G.R. No.

6878

September 13, 1913

MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law
to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land
situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63
centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two applications were filed, one for each
parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this
marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's
death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue
and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina
Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her
ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan
appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the
registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be
recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of
exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of
the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only
be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and
denies that the land which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be
reserved a contention we regard as indefensible.
Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2)
Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3)
Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan
and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property
had between him and his brothers. These are admitted facts.

A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration
[gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is
that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under
obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property proceeded. (Civil Code,
art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he
had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his
father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the
third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands
proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature property required by law to be
reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been
acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which
is by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only
herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property
in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right
required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of
action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right, admitting that it existed and that they had it"
(p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant
inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The
trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17,
20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her
son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall
from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had
passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary
provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from the son to the mother, not by operation of
law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was
abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No.
190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully
complied with.

If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left
at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her
as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary
estate of the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other
half, with the exception of what is established in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved,
because it is what by operation of law could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other
half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the
application are required by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that
either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of her son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a
half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides
that the other half is also presumed to be acquired by operation of law that is, by intestate
succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be presented by the interested party,
that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible that the trial court failed to sustain the
renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the
opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact
that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my house
and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of
them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio
Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced
that he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of
article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The
appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the
obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right required by law to be
reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation is created
by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She adds: "Prescription of
the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she
do so in first instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not
refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the

prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking
that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage Law grants a period of time for
recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the
registry; but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that
it be recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be reserved has not
prescribed, but the right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is
required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to
constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the
required by law to be reserved; but because that right of action has prescribed, that property has not
been divested of its character of property required by law to be reserved; that it has such character
by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889,
and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the country by law of July 14,
1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code
acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the
Mortgage Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that although the
Mortgage Law has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the
force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the
right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by operation of law to require of the
person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for the enforcement, in
due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the right itself; that
the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of
the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being
indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a
guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this
appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can
and ought to be registered, not in the property registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but
in the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted
some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights required
to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential points may not be
out of place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the
colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of
said amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications
necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on
December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation of the law on real
property, and consequently of agrarian credit.
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.

Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth
in article 968 thereof, where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds
marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the
ownership of all the property he or she may have required from the deceased spouse by will, by
intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1,
189, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil
Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions
intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of the children of the first marriage when
their father or mother contracts a second marriage. Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court
of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been
reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the
right required to be reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract
second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes
in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is the same in both cases, such
must be the construction from the important and conclusive circumstance that said
provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either testate
or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with
property required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and
it would consequently be contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature
of said provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court
has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required
by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in
article 811, because the same principle exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of
the chapter in which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case
had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right
would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who must make the reservation,
proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to the children of a first
marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The proceedings for assurance,
under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation in the
property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property;
and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value
of what is validly alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this
is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right
reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in

article 968, but there is a positive provision of said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain,
to wit, article 199, which read thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can
only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of
age; if minors, it will be require by the person who should legally represent them. In either
case the right of the persons in whose favor the property must be reserved will be secured
by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding article (relative to the right reserved by
article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted,
so that said article 168 reads as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property
required to be reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to reserve it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety
days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the
effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down
a principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has not prescribed, because the
period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the exercise of the right of action of the
persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must
make the reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the
proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment,
etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person obligated to reserve the right the
provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199
of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days
succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to
reserve the property; after this period has elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution
of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other case, their legal representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the
period for the right must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to
exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by
law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in the property registry of the
Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings to that end, and an allegation
of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.

Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for requiring
that the property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no
necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the
Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action cannot take place, because such right of action
does not exist with reference to instituting proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of
the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present
case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for
recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this
finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two
uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the
name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and
recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of
the thing; otherwise, the person who has the right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the
person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The person who by law, act, or
contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an enjoying, and then he is
said not to have the fee simple that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain to
another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of
article 811 of the Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the
person in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property could
not apply for registration of title, but the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's
consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible, although it appears to be supported by
decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code,
and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points the usufruct and the fee simple;
the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of
that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that the person holding the property will
enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained that is,
that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be
regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has
no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)

The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law,
requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes
of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This
absolute ownership, which is inherent in the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no
relatives within the third degree in the line whence the property proceeds or they die before the
ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives
within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to
that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with
exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes
this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary,
depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as
it does not have, according to the opinion that he has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the
father or mother who has married again. There is a marked difference between the case where a
man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his
property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the
first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the
hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform
any act of disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in
accordance with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except
the limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the
fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and
the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of the property they
might itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child in first marriage, and
recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is
required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may
dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the
surviving spouse aftercontracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death
no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition
subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage
survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof
would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he
could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to
exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may
mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of the parties interested in
said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the registration.

In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is
reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending,
that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily
happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all the person in whose favor the
right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the condition subsequent that they survive
him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be reserved would
disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective.
Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to the children is
respected; while the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not
become definite, it will continue to exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what
the law establishes with reference to the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly
directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or
descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants
must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and
obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be
reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their
turn may pertain to them has been assured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not
even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to
their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code
referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee
simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the
same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion
of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer
to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude of the legislator on this
subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the right reserved
in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right
required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those
conditions can validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such
alienation to continue, pending fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not
there exists at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendants from
whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they
acquire ownership of the property at the death of the ascendants. If they do not exist, the
ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the possessor of property subject
to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the

property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more
because no one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore
receive a limited and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn
have an expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be
transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the person who
is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind the alienation of the
realty required by law to be reserved and they will complete ownership, in fee simple,
because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death of the
usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt
at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and
dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the
law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it
and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion,
even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be
reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot
dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their
possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they
can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who must reserve the right
should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take
their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third degree,
that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a
possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their
rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of
the property to be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the
decision on appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain
therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and scope of
the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen, for it may
disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even become absolute
should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of the
person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved,
because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal
title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order
to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us
that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than relatives within the third
degree of the descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him,
because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein."
(Decision of December 30, 1897.)

Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of
a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that
may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that
which the appellant has made of the two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the
conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent to an alienation of the usufruct, which is
authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and enjoyment of the property
required by law to be reserved are all that the person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and
in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible
manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re,
for it is not real, actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and
the other the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership,
he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law
the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to the
following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent
is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the property he has
inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made degree thereto, provided
that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once
acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent
annexed that the alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if the vendor should
exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover
the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been
agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and
other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that
the vendee may register his title in the same way as the owner of a thing mortgaged that is to say,
the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the consent of the vendor. He may
alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in the registry that
he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than
the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day
what another has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person
who must make the reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto,
since the argument in his favor is the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis
dispositivo.

Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the
applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter
of the applicants, recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to either
or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special
findings as to costs.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

CASE DIGEST

Marcelina EDROSO

vs.
Pablo and Basilio SABLAN
G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913
FACTS:
Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son named, Pedro who
inherited two parcels of land upon the death of his father. Subsequently, Pedro died,
unmarried and without issue, the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to
his mother. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for
registration of her ownership. The two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio
Sablan(legitimate brothers of Victoriano) opposed the registration claiming that
either the registration be denied or if granted to her, the right reserved by law to
them be recorded in the registration of each parcel. The Court of Land Registration
denied the registration holding that the land in question partake of the nature of
property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could
only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the property in question is in the nature of a reservable property.
2. Whether or not Marcelina Edroso has the absolute title of the property to cause
its registration.
RULING:

A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a
valuable consideration (gratuitous tile), and it is so characterized in Article 968 of
the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what
he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles are within
the third degree of blood relationship.
Article 811. The ascendant, who inherits from his descendant property which the
latter acquired without a valuable consideration from another descendant, or forma
brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of
law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line where
the property proceeded.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him the two parcels of
land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by
inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by
operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to
the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of Victoriano), where
the lands proceeded. The trial courts ruling that they partake of the nature property
required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.

