Professional Documents
Culture Documents
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
21 July 2015
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 70597/11) against the
Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(the Convention) by a Latvian national, Mr Mairis Meimanis (the
applicant), on 10 November 2011.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr S. Vrpi, a lawyer practising
in Riga. The Latvian Government (the Government) was represented by
their Agent Mrs K. Lce.
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that on account of the interception
of his telephone conversations his Article 8 rights had been violated and that
there were no effective remedies in the Latvian legal system by which to
complain about such breaches. He also alleged that the proceedings before
the Constitutional Court had not been public and that he had been denied the
right to be heard.
4. On 7 December 2012 notice of the application was given to the
Government.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Riga.
6. He is currently on trial in criminal proceedings instituted on
30 December 2005 for an attempt to take a bribe, together with A.B.
and A.S. At the time the applicant was the head of a division in the
Economic Crime Bureau (Ekonomikas policijas birojs) in the Main Police
Department in Riga (Rgas galven policijas prvalde).
7. According to the applicant, during his trial before the appellate court,
he learned that an operational investigation (operatvs uzskaites lieta) had
been opened in respect of his co-defendant A.S.
8. According to the Government, on 27 December 2005 the operational
investigation had been opened on the basis of information provided by a
private person. On 28 December 2005 the relevant authority, the Bureau for
the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (Korupcijas novranas un
apkaroanas birojs the KNAB), had informed the prosecutors office
about this. On the same date, a Supreme Court judge had authorised the
interception of A.S.s telephone conversations and the prosecutors office
had authorised an undercover operation (operatvais eksperiments). On
29 December 2005 the Head of the KNAB had authorised the interception
of A.B.s telephone conversations on the basis of section 7(5) of the Law on
Operational Activities, and they included conversations with the applicant.
On 30 December 2005 the KNAB had informed the prosecutors office
about the operational measures under the same provision. The Government
did not adduce any evidence in this connection.
A. Operational activities and the applicants complaints in that
regard
9. On 22 January 2009 a judge of the Criminal Cases Chamber of the
Supreme Court (Augstks tiesas Kriminllietu tiesu palta), in the context
of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, requested information
about the operational investigation.
10. On 18 February 2009 a specialised prosecutor, having examined the
material in accordance with section 35(1) of the Law on Operational
Activities, replied that the operational investigation had been opened on 27
December 2005. In respect of the applicant, no interception of telephone
conversations had been carried out in the context of that operational
investigation. However, she noted that his conversations were recorded if
he was speaking to [a person], whose conversations were intercepted in
accordance with the Law on Operational Activities. According to the
applicant, he learned about this information during the appellate court
hearing on 22 October 2009.
11. On 22 October 2009 the applicant requested the prosecution
authorities to review the lawfulness of the operational measures which had
been carried out and asked specific questions concerning these measures.
12. On 4 November 2009 the specialised prosecutor replied, among
other things, that on 28 December 2008 an undercover operation had been
approved on the basis of section 15(3) of the Law on Operational Activities
as such did not infringe his rights to be heard, but submitted that it had to be
examined in each particular case and that the court was not allowed to reject
a request in connection with the gathering of evidence without examining its
necessity, significance or procedural legal grounds.
23. On 25 January 2011, in a closed preparatory meeting, the
Constitutional Court examined the case materials and found that the
documents contained therein were sufficient for the purposes of examining
the case by means of a written procedure (sections 22(10) and 281 of the
Law on the Constitutional Court). On 26 January 2011 the applicant was
informed about this decision and was given 15 days to see the case materials
and to give his opinion in connection with them (section 281(2) of the Law
on the Constitutional Court). The applicant used this possibility.
24. On 11 May 2011 the Constitutional Court delivered its ruling in case
no. 2010-55-0106 and held that the contested legal provisions complied
with the Constitution and the Convention. The relevant part reads as
follows:
11. ...
