centrifuges per year for each type. After year 10. Iran wilt
produce complele centrifuges with the same rate to meet its enrichment and
enrichment R&D needs. Iran wilt store them at Natanz in an above ground
location, under IAEA continuous monitoring, until they arc needed for final
assembly according to the enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.


Iran will notify the IAEA of provisional application of the Additional Protocol
to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance wilh Article 17(b) of the Additional
Protocol pending its entry into force, and subsequently seek ratification and
entry into force, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the

Majlis (Parliament).

Iran will notify Ihe IAEA that it will fully implement the Modified Code 3.1 of
the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran's Safeguards Agreement as long as the
Safeguards Agreement remains in force.


S/2{H 5/547


han a, il] compiete all acd\,'ides as set ou/ in paragraphs 2ÿ 4, 5, and 6 of ÿhe
"Roadmap for Cÿarificadon of Pasÿ and Presem ()mstanding Issues", as

verified by @e ]AEA in its regular updates by @e Dhecÿor General of @e
IAEA on the implementation of @is Roadrnap.


For @e purpose of increasing the efficiency of monitoring for @is JCPOA, ÿ'or
15 years or longer, t:or @e specified verification measures:
67.1. han will permiÿ @e IAEA the use of on-line enrichment measuremem
and elecuonic scab; which communicate their status wi@in nuclear sites
to ]AEA inspectors, as welt as o@er ÿAEA approved and certified
modern ÿcchnologies in line wi@ internationally accep[ed IAEA practice.
[ran will t'acilhaÿe aulornaÿ.ed collection of tAEA measurement
recordings registered by installed measurement devices and sending m
tAEA working space in individua! nuclear si*es.

[ran will make @e necessary arrangements to al!ow for a long-term IAEA
presence, including issuing hmg4erm visasÿ as well as providing proper
working space al nuclear sites and, wi@ best effortsÿ aÿ locations near
nuclear sites in lran for @e designated tAEA inspectors for working and
keq-ing necessary cquipmcnu

67.3. tran will increase @e number of designated tAEA inspectors ÿo @c range

of 130-150 within 9 nmmhs from @e daÿe of {he implemenmti{m of @e
JCPOA, and will generally allow the desigmHion of inN}ectors from
nations @aÿ have diph}mmic relations wi@ -kan, consimem with its laws
and regulations.


han wiI1 permiÿ @e IAEA to monitor, @rough agreed measures that will
include containment and surveillance measures, for 25 years. @at all uranium
ore concentrae produced in h-an or obtained from any o@er source, is
transferred Hy @e uranium conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan or to any o@cr
fulure uranium conversion faciiib, which hmn might decide to build in h'an
wi@in @is period.


han will provide the ÿAEA with all necessary information such @at @e IAEA
will be able to verify @e production of the uranium ore concemraÿe and @e
inventory of uranium ore concentrate p, oduced in Iran or obtained from any
other source R)r 25 years.


For 15 years, tran wiII permiÿ @e IAEA uÿ implement eominuous monitoring,
includinÿ @rouÿhÿ_ containment and surveillance measures, as necessary, m
x, erifv that stored cemrit'uÿes and infrastructure remain in storaÿ,e and are onh,
used 1o replace failed or damaged centrifuges, as specified in @is Annex.




Iran will permit the IAEA regular access, including daily access as requested

by the IAEA. Io relevant buildings at Natanz, including all parts of lhe FEP
and PFEK for 15 years.



For 15 years, the Natanz enrichment site will be tile sole location for all of
Iran's uranium enrichment related activities including safeguarded R&D.


han intends to apply nuclear export policies and practices in line with the
internationally established standards for the export of nuclear material,
equipment and technology. For 15 years, han will only engage, including
through export of any enrichment or enrichment related equipment and
technology, with any other country, or with any foreign entity in enrichment or
enrichmenl related activities, including related research and developmenI
activities, following approval by the Joint Commission.


Requests for access pursuanl to provisions of this JCPOA will be made in
good faith, with due observance of the sovereign rights of Iran, and kept to the
minimum necessary to effectively implement the verification responsibilities
under this JCPOA. In line with normal international safeguards practice, such
requests will not be aimed at interfering with Iranian military or other national
security activities, but will be exclusively for resolving concerns regarding
fulfilment of tile JCPOA commitments and Iran's other non-proliferation and
safeguards obligations. The following procedures are for tile purpose of
JCPOA implementation between the E3!EU+3 and h'an and are without
prejudice to the safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol thereto. In
implementing this procedure as well as other transparency measures, the IAEA
will be requested to take every precaution to protect commercial, technological
and industrial secrets as well as other confidentia! information coming to its


In furtherance of implementation of the JCPOA, if the IAEA has concerns
regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent
with the JCPOA, at locations that have not been declared under tile
comprehensive safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol, |he IAEA will
provide lran the basis for such concerns and request clarification.


If Iran's explanations do not resolve the IAEA's concerns, tlle Agency may
request access to such locations for the sole reason to verify the absence of
undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with tile
JCPOA at such locations. The IAEA will provide Iran the reasons for access in
writing and will make available relevant information.


Iran may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the 1AEA's
concerns that enable the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear
materials and activities or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA at the
location in question, which should be given due and prompt consideration.


If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities
inconsistent with the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the
alternative arrangements agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if tile two sides are
unable to reach satisfactory arrangements to verify the absence of undeclared
nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with tile JCPOA at the


S/20t 5/547

speciiied Rÿcafions within t4 days of @e [AEA% original request lbr aeccs%
1ram in e<msultafion wi@ the members of tile Joh?t Commission. woukt resolve
@e IAEA% concerns @rough necessary means agreed between Iraÿ and the
]AEA. M the abserÿce of aÿs agreemel?t, @e members of the Joint Commissiom
by eoÿsensus or by a voÿe of 5 or more of its g members, would advise on @e
tecessary means Rÿ ÿesolve the ÿAEA"s concerto;. The process of consub.afion
wi@. and any acthm by, the members of @e Joim Commisskm would not
exceed 7 day's, and Iran would iml-qemem the ÿecessary means v,i@in

3 additional days.


