Jose P.

Chaparro
Philosophy of Law

External and Internal PoV

To explain the external and internal points of view, with regards to rules and obligation, Hart

uses the example of a traffic signal. In this example there is an observer and a group member, each of

which will allow us to see intuitively what each point of view entails. We can use the same example to

hash out what Hart meant as well as what he is reluctant to explore.

Consider first an alien intelligence, ignorant of the traffic, and also not particularly curious

about the lives of people. They would observe the traffic signal and come to see the regularity of the

red light and the stopping of traffic. The light goes red, the people stop, those who don't suffer

penalties, and the rule might become apparent. Red means stop, and this rule is enforced by some kind

of authority. Further investigation by this intelligence might lead them to who decreed this order. Here

we can see the strictly external understanding of the rules and obligations. The alien intelligence

understands the rule as a sign that can predict the behavior of the people in transit. There is a

probability that the travelers will obey the rule and stop, and there is a probability that those disobeying

will be punished. The intelligence might see how this order may flow from some command to the

group members.

Hart is right to point out the gaps in the description of such a predictive theory. The external

point of view is missing a lot, but it is not hard to see why the alien intelligence we have imagined

would be missing so much. The odd lack of curiosity in this alien is the root of this issue in this

imaginary case. Upon observing the traffic signal rule, an intelligence used to a community or

interactions like ours, might naturally wonder why people obey this rule. This opens the door to the

inner workings of the minds of the group members that follow the rule. Hart has made an attempt to fill

in these missing details. He points out that beyond the external, we use moral vocabulary to describe

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Philosophy of Law

the relations we have with rules. For example, some group members consider they have an 'obligation'

to follow the rule. They believe they 'ought to' act in accordance with it, because it is the 'right' thing to

do. Hart claims these terms apply to rules, not regardless, but perhaps without necessarily considering

their moral content. It seems true, when we postpone the discussion of moral content, that many laws

still demand relations like 'duty' and 'obligation', making us use the moral vocabulary. This, however, is

a deceptive intuition.

In discussing the internal point of view, Hart is careful to separate the feelings of any group

member from their obligations. A hardened criminal, he points out, might no longer feel any duty to

certain laws, but this does not exempt them from their lawful obligations. We, the other group

members, may still feel that they have these obligations. The duty that binds them in our community is

not dependent on their emotional state. But at this point the discussion is lacking. Yes, Hart is right to

point out that from the internal point of view of an agent laws may be somehow binding. However, it is

not difficult to see that there are more weighty laws than others. The duties and obligations can vary in

gravity, and they ought to bind, if they are to be binding at all, regardless of how an agent will feel.

This is a familiar Kantian conception of morality. The reason moral vocabulary applies to some rules

we call laws, and not rules of a game, is because they do in fact have moral content. By asking us to

postpone the discussion of moral content Hart makes it appear that perhaps laws are the kinds of rules

that can have binding claims regardless of such content. This is not the case.

Laws are binding because of others around us and ourselves. The development of the

relationship between a system of ethics and the law is obviously far beyond the scope of this paper.

However, when we consider the internal point of view and its power to give reasons or dictate duties,

we cannot avoid discussing it normatively. There must be a reason for a law to impose this duty,

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Philosophy of Law

whether it be a distinct moral principle that is entailed in the content or the law, or we consider

following the law a moral principle in itself. It would be ridiculous to regard some duty as appropriate

if we could find no reason for it. If the duty of a law was not good, or right, what would it mean? An

agent that did not consider following the law a good thing, and did not consider the content of the law a

good thing, would only follow such a law if they were forced or acting randomly.

The external point of view, a purely descriptive and predictive model of the law, can capture all

the things we can observe in legislation and practice in the world. There are rules made, incentives put

in place, and enforcement, all to observable degrees. This is an important part of philosophy of law.

The next step in this external point of view is perhaps determining how it ought to work best. As for the

internal point of view, a purely descriptive model would require a more psychological analysis of how

the laws might bind. A philosophical one, however, demands that we look for reasons behind these

bonds. And if these are to be the bonds of obligation, not fear or stupidity or other fickle feelings, they

must appeal to our reason. Reason has to provide the connection to the content of the laws, or the law-

following duty that would establish this bond. The realm of our reasons for action, and reasons that

oblige is morality. This is why Hart should not hesitate to bring in the moral content of laws or law-

following as soon as he intends to fill in the missing internal point of view. Only the externalist's

descriptions can be free from moral content. So long as the group members under the law are intelligent

rational beings, their internal point of views will depend completely on how they reason they ought to

act in relation to the law.