The War of Independence

The 1948 war was the climax of the rising Arab-Israeli tensions in the British
mandate of Palestine. As Bregman states in his book Israels Wars 1947-93, under
the British rule, which lasted from 1917 to 1948, the influx of Jewish immigrants was
exacerbating the already ancient problem of the clash of rights, that is, the claim
of the Arabs and Jews to the same land. The Jews called Palestine Eretz Yisrael
the land of Israel, their spiritual and cultural home, promised to them by God, also
the Arabs considered Palestine their home, since they considered themselves the
descendants of Ishmael - Abrahams son. But the conflict between the two nations
was (and still is) more complex that just a quarrel of canonical origin. Jews believed
that the Land of Israel was the only place in the world where, after centuries of
persecution in their native countries, they could feel safe. The Arabs, however, felt
very dissatisfied, feeling that the Palestinian Muslims were burdened with paying
the prices of crimes committed against the Jews by mostly occidental countries.
What worsened the situation was the fact that the Jewish immigrants started
purchasing large swaths of land from the Arab landlords, which combined with the
philosophy of many Jewish settlers who believed that they should work it
themselves (Avoda Ivrit Jewish work) effectively deprived many Palestinians of
work. The British Government also played an important role in aggravating the
tensions in Palestine, first by committing to the establishment of a national home
for the Jews in Palestine, clearly expressed in the Balfour Declaration of 1917.
Unfortunately, the British government did little to stabilize the situation when
Palestine descended into a state of civil war, with the government of Winston
Churchill busy evacuating British citizens from the mandate. Interestingly, the
evacuation was ordered even before the UN decided on diving it into two states (UN
General Assembly Resolution 181).
Suez Crisis
The underlying factors which eventually triggered off the Suez crisis were more
political than as in the case of the 1948-49 War, which was more of an
ethnic/religious nature. As Vatikiotis points out in his book Nasser and His
Generation the Middle East of the 1950 was an area where four different struggles
were overlapping. The first was the Cold War competition between the US and the
Soviet Union in the region. The second was the determination of the local Arab
leaders to oppose the remaining influence of the two colonial powers Britain and
France. The third was the rivalry inside the Arab world over the leadership in the
region (most notably Egypt and Iraq), known as the Arab Cold War.
The Egyptian example is especially important in this context: Egyptian president
Gamal Abdel Nasser, who came into power as a result of the 1950 coup of Free
Officers, believed that Egypt would not be safe until it established itself as an
undisputed leader in the region. This translated into his anti-British rhetoric, as well
as his financial support for the Fedayeen raids into Israel, which caused mounting

tensions with the British and the Israelis. However the event which is often cited as
the direct reason for the military confrontation amongst Egypt, Israel, Great Britain
and France broke out was the nationalization of the Suez Canal. The nationalization
was Nassers response to withdrawal of financial aid of the US government for the
Aswan Dam on 19 July 1956. Egypt nationalized the Canal on July 26, closing it the
same day for Israeli shipping. Egypt also blocked off the Gulf of Aqaba, which
according to many was a violation of the 1949 Armistice Agreement. The plan to
attack Egypt was formulated by the future aggressors in the Protocol of Sevres on
22 October 1956. The signatories had different motivations: Britain wanted to
maintain its position of a Great Power in the Middle East, France treated Nasser as
an enemy because of the fact that he was sending arms to the Algerian rebels,
while Israelis were troubled by the Fedayeen attacks as well as the blockade of the
Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal to their shipping.
Six-day war
Apart from the obvious catalyst in the form of Soviet manipulations, the 1967 ArabIsraeli was a culmination of rising tensions between Syria and Israel. There were
three main issues which made the eventual confrontation between the two states
almost inevitable. The first one was the Israeli project to divert water from Lake
Kinneret to the Negev desert, where its scarcity was impeding the plans of
populating and industrializing the area. Syrians opposed these plans and embarked
on diverting the two main rivers supplying the sea with water: Hatzbani and Banyas.
This situation even led to an exchange of fire between the sides, however, in the
end, Israel managed to realize its project. The second issue was the support of the
Syrian government to various Palestinian military groups, which were often
trespassing into Israel in order to terrorize populations living close to the frontier.
The third flashpoint in the relations between Israel and Syria was the issue of
control over the DMZs. The three zones located west of the international border
were occupied by Syria in 1948, and subsequently demilitarized under the 1949
armistice agreement between the countries. Both sides were dissatisfied with their
status and were persistently looking for ways which would give them control of the
territories.
Conclusion
I personally believe that there are three main reasons why none of the military
conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbours between 1949 and 1967 managed
to put an end to the Middle--Eastern dispute. Fist, each of these wars finished with
an undisputed Israeli victory, only in one conflict (Suez Crisis) the IDF was fighting
against one country, in the two other instances it managed to fend off attacking
armies of a number of Arab states, which were not only cooperating between each
other but also were vastly superior in the number of troops and the amount of
military hardware. These victories gave the Jewish people a great sense of pride,
but at the same time humiliated the Arabs. This resentment which was initially the
product of 1948-49 War was further cemented by every subsequent military defeat

of the Arab armies, often led into battle by populist leaders beating the drums of
nationalism and national pride. Over generations many Arabs internalized the ethos
of conflict between the Arabs and the Jews to a level where reconciliation has
become impossible, not because of the difficulties in material retribution but
because of deep grudge nourished by feelings of humiliation, injustice and the
longing for revenge. The significance of emotions in the Arab-Israeli conflict was
analysed by Khaled Fattah and K.M. in their article published in the European Journal
of International Relations A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and
Political Violence in the Middle East. Moreover, these conflicts have also produced
great numbers of Palestinian refugees. The Arab-Israeli conflict was already very
difficult to solve after the 1948-49 conflict which forced over 700.000 Palestinians
out of the former British mandate. Then the Six-day War produced another 300.000
Palestinian refugees after Israel took over Gaza and the West Bank(unrwa.org). The
refugee problem poses an important obstacle in the Arab-Israel relations till this
day, it is often exploited by different Arab leaders who portray themselves as the
defenders of the Palestinians, but it also inhibits the realisation of any peace
initiatives within Israel which could solve the issue of Palestinian statehood(Forsythe
in UNRWA, the Palestine Refugees, and World Politics: 1949-1969).
Bregman explained Israeli gains from the 1948-1967 conflicts in the following light:
the War of Independence created the state of Israel, the Suez crisis once again
opened the Gulf of Aqaba and Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, as well as, through
the introduction of UN peacekeepers in the Sinai Peninsula, it stabilized the southern
frontier for over a decade. Finally, the Six-day war opened the Western Wall in
Jerusalem and the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron to the Jewish worshippers. It was
hard to expect the state of Israel to make great strides in order to appease its Arab
neighbours if all the wars it won against them were so strategically beneficial for the
Israeli statehood, and from then on Israel found itself in a position of strength in
relations with the rest of Middle East.