Ires alsd @e IAEA v, itl take @c rÿeeessary steps [or eonlaiÿmÿent and
surveillance oÿ eenuqfuge rotor ÿubes and beHov,,s R>r 20 yea>,.

S0, M lhis eoutuxt:
g().l.han will provide flÿe IAEA wi@ an initial invert,cry of all exisfirÿg
centrifuge rok>r ÿubcs and bellows arid subsequent reports oÿ changes in
such illventory and wil! permh, the I[AEA to verify @e inventory by item
coumhtg and numbering, a,ÿd @rough cuntainmenl and surve)llance, of
all rotor ÿubes and bellows, including in aH existiÿ?g and nevdy produced


han will declare aH location, s and equipmem, namNy flow-f'orming
machines, filament-winding machines and mandrels thaf are used for
production of centrifuge rotor tubes or bellows, and wH] permiÿ the ÿAEA
to implement conthÿuous monilorinÿ.ÿ includin£ÿ throuohÿ containment and.
surveilhmee o!ÿ @is eq@pmem, to veril) @aÿ this equipmem is being
used to man@'acture een/riFuges only for the activities specified in @is




For l0 }:ears. Iran°s uranium isotope separalhm-re]ated research and
devdopment or production acfix.ities will be cxclusivNy based on gaseous
centrifuge technology.4 [ralÿ a,ill permit IAEA access to verify thai uranium
isotope separation production aÿd R&D activities are consistent with @is



[ra,ÿ will not engage in the foHov,:ing activities ÿhich could eomribme to the
developmenl o1" a nuclear explosive device:
82.1. Designing. developing, acquh'iÿg, or usiÿg computer medals R> sire@ate
nuclear exNosive deÿices

€ For tMJ purpose of th,s Ampex, non--gaseous centrifuge uranium isotope .,eparaQon-rctated
research and de elopmem or production ÿa, ill include laser is, crepe separation %'stems,

electromagnetic isotope separation ÿystem<, chemical exchange syatems, gaseotts dilTua (m
syslemÿ< xorIex and aerodynamic systems, aÿd other such processes that <,eparate uranium

33/1 @4


82.2. Designing. developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using multi-point
explosive detonation systems suilabte for a nuclear explosive device.
unless approved by the Joinl Commission for non-nuclear purposes and
subject lo monitoring.
82.3. Designing. developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosixe diagnostic
syslems (streak cameras, framing cameras and flash x-ray cameras) suitable
for the development of a nuclear explosive device, unless approved by the
Jo]ili Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring.
82.4. Designing. developing, fabricating, acquiring, or using explosively driven
neutron sources or specialized materials for explosively driven neutron


S/20] 5/547

Attachmeÿt: Arak corÿceptual design
Fuÿdamenta[ Principles:
o Maximize use of @e currem infrastructure of oN2inal desion of Arak research
reacÿor, designated by @e ÿAEA gÿs ÿ[R-40, accordfiÿg {o @eir respective ratings.
o Modernizinÿ of the oriMnaÿ desiÿmÿ in order to be a muhi-pmposc rcsearch
reactor comprising radio-isotope production, structural materials ÿmd fuel (pins
and assembly proRÿtypes) testing and able to conduct other neuÿronic
experiments which demand high neutron fJuxes (more @an t()N).
° Using heavy wafer as coolanL moderator aK] reNecRv. Lighÿ water v,'ouId be
utilized as an ann@m" ring at<rand @e compacl new core for safety reasons if
preliminary characteristics will be loaded.



o Up to 3.67 percent emqd,ed UO:, in @e improved assembly de:dgn° will be
used as furl.
o Power wi]] no{ exceed to 2() MW@.
o Adding difl%renl %pen of beam tubes to *he existing beam tubes which being
extended to @e edge of 1he <ÿcw compact core.
, Having one cemral channd in /he cemer of the new core wi@ passive cooling
system for the purpose of swuclural materials and fuel pins and asscmbb,
prototypes testing with neutro!ÿ flux beyond 2o10 N. twelve in-core irradiation
channels (IJC) inside @e core and {wNve lateral h'radiation thermals (LIC} just
next ÿo @e outer ring of hÿeJ assemblies.
o The location of the in-core and lateral irradiation channels should be designed
and fixed to meet the best anticipated perIbrmances.
o Consistem with reJevant section of Annex I, sibsidiary laboratories fire part of
the modernization prqiect of @e Arak Research Reactor. In Addition. Annex
H1 reinforce design and construction of subsidiary laboratories.
" The highest tolerable pressure for @e first and second loop is 0.33 Mpa (aÿ @e
inlcrance of the reacÿor ph}.
o The highest possible flow rate for coolam i,; 610 kg!s at the pres,ÿure of 0.33
MPa in @e main piping system and 42 Kg/sec for Moderator with the same

35/] {}4


Preliminary Characteristics:
Core Parameters


Power (MW)
Number of fuel assemblies


Active length (cm)


Lauice configuration


Fuel pellets Material


Fuel enrichment level

)p to 3.67 'ÿ

Clad material

Zr Alloys

Burnable poison

Yes, if necessary

attice pitch (cm)
Coolant medium


Moderator medium


Rel]cctor medium


Rcfleclor thickness (cm)
Purity of D2()
Mass of D20 (mtons)

- 50
- 60-70

Yearly makeup



< 1.25

Core Excess reaclivity (pcm)

< 20000

Cycle length (days) <,i, ......... ÿ1,

- 250

2>Pu at EoC (g)

- 850

230pu purity at EoC

- 78c,ÿ

235U consumption
Maximum Thermal Flux. E<0.625ev
Maximum Fasl Flux, E>0.625ev
Minimum Thermal Flux, E<0.625ev
Minimum Fast Flux, E>0.625ev
Fluid velocit-ÿ in channels (m/s)

.ÿ l,!Ol"

ÿ 3.8

Channel mass flow rate (kg/s)

ÿ 2.4

Working pressure (MPa)
Fluid inlet temperature (°C)

ÿ 47

Fluid outlet lemperature (°C)
Core material


- 99.8(ÿ-

- 78
Mainly S.S. 304

Core wall Thichness (ram)

- 30

Fuel Pellet Diameter (cm)

ÿ 0.65

Inner Clad Diameter (cm)

- 0.67

Outer Clad Diameter (cm)

ÿ 0.8

Number of pins per assembly
Mass of UO2 in full core load (Kg)
Core diameter (cm)

ÿ 350
ÿ 240

,}CPOA Annex H - Sanctions-reÿated commitments
The sequence of implementation of the commiiments deÿailed iÿ ibis Annex is
.'ÿpecified in Annex V (ÿ[mplementaÿion Plan) to ÿhis Jtÿinÿ Compÿehensive Plan of

Action (JCPOA).

