Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, 83 Phil.

179 (1949)
Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1949/mar1949/gr_l-2662_1949.html
Digest:
FACTS: Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military
Commission, headed by Major General Rafael Jalandoni, due to the atrocities that
were done against non combatant civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial
was in pursuant to Executive Order No. 68 which established the National War
Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused
war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the
same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact that the
Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations
Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal charges
because it has no laws to base on, national or international.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?
HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take
cognizance of the case at bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision
that states the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the nation. The Hague Convention and other similar conventions whose principles
are generally accepted are hence considered as part of the law of the land.

Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113 (1945)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1945/sep1945/gr_l-5_1945.html
Digest:
FACTS: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese
occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the
Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue
hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas
MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of
the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the
courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under
the Japanese).
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese
occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2.
Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which
he declared that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in
the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without
legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control
invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3.
And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthurs proclamation,
those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.
HELD: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de
facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de
facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from
the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended
or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for the
existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or
do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they
were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out
with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase
processes of any other government and whether or not he intended it to annul all
other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military
occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings
of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory
has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs intention to refer to
judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.

A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute ought never to be

construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.
Another is that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction,
or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to
presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless
required by clear and unequivocal words.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the
dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be
construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase processes
of any other governments.
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are
continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him.
The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as
required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, law once established
continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED
MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of course, the new sovereign by
legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the
Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan,
as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have
continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising
the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring
jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1949)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1949/jul1949/gr_l-2855_1949.html
Digest:
FACTS: Boris Mejoff was a Russian citizen who was arrested for being suspected as a
Japanese spy after the Philippine liberation. It was found out that he illegally entered
the Philippines in 1944. He was without inspection and admission by the
immigration officials at a designated port of entry. He was then ordered to be
deported to Russia on the first available transportation to said country. But Russian
ships refused to take him due to their alleged lack of authority to do so. He was then
transferred to the Bilibid Prison and was kept in detention as the Commissioner of
Immigration believes it is of best interest to detain the unwanted alien while
arrangements for his deportation are being made. Mejoff contends that he was
legally brought to the Philippines by the then Japanese forces and he may not now
be deported. He also contends that the statutory period to deport him has long
lapsed and that we cannot detain him for an unreasonable period of time pursuant
to the Universal Declaration on Human rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mejoff shall remain in detention?
HELD: Yes. The government has the power and the authority to eject from the
Philippines any and all unwanted aliens. He entered the country illegally in 1944
and was arrested in 1948. Pursuant to Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940 an unwanted alien is subject to deportation within 5 years from arrest. And
he may be held for a reasonable period of time (depending on the circumstances)
while arrangements are being held for his deportation. There is no allegation
however as to the length of time that he has been detained. Hence, the same
cannot be construed as unreasonable. Further, there is no indication that the
statutory period to deport Mejoff had lapsed.

Baer vs. Tizon 57 SCRA 1 (May 1974)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/may1974/gr_l_24294_1974.html
Digest:
FACTS: Respondent Edgardo Gener, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for injunction with
the Court of First Instance of Bataan against petitioner, Donald Baer, Commander of
the United States Naval Base in Olongapo. He alleged that he was engaged in the
business of logging and that the American Naval Base authorities stopped his
logging operations. He prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
petitioner from interfering with his logging operations. A restraining order was
issued by respondent Judge Counsel for petitioner, upon instructions of the
American Ambassador to the Philippines, entered their appearance for the purpose
of contesting the jurisdiction of respondent Judge on the ground that the suit was
one against a foreign sovereign without its consent.
ISSUE: Whether the contention of the petitioner that the respondent judge acquires
no jurisdiction on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign
without its consent.
HELD: YES.
The contention of the petitioner is tenable. The writ of certiorari prayed for is
granted, nullifying and setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction. The
invocation of the doctrine of immunity from suit of a foreign state withoutits consent
is appropriate. In the case of Coleman v.Tennessee, it was explicitly declared:
It is well settled that a foreignarmy, permitted to marchthrough a friendly country
or tobe stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt
fromthe civil and criminaljurisdiction of the place."
In the case of Raquiza v. Bradford, it was held that:
Accuracy demands the clarification that after the conclusion of the PhilippineAmerican Military Bases Agreement, the treaty provisions should control on such
matter, the assumption being that there was a manifestation of the submission to
jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power whenever appropriate.
This is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without
the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign
government without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the
lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country.
In the case of Parreno v. McGranery, the court ruled that:
"It is a widely accepted principle of international law,which is made a part of the
lawof the land (Article II, Section 3of the Constitution), that aforeign state may not

bebrought to suit before thecourts of another state or itsown courts without its
consent."
The doctrine of state immunity is notlimited to cases which would result in
apecuniary charge against the sovereign orwould require the doing of an affirmative
actby it. Prevention of a sovereign from doing anaffirmative act pertaining directly
andimmediately to the most important publicfunction of any government - the
defense of the state - is equally as untenable as requiringit to do an affirmative act."

