Case

Narrative: Ill admit it, my family is anti-black. In fact, a

growing problem in latinx communities is that we refuse to
engage the problem of antiblackness, refuse to acknowledge
its existence. Id come home from a long days work with my
father, sitting at the dinner table asking them if they heard
about the stories of lives being taken on the news. Were they
black? Yes, then they deserved it I couldnt fathom such
hatred and racism from a family of immigrants. Thats really
racist dad well I guess im a racist my father would say, in
the broken English he acquired while living in the states. do
you think youre martin luther king or something?, it felt like
my family was coopted by civil society. Although it isnt
apparent to us that where we live was a military occupation
zone, I understood it as what fanon called occupied
breathing, our thoughts were occupied to sustain the
narrative to justify violence against other oppressed
communities. Thats how they get us, we fight eachother so
the white man can pillage what we got while were focused on
our neighbors. Thats military presence. Thats what it means
to live thinking our violent thoughts came from us alone.
We are in a militarized space, the 1AC was a pedagogical
performance advocating for the ending of militaristic presence
while also redefining military presence to be psychoanalytic as
well. Otherwise we as educators cannot evaluate the cultural
hegemony that is engrained in cultures. We think its
specifically important to highlight the 1AC as a methodological
praxis of attacking the psychoanalytical space of military
presence.
1. Asnwering Tuck and Yang NO link, merely acknowledging
that there is suffering in other parts of the world if not
the damage centered research that Tuck and Yang is
criticizing.
2. Performative contradiction, if merely saying that there is
suffering in other parts of the world is the link, they
magnify the link by talking about everyone who is
affected by eurocentrism is destined for destruction
3. Answering wilderson evidence: We dont believe that
white people are key to solving for the affirmative.

4. Answering troops leaving already, extend our Ginoza

evidence that says that military presence is NOT just foot
soliders on the ground. Assuming so wipes away the
cultural impact that military presence has led on the
psyche.
5. No link on the Wilderson evidence, we arent white fem
make them prove it
6. No link on the Crenshaw evidence, we call into question of
race and how psychic military presence changes their
culture to be on the side of civil society
7. Answering Heliport evidence, no evidence that the
heliport will be built, merely that it is being proposed.
Along with that no-link, you vote on the pedagogy
produced in the 1AC not the end game. If the 1AC
pedagogy was benefical you vote on it

Offcase
Nothing about the performance of the 1AC presumes that
maps are neutral, the affirmatives understanding that
military occupation is everywhere and in every mind. The 1ACs
performance of breaking down the main narrative of military
presence as being solely done in physical instances and
singular events and not the psychoanalytic approach solves for
the criticism much better than the alternative. Before
individuals can attempt to fight against maps, they must be
able to understand that the maps are not true.

1. Answering Harley: No-Link Make them prove a specific link

to the 1AC, merely uttering the words Okinawa is not
sufficient.
2. Answering Fedman: No link-If merely uttering the words
Okinawa is the link threshold that we will hold, they self-link
into the criticism.
3. If we arent able to reference certain areas where
colonization occurs we arent able to access the vast amount
of critical knowledge to combat colonization within the context
of the topic areas
4. Frame the entirety of the debate of a question of reverse
causality, while colonizers used maps as a tool for domination
taking away those are just one tool in the colonizers arsenal.
Frame the debate under this pretense: does understanding
maps differently change the way the colonizer functions? Or
does rethinking our orientation to the colonizer solve.

5. Rethinking of the cultural mapping of military presence was

always a part of the 1AC. Not understanding that cultural
hegemony is also a form of mapping to construct the physical
military bases as the center of their cultural mapping only
allows for individuals to justify that leaving the country is
enough and allows whites to wipe their lands clean from the
impacts that modernity has left behind.
6. White Cleaning DA - Explaining colonization through a purely
cartographic lens gives whites the ability to claim that once we
embark on the alternative and rethink maps, they find
justification in their cartographic mappings of cultures
throughout their daily lives.
7.Current efforts to redefine mapping practices and
subsequent epistemology reifies the white imperialism that
perverted it in the first place. A new methodology from the
subject position of the oppressed is the only way to solve
Dogde, Perkins, Kitchins 2009 [Dodge, Perkins, Kitchin; Rethinking Map;
2009; Martin Dodge - School of Environment and Development, University of
Manchester, UK; Chris Perkins - School of Environment and Development, University of
Manchester, UK; Rob Kitchin - National Institute for Regional and Spatial Analysis and
Department of Geography, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Ireland ; BM]
A major methodological element of map studies should be to explore the political economy of contemporary