G.R. No. L-12957

March 24, 1961

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.
DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the sale
executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of the
Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the appellees to
pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit. In
their answer appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedly made
on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale was made,
the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject
matter thereof. They further alleged that said property had never been in possession of appellants,
the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession thereof since the
death of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and counterclaim, they further alleged that
on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso,
executed a public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the
said sale having been registered together with an affidavit of adjudication executed by Paulina and
Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the
Esparcias had been in possession of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1) that the sale
of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio Sienes and

Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale
made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes involving the same lot is also void, and they have no valid title thereto; and (3) that
the reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana
Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang
as of December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the costs.
From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal
contentions being, firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey
of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot executed by
Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to
inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four
children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang,
he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the properties
left by Saturnino upon his death the date of which does not clearly appear of record were left to
his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377
(southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the
cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the
name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the
property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes
due thereon (Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single
and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit F
entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in
consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter
said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of
Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 which was in their possession the latter refused, thus
giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507. The same,
however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving halfsisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951
executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in
turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in their name of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was
reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and
upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother,
Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The
record discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone
reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).

In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two
resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival,
at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection
with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he
may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or
resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of
Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that
the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died
without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when
Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the
previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable
property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in
favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition.
The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from
which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and
dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the
vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case,
Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to
reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's
death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event, became
effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to
reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in question to the
Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees the Esparcia spouses did not appeal
therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as above modified is affirmed, with costs, and without
prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana
Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.

CASE DIGEST
SIENES VS. ESPARCIA
FACTS:
The case involves Lot 3368 which originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. According
to the cadastral records, upon Saturninos death, he left the aid land to Francisco,

his only son with his second wife, Andrea Gutang. Because Francisco was a minor at
the time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it in her name for
taxation purposes and paid the taxes due thereon. When Francisco died on May 29,
1932 at the age of 20, single andwithout any descendant, his mother, as his sole
heir, executed an extrajudicial settlement and sale whereby, among other things,
she sold the property in question to the appellant, Constancio Sienes. Thereafter,
Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who had
declared the questioned property in their name, executed a deed of sale in favor of
the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes. The Trial court declared both sale as
void and ordered that the property be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the
lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang.

ISSUE:
WON the sale of the property by the ascendant who is obliged to reserve the
property is valid although at the time of his death, there are still surviving relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came.

RULING:
The land in question was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by
operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried
and without descendants; it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang.
The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any
survived her. The record discloses that when Andrea Gutang died, the lone reservee
surviving her is Cipriana Yaeso. The reserve creates two resolutory conditions,
namely,
(1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and
(2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the property came.
The reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable
property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation
transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the
rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of
reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista. The sale made by Andrea
Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the
vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the
vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable

property. When Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive; thus, the
previous sale made by the former in favor of appellant became of no legal effect
and the reservable property passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.On the other
hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso
in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar
resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the
third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came,
constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit
conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the
vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the
present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea
Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute
owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death

G.R. No. L-27696 September 30, 1977

MIGUEL FLORENTINO, ROSARIO ENCARNACION de FLORENTINO, MANUEL ARCE, JOSE
FLORENTINO, VICTORINO FLORENTINO, ANTONIO FLORENTINO, REMEDION
ENCARNACION and SEVERINA ENCARNACION, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
SALVADOR ENCARNACION, SR., SALVADOR ENCARNACION, JR., and ANGEL
ENCARNACION, oppositors to encumbrance-petitioners-appelles.
Jose F. Singson and Miguel Florentino for appellants.
Pedro Singson for appellees.

GUERRERO, J.:

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, acting as a land registration
court, in Land Registration case No. N-310.
On May 22, 1964, the petitioners-appellants Miguel Florentino, Remedios Encarnacion de
Florentino, Manuel Arce, Jose Florentino, Victorino Florentino, Antonio Florentino, Remedior,
Encarnacion and Severina Encamacion, and the Petitiners-appellees Salvador Encamacion, Sr.,
Salvador Encamacion, Jr. and Angel Encarnacion filed with the Court of First Instance of ilocos Sur
an application for the registration under Act 496 of a parcel of agricultural land located at Barrio
Lubong Dacquel Cabugao Ilocos Sur.
The application alleged among other things that the applicants are the common and pro-indiviso
owners in fee simple of the said land with the improvements existing thereon; that to the best of their
knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage, lien or encumbrance of any kind whatever affecting said
land, nor any other person having any estate or interest thereon, legal or equitable, remainder,
reservation or in expectancy; that said applicants had acquired the aforesaid land thru and by
inheritance from their predecessors in interest, lately from their aunt, Doa Encarnacion Florentino
who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur in 1941, and for which the said land was adjudicated to them by virtue
of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated August 24, 1947; that applicants Salvador Encarnacion, Jr.
and Angel Encarnacion acquired their respective shares of the land thru purchase from the original
heirs, Jesus, Caridad, Lourdes and Dolores surnamed Singson one hand and from Asuncion
Florentino on the other.
After due notice and publication, the Court set the application for hearing. No Opposition whatsoever
was filed except that of the Director of Lands which was later withdrawn, thereby leaving the option
unopposed. Thereupon, an order of general default was withdrawn against the whole world. Upon
application of the asets the Clerk Of court was commission will and to have the evidence of the
agents and or to submit the for the Court's for resolution.
The crucial point in controversy in this registration case is centered in the stipulation marked Exhibit
O-1 embodied in the deed of extrajudicial partition (Exhibit O) dated August 24, 1947 which states:
Los productos de esta parcela de terreno situada en el Barrio Lubong Dacquel
Cabugao Ilocos Sur, se destination para costear los tos de procesio de la Tercera
Caida celebration y sermon de Siete Palbras Seis Estaciones de Cuaresma,
procesion del Nino Jesus, tilaracion y conservacion de los mismos, construction le
union camarin en conde se depositan los carros mesas y otras cosas que seven
para lot leiracion de Siete Palabras y otras cosas mas Lo que sobra de lihos
productos despues de descontados todos los gastos se repartira nosotros los
herederos.
In his testimony during the trial, applicant Miguel Florentino asked the court to include the said
stipulation (Exhibit O-1) as an encumbrance on the land sought to be registered, and cause the entry
of the same on the face of the title that will finally be issued. Opposing its entry on the title as an
encumbrance, petitionersappellee Salvador Encamacion, Sr., Salvador Encarnaciori, Jr. and Angel
Encarriacion filed on October 3, 1966 a manifestation seeking to withdraw their application on their