Yamashita vs. Styer 75 Phil 563

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1945/dec1945/gr_l-129_1945.html
Digest:
FACTS:
1. Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Japanese army in the Philippines
during World War 2. He was charged before the American military commission for
war crimes.
2. He filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Gen. Styer to
reinstate his status as prisoner of war from being accused as a war criminal.
Petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of the military tribunal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the military tribunal has jurisdiction
HELD: YES.
1. The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with an act of
Congress sanctioning the creation of such tribunals.
2. The laws of war imposes upon a commander the duty to take any appropriate
measures within his powers to control the troops under his command to prevent
acts which constitute violation of the laws of war. Hence, petitioner could be
legitimately charged with personal responsibility arising from his failure to take such
measure. In this regard the SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague Convention No. IV of
1907, as well as Art. 19 of Hague Convention No. X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva
Convention among others.
3. Habeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner merely sought for restoration to
his former status as prisoner of war and not a discharge from confinement. This is a
matter of military measure and not within the jurisdiction of the courts.
4. The petition for prohibition against the respondent will also not life since the
military commission is not made a party respondent in the case. As such, no order
may be issued requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.

Kookooritchkin vs. Solicitor General, 81 Phil 435

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1948/aug1948/gr_l-1812_1948.html
Digest:
FACTS: Appellee filed with the lower court a petition for naturalization,
accompanied with supporting affidavits of two citizens. The petition was finally set
for hearing but it was held on that date because the province was invaded by
Japanese forces and the case remained pending until the records were
destroyed during the military operations for liberation.
The case was declared
reconstituted and the evidence was presented. On the same day resolution was
issued granting the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a Russian citizen or is stateless.
HELD: The appealed resolution is affirmed. After finding in this country economic
security in a remunerative job, establishing a family by marrying a Filipina with
whom he has a son, and enjoying for 25 years the freedoms and blessings of our
democratic way of life, and after showing his resolution to retain the happiness he
found in our political system to the extent of refusing to claim
Russian citizenship even to secure his release from the Japanese and of casting his
lot with that of our people by joining the fortunes and misfortunes of our guerrillas,
it would be beyond comprehension to support that the petitioner could feel any
bond of attachment to the Soviet dictatorship.

Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1979/feb1979/gr_l_49112_1979.html
Digest:
FACTS: Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity
of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early
warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular
early warning devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh,
cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with
blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And
that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning
devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor
oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights
in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside
motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor
vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being
universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and
visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any
motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized
rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways,
will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that
road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or
disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist
who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum
lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think
what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law
enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of
the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power.
That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the
submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has
offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the
Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad
and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief
Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more
or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty was stressed
in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the first leading

decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified
police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and
property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after
independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a preCommonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.
In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v.
Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and
most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the
most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers, extending as Justice
Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public needs. Its scope, ever expanding
to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the
present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the
time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not
intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact
that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to
promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to
invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to
our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point,
Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived
with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . .As a matter of
fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution,
the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted
by the imperative demands of public safety.

Abbas vs. COMELEC 179 SCRA 287 (1989)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/nov1989/gr_89651_1989.html
Digest:
FACTS: On October9,1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest
docketed against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed
senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the COMELEC. The
SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6)
Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from
partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested
parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms
of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought.
To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following
amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) requiring the concurrence of five (5)
members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where
more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall
constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may
adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the
situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of
that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three members who
would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.
HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and
intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC
and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and
legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the
resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and
intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-

Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any
case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET
cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that
no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the
power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest. The charge that the
respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents
referred to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and
principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or inhibition filed by herein
petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Phillip Morris vs. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 576 (1993)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/jul1993/gr_91332_1993.html
Digest:
FACTS: Herein petitioner Philip Morris Inc., is a corporation registered under the laws
of Virginia, USA and the two other petitioners are the affiliates of said corporation all
of which are not doing any business here in the Philippines. They are the registered
owners of the labels Mark VII, Mark Ten and Lark, all are cigarette products. On the
other hand, respondent Fortune Tobacco Corp., is a corporation organized under the
Philippine which manufactures and sells cigarettes using the same brand
name Mark in one of its products. This controversy arose when petitioners
filed a suit against the respondent alleging that the trademark Mark may not be
used by the respondent because such trademark is exclusively owned by it and that
the continuous manufacture and sale of the cigarettes of the same trademark by
the respondent would cause an irreparable injury or damage to it. Pending
the resolution
of
the case
on
its
merits, petitioners prayed
for
the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to preclude the respondent from
performing any of the acts complained of.
On the other hand, for its defense,
respondent contends that since petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines
coupled with the fact that the Director of Patents has not denied their pending
application for registration of its trademark MARK, the grant of preliminary
injunction is premature.
The trial court denied the petitioners prayer
for injunction.
On appeal, the appellate court initially set aside the decision of
the lower, but eventually lifted said injunction. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE: Whether
or
not
Fortune Tobacco
could
be precluded from
manufacturing and selling cigarettes with a trademark MARK similar to that
of petitioner.
HELD: No. A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in
commerce in the Philippines is a prerequisite to the acquisition of ownership over a
trademark or a trade name.
Adoption alone of a trademark would not give
exclusive right thereto. Such right grows out of their actual use. Adoption is not
use. One may make advertisements, issue circulars, give out price lists on certain
goods; but these alone would not give exclusive right of use.
The records show
that the petitioner has never conducted any business in the Philippines.
It has
never promoted its trade name or trademark in the Philippines. It is unknown to
Filipino except the very few who may have noticed it while travelling abroad. It has
never paid a single centavo of tax to the Philippine Government. Under the law, it
has no right to the remedy it seeks. In other words, the petitioner may have the
capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of business activity in the
Philippines but the question whether they have an exclusive right over their symbol
as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on the actual use of their
trademarks in the Philippines. A foreign corporation may have the personality to file

a suit for infringement but it may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to
absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market.

Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion 322 SCRA 160 (2000)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/gr_139465_2000.html
Digest:
FACTS: On January 18, 2000, petitioner was ordered to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
Private respondent states that he must be afforded the right to notice and hearing
as required by our Constitution. He likens an extradition proceeding to a criminal
proceeding and the evaluation stage to a preliminary investigation.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration assailing the mentioned
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process
HELD: No. Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will
call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the
state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are
only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked
by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing
evaluation. As held by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:
An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional
safeguards that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused
from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty.
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in
an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process
safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former.
The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances must begin
with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as
well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action. The
concept of due process is flexible for not all situations calling for procedural
safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.

In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it
is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all
throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due
process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the
degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to
whether procedural protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn
depends on the extent to which an individual will be condemned to suffer grievous
loss.
As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords
an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the
petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request
for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for
extradition. The extraditees right to know is momentarily withheld during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process to accommodate the more compelling
interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be
precipitated by premature information of the basis of the request for his extradition.
No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be
more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government, the
Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power over
matters involving our foreign relations. Needless to state, this balance of interests is
not a static but a moving balance which can be adjusted as the extradition process
moves from the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the execution
stage depending on factors that will come into play. In sum, we rule that the
temporary hold on private respondents privilege of notice and hearing is a soft
restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental
fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United
States. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured
a party.

Mighty Corporation vs. Gallo Winery, 243 SCRA 473 (2004)

Link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/jul2004/gr_154342_2004.html
Digest:
FACTS: On March 12, 1993, respondents sued petitioners in the RTC-Makati for
trademark and trade name infringement and unfair competition, with a prayer for
damages and preliminary injunction.
They claimed that petitioners adopted the Gallo trademark to ride on Gallo
Winerys and Gallo and Ernest & Julio Gallo trademarks established reputation and
popularity, thus causing confusion, deception and mistake on the part of the
purchasing public who had always associated Gallo and Ernest and Julio & Gallo
trademarks with Gallo Winerys wines.
In their answer, petitioners alleged, among other affirmative defenses that:
petitioners Gallo cigarettes and Gallo Winerys wine were totally unrelated products.
To wit:
1.
Gallo Winerys GALLO trademark registration certificates covered wines only,
and not cigarettes;
2.
GALLO cigarettes and GALLO wines were sold through different channels of
trade;
3.
the target market of Gallo Winerys wines was the middle or high-income
bracket while Gallo cigarette buyers were farmers, fishermen, laborers and other
low-income workers;
4.
the dominant feature of the Gallo cigarette was the rooster device with the
manufacturers name clearly indicated as MIGHTY CORPORATION, while in the case
of Gallo Winerys wines, it was the full names of the founders-owners ERNEST &
JULIO GALLO or just their surname GALLO;
On April 21, 1993, the Makati RTC denied, for lack of merit, respondents prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
On August 19, 1993, respondents motion for reconsideration was denied.
On February 20, 1995, the CA likewise dismissed respondents petition for review on
certiorari.
After the trial on the merits, however, the Makati RTC, on November 26, 1998, held
petitioners liable for, permanently enjoined from committing trademark
infringement and unfair competition with respect to the GALLO trademark.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the Makati RTCs decision and subsequently denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether GALLO cigarettes and GALLO wines were identical, similar or related goods
for the reason alone that they were purportedly forms of vice.
HELD:
Wines and cigarettes are not identical, similar, competing or related goods.
In resolving whether goods are related, several factors come into play:
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the business (and its location) to which the goods belong

the class of product to which the good belong
the products quality, quantity, or size, including the nature of the package,
wrapper or container
the nature and cost of the articles
the descriptive properties, physical attributes or essential characteristics with
reference to their form, composition, texture or quality
the purpose of the goods
whether the article is bought for immediate consumption, that is, day-to-day
household items
the field of manufacture
the conditions under which the article is usually purchased and
the articles of the trade through which the goods flow, how they are
distributed, marketed, displayed and sold.

The test of fraudulent simulation is to the likelihood of the deception of some

persons in some measure acquainted with an established design and desirous of
purchasing the commodity with which that design has been associated. The
simulation, in order to be objectionable, must be as appears likely to mislead the
ordinary intelligent buyer who has a need to supply and is familiar with the article
that he seeks to purchase.
The petitioners are not liable for trademark infringement, unfair competition or
damages.