It follows from the case materials that, on 27 December 2005, the KNAB opened an
operational investigation. Interception of the Applicants telephone conversations was
carried out from 29 to 31 December 2005, that is, for three days under section 7(5) of
the Law on Operational Activities (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 85 86). There is
no dispute that the Applicant also participated in the telephone conversations which
were intercepted.
...
13. The Applicant and the Ombudsman argue that the restriction of rights
established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities is unclear. It is
impossible to understand the meaning of to prevent. Nor can it be understood what
preconditions need to be fulfilled in order to take operational measures under the
special procedure where immediate action is required. Therefore, the restriction of
rights established in the above-mentioned legal provision has not been provided for by
a properly adopted law (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 7 8, and Vol. 3, pp. 46-48).
...
13.2. The Applicant argues that the provisions of section 7(5) of the Law on
Operational Activities must be applied only when necessary to prevent serious or
especially serious crimes. Consequently, the operational measures contained in this
provision cannot be performed for the purpose of detecting (atklt) a criminal offence.
...
The first sentence of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides that
... operational activities may be carried out to react immediately to threats of criminal
offences as referred to in this provision and [that] corresponding operational measures
[may be taken] to prevent these offences. However, the fact that detection of criminal
offences has not been mentioned expressis verbis in section 7(5) of the Law on
Operational Activities, does not exclude the obligation to observe the purpose of
operational activities. [The Constitutional Court] can agree with the arguments of
Parliament and the KNAB, namely, that when carrying out activities mentioned in
section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, a criminal offence can be prevented
and detected as well. When taking operational measures to prevent criminal offences,
some [other] criminal offence may also be detected. For instance, in the case of the
taking of a bribe, operational measures may prevent a criminal offence, as well as
identifying the persons involved in giving such a bribe. Therefore, it can be concluded
that the term to prevent in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities includes
not only prevention of crime, but also detection of other criminal offences.
13.3. ...
[The Constitutional Court] does not agree with the opinion by the Ombudsman that
section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities is unclear as it fails to establish
preconditions which are necessary to allow immediate action to be taken in the form
of operational measures under the special procedure. Section 7(5) of the Law on
Operational Activities establishes two preconditions which allow ... operational
measures.
First, section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities enumerates specific
circumstances ... Operational measures may be taken when required to prevent acts of
terrorism, murder, banditry, riots, or other serious or especially serious offences. They
are permissible also in circumstances of a real threat to the life, health or property of
an individual. [The Constitutional Court considers that] this enumeration ... is
exhaustive and sufficiently precise. Consequently, it excludes any possibility of
operational measures under the special procedure in relation to the prevention of such
criminal offences which are not indicated in the legal provision.
Second, operational measures ... may be taken ... only when an immediate action is
required.
Interpreting this legal provision in conjunction with section 17(3) of the Law on
Operational Activities, [the Constitutional Court] concludes that covert interception of
non-public conversations is allowed only when [there is] reliable information
(pamatotas zias) about persons involvement in a criminal offence, as well as a threat
to important interests of the State, its security or defence. Consequently ... operational
measures ... may be taken if [there is] reliable information regarding the involvement
of an individual in a criminal offence.
Section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides for an exceptional
procedure, namely, it allows ... immediate operational measures to be taken because
any delay might significantly influence their results. Taking into account the
seriousness of the offences referred to in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational
Activities, it is important to provide a timely and effective response to prevent all
threats related to such crimes.
Section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities establishes the preconditions
for its application [with sufficient precision]; consequently, the restriction on the
fundamental rights has been established by law.
...
17. The Applicant indicates that section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities
does not provide an obligation ... to receive approval by a judge in cases where
operational measures are terminated within ... 72 hours (see Case materials, Vol. 1,
pp. 26 27).
17.1. Sections 7(2) and 7(3) of the Law on Operational Activities establish two
procedures for taking operational measures, namely, under the general and special
procedures. Such classification is closely related to the nature of operational measures
and their impact on the fundamental rights of persons. In the cases established in
section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, operational measures must be taken
under the special procedure as they significantly impinge on the fundamental rights of
persons.