In the late 1980s social constructivist research began to interrogate the

power of mapping and its historical implication in capitalist modes of production (see
for example, the classic studies by Harley 1989; Harvey 1989; St Martin 1995). Similarly, there were a
number of studies on the use of cartography in the propaganda of nation states and
others (e.g. Monmonier 1996a). However, a political-economic approach is very rarely taken
in studies of contemporary mapping, despite the fact that the vast bulk of mapping,
measured in terms of volume, scale and spatial coverage, is still produced and
owned by government institutions and large corporations. This concentration of
spatial power is likely to remain the case into the future as well, notwithstanding
the current fashion and fascination with open maps made with volunteer effort . So
tracing the monetary and political structures underlying the production of maps
used in everyday practice is worthwhile. The fact that we seem to have more free
access (i.e. underpinned by advertising revenue) to detailed mapping than ever before, via Internet portals
masks continuing limits to availability of large-scale data that stem from official and
corporate secrecy (cf. Lee and Shumakov 2003). Decisions on where capital is being
invested to produce updated and new maps, data and delivery systems affects, in practical and
political terms, how the world is going to be envisioned cartographically in the future, but
mapping.

is opaque to scrutiny. Who controls what gets mapped when you enter a mundane geographical search query on
the Web, or type a postcode destination into the find menu on your satnav, or text locate on your phone?

Tracing out patterns of capital investment, government subsidies, licencing fees

and profits that circulate continuously, but unseen, through maps can reveal the
wider power structures in which everyday mapping practice is situated, many of which
are several steps removed from moments of use.

8.Its not about the maps, its about how the colonizers USE
those maps
Kitchen, Geography Professor at National University of Ireland,
Maynooth, Perkins Senior Lecturer of Geography at University
of Manchester and Dodge Senior Lecturer of Human Geography
at University of Manchester, 11 (Rob, Chris and Martin, June 2nd 2001,
Rethinking Maps: New Frontiers in Cartographic Theory, p. 10,11, Accessed 6/30/14,
ESB)
Despite the obvious advances of the various social constructivist approaches in
rethinking maps, more recent work has sought to further refine cartographic thought
and to construct post-representational theories of mapping. Here, scholars are
concerned that the critique developed by Harley and others did not go far enough in
rethinking the ontological bases for cartography, which for them has too long been
straitjacketed by representational thinking. As Denis Wood (1993) and Jeremy
Crampton (2003) outline, Harleys application of Foucault to cartography is limited.
Harleys observations, although opening a new view onto cartography, stopped
short of following Foucaults line of inquiry to its logical conclusion. Instead,
Crampton (2003: 7) argues that Harleys writings remained mired in the modernist
conception of maps as documents charged with confessing the truth of the
landscape. In other words, Harley believed that the truth of the landscape could still
be revealed if one took account of the ideology inherent in the representation. The
problem was not the map per se, but the bad things people did with maps
(Wood 1993: 50, original emphasis); the map conveys an inherent truth as the
map remains ideologically neutral, with ideology bound to the subject of the
map and not the map itself. Harleys strategy was then to identify the politics
of representation in order to circumnavigate them (to reveal the truth
lurking underneath), not fully appreciating, as with Foucaults observations, that
there is no escaping the entangling of power/knowledge. Cramptons solution to the
limitations of Harleys social constructivist thinking is to extend the use of Foucault
and to draw on the ideas of Heidegger and other critical cartographers such as
Edney (1993). In short, Crampton (2003: 7) outlines a non-confessional
understanding of spatial representation wherein maps instead of being interpreted
as objects at a distance from the world, regarding that world from nowhere, that
they be understood as being in the world, as open to the disclosure of things. Such
a shift, Crampton argues, necessitates a move from understanding cartography as a
set of ontic knowledges to examining its ontological terms. Ontic knowledge
consists of the examination of how a topic should proceed from within its own
framework where the ontological assumptions about how the world can be known
and measured are implicitly secure and beyond doubt (Crampton 2003). In
other words, there is a core foundational knowledge a taken for granted ontology
that unquestioningly underpins ontic knowledge.