European Unions
Tiÿe EU and EU Member Sÿates commh wÿ ÿeHÿinate all pFovision:ÿ oi" Council

ReguIaÿion (EU) No 267/20ÿ2 (as subsequenÿ.Jy amended} implementing al!
nuciear-re}aed sanc{%ns oÿ ÿ-esÿric{ive measures as specified in See{ions
l.l-l.lO below, to !eHÿlinaÿe all
of Coÿmcii Decis%n
20I(}/413/CFSP (as subsequently amended} as specit'icd in SecYons 1,1-1.10
below, and to ÿcnÿinate or amend naliomi1 implementing legislation an
teqÿfiled, in accordance with Annex V:
Financial banking and insurance measu rest'
ProhibiYon and authorisaÿion regimes on financial ÿ!ansl'elÿs to and from Iran

(Aÿ'{icle l(} of Council Decision 2(71 (7/413/CFSP; Aÿÿicies 3(}, 30a, 30b alÿd
31 of Council ReguIaÿkm (EU) No 267/2012);
Sanctions on banking activities (Article I I of Council Decision

2(}1 (}/413/CFSP: Aÿqicle 33 of Comÿcil Regulaion (EU) No 267/2012):

l J.4.

Sancÿh)ns on ilÿsulance (Article 12 of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP;
Alÿicle 35 of Council Regulation/EU') No 267/20!2):
Sanctions on financial messaging selvices (AFiiele 20(12) of Council

Decision 20101413iCFSP: Article 23(4) of Council Regulation (EU)

No 267/2012):
1 1.5, Sanctions oÿs financial suppol-ÿ f(u- trade wiih han (Altic}e 8 of Council

Decisiorÿ 20! 0/4 [3/CFSP):
I 1.6. Sanctions on gÿ-anls, financhtl assistance and cotÿcessional loans (Article 9

of Council Decisioÿ 20 I(7/413/CFSP):
I 1.7, Sane{ions on Go',ernmem of han puhiic-guai-anÿeed bonds (AlticIe 13 of

Counci! Decisktn 2010/413/CFSP: Ar{icle 34 of Council Regulation (EU)

No 267/2012): aiÿd
l.S. Sanctions on associated services7 lbr each of the categories above (see {he
references above).

s For the purposes of EU Dgislation, "iranian pcrsom enlity or Body'" means:
(i} the State of ltan oF any public aW.hoÿ-ily thereof:
(ii} aiD natural peÿson ÿn. or ÿesident in, h-an:

(iii} aÿyJegaIperson, entity or body having its registered office in lran:
(ix) any Jega} peÿ-son, entily or body. inside of outside Jr}n. o\ÿ ned or cow, trolled directly or
indirectiy by one o: more of the aboÿ e :::¢ntioned pe:sons o1 Bodies.
<' The headiÿgs and suBheadings in this Annex are for desc:ip:ive pt:rposes only.
v Foÿ the purposeq of {his Aÿnexo the teFm "associated sere:ices means any seevice -- inciuding
{ethnical assistance. {ÿ-aiÿfing. insurance, re-iÿ-o,m-ance, broke_ring, t_ransporlation or financial

sea-vice -- necessa? and ordinarily iiÿcidcm to the underlying activity ioÿ >hich sanction, s haÿe
beeiÿ lifted puÿ-stmnt ÿo ÿhis JCPOA.

37It 04


Oil, gas and petrochemical sectors
Sanctions on the import of oil and gas from Iran (Articles 3a, 3c and 3e of

Council Decision 2010/413iCFSP; Articles 1t, 12 and !4a. and Annexes IV
and [VA of Council Regulalion (EU) No 267/2012);
Sanctions on the import of Iranian petrochemical products Articles 3b and


3d of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP: Articles !3 and 14, and Annex V of
Council Regulation (EU) No 267/20t2);
Sanctions on the export of key equipment for the oil, gas and petrochemical


sectors (Articles 4. 4a and 4b of Council Decision 20101413/CFSP: Articles
8, 9 and 10. atad Annexes VI and VIA of Council Regulalion (EU) No

1.2.4. Sanctions on investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors (Articles

6. 6a and 7 of Council Decision 2010/4t3iCFSP: Articles 17(11, 17(2)(b) and
(c), 17(3), 17(4), 17(51, 20 and 21 of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/20121:
1.2.5. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (set Ihe
references above).

Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors
Sanctions related to shipping and shipbuilding (Articles 4g, 4h, ÿ;a, !8a and
18b of Council Decision 20tO/413iCFSP: Articles 10a. 10b, 10c. 37a. and
37b. and Annex VIB of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012):

Sanctions related to the transport sector (Articles 15, 16, 17 and 18 of

Council Decision 2010i413iCFSP; Articles 36 and 37 of Council Regulation

(EU) No 267/20121: and
1.3.3. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the
references above).
Gold, other precious metals, banknotes and coinage
Sanctions on gold, precious metals and diamonds, banknotes and coinage

(Articles 4c and 4d of Council Decision 2010!413iCFSP: Articles 15 and t6,
and Annex VII of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/20121: and

Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see the
references above).
Nuclear proliferation-related measures
Sanctions related to proliferation-sensilive nuclear activities (goods and

technology, investment and specialised training) (Articles 1(11 (a), (b). (d),
(e), (2), (3) and (4), 2, 3, 5, 14 and 21 of Council Decision 2010/4 13/CFSP;
Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,7. 17(11 and (2)(a), !8, 19 and 22, and Annexes I, II and

III of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012): and

Sanctions on associated services for the category above (set the references


S/2@ 5/547
Sanctions on metals (Articles 4e and 4f of Comwiÿ Decision

20ÿOi4]3/CFSP; Articles 15a, 15b and i5c. ap, d Annex VHB of Council
Reg@a'don (EU>No 267/20ÿ2); and
t Xÿ2.