The Constitutional Court considers that the grammatical wording of section 7(5) of
the Law on Operational Activities [does not clearly indicate] whether it is necessary to
obtain approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge
in cases when operational measures are terminated within ... 72 hours.
17.2. In order to determine the content of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational
Activities, it must be interpreted in conjunction with other provisions of the same
section regulating operational measures to be taken under the special procedure.
Section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities contains a reference to
section 7(4) setting out the operational measures to be taken under the special
procedure. These measures, including monitoring of correspondence and covert
interception of non-public conversations, must be taken with the approval of the
President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge.
Although section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides for exceptional
circumstances where ... immediate action may be taken, it also establishes the
obligation ... to obtain the approval of the President of the Supreme Court or a
specially authorised judge for operational measures under section 7(4). Already when
the draft of the Law on Operational Activities was being drawn up ... the need to
receive a judges approval was emphasised in cases where operational measures
would be taken under the special procedure (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 171
and 173).
The third sentence of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities indicated
that the operational measures had to be discontinued where no approval by a judge
was obtained. According to the KNAB, this indication confirms that a judges
approval must be sought only in cases where operational measures have not been
terminated within ... 72 hours (see Case materials, Vol. 3, pp. 45). However, the
Ministry of Justice and the Ombudsman indicate that such an interpretation ... would
not comply with the essence of the Constitution (see Case materials, Vol. 3, pp. 48
and 54 55).
Section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities contains no reference to the fact
that no approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge
is necessary for operational measures to be taken under section 7(4) in the event that it
is planned to terminate them within ... 72 hours. Consequently, [the Constitutional
Court] cannot agree with the opinion by the KNAB that a judges approval does not
have to be obtained if operational measures are terminated within ... 72 hours.
...
17.3. ... Consequently, section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides
that a prosecutor must always be informed of the operational measures taken; this
provision also obliges ... [the seeking of] approval by the President of the Supreme
Court or a specially authorised judge.
The restriction established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities
must be regarded as the most lenient measure for fulfilling the legitimate aim
because monitoring by a prosecutor and subsequent judicial scrutiny of the
lawfulness of operational measures ensures effective protection of the rights of
persons.
18. ...
It is not possible to agree with the Applicants statement to the effect that the
infringement of his right is greater than the benefit gained by society. By means of a
lawful restriction of a persons right to respect for his or her private life, the State
helps to combat crime and permits ... immediate reaction to threats of criminal
offences that are particularly dangerous for society, serving to prevent them and
identifying the persons involved. When intercepting non-public conversations in the
cases established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, the protection
of public safety is ensured.
Consequently, operational measures taken to prevent criminal offences
referred to in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities must be regarded
as proportionate and compliant with Article 96 of the Constitution only if
approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge
has been obtained irrespective of the time when the operational measures are
terminated.
19. The Applicant indicates that the [prosecutors office] cannot be regarded as an
effective remedy in respect of his rights within the meaning of Articles 8 and 13 of the
Convention (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 17 18).
The Constitutional Court has already established in its case-law that [an application
to] the prosecutors office in Latvia may be regarded as an effective and available
remedy, because the status and the role of the prosecutor in the supervision of law
secures independent and impartial review of cases in compliance with Article 13 of
the Convention (see Judgment of 11 October 2004 by the Constitutional Court in the
case No. 2004-06-01. Para 19).
In the present case it is necessary to examine whether section 7(5) of the Law on
Operational Activities provides a person with protection compliant with Article 13 of
the Convention in cases where the right to the inviolability of private life and
correspondence guaranteed in the Convention is infringed.
The Constitutional Court concludes that section 7(5) of the Law on Operational
Activities establishes circumstances ... where operational measures may be taken
immediately, as well as the procedure in accordance with which this has to be notified
to a prosecutor and approval by a judge is to be obtained. However, this provision is
not related to the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention.
