SEARLES SPEECH ACTS IN A THEORY OF LANGUAGE USE

Adetutu, Olusola Joseph

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Background

2 Relevant Issues
2.1 Saying What to Whom?
2.2 The Controversy of Acting

2
2
4

3 Analysis of Data
3.1 The Basic Five
3.2 Searles Taxonomy in a Natural Language Environment

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4 Conclusion
Bibliography

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BACKGROUND

Language is mans unique tool for communication. The practical use of this complex tool is
guided by meaning-determining factors, conversation-internally or otherwise. This is natural
language.
Therefore, a theory which accounts for natural language must: establish the creation of meaning
relations; then account for the communicative roles of these relations in various situations on
universal, extra-linguistic grounds. Only this is an exhaustive theory of language use.
Considering these, I opine that such theory operates on a context-semantic interface. The theory,
while acknowledging that, unlike metalanguages, natural language is both a linguistic and extralinguistic system of communication, is bound to locate utterances in universal situations.
What I therefore undertake in this essay is; place Searles (1975) taxonomy of illocutionary acts
on a semantic scale, where I consider them as effective communicative delivery of speaker
intentions. I then place them on a context scale, where I consider them as adequate or otherwise
both in universal and contextual instances. I have chosen Searle (1975), because his illocutionary
acts are the immediate intentional content of (his proposed) speech acts.

RELEVANT ISSUES

2.1

Saying What to Whom?

Language users use language as a tool for expression. While the act of expressing, on the one
hand, is an act; what is expressed is, on the other, another act. I will refer to the former as a
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communicative act and the latter, as in the literature, a speech act. This is precisely stated when
Halliday (1979: 196) says that language, which is a semiotic system, is a code having two or
more realisational cycles in it, so that the expression of content 1is itself a content [2]that in
turn has its own expression. Therefore, by saying
(1) I will help you
I have created two forms: the physical and the intentional form. Therefore, (1) is a first
content (the physical) which expresses another content whose own (indirect) expression, is that
of a promise (the intentional) the illocutionary force.
The illocutionary force accompanies a proposition the specific intentional weight of an
utterance. This might be confusing, since it suggests that different illocutionary forces occupy
different positions on a single continuum of force (Searle, 1975: 345) and because a single
proposition might have varying illocutionary forces. (2), for instance, might have the force of an
assertion or an order but a single proposition that the wine is good.
(2) The wine must be good
Searle (1979: 178) himself admits that the problemof the theory of language [use] is to
describe how we get from the sound to the illocutionary acts (Rajagopalan, 2000: 348). Searles
sounds is the communicative act, which Austin (1962) terms locution (cited in Grundy, 2000:
51).
While a movement away from the locution, L yields a single proposition, herein abbreviated P; a
movement further away might yield two different illocutionary forces, 1 and 2 . This

establishes three levels, LP1 / 2 .

Therefore, what determines transition LP is not what determines transition PF. For example,
while the fact, P, that the wine is good is correct based on evidence available to and observed by
me, I might be, for instance, asserting 1 as a wine taster or ordering 2 a non-challant apprentice
wine-maker.

This possible diversity brings up what Searle (2002: 4) calls constitutive rules, the basic form
of which is: X counts as Y in C. So what is C? C is a condition that must be for an act to be
performed.
Since most natural language utterances are vague (Green, 1996: 11), the derivation of specific
meaning would engage the interlocutors, the utterance, and the context. Context therefore is an
extra-linguistic phenomenon, on whose basis specific meaning is derived from locution. The
question then is: is it context or condition(s) that is more important for the derivation of specific
meaning from utterances? For the sake of brevity, I will only practically pursue this further in
Section 3.

2.2

The Controversy of Acting

The idea of acting with speech is itself debatable; let alone the identification of what particular
act a speaker performs with his speech. It is a known fact that, as Grundy (2000: 52) says, the
meaning that utterances have as a result of our understanding what they count as doing was first
described by Austin (1962). However, Austins perspective, though unquestionably still
relevant, has been under heavy criticism by pragmaticists like Allan (1986), Searle (1975).