Sanctions on assoeialod serviceÿ-; for the category above (see ÿhe reference.'ÿ

Sanctions on software (Articles 4i and 4j of Council DecisRm

2010/413/CFSP: Articles 10dÿ 10e aÿsd 101", and Annex VHA of CounciI
Regulation (EL?) No 267/20? 2): and

Sanctions on associated >;ervices for rise category above (see the rcl'erences

Sanctions on arms (Articles J(1)(c), (3) and (4) and 3 oJ'Council Decision
2010/413/CFSP: Articles 5(1)(a) and (c), I7(1) aild (2)(a), and t9 of
Council Reg@afion (EU) No 267/2012): and
] ÿS.2.

Sanctions on assockHed services for the category above (see the refererÿees
above )


Listing of persons, erÿtities and bodies {asset freeze and visa bar0
1.9.1. Asset freeze and visa ban measures applicable to:
1ÿ9.1.!. lisÿed Ira@an banks and financial institufionsÿ includilÿg the Central
Bank of han;

listed persons, enfifics and bodies relaÿed ÿo the oil gas and
petrochemical sectors;


lisÿcd persons, entities alÿd bodies related ÿo shippingÿ sMpbui]ding
and transport:


o@er lis(ed personsÿ amides and bodies not related R} proliFeraÿionsens;idve nuclear-, arms- and ballistic missiJe-rehned activit}es:

listed persons, entities and bodies rNated to proliJ%rafiorÿ-seÿsifive
nuclear-, arms- and ba}liÿ,qic missile-relaÿcd activities; and

1.9. I.6.

entities and indivkluals lisÿed by @e UN SecuriW Council, as seÿ
om in A{mchmenÿ 1, pall I to @is Annex for categories 1.9.1.I1.9.1.4, A{ÿachmeaÿ 2, part I to @is Annex for category, a,ÿd

Parts IX of Attachments 1 and 2 ÿo Ibis Annex for category
(Articles 19 and 20o and Amÿexes I and IX to Council Decision

2010/413/CFSP: Articles 23, 24, 25ÿ 26° 27, 28, 28a, 28b and 29,
arid Amÿexes VII! and IX ÿo CounciI
(EU) No

39/t 04

Other provisions
The commitnaent in Section 1 covers all remaining provisions of Council

Decision 2010/413/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 267120!2 not
specified above.

Definitions (Article t of Council Regulation (EU) No 26712012); and
General and final provisions (Articles 22, 23. 24, 25. 26, 26a, 27 and 28

of Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP: Articles 38. 39, 40, 41, 42, 43.43a,
44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 51, and Annex X of Council Regulation

(EU) No 26712012).

The EU represents that lhe provisions listed in Section 1 above constitute
the full and complele list of a!l EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive
measures. These sanclions or restrictive measures will be lifted in
accordance with Annex V.


Effects of the lilting of EU economic and financial sanctions


As a result of the lifting of sanctions specified in Section 1 above, the
following activities, including associaled services, will be allowed,
beginning on implementation day, in accordance with this JCPOA and
provided that such activities are otherwise consistent with EU and EU
Member Statesÿ laws and regulations in effect:s
Financial, banking and insurance measures (See Sections 1.1.1 to 1.1.8)
Transfers of funds between EU persons, entities or bodies, including EU
financial and credit institutions, and hanian persons, entities or bodies,
including Iranian financial and credit institutions, without the
requirement for authorisation or notification:


Opening of new branches, subsidiaries or representative offices of h'anian
banks in the territories of EU Member States: and the establishment of
new joint ventures, or the taking of an ownership interest or the
establishment of new correspondent banking relationships by Iranian

banks with EU banks; and opening by EU persons, including EU financial
and credit inslilulions, of representative offices, subsidiaries, joint
ventures or bank accounts in Iran:

Provision of insurance or reinsurance to h'an or the Government of han,
an Iranian legal person, entity or body. or a natural person or a legal
person, entity or body acting on their behalf or at their direction;


Supply of specialised financial messaging services to any Iranian natural
or legal persons, entities or bodies, including those listed in Attachment 1
to this Annex:


Entering into commitments by EU Member States to provide financial
support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits.

s Unless specifically provided otherwise, the sanctions lifting described in this Section does not
apply to transactions thai involve persons still subject to restrictive measures and is without
prejudice to sanctions thai may apply under legal provisions other than those referred to in
Section 1. Nothing in this JCPOA reflects a change in Iran's position on EU sanctions.



gtmÿantees or insurance; and inR} commiHÿsenb; [o! ÿiÿraBtsÿ' ÿ


assistance and concessiona] kmns ÿo @e Governmenÿ of han: and

Sale or purchase of punic or pubHe-guarameed bonds m and fiom han,
Jÿe Ooveÿmÿent of kan, ÿbe Cemrat Bank of ]ran, or h-snJan banks and
financia! insfiRHions or persons acting on @eir behaK.
OH, gas and petrochernbalt sectors (See Sections 1.2,1 to 1o2o5}
hnpon, purchase, swap or transport of Iranian crude oil and pewoteum
producÿsÿ naÿuraÿ gas or petrochemical producÿs and relaÿed financing:
Sale, suppIyÿ transfer or export of equipmem or ÿechnoIog), technical
assistance, including ÿraining used in the scours of @e oil, gas and
petrochemical industries in han covering exploration, production and
refining of oil and natural gas, including liquefaction of natural gas, Rÿ any
-Iranian person, in or otHside han, or for use in tran: and