9. Aff is a pre-requisite to a alternative, cartographic mapping

within the context of the criticism is solely on the physical
sense, the drawing of borders and such. Aff is a criticism of the
colonizers cultural cartographing of what it means to be
Okinawan.
10. Historical context makes Okinawa the key site of
contestation - questioning cultural mapping is key
McCormack 8 [Gavan, meritus Professor and Visiting Fellow, Division of Pacific and
Asian History @ Australian National University, "THE ALTERNATIVE TO JAPAN'S
DEPENDENT MILITARISM, October 20,
http://www.britannica.com/bps/additionalcontent/18/35010252/The-OkinawanAlternative-to-Japans-Dependent-Militarism-Japanese-translation-available/fulltext]
This is a slightly abridged English version of a talk delivered in Japanese (see
attached text) at the offices of the Ryukyu Shimpo in Naha, Okinawa, on the
occasion of the award of the Ikemiyagi Shui Prize to Japan Focus on 18 September
2008. An abridged version of the Japanese text was published in Ryukyu shimpo on
22 September 2008. It was posted at Japan Focus on October 13, 2008. Okinawa is
simultaneously Japan's periphery and its centre . It is peripheral for obvious
geographical reasons, being much closer to the China coast and Taiwan than to
Tokyo, but it is also peripheral in the historical sense that its links with the main
Japanese islands, and eventually with the modern Japanese state, have been thin,
fraught, and relatively recent. Only belatedly incorporated as a prefecture in the
Japanese state in the late 19th century, it was then excised from it between 1945
and 1972, and only half restored to it in 1972, since the US bases remained intact. It
has continued since then to be governed as if the US-Japan Security Treaty mattered
more than the Japanese peace constitution, half-in and half-out of the country, so to
speak. Though thus peripheral, Okinawa is also "central" in that it constitutes the
fulcrum on which the key security relationship between the US and Japan rests.
Okinawa's culture, with this "half in and half out" quality and the blend of the premodern, modern, and post-modern, reflects this ambiguity. With only relatively faint
traces of Yamato, Tenno, samurai, imperialist/militarist, and salaryman cultures, and
with strong elements of shamanism and sense of affinity with Asia and the Pacific,
Okinawa appears as both "Japan" and "non-Japan." Because of its difference,
mainland elites have tended to look on Okinawa as backward, but the same
qualities may rather signify Okinawa's strength, offering the mainland a glimpse of
what its multicultural future and bonds to Asia Pacific nations might look like. The
contradictory forces that surround Okinawa are burdensome, but they generate a
tension and openness, and a level of hope, civic responsibility and energy
unequalled elsewhere in Japan. Without such qualities, Okinawa could never have
become the byword for grassroots democratic struggle that it has become. In the
post-Cold War world, the US has called for Japan to play a greatly stepped up
military role (from the 1996 "Guidelines" to the 2005-6 "Beigun Saihen" or US
military realignment), and governments in Tokyo have done their best to comply. My
understanding of this is that these measures deepen and reinforce Japan's
dependence and therefore its irresponsibility, transforming the long-term dependent