Probably the most confusing factor in Austins perspective is his emphasis on performatives.
This, I believe, is what led him on to a supposedly precise speech act construct. While a
taxonomy of speech acts is bound to be unspecific, Austin makes generalisations such as the
classification of intend, which is in fact not intending, as a performance of intention (Searle,
1975: 352).
Any act performed through the production of speech is a speech
act, including referring and predicating, as well as explaining,
intimating and nagging, but none of them can be performed by
[merely] naming the act...
Green (1996: 68)
It is not merely by stating but by carrying out the act in speech that a speaker realises a speech
act. A bully is not regarded so, just because he says
(3) I hereby threaten you
According to Searle (ibid), there is no particular rule guiding the classification of illocutionary
verbs into categories. These absent rules are felicity conditions. Even though Austin
acknowledges these general conditions, he does not give answer to the question: What
SPECIFIC requirements must be satisfied, before an utterance is a PARTICULAR speech act
type? Even though Searle (1975) provides definitive differences in speech act categories such as
the inevitable role of authority in directives, these too may not be accurate in a theory of
pragmatics. Thomas (1995), in Paltridge (2006: 59) opposes this notion of definitive constitutive
rules and propose non-definitive principles (similar to Grices maxims) instead, since it is
extremely difficult to device rules which will satisfactorily account for the complexity of speech
act behaviour. This means that: X may count as Y, when C is not. For instance, when a student
tells his flatmates, with whom he is currently in a competition:
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(4) I challenge us to win this competition

he is modestly ordering that a new and probably better course of action be taken by them (his
flatmates and him) to win the competition; but he is definitely in no place of authority.
Despite such slacks in his ideas, Searle (1975: 351) must be credited for his observation that,
owing to the absence of classification guidelines my cover term for rules and principles,
Austin(assumes) that a classification of different verbs is eo ipso a classification of kinds of
illocutionary acts. Austin must have been working in line with the Performative Hypothesis.
Now a less popular perspective on speech acts, its primary proposition was that the underlying
linguistic representation of every sentence contained as its highest clause, a performative verb
and a first person singular subject (Green, 1996: 69). There was no performance of a speech act
when: (a) the performer was not the (first-person singular) subject; (b) the verb was not an
explicit performative; and (c) there was no syntactic structure [ NP [ V [

NP + VP]]] or

[ NP + VP]. It did not acknowledge congratulate as a behabitive in (5) but in (6).

(5) [ [ I] [ want you to know [

I congratulate you]]]

(6) [ [ I] [ congratulate you]]

Searles observation probably makes him disregard the verb-act approach and rather
acknowledge implicit performatives and the fact that not all speech acts are sewn in the matrix
clauses predicate (performative) verb but some are in the verb of a subordinate clause.

ANALYSIS OF DATA

3.1

The Basic Five

Searle formalises his taxonomy, being careful not to confuse illocutionary verbs with: (a)
illocutionary acts; (b) manner-stating verbs; and (c) predicate verbs.
Representatives have a peculiar characteristic feature which I call Polarity. Its propositional
content (p) is either true or false, while its illocutionary force indicates the speaker only believes
that (p). This is to show that the speaker holds the truth-condition of the proposition on a bi-polar
basis.
(7) I affirm that technology is bad
(8) I deduce the sun will rise at 0600
Both (7) and (8) are quantifiable on a polar scale, since (p) might be false hence technology
turns out good and the sun rises at 0559 or 0601 or some other time.
Directives are acts that, through whatever means, try to make the hearer do something. This
ultimately implies that what is to be done is spatio-temporally located in the future. The peculiar
feature of this type is that what follows that is, (p) the illocutionary verb (in the case of direct
speech acts) is expected to be carried out by the hearer in a way that conforms to the speakers
expectation. When I say
(9) I advise you step away from the river bank
I expect that (p) that you step away from the river bank be carried out as I propose(d).