Granting of any financial hmn or credil ÿo, 1he acq@sit[on or extension of a
participation in. and the creation of any join', vemure wi@, any iranian
person flsat is en£aÿedu c in rise oil.
ÿ,as, and petrochemical seeu}rs in han or
omside han.
Shipping, shipbuilding and transport sectors (See Sections 1.3.1 to 1,3,3}
Sale, supply, ÿransfer or export o[ naval equipmenÿ and ÿechnobgy for ship
building, maintenance or refit, to ][ran or to an3, Danian persons engaged in
dis sector: @e desbm construction or @c participation in @e desi<,n or
consuucfion of cargo vessels and oil rankers for Iran or for Iranian
persons: the provision of vessels designed or used for @e transporÿ or
storage of oH and petrochemical products ÿo Iranian persons, emities or
bodies; and the provision of flagging and classification services, including
@one pertaining (o technical specificalion, registration and identification
numbers of any kind, ÿo kanian oil rankers and cargo vessels;


Access to the airports under 1he jurisdiction of EU Member States of all
cargo flights npcraÿed by banian carriers or originating from lran:


Cessation of inspection, seizure and disposal by EU Member Sullen of
cargocs *o and from h-m-ÿ in @eir ÿerritories wi(h regard (o items which are
no longer prohibiled: and


Provision of bunkering or ship supply services, or any o@er scrvbing of
vessels, ÿo Iranian-owned or h'anian-eonlracted ,,esse]s not carrying

prohibited iÿems: and the provision of fuN, engineering and maimenance
services ÿ(ÿ Danian cargo aircraft noÿ carrying prohibited hems.
Goÿd, other precions metals, banknotes and coinage (See Sections 1.4.!
to 1.4°2)

Sale. supply, purchaseÿ export, transfer or ÿranspon of gold and precious
metals as well as diamonds, and provision of relined brokeNng, fhmncing
and seemi%, services, to, from or for @e Governmcnl of ham its public
bodies, corporations and agencies, or @e Central Bask of Dan: and


Delivery of newly printed or mimed or unissued Iranian denomina{ed
banknohÿs and coinage m, or ÿ%r @e benefit of [he Cemral Bank oflran.



Metals (See Sections 1.6.1 to 1.6.2)
Sale, supply, transfer or export of graphite and raw or semi-finished metals.
such as aluminum and steel lo any hanian person, enlity or body or for use
in Iran, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA.
Software (See Sections 1.7.1 to 1.7.2)
Sale, supply, transfer or export of software for integrating industrial
processes, including updates, to any iranian person, entity or body, or for use
in h-an, in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA,

Listing of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) (See
Section 1.9.1)


As a resull of delisling as specified in this Annex, releasing of all funds and
economic resources which belong to, and making available funds or
economic resources {o, {he persons, entities and bodies, including h'anian
banks and financial institutions, the Central Bank of Dan, listed in
Attachment i to this Annex: and


As a resuIl of delisting as specified in Ibis Annex, entry inlo. or transit

through the terrilories of EU Member Stales of individuals listed in
Aÿtachmem 1 to {his Annex.


S/20I 5/547


United States°
The United States commits to cease ÿlÿo appXcafion o£ and ÿo ÿ,cek :¢ucl3
legislative eerier} as may be appropriate to termimÿeÿ or modify to effectuate
the termination of, atl nuclear-related sanctionst° as specified in Sections
4ÿ1-4.9 below, attd {o ÿerminaÿe Executive Orders 13574, 135902 13622 aisd
13645, and Seclhms 5-7 aÿH 15 of Executive Order 13628, in accordance
wilh Atÿnex V.t*
Fhÿanciaÿ and bar, king measures
Satÿcÿions on ÿrassacfions wiÿh individttals and emifies scÿ out in A{tachmem 3
o dsis Annex, inchtdh>g: fl>: Central Bank of ]ran (CB]) and oilier qÿecified
Iranhm financiaÿ insfiludons: die Nathma] Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).ÿ2
Nafÿiran Imertradc Company (NICe), Naliona] hanian Tanker Company

(NÿTC) and off, or specified individuals and entities idemified as Government
of ]ran b) rise Office of Foreign Asset,€ ComroI; and certain designated

individuals and entities on the Spechflly Designated Nationals and Blocked
Persons Lisÿ (SDN List) (Comprehensive han Sanctions, Accoumabi]iwo and

Divcstmem Acÿ of 2010 (CISADA) Section ]04(c)(2)(E)(ii)(]): National
Defense Audsorizafion Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA) Sections 1245(d)(1)
and (3): Iran Fÿcedom and Counter-Proliferation Acÿ of 2012 ([FCA) Sections

1244(c)(1) and (d), 1245(a)(1)(A), (a)(l)(C}(i)(II) and (c), 1246(a) and
1247(a): Secdons t(a)(i) and 5(a) of Executive Order (E.(X) 3622 and
Sec[hms 2(a)(i} arm 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645):
o For the purposes of L;.S. legislation, "'Iranian person"ÿ mean,ÿ (A) an indi\iduat ÿho is a citizen or

nauonal of Iran: and (B) an entity organised under the laws of ]ran or otherwise subject to the
jurisdiction of the GO\lerFu]se[]{ of IFaD.
u The sancthms that the United States will cease to apply, and subsequently terminate, or modify to
effectuate tJ30 termination of. ptlFSUaÿlt to its, commitment trader SectXm 4 are those directed
towards non-V.S, persons, For the purposes of Sections 4 aud 6-7 of this JCPOA, the ÿerm
"non-ki.S. person" means any individual or entity, excluding (i} any, t_lnited States citizem

permanent resident Mien, entiU organised under the laws <)1 the Uni{ed States or any jurisdicthm
within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in ttÿe United States, and
(it) any entity owned or contro!led by a U.S. person. For {lÿe purposes of (it) of the preceding
sentence, an entity is "owned or controlled- by a U.S. person if the U.S, person: (i) holds a

50 percent or greater equity interest by vote or ÿ,alue in the entib,: (it) holds a majorit3 o1: seats
on {he board of directors of the entity: or (iii) otherÿise controls the actions, policies, or
personnel decisions of the entity. U,S, persons and U,S.-ow ned or -controlled foreign entities

will continue to be generally prohibited from conducting ÿransactions of the type permitted
pursuant to this JCPOA, unless authorised ÿ,o do so b,, the U.S. Deparlment of the Treasurys

Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFACL
All citations to statutes and Executive orders iÿseIuded in this JCPOA refer to the statute or
Executive order as amended as of the conclusion date of this JCPOA, including: the Iran
Sanctions Act of 1996 (lSAh as amended by Section 102 of the Comprehensive h-an Sauctions,

Aceoumabi[itv, and Dixestmem Act of 2010 (CISADA) and Sections 20t-207 and 3I I of the han
Threat Reduction and S\ria ÿhnmm Rights Act of 2012 ('FRA): C1SADA. as amended by
Sections 2 t4-2t6, 222,224, 3!I-312,402-403 and 6(}5 of TRA and Section3 1249 of the barÿ
Freedom a,sd Counterq)rolfferation Act of 2012 (IFCA): the NationaI Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2012 tNDAA), as amended by Sections 503-504 of TRA and Section 1250 of
IFCA: Executb, e Order (E.O.} 13622, as amended by Section 15 of E.O. 13628 and Section 16 of
E.O. 13645. The citations) listed in Section 4 inch,de authorities under which secondary sanctions
will 330 longer apply as a resutt of actioÿsq described in Section 4.S.l.
2 Removal o! N]OC from the SDN List, as provided for in Seethm 4.8./, will ÿscludc resohltion of
relaÿcd dey@rmtions and detcrmiÿaationÿ.





Sanctions oll the Iranian Rial (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA
Sections 1244(c)(t), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and
Sections l(a), 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645):
Sanctions on the provision of U.S. banknotes to the Governmcnt of Dan

(NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3): IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1) and (d).
1246(a) and 1247(a): SecHon 5(a) of E.(). 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and
3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645);

Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues held abroad, including

]imitalions on their transfer (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); IFCA
Sections 1244(c)(1). (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and 1247(a): Sections l(a)(i)(it), 2(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O.


Sanctions on the purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of
Iranian sovereign debt. including governmental bonds (NDAA Sections

1245(d)(1) and (3); ]ran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012 (TRA) Section 213(a): lFCASections t244(c)(l) and (d). 1246(a) and
1247(a); Sections l(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Sections 2(a)(i) and
3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645):

Sanctions on financial messaging services lo the CBI and Iranian financial
institutions set out in Attachment 3 to this Annex (NDAA Seclions

1245(d)(1) and (3): TRA Section 220: IFCA SecHons 1244(c)(l) and (d).
1246(a) and 1247(a): Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and Seclions 2(a)(i) and
3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645); and

Sanctions on associated services13 for each of the categories above (see
individual citation references above).
Insurance measures
Sanctions on the provision of underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including
activities with individuals and entities set forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex

(han Sanctions Ac! of 1996 (ISA) Section 5(a)(7): NDAA Sections
1245(d)(1) and (3): TRA Sections 21t(a) and 212(a): ]FCA Sections
1244(c)(1) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a): Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and
Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645).
Energy and petrochemical sectors
Efforts to reduce Iran's crude oil sales, including limitations on the quantities
of Iranian crude oil sold and the nations that can purchase Iranian crude oil

(ISA Section 5(a)(7): NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3); TRA Seclion
212(a); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(I) and (d), 1246(a) and 1247(a); Section 1 of
E.O. 13574, Sections l(a)(i)-(ii), 2(a)(i) and 5(a) of E.O. 13622, Section 5 of
E.O. 13628, and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645):

Sanctions on investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods.
services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for
Iran's oil, gas, and petrochemical sectors (ISA Sections 5(a)(1)-(2) and

3 See footnote 3 for the meaning of"associated services".



(4}-(8): TRA Section 212(a): IFCA Sections t244(c)(t). (d} and (h)(2),

1245(a/(I}(B), (a)(1)(C)(i)(l)-(II) (a)(1)(C)(ii)(ÿ[}-(II) and (c} 1246(a} aÿld
1247(a): Section 1 orE()t3574ÿ Section t ofEÿ(). !3590ÿ Sections ÿ(a)(i)(ii), 2(a)(i)-(iii) and 5(a) of g.(). 13622 and See@ms 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of
E!). 13645):
4S.3. Sanctions on @e purchase, acquisition, saleÿ trarÿsportation, or marketing o[

petrochemical producrts and natura! gas from [ran (NDAA

Sections 1245(d)(1) and (3}: TRA Section 212(a); IFCA SectRms I244(c)(ÿ}ÿ
(d} and (h)(2)° 1246(a) and !247(a}, Sec@ons l(a)(i)-(iii), 2(a)(i)-(ii) and 5(a)
of E.(}. 13622° and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645):
4L4. Sanctions on @e export, sale or provision of refined petroIeum producÿs and

producÿs t.o [ran (ÿSA Seclion 5(a)(3): NDAA Sectkms
1245(d)(1} and (3): TRA Section 212(a): IFCA Sections 1244(c)(t) and (d),
1246(a) and 1247(a}: Section 1 of El). 13574, Sections I(a)(i} and 5(a) of
E.O. 13622, See{ion 5 of E.(}. 13628, and Sections 2(a}(i) and 3(a)(i} of E.O.
J ,q-}45):


Sanctions on transactions wi@ Iran's energy sector including wi@ NIOCÿ

N]C() atÿd INITC (NDAA See{ions 1245(d)(1) and (3): IFCA Sections
1244(c)(1). (d) and (h)(2), 1246(a) and I247(a); TRA Section 212(a}:
Sections l(a)(i)-(iii). 2(a)(i)-(ii)and 5is) of E.O. 13622, and Sections 2(a}(i)
aÿ?d 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645t: and

Sanction, s on associated services i%r each uf the categories above (see
individual citalion references above),

SMppiÿlg, shipbuiÿdirÿg and port sectors
Sanc[R,ns on transactions wi@ Iran's shipping and ,shipbuilding sectors and
port operators including IRtSLo Sou@ Shipping Line, and NITC, and @e port

operator(s) of Bander Abbasta (TRA See@ms 211(a) and 2!2(a); IFCA

See@ms 1244(c)(1) and (d): 1245(a)(1)(B), (a)(l)(C)(i)(I)-(I1); (a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)(II) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a): Section 5(4) of E,(). 13622 and Sections
2(a)(i} and 3(a)(i) of E!). 13645): and