and semi-sovereign Japanese state of the Cold War into a full "Client State." [1] Far
from pursuing its own "values, traditions, and practices, " (as other scholars have
argued) 21st century Japan scraps them in order to follow American prescriptions,
and the present political confusion stems at root from this identity crisis. US Officials
such as Richard Armitage (former Deputy Secretary of State), Thomas Schieffer
(ambassador) and Defense Robert Gates (Defense Secretary) offer Japan a steady
stream of advice - pushing, pulling, and manipulating it in the desired direction, to
"show the flag" and "put boots on the ground" in Iraq, to send the MSDF to the
Indian Ocean (and keep it there), to revise Ampo de facto and the Constitution
explicitly. Yet few ordinary Japanese people share these priorities. It is as much
these days as most can manage to cope with livelihood problems - pensions,
welfare, and jobs - and so governments, torn between their desire to serve
Washington and their need to seem to be serving their own people, always incline to
attach priority to the former. In the post Cold War decades, the contest in Japan
between civil society and state power has nowhere been sharper than in Okinawa.
Okinawa's modern history is commonly seen as a series of acts of shobun, or
disposal, in which Okinawan people had no say and their interests were
disregarded, first in 1879, when the Ryukyu kingdom was abolished and the islands
incorporated, as Okinawa, in the Japanese state; second in 1952, when sovereignty
was restored to the rest of Japan but Okinawa, its land and population having been
devastated in the Battle of Okinawa, was turned into a US military colony, "Keystone
of the Pacific," a center for the cultivation of "war potential," and preparation for
"the threat or use of force" such as was forbidden under Article 9 of the Japanese
constitution; third in 1972, when the islands were returned to Japan, but with bases
and the island's military mission in the service of American power intact; and fourth
in 1996, when the return of Futenma base was promised "within five to seven years"
but with the catch that it would have to be replaced, the replacement facilities
would also have to be located in Okinawa, and Japan would have to foot the bill. The
Japanese state has struggled since 1996 to secure the compliance of the Okinawan
people to an agenda whose core is priority to the US alliance over the constitution,
priority to military over civil or democratic principle, and priority to the interests of
the Japanese state over those of the Okinawan people. The cycle of shobun
(disposition)and teiko (resistance) has been almost endless. The contest that has
evolved especially since 1995 seems to me to be the defining, still unresolved,
struggle of Japanese democracy. Priority to military over civil is what is known in
neighboring North Korea by the term Sengun. Nobody, so far as I know, compares
Okinawa with North Korea, but is the analogy not apt, at least in this respect? The
state demands Sengun, and civil society attempts to articulate Senmin, the priority
to citizen values and lives and to peace. For the US and Japanese government, the
priority to Sengun is plain. The state's design was disguised first as a "Futenma
return," that turned out to require the construction of a major new base. The base
was disguised first as a "helipad," then as a removable, offshore pontoon with a
runway, initially 1,500 meters but gradually stretching to 2,500 meters, before
eventually assuming the current form of dual 1,800m runways stretching out from
Cape Henoko into Oura Bay, plus a deep sea naval port and other facilities, and a
chain of helipads scattered through the forest - a comprehensive air, land and sea
base. The people of Nago rejected the designs in their plebiscite of 1997, only to be

betrayed by their mayor. They persisted in rejecting the offshore Henoko design
until in 2005 Prime Minister Koizumi announced that the state had given up because
of "a lot of opposition," whereupon, however, the state drew up the current design.
The helipad of 1996, has now evolved into a design for the comprehensive
militarization of Yambaru, the northern reaches of the main island. The outcome
remains uncertain. Governments and bureaucrats continually renew their strength
and, backed by the resources of tbe state, often seem omnipotent. In 2007, even
the MSDF was mobilized to take part in an almost certainly illegal survey and to
intimidate local protesters. The people, on the other hand, tire, age, and sometimes
surrender. Yet, despite everything, for this struggle to be able to stall
implementation of a project prioritized by the governments of the world's two most
powerful countries for a decade indicates its profound historical significance . In July,
the Prefectural Assembly took an unequivocal stance of opposition to the new base.
[2] Yet Governor Nakaima Hirokazu now quietly abandons both the conditions on
which his predecessor had insisted (joint civil-military use, a 15 year limit, and
assurance of no harm to the environment) and those which he himself had
demanded (a shifting of the base site offshore into Oura Bay), and argues that
"realism" demands viewing the project as a fait accompli - a kind of "reluctant
realist" pose - and so the construction at Cape Henoko should go ahead, under the
subterfuge that what was to be constructed would not be really a "new" base
because it would in part be constructed on the site of an existing one. [3] Mainland
civil democracy is so enfeebled that the Beigun Saihen process of incorporation of
Japan's Self Defense Forces under American command in the global "war on terror"
passes with little debate or protest. For Okinawa, stepped up militarization is likely
to lead, as it did 63 years ago, not to increased but to diminished security, and it is
certain to increase conflicts between the US military and Okinawan people, so civil
society is compelled to respond. Okinawa is a litmus test of Japan's
constitutionalism. From 1945 to 1972, "Japan" was divided into the mainland "peace
state" under the Constitution and its Article 9 on the one hand and the Okinawan
"war state" on the other, both tied symbiotically within the US's Pacific and Asian
Cold War system. Since the "reversion" of 1972, the reinforced Okinawan "war
state" has begun to erode the fabric of the "peace state" mainland. As Article 9 is
steadily emptied out, the "peace" and "war" functions merge, Ampo trumping
Kempo. Although the Nagoya High Court held in April 2008 that the Japanese
intervention in the Indian Ocean in the form of dispatch of MSDF to refuel US and
allied ships was unconstitutional, the politicians who represent the Japanese state
treated it as a kind of joke. The Foreign Minister said he would read the judgment if
he had time and the head of the Air SDF dismissed it with a vulgar comic expression
as something that had "nothing to do with us." Such contempt for the constitution is
plainly in breach of Article 99, but it is an attitude that has permeated the higher
echelons of state ever since the landmark US intervention of 1959, of which details
have only recently come to light. [4] Outside the state bureaucracy, however, civil
society strongly mobilizes at the grass-roots) to protect and demand adherence to
Article 9. The "Article 9 Society," founded in 2004, has blossomed into a nationwide
movement with over 7,000 branches. The power of such grassroots mobilization
was evident in the Upper House election of 2007, when the revision-intent Prime
Minister suffered a humiliating electoral rebuff. The Okinawan experience also raises