Commissives obligate the speaker to a course. This course is spatio-temporally located in the
future. However, since it is the speaker and not the hearer who is obligated to perform the action,
(p) is not a polarity element but a realisable element. Therefore, when I say
(10) I vow to be your husband, till death do us part
(11) I guarantee that this device will not be faulty for at least two years
I commit myself to a string of situations not a single event.
Expressives state the speakers disposition to a current state of things. There is no stipulated
attitude of the speaker; it is a variable. While, in contrast, all commissives show an intention of
the speaker to do (p); some expressives approve, some disapprove of (p); and so on. Polarity and
the spatio-temporal Future do not have a role to play here, since (p) is undisputable, for example,
my childs misdemeanourin
(12) I apologise for my childs misdemeanour
Declarations do not state existent facts but instigate change in facts. This means the
performance of the illocutionary verb is ultimately equal to a change in fact. Therefore, when a
minister says
(13) I pronounce you man and wife
he changes a fact fianc and fiance to man and wife, hence an instigation of change by the
performance of pronounce.

3.2

Searles Taxonomy in a Natural Language Environment

A theory of language use is one that does not only deal with natural meaning but also non-natural
meaning. Non-natural meaning is that which is found in non-conventional language. Also,
natural language is the language employed by its speaker for everyday discourses. This use
makes it impossible for it to conform to a perfectionist, semantic model but a radical,
nonconformist pragmatic model.
I will adopt Dascals (2003) description in no similar order here, since he only lists the points.
Also, I will merge some of them to avoid redundancy.
Grammar is probably the greatest weakness of Searles taxonomy. He (Searle) probably took
the first wrong step, when he admitted in his (1975) publication that the differences he had
specified between his five speech act types inevitably had effects on their syntactic forms. By
this, I mean that in a syntactic analysis of (14), for instance
(14) I promise to get there soon
the grammar must specify a [PAST] time for the action to which the speaker commits
himself. The deep structure of (14) is (15).
(15) [ I promise [

that I will get there soon ]]

Will indicates future time; therefore, the speech act, according to Searle, is fine. However, what
Searle is not aware of is that transformations only operate on the deep-structure level; while
natural language merely deals with the surface structure of utterances. Searle forgets that he

(1969: 18) admits that a transformational analysis of natural language is extremely misleading
(cited in Rajagopalan, 2000: 348). In natural language, I might say
(16) I promise you an apple
which is not analysable by a generative grammar. Searle (1975: 363) prescribes the structure
below for commissives.
I verb (you) + I Fut Vol Verb (NP) (Adv)
The deep structure of (16) is (17).
(17) I promise (you) + you will get an apple
Searles prescription works well for the first but not the second part. While he acknowledges that
you is optional in the former, he does not acknowledge that I is (also) a variable in the latter
because, as he believes, commissives must explicitly commit the speaker. But that is not the case
the speaker might merely be assuring the hearer that, no matter the circumstances, the hearer
will get an apple. He promises a future occurrence; not his performance of a future action.
Also, unlike the Gricean model, Searles taxonomy is monological, and the taxonomy which is
practically grammatical cannot comprehensively study conversations which are the true uses of
language. Searles (1992: 143) argument, in Dascal (2003: 518), is that conversation does not
name a unit of meaning, but a speech act does; therefore, to him, if this one engagement is
generalised, the mere study of a single speech act will satisfy the requirements of natural
language.

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(18)

1 is

1:

You did not do what you promised yesterday

1:

I apologise for that. I was busy. I promise to do it tomorrow

2:

Okay

2:

Wait a minuteyou were not even around yesterday

an (indirect) elicitation of a reason why speaker B did not do as he promised. While Searles

taxonomy does not account for the apology and the (new) promise in

1,

if at all account for the discourse relevance of the discourse move

taxonomy stipulates that commissives (as in

1)

it cannot satisfactorily
2.