respective shares of the land sought to be registered. The withdrawal was opposed by the
petitioners-appellants.
The Court after hearing the motion for withdrawal and the opposition thereto issued on November
17, 1966 an order and for the purpose of ascertaining and implifying the issues therein stated that all
the applicants admit the truth of the following;
(1) That just after the death of Encarnacion FIorentino in 1941 up to last year and as
had always been the case since time immomorial the products of the land made
subiect matter of this land has been used in answering for the payment for the
religious functions specified in the Deed Extrajudicial Partition belated August 24,
1947:
(2) That this arrangement about the products answering for the comment of
experisence for religions functions as mentioned above was not registered in the
office of the Register of Deeds under Act No 3344, Act 496 or and, other system of
registration;
(3) That all the herein applicants know of the existence of his arrangement as
specified in the Deed of Extra judicial Partition of A adjust 24, 1947;
(4) That the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of August 24, 194-, not signed by Angel
Encarnacion or Salvador Encarnacion, Jr,.
The court denied the petitioners-appellee motion to withdraw for lack of merit, and
rendered a decision under date of November 29, 1966 confirming the title of the
property in favor of the f appoints with their respective shares as follows:
Spouses Miguel Florentino and Rosario Encarnacion de Florentino, both of legal age,
Filipinos, and residents of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, consisting of an undivided 31/297 and
8.25/297 portions, respectively;
Manuel Arce, of legal age, Filipino, married to Remedios Pichay and resident of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, consisting of an undivided 66/297 portion;
Salvador Encarnacion, Jr., of legal age, Filipino, married to Angelita Nagar and
resident of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, consisting of an undivided 66/297; Jose Florentino, of
legal age, Filipino, married to Salvacion Florendo and resident of 16 South Ninth
Diliman, Quezon City, consisting of an undivided 33/297 portion;
Angel Encarnacion, of legal age, Filipino, single and resident of 1514 Milagros St.,
Sta. Cruz, Manila, consisting of an undivided 33/297 portion;
Victorino Florentino, of legal age, Filipino, married to Mercedes L. Encarnacion and
resident of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, consisting of an undivided 17.5/297 portion;

Antonio Florentino, of legal age, Filipino, single and resident of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
consisting of an undivided 17.5/297;
Salvador Encarnacion, Sr., of legal age, Filipino, married to Dolores Singson,
consisting of an undivided 8.25/297;
Remedios Encarnacion, of legal age, Filipino, single and resident of Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, consisting of an undivided 8.25/297 portion; and
Severina Encarnacion, of legal age, Filipino, single and resident of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
consisting of 8.25/297 undivided portion.
The court, after ruling "that the contention of the proponents of encumbrance is without merit
bemuse, taking the self-imposed arrangement in favor of the Church as a pure and simple donation,
the same is void for the that the donee here has riot accepted the donation (Art. 745, Civil Code) and
for the further that, in the case of Salvador Encarnacion, Jr. and Angel Encarnacion, they had made
no oral or written grant at all (Art. 748) as in fact they are even opposed to it," 1 held in the Positive
portion, as follows:
In view of all these, therefore, and insofar as the question of encumbrance is
concerned, let the religious expenses as herein specified be made and entered on
the undivided shares, interests and participations of all the applicants in this case,
except that of Salvador Encarnacion, Sr., Salvador Encarnacion, Jr. and Angel
Encarnacion.
On January 3, 1967, petitioners-appellants filed their Reply to the Opposition reiterating their
previous arguments, and also attacking the junction of the registration court to pass upon the validity
or invalidity of the agreement Exhibit O-1, alleging that such is specified only in an ordinary action
and not proper in a land registration proceeding.
The Motion for Reconsideration and of New Trial was denied on January 14, 1967 for lack of merit,
but the court modified its earlier decision of November 29, 1966, to wit:
This Court believes, and so holds, that the contention of the movants (proponents of
the encumbrance) is without merit because the arrangement, stipulation or grant as
embodied in Exhibit O (Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial), by whatever name it may
be (called, whether donation, usufruct or ellemosynary gift, can be revoked as in fact
the oppositors Salvador Encarnacion, Sr., who is the only one of the three oppositors
who is a party to said Exhibit O (the two others, Salvador Encarnacion, Jr. and Angel
Encarnacion no parties to it) did revoke it as shown by acts accompanying his refusal
to have the same appear as an encumbrance on the title to be issued. In fact, legally,
the same can also be ignored or discararded by will the three oppositors. The
reasons are: First, if the said stipulation is pour bodies in Exhibit O-1 is to be viewed
as a stipulation pour autrui the same cannot now be enforced because the Church in
whose favor it was made has not communicated its acceptance to the oppositors
before the latter revoked it. Says the 2nd par. of Art. 1311 of the New Civil Code:

"If a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person he may
demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor
before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient.
The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a
third person." No evide nee has ever been submitted by the Church to show its clear
acceptance of the grant before its revocation by the oppositor Salvador Encarnacion,
Sr. (or of the two other oppositors, Salvador Encarnacion, Jr. and Angel Encarnacion,
who didn't even make any giant, in the first place), and so not even the movants who
have officiously taken into themselves the right to enforce the grant cannot now
maintain any action to compel compliance with it. (Bank of the P.I. v. Concepcion y
Hijos, Inc., 53 Phil. 806). Second, the Church in whose favor the stipulation or grant
had apparently been made ought to be the proper party to compel the herein three
oppositors to abide with the stipulation. But it has not made any appearance nor
registered its opposition to the application even before Oct. 18, 1965 when an order
of general default was issued. Third, the movants are not, in the contemplation of
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the real party in interest to raise the present
issue; and Fourth, the movants having once alleged in their application for
registration that the land is without encumbrance (par. 3 thereof), cannot now be
alloted by the rules of pleading to contradict said allegation of theirs. (McDaniel v.
Apacible, 44 Phil. 248)
SO ORDERED. 2
After Motions for Reconsideration were denied by the court, the petitioners- appellants appealed
directly to this Court pursuant to Rule 4 1, Rules of Court, raising the following assign of error:
I. The lower court erred in concluding that the stipulation embodied in Exhibit O on
religious expenses is just an arrangement stipulation, or grant revocable at the
unilateral option of the coowners.
II. The lower court erred in finding and concluding that the encumbrance or religious
expenses embodied in Exhibit O, the extrajudicial partition between the co-heirs, is
binding only on the appoints Miguel Florentino, Rosario Encarnacion de Florentino,
Manuel Arce, Jose Florentino, Antonio Florentino, Victorino Florentino, Remedios
Encarnacion and Severina Encarnacion.
III. The lower court as a registration court erred in passing upon the merits of the
encumbrance (Exhibit O-1) as the sanie was never put to issue and as the question
involved is an adjudication of rights of the parties.
We find the first and second assignments of error impressed with merit and, therefore, tenable. The
stipulation embodied in Exhibit O-1 on religious expenses is not revocable at the unilateral option of
the co-owners and neither is it binding only on the petitioners-appellants Miguel Florentino, Rosario
Encarnacion de Florentino Manuel Arce, Jose Florentino, Victorino Florentino Antonio Florentino,
Remedios Encarnacion and Severina E It is also binding on the oppositors-appellees Angel
Encarnacion,

The stipulation (Exhibit 411) in pan of an extrajudicial partition (Exh. O) duly agreed and signed by
the parties, hence the sanie must bind the contracting parties thereto and its validity or compliance
cannot be left to the with of one of them (Art. 1308, N.C.C.). Under Art 1311 of the New Civil Code,
this stipulation takes effect between the parties, their assign and heirs. The article provides:
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs,
except in cases where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not
liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent.
If a contract should contain a stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its
fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its
revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The
contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third
person.
The second paragraph of Article 1311 above-quoted states the law on stipulations pour
autrui. Consent the nature and purpose of the motion (Exh. O-1), We hold that said stipulation is a
station pour autrui. A stipulation pour autrui is a stipulation in favor of a third person conferring a
clear and deliberate favor upon him, and which stipulation is merely a part of a contract entered into
by the parties, neither of whom acted as agent of the third person, and such third person and
demand its fulfillment provoked that he communicates his to the obligor before it is revoked. 3 The
requisites are: (1) that the stipulation in favor of a third person should be a part, not the whole, of the
contract; (2) that the favorable stipulation should not be conditioned or compensated by any kind of
obligation whatever; and (3) neither of the contracting bears the legal represented or authorization of third
person.
To constitute a valid stipulation pour autrui it must be the purpose and intent of the stipulating parties
to benefit the third and it is not sufficient that the third person may be incidentally benefited by the
stipulation. The fairest test to determine whether the interest of third person in a contract is a
stipulation pour autrui or merely an incidental interest, is to rely upon the intention of the parties as
disclosed by their contract. In applying this test, it meters not whether the stipulation is in the nature
of a gift or whether there is an obligation owing from the promisee to the third person. That no such
obsorption exists may in some degree assist in determining whether the parties intended to benefit a
third person.4
In the case at bar, the determining point is whether the co-owners intended to benefit the Church
when in their extrajudicial partition of several parcels of land inherited by them from Doa
Encarnacion Florendo they agreed that with respect to the land situated in Barrio Lubong Dacquel
Cabugao Ilocos Sur, the fruits thereof shall serve to defray the religious expenses specified in Exhibit
O-1. The evidence on record shows that the true intent of the parties is to confer a direct and
material benefit upon the Church. The fruits of the aforesaid land were used thenceforth to defray
the expenses of the Church in the preparation and celebration of the Holy Week, an annual Church
function. Suffice it to say that were it not for Exhibit O-1, the Church would have necessarily
expended for this religious occasion, the annual relisgious procession during the Holy Wock and also
for the repair and preservation of all the statutes, for the celebration of the Seven Last Word.