Sanclions on assoeialed services for each of @e caegories above (see
individual citation rd%rences above).
Gold aÿd other precious metMs
Sanctions on h-an's trade in gold and o@er precious metals (NDAA Sections

1245(d)(1) and (3): IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1), 1245(a)(1)(A) ar@ (c),
1246(a) and 1247(a): See{ion 5(a} of E.O. 13622 and Scetions 2(a)(i) and
3(a)(i) of E.©. 13645): and

Sanctions on associaÿ.ed services for each of the categories abo\e (see
individual citation references above).
Software and metaJÿs
Sane{ions on trade with Kan in graphi{eo raw or semi-finished ruetais such as
alumhÿum and sÿccl, coal, and sotiware for inteÿraing industrial processes.

4 This commi{ment iÿs Section 4.4.t is based on @e poll operator(s'} ÿ,1 Bandar .&bba,ÿ no }onger
being controtIed by a person on the SDN Li.q.



in connection with activities consistent with this JCPOA, including trade

with individuals and entities set forth in Attachments 3 and 4 to this Annex
(NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) anti (3); IFCA Sections 1244(c)(1),
1245(a)(I)(B)-(C) and (c), 1246(a) and 1247(a): Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622
and Sections 2(a)(i) and 3(a)(i) of E.O. 13645): and

Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see
individual citation references above).
Automotive sector
Sanctions on the sale. supply or transfer of goods and services used in
connection with Iran's automotive sector (NDAA Sections 1245(d)(1) and

(3); IFCA Sections 1244(e)(1), 1245(a)( 1 )(B), (a)(t)(C)(i)(II),
(a)(t)(C)(ii)(lI) and (c). 1246(a) and 1247(a): Section 5(a) of E.O. 13622 and
Sections 2(a)(i). 3(a)(i)-(ii), 5 and 6 of E.O. 136457: and

Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above (see
individual citation references above).

Designations and other sanctions listings
Removal of individuals and entities set out in Attachments 3 and 4 to this
Annex from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List
(SDN List), the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List. and/or the Non-SDN Iran
Sanctions Act List (Removal of designations and/or sanctions imposed under

ISA Section 5(a), IFCA Section 1244(d)(t) and TRA Section 212; and
removals pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of
certain persons listed pursuant to E.O. 13382, E.O. 13608, E.O. 13622, and
E.(). 13645).
Nuclear proliferation-related measures
Sanctions under the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act on the
acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities
contemplated in the JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other
non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT:

Sanctions on joint ventures relating to the mining, production, or

transportation of uranium (ISA Section 5(b)(2)); and

Exclusion of Iranian citizens from higher education coursework related to
careers in nuclear science, nuclear engineering or the energy sector (TRA

Section 501 ).

Other trade measures


The United States commits to:ÿ5


Allow for the sale o1" commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and
services to han by licensing the (i) export, re-export, sale. lease or transfer to
Iran of commercial passenger aircraft for exclusively civil aviation end-use,

5 To give effect to lhe measures described in this Section 5.1, the United States will license
aclivilies thal do not involve any person on the SDN List and are otherwise consistent with
applicable U,S. laws and regulations, including but not limited to the Export Administration Act.
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the tran-lraq Arms Nonproliferation Act.


q/2(t! 5/547

(ii) exporÿ, re-exporL sate, lease or transfer to ÿran of spare parÿs and
components ÿ'or comruerciaI passenger ah-crafÿ, and (iii)
associated service& including warranÿyÿ maintenance, and repair services and
safely-re]stud inspections, i)r all ÿhe f(;regoing, provided ÿhat ÿicensed iÿems
and services are used exclusively for commercial passenger aviation: ÿ(,

License non-U.S, enÿities thai are turned or cormoiled by a U.S. person 17 ÿo
enoa<m in activities with h-an ÿhaÿ are consisÿ.ent wiflÿ this JCPOA and


License flÿe importalion imo flÿe United S{aÿes of Iranian-origin earpcÿs and
foodstuffs, including pistachios and caviar.


The United Stal.es represents ÿhaÿ the provisions iisÿed in Section 4 above
comÿtilute the full and complete lisl of all US. nuetear-relaÿed sancÿiuns.
These sanctions wil! be lifted in accordance wiÿh Annex V.


Effects of the Hfting of U.S. ecmÿomic artd finaneiaIÿ sarÿetiorts:


As a resuh of flÿe lifting of sanctions specified in Section 4 abmc, begimÿing
on implementation day such sanctions, ineluding associated servicesÿ would
not apply ÿo non-U.£, persons who carry oul the tbIlowing or thaÿ: is


Financiaÿ and banking measures lÿ; (See Sections 4.1°1 to 4olo7)
Engage in activhies, including financial and banking hansacÿi(ms, ,,iÿh tlÿc
Governmem of Iran, ÿhe Central Bank of Ires, hanian financial hÿ>;tiÿmions
and oÿher Iranian persons specified in Attachment. 3 ÿo ÿhis Annexÿ including
the provision of loans. ÿransfers, accoums (including ÿlÿe opening and
maintenance of correspondent and payable /hmuglÿ accounls at non-U.S.
financial insÿitutionsL, invesmÿems, securities,
ÿuarantees, foreiÿ,nÿ exchange
(including Rial related transactions), letters of crcdil and commodity fmures
or options, the provision of spccialised financial messa<qn<, ÿer\ices and
faciJilation of direcÿ or indirecÿ access {hereto, the purchase or acquisi{ion by