This is because the

commit only the speaker, but

is not even an

illocutionary act hence it is not analysable and/as relevant. An adequate taxonomy will regard
implicature for relevance to be established between

2 and

1.

Furthermore, Searles taxonomy is formal. This also stems from its relationship with grammar.
The model does not deal with language as used but as it is. Searle and Vanderken (2005) propose
what they call the illocutionary logic. This is a formal prescription that stipulates the guidelines
for use in a natural language. This logic does not let a language user have parameters to utilise in
the realisation of his communicative performance. What it does is study the common (F) of
speech act types and justify the taxonomy based on that. However, this is inaccurate. For
instance, if Searles (1975) specification for expressives is to be followed, (14) will clearly be an
apology.
As a natural language instance however, this might not be expressing, to a college principal, a
fathers disposition to his childs misbehavior but a non-literal commissive expression of a
determined intention to reprimand the child, when father and son get back home. This
interpretation is possible with external determining factors such as: (a) the childs prior

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knowledge of a reprimand-misdemeanour pattern; or (b) the loud tone of the father, who also
looks disappointedly at the child, as he speaks.
An instance like (19) clearly implies that, as Dascal (2003: 518) states, Searles speech act theory
is semantic. They do not recognise certain basic external factors. Through its acknowledgment
of Austins (1962) felicity conditions, the taxonomy recognises only a few factors such as
interpersonal relationships, social status, and so on (Searle, 1975), but this is not entirely
pragmatically practical. Context is a safer extra-linguistic element, but a generative model
unlike a functional one as that proposed in Halliday (1979), Halliday and Matthiessen (2004)
cannot satisfy this.
According to Searles taxonomy, (19) does not pass as a commissive.
(19) I will be with you in a second
The speaker knows that he cannot and he does not intend to do the impossible. According to
Searle (1975: 356), the illocutionary force of commissives is I which stands for Intention but in
figurative (19), the speaker does not intend to be with the hearer in a second. This is merely an
extreme expression. Since the sincerity condition has been violated, Searles taxonomy regards
this as a non-pass.
This instance is proof that a taxonomy which satisfies a theory of language use is one which
employs principles as opposed to constitutive rules. The Gricean model is clearly functional and
not generative in this aspect, since it, aside employing principles, even allows for the flouting as
well as the violation of these principles.

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4.0

CONCLUSION

Illocutionary acts operate on the semantic level, because conversations are functional constructs
that operate on a pragmatic level, as opposed to the structural constructs of utterances and
sentences. Taxonomies of speech acts, such as Searles, therefore are hardly adequate for the
description of language use. It is concluded that Searles taxonomy is an inadequate, though
useful, tool for a study of language use.
(a) Because they are highly prescriptive, constitutive rules are inapplicable to conversations
which, being a series of both subtly and directly connected utterances, require a flexible,
descriptive model.
(b) That (F) and (p) are equidistant derivations of locutionary acts makes Searles taxonomy
practicable only in a context-free environment (cf. section 2.1).
(c) Transformations, which are features of a generative model applicable to single units of
language, merely disorient the pragmatic analysis of language (use).
(d) Since it is generative, Searles taxonomy is only a prescriptive theory of communicative
competence and not a theory of performance if I am to follow Lyons (1977)
distinction, adopted in Dascal (2003: 545).
(e) Even in the case of single utterances, sincerity conditions are not an adequate means of
accounting for communicative but linguistic competence (cf. section 3.2).
(f) In a case entirely different from that of context, Searles taxonomy is incapable of
handling non-natural meaning. Though also not single-handedly adequate, a functional
approach is more effective (cf. section 3.2).

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On the whole, since functionalism too is an extremist mistake (Dascal, 2003: 539), Searles
taxonomy should not be outright discarded: though it is inadequate, it is yet useful.

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