We find that the trial court erred in holding that the stipulation, arrangement or grant (Exhibit O-1) is
revocable at the option of the co-owners. While a stipulation in favor of a third person has no binding
effect in itself before its acceptance by the party favored, the law does not provide when the third
person must make his acceptance. As a rule, there is no time at such third person has after the time
until the stipulation is revoked. Here, We find that the Church accepted the stipulation in its favor
before it is sought to be revoked by some of the co-owners, namely the petitioners-appellants herein.
It is not disputed that from the time of the with of Doa Encarnacion Florentino in 1941, as had
always been the case since time immemorial up to a year before the firing of their application in May
1964, the Church had been enjoying the benefits of the stipulation. The enjoyment of benefits
flowing therefrom for almost seventeen years without question from any quarters can only be
construed as an implied acceptance by the Church of the stipulation pour autrui before its
revocation.
The acceptance does not have to be in any particular form, even when the stipulation
is for the third person an act of liberality or generosity on the part of the promisor or
promise. 5
It need not be made expressly and formally. Notification of acceptance, other than such
as is involved in the making of demand, is unnecessary. 6
A trust constituted between two contracting parties for the benefit of a third person is not
subject to the rules governing donation of real property. The beneficiary of a trust may
demand performance of the obligation without having formally accepted the benefit of the
this in a public document, upon mere acquiescence in the formation of the trust and
acceptance under the second paragraph of Art. 1257 of the Civil Code. 7

Hence, the stipulation (Exhibit O-1) cannot now be revoked by any of the stipulators at their own
option. This must be so because of Article 1257, Civil Code and the cardinal rule of contracts that it
has the force of law between the parties. 8 Thus, this Court ruled in Garcia v. Rita Legarda,
Inc., 9 "Article 1309 is a virtual reproduction of Article 1256 of the Civil Code, so phrased to emphasize
that the contract must bind both parties, based on the principles (1) that obligation arising from contracts
have the force of law between the contracting parties; and (2) that there must be mutuality between the
parties based on their principle equality, to which is repugnant to have one party bound by the contract
leaving the other free therefrom."
Consequently, Salvador Encarnacion, Sr. must bear with Exhibit O-1, being a signatory to the Deed
of Extrajudicial Partition embodying such beneficial stipualtion. Likewise, with regards to Salvador,
Jr. and Angel Encarnacion, they too are bound to the agreement. Being subsequent purchasers,
they are privies or successors in interest; it is axiomatic that contracts are enforceable against the
parties and their privies. 10 Furthermore, they are shown to have given their conformity to such
agreement when they kept their peace in 1962 and 1963, having already bought their respective shares
of the subject land but did not question the enforcement of the agreement as against them. They are also
shown to have knowledge of Exhibit O-1 as they had admitted in a Deed of Real Mortgage executed by
them on March 8, 1962 involving their shares of the subject land that, "This parcel of land is encumbered
as evidenced by the document No. 420, page 94, Book 1, series 1947, executed by the heirs of the late
Encarnacion Florentino, on August 26, 1947, before M. Francisco Ante, Notwy Public of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
in its page 10 of the said document of partition, and also by other documents."

The annotation of Exhibit O-1 on the face of the title to be issued in this case is merely a guarantee
of the continued enforcement and fulfillment of the beneficial stipulation. It is error for the lower court
to rule that the petitioners-appellants are not the real parties in interest, but the Church. That one of
the parties to a contract pour autrui is entitled to bring an action for its enforcement or to prevent its
breach is too clear to need any extensive discussion. Upon the other hand, that the contract involved
contained a stipulation pour autrui amplifies this settled rule only in the sense that the third person
for whose benefit the contract was entered into may also demand its fulfillment provoked he had
communicated his acceptance thereof to the obligor before the stipulation in his favor is revoked. 11
Petitioners-appellants' third assignment of error is not well-taken. Firstly, the otherwise rigid rule that
the jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court, being special and limited in character and
proceedings thereon summary in nature, does not extend to cases involving issues properly litigable
in other independent suits or ordinary civil actions, has time and again been relaxed in special and
exceptional circumstances. (See Government of the Phil. Islands v. Serafica, 61 Phil. 93 (1934);
Caoibes v. Sison, 102 Phil. 19 (1957); Luna v. Santos, 102 Phil. 588 (1957); Cruz v. Tan, 93 Phil. 348
(1953); Gurbax Singh Pabla & Co. v. Reyes, 92 Phil. 177 (1952). From these cases, it may be
gleaned and gathered that the peculiarity of the exceptions is based not only on the fact that Land
Registration Courts are likewise the same Courts of First Instance, but also the following premises
(1) Mutual consent of the parties or their acquired in submitting the at aforesaid determination by the
court in the registration; (2) Full opportunity given to the parties in the presentation of their respective
skies of the issues and of the evidence in support thereto; (3) Consideration by the court that the
evidence already of record is sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision upon these
issues. 12 In the case at bar, the records clearly show that the second and third premism enumerated
abow are fully mt. With regards to first premise, the petioners-appellants cannot claim that the issues
anent Exhibit O-1 were not put in issue because this is contrary to their stand before the lower court
where they took the initial step in praying for the court's determination of the merits of Exhibit O-1 as an
encumbrance to be annotated on the title to be issued by such court. On the other hand, the petitionersappellees who had the right to invoke the limited jurisdiction of the registration court failed to do so but
met the issues head-on.
Secondly, for this very special reason, We win uphold the actuation of the lower court in determining
the conflicting interests of the parties in the registration proceedings before it. This case has been
languishing in our courts for thirteen tong years. To require that it be remanded to the lower court for
another proceeding under its general jurisdiction is not in consonance with our avowed policy of
speedy justice. It would not be amiss to note that if this case be remanded to the lower court, and
should appeal again be made, the name issues will once more be raised before us hence, Our
decision to resolve at once the issues in the instant petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in Land
Registration Case No. N-310 is affirmed but modified to allow the annotation of Exhibit O-1 as an
encumbrance on the face of the title to be finally issued in favor of all the applications (herein
appellants and herein appellees) in the registration proceedings below.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST
FLORENTION VS. FLORENTINO
FACTS
In 1890, Apolonio II died leaving a notarial will. He was survived by his ten children
and his widow as heirs. Apolonio III received in the partition of the subject property.
When Apolonio III died, the said property were inherited byhis mother Severina, who
later died, leaving a will instituting her only daughter as her universal heiress.
Herein appellants demands from Mercedes to deliver their corresponding share in
the reservable property but Mercedes refused. CFI dismissed the complaint of
specific performance.