Consequently, the compliance of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities
with Article 13 of the Convention must be assessed in conjunction with the first
sentence of section 35(1) of that Law, the latter establishing a mechanism for
monitoring operational measures and being contested by the Applicant as to its
compliance with Article 92 of the Constitution.
20. The Applicant indicates that the first sentence of section 35(1) of the Law on
Operational Activities fails to comply with Article 92 of the Constitution because it
has no legitimate aim and it is not necessary in a democratic society. The provision
fails to establish a procedure according to which the supervision and monitoring of
performance of operational measures would be carried out. In the monitoring of
operational measures, the first sentence of section 35(1) of the Law on Operational
Activities confers on the prosecutors office a broad margin of appreciation (see Case
materials, Vol. 1, pp. 20 21).
21.1. ...
The Constitutional Court has already concluded in paragraph 17 above that [there is]
an obligation to request, in any event, the approval of the President of the Supreme
Court or a specially authorised judge in relation to operational measures.
10
...
Consequently, the investigating authority and the court ensure the review of
the admissibility of information obtained by means of operational measures.
However, the Prosecutor General and specialised prosecutors, by monitoring the
conformity of operational activities with the law, as well as the court in carrying
out subsequent scrutiny, ensure effective protection of a persons rights.
...
11
12
32. Section 17 of the Law on the Constitutional Court provides that any
person who considers that his or her fundamental rights have been breached
has the right to submit an application to the Constitutional Court.
33. Section 192 of the Law on the Constitutional Court provides:
(1) Any person who considers that a legal provision, which is not in compliance
with a provision having superior legal force, has infringed his or her fundamental
rights under the Constitution may lodge a constitutional complaint (an application)
with the Constitutional Court.
(2) A constitutional complaint (an application) may be lodged only after exhaustion
of all the possibilities for securing protection of such rights through ordinary legal
remedies (appeal to a higher authority, appeal or application to a court of general
jurisdiction, etc.) or where no such remedies exist.
(3) Where examination of a constitutional complaint (an application) is in the public
interest or where legal protection of the rights in question via ordinary remedies does
not enable the appellant to avoid substantial damage, the Constitutional Court may
decide to examine the application even before all other domestic remedies have been
exhausted.
(4) A constitutional complaint (an application) may be lodged within six months of
the date on which the decision of the highest instance becomes final.
(5) The submission of a constitutional complaint (an application) shall not suspend
the execution of a judicial decision, except in cases where the Constitutional Court
decides otherwise.
(6) In addition to its substance, as required by section 18(1) of the present Law, a
constitutional complaint (an application) must contain submissions concerning:
(i) the violation of the appellants fundamental human rights as provided in the
Constitution, and;
(ii) the exhaustion of all ordinary remedies or the fact that no such remedies exist.
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34. Section 22(1) provides that the President of the Constitutional Court
assigns a case to one of the judges for preparation. It is for the judge to
decide which institutions or officials are to be requested to submit additional
information or documents and to determine any third parties (pieaicints
persons) who will be requested to submit their opinions (section 22(2)-(3)).
Any person may be recognised by a judge as a third party, if that persons
opinion would facilitate comprehensive and objective adjudication
(section 22(3)). A judge completes his or her preparation of the case by
issuing a preliminary opinion (atzinums par lietas sagatavoanu
izskatanai), and if he or she considers that the proceedings could be
conducted in accordance with a written procedure, he or she includes a
proposal to that effect in the preliminary opinion (section 22(8)). The
preparation of the case is completed when the President of the
Constitutional Court issues a decision concerning adjudication (lmums par
lietas nodoanu izskatanai), determining the composition of the bench and
scheduling the time and place for a preparatory meeting (rcbas sde)
(section 22(9)). One of the matters to be decided in the preparatory meeting
is whether or not to conduct proceedings in accordance with a written
procedure (section 22(10)(1)). Lastly, if the written procedure is to be
followed, the parties are to be informed about this decision (section 22(13)).