large questions about other clauses, notably those on Local Self-Government,

especially A 93 and A 94, since Okinawan self-government has repeatedly been
subordinated to the requirements of the US alliance. Recently, instead of seeking
the informed consent that a democratic society demands, governments have
sought instead to gain formal consent, by fiscal manipulation that combines
incentives and threats. It is a stratagem developed over the past decade by the
bureaucrats at the helm of the nation state to impose their base project on Nago
City. Since Nago opposition to the new Henoko Base was plain, and the formal
consent of local self-governing bodies was necessary, money was poured in to
secure it under the 10 year, 10 billion yen per year, "Northern Districts
Development" policy adopted in 1999. That procedure, codified in May 2007 under
the Special Measures Law on the Reorganization of US Forces in Japan (Beigun
saihen tokubetsu sochiho) was then applied nationally, so that in that additional
sense mainland Japan experienced "Okinawa-ization." The "Nago model" has proved
singularly effective, as shown during 2008 by the defeat of Mayor Ihara Katsusuke in
Iwakuni and the surrender of Mayor Hoshino Katsushi in Zama to plans for expanded
US military presence in their cities. But even as the state seemed to triumph by
using the new law to eliminate opposition to the Beigun Saihen at the local
government level, the Okinawan prefectural assembly adopted its historic
resolution, showing that that was far from being guaranteed. The employment of
fiscal pressures to break popular will and buy consent encourages cynicism and
corruption, blocks true development rooted in local needs, and is plainly contrary to
the spirit, even if within the letter of democracy (cf. the regional self-government
clauses, especially A93 and A94). It seems to me as a historian that the roots of the
present "Okinawan problem" are embedded in a past that goes back long before the
US-Japan Security Treaty. It is just 400 years since the Okinawan (Ryukyuan) king
enunciated the principle of Nuchi du takara or non-resistance, in the face of the
Satsuma samurai's Sengun, initiating the process of forceful incorporation by Japan.
Sengun militarism has been the bane of Okinawa ever since - under Satsuma, the
modern Japanese state, the US, and now the joint US-Japan regime. Article 9 was in
1946 a new and astounding reversal for mainland Japan, but for Okinawa it was a
reversion to an ancient ideal, and to the centuries when the culture of these islands
was a byword for sophistication, culture and peace. If it were indeed the case that
Nuchi du Takara principle encapsulates some Okinawan essence, then it is up to
present-day Okinawans to spell out ways, not just for Okinawa but for humanity, to
come to terms with nature, finding a way beyond both war and rampant
developmentalism with its environmental destruction . I have said enough about war.
In the public works-centred economy that has prevailed in Okinawa for the three
and a half decades since reversion, nature has come to be seen as something to be
"fixed" (by seibi) in a process that has virtually no limit. [5] As a result, the natural
environment, notably in the form of the coral, the dugong, the noguchigera, is under
siege. Only a recovery of Nuchi du takara values (and within them, presumably, a
reassertion of cooperative, non-market, yuimaru values) can hope to save it. Plainly
the Yambaru can be either militarized or protected, can follow either "Sengun" or
Nuchi du takara, not both.

11.Colonized communities have known this for generations, aff

is a prior question because otherwise people will believe those
maps are capital T true
-Perm do the aff and interrogate the borders constructed
through psychoanalytic military presence.