HELD:
REVERSED. Even if Severina left in her will said property together with her own
property to her only daughter, nevertheless, this property had not lost their
reservable nature in as much as it originated from the common ancestor of herein
appellants. The property was inherited by the son and was transmitted by operation
of law to his mother. Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
while there are living within the 3rddegree relative of the latter, is nothing but a life
usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. But if afterwards, all
of such relative die, the said pro perty become free property by operation of law,
and is thereby converted into the legitime of theascendant heir who can transmit it
at his death to his legal succession. There are seven reservatoris who are entitled to
the reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III:
(1)3 children of the 1st marriage;
2)3 children who are represented by their own children (nephews/ nieces);
(3)Mercedes All of the appellants are the relatives of the posthumous son within the
third degree. Hence, they are entitled as reservatarios to the property which came
from the common ancestors.

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA, ROSARIO L.
VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA, BENITO LEGARDA Y
FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ,
CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA.
TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, ROSARIO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA
ROCES DE LEGARDA, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

1wph1.t

Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not
subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from
Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933.
He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named
Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.

On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal
portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y
De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress
was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the
properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties
consist of the following:
1wph1.t

(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of
P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in
certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine
Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles),
80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205,
48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal,
now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of
deeds of Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the
Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael
describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds
(Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry
of deeds (Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of
T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena
Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties
held proindiviso by her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she
disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her
sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads:
1wph1.t

A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes
que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria
La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada
a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta
construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races.
1wph1.t

(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA

6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children
partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason
which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in
the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No.
70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20,
1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she
inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties
are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three
brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion
was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary
civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the
purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs.
Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three
daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under
Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not
regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.

On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the
lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena]
Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito
Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable
properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales'
petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied
respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts.
Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the
properties in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this
appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters,
cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling
which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the
Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of
them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter
Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the second
degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the six
children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was resolved
in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the
doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse
on the nature of reserve troncal, also calledlineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature
of reserve troncal which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the
Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty
in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the
reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for
generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the
socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian
unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust
and inequitable.

However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored
the reserve troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has
provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which
reads:
1wph1.t

ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese
adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado
a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes
que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes
proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should
reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the
deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation)
from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by
operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la
reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede
the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the
reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree
from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the
deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and
her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should
be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not
reservable property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other
ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves
(reservatario) who is within the third degree from theprepositus and who belongs to the (line o
tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.

The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs.
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth
degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una
familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes
prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir
bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed.,
1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro
Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and
without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were
Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina
could register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was
reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in
the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of
conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920,
said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac who owned the other one-half
portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was held that
the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon his
death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts
of Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs.
Maalac 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and
Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil.
551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil.
737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of
the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is
called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo.
When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was
reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa
Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.

First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even
represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third degree
(Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of
representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura
vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by
affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return
such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa,
Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to
reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee
gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked
upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible
when the reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480:
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to
a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that
if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should
deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the
transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118
Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant
right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the reservor
predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the
reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737;
Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).

There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for
being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of
conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353).
1wph1.t

The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant

(prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities
are all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter
must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable
property. (J. J. B. L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate
acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from
doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they
can compel the annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the
(reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural
heirs of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the
estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are
reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant
(prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the
condition that they must survive thereservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p.
286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes
in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
"automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of
Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of
Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the
time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena
Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable
properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren)
to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As
indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.

We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor
cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees
survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties
from theprepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and
deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in
favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
480, a similar case, where it was ruled:
1wph1.t

Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant

(reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as
forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the
reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same
as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the
relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without
prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the same
time the right of a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de
Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father.
Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in
1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including
those coming from her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the
descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the
recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited from
Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her
daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in
Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.

It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's
estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the
properties. The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine
of theFlorentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon
his death there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus regardless of whether those
reservees are common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property
came, the property retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees.
The reservor cannot, by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property
should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only relatives
within the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the
ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the
ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties
because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when
Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives
of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has
been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life,
property that would otherwise have remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable
properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors,
the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor
to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be
given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reserves it did
not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the
reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the
other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the
properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from
Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the reservor but
from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that

they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065).The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the nonexistence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs.
Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the
Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of
reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still
are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their
reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with
article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will.
The said properties did not form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil.
l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the
properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with
all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario,
Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of
Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to
their respective heirs. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, Petitioner, vs. CFI OF MANILA, et al., Respondents

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981

Facts: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died. He was survived by
his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: (Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena,
Benito, Alejandro and Jose). The real properties left by Benito were partitioned in three equal
portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y
De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena died intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races. Mrs.
Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena. As a result, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter
Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties,
which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and

Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the
properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the
children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will. The decree of probate was
affirmed by the CA.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed a motion to
exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which
should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of
Benito, Alejandro and Jose. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Beatriz filed an ordinary civil action against her
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a
declaration that the said properties are reservable properties. Lower court dismissed the action of
Beatriz.

Issue:
Whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal under art.
Held:
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is
acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should
reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the
deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.
3 transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from
an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by
operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la
reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede
the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the
reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree
from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the
deceased descendant .
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the
property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or
prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant
who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves

(reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o
tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by
affinity are excluded. Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient
gives nothing in return such as donacion and succession.
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to
reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which the property came.
The properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. She
was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or
relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs.
Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable
properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties
did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the
reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and
deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in
favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.

G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990

CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR
CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 13207 for partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two (2)
shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-half for defendant. From both shares shall
be equally deducted the expenses for the burial, mausoleum and related
expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be charged the expenses for
scholarship, awards, donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial
Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property,
including but not limited to, specific items already mentioned in this decision and to
render an accounting of the property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt
of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall belong to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation; P10,000.00
for and as attorney's fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war
Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner
Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private
respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December,
1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa
Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo
covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first
wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to
Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.,
including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time,
the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some
close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but
deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February
26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be
named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students
in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by
her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on
July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding
paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third
degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the
decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia
Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the
decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their
filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not
far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the
formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on
March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate
of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of
administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after
payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p.
115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared
sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for three reasons:
(1) because the properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the
decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of the
properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of
Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of
the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA
FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on
July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she
too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for
tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980
(or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch

26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of
possession, ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and
required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for
reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already
been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). On
January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision
of the trial court in toto.Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the following legal issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No.
13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540)
were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc. No.
2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of
Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had
inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to
place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and
notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said agreement, the Foundation has
been formed and properties of the estate have already been transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and
recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl,
Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court,
there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and
accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31,
Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled
thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus

far relieves the administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last
paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The
pertinent portions of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio
as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears from the record that despite the
notices posted and the publication of these proceedings as required by law, no other
heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant proceeding. It further
appears that herein Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the late
Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was
established that the late Esteban Javellana died single, without any known issue, and
without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein Administratrix, an
elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him and with whom he had always
been living with [sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole
and legal heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on February 26,
1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate
so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now
RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of
Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the
properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the
court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari.
However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for
the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed
for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court.
Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January
31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition
executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her
mother:

The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of The probate court, in
the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to determine the
proportion or parts to which each distributed is entitled. ... The power to determine
the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of
the court making a just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a
separate and independent action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the
general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further,
expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is
exclusively within the range of the administratrix proceedings and can not properly be
made an independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5
Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1
SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30).
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v.
Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not
prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The
better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand
his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had
already been closed, and not through an independent action,which would be tried by
another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or
intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v.
Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic
v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for
the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a
civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased
to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired
during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffsappellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal
properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court,
we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper,
in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings
No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation
of the project of partition. (p. 378).