35. Section 24 of the Law on the Constitutional Court provides:
After a decision concerning adjudication (lmums par lietas nodoanu izskatanai)
has been taken, the parties to the case the applicant and the institution or authority
which has issued the impugned provision may acquaint themselves with the case
materials.
36. Section 281 (with amendments effective until 30 June 2011) of the
Law on the Constitutional Court provides:
Section 281 - Written Procedure
(1) In circumstances where the case materials are sufficient for adjudication of the
case by a written procedure, a hearing with the participation of the parties need not be
held. Adjudication of a case by a written procedure shall be determined in accordance
with section 22(10) of the present Law.
(2) Within fifteen days of receipt of a notification regarding a matter being
adjudicated by a written procedure, the parties shall have the right to acquaint
themselves with the case materials and express their opinion regarding them in
writing.
(3) The case shall be adjudicated by the written procedure and the judgment shall be
made in the deliberation room.
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38. Section 32(2) of the Law on the Constitutional Court was amended
to provide that the interpretation of a legal provision provided by the
Constitutional Court would also be binding. The amendment was effective
from 1 January 2010.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
39. The applicant complained that the proceedings before the
Constitutional Court had not been public and that he had been denied a right
to be heard as provided for in Article 6 1 of the Convention, which in its
relevant part reads as follows:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a
fair and public hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...
A. Applicability of Article 6 1
40. The Government contested the applicability of Article 6 1 to the
proceedings in question, arguing that there was no criminal charge, civil
right or dispute in the present case.
41. The applicant did not provide any comment in this connection.
42. The Court reiterates that proceedings come within the scope of
Article 6 1, even if they are conducted before a Constitutional Court,
where their outcome is decisive for civil rights and obligations (see
Smann v. Germany, 16 September 1996, 41, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1996-IV).
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courts special role and the specific nature of the proceedings before it,
which involved exclusively legal issues and not the establishment of facts
(they referred to Jurii v. Croatia, no. 58222/09, 90, 26 July 2011). The
Government submitted that in proceedings involving only questions of law,
as opposed to questions of fact, a hearing was not required, provided that
one had been held before a lower court (they referred to Hermi v. Italy
[GC], no. 18114/02, 60-61, ECHR 2006-XII). As regards the
constitutional courts in particular, a hearing was not normally required as
their competence was limited to an examination of constitutional issues and
entailed an assessment of points of law and not facts (they referred to Zippel
v. Germany (dec.), no. 30470/96, 23 October 1997; Weh and Weh v. Austria
(dec.), no. no. 38544/97, 4 July 2002; and Prischl v. Austria, no. 2881/04,
20-22, 26 April 2007).
47. There was only one exception where a hearing would be required
before a constitutional court where the latter was the only body which
could determine the dispute between an applicant and the national
authorities (Kugler v. Austria, no. 65631/01, 50, 14 October 2010). The
Government argued that this exception was not applicable in the present
case. The lawfulness of the interception had already been examined by the
prosecutors office, which in their submission was an institution exercising
a judicial function, and the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result
would be examined in the criminal proceedings, where hearings were held
at first and second instance. The Constitutional Court could address only the
specific question of the compliance of the impugned legal provisions with
the Constitution. Lastly, there was no information as to why his complaint
could not be decided on the basis of the case file alone (they referred to
section 281 of the Law on the Constitutional Court).
2. The Courts assessment
48. The Court recognises not only the special role and status of
constitutional courts, but also the special nature of constitutional appeals,
which, in those States that have made provision for a right of individual
petition, afford additional legal protection to citizens at national level in
respect of their fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution (see
Smann, cited above, 37, and Hesse-Anger and Anger v. Germany (dec.),
no. 45835/99, ECHR 2001-VI (extracts)). Proceedings before a
Constitutional Court have their own characteristics, which take account of
the specific nature of the legal rules to be applied and the implications of the
constitutional decision for the legal system in force. They are also intended
to enable a single body to adjudicate on a large number of cases relating to
very different subjects (see Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain, 23 June 1993, 63,
Series A no. 262). The constitutional proceedings may be limited to the
examination of questions of constitutionality, which do not necessarily
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Anger, cited above). It is true that, where proceedings are conducted at only
one level of jurisdiction, the right to a public hearing within the meaning
of Article 6 1 of the Convention may entail an entitlement to an oral
hearing (see Fredin v. Sweden (no. 2), 23 February 1994, 21, Series A
no. 283-A). The Court notes, however, that the review undertaken in the
present case related to constitutionality of legal provisions and not to factual
issues, as argued by the applicant.