' Licenses issued in Jm-therance of Section 5.I.1 will include appropriate conditions to ensm-e thai
licensed actixities do not involve, and no licensed aircraft, goods, or services are re+old or re-

transferred to, any person on the SDN lisL Should the United States determine that licensed
aircraft, goods, or services have been used for purposes other than exclusively civil aviation enduse, or have been re-sold or re-transferred to persons on the SDN List, the United States would

slew this as grounds to cease performing its commitments under Section 5.1. l irÿ whole or in

t? For the purposes of Section 5.1.2 of this JCPOA, ÿ non-U.S, entity is, owned or controlled b5 a
U.S. person if the U.S. person:(i) holds a 50 per cent or greater equity interest by voleor alue
in the emily: (it) holds ÿ majorit} of seats on the board of directors of the entity: or (iiit
otherwise controls the actions, policies, or personnel decisions of the entity.
s Unless specificaIly proxided otherwise, the sanctions lifting described in this Section does not
apply to transactions that inÿ,ohe persons on the SDN List and is u, ithoul prejudice to sanctions
that may apply under legal proxisions other [han those cited in Section 4. Nothing in this JCP()A
relteet'ÿ a change in Iran's position on C.S. sanctions.
*ÿ) For the purposes of the cessation of appticalion ef the provisions ÿet out in Sections 4.1.1 --4.1,7,

the effects described for non-U.S, financial institutions extend to the activities outside of El,S,
jurisdiction of international fimmciai institutions.

47/i 04


the Government of h'an of U.S. bank noles, and the purchase, subscription to,
or facilitation of the issuance of h'anian sovereign debt.2°

Insurance measures (See Section 4.2.1)
Provide underwriting ser,!ices, insurance, or re-insurance in connection wilh

aclivities consistent with lhis JCPOA, including activities with individuals
and entities se! forth in Attachment 3 to this Annex, including underwriting
services, insurance, or re-insurance in connection with activities in the
energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors of Iran. for the National Iranian

Oil Company (NIOC) or the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), or
for vessels that transport crude oil, natural gas. liquefied natural gas,
petroleum and petrochemical products to or from Iran.

Energy and petrochemical sectors (See Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.6)
Are part of the energy sector of Iran: purchase, acquire, sell, transport or
markel petroleum, petroleum producls (including refined petroleum
products), petrochemical products or natural gas (including liquefied natural
gas) lo or {rom h'an: provide to lran support, investment (including through
joint ventures), goods, services (including financial services) and technology
that can be used in connection with Iran's energy sector, the development of
its petroleum resources, its domestic production of refined petroleum
products and petrochemical products: or engage in activities with Iran's
energy sector, including NIOC, NITC, and NICO).

7.5. Shipping, shipbuilding and port sectors (See Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.2)
Are part of the shipping or shipbuilding sectors of lran; own. operate, control
or insure a vessel used lo transport crude oil, petroleum products (including
refined petroleum products), petrochemical products or natural gas
(includinÿ liquefied natural
ÿ,a<ÿ,, to or from lran: operate a port in han,
engage in activities with, or provide financial services and other goods and
services used in connection with, the shipping and shipbuilding seclors of
Dan or a port operator in lran (including the port operator(s) of Bandar
Abbas-ÿl), including porl services, such as bunkering and inspection.
classification, and financing, and the sale, leasing, and provision of vessels

to Dan, including to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL).
NITC. and South Shipping Line Iran or their affiliates.

Gold and other precious metals (See Sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.2)
Sell, supply, export or transfer, directly or indirectly, to or from Iran, gold
and other precious metals, or conduct or facilitate a financial transaction or

eo Non-U.S.. non-Iranian financia! institutions engaging in transactions with Iranian financial

institutions (including the Central Bank of Iran) not appearing on the SDN List will not be
exposed to sanctions as a result of those lranian financial institutions enÿ,aÿ*in,,e ÿ ÿ_ in transactions or
banking relationships involving Iranian individuals and entities, including financial institutions.
on the SDN List, provided that the non-U.S., non-Iranian financial institution does not conducl
or facilitate, and is not otherwise involved in, those specific transactions or banking relationships
with the Iranian individuals and entities, including financial institutions, on the SDN List.
2ÿ The effects described in Section 7.5 with respect to the porl operator(s) of Bandar Abbas are
based on the port operator(s) of Bandar Abbas no longer being controlled by a person on the

SDN List.



services for ÿ[se foreÿ,oilÿ


itssurancc and

Software and metals (See Sections 4.6ol to 4°5°21
Sell, supply, or transfer° direcqy oÿ iIÿdirectly, grapiaiÿc, raw or semi-finished
mcÿaIs such as alumirmm aÿsd sÿcol, coal trod sofÿ\vaÿc for inlegraÿing
JndustrJaJ iwocesses, ÿo or lix}m Iran in cormecÿier} with activities consisÿem

with 1Isis JCPOA, includilÿg ÿrade wifls iÿdividuats aÿd elsti[ies set forth in
Altachmcnt 3 to this Annex, aisd [he sale, supply, or transfer of such
malerials lo the energy, petrochemical, shipping and shipbuildisg sectors of
h-an, alÿd [ranfan porÿ_s, or conduc[ or facili[ate a fhÿancial [ransacÿion or
provide ser\.qces for ÿJÿe foregeirÿ$, inc]udhÿg [nsm-ance and ÿraÿspor/aÿ[on.

Automotive sector (See Sections 4o7ol to 4°7°2)
Conducÿ or faci]iiaÿe I'inancia] or ,,)thor l:ransactioÿss ['or the sale, suppJ}r or
raÿsfer to han of goods and services used in comÿccfion with ÿhe aulomofive
sector of Iran.


Desigÿmtions aÿd other sanctions ÿistings (See Section 4o8°1}
The removal of designafioÿs amilor sa,ÿcfioÿs as described in Section 4.8ÿt,
ceasing dÿ.e app]icalhm of secondary sanction, s for ÿrarÿsactions wiflÿ
individuals aÿd eraifies seÿ out iÿ Atÿachmeÿt 3 ÿo fiÿis Annex; and mÿb!ocking
of property and imerests iÿ pÿ'operW wi[hin U.S. jurisdic{io,ÿ for individuals
and entities set ou{ iÿ Atmchmcn[ 3 to [his Ampex.

49/t @4


REG ULATION (E U ) N O 267/2012
AHMADIAN, Mohammad


B £FENI, Naser