However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and terminated
for over three years, the action for annulment of the project of partition was allowed to continue.
Considering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless,
Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted
likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the probate
proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring
Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition
of the estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of
the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he within the exclusive
competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic fraud employed
by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint
in Civil Case No. 13207. It was only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud
was alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct of the
prevailing party which prevented a fair submission of the controversy (Francisco v.
David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents a party from having a trial or presenting
all of his case to the court, or one which operates upon matters pertaining, not to the
judgment itself, but to the manner by which such judgment was procured so much so
that there was no fair submission of the controversy. For instance, if through
fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to withdraw his
defense or was prevented from presenting an available defense or cause of action in
the case wherein the judgment was obtained, such that the aggrieved party was
deprived of his day in court through no fault of his own, the equitable relief against
such judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited
in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil.
248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as
distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which connotes any fraudulent scheme executed
by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his
agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from
presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding consideration is that
the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day
in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and
goes into the jurisdiction of the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45
SCRA 17, 27-29; Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30
SCRA 318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:

1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed by

Celedonia. She admitted in her complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that
the latter would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes and obligations
of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban
Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the
defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the necessary proceeding, cause
the payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do everything else required by
law, and thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her and the plaintiff,
[although Celedonia denied that they agreed to partition the estate, for their
agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis
supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed away by
choice.Besides, she knew that the estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio,
and she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of
hearing of the petition is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec.
3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original petition was
published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197,
Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for
the settlement of the estate was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong
Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record).
The publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole
world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she
had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same. As pointed out by the probate
court in its order of October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months after
Celedonia Solivio was declared as the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as
required by law, despite which the present movant only came to court now, then she
is guilty of laches for sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a petition for relief from
judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court
and proceeding was in rem no subsequent errors or irregularities are available on
collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)

Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on
his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that
because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's
nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been selfdefeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirshipif she stated in her petition that Concordia
was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's
own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of
the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National
Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d
1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed by any
"interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not
preclude Concordia from filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva
troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side.
The reserva troncalprovision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)the ascendant who
inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)
relatives within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and
belonging to the line from which the property came.
3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without
issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by
Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban,
Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited
the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor
of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side.

The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited
it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a
descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution
of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within
the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject
estate 'without distinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship
by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate.
(p. 57, Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation
in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an
agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order
dated April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and
movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the
decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for
(sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance
in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda.
de Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his
mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is
conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80

Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v.
Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986,
146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not even
testify in the case, although she could have done so by deposition if she were supposedly
indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively
participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but
he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to give all, but only one-half, of her
share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was established and duly
registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following
principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such
deserving students as the Board of Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least
one scholar each to study at West Visayas State College, and the University of the
Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements Redemptorist
Community for a deserving student who has the religious vocation to become a
priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the advancement
and enrichment of the various fields of educational endeavors, especially in literary
arts. Scholarships provided for by this foundation may be named after its benevolent
benefactors as a token of gratitude for their contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine
community needs and be able to alleviate partially or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the SolivioJavellana mausoleum at Christ the King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the
Javellana Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of appreciation for
the contribution of the estate of the late Esteban S. Javellana which has made this
foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs and those of
his mother, Gregorian masses or their equivalents will be offered every February and
October, and Requiem masses every February 25th and October llth, their death
anniversaries, as part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and financial aids
or loans from whatever source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income
thereof and pay or apply only the income or such part thereof as shall be determined
by the Trustees for such endeavors as may be necessary to carry out the objectives
of the Foundation.

7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage, pledge,

exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted
by law, in real and personal property of every kind and description or any interest
herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the
accomplishments of any of the purposes herein enumerated or which shall at any
time appear conducive to the protection or benefit of the corporation, including the
exercise of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon the corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines in general, and upon domestic
corporation of like nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its eight Esteban
Javellana scholars graduated in 1986, one (1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and
two (2) from WVSU graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude and the other was
a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for being the most outstanding student
teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay High School,
the site of which was donated by the Foundation. The School has been selected as
the Pilot Barangay High School for Region VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be ordained
this year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City.
The Foundation likewise is a member of the Redemptorist Association that gives
yearly donations to help poor students who want to become Redemptorist priests or
brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban Javellana
Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multi-purpose
Center at the West Visayas State University for teachers' and students' use, and has
likewise contributed to religious civic and cultural fund-raising drives, amongst
other's. (p. 10, Rollo)
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is
obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban
Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement between
her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the
"Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private
respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to
constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes

set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court
an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the
proceedings therein.
SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST

SOLIVIO vs. CA
February 12, 1990
FACTS:
Celedonia, maternal aunt of the deceased, was declared as the sole heir. 4 months later, Concordia,
sister of the deceaseds father file a MFR claiming that
she too was an heir of the deceased. Instead of appealing, Concordia sued Celedonia for partition,
recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The suit was initiated while the probate
proceedings were still
pending. Branch 26 granted Concordias prayers.

HELD:
Branch 26 was incorrect in taking cognizance of the case because it was the probate court that had
the exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. It is the
order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto
that brings to a close the intestate proceedings.
The order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate did not toll the end of the proceedings.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedents estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal
court.
G.R. No. L-10701

January 16, 1959

MARIA CANO, applicant-appellee,

vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, EUSTAQUIA GUERRERO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
JOSE FERNANDEZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Ramon C. Fernandez for appellants.
Jose B. Dealca for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in Land Registration Case No. 12, G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 2835, the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon decreed the registration of Lots Nos. 1798
and 1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre, under the following terms and conditions:
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the notices have been duly published and
posted as required by law, and that the title of the applicant to the above-mentioned two
parcels of land is registrable in law, it is hereby adjudged and decreed, and with reaffirmation
of the order of general default, that the two parcels of land described in plan SWO-24152,
known as Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Cadastral Survey of Juban, with their
improvements, be registered in the name of Maria Cano, Filipina, 71 years of age, widow
and resident of Juban, province of Sorsogon, with the understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall
be subject to the right of reservation in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of
the Civil code. After this decision shall have become final for lack of appeal therefrom within
the 30-day period from its promulgation, let the corresponding decree issue.
So ordered. (Rec. App. pp. 18-19)
The decision having become final, the decree and the Certificate of Title (No. 0-20) were issued in
the name of Maria Cano, subject to reserva troncal in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero. In October 1955,
counsel for the reserve (reservatorio) Guerrero filed a motion with the Cadastral Court, alleging the
death of the original registered owner and reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955, and
praying that the original Certificate of Title be ordered cancelled and a new one issued in favor of
movant Eustaquia Guerrero; and that the Sheriff be ordered to place her in possession of the
property. The motion was opposed by Jose and Teotimo Fernandez, sons of thereservista Maria
Cano, who contended that the application and operation of the reserva troncal should be ventilated
in an ordinary contentious proceeding, and that the Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to
grant the motion.
In view of the recorded reserva in favor of the appellee, as expressly noted in the final decree of
registration, the lower court granted the petition for the issuance of a new certificate, for the reason
that the death of the reservistavested the ownership of the property in the petitioner as the
sole reservatorio troncal.
The oppositors, heirs of the reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the order, insisting that the
ownership of the reservatorio can not be decreed in a mere proceeding under sec. 112 of Act 496,
but requires a judicial administration proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as