53. In the present case the Constitutional Court decided that the case
material was sufficient for the case to be examined using a written
procedure (see paragraph 23 above) in accordance with the domestic law.
The applicant did not complain that this decision was arbitrary, he merely
wished to personally explain his case before the Constitutional Court
without providing more substance to this argument. The only argument the
applicant advanced in this connection was that there had been no legal
grounds for such decision to be taken. The Government relied on section
281 of the Law on the Constitutional Court and the applicant did not dispute
this.
54. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to
conclude that it was not necessary to hold a public hearing before the
Constitutional Court in the present case. Even assuming that Article 6 1
applies to the constitutional proceedings, it follows that this complaint is
manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35
3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
55. The applicant complained that on account of the interception of his
telephone conversations his right to respect for his private life and for his
correspondence had been violated. The relevant part of Article 8 of the
Convention provides as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private ...life ... and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
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20
21
64. In the present case, the applicant submitted and the Government did
not deny that the relevant authority the KNAB never sought an ex post
facto approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially
authorised judge. Indeed, as can be seen from the submissions by the
KNAB before the Constitutional Court, it had been the authoritys opinion
that ex post facto approval was not required in all cases namely, that it was
not required if the operational measures were terminated in less than
72 hours. This argument was expressly dismissed by the Constitutional
Court (see paragraph 17.2 in fine of its judgment, paragraph 24 above). The
Court finds that, in accordance with the relevant Latvian law, as interpreted
by the Constitutional Court, the ex post facto approval by the President of
the Supreme Court, or a specially authorised judge, of the operational
measures was required in the circumstances of the present case,
notwithstanding that the interception of the telephone conversations was
terminated in less than 72 hours. This conclusion is not altered by the fact
that the lawfulness of these measures was confirmed by various prosecutors.
Their conclusions were limited to section 35(1) of the Law on Operational
Activities (see paragraphs 12 and 15 above) and, in any event, their review
was carried out before the Constitutional Court adopted its judgment in the
present case providing for an authoritative interpretation of section 7(5) of
that Law. The Court would add that the domestic authorities are bound by
the interpretation given by the Constitutional Court in accordance with
section 32 of the Law on the Constitutional Court (see paragraphs 37 and 38
above).
65. Having found that the ex post facto approval by the President of the
Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge, as required by section 7(5)
of the Law on Operational Activities following the interpretation of the
Constitutional Court, was never sought in the applicants case, the Court
does not consider it necessary to examine whether other conditions set out
in the domestic law for the application of the operational measures were met
in the present case.
66. The foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude
that the interception of the applicants telephone conversations was not in
accordance with the law within the meaning of Article 8 2 of the
Convention. Consequently, there has been a violation of Article 8. Having
regard to this conclusion, the Court does not consider it necessary to review
compliance with the other requirements of Article 8 2 in this case (see
Petrova v. Latvia, no. 4605/05, 98, 24 June 2014).
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION
67. The applicant further complained that there were no effective
remedies in the Latvian legal system in respect of breaches of Article 8
rights. He complained about the fact that the review of operational activities
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A. Damage
84. The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of nonpecuniary damage sustained by him.
85. The Government disagreed and considered this sum unjustified,
excessive and exorbitant.
86. Deciding on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant
EUR 2,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
B. Default interest
87. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate
should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
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Fato Arac
Deputy Registrar
Guido Raimondi
President