the reservatorio entitled to the reservable property, are to be declared. In this connection, appellants
argue that the reversion in favor of the reservatorio requires the declaration of the existence of the
following facts:
(1) The property was received by a descendant by gratuitous title from an ascendant or from
a brother or sister;
(2) Said descendant dies without issue;
(3) The property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and
(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree belonging the line from which said
property came. (Appellants' Brief, p. 8)
We find the appeal untenable. The requisites enumerated by appellants have already been declared
to exist by the decree of registration wherein the rights of the appellee as reservatario troncal were
expressly recognized:
From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of facts, it is evident that Lot No. 1799 was
acquired by the Appellant Maria Cano by inheritance from her deceased daughter, Lourdes
Guerrero who, in turn, inherited the same from her father Evaristo Guerrero and, hence, falls
squarely under the provisions of Article 891 of the Civil Code; and that each and everyone of
the private oppositors are within the third degree of consaguinity of the decedent Evaristo
Guerrero, and who belonging to the same line from which the property came.
It appears however, from the agreed stipulation of facts that with the exception of Eustaquia
Guerrero, who is the only living daughter of the decedent Evaristo Guerrero, by his former
marriage, all the other oppositors are grandchildren of the said Evaristo Guerrero by his
former marriages. Eustaquia Guerrero, being the nearest of kin, excludes all the other
private oppositors, whose decree of relationship to the decedent is remoter (Article 962, Civil
Code; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 62 Phil., 279). (Rec. App. pp. 16-17)
This decree having become final, all persons (appellees included) are bared thereby from contesting
the existence of the constituent elements of the reserva. The only requisites for the passing of the
title from thereservista to the appellee are: (1) the death of the reservista; and (2) the fact that
the reservatario has survived the reservista. Both facts are admitted, and their existence is nowhere
questioned.
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the assumption that
the reservatario will succeed in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is not
true. The reservatario is not thereservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property
part of the reservista's estate; the reservatarioreceives the property as a conditional heir of the
descendant ( prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed
that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoined
no more than a life interest in the reservable property.

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest
to theprepositus (the appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the
owner of the reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of
the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its acquisition by
the reservatario may be entered in the property records without necessity of estate proceedings,
since the basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled that the reservable
property can not be transmitted by a reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa,(like
appellants herein) so long as a reservatario within the third degree from the prepositus and
belonging to the line whence the property came, is in existence when the reservista dies.
Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character of the property,
without determining the identity of the reservatario (as in the case of Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63
Phil., 279) or where several reservatarios dispute the property among themselves, further
proceedings would be unavoidable. But this is not the case. The rights of the reservataria Eustaquia
Guerrero have been expressly recognized, and it is nowhere claimed that there are
other reservatarios of equal or nearer degree. It is thus apparent that the heirs of the reservista are
merely endeavoring to prolong their enjoyment of the reservable property to the detriment of the
party lawfully entitled thereto.
We find no error in the order appealed from and therefore, the same is affirmed with costs against
appellants in both instances. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977

IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA DE
LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la
Torre, respondents.
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.
Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.

MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the complaint of
petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs. Susana de la Torre,
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre"
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio he sired
three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua. When Patricia S.
Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom
he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any
issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and
his son Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias
Chua of his first marriage. In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated
January 15, 1931 1 adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of
P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot No. 399 in
favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze Frias chua;
and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue of said adjudication,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28, 1932 was issued by the Register of

Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No.
399.

On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without any issue.
After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No.
399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of
heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name. Then
on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the
descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A, the
petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and dominador and Remedios Chua, the
supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the first marriage filed the
complaint a quo 3 (subseqently segregated as a distinct suit and docketed as Civil Case No. 7839-A) on
May 11, 1966 before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V, praying that
the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to
Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declaredas a reservable property for the reason that
the lot in questionn was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code, Private
respondent as administratrix of the estate of individually the complaint of petitioners 4
On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioner.
Hence this instant.
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendat, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line
from which said property came.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a reservable
character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a
descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said
descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by
operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which said property came. 5 In the case before Us, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as
borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died
withour leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother,
Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third
degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose
legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit of reserva troncal
whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias
Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent Court said:

It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in question was
not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua gratuitously but for a
consideration, namely, that the legatees were to pay the interest and cost and other
fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of this Court. As such it is undeniable that the
lot in question is not subject tot a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil
Code, and as such the plaintiff's complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in question is not
subject to areserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It is, As explained by Manresa
which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The transmission is
gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not
whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that
the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without
imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives
or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, 6 "the essential thing is
that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the
transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to
Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of
a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate
Court in Intestate Proceeding No. 4816 which estates in express terms;
2. Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la Torre, viuda, mayor
de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad, todos residente de San
Enrique, Negros Occidental, I.F.,como herederos del finado Jose Frias Chua Choo,
estas propiadades:
14483
La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de la Carlota, Negros
Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados y cubierto por el Certificado de Titulo
No. 11759, en partes equales pro-indiviso; por con la obligscion de pagar a las
Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas
gastos resultantes del asunto civil No. 5300de este jusgado
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed
upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the deceased Jose Frias
Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding No.4816
dated January 15, 1931. As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any
condition imposed by the deceased himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, itg is
gratuitous. it does not matter if later the court orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias
Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20. This does not change the
gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. This being the case the lot in question is
subject to reserva troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.
It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to the respondent
heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in their project of partition based on the last will and

testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that the supposed Last Will and Testament of
Jose Frias Chua was never probated. The fact that the will was not probated was admitted in
paragraph 6 of the respondents' answer. 7 There is nothing mentioned in the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 7839 A which is the subject of the present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of
the trial court in the Testate Estate Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private respondent's brief, that the Last
Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua has ever been probated. With the foregoing, it is easy to deduce
that if the Last Will and Testament has in fact been probated there would have been no need for the
testamentary heirs to prepare a project of partition among themselves. The very will itself could be made
the basis for the adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their project of partition with Juanito Frias
Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance as a sone of the deceased Jose Frias Chua by the latter's
second marriage.

According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any issue. After his
death his mother Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso share of Lot 399.
This was, however, subject to the condition that the property was reservable in character under Art.
891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within the third degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the
property came. These relatives are the petitioner herein.
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399 which
originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed when it was filed on May 11, 1966.
We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners herein are claiming as reservees
did not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died in March 1966. When the
petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were
very much in time to do so.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The petitioners
Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared owners of 1/2 undivided
portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is hereby ordered to cancel.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued in the name of Consolacion de la
Torre and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided
portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4
undivided portion, of said lot. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST

Chua v. CFI
Facts:
Jose Frias Chua had 2 marriages. First with Patricia, he had 3 children- Ignacio, Manuel and
Lorenzo. When Patriciadied, he married Consolacion de la Torre and had one child- Juanito Frias
Chua. Jose Frias Chua died intestate.After the intestate proceeding the court adjudicated half of lot
in question to Consolacion and the other half totheir only son, Juanito. The two sons in the first
marriage, Lorenzo and Ignacio, received P3k and P1550respectively. (Manuel already died).Juanito
also died intestate without issue. Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship
adjudicating inher favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito in the lot in question. When dela
Torre died, Ignacio and theheirs of Lorenzo filed a complaint praying that the one-half portion of the
Lot be declared as a reservable propertyfor the reason that the lot in question was subject to
reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 NCC.Lower court dismissed complaint
.Issue: WON property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias
Chua gratuitously(as first requisite of Reserva Troncal).
Held:
Yes
Ratio: In order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the following requisites
must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or from a
brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the
property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came.
All of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of
the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died without leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2
share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias
Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua
and Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo
Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein
According to Manresa, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be
not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or
by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the
recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return. "the essential
thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring
from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property
in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death of his father JoseFrias
Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous. As long as the
transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself
and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous.

G.R. No. 176422

March 20, 2013

MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA,

DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA,
JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.

JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS,
ROSA BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS
SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOSCABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO,
PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M. MENDOZA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to
the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its
being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant. 1
The Facts
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan:
(1) Lot 1681-B, with an area of 7,749 square meters;2 (2) Lot 1684, with an area of 5,667 sq m;3 and
(3) Lot No. 1646-B, with an area of 880 sq m.4 Lot Nos. 1681-B and 1684 are presently in the name
of respondent Julia Delos Santos5(respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the
name of respondent but co-owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from
petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga).
Placido and Dominga had four children: Antonio, Exequiel, married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin.
Petitioners Maria, Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and Ricardo are the children of Antonio.
Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes, Elvira and Fortunato, on the other hand, are Valentins children.
Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Domingas properties that were
subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiels death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonors death, her share went
to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed that after Gregorias
death, respondent, who is Leonors sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole
surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been
reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the
Civil Code on reserva troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did not originate from
petitioners familial line and were not originally owned by Placido and Dominga. According to
respondent, the properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos in
1931. It appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of the properties. 6
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6, found merit in petitioners claim and
granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and
Reconveyance. In its Decision dated November 4, 2002, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to reconvey the three (3) parcels of land
subject of this action in the name of the plaintiffs enumerated in the complaint including
intervenor Maria Cecilia M. Mendoza except one-half of the property described in the old
title, TCT No. T-124852(M) which belongs to Victorina Pantaleon;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the titles in the name of Julia
Policarpio, TCT No. T-149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-149035(M) and reconvey the same to
the enumerated plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorneys fees and damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the
complaint filed by petitioners. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision dated November 16, 2006
provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br.
6, Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Third Amended
Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same per Resolution 9 dated
January 17, 2007.
In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish that Placido and
Dominga owned the properties in dispute.10 The CA also ruled that even assuming that Placido and
Dominga previously owned the properties, it still cannot be subject to reserva troncal as neither
Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease Exequiel. 11
Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:
A.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE
FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS
MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF
THE LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.12

Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA, contending that it is sufficient that the properties
came from the paternal line of Gregoria for it to be subject to reserva troncal. They also claim the
properties in representation of their own predecessors, Antonio and Valentin, who were the brothers
of Exequiel.13
Ruling of the Court
This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The general rule in
this regard is that it should raise only questions of law. There are, however, admitted exceptions to
this rule, one of which is when the CAs findings are contrary to those of the trial court. 14 This being
the case in the petition at hand, the Court must now look into the differing findings and conclusion of
the RTC and the CA on the two issues that arise one, whether the properties in dispute are
reservable properties and two, whether petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these properties.
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous
title, whether by inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the
prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other
ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from the
reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within the third degree from which
the property came.15
The lineal character of the
reservable property is reckoned
from the ascendant from whom the
prepositus received the property by
gratuitous title
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva troncal is not applicable.

The fallacy in the CAs resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous premise that Placido is the
ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil Code. From thence, it sought to trace the origin of
the subject properties back to Placido and Dominga, determine whether Exequiel predeceased
Placido and whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the
prepositus by operation of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who
belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property
should be reserved by the reservor.16
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from
Exequiels as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria
inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in
determining the lineal character of the property.17 It was also immaterial for the CA to determine
whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.
What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom the
properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who received
the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.

Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the
descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is
gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being
repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by
Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as
inheritance.
Ascendants, descendants and
collateral relatives under Article
964 of the Civil Code
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also
known as the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregorias
ascendant; rather, she is Gregorias collateral relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants,
and those who are not ascendants and descendants but come from a common ancestor, viz:
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral. A direct line is
that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.
1wphi1

A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants
and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor. (Emphasis and italics ours)
Gregorias ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents, great-grandparents
and so on. On the other hand, Gregorias descendants, if she had one, would be her children,
grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Not being Gregorias ascendants, both petitioners and Julia,
therefore, are her collateral relatives. In determining the collateral line of relationship, ascent is made
to the common ancestor and then descent to the relative from whom the computation is made. In the
case of Julias collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to her
mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is, Julia and Leonors parents
(second line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregorias
collateral relative within the third degree and not her ascendant.
First cousins of the
descendant/prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within
the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree
should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent.19 It is Gregoria in this case.
Petitioners are Gregorias fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the
prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios. 20

They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891
grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the
reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of
the prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the
brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the third degree. 21 In Florentino v.
Florentino,22 the Court stated:
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the
descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the
property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes
that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming
same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree
belong to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in
Article 811 now Article 891 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of the
designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never
be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third
degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the
reservable property came. x x x.23 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are reservable in character,
petitioners cannot benefit from reserva troncal. First, because Julia, who now holds the properties in
dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and second,
because petitioners are not Gregorias relatives within the third degree. Hence, the CAs disposition
that the complaint filed with the RTC should be dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If at all, what
should apply in the distribution of Gregorias estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code,
which provide:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to determine the proper distribution of
Gregorias estate at this point as the cause of action relied upon by petitioners in their complaint filed
with the RTC is based solely on reserva troncal. Further, any determination would necessarily entail
reception of evidence on Gregorias entire estate and the heirs entitled thereto, which is best
accomplished in an action filed specifically for that purpose.

A reservista acquires ownership of

the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is
extinguished
Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in the RTCs disposition of the case. In
upholding the right of petitioners over the properties, the RTC ordered the reconveyance of the
properties to petitioners and the transfer of the titles in their names. What the RTC should have
done, assuming for arguments sake that reserva troncal is applicable, is have the reservable nature
of the property registered on respondents titles. In fact, respondent, as reservista, has the duty to
reserve and to annotate the reservable character of the property on the title. 24 In reserva troncal, the
reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether by the latters wish or by operation of law,
acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes
of ownership belong to him exclusively.25
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee
gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferees rights are revoked
upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible
when the reservees predecease the reservor.26(Citations omitted)
It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished, 27 that a reservatario becomes, by operation
of law, the owner of the reservable property.28 In any event, the foregoing discussion does not detract
from the fact that petitioners are not entitled to a reservation of the properties in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16, 2006 and Resolution
dated January 17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar as it dismissed the
Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are AFFIRMED. This Decision is without
prejudice to any civil action that the heirs of Gregoria
Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the determination of ownership of the
properties in question.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST

Mendoza v Delos Santos

GR No 176422, March 20, 2013

MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA,

DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA,
JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS,
ROSA BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS
SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT,
MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P.
DELOS SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M. MENDOZA, Respondents.

FACTS:
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan
are presently in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the
other hand, is also in the name of respondent but co- owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought onehalf of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga).
Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Domingas properties that were
subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiels death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonors death, her share went
to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed that after Gregorias
death, respondent, who is Leonors sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole
surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have been
reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the
Civil Code on reserva troncal.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC: granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT
and Reconveyance.
(2) CA: reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners.
CA also denied their motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:

A. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT

PROPERTIES ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE
FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS
MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW
ON RESERVA TRONCAL.

APPLICABLE LAW:

The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)

RULING:
No, CA is correct.
I. Reserva troncal is not applicable.
Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of
Article 891 of the Civil Code
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to
the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its
being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from
Exequiels as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria
inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in
determining the lineal character of the property. It was also immaterial for the CA to determine
whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.
What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom the
properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who received
the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.

Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or
prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by
gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious,
what was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel
(ascendant). After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as
inheritance.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also
known as the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregorias
ascendant; rather, she is Gregorias collateral relative.

II. Petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third
degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be
reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at the end of the line from which the property came
and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are
Gregorias fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891
grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the
reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of
the prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the
brